ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN EXTREMISM AND DEMOCRACY

Extreme Right Parties in Scandinavia

Anders Widfeldt

ROUTLEDGE

Extreme Right Parties in Scandinavia

This book provides an up-to-date account of extreme right parties in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. It seeks to explain why these parties have grown in support, and in Denmark and Norway reached positions of direct political influence.

Following an analytical framework, in which explanatory factors on the demand- as well as supply-sides are identified, the book investigates a wide range of possible such factors. The account covers economic conditions, immigration and political trust, as well as the extent of the fascist and Nazi legacy in Scandinavia. Each of the three countries is then subject to an in-depth study. The origins, historical development, ideology, organisation and leadership of the relevant extreme right parties in each country are analysed thoroughly. The analysis draws on party documents and publications, such as Party manifestos, as well as media sources, biographies and academic literature. The main argument of the book is that internal supply-side factors, that is factors within the parties themselves, are indispensable in order to understand variations in the success of extreme right parties. External conditions are not unimportant, but account for very little if the parties do not provide a political package that can tap into the potential demand.

Anders Widfeldt has been a lecturer in Politics at the University of Aberdeen since 1996. He obtained his doctoral degree at Göteborg University in Sweden. Besides right-wing extremism and populism, his research interests also include party membership and party organisations.

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1 A year of many tragedies

Like its predecessor ten years earlier, the year 2011 will be long remembered. But while 2001 could, without too much simplification, be summed up into a single fateful event, the 11 September attacks on the USA, a summary of 2011 is less straightforward. The year contained a long list of momentous, mostly tragic, events. The Green Revolution in Northern Africa and the Middle East led to some regime changes, but also to repressive responses and civil wars. There were several large-scale natural disasters. The global, and not least European, economy was in serious crisis.

To this could be added the events that took place in Norway on Friday, 22 July 2011. At 3.26 p.m. local time, a bomb detonated in central Oslo, next to the so-called government bloc where a number of key ministries are located. Several government buildings were completely destroyed. Eight people, all government officials or civil servants, were killed. The exploding device had been constructed and placed by a 32-year-old Norwegian man named Anders Behring Breivik. By the time of the explosion, Breivik was driving towards Tyrifjorden, a lake some 38 kilometres north-west of Oslo.

Tyrifjorden contains a 26-acre (10.6 *hektar*) island named Utøya. Since 1950, Utøya has been owned by *Arbeiderpartiets Ungdomsfylking* (AUF), the youth organisation of the Norwegian Labour Party. It is used for a variety of activities, the most important of which is the annual AUF summer camp, which is very popular among AUF's 9,000 members. In 2011, the camp was held between 19 and 24 July, with around 550 participants. It was Breivik's next target.

Transports to and from Utøya took place with a small shuttle ferry. The ferry was not open to the public, but Breivik was able to get on board by posing as a policeman. He had brought a bag containing firearms, including a semi-automatic rifle, and large amounts of ammunition. Shortly after having reached the island, he started shooting people around him, apparently at random. Panic ensued among the mostly youthful and completely unprepared camp participants. The confusion was exacerbated by Breivik's spoken assurances that he was from the police, and his clothes, which looked like some kind of uniform.

Some tried to escape into sheds, buildings and natural hiding places on the partly wooded island. Others attempted to swim away. A few managed to reach the mainland despite being shot at, others were rescued by people in boats, but

the water was cold and many were forced to return, in some cases to their death. One drowned. There were several miraculous escapes and rescues, but Breivik was able to continue shooting more or less undisturbed for over an hour. When police arrived, at 6.26 p.m., he gave himself up without resistance. By that time, 69 persons had lost their lives, or were fatally wounded. Together with those killed by the bomb blast in Oslo, the eventual death toll was 77.

Breivik claimed to be a member of the international Christian "Knights Templar" order, fighting a war against Marxism and multiculturalism. Before committing the 22 July atrocities, he had mounted a 1,518-page document on the Internet. Titled "2083. A European Declaration of Independence", it is hardly a coherent piece, but rather a dossier consisting of texts copied from other sources, bomb-making instructions, an account of Breivik's own life, a fairly detailed summary of his political ideas plus other mixed content.[1]

The events of 22 July made headlines across the whole world. The reason is obvious – even though there had been several cases of mass shootings across the world in preceding years, the number of casualties was extremely high in any comparison. In addition, while other shootings have tended to be driven by personal grievances and mental problems, Breivik's motive was explicitly political. Quite naturally, Breivik's mental health has been questioned. Whether he is insane in a clinical sense is not straightforward, however. Indeed, two different expert assessments of his mental status during the legal process reached diametrically opposing conclusions. In the end, however, he was declared fit for a custodial sentence.

Thus, although the motivation behind his acts may never be fully explained, Anders Behring Breivik cannot easily be dismissed as just a madman. To be sure, his (unsuccessful) insistence on speaking from a podium, and wearing his "Knights Templar" uniform during the initial court hearings came across as bizarre. So was his interrupted attempt to make a declaration to other radical nationalists when he was sentenced. But besides the idiosyncrasies, Breivik is also a political extremist. His ideas are extreme, but by no means unique. They are quite widespread on the Internet, and can even be found in organisations calling themselves parties. Where Breivik differs from most other extremists is that he put these ideas into brutal practice.[2]

The international reaction was one of disbelief. To a significant extent of course, this was due to the cruelty of Breivik's actions, and the powerful witness accounts from Utøya. In addition, however, many asked how something like this could happen in a country like Norway, known for its prosperity and stability. More or less immediately it was revealed that Breivik was a former member of *Fremskrittspartiet*, at the time the second biggest party in the Norwegian parliament. *Fremskrittspartiet* is by no means a party associated with violence, but anti-establishment rhetoric and criticism against immigration are significant parts of its agenda.

Norway was not the only Scandinavian country to hit the headlines for reasons linked to far right politics in the early 2010s. In neighbouring Sweden, *Sverigedemokraterna* entered parliament some ten months before Breivik's terrorist attacks. Emerging out of an anti-immigration subculture in the 1980s, *Sverigedemokraterna*

was for many years little more than a fringe phenomenon, and its transformation into an electoral force strong enough to enter parliament in September 2010 was remarkable. In Denmark, 2011 was not one of *Dansk Folkeparti*'s best years. For the first time it registered a loss in a parliamentary election, and lost a position of political influence it had occupied for almost ten years. The party could, nevertheless, look back on a period during which it had arguably been more successful than any comparable party in Europe. Formed in 1995, *Dansk Folkeparti* adopted a platform with strong nationalism, welfare chauvinism and Euroscepticism as key elements. Between 2001 and 2011, the party provided parliamentary support for a centre-right minority government. From this position, it was able to exert considerable influence on government policy, notably on immigration.

Thus, while Anders Behring Breivik is an extreme case, far/extreme right ideas and their political expressions were by the early 2010s an established part of everyday political life in Scandinavia. To international observers this may come as a surprise. The Scandinavian region and its constituent countries have a long-standing reputation as consensual and stable democracies, with low levels of societal and political conflict. Not the kind of climate one would normally associate with extreme right politics.

Yet anti-establishment parties have a long history in Scandinavia. In Denmark and Norway populist parties broke through in the early 1970s. The fortunes of these parties that emerged in the 1970s would fluctuate, but they did not disappear. They all still exist, not in their original form but under new names or as successor parties: *Fremskrittspartiet* and *Dansk Folkeparti*.

Whether these parties are classifiable as extreme right is not entirely straightforward. Immigration was not originally part of their agenda, but is now a key part of their message. Thus, even though there is quite an extensive discussion about definitions and classifications, the majority view in the academic literature is that the three parties in question are members of the extreme/far/radical/populist right party family. The case of *Sverigedemokraterna* is more clear-cut, with the only qualification that it was for many years so small that it received little attention in the comparative literature.

There is by no means a shortage of academic texts about extreme right parties in the Scandinavian countries. The tendency, however, has been to treat the different countries one by one. In some cases these single-country accounts are highly accomplished, theoretically as well as empirically, but the broader comparative perspective has been lacking. There are also examples of Denmark and Norway being treated together, but Sweden left out.[3] For many years this made sense, as the extreme right in Sweden was insignificant at the time when the work in question was written. On the other hand, it could be seen as a weakness that attention was only given to the most successful cases.

Other studies nominally deal with Scandinavia as a whole, but with heavy emphasis on Denmark and Norway, with the apparent justification that those two countries contain the most successful extreme right parties.[4] A comprehensive, theoretically informed empirical treatment of the Scandinavian region as a whole has been lacking. It is the aim of this book to fill that void – at least in part. The

following account will not deal with the whole of what in Danish, Norwegian and Swedish is called *Norden*. It will focus on Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Finland and Iceland will thus be left out, as will the semi-autonomous regions/islands of Greenland, Faroe Islands and Åland.

For many years the three countries studied in this book comprised something of a textbook collection of cases suitable for comparative analysis. Denmark, Norway and Sweden are not identical but have much in common, in terms of history, culture, geography and language. Politically they have, sometimes together with Finland and Iceland, been described in terms of a "Nordic model", with stability and consensus as the key characteristics.[5] Even if the empirical support for the existence of such a model is at best questionable, it has often served as a point of reference in many studies.[6] Above all, there were variations among the three countries in terms of extreme right success. Extreme right parties were strong in Denmark and Norway but weak in Sweden. In recent years, this picture has changed. *Sverigedemokraterna* is still comparatively small, but everything suggests that the party is established at the parliamentary level for the foreseeable future.

Still, these recent developments have hardly meant the destruction of a delicate research model. Rather, the fact that fortunes for extreme right parties have fluctuated over time in all the three studied countries is an eminently promising setting for comparative analysis. If the findings disappoint, it is because of the quality of the research, not empirical quirks in the selected cases.

The book is structured as follows. The next chapter deals with some key conceptual and terminological issues. It will be argued that extreme right is, after all, a justifiable name of the party family we are dealing with. Other relevant concepts, such as populism, racism and xenophobia will also be discussed. Chapter 3 sets out the analytical framework. Chapters 4–8 are the empirical applications of the explanatory factors identified in Chapter 3.

Notes

1 The "Manifesto" was soon taken down from its original Internet location, but copies have circulated quite widely on the Internet and should, in the foreseeable future, be easy to find via search engines.
2 This summary account of the events of 22 July 2011 and their aftermath is based on media reports available on the Internet. It is not complete, and may not be accurate in detail, although every effort has been made to avoid factual errors.
3 E.g. Bjørklund and Andersen 2002.
4 E.g. Kitschelt 1997, Ch. 4; Andersen and Bjørklund 2000; Ignazi 2003, Ch. 8.
5 E.g. Hilson 2008.
6 E.g. Elder *et al.* 1988; Arter 2008.

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2 A rummage in the conceptual jungle

In the academic literature, there seems to be widespread agreement about the existence of an identifiable family of parties far away to the right. There also seems to be a relatively broad – if not exact – understanding of who the members of this family are. The name and definition of the family, however, have caused considerable disagreement.

Often, the labels used denote a kind of ideological exceptionalism, for example "extreme right" or "far right".[1] A popular alternative is "radical right", sometimes with the specification "new".[2] Sometimes the point of departure is a particular ingredient in the party ideology rather than the ideology as a whole, leading to labels such as "anti-immigrant" or "anti-immigration".[3] Many writers emphasise the presence of populism, and use labels accordingly, usually with some form of further specification.[4] Labels implying links to fascism or Nazism are less common than they used to be, but still exist in some cases.[5]

In some cases the chosen denominations are used rather loosely, in others they are based on a careful conceptual discussion. An example of the latter is Cas Mudde, who in a book from 2000 argues that "extreme right" is the most appropriate (or least inappropriate) designation.[6] Seven years later, however, Mudde advocates the label "populist radical right", after another detailed discussion, which also ends in a different definition of the party family.[7]

These mentioned examples of labels by no means constitute an exhaustive list, but they do give an idea of the rather confused overall state of affairs. If we move on to different suggestions of whether, and how, to subclassify the party family in question, the confusion increases even more. This alone is reason for devoting some attention to the label chosen here, "extreme right", and why it has been chosen. Are extreme right parties really extreme, and are they really to the right? The chapter will also provide a working definition of extreme right parties.

In addition, however, the kind of party discussed in this book more or less inevitably tends to be associated with concepts that are normatively loaded, and often rejected by the parties themselves. Extreme right parties do not like being called extreme, and they often oppose being classified as right-wing. They usually deny being populist. They angrily deny any accusations of racism or xenophobia – and they vehemently reject having any links to fascism or Nazism.

Even if the purpose is not to once and for all determine the extent to which each of these labels are applicable to the parties discussed in this book, it makes sense to have some understanding of their meaning before we start using them.

Extreme, right – and extreme right

The word "**extreme**", with derivations, has a negative ring to it. Very few persons or groups would subscribe to being extremist. Yet it is quite commonly used, often in an attempt to tarnish the object. This normative burden makes extremism difficult to use as a concept. The fact that it can have at least two analytical meanings further contributes to the problem. According to the first meaning, extremism means hostility to the established political system. What it means to be anti-system of course depends on the system, but in a democratic context, extremism would mean the rejection of democracy, and the ambition to replace it with an alternative system. According to the so-called extremism-theoretical school of thought, right-wing and left-wing extremism have much in common, as they both seek to overthrow the democratic system.[8] There may well be important differences between the respective alternatives that they seek to introduce, but their hostile attitude to democracy makes them both extremist.

Whether you are anti-democratic of course depends on how you define democracy. There are two main definitions of democracy: procedural and substantive. According to the former, democracy is defined as a set of rules regulating decision-making and the selection of public office holders. According to the latter, democracy is defined as a set of human rights and liberties. Very few contemporary parties could be argued to be anti-democratic in the procedural sense. To be sure, there are parties that criticise democracy and the way it works, sometimes very stridently. This lack of respect for political opponents, institutions and procedures suggest that the parties in question may lack loyalty to democracy,[9] but it is doubtful whether they are extremist in the sense discussed here. It is, on the other hand, possible to argue that some parties are anti-democratic in the substantive sense, for example by advocating differences in political or social rights on the basis of ethnic or national criteria.[10] Still, the extremism-theoretical school assumes a more clear-cut form of hostility to democracy, associated with some form of revolutionary change and a stated alternative, such as the dictatorship of the proletariat or a single personal dictator.

If the first form of extremism is in relation to the existing political system, the second is in relation to other parties. According to this perspective, an extreme party is markedly different to all, or at least most, other parties. This means that it is at, or near, the end of an ideological dimension. The label "centre extremist" exists, but tends to be based on a confusion between ideology and social basis.[11] It should be noted, however, that it is not completely clear-cut what this dimension is. The socio-economic left-right dimension is still the most important in most Western democracies, but it is not without competition. In some countries, the religious, or centre-periphery, dimensions have competed with the left-right dimension since democracy was established.

Another "old" dimension is the national, or language-based, dimension, whose significance if anything has grown in some countries; an obvious example being Belgium. More recently a Green, or industrial/post-industrial, dimension has led to the formation of new parties in several countries. And the growth of far/extreme/radical right parties is linked to the growth of a sociocultural dimension, with cosmopolitanism at one end and particularism at the other. To be extremist in this sense, you need to be markedly different from all, or most, other parties on at least one dimension – but it could well be that you are not extreme at all on other dimensions.

The term "**right**" may not be quite as stigmatised as "extremism", but it is by no means uncontroversial. A quick survey of party names in the Nordic countries suggests that the word "left" is significantly more common than the word "right" – and not only among parties nowadays regarded as left-wing. In the summer of 2013, the parliaments in Denmark, Norway and Sweden contained a combined total of 23 parties. Of these, five had names including the word "left", and one a name including "right".

Indeed, the parties with "left" in the name are not necessarily left-wing in the modern sense. The Danish and Norwegian Liberal parties have kept the name *Venstre* (Left), despite the fact that the meaning of the word has changed rather significantly since the parties in question were formed in the nineteenth century. The word "Left" is also used by the centrist Danish Social Liberals (*Radikale Venstre*; literally Radical Left), as well as two more left-wing parties: the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*) and the Swedish Left Party (*Vänsterpartiet*).

Meanwhile, most Nordic parties have tended to avoid the word "right". Denmark had a party called *Højre* (Right) until 1915, but when it in that year merged with two other parties, the new name was agreed as *Det Konservative Folkeparti* (Conservative People's Party), which has been kept since. The Swedish conservatives had the name *Högerpartiet* (Right Party) until 1969, when it changed into *Moderata Samlingspartiet* (Moderate Coalition Party). The one exception is the Norwegian conservatives. Formed as *Det Konservative Parti* (The Conservative Party) in 1884, the party soon began to refer to itself as *Høyre* (Right), which was formally adopted as the party name in 1913 and has remained so ever since.[12]

This reluctance to use the word "right" may be associated with a way of thinking, according to which politics is regarded as a necessary evil. The Nordic conservative parties were formed reluctantly, as defence organisations against the growth of the left. They saw themselves as the voice of moderation and national community against divisive and disruptive forces. Thus, avoidance of the word "right" may have been a way of showing that they did not recognise the relevance of a left-right divide. This still holds true in many cases – to be opposed to the "left" is by no means the same thing as being prepared to call yourself "right". This is at least as true if we move beyond the conservative party family.

The origins of "left" and "right" as political designations can be traced back to the French Revolution. On 29 August 1789, the chairman of the National

Assembly instructed deputies who supported the veto power of King Louis XVI to move to his right, while those who opposed the royal right to veto were asked to move to his left. This practical arrangement to make the counting of votes easier immediately took symbolic status. Supporters of *l'Ancien Régime* belonged to the "right", while the revolutionaries were on the "left".[13]

The symbolism soon extended into a more general dichotomy, which proved to be enduring. The exact meanings of the two ends of the dichotomy have varied considerably. In the nineteenth century the left-right dichotomy was mostly associated with the liberal-conservative divide, as shown by the names of some Nordic liberal parties. After the breakthrough of democracy and the growth of labour and socialist parties, it shifted to depict a divide between socialism and non-socialism. Still, the left-right dichotomy has proved enduring, fitting remarkably well into differing contexts – so much so that it has been called "political esperanto".[14]

Nevertheless, it is not easy to assign meanings to left and right. Left has been associated with socialism (with variations), anarchism, communism and some forms of liberalism. Right has been associated with other forms of liberalism, conservatism, fascism and Nazism. Both lists could be extended. Thus the left-right conflict has, at various times, been about issues such as the right to vote, the church, employment, military defence, taxation, the size of the public sector and migration – again, the list could be extended. In each case, despite differences over time and between countries, the left-right dichotomy has been meaningful to political elites as well as citizens at large. Comparative research has shown that most voters can orientate themselves along a left-right scale, and that political parties can be meaningfully ordered along the same scale.[15]

Ignazi argues that, despite many variations, there has been some consistency to the left-right divide; left has been associated with equality, and right with inequality or privilege.[16] This is, of course, a simplification, and the concrete meanings have varied over time and across countries. Whether a certain point of view can be classified as left, right or neither can be subject to very heated debates. Still, as Ignazi points out, the left-right dichotomy is not confined to one single dimension. Its applicability to the socio-economic dimension between the socialist and capitalist economic models is widely accepted, but it can also be applied elsewhere. It has been argued, for example, that the post-materialist/materialist dimension is essentially a question of left versus right.[17]

Crucially, for the purpose of this book, the terms "left" and "right" make eminent sense when applied to the sociocultural conflict dimension, where the former entails cosmopolitanism and inclusiveness, while the latter stands for particularism and exclusiveness. It is then possible for a party or movement to be left-leaning on one dimension, and right-leaning on another. In such a case, the eventual classification of the party will depend on which dimension it prioritises. Thus, a nationalist party that prioritises sociocultural issues may be classified as right, even if it is not to the right on the socio-economic dimension.

After this discussion, it may be tempting to just put the words "extreme" and "right" together. But the extreme right is something more than just the sum of

the linguistic parts. Many writers have tried to identify an extreme right ideological core, but the variations of its contents are considerable. In an inventory of 26 definitions of the extreme right, Cas Mudde identifies a total of 58 features.[18] The best attempt is arguably provided by Mudde himself, although he, as mentioned above, later reappraised the name as well as definition of the party family in question.[19] The purpose here is not to once and for all bring order into this conceptual, or terminological, jungle. Some clarity, however, would be useful.

This book will focus on parties which will be referred to as "extreme right". They are extreme because they are markedly different to the mainstream political parties on at least one conflict dimension. Usually, this takes the shape of the extreme right party being unique in its advocacy of certain policies. They are to the right, because they question, or seek to reduce or abolish, equality in issues related to this dimension. In the case of the sociocultural dimension, this means advocating some form of differentiation on the basis of nationality and/or ethnicity. In the case of the socio-economic dimension this means advocating a deregulated economy, and the centrality of private ownership. It is worth noting that this is a fairly broad definition of extreme right. Understood this way, the label "extreme right" can cover fully democratic political parties, as well as anti-democratic and violent groups.

Populism

The literature does not exactly suffer from a shortage of definitions of populism. The concept was even the subject of a special conference in 1967, resulting in a highly authoritative and valuable report, but hardly providing definitive answers to the definitional question(s).[20] Unsurprisingly, this lack of academic consensus has not prevented the word from being used quite frequently in the general political debate. It tends not to be used as a compliment. Rather, it is almost as controversial as the words "extreme" and "right". There are politicians who do not mind referring to themselves as populist (e.g. Timo Soini, leader of the True Finns Party), but they are exceptions. Populism usually has a derogatory ring to it. It can, for example, be is used to imply a modified form of extremism, a tendency to propose simple solutions to complex problems and/or a general lack of sophistication.

Paul Taggart distinguishes between three types of definitions. First, contextual definitions, which are restricted to one historical case at a time. In other words, there is one definition for Russia in the 1870s, one for Argentina in the 1940s/1950s, one for Denmark in the 1970s and so on. Second, variegated definitions, according to which historical examples of populism can be classified into different types. Third, the universal approach, which seeks to provide a "one size fits all" definition.[21] The growth of extreme right parties has also led to a renewed interest in populism, which has triggered a new wave of definitions. These definitions have tended to have variegated or universalistic ambitions, although it is questionable to what extent this has been successful.

Contextual and variegated definitions of populism tend to emphasise social and economical background factors. This is a problem for anyone who seeks to move on towards generality, because populism has appeared in so many and such different social and political contexts that common background factors are very hard to identify. An attempt to find a common core would have to focus on content and expression rather than roots. And here, the literature offers some help, even though there are many differences between different definitional attempts. Paul Taggart identifies six themes, or features, of populism, namely (1) hostility to representative politics; (2) identification with an idealised heartland; (3) a lack of core values; (4) a reaction to a real or perceived crisis; (5) a self-limiting contradiction between disregard for politics and its own political activity; and (6) chameleonic characteristics, with an ability to adapt to the colours of its environment.[22]

Hans-Georg Betz identifies three main ingredients, but each with a number of specifications: (1) a *structure of argumentation* with faith in the common sense of the common people, and the belief in simple solutions to complex problems; (2) a *political style and strategy*, where populists claim to speak on behalf of the unarticulated opinions of the common people, and the mobilisation of resentment against a set of clearly defined enemies; and (3) an *ideology* based on producer ethic with the primacy of individual effort, a rejection of the existing system as serving the few at the expense of the many and a claim to democracy and egalitarianism based on the belief of a harmony of interests.[23]

There are many other efforts to identify a populist core. From these, a number of observations with particular importance can be extracted. The first is a tendency towards simplicity. Populists often argue that political and bureaucratic elites overcomplicate things, but that there is common sense out there, among the common people, whose voice is ignored. The simplicity is also manifested in an "us and them" dichotomy; "us" being the silent majority and those who endeavour to represent it; and "them" being the political and bureaucratic rogues.[24] The second is a kind of backward-looking utopia, to what Taggart calls the heartland, i.e. a mythical ideal existence somewhere in the vague historical past, before the rogues took over.

The third is the lack of core values. To be sure, concrete populist parties or movements may well have very strong and articulated values, but this is by no means always the case. Often, populists are more easily recognised in terms of what they are against rather than what they are for. In more general terms, populism can take so many shapes and forms that it is difficult to identify any core beliefs. A fourth characteristic is the personalised nature of populism. There are some variations also here, but populist parties and movements tend to be based around one leading personality, sometimes referred to as a "political entrepreneur";[25] often – if not always – with an element of charisma.

There are also, however, a number of important negations of populism. The first is that, even though populists are sceptical of representative democracy, populism is not intrinsically anti-democratic. Populists mock the political establishment, and they may advocate more referendums. In some cases the

antagonism to democratic procedures may be such that the adherence to democracy is at least questionable, and it is not inconceivable that a populist may be un- or even anti-democratic. But anti-democracy is not a defining criterion, and most post-war populist movements are not opposed to democracy.

The second negation has to do with whether there is an ideological element in populism. Betz, as we have just seen, claims that this is the case. Jens Rydgren argues along similar lines, stating that populists advocate "an economic policy based on small-scale production and family capitalism", and that they "generally do not favor principally egalitarian principles".[26] This is clearly relevant to many concrete manifestations of populism, but it does not sit easily with the idea that populism is lacking in values. Populism can take many forms, of which right-wing populism is only one. It is sometimes forgotten that there is also left-wing populism, and left-wing populists would not subscribe to the belief in a harmony of interests across class divides, or an economic system based on family capitalism.[27] More in general, it is questionable how populism can have an ideological element, on the one hand, and be lacking in core values, on the other.

Here, this problem is comparatively limited. We will not be dealing with populism as a whole, but with a family of political parties where populism often is of relevance. So why, then, call them extreme right and not populist right? There are two main reasons for this. First, the party family we are dealing with counts many populist parties among its members. But is populism a defining criterion? Is it not possible to prioritise the sociocultural dimension, and be to the right on that dimension, without being populist? Even if it can be argued that many, if not most, members of the extreme right party family are populist, it does not make sense to let the family name include a concept that is not a defining criterion. The second argument is that party families are best defined according to ideology, and since it can be questioned whether populism is ideological, it seems inappropriate to include it in the family name.

Thus, an extreme right party can be defined as one or more of the following: a party that is in opposition to the (other) established parties by being (1) near the particularist end of the sociocultural dimension; (2) near the capitalist end of the socio-economic dimension or (3) near the materialist end on the materialist/post-materialist dimension. An extreme right party may, but does not have to, be right-wing on more than one conflict dimension. The crucial point is that it is right-wing on the dimension that it prioritises. Thus, a party that leans towards the left on the socio-economic scale, but towards the right on the sociocultural scale is still extreme right, if it prioritises the latter dimension. Indeed, as we shall see, some of the most significant Nordic extreme right parties have over time shifted their priority between the socio-economic and the sociocultural dimensions.

Fascism, Nazism and authoritarianism

The concepts of fascism and Nazism are not as straightforward as one might think. The "new consensus" definition of fascism, palingenetic (reborn) ultranationalism,[28] may well be widely accepted, but it is not straightforwardly applicable to actual

groups, movements or parties. More elaborated definitions, with lists of criteria, do not necessarily solve the problem, partly because this is where the consensus ends. It is more or less universally agreed that fascism is anti-democratic and nationalist, but as soon as you go further it becomes less clear-cut.

Racism is not necessarily a core ingredient, as it is often pointed out that Italian fascism, at least initially, was not racist.[29] Corporatism is often included in definitions, but the programmatical and practical commitment to a corporatist organisation of society has varied among fascist movements.[30] Then there are a number of fascist negations. Fascism is anti-Marxist, anti-liberal, even anti-conservative – the list could be extended.[31] In some cases the negations have been questioned – some argue that fascism has key elements in common with conservatism, such as an organic perspective of the nation; others see similarities with Marxism in the collectivism and disregard for the rights of the individual. On the other hand, it could just as well be argued that fascists are opposed to everyone and everything not associated with the fascists themselves – which would make a list of negations rather meaningless.

Another issue is the relation between fascism and Nazism. Taggart's different approaches to define populism, referred to above, could also be applied here. It is possible to use a contextual approach, and treat (Italian) fascism and (German) National Socialism as two separate ideologies, with their own definitions. The variegated approach, where fascism and Nazism have a common core, but also some contextual differences, is also a possibility. So is the universal approach, where there is assumed to be one core ideology (usually called fascism).

Clearly there are important differences between fascism and National Socialism. The comparative lack of racism in the former has already been mentioned; even more conspicuous is the centrality of anti-Semitism in National Socialism, something which made a late and more or less forced entry into fascism.[32] Another difference is corporatism, which does exist in National Socialism but is more central to fascism. Despite these differences and ambiguities there is nevertheless a core, which could be argued to be distinctive to fascism. This core, a combination of nationalism and anti-democracy, is common to all fascist movements, including possible subsets, and would be a key part of universal as well as variegated and contextual definitions.

As mentioned above, there are examples of researchers who refer to some political parties as neo-fascist. Taggart, for example, claims that neo-fascists constitute the more radical of two subsets of the far right, with new populists constituting the other, less radical (and more successful), subset. The main difference is that the neo-fascists are almost exclusively anti-immigrant parties, while new populists have a broader programme. There are also differences in terms of organisation, strategy and electoral base.[33] Ignazi distinguishes between "old" and "new" extreme right parties, where the former have some form of links to fascism in terms of "myths, symbols and slogans" of interwar fascism, and the latter do not.[34]

Both of these classification attempts have their problems, and do not add much clarification. Links to historical fascism are often difficult to find and

substantiate, and where they exist, they do not necessarily say very much about the contemporary party. An example is the Italian *Alleanza Nationale*, which had unambiguous links to historical fascism but in the 1990s and 2000s became so deradicalised that it was questionable whether it belonged to the extreme right party family any longer, before it dissolved and merged into *Popolo Della Liberta* in March 2009. The more radical and immigration-critical *Lega Nord*, meanwhile, has no links to fascism.

Of course, fascist and Nazi groups and movements can still be found across the whole of Europe, and the Nordic countries are no exception. Militant racist, sometimes openly Nazi, groups are active in all the Nordic countries, most notably in Sweden and Denmark. There are several examples of fascist/Nazi marches and rallies that have led to violent clashes with protesters.[35] There are also several cases of violent crimes committed by members of fascist/Nazi groups.[36] Historically, fascist and Nazi parties have existed in all the Scandinavian countries, as will be shown in Chapter 5. In addition, it will be shown that there are examples of contemporary Nordic extreme right parties with links to historical fascism/Nazism, although they have not themselves been fascist or Nazi. Thus, although this book does not deal with fascism or Nazism as such, these concepts form a relevant background.

Related to fascism and Nazism is the concept of authoritarianism. Fascism and Nazism are both authoritarian, but not uniquely so – communism, for example, is also often said to be authoritarian. Cas Mudde has defined authoritarianism as "the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely".[37] In practice, authoritarianism is usually assumed to involve strict law and order ideas, and disapproval of deviant behaviour, for example in terms of sexuality and family morals. Authoritarianism is often assumed to be a key part of the outlook of extreme/far/radical right parties, but the way such parties are defined here, this is not always the case.

Racism, xenophobia and nativism

Like all other terms and concepts discussed in this chapter, "racism" and "xenophobia" are difficult to handle. They are heavily normatively loaded, so much so that their use could have legal consequences. There is no shortage of definitions, but these definitions are difficult to apply to actual statements or programmes. The purpose here is not to present definitions of racism and xenophobia that can then be used to test every party or movement discussed in the following chapters – such precise definitions do not exist. Still, in a book dealing with the extreme right, racism and xenophobia are more or less unavoidable concepts, and some discussion about them is necessary.

The modern literature distinguishes between new and classical racism. The latter is defined as the belief in systematic, natural and hereditary differences between population groups. Classical racism also holds that there is a racial hierarchy, where some population groups are more advanced than others. The history and horrific consequences of such beliefs are well known, and will not be

elaborated on here. New racism is rather different. First, the emphasis is on cultures, rather than genetics. Second, there is no notion of a hierarchy, but rather a principle which could be summarised as "equal but separate" – different cultures are of the same value, but should not mix.[38] Hence, opposition to multiculturalism would meet the definition of new racism. The differences between new and classical racism are such, however, that it is not straightforwardly justified to refer to the former as racism at all. Hence, it is sometimes also called culturism. Similar to this view is ethno-pluralism, the belief that population groups are equal but different, but here the defining criterion is ethnicity rather than culture.[39]

"Xenophobia" is taken from a Greek word, which means "fear of strangers".[40] Strictly speaking, the "strangers" can be almost any out-group, such as religions, sexual minorities, people from a different part of the same country, or even people from a neighbouring town or village. Political xenophobia, however, has tended to concentrate on immigrants, or foreigners in general. Racism and xenophobia are sometimes used interchangeably.[41] It is also quite common to treat the latter as a milder form of the former.[42] Both these usages are problematical. In practice, racism and xenophobia often appear together, but conceptually they are quite distinctive from each other. The simplest way of putting the difference is that racism is ideological and xenophobia is psychological.[43] What this means is that racism is based on some form of belief in systematic differences between population groups or cultures, and that these differences should have political consequences, such as segregation or repatriation. Xenophobia, on the other hand, is an irrational state of mind, where certain groups are seen as a threat, with whatever justification.

Conceptually, this has two consequences. The first is that, although racism and xenophobia often appear together, they are not concepts that can be used interchangeably. It is quite possible to be xenophobic without being racist, and vice versa – although the latter is probably less common. For example, fear of immigrants from another part of the world does by no means have to be based on some principled belief in a racial hierarchy, or the necessity of cultures being kept separate. Conversely, it is quite possible, at least in theory, to hold racist beliefs without being xenophobic. A possible example could be a nineteenth-century missionary or colonialist who advocated friendly treatment of the "natives", but believed that they were culturally and intellectually inferior. The second consequence is that the distinction between racism and xenophobia is not one of degree. A xenophobe may well dislike the targeted out-group with every bit as much intensity as a racist might do – the difference is on what this animosity is based. For the racist, the basis is the belief in systematic differences between population groups in general; for the xenophobe it is a psychological reaction to a perceived threat from one or several out-groups.

As already argued, the concepts of xenophobia and racism are difficult to apply to the real world. In his earlier work Cas Mudde argued that both racism and xenophobia are core ingredients in the extreme right ideology.[44] More recently, however, he has reached the conclusion that the extreme right parties'

prioritisation of the "own" people and scepticism against multiculturalism are more aptly summarised under the label "nativism". The definition of nativism, according to Mudde, is the belief that "states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation'), and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state". His justification for using this concept instead of racism or xenophobia is that nativism can be racist as well as non-racist, and that it is able to encompass dislike of immigrants as well as indigenous minorities.[45]

Conclusion

It should be reiterated that this chapter has not set out to resolve all disputes and debates about the loaded and contentious concepts discussed. For the purpose of the book, however, it is useful to be clear about the kind of party we are dealing with. The working definition of an extreme right party is a party that is in opposition to all other relevant parties on the conflict dimension it prioritises, and that it is to the right on that dimension. As already noted, this means that there are several ways of being to the right, where nativism, xenophobia or criticism of immigration, i.e. a right-wing position on the sociocultural conflict dimension, is only one possibility.

The proposed definition of extreme right is in contrast to Cas Mudde's work, where extreme right, or populist radical right, parties are defined in terms of programmatical content. In his book from 2000, he identifies five ideological ingredients in the extreme right ideology, namely nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the advocacy of a strong state.[46] When these ingredients are applied to concrete parties, however, Mudde finds that they do not all appear as core values in studied party documents and publications. Instead, he found nationalism, xenophobia, law and order and welfare chauvinism as the most recurring ideological features.[47] In his book from 2007, Mudde proposes a minimalist definition of populist radical right parties, and argues that this definition comprises authoritarianism, populism and nativism.[48]

In Mudde's latter work, the minimalist definition of populist radical right parties leads on to a classification, which excludes some parties often classified as extreme/radical/far right in many other publications, such as the Norwegian Progress Party and the German NPD. The former party is not found to be nationalist or xenophobic, and therefore neo-liberal populist rather that populist radical right (something it shares with its Danish namesake party, and the Swedish New Democracy). The NPD is not populist radical right because it is not populist, but instead extremist, in the sense that it is undemocratic.[49] The problem, then, remains that a definition based on a "shopping list" of ideological ingredients does not seem to remove all ambiguities.

The definition proposed here has the advantage that it is more open-ended than one that rests on a predefined set of ideological ingredients. It also leads on to a workable subclassification, which Mudde attempts in his earlier work, but largely abandons in his 2007 book. In his book from 2000, he argues that

extreme right parties can be subclassified according to whether their form of nationalism is based on civic/citizenship (*ius soli*), or ethnic (*ius sanguinis*), criteria.[50] In his more recent book he allows for neighbouring party types, such as nonpopulist radical right, nonpopulist right and nonradical right populist parties, but the focus is on parties he finds to meet his definition of radical right populist parties.[51]

Subclassifications of extreme/far/radical right parties tend to make a distinction between a more radical and one less radical group. This is again tricky, because criteria for such distinctions are difficult to construct. Mudde's (2000) distinction between ethnic nationalist and civic nationalist parties makes eminent theoretical sense, but when applied to five studied parties he finds that two cannot be classified as civic or ethnic nationalist, namely the German NPD and DVU.[52]

Here, the argument is that the criteria for subclassification should not be related to the degree of radicalism, but instead to the form of rightism. Extreme right parties can be subclassified according to their prioritised conflict dimension. Thus, we can have sociocultural extreme right parties, economic extreme right parties and materialist (as opposed to post-materialist) extreme right parties. Various combinations are also possible, to the extent that parties give equal weight to different conflict dimensions. In contrast to Mudde, this means that extreme right parties are not necessarily populist – although in practice they often are. Nor are they by definition authoritarian – although they often are that too. They are, finally, not by definition nativist/xenophobic/anti-immigration either – and we will come across a few examples of the latter in this book.

Notes

1 E.g. Ignazi 2003; Schain *et al*., eds., 2002 (both extreme right); Cheles *et al.*, eds., 1995; Davies with Jackson 2008 (both far right).
2 E.g. Givens 2005 and Norris 2005 (both radical right). Kitschelt's famous book from the 1990s is titled *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, but the analysis focuses on a subtype labelled "New radical right" (Kitschelt 1997); the term "New radical right" is also used by, for example, Prowe 1994.
3 Fennema 1997 and Gibson 2002 (anti-immigrant) and Bjørklund and Andersen 2002 (anti-immigration).
4 E.g. Betz and Immerfall, eds., 1998 (neo-populist); Taggart 1995 (new populist); Betz 1994 and Rydgren 2006 (both radical right-wing populist).
5 Copsey (2008) uses "Fascism" in the title of a book on the British National Party; the German NPD is referred to as "Neonazis" in the title of a book; see Röpke and Speit, eds., 2008.
6 Mudde 2000: 178ff.
7 Mudde 2007, Chapter 1.
8 Compare Mudde 2000: 177.
9 Compare Schedler 1996, who speaks in terms of "semi-loyalty" to democracy.
10 For a discussion on anti-democracy, see Mudde 1995: 214ff.
11 E.g. Preece 1968: 251, who uses "centre-extremist" to describe extremist parties who are socially centrist, i.e. based on middle-class support.
12 Kaartvedt 1984: 30f.

13 Ignazi 2003: 4.
14 The phrase appears to have been coined by the French Canadian political scientist Jean Laponce in a book from 1981; here quoted from Ignazi 2003: 8f.
15 See Fuchs and Klingemann 1990 (voters' self-placements) and Knutsen 1998 (expert placements of parties).
16 Ignazi 2003: 8.
17 Ignazi 2003: 13.
18 Mudde 1996: 229.
19 The definition of the extreme right party family appears in Mudde 1995 and Mudde 2000; the reappraisal in Mudde 2007.
20 Ionescu and Gellner 1969.
21 Taggart 2000: 7.
22 Taggart 2000: 2ff.; Taggart 2002: 66–71.
23 Betz 1998: 4.
24 Compare Mudde 2002.
25 Peterson *et al.* 1988: 60–68.
26 Rydgren 2006: 8.
27 Two recent examples of left-wing populists are Tommy Sheridan, former leader of the Scottish Socialist Party, and the Swede Lars Törnman, who, after expulsion from the Social Democrats, formed the Kiruna Party, and later the Norrbotten Party. A better-known, but also more problematical, example could be the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez.
28 Griffin 2002; Copsey 2008: 80–87.
29 See, for example, Gregor 2005: 185ff.
30 Neocleous 1997: 42–50.
31 Payne 1980: 20.
32 Eatwell 1995: 66ff.
33 Taggart 1995.
34 Ignazi 1992: 10.
35 An example is the "Salem march", held by militant nationalists in a Stockholm suburb every year since 2000, in memory of a Swedish youth who was killed in a fight. See, for example, "Polisen fruktar nya bråk i Salem", *Dagens Nyheter* 1 December 2008; *Searchlight* issue 1/2009.
36 "Säpo ville medla åt dömd nynazist", *Dagens Nyheter* 5 December 2009. See also, for example, *Searchlight* issues 2 and 3/2002.
37 Mudde 2007: 23.
38 Mudde 1995: 210ff.; Gardberg 1993: 23f.
39 Mudde 1995: 210ff.; 220 (note 13); Mudde 2000: 187.
40 Mudde 1995:212ff.; Mudde 2000: 188; Gardberg 1993: 22f.
41 E.g. Tränhardt 1995.
42 See, for example, Wimmer 1997: 33 (note 2), who distinguishes "between xenophobia and racism as two points on a continuum of ever more exclusionist discourses".
43 Compare Rydgren 2003: 48, who argues that "new cultural racism … is an 'ideologicalized' form of manifest xenophobia". See also Fredrickson 2002: 19f., who argues that there is an important conceptual difference between racism and xenophobia.
44 Mudde 1995, 2000.
45 Mudde 2007: 18ff., 22; quote from p. 19.
46 Mudde 1995, 2000.
47 Mudde 2000: 177.
48 Mudde 2007: 15–23.
49 Mudde 2007: 46–52.
50 Mudde 2000: 181f.; 187.
51 Mudde 2007: 46–52.
52 Mudde 2000: 171.

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3 A framework for analysis

There is no shortage of theoretical approaches to the study of extreme right parties. A comprehensive rundown and appraisal that does justice to all relevant theories would require a book of its own. This overflowing state of affairs was not always at hand, however. For many years the literature on extreme right parties was thin on theory. Treatments of extreme right parties tended to deal with one case at a time, and the fledging theoretical attempts that existed tended to be ad hoc, often treating extreme right parties as shallow single-issue parties, whose support was mainly an expression of protest.

The theoretical state of play was dramatically improved when Hans-Georg Betz published his book *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* in 1994. Betz's point of departure is the transformation from industrialism to a post-industrial economy and society. He notes that the collapse of communism and the growth of economic globalisation have led to profound changes in Western societies. Their economies have been restructured, their social structure and value system have changed drastically and there has been a major transformation of their culture.[1]

The growth of new information technologies has been a key driving force behind these economic and social changes. Computerised knowledge has become crucial, something which has had far-reaching consequences for the workforce. Traditional factory work has declined, while there has been an increase in technical and managerial professions. The industrial economy, with emphasis on mass production, has been overtaken by a post-industrial economy, with emphasis on flexible specialisation. As a consequence a new divide has emerged, between a core sector of demanding, attractive, secure jobs in a positive environment, and a periphery sector of low-skill, high-risk, insecure and generally undesirable jobs.[2]

Betz's portrayal of the transformation into a high-tech, globalised, market-oriented and individualised society is quite dark. A key consequence is the growth of a new underclass, which is not only left to take the less prestigious jobs, but also disproportionally vulnerable to unemployment. According to Betz, those in possession of cultural capital, individual entrepreneurship and flexibility are likely "to be among the winners of postindustrial modernization".[3] At the same time an underclass has developed, consisting of people who have "become

superfluous and useless for society".[4] This underclass is abandoned and alienated. The decline in class and party loyalties mean that they feel "anxious, bewildered and insecure".[5] They react with resentment, and become susceptible to a political message consisting of anti-establishment rhetoric, scapegoating and simple solutions.

Betz's theory is a very important contribution, but not without weaknesses. There is, perhaps, a little bit too much emphasis on resentment. Extreme right voters are depicted as unarticulated and unsophisticated, who vote for the extreme right out of protest. Betz's approach is also somewhat unidimensional, in that it focuses almost entirely on demand-side factors. He is by no means unaware of the existence of supply-side factors, but they are not given the same attention. Rather, the argument is that extreme right voting grows out of resentment, which is a consequence of the transformation from industrialism to post-industrialism. This transition seems to have little variation. It has affected the whole of the Western world, which makes it difficult for Betz's theory to explain variations in the success of extreme right parties.

Not long after Betz's book had been published, another major contribution appeared. Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann's book on New Radical Right parties had a theoretical framework that had similarities to that of Betz, but Kitschelt and his collaborator also took the discussion further. Like Betz, Kitschelt takes the transformation from industrial to post-industrial societies as point of departure. He argues that this transformation has created new cleavage lines, where three conflict dimensions are particularly important. These are (1) capitalist v. socialist approaches to economics; (2) particularist v. cosmopolitan approaches to citizenship and migration; and (3) authoritarian v. libertarian approaches to lifestyle issues and collective decision-making.[6]

Kitschelt argues that orientations on these three conflict dimensions are heavily influenced by worklife experiences. Those whose work involves the processing of clients and symbols, notably in the reproductive service sector, tend to be found towards the socialist, cosmopolitan and egalitarian ends of the new conflict dimensions. People whose worklife experience involves the manipulation of objects and spreadsheets, on the other hand, are more likely to be found near the capitalist, particularist and authoritarian ends of the same conflict dimensions. It is the latter category that is the most likely to vote for new radical right parties – the former is more inclined towards the new left/green politics.[7]

Thus, both Betz and Kitschelt have identified new social groups emerging as a consequence of the economic and societal transition. The difference is that while Betz portrays this group as relatively unsophisticated "losers", who vote extreme right out of protest, Kitschelt has a more nuanced perspective. Extreme right voters are not necessarily unsophisticated at all. They work in the private sector, where they primarily deal with the manipulation of objects etc. and such work can be highly qualified and well paid. This would suggest that extreme right voting is more of a rational act than an expression of resentment. As Jens Rydgren aptly puts it, "whereas Betz focuses mainly on emotions … Kitschelt is concerned rather with *preferences*".[8]

Another important difference between Betz and Kitschelt is that, while the former concentrates largely on demand-side factors behind extreme right voting, the latter puts more emphasis on supply-side factors. The fact that economic and societal change creates a demand for parties with an extreme right agenda is not enough; they must themselves supply a message that meets the demand. Crucially, Kitschelt argues that new radical right parties need to provide a "winning formula", consisting of free market economics, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism.[9]

In the empirical country chapters, Kitschelt then goes on to argue that failure to provide this formula is a key factor behind the variations in the success of new radical right parties. Successful parties (e.g. the French *Front National*) are said to have got this mix right, while unsuccessful cases (such as British and German extreme right parties) have got it wrong.[10] Most importantly, Kitschelt emphasises the pro-capitalism part of the "winning formula" – too much "socialism" is seen as an obstacle to success. This part of Kitschelt's theory has been widely criticised, not least due to the empirical development. Many extreme right parties have in recent years adopted a welfare chauvinist approach to economics, where a generous tax-funded welfare system is supported, with the qualification that it should only be on offer to the "own" people.[11] Kitschelt has defended his position, but it arguably remains a weak spot in his otherwise very convincing framework.[12]

Another key part of Kitschelt's theory is political opportunity structures. These relate to the ideological differences between the established mainstream parties. Crucial, according to Kitschelt, is the distance between social democrats and moderate conservatives. If the ideological gap between them decreases, what Kitschelt calls *left-right convergence*, it creates a favourable opportunity structure for challenger parties on the new left as well as the new radical right.[13] In the country chapters the authors go on to argue the centrality of left-right convergence in a number of cases. A key example is France, where it is argued that the changes in economic policy by the Socialist government in 1983 reduced the ideological gap to the Gaullist opposition, and that this left-right convergence was a key factor behind the breakthrough of the *Front National*, which began in 1983 and peaked in the National Assembly election of 1986.[14] There are also illustrative negative examples, such as Britain where the first past the post electoral system (in one round, unlike France) and the ideological differences between the Conservative Party – under Margaret Thatcher – and the Labour Party combined to prevent an extreme right breakthrough in the late 1970s which, at least by some, was not considered completely impossible.[15]

As already mentioned, Kitschelt has been criticised. The problematical emphasis on the "winning formula" is one example. There are also country cases which, on empirical examination, do not fit the overall theory.[16] Even if some critics have a point, Kitschelt's contribution can hardly be overrated. Above all, his emphasis on supply-side factors has proved a crucial step in our understanding of extreme right parties and the conditions for their success. We can discuss whether there is such a thing as a universal "winning formula", and even if we

agree that there is, we can debate what it contains. The key point, however, is that extreme right parties cannot take their support for granted. Societal changes playing into their hands may be a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. To realise their electoral potential they need to provide a message that resonates with their prospective voters – they need to supply a package that meets the demand.

After Kitschelt, a number of important contributions followed. Elisabeth Carter's broadly comparative analysis is focused on the supply-side. This choice is made in full awareness of the distinction between demand and supply, and is motivated by the argument that demand-side factors are already well documented, while the supply-side is underresearched. Carter identifies four supply-side factors. First, ideology; second, organisation and leadership (amalgamated into one factor); third, party competition (left-right convergence, and the ideological distance to the mainstream parties on the right); and, fourth, the institutional environment (the electoral system and other electoral laws).[17]

Also Pippa Norris provides a broadly comparative analysis, but her framework consists of the dynamics between supply and demand. Three main components are identified. First, the entire electoral setting, including ballot access and campaign finance as well as the electoral system, forms a foundation, called the electoral marketplace. Second, demand-side factors, which consist of the social as well as attitudinal bases of extreme right support. The social base is placed into the context of social and industrial change in Western societies, which has led to new political cleavages – as highlighted by Betz as well as Kitschelt. The attitudinal base consists of resentment against the political establishment and immigration scepticism. The third and final component is what the extreme right parties themselves supply, in terms of ideology and organisation. In the former respect, Norris argues that a successful extreme right party needs to adjust its message to the broader institutional context. Very simply put, Norris holds that it pays for extreme right parties to be moderate in majoritarian systems, where parties compete for the median voter. In proportional systems, however, there is more scope for radicalism, as the competition for votes is spread wider across the ideological spectrum.[18]

Jens Rydgren has provided a framework which has been developed and refined in several publications. It has been applied to single-country studies,[19] but also presented on its own, as a theory.[20] Rydgren takes into account both demand- and supply-side factors, as well as the interplay between them, although the distinction between supply and demand is given less attention in his later pieces. Factors highlighted by Rydgren include the availability of unattached voters, the presence of de- or realignment in the electorate and the politicisation of new political issues, such as immigration.[21] Left-right convergence among the mainstream parties, and the permissiveness of the electoral system are also important factors. So is the ideology of extreme right parties or, as Rydgren puts it, the adoption and effective diffusion of a "master frame" with electoral potential. In other words, a party's capacity to provide voters with a message that can draw on immigration scepticism without carrying the stigma of historically

burdened ideas, such as biological racism.[22] In this context, the availability of useful examples from other countries, and the party's own ability to adapt to successful examples, are of importance.[23] Other party-centric factors are the parties' organisation and internal resources; in particular their degree of internal unity, and internal democracy.[24]

Thus, the distinction between demand and supply has had a clear impact on the literature, even though its application has varied. The development has been summarised by Roger Eatwell, who identifies five demand-side and five supply-side factors from an overview of the research literature. The demand-side factors are the single-issue thesis, protest, social breakdown, reverse post-materialism and economic self-interest. The supply-side factors are opportunity structures, mediatisation, national traditions, party programmes and charismatic leadership.[25] Eatwell's article underlines the importance of supply-side as well as demand-side factors, but it also highlights the problem of distinguishing between the two. Opportunity structures, for example, are treated as a supply-side factor, yet the electoral system or the ideological distance between other parties are not things the extreme right party itself can do much about. In addition, it could be argued that the impact of favourable political opportunity structures, such as left-right convergence, is surely that it creates a demand for alternatives, which blurs the distinction between supply and demand.

This problem has been addressed by Cas Mudde, who provides more nuanced sets of demand-side as well as supply-side factors. The demand-side factors are subdivided into three levels: macro-, meso- and micro-. Mudde lists four macro-level demand-side factors: first, economic, social and industrial modernisation. This approach largely draws on Betz's work, where the victims of modernisation turn to the extreme right, more or less in desperation. Second, crisis, which can be economic as well as political. Trust in the political system, its institutions and key representatives are among the indicators here. Third, ethnic backlash, which refers to immigration and reactions against it. Fourth, the presence or absence of an authoritarian legacy, understood as whether or not a country has been subject to communist or fascist dictatorship. Usually, this approach assumes that a sufficiently large part of the living population will personally have had the experience of dictatorship; i.e. to have lived in such a system makes you more susceptible to authoritarian political ideas.[26]

The demand-side meso level factors discussed by Mudde are the educational system and the family. The thinking here draws on the literature on socialisation, where it is often argued that political views and values are shaped by influences from childhood and early adulthood.[27] On the demand-side micro level, Mudde identifies populist radical right attitudes and insecurity. The former, Mudde equates with his definition of a populist radical right party. In other words, such parties are successful when sufficiently large proportions of voters are nativist, authoritarian and populist. The latter factor, again, draws on Betz. The reasoning is that those who feel insecure in one way or other – employment, identity, life situation in general – may turn to what radical alternatives there are on the right.[28]

On the supply-side, Mudde makes a very important contribution by distinguishing between external and internal supply-side factors. This brings some welcome order into the aforementioned confusion between what really is supply and what is demand. External supply-side factors can be institutional, such as electoral systems or the political system more in general. The latter can, for example, refer to whether the system is unitary or federal, or the extent to which it contains corporatist features. The other external supply-side factors are the political and cultural contexts, plus the media. Regarding the political context, the positioning of other parties, notably the presence or absence of left-right convergence, is central. The cultural context refers to the elusive concept of political culture. Here, Mudde discusses (and largely dismisses) the possible impact of a fascist or Nazi legacy in a country, either as a regime or in the form of wartime collaboration. Other aspects of the political culture can be more vague, such as the debate climate in a country, the presence or absence of strong anti-racist organisations, etc.[29] The media is also a somewhat elusive factor, as it can be argued that a media climate, which at one level is hostile to extreme right parties, can still set an agenda which favours such parties, for example by frequently reporting about immigration as a problem.[30]

Three internal supply-side factors are identified: ideology, leadership and organisation. The ideology factor addresses the dilemma for an extreme right party to provide a programmatic package which taps popular discontent with perceived problems such as immigration and distrust in the established parties. Leadership factors can be external as well as internal. When dealing with the former, we are confronted with the much-used, sometimes abused, concept of charisma. Even if that is left aside, effective leadership is very important for parties which often seek to personalise their message, with attacks on others and adulation of their own leader. Organisational factors include pure organisational strength, but also the extent of internal cohesion and order. Extreme right parties often suffer from fractionalisation and internal unrest, partly because they often attract idiosyncratic personalities with strong minds. Mudde also mentions international factors, such as cooperation among extreme right parties from different countries and the presence or absence of international success cases as role models, as internal supply-side factors.[31]

Mudde's thorough evaluation of demand- and supply-side factors draws on a wealth of literature. He convincingly rams home the point that extreme right success, or lack thereof, is best understood as an interplay between demand- and supply-side factors, but with the important addition that these can be subdivided into different levels. His one-by-one evaluation of different factors can perhaps be discussed in some cases, but the overview and comprehensiveness is seminal and the distinction between internal and external supply-side factors adds much needed clarity. Together with the contributions from Betz, Kitschelt, Carter, Rydgren and Norris, Mudde's work provides us with the necessary parts to construct a framework for analysis of the Scandinavian countries. The remainder of this book will follow the distinction between demand-side, external supply-side and internal supply-side factors.

Beginning on the demand-side, three sets of factors will be considered. The first are related to immigration. Betz and Kitschelt have pointed out that the growth of extreme right parties is not simply, in some cases not even primarily, a case of a backlash against immigration,[32] and this is supported by more recent research.[33] Nevertheless, while extreme right parties are not single-issue anti-immigration parties, immigration is a central part of their message and appeal.[34] The argument here is not that immigration holds the only key to the understanding of extreme right parties and their success, but it would be difficult to justify leaving it out of an analytical framework. We will, consequently, look at the development of immigration in the Scandinavian countries in a comparative context. The questions to be answered are (1) which of the Scandinavian countries have experienced the highest levels of immigration; and (2) how the levels of immigration to these countries compare with other European countries. In addition, we will look at attitudes to immigration, to see whether citizens in Denmark, Norway and Sweden are more or less positive to immigration than citizens elsewhere in Europe.

The second set of demand-side factors are related to political trust. To be sure, earlier assertions that extreme right voting is essentially a protest phenomenon have been conclusively disproved by more recent research.[35] Still, although there is much more to extreme right support and voting than mere protest, it has been convincingly shown in many studies that political fatigue and anti-establishment attitudes are important and recurring attributes of extreme right voters.[36] Two indicators of political satisfaction will be looked at: election turnout and survey evidence of attitudes to the political system and establishment. Third, economic-related factors will be considered. Empirical evidence suggests that there is no simple causal relationship between economic crisis and extreme right success; not least the impact of unemployment is disputed.[37] Still, following Betz's approach, some kind of economic indicators need to be at least considered in a broader analytical framework.[38] In addition, the levels of taxation will be taken into consideration. As is well known, and will be discussed in later chapters, at least two, possibly three, of the parties discussed in this book started as protest movements against high taxation and state bureaucracy.

Moving on to external supply-side factors, two will be looked at. First, opportunity structures. The account will cover the electoral systems, and the extent to which they make entry easy or difficult for new challenger parties. At least as importantly, the degree of convergence between the mainstream left and right parties will be investigated. The relevance of these factors has already been discussed, and is a key part in Kitschelt's as well as Rydgren's work. Second, national traditions. This appears among Eatwell's supply-side factors, and is one of Mudde's external supply-side factors. National traditions are not straightforwardly operationalised, and none of the Scandinavian countries have any experience of dictatorship, if we exclude Denmark and Norway during occupation in the Second World War. Here, focus will be on fascist tradition. The success and impact of interwar and Second World War fascist and Nazi parties and movements will be discussed, in order to establish the extent to which there is a

long-standing extreme right tradition in the Nordic countries. This will also serve a secondary purpose, as at least in the Swedish case some background knowledge of traditional fascism and Nazism adds to our understanding of more recent extreme right parties.

Finally, internal supply-side factors will be considered. First, the origins and history of the Scandinavian extreme right parties. They are often accused of fascism, a dubious approach to democracy and racism or xenophobia. In order to meet such criticism, it is important that the party does not have historical origins or a background which seem to confirm such criticism. The background and history are also a help when it comes to understanding more recent developments in the studied parties. Second, ideology. The "master frame" concept used by Rydgren, as well as Kitschelt's "winning formula" are of relevance here, but will not be rigorously applied. Instead of concentrating on the application of a particular master frame or formula, the analysis will be more open-ended. The question to be answered is rather to what extent the party, in general terms, is able to articulate nationalist, anti-establishment and/or immigration-sceptical values without opening up to attacks for racism or anti-democracy.

To this end, two indicators will be looked at. The first is the relative emphasis on immigration in manifesto documents. This also has the secondary purpose of investigating the extent to which the single-issue thesis is applicable to the studied parties.[39] The second indicator is the substantive content of the parties' approach to immigration. Essentially, what will be looked at is the degree of radicalism. For example, whether ethnic or civic criteria for nationality are applied; the former being indicative of a more radical position than the latter. While, however, immigration and related issues are very important when analysing the ideology of extreme right parties, the discussion will be broader. The purpose is to provide a comprehensive characteristic of the parties' ideological orientation, including their take on economic issues and their approach to the different political "isms", such as liberalism, conservatism and nationalism.

The third and fourth internal supply-side factors are party organisation and leadership. In general, it can be argued that all parties benefit from a strong organisation, but for extreme right parties the situation is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, they can be isolated, and they often complain about how they are treated by the media, which could suggest that a strong and active party organisation is their only alternative to get the message across. On the other hand, extreme right parties are, more than most other parties, in danger of being compromised by their activists, either because they are carrying racist or undemocratic baggage or because they are, simply, odd. The latter can be a general problem for all new parties, and parties which experience a sudden growth in support. As will be shown below, however, it is a frequent and serious problem for extreme right parties, not only when they are newly formed or during times of growth. It is not an exaggeration that all the parties in this book have had serious "oddball" problems to deal with. The discussion about organisation will deal with conventional aspects, such as internal structure and membership strength, but also how the parties deal with problematical members and activists.

In any discussion of leadership in extreme right parties, the concept of charisma immediately springs to mind. What will be looked at here, however, is not charismatic leadership as such. Partly because it is difficult to operationalise, but also because it is questionable how fruitful it is. Definitions of charisma, often inspired by the work of Max Weber, tend to be quite detailed and multidimensional, and end up being rather restrictive.[40] Also Panebianco's definition of a charismatic party is somewhat narrow for our purposes.[41] In political journalism, on the other hand, the epithet "charismatic" has been used rather frivolously, and applied to a wide range of politicians such as former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair,[42] Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond[43] and former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.[44]

This is not to say that charisma is irrelevant to contemporary politics – possible counter-examples include former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, and the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. It seems clear, however, that too narrow a focus on charisma would mean important omissions. A party leader can make a difference, positive or negative, quite irrespective of whether or not s/he meets a reasonably stringent definition of charisma. Therefore, the analysis of leadership will be broader, and focus on three main aspects. The first is the party leaders' general popular appeal – which is *not* synonymous with charisma. This will be looked at by referring to available poll and survey data. The second aspect of leadership is the ability to handle the media, and get the party message across. This is not least the case for new and/or small parties, which have to make good use of the media opportunities they get. The third aspect of leadership is the ability to maintain internal cohesion. This is a difficult, but important, task in parties which, as mentioned, often tend to attract extremists and oddballs. Also notwithstanding the most difficult individuals, extreme right parties are prone to internal conflicts which a leader needs to pre-empt and, when necessary, quell.

Thus, a comprehensive range of demand- as well as supply-side factors will be considered in this book. It can, however, already now be said that a key argument will be that internal supply-side factors are indispensable when it comes to understanding the successes, and failures, of extreme right parties. No matter how strong the demand, and how favourable the opportunity structures, a party with an extremist tradition, a manifesto with elements of racism and an incompetent leader, will not stand a chance. As already mentioned, it has been quite conclusively shown that extreme right parties will not get their votes as a straightforward outlet of protest, even from voters who oppose immigration and dislike the political establishment. Such voters are not any more irrational than other voters – they want parties that can make a difference. Parties which make it look credible that they, if given the chance, can deliver the kind of policies their voters want. Differently put: the demand may be there, but if the party cannot deliver the appropriate supply, it will not succeed.

The disposition of the remainder of the book is as follows. The next chapter will look at the demand-side factors outlined above, plus political opportunity structures. Then comes a chapter that deals with the extreme right tradition in the

three studied countries. The subsequent three chapters are devoted to internal supply-side factors, and provide a detailed account of the Scandinavian extreme right parties on a country-by-country basis. Each chapter will provide a historical overview, followed by an analysis of the ideological development, organisation and leadership. Then, in the final chapter, the findings will be put together into a conclusion.

Notes

1 Betz 1994: 27.
2 Betz 1994: 27f.
3 Betz 1994: 29f.
4 Betz 1994: 32.
5 Betz 1994: 33.
6 Kitschelt 1997: 4f.
7 Kitschelt 1997: 6ff.
8 Rydgren 2002b: 30, italics in original.
9 Kitschelt 1997: viif.
10 Kitschelt 1997: 112 (France), 239 (Germany), 254 (Britain).
11 See, for example, Mudde 2000: 178.
12 Kitschelt 2007.
13 Kitschelt 1997: 14–19.
14 Kitschelt 1997: 95–102.
15 Kitschelt 1997, Ch. 7. Predictions, or fears, of an extreme right breakthrough: e.g. Walker 1978: 7.
16 E.g. Sweden, according to Rydgren 2002a. See also Veugelers and Magnan 2005.
17 Carter 2005: 2–8.
18 Norris 2005: 214ff.; 271.
19 Rydgren 2002a (France), 2002b, 2006 (both Sweden), 2004 (Denmark).
20 Rydgren 2005.
21 Rydgren 2006: 13–22, 25ff.
22 Rydgren 2004: 477ff.
23 Rydgren 2005: 429ff.
24 Rydgren 2006: 22–25.
25 Eatwell 2003.
26 Mudde 2007: 202–217.
27 Mudde 2007: 217ff.
28 Mudde 2007: 219–224.
29 Mudde 2007: 232–255.
30 This is the conclusion reached by Walgrave and de Swert 2004, based on evidence from Belgium.
31 Mudde 2007: 256–276.
32 Betz 1994: 35; Kitschelt 1997: viii.
33 E.g. Rydgren 2008; Givens 2005, Ch. 4; Norris 2005, Ch. 8.
34 Compare Mudde 1999; Eatwell 2003.
35 E.g. Van Der Brug *et al.* 2005.
36 E.g. Lubbers *et al.* 2002: 364f.
37 Jackman and Volpert 1996: 516f.; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000, 2005; Dülmer and Klein 2005.
38 Compare Rydgren 2002b: 32.
39 See note 34 above.
40 Compare Eatwell 2007.

41 Panebianco 1988: 143–147.
42 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6506365.stm (accessed 4 April 2014).
43 www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/27/scottish-independence-unionists-appeal-heart-head (accessed 4 April 2014).
44 www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/artikel/88399:Liv–Sjael–De-10-mest-karismatiske-politikere (accessed 4 April 2014).

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4 The social, economic and political setting

In the previous chapter a number of theoretically derived background factors on the demand- and supply-sides were identified which, on their own or in combination, were argued to be conducive to extreme right success. This chapter covers three demand-side factors. First, immigration and attitudes to immigration; second, the state of the national economies, unemployment and the size of the tax burden; third, trust in the political system. In addition, two external supply-side factors will be considered, both related to opportunity structures. More specifically the electoral systems, and the degree of convergence between the established parties to the left and right of centre, will be looked at.

By necessity the account in this chapter will be somewhat superficial. It will not be possible to scrutinise in great detail the respective immigration or economic performance statistics according to every possible indicator. The evidence presented will, however, provide a summary of key indicators, which are all derived from the literature. Where possible the evidence will be presented in a comparative European context, so that the situation in the Scandinavian countries can be put into a broader perspective. An interim summary of the factors covered thus far will be provided in the concluding section of the chapter. The remaining factors, all on the supply-side, will be studied more in depth in subsequent chapters.

Immigration

Migration has become one of the most loaded and divisive political issues across Europe. Scandinavia is no exception. Labour immigration to the Scandinavian countries had already begun in the 1950s, initially at a modest level, but accelerated in the 1960s. To a significant extent this migration was from relatively closely located countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, large numbers moved from Finland to Sweden to find work. In 1980 a quarter of a million people born in Finland were resident in Sweden, amounting to just below 3 per cent of the Swedish population.[1] In addition Sweden also received labour immigration from Greece, Turkey and what then was Yugoslavia. This early phase of mostly labour immigration, which also affected Denmark, was not free of friction. There is anecdotal evidence of discrimination and conflicts, but there were no concerted protests and the level of public controversy was limited.

The era of labour immigration ended around 1970, with the introduction of restrictions on non-Nordic immigration. Sweden first introduced restrictions in 1967, and from 1972 labour immigration from non-Nordic countries in practice became impossible.[2] Denmark introduced restrictions in 1969, followed by a full stop in 1973. This meant that immigration in the following years was restricted to political refugees, with Sweden as the primary recipient. Denmark, however, started to receive more refugees following the introduction of a less restrictive immigration law in 1983.[3] Norway also started to receive increasing numbers of refugees in the 1980s.

The development thus sketched can be illustrated statistically. Table 4.1 reports asylum applications in absolute numbers for five-year periods from the mid-1980s to the late 2000s. The table shows how Sweden received the largest numbers of applications of the Scandinavian countries throughout the 1985–2009 period, often with overwhelming margins. It is worth noticing how Sweden in some periods received more applications in absolute terms than some countries with much larger populations, such as France or the Netherlands. The table also shows how asylum applications in the Scandinavian countries peaked in the first half of the 1990s, then declined, but increased again in the early 2000s.

The large number of asylum applications received by Sweden is further illustrated in Table 4.2, which reports the spread of applications among the EU15

Table 4.1 Asylum applications, 1985–2009, in EU15 plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. Absolute numbers, added together for five-year periods

	1985–1989	*1990–1994*	*1995–1999*	*2000–2004*	*2005–2009*
Denmark	29,985	44,780	28,330	36,425	12,400
Norway	23,200	30,025	24,045	67,065	48,818
Sweden	97,145	197,010	48,560	127,315	127,105
Austria	64,440	76,160	53,565	144,760	76,265
Belgium	29,705	87,120	93,380	111,980	70,605
Finland	340	11,375	6,905	14,930	15,960
France	178,655	184,590	112,515	239,870	187,480
Germany	455,255	1,337,175	543,045	324,145	127,865
Greece	27,800	10,875	11,775	26,900	82,240
Ireland	140	580	17,830	44,650	19,035
Italy	26,440	33,800	35,880	71,945	81,365
Luxembourg	400	960	5,620	5,475	2,510
Netherlands	46,355	151,145	171,050	118,320	65,305
Portugal	735	3,655	1,410	935	770
Spain	15,690	53,130	28,725	34,855	25,060
UK	40,280	205,230	223,280	355,430	146,960
Switzerland	68,455	135,943	141,800	90,408	59,256
Iceland	15	40	0	0	235
Total	1,105,035	2,563,593	1,547,715	1,815,408	1,149,234

Source: Based on data and reports from Eurostat (www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). Data are not always exactly comparable over time and across different counties.

countries plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. Between 2005 and 2009, Sweden accounted for more than 1 in every 10 asylum applications made in these 18 countries. Throughout the 1985–2009 period the Swedish contribution was steadily over 5 per cent, except for the second half of the 1990s. Over the whole period Sweden received 7.3 per cent of all applications, the fourth highest proportion of the 18 countries reported in the table. Denmark and Norway stood for smaller contributions in absolute as well as relative terms, but both countries accounted for over 2 per cent of all applications in the second half of the 1980s as well as the first half of the 2000s. There was, however, a clear drop in applications to Denmark in the last five-year period in absolute as well as relative terms, something which will be further discussed in Chapter 7.

In Table 4.3 all the statistics from the previous two tables are added together, and reported relative to the respective national populations, as well as the total number of asylum applications to all 18 countries. The countries appear in the table according to a rank ordering based on the proportions of asylum applications relative to their respective populations. The Swedish position, already apparent in the earlier tables, is reinforced in Table 4.3. Throughout the 1985–2009 period, Sweden received over half a million asylum applications, equivalent to 6.45 per cent of her national population in 2009. This is the highest proportion of all the countries reported in the table, marginally ahead of Switzerland. Norway is in fourth place overall, nearly 404,000

Table 4.2 Asylum applications, 1985–2009, in per cent of EU15 plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. Percentage of all asylum seekers in these 18 countries

	1985–1989	*1990–1994*	*1995–1999*	*2000–2004*	*2005–2009*	*1985–2009*
Denmark	2.7	1.7	1.8	2.0	1.1	1.9
Norway	2.1	1.2	1.6	3.7	4.2	2.4
Sweden	8.8	7.7	3.1	7.0	11.1	7.3
Austria	5.8	3.0	3.5	8.0	6.6	5.1
Belgium	2.7	3.4	6.0	6.2	6.1	4.8
Finland	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.8	1.4	0.6
France	16.2	7.2	7.3	13.2	16.3	11.0
Germany	41.2	52.2	35.1	17.9	11.1	34.1
Greece	2.5	0.4	0.8	1.5	7.2	2.0
Ireland	0.0	0.0	1.2	2.5	1.7	1.0
Italy	2.4	1.3	2.3	4.0	7.1	3.0
Luxembourg	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2
Netherlands	4.2	5.9	11.1	6.5	5.7	6.7
Portugal	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Spain	1.4	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.2	1.9
UK	3.6	8.0	14.4	19.6	12.8	11.9
Switzerland	6.2	5.3	9.2	5.0	5.2	6.1
Iceland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Based on data and reports from Eurostat (www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).

applications and 2.43 percentage points behind Sweden. Denmark is third of our studied countries and ninth overall; around 41,000 applications and 1.26 percentage points behind Norway.

It goes without saying that these large numbers of asylum applications have had an impact in Scandinavia as well as across Europe. Not all asylum applications are successful, but many are, especially as it has often been possible to appeal against rejected applications. Asylum seekers stay in the application country until their case is resolved, a process that sometimes takes many years. In addition, successful applicants are often followed by family members.

The influx of immigrants is illustrated in Table 4.4, which reports the proportions on non-national inhabitants in 12 European countries in the year 2000. Again, Sweden stands out in a Scandinavian comparison, with 5.5 per cent non-nationals resident in the country. Sweden as well as Denmark report proportions of non-nationals above the total average for the 12 countries included in the table, while Norway falls marginally below the average. These figures, however, include immigrants from the other Nordic countries. The table also reports the proportions of non-nationals from outside Europe (excluding North America). Of the Scandinavian countries Denmark had the highest proportion of

Table 4.3 Asylum applications 1985–2009, in EU15 plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. Total number, percentage of respective own population and percentage of all asylum seekers in the 18 countries combined

	Country	*Total number*	*Percentage of own population (2009)*	*Percentage of all asylum seekers*
1	Sweden	597,135	6.45	7.30
2	Switzerland	495,862	6.43	6.06
3	Austria	415,190	4.97	5.07
4	Norway	193,153	4.02	2.36
5	Belgium	392,790	3.65	4.80
6	Germany	2,787,485	3.40	34.07
7	Netherlands	552,175	3.35	6.75
8	Luxembourg	14,965	3.03	0.18
9	Denmark	151,920	2.76	1.85
10	Ireland	82,235	1.85	1.01
11	UK	971,180	1.58	11.87
12	France	903,110	1.45	11.03
13	Greece	159,590	1.41	1.95
14	Finland	49,510	0.92	0.60
15	Italy	249,430	0.41	3.05
16	Spain	157,460	0.34	1.92
17	Portugal	7,505	0.07	0.09
18	Iceland	290	0.09	0.00
	Total, all above countries	8,180,985	2.01	100.00

Source: Based on data and reports from Eurostat (www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). Data are not always exactly comparable over time and across different countries.

non-European nationals, with 1.6 per cent – marginally above the total average. Sweden was exactly on, and Norway 0.4 percentage points below, the average.

Of course, the statistics reported do not tell the whole story. Migration statistics are complex, and it would be possible to devote a whole book to the development of migration in the Scandinavian countries since the Second World War. The above reported data do, however, point in a fairly straightforward direction. Sweden, Denmark and Norway have received sizeable numbers of immigrants in recent decades. Sweden stands out as having received the highest numbers of asylum seekers, in absolute terms as well as relative to the own population. Denmark and Norway have also received large numbers. The trend over time is that the influx started in Sweden in the 1970s, with Denmark and Norway following suit a few years later. Denmark drastically reduced its intake in the 2000s. Nevertheless, immigration has been sizeable in the three countries studied in this book.

Attitudes to immigration

The next task is to see how immigration has been received by those already residing in the respective countries. To look into this we will turn to survey data. The problem is that, although there is no shortage of national studies, broadly comparative time series data do not exist in abundance. The data situation is best in Sweden, where the national SOM surveys have included questions about attitudes to immigrants and immigration since the early 1990s. The indicator with the longest continuous time series is a question where respondents are asked what they think about the proposal to receive fewer refugees into Sweden. These

Table 4.4 Foreign population in 12 European countries, as of 1 January 2000. Percentage of the national population with foreign citizenship, and percentage with citizenship outside Europe (excluding North America)

	Total non-national population	*Non-national population from outside Europe (excl. N. America)*
Denmark	4.9	1.6
Norway	4.0	1.1
Sweden	5.5	1.5
Belgium	8.8	1.9
Finland	1.7	0.4
France	5.6	2.8
Germany	8.9	1.5
Italy	2.2	1.3
Netherlands	4.1	1.5
Portugal	1.9	1.2
Spain	2.0	1.1
UK	3.9	1.6
Average	4.5	1.5

Source: Taken from European Social Statistics; Migration. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002.

data have been analysed and reported on several occasions by Swedish political scientist Marie Demker.

The results reported by Demker show that majorities, or at least clear pluralities, consistently respond positively to the proposal to receive fewer refugees. In 2012 the difference was 16 percentage points between those who agreed with the proposal, and those who disagreed with it – 45 per cent thought that it was a good, or fairly good, proposal, while 29 per cent responded that it was a bad, or very bad, proposal. This represented a break in a recent trend towards less negative attitudes to the admission of refugees. The peak of refugee scepticism was 1992, when 65 per cent agreed with the proposal while 16 per cent disagreed – a difference of 49 points. Despite the long-term trend towards less negativity, however, the pattern is clear. There has always been a plurality of responses agreeing with the proposal to accept fewer refugees. The size of the difference between the proportions agreeing and disagreeing has varied, but it has always been in the same direction, and statistically significant.[4]

In Denmark and Norway data are scarcer, and do not to the same extent allow comparisons over time. An in-depth study by the Danish political scientist Hans Jørgen Nielsen, based on secondary analysis of various data sources from the late 1990s and early 2000s, paints a rather diverse picture. In one of the studies cited by Nielsen, a survey from 1999 commissioned by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), Danes come across as relatively, but not uniquely, negative to immigration in a European comparison. There is, however, a great deal of variation depending on the indicator used. Compared to other countries, Danes are immigration-sceptical in terms of their attitudes to minorities. Danes are also disproportionately prone to demand assimilation, and they react more negatively than other countries to mixing with minorities. Other indicators, however, complicate the picture. Danes were more willing than most other countries to accept support for minorities, less prone to advocate repatriation and more optimistic regarding the prospects of successful multiculturalism. Nevertheless there is a consistent difference to Sweden, whose population consistently is more positive (or less negative) to immigration than that of Denmark – and, indeed, also compared to most other countries. At the same time, Nielsen points to methodological problems with the EUMC-commissioned study, and warns against far-reaching conclusions.[5] There is, in addition, a scarcity of time series data from Denmark.

In Norway an annual time series of questions measuring attitudes to immigration was started in 2002 by *Statistisk Sentralbyrå* (SSB). The data quite clearly indicate that Norwegians became more positive, or less negative, to immigrants and immigration during the 2002–2012 period. An example is the statement that immigrants abuse the welfare system, to which respondents were almost exactly evenly split in 2002 (41 per cent agreeing and 43 per cent disagreeing). From then on, however, the proportions agreeing declined, while the proportions disagreeing grew. The size of the gap has fluctuated, but the proportions disagreeing have constantly been significantly higher than the proportions agreeing. In 2012 the difference was 17 percentage points (33 per cent agreeing and 50 per cent disagreeing).

Similar patterns emerge with other indicators. The statement that immigrants are a source of insecurity in society was met with approval by a narrow plurality in 2002 (45 per cent agreeing and 41 per cent disagreeing), but in 2012 the proportion agreeing had sunk to 33 per cent, while the percentage disagreeing had gone up to 54; a difference of 21 percentage points. The statement that immigrants enrich the Norwegian culture was met with approval by clear majorities throughout the 2002–2012 period, but also here a trend towards more immigration-positive attitudes is clearly observable. In 2002 the percentage difference between those agreeing and disagreeing with the statement was 41 points; 10 years later the gap had grown to 58 points (73 per cent agreeing and 15 per cent disagreeing). The overall picture from the SSB data is that Norwegians tend to be positive rather than negative to immigration, and that these positive attitudes have strengthened over time.[6]

It is, however, difficult to assess and contextualise the Scandinavian opinion situation on the basis of national surveys. A further problem is the lack of long-term time series data, Sweden being the only, partial, exception. Comparative data were for a long time unavailable, but this has been remedied in recent decades by the World Values Survey (WVS) and, more recently, the European Social Survey (ESS). These data are not entirely unproblematic either, however. The ESS surveys do not go further back than 2002. The WVS surveys do go further back in time, but have several gaps in terms of which countries are covered at the various time points, as can be seen in Table 4.5 below. Although the table has three time points, Denmark and Norway are only covered by one of those time points, while data for Sweden are available for all three time points.

Nevertheless, the WVS data are not without interest. Sweden, the only country where the table allows comparisons over time, shows a trend towards more immigration-positive attitudes. Sweden comes across as immigration sceptical in 1996, but then unequivocally moved to more immigration-positive attitudes. The WVS data suggest that Sweden by some margin has been the most immigration positive of the Scandinavian countries after the turn of the century. It does seem, however, as if the pro-immigration climate in Sweden has emerged in the 2000s, and is not a long-term phenomenon. Norway, where data are only available for 1996, comes across as the least immigration-negative country in that year. Denmark, on the other hand, is by some distance the most immigration-sceptical country at its only time point, 1999–2000. Indeed, the Danish percentages from that time point indicate the most immigration-negative opinion climate for any country in the whole table.

The European Social Survey (ESS) does not go further back in time than 2002, but on the other hand provides quite complete information from that year onwards. Some ESS surveys include a wide range of questions measuring opinions related to migration and integration, while a smaller number of relevant questions appear in consecutive surveys.[7] Table 4.6 reports national averages in 15 European countries from an additive index based on three questions: whether respondents think immigrants are good or bad for the country's economy; whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life; and

Table 4.5 Attitudes to immigration in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 1996–2006. Answers to the question: "How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?"

1996	*Let anyone*	*If there are jobs*	*Strict limits*	*Prohibit*	*Total*	*Balance*	*n*
Denmark	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Norway	5	42	51	2	100	−6	1114
Sweden	9	33	57	1	100	−16	975
1999–2000	*Let anyone*	*If there are jobs*	*Strict limits*	*Prohibit*	*Total*	*Balance*	*n*
Denmark	7	24	66	3	100	−38	989
Norway	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sweden	16	54	29	1	100	+40	967
2005–2006	*Let anyone*	*If there are jobs*	*Strict limits*	*Prohibit*	*Total*	*Balance*	*n*
Denmark	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Norway	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sweden	17	54	28	1	100	+41	976

Source: World Values Survey, q. E143. Detailed response alternatives: let anyone come; let people come as long as there are jobs available; set strict limits on how many foreigners can come; prohibit people from other countries from coming. The balance measures indicate the total difference between "let anyone" + "if there are jobs" on the one hand, and "strict limits" + "prohibit" on the other.

Table 4.6 Attitudes to immigration in 15 European countries, 2002–2010. Average scores on a scale from 0 to 10, where low numbers indicate scepticism, and high numbers positive attitudes, to immigration

	ESS 2002–2003	*ESS 2004–2005*	*ESS 2006–2007*	*ESS 2008–2010*
Austria	5.4	4.9	4.8	n/a
Belgium	4.9	4.8	5.0	5.2
Switzerland	5.9	5.6	5.8	6.0
Germany	5.4	4.9	5.0	5.4
Denmark	5.4	5.3	5.8	5.7
Spain	5.4	5.6	5.5	5.2
Finland	6.0	5.8	6.0	6.1
France	4.9	4.7	4.8	5.0
UK	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.6
Greece	3.5	3.7	n/a	3.4
Ireland	5.3	5.8	5.9	5.5
Netherlands	5.2	5.1	5.5	5.5
Norway	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.7
Portugal	4.8	4.3	4.9	5.0
Sweden	6.3	6.0	6.2	6.3
Combined average	5.2	5.1	5.4	5.3

Source: European Social Survey, respective years. Entries are average scores based on responses to three questions: "Would you say it is generally good or bad for [country's] economy that people come to live here from other countries?", "Would you say that [country's] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?" and "Is [country] made a worse or better place to live by people coming here from other countries?". Respondents are asked to answer each question according to a scale from 0 to 10, where low numbers indicate a response negative, and high numbers positive, to immigration. Responses to these three questions have been added together and divided by three, to produce a score from which national averages have been calculated. The number of responses vary between 1,209 (Portugal 2002) and 2,697 (Germany 2002). Standard deviations vary between 1.568 (Netherlands 2006) and 2.289 (UK 2008).

whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live. Responses to each question are given on a scale from 0 to 10, where low numbers indicate immigration scepticism and high numbers a positive attitude. The entries in the table should be interpreted in accordance with this scale. The resulting average scores are quite compressed. The lowest and highest scores are 3.4 and 6.3 respectively, and the vast majority of scores vary between 4.5 and 6.0. Still, due to the relatively high number of cases (never below 1,200) and low standard deviations (never above 2.29), all differences of 0.2 or higher are significant at the 0.05 level.

The ESS data reinforce some, but not all, of the impressions from the previous table based on WVS data. Sweden stands out as the most immigration positive of all the countries included in the table. Sweden is the only country with scores that never go below 6, and has the highest score at each time point. The only other countries to ever reach the 6 mark are Finland and Switzerland. Norway and Denmark are closely tied together somewhat further behind, with

identical scores on all time points except 2006. Also these two countries, however, are above the total averages, suggesting that the Scandinavian countries have a more immigration-positive opinion climate than Europe as a whole. The most immigration-sceptical countries are Greece, where the scores never reach 4, and the UK, whose scores never reach the midpoint of 5. As for trends over time during the relatively brief time period covered in the table, Sweden shows a curvilinear pattern, with high scores at the beginning and the end of the time series, and slightly lower (but still high in comparative terms) scores in between. Denmark and Norway, however, display a trend (albeit not linear) towards more positive attitudes over time.

The combined evidence strongly suggests that, at least in the 2000s, Sweden is the most immigration positive of the Scandinavian countries – in fact the most immigration positive in Europe. In the 1990s the limited comparative evidence suggests that the climate in Sweden was more negative than that in Norway, but since the turn of the century Sweden stands out in all comparisons. This does not mean that Sweden is an idyllic haven of tolerance and successful integration. Much depends on the indicators used, and the SOM surveys suggest that there are in fact constant pluralities agreeing with the proposal to allow fewer political refugees into the country. According to the comparative indicators, however, Sweden stands out in an international comparison, at least in the 2000s. The image of Denmark as xenophobic gets some limited support from the WVS data in Table 4.5, but the ESS data presented in Table 4.6 tell a different story. Still, the ESS data from the 2000s do suggest that the Scandinavian countries can be split into two groups, with Sweden as immigration positive, and Denmark and Norway as somewhat more sceptical. None of the three Scandinavian countries report a trend towards more scepticism. If the first and last time points are compared, Sweden displays stability while the trend in Denmark and Norway is towards increased positivity.

The economy

One of the most lasting stereotypes of the Scandinavian countries is that they have been able to defy the convention that an extensive welfare system and an interventionist economy are incompatible with economic prosperity. The measurement of economic performance is a science it itself, and the indicator used in Figure 4.1, annual percentage growth of GDP, is by no means unproblematic. With data taken from OECD, however, it provides the basic information needed for the overview we are looking for here. The figure reports the trends in GDP growth since 1984 in the three studied Scandinavian countries, plus the annual averages in the EU15 countries plus Norway. The figure is somewhat congested and not straightforward to interpret, but it is possible to extract some relevant information from it.

Denmark enjoyed a growth rate above the European average in the mid-1980s, briefly ahead of the other Scandinavian countries. In the late 1980s, however, Denmark dipped to well below the EU15 + Norway average. A

recovery followed in the early 1990s, a period when most other European economies suffered a sharp decline, and from 1992 onwards the Danish economy has largely followed the overall European trend, albeit at a level mostly marginally below the EU15+Norway average. The Norwegian economy suffered a decline in the late 1980s, but then recovered. Like Denmark it has for the most part followed the overall trend among the EU15 countries plus Norway but, unlike Denmark, at a level marginally above that of the other European countries. Sweden, finally, suffered a serious recession in the early 1990s. A recovery started in the mid-1990s, and from then on Sweden largely followed the overall EU15+Norway trend. Figure 4.1 also shows that all three Scandinavian countries were affected by the sharp recession that hit most of Europe in 2008–2009.

The trends in GDP growth are to some extent reflected in the unemployment rates, which are reported in Figure 4.2. This graph is somewhat easier on the eye than the figure reporting GDP growth rates, due to the fact that the annual fluctuations in unemployment have not been quite as sharp. Essentially, the figure suggests a tendency for unemployment to linger for some time after the GDP growth rate has started to pick up. The Swedish unemployment rates were well below the EU15 + Norway average until the mid-1990s, but from then on followed the aforementioned average very closely. Denmark was continuously below the EU15 + Norway average from the mid-1990s onwards, while Norway was below the same average more or less throughout the 1984–2009 period.

Thus, the overall picture of the Scandinavian economies is somewhat mixed. In terms of GDP growth there are significant fluctuations without any clear pattern, but the trends largely follow the EU15 + Norway average. In terms of unemployment Denmark and Norway have fared better than Europe as a whole, while Sweden has largely been on par with the EU15 + Norway average. None of our three studied Scandinavian countries has suffered a serious economic crisis in modern times. Against this it should be remembered that the strength of the Norwegian economy is largely explained by its oil resources, and Sweden has not in recent decades lived up to its earlier reputation as a small but powerful economy. Between 1870 and the 1960s, Sweden's overall growth rate was only exceeded by that of Japan.[8] But, as is apparent from Figure 4.1, this has changed in more recent decades.

Another much-discussed aspect of the Scandinavian economies is the extensive welfare systems, with a large public sector and high levels of taxation. The overall annual tax burden, all taxes as percentages of GDP, in Scandinavia, EU15 and OECD is reported in Table 4.7. The Swedish position as a high tax country is clearly borne out by the table. Since the mid-1960s, Sweden has never been outside the top two heaviest tax-burdened countries in the OECD. Denmark was not far behind, and since the 1980s to date, the position as the country with the highest tax burden in the OECD has been a two-horse race between Sweden and Denmark. In both these countries the total amount of taxes paid has often exceeded 50 per cent of GDP. Norway has been somewhat behind, but always in the OECD top 10. None of our studied Scandinavian countries has had a tax burden below 40 per cent since the 1970s.

Figure 4.1 Annual percentage growth of Gross Domestic Product (expenditure approach) in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and EU15 plus Norway, 1984–2009 (source: Data extracted on 21 February 2011 16:42 UTC (GMT) from OECD iLibrary (www.oecd-ilibrary.org/)).



Figure 4.2 Unemployment rates in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and EU15 plus Norway, 1984–2009. Percentage of workforce (source: OECD (2010): "Labour Market Statistics: Labour force statistics by sex and age: indicators", OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database). doi: 10.1787/data-00310-en (accessed on 21 February 2011)).

Table 4.7 Overall tax burden in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, EU15 and OECD, selected years 1955–2005, percentages of GDP. Figures in brackets indicate rank positions in OECD

	Denmark	*Norway*	*Sweden*	*Average EU15*	*Average OECD*
1955	23.3 (13)	28.3 (5)	25.5 (9)	26.0	24.0
1960	25.2 (12)	31.2 (3)	27.2 (9)	26.0	24.6
1965	30.0 (9)	29.6 (10)	35.0 (1)	27.6	25.5
1970	38.4 (1)	34.5 (5)	38.2 (2)	29.5	27.6
1975	38.4 (5)	39.2 (4)	41.6 (1)	32.1	29.5
1980	43.0 (3)	42.4 (4)	46.9 (1)	34.8	31.2
1985	46.1 (2)	42.6 (5)	47.8 (1)	37.4	32.7
1990	46.5 (2)	41.0 (7)	52.7 (1)	38.0	33.9
1995	48.8 (1)	40.9 (9)	48.1 (2)	38.8	34.9
2000	49.4 (2)	42.6 (6)	52.6 (1)	40.4	36.2
2005	50.3 (2)	43.7 (6)	50.7 (1)	39.7	36.2

Source: OECD Factbook 2008: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. Public Finance, Taxes, Total tax revenue.

The detailed reasons for the high tax burdens in the Scandinavian countries are complex, and not in a direct way linked to the development of welfare provisions. The high tax burden in Sweden in the 1990s and early 2000s, for example, coincided with cuts in the welfare system, and the taxes were to a significant extent used to pay off a national debt, which had caused a major crisis in the early 1990s. Comparisons of tax burdens are, furthermore, not straightforward. Among other things, it depends on how the respective social welfare systems are organised.[9] Even bearing these caveats in mind, the overall impression of the Scandinavian countries as high-tax economies stands. Sweden and Denmark have the highest tax burdens, with Norway a little bit further behind. All three are well above the EU15 and OECD averages. This has been the situation for several decades; one has to go back to the early 1960s to find a different pattern.

Turnout and political trust

The final demand-side factor to be considered is trust in the established political system. It has become something of a truism that fatigue and critical attitudes to the political system and establishment in Western democracies have grown drastically in recent decades. A closer look at available data suggests that the situation is in fact not as clear-cut as is often believed. There are significant country variations, and the picture also varies according to the indicator used. The following does not claim to be an exhaustive investigation into trends and levels of political trust in Scandinavia, but it will look at some indicators and put them into a longitudinal as well as comparative context.

The first indicator to be looked at is election turnout. Table 4.8 reports average turnouts by decade between 1970 and 2009, and for the entire 1970–2009 period.

Table 4.8 Election turnout in EU15 plus Norway. Averages by decade 1970–2009, plus entire period[1]

	1970–1979	*1980–1989*	*1990–1999*	*2000–2009*	*1970–2009*
Austria	92.3	91.5	83.0	80.5	86.9
Belgium	93.0	93.8	91.5	91.3	92.5
Denmark	87.7	86.0	84.5	86.1	86.3
Finland	78.2	73.9	67.2	68.8	72.7
France	82.3	71.7	73.4	62.4	72.4
Germany	90.9	86.6	79.7	75.9	82.6
Greece	80.3	83.2	79.6	74.1	78.8
Ireland	76.4	72.7	67.3	64.8	70.8
Italy	92.3	88.9	85.5	81.8	87.0
Luxembourg	89.5	88.1	87.4	90.3	88.8
Netherlands	83.5	83.6	75.9	79.8	81.3
Norway	81.5	83.1	77.0	76.4	79.6
Portugal	87.5	78.0	65.2	62.6	73.7
Spain	72.5	73.4	77.5	72.7	73.9
Sweden	90.4	89.1	85.0	81.0	87.2
UK	74.5	74.0	74.6	60.3	71.2
EU15+Norway	85.4	82.1	78.8	75.8	81.2

Note

1 In cases of bicameral systems, entries refer to second chamber/lower house elections only. Where possible, turnouts include blank and invalid votes.

As can be seen from the table, all three Scandinavian countries report a long-term declining trend in the 40 years covered by the table. The decline is not continuous, and would be even less so if every individual election was reported. Indeed, the average turnout in Denmark increased somewhat in the first decade of the 2000s compared to the 1990s.

Still, the long-term pattern is clear. In Denmark and Sweden the highest turnouts occurred in the 1970s; in Norway it happened in the 1980s. The Norwegian increase in the 1980s was followed by a clear decline in the 1990s and a further drop in the 2000s. In Sweden, the trend is clear, and was accelerated from the 1990s onwards. The trend has been somewhat reversed in recent elections, with increased turnouts in 2006 and, especially, 2010. The latter election is not included in the table, but the long-term Swedish trend would still be one of decline if the 2010 turnout of 84.6 per cent had been included in the calculations. Denmark is one of the Scandinavian countries where turnout has stood up best, with an average of 86.1 per cent in the 2000s, well ahead of Sweden's 81 per cent in the same decade. In fact, the Danish average in the 2000s was the third highest in any of the 16 countries covered in the table, surpassed only by Belgium and Luxembourg, where voting is compulsory. Furthermore, the Danish 10-year averages vary within a range of 3.2 percentage points, to be compared with 9.4 points in Sweden and 6.7 points in Norway.

The downward trend is not a specifically Scandinavian phenomenon. The decline is not always continuous, and the rate of decline varies, but the general pattern is clear in almost every country. The only exceptions are Luxembourg and Spain. Indeed, although the Scandinavian countries follow the broader international trend, they mostly do so at higher levels than the other European countries. In the 2000s Sweden as well as Norway and Denmark are above the overall EU15 + Norway average. But that the international decline has affected Scandinavia is obvious. The most clear-cut case is Sweden, whose turnouts were comparable to countries with compulsory voting in the 1970s, but has since then declined steadily.

Of course, there are validity problems with turnout as an indicator of trust. Indeed, it could be argued that voters for extreme right parties can express their dissatisfaction by turning up to vote for a party that channels their criticism. Thus, we also need to look at other indicators. There is no shortage of survey research on political trust, but studies allowing comparisons across different countries are relatively recent. In a study from 1999 the Swedish psephologist Sören Holmberg looks at the development of the trust in political institutions from the 1960s/1970s to the 1990s in the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Despite problems of methodology and comparability, Holmberg's results are not without interest. His verdict is that trust declined somewhat, but not very drastically, in Denmark and Norway between the 1970s and 1990s. Sweden, however, experienced a drastic and near-continuous decline in trust between 1968 and 1994. The only non-Nordic comparison, the Netherlands, can boast a reverse trend, with higher levels of trust in the 1990s than in the 1970s and 1980s.

The one indicator that allows some international comparisons, a statement about parties only being interested in votes and not their opinions, is comparable across Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. From the 1970s to the 1990s the levels of trust according to this indicator were lowest in Sweden and highest in the Netherlands, with Norway in between.[10] According to more recent research by Holmberg, the Swedish levels of trust according to this indicator reached a low point in 1998. They then recovered, and in 2010 nearly half of the respondents, 44 per cent, disagreed with the statement.[11]

More recent comparative research by Pippa Norris provides an update as well as a broadened overview. Her analysis is based on Eurobarometers, which means that Norway is not included (for most indicators, Norris reports data from the EU15 countries). In terms of trust in the national government, Sweden moved towards increasing trust between 1997 and 2008, while Denmark registered a marginal decline. This, however, is based on a comparison between the two endpoints of the timescale, with significant fluctuations in between. Both Sweden and Denmark compare favourably with most other European countries, especially so Sweden.

A similar picture emerges when the indicators are trust in the national parliament and trust in the political parties: positive differences between the two chronological endpoints, and levels higher than in most of the other EU15 countries. In 2007 and 2008 Denmark scored highest of all the reported countries in terms of trust in parliament as well as parties. Sweden also compares favourably with most the other EU15 countries, but is well behind Denmark, which also

reports a high increase in, and level of, satisfaction with its democratic performance. In 2007, a massive 94 per cent of Danes claimed to be satisfied with the democratic performance in their country. Closest behind Denmark were the Netherlands with 80 per cent and Spain with 77 (no data for any other Scandinavian country are reported for this indicator).

On the whole, Norris's research suggests that the levels of trust in the Scandinavian countries are high in a Western/southern European comparison. The long-term trends are best described as stable or increasing levels of trust. Holmberg's evidence suggesting a virtual collapse of the levels of trust in Sweden is not supported by the data presented by Norris, which of course are based on different indicators. Most notable, perhaps, is the high and increasing levels of trust in Denmark. Towards the end of the first decade of the 2000s, Denmark was at or near the very top in terms of political trust compared to the other countries of Western and southern Europe.[12]

The leading position of Denmark is also borne out by data from the European Social Survey from the 2000s, as shown in Table 4.9. The entries in the table are based on two variables: trust in the national parliament and trust in the respective

Table 4.9 Political trust in 15 European countries, 2002–2008. Average scores on an index from 0 to 10, where low numbers indicate no or little trust, and high numbers high levels of trust

	ESS 2002–2003	*ESS 2004–2005*	*ESS 2006–2007*	*ESS 2008–2010*
Austria	4.3	4.0	4.1	n/a
Belgium	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.3
Switzerland	5.3	5.1	5.3	5.3
Germany	3.9	3.6	3.6	4.0
Denmark	5.8	5.9	6.0	6.1
Spain	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.2
Finland	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.4
France	4.1	3.9	3.8	4.0
UK	4.2	3.9	3.8	3.9
Greece	4.1	4.2	n/a	3.0
Ireland	4.1	4.4	4.3	3.5
Netherlands	5.0	4.6	5.2	5.3
Norway	5.1	4.8	5.0	5.2
Portugal	3.6	2.9	3.2	3.0
Sweden	5.3	4.8	5.0	5.2
Combined average	4.6	4.4	4.6	4.5

Source: European Social Surveys, respective years. Entries are average scores based on responses to two questions: "Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means that you have complete trust. First, [country's] parliament?…" [As fourth item]: "…politicians?". Responses to these two questions have been added together and then divided by two, to produce a score from which national averages have been calculated. Low scores indicate low levels of trust, and high scores high levels of trust. The number of responses varies between 1,394 (Portugal 2002) and 2,826 (Germany 2002). Standard deviations vary between 1.728 (Switzerland 2002) and 2.399 (Greece 2002).

country's politicians, and have been calculated the same way as the scores on attitudes to immigration reported in Table 4.6. As was the case with attitudes to immigration, the average scores tend to be concentrated closely to the midpoint of the 11-degree scale on which the variables are based. Still, the numbers of cases are high enough, and standard deviations low enough, for differences of 0.2 or higher to always to be significant at the 0.05 level.

The table tells its own clear story. Denmark has the highest levels of trust of all reported countries at all four time points, and also steadily increasing scores. The other Scandinavian countries also compare favourably with the rest of Western and southern Europe, but at levels clearly below those of Denmark. Sweden and Norway, whose scores are identical at three out of the four time points, dip to below the midpoint 5 in 2004–2005. They are still above the total average, and if Finland is also taken into account, trust in the Nordic countries (i.e. Scandinavia plus Finland) must be regarded as high in a Western/southern European comparison. The only non-Nordic country to consistently score above 5 is Switzerland; Netherlands is the only other non-Nordic country to ever do so.

To summarise the evidence from this section, the Scandinavian countries can boast relatively high levels of turnout and trust in a European comparison. There is no justification to portray our studied countries as some sort of haven full of participating and trusting satisfied citizens, but for the most part they compare favourably with the non-Nordic EU15 countries. The trend over time is best described as stable, with the exception of Denmark, where increasing levels of trust are apparent in the 2000s. Indeed, the Danish situation, with stable and high turnouts and high and rising levels of political trust, stands out in an international comparison.

Opportunity structures

Two main forms of opportunity structures are of relevance when assessing the conditions for success for extreme right parties: institutional and political. The most important institutional opportunity structures are the electoral systems. Essentially, the less severe hurdles the electoral systems have against the entry of new parties, the more favourable the opportunity structures for new challenger parties, such as extreme right ones.

All three Scandinavian countries have unicameral parliaments. In Norway this has always been the case; in Denmark and Sweden the upper house was abolished in 1953 and 1970, respectively. The parliamentary term is four years, although Sweden had three-year election periods between 1970 and 1994. In Denmark premature dissolutions of parliament can be made by the prime minister (formally by the head of State), a prerogative that has been used relatively often, and has resulted in a total of 25 elections between 1945 and 2010; to be compared with 20 in Sweden and 16 in Norway during the same period. Premature dissolution is possible also in Sweden but is a very rare occurrence; the most recent such election was held in 1958. In Norway the four-year election period is completely fixed.

All three countries have proportional election systems with party lists in multi-member constituencies. In order to increase proportionality, Denmark, Sweden (since 1970) and Norway (since 1989) have additional/compensatory seats in addition to the fixed constituency seats. In Denmark only parties with more than 2 per cent of the national vote are eligible for additional seats. In Norway the criterion is 4 per cent of the national vote. In both countries parties below the national threshold are allowed to keep any "normal" constituency seats they may have earned. This has happened relatively frequently in Norway, but only rarely in Denmark, which means that in the latter country the 2 per cent criterion in practice works as a representational threshold. Sweden has had a representational threshold of 4 per cent since 1970. Parties below 4 per cent nationally are entitled to fixed constituency seats only in constituencies where they reach 12 per cent of the vote; this rule has so far never been applicable.

A few other points are of relevance for the remainder of this book. Sweden is the only country to allow a person to be a candidate in more than one constituency. This means that it is possible to rely on the appeal of one popular personality across the whole country. Smaller parties sometimes present a "national list", i.e. an identical list in every constituency. This can be because the party has difficulties in finding sufficient numbers of suitable candidates, but also because it gives the central leadership more control over the selection process. Personal voting is optional in Denmark, but relatively frequently used. The numbers of personal votes are noted by media commentators, and are a source of prestige in the parties.[13] Sweden has had a form of personal voting since 1998. Earlier, Sweden had what effectively amounted to a closed list system where voters had no practical influence on which of a party's candidates were elected. Norway has had a closed list system all along. Sweden has held parliamentary, regional and local elections on the same date since 1970; in Denmark and Norway parliamentary and subnational elections are held separately.

In summary, Sweden has the most restrictive electoral system of our three studied countries. The 4 per cent threshold in existence since 1970 has only 1 exception, which has never been of practical relevance. Norway had no formal threshold before 1989, and still lets parties below the then introduced 4 per cent threshold keep any constituency seats they have won. The Danish threshold of 2 per cent is lower than most formal thresholds in other countries, and also here parties below the threshold are allowed to keep constituency seats they have won. This means that, with Sweden as the possible exception, the Scandinavian countries are on the whole relatively accommodating for new and small parties.

Another institutional opportunity structure is the public funding of political parties. Scandinavia has a long tradition of generous party subsidies. Sweden introduced state subsidies to the national organisations of the parties represented in parliament in the 1960s. Norway followed suit in 1970, while Denmark took until 1987 to do so. Norway and Denmark had, however, already provided public funding to the parties' parliamentary groups in the 1960s. Sweden introduced local and regional party subsidies in the early 1970s. In 1972 Sweden also introduced changes in the system to slow down the impact of increases and decreases

in electoral support. A limited subsidy was also introduced to parties outside parliament, which had received over 2.5 per cent of the vote in the most recent parliamentary election. Norway introduced seat-based local and regional subsidies in 1975, while Denmark has not yet introduced any subsidies at subnational levels. The size of the subsidies has grown significantly in all three countries.[14]

Thus, although all three studied countries have some form of public funding of political parties, it is Norway and Sweden that have the oldest, and most generous, subsidies. The normal expectation is that public funding of political parties could be expected to preserve the dominance of the established parties, as it gives them resources to fight any new challenger parties.[15] On the other hand, the subsidies can benefit challenger parties as soon as they qualify for them. Not least can subnational subsidies benefit new parties, if they gain local and regional representation before they make a national breakthrough.[16]

Moving on to political opportunity structures, the key variable is the ideological distance between the mainstream parties on the left and right. If the parties on the left and right move closer to each other, it creates available spaces on both sides in the party system, spaces that can be filled with new challenger parties. Thus, although the focus of this book is on extreme right parties, the left-right convergence theory is not only applicable to extreme right parties, but also relevant to the rise of "new politics", notably green parties.

First, it needs to be established between which parties' convergence needs to take place. In the Scandinavian context, the mainstream parties on the left are relatively straightforward to identify: the Social Democratic parties in Denmark and Sweden, and the Norwegian Labour Party. On the right, the situation is not quite as clear-cut. In Sweden, the conservative *Moderata Samlingspartiet* has been the biggest party to the right of centre since 1979, and would be the obvious choice as the main party on the right. In Norway the conservative *Høyre* has held the same position for most of the post-war period, and is also a relatively clear-cut choice. In Denmark, however, the Conservative Party, *Konservative Folkeparti*, has not always been the dominant centre-right party. For long periods the liberal *Venstre* has been as important and significant in the non-socialist bloc. We need, therefore, to take *Venstre* as well as the Conservatives into account in the following discussion.

The most obvious form of left-right convergence is the formation of cross-bloc governments, containing the key parties on the left as well as right. In all our studied Scandinavian countries the respective party systems are split into two main blocs: one on the "socialist" left and one on the "bourgeois" (*borgerlig*) right. The boundaries between the blocs have not always been completely clear-cut, in the sense that the positioning of some parties has been ambiguous, or changed over time. On the whole, however, the blocs have structured party competition for most of the post-war period. Indeed, as we will see, coalitions containing parties clearly identifiable to both the main blocs have been unusual.

This was especially the case in Norway. Notwithstanding the 1940–1945 period, when circumstances were extraordinary, there were no cross-bloc

coalitions in Norway until 2005. The Labour Party always governed alone, although from the 1960s onwards only as minority governments. Indeed, as the party's share of the vote declined, Labour governments sometimes governed on a very thin parliamentary basis, which often necessitated ad hoc deals with other parties. It was not until 2005, however, that the Labour Party entered into a coalition government. Following the "Soria Moria" agreement after the 2005 election, a coalition was formed consisting of the Labour, Centre and Socialist Left parties. The same coalition constellation was renewed after the 2009 election.[17]

The Centre Party had participated in several non-socialist coalitions from the 1960s onwards, most recently 1997–2000, but had increasingly started to disagree with the other non-socialist parties, which paved the way for the entry into a coalition with the Labour and Socialist Left parties in 2005.[18] It was, however, never a leading non-socialist party. Indeed, the government also contained the Socialist Left Party, which is to the left of the Labour Party, and the level of conflict between the government and the non-socialist opposition was high during its eight years in office (it was defeated in the election of September 2013). Thus, the red-green 2005–2013 government, with the strong presence of left-of-centre parties, could hardly be regarded as evidence of left-right convergence. Since 1945, there has been no other government composition which in any way could be regarded as comprising parties from both blocs.

In Sweden, the Social Democrats were in two-party coalitions with the then Agrarian Party in the 1930s and 1950s. At this time, the ideological position of the Agrarian Party was ambiguous, although it was never a socialist party. In the late 1950s it changed its name to the Centre Party, and soon became clearly identifiable as a member of the "bourgeois" bloc (although it was not until the 2000s that the party started to refer to itself as "bourgeois"/*borgerligt*). Cross-bloc agreements on separate policy areas have taken place, but government formation in Sweden has strictly followed bloc lines. In Denmark the situation has been more complicated, with a long series of often unstable minority governments. These governments have, however, tended to follow bloc lines. Until the 1980s, the government alternatives in Denmark tended to be a Social Democratic single-party minority government, or a centre-right coalition.

From 1993, when the Social Democrats returned to power after 11 years of Conservative-led centre-right coalitions, the Social Democrats were in office for 8 years in coalition with various centrist parties. To be sure, Denmark has had a number of centrist parties that have alternated between governments led by the Conservatives as well as the Social Democrats. Two of these parties, the Centre Democrats and the Christian Democrats, were small and lost their parliamentary status in the 2000s. The only sizeable party with an ambiguous bloc location has been the social liberal *Radikale Venstre* party, which participated in centre-right coalitions in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and governed with the Social Democrats from 1993 to 2001 and again after 2011. Despite the somewhat blurred situation in the centre, it is still relevant to speak of a bloc divide in Danish politics. The liberal *Venstre* briefly governed with the Social Democrats in the late

1970s, but has since belonged to the centre-right bloc. The Social Democrats and Conservatives have never governed together. Thus, despite an often complicated parliamentary situation, government formation in Denmark has not been characterised by left-right convergence.

Coalition participation is of course a crude measure of left-right convergence. Parties can move closer to each other without being in the same government. To shed further light on the voters' perception of the ideological distance between the mainstream parties on the left and right, we will turn to survey data. In the national election studies of the Scandinavian countries, voters have been asked to place the political parties on an ideological scale from left to right, where low numbers mean a left-wing orientation, and high numbers an orientation far to the right. The data are not without difficulties. The available time points vary, and the time series is quite short in Denmark. The scales used also vary. All 3 countries have in recent years used an 11-point scale, with 5 as the midpoint. Denmark and Norway previously used a 10-point scale, which does not have a midpoint (it is not possible for respondents to indicate a position between 2 points on the scale). Furthermore, Norway in 1977 and 1981 used a 9-point reversed scale, where low numbers indicate "conservatism" and high numbers "radicalism". In Table 4.10 below, the 9- and 10-point scales have been recoded to make them compatible with the 11-point scale.

Beginning with Denmark, data is only available from 1994 onwards, and the scale used in the original question changed between 1994 and 1998. Still, the available data suggest that there was a converging trend between the Social Democrats, on the one hand, and the two main centre-right parties, on the other, between 1994 and 2001. Between these time points the Social Democrats moved from an average position of 4.1 to 4.4 on the left-right scale. The Conservatives moved from 7.3 to 7.0 during the same period. The Liberals, interestingly, were placed somewhat further to the right than the Conservatives by the Danish voters, but also moved towards the middle, from an average placement of 7.7 in 1994 to 7.3 in 2001. The difference in average placements on the left-right scale between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives was 3.2 scale points in 1994; in 2001 it was reduced to 2.6. The difference between the Social Democrats and the Liberals sank from 3.6 in 1994 to 2.9 in 2001. The distance between the Social Democrats and the centre-right parties then increased again. Between 2001 and 2005 this was due to slight moves to the right among the two centre-right parties. Then, in 2007, the gap widened further due to the Social Democrats moving to the left. Although the changes from election to election are small, the overall impression is one of left-right convergence between 1994 and 2001. From then on, however, there was divergence.

In Norway, data exist from as far back as 1977, but the original scale has changed twice, which could be one reason for the apparent jumps in average placements for both the Labour and Conservative parties between 1981 and 1985, and again between 1993 and 1997. The long-term trends in the Norwegian data therefore have to be interpreted with care. The Labour and Conservative parties moved somewhat closer together between 1977 and 1981, and again

between 1985 and 1989. The two parties converged even more between 1993 and 1997, but it should be taken into account that the original scale changed between those two years. Between 1997 and 2005, however, the two parties again diverged. Thus, the long-term development of the relative ideological positions of the two mainstream left and right parties has fluctuated considerably, but could without too much simplification be described as curvilinear. If it is accepted that the recoding of the original scales makes them directly comparable, the distance between the Labour and Conservative parties in the 2000s was quite similar to what it had been in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but it was greater between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s.

Sweden arguably has the most favourable data situation, with the same scale having been presented to respondents in every election study since 1979. Despite short-term fluctuations, the long-term trend is clearly one of reduced distance between the Social Democratic and Moderate parties. There was a clearly converging trend between 1985 and 1991. In 1994 the distance grew, but this was a temporary blip; the converging trend returned in 1998 and continued in 2002. Most of the change between 1979 and 2002 was due to the Social Democrats moving towards the centre; the Moderates fluctuated within a narrow range between 8.7 and 9.0. In 2006, however, the Moderates moved from 8.8 to 8.4, the latter being the most centrist, or least right-wing, position it had ever occupied on the scale. This meant that the overall difference between the two parties reached an all-time low point of 4.8 scale steps. It should be remembered that this is still a considerable distance in comparative terms. The only country in Table 4.10 to ever display greater distances is Norway between 1985 and 1993. The converging trend, furthermore, was broken in 2010. The Moderates continued to move towards the middle, but with the Social Democrats taking a leftward turn of 0.3 scale points, the overall difference increased to 5.0.

On the whole, the ideological distances between the mainstream parties on the left and right are greatest in Sweden, followed by Norway. It is only in Sweden, however, where there is a long-term trend towards convergence – although that trend was broken in 2010. In Denmark differences are smaller, and there was a converging trend between 1994 and 2001, but it was halted in 2005, and the gap widened in 2007. It was still smaller than in Norway, and much smaller than the gap between the Swedish Social Democrats and Moderates.

Conclusion

It was never to be expected that this chapter would provide a clear-cut picture. The different indicators reported do not tell a unanimous story. Above all, they do not tell the whole story. The theoretical point of departure for this book is that the success, and lack of success, of extreme right parties cannot be understood purely on the basis of demand-side and external supply-side factors. A more comprehensive understanding of the differences and variations in extreme right success in the Scandinavian countries is, therefore, not at hand until we have looked at further factors on the supply-side. This will be the purpose of the following chapters.

Table 4.10 Degree of left-right convergence in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Voters' average placements of mainstream left and mainstream right parties on a scale from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right)[1]

Denmark	*Social Dem.*	*Conservatives*	*Liberals*	*Diff. SD–Con*	*Diff. SD–Lib*
1994	4.1	7.3	7.7	3.2	3.6
1998	4.3	7.2	7.4	2.9	3.1
2001	4.4	7.0	7.3	2.6	2.9
2005	4.4	7.2	7.4	2.8	3.0
2007	4.1	7.3	7.3	3.2	3.2

Norway	*Labour Pty*	*Conservatives*	*Difference*
1977	3.9	8.2	4.3
1981	3.9	7.8	3.9
1985	2.9	8.5	5.6
1989	3.2	8	4.8
1993	3.6	8.4	4.8
1997	4.8	8	3.2
2001	4.6	8.1	3.5
2005	4	8	4
2009	4.2	7.9	3.7

Sweden	*Social Dem.*	*Moderates*	*Difference*
1979	2.9	8.9	6.0
1982	2.8	8.9	6.1
1985	2.8	9.0	6.2
1988	3.2	8.9	5.7
1991	3.5	8.7	5.2
1994	3.2	8.8	5.6
1998	3.6	8.9	5.3
2002	3.6	8.8	5.2
2006	3.6	8.4	4.8
2010	3.3	8.3	5.0

Note

1 The table is based on data from the national election surveys, respective years. Denmark: datasets downloaded from www.surveybanken.aau.dk/. Norway: based on calculations from method reports downloaded from www.ssb.no, and datasets provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, University of Bergen (www.nsd.uib.no/). Sweden: Swedish Election Studies data kindly supplied by Henrik Oscarsson and Per Hedberg, Department of Political Science, Göteborg University. Respondents have been asked to place the respective parties on a scale between far left and far right. The survey questions do not guide respondents about the meaning of left and right; this is left to respondents' own judgements. Entries are overall averages of all respondents who answered the question. All entries are based on a scale from 0 to 10, but in some cases the original scale presented to respondents was different. In Norway in 1977 and 1981 respondents were presented with a scale between 1 and 9, where low numbers indicate "conservatism" and high numbers "radicalism". In Norway 1985, 1989 and 1993, and Denmark 1994, respondents were presented with a scale from 1 to 10, where low numbers indicate far left and high numbers far right. For all other entries, respondents were presented with a scale from 0 to 10, where low numbers indicate far left and high numbers far right. For all entries where the original scale was not 0 to 10, the values have been recoded to fit with the 0–10 scale. The recoding has followed the guidelines given by Gilljam and Oscarsson 1996: 38, note 2. Changes of the original scale are indicated by a double-line border between the rows. Number of cases vary between 1,356 (Norway, Labour 1977 and Conservatives, 1981) and 3,838 (Denmark, Liberals, 2007). Standard deviations vary between 1.32 (Denmark, Social Democrats, 2005) and 2.61 (Denmark, Liberals, 2007).

Nevertheless, this is a suitable place for an interim overview, based on the evidence presented so far. Beginning with demand-side factors, Sweden has had the highest levels of immigration of the Scandinavian countries. At the same time, Sweden has had increasingly positive attitudes to immigration, and stands out as very immigration positive in a Scandinavian as well as broader European comparison in the 2000s. Earlier, however, public opinion appears to have been more reserved, and the SOM data cited above suggest some caution against over-interpreting the ESS data presented in Table 4.6. Denmark and Norway are behind Sweden in terms of immigration levels, but also report somewhat less positive attitudes to immigration. In terms of immigration, then, the evidence we have seen would suggest that the conditions for extreme right success are most favourable in Denmark and Norway, and less favourable in Sweden.

The economy has for the most part tended to be strong in all three countries, but not without fluctuations and variations. Sweden suffered a recession in the 1990s, but recovered in the 2000s. Denmark and Norway avoided the 1990s recession, and have enjoyed a more stable economy in the periods from the mid-1980s to the end of the first decade of the 2000s – but all three countries were affected by the global recession that started in 2008. All evidence considered, none of our studied Scandinavian countries display signs of an economic crisis that has been deep and sustained enough to provide favourable conditions for extreme right success. The tax burden, however, is high. Denmark and Sweden stand out in particular, but also Norway is constantly above the EU as well as OECD averages.

Election turnout has declined over time in Norway and Sweden, but has remained stable and high in Denmark. The levels of political trust vary according to the indicators used. According to the most long-term indicator available, which does not allow broad comparisons, trust declined in Denmark and Norway between the 1970s and 1990s. In Denmark, however, it then recovered, and data from the 2000s show high and rising Danish levels of trust. For Norway, a lack of data makes comparisons over time difficult. In Sweden the development is largely negative, although it varies according to the indicator used. The EES data from the 2000s indicate high and rising levels of trust in Denmark. Norway and Sweden display fluctuating trends, but increased trust towards the end of the 2002–2008 period. On the whole, indicators of political trust suggest favourable conditions for extreme right success in Denmark and Norway until the 1990s, while in Sweden they continued to do so into the 2000s. The evidence is sketchy, however, and far-reaching conclusions should probably be avoided.

Moving on to external supply-side factors, the electoral systems are permissive for small challenger parties in Denmark. The Norwegian system is somewhat less open, with the 4 per cent threshold for additional seats introduced in the late 1980s. It is still less restrictive than that of Sweden, whose 4 per cent representational threshold applies to fixed as well as additional seats, with no exception of practical significance. In terms of left-right convergence, finally, the scarcity of directly comparable data in some countries provides problems. But conditions for extreme right success appear to have been favourable in Denmark

between the mid-1990s and early 2000s. In Norway this was the case between 1977 and 1981, and again from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s. In Sweden, however, there is a long-term converging trend between the two main parties on the left and right, with only slight and temporary interruptions.

The evidence gathered so far has been summarised in Table 4.11. The table does not claim to adequately report all shifts, variations, limitations and ambiguities in the data presented in this chapter, but it does provide an indicative overview. On the demand-side it would seem that the most favourable conditions can be found in Sweden, with at least somewhat favourable conditions on all indicators. Also the other three countries appear to have conditions that to some extent are favourable in a majority of indicators. In Denmark conditions are constantly favourable in terms of immigration and tax burden, but not in terms of economic crisis and turnout and trust. The levels of trust were conducive to extreme right success until the turn of the century, but much less so since 2000. In Norway the strong (oil-driven) economy is the only condition that is not favourable, with the possible addition that political trust was stable and relatively high in the 2000s.

On the external supply-side, conditions have arguably been most favourable in Denmark. Here, conditions were favourable in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the constantly permissive electoral system was coupled with a clearly converging trend between the Social Democrats and the established "bourgeois" parties. Norway has also had periods of clear left-right convergence, and an electoral system where the 4 per cent threshold is not as penal against small parties as it is in Sweden, suggesting favourable conditions have existed there too. Sweden, finally, has a long-term trend towards left-right convergence, but not a very permissive electoral system.

Table 4.11 Conditions for extreme right success in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, based on demand-side and external supply-side factors

	Denmark	*Norway*	*Sweden*
Demand			
Immigration – levels	Favourable	Favourable	Favourable
Immigration – opinion	Favourable	Favourable	Somewhat favourable
Economic crisis	Not favourable	Not favourable	Somewhat favourable in 1990s
Tax burden	Favourable	Favourable	Favourable
Turnout	Not favourable	Favourable	Favourable
Trust	Favourable until 1990s	Favourable until 1990s	Favourable
External supply			
Permissiveness of electoral system	Favourable	Somewhat favourable	Not favourable
Left-right convergence	Favourable 1994–2001	Favourable 1977–1981; 1985–1997	Favourable

A quick glance at Table 4.11 would suggest that the climate for extreme right success is favourable, or at least moderately favourable, in all the three countries studied in this book. To be sure, there are variations. Sweden has an electoral system that makes it difficult for small and new parties. Denmark and Norway have on the whole enjoyed stable economic conditions. Danes are also very loyal participants in elections. But these are aberrations. The majority of conditions discussed so far appear to be favourable. But we are not even halfway through the story. One external supply-side factor, extreme right traditions and legacies, will be discussed in the following chapter. And then there are the internal supply-side factors: the ideology, strategies, organisation and leadership of the Scandinavian extreme right parties. This will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Notes

1 Korkiasaari 2003.
2 Dahlström 2004: 52.
3 Jørgensen 2006.
4 Sandberg and Demker 2012.
5 Nielsen 2004, Ch. 4. The EUMC-commissioned study is reported on pages 239ff.
6 Blom 2012: 10ff.
7 For an in-depth analysis based on a single ESS survey, see Rydgren 2008.
8 Jörberg 1984: 22ff.
9 OECD 2000.
10 Holmberg 1999: 104–108.
11 Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013: 348f.
12 Norris 2011, Ch. 4.
13 Thomsen and Elklit 2008.
14 This paragraph is based on country-specific chapters in Wiberg, ed., 1991, and the Scandinavian country chapters in Katz and Mair, eds., 1992.
15 Compare Katz and Mair 1995.
16 Compare Pierre *et al.* 2000.
17 Aalberg and Brekken 2006; Aalberg 2010.
18 Aalberg and Brekken 2006: 1225.

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5 The extreme right legacy in Scandinavia

Fascist, Nazi and extreme nationalist (for the remainder of the chapter, the generic term "fascist" will be used) parties, movements and groups made their presence felt across Europe between the two world wars. In some countries they played a fateful political role. To be sure, their significance varied. Italy and Germany, where fascist dictatorships stayed in power for 21 and 12 years respectively, were exceptions in a broader comparative context. But hardly any country was completely unaffected by fascism. The three Scandinavian countries studied in this book all had fascist movements. Neither was significant in peacetime conditions, but in recent decades they have been subject to renewed interest. In Norway and Denmark, which were both occupied by Germany during the Second World War, the interest is associated with a debate about collaboration and resistance. In Sweden, which was never occupied, the interest is rather linked to a self-critical discussion about the Swedish neutrality, and breaches against it, during the war.[1]

Thus, a key line of inquiry in Norway and Denmark has been contacts and relations between local fascists and the German occupiers, with a view to establishing the extent and nature of the collaboration. That this is a relevant approach goes without saying – but it does not cover all aspects of Norwegian and Danish fascism. Research on the occupation of Norway and Denmark shows quite clearly that there was never a complete overlap between pre-war fascist organisations and collaboration. Not all members of the domestic fascist parties collaborated actively with the occupiers; indeed some of those who had joined before the war left during occupation.[2] Conversely, some of the most infamous and notorious collaborators were not members of fascist organisations.[3]

Still, the membership of fascist parties has been one of the key research themes in Denmark and Norway. This has been facilitated by the fact that fascist party archives, including membership records, were seized by the authorities in both countries after liberation in 1945. In Norway, the key membership study is by the sociologist Jan Petter Myklebust, while the main Danish study is by the historian Malene Djursaa.[4] Both have a quantitative and sociological approach, and abbreviated versions were published in English in an anthology entitled *Who Were the Fascists?*[5] This "quantitative wave" of research has been accompanied by more historical and biographical accounts. Especially the Norwegian fascist

leader Vidkun Quisling, whose surname became an international synonym for traitor, has been subject of a number of studies,[6] but there are also biographical accounts of other individuals.[7] The most comprehensive treatment of a single country published so far is the historian John T. Lauridsen's study of Danish fascism, which provides a critical discussion of previous research, as well as new insights regarding propaganda, ideology, organisation and leadership.[8]

In Sweden, the fascist groups and parties that existed between the 1920s and 1940s were for many years regarded as near irrelevances. The first systematic post-war study of Swedish fascism was by the historian Eric Wärenstam, whose work largely focused on ideology, coupled with essentially chronological treatments of the most important fascist organisations.[9] In the 1980s and 1990s, however, research by the historian Helène Lööw triggered renewed interest. Her doctoral dissertation provides a profound account of the organisation, propaganda and membership of the main Swedish fascist organisations. In particular, she presented pioneering findings regarding the membership.[10] Lööw's work received much media attention, and was followed by other writers, whose main purpose seems to have been to re-establish the fact that Sweden actually had fascists and, hence, also a potential fifth column.[11] Despite Lööw's efforts, Swedish research has suffered from a lack of systematic archive sources, which means that it has not been possible to study the social basis of fascism as thoroughly as in Norway and Denmark. Comparative Scandinavian studies are rare. The main exception is the political scientist Ulf Lindström, whose study covers Norway, Denmark and Sweden.[12] Lindström's focus is not primarily on the fascist parties themselves, but rather on their political environment. His main argument is that factors in the political system, and the strategies of the mainstream parties, combined to prevent a fascist breakthrough in Scandinavia.

The ambition of this chapter is not to add new knowledge to the existing research. Rather, the purpose is twofold. First, it will hopefully serve as a reader's guide to Scandinavian interwar fascism and Nazism. No such comparative account has been written in English for nearly three decades, which means that more recent research published in the Nordic languages, such as the work by Lööw and Lauridsen, has not been accessible outside the Scandinavian language sphere. Second, and more important, the chapter will probe into a second external supply-side factor behind extreme right success – national traditions. The question to be answered is to what extent there is an extreme right tradition in the Nordic countries. A related question, which will be returned to in later chapters, is whether there are links between interwar Nordic fascism, on the one hand, and contemporary extreme right parties, on the other.

A historical overview

Traditional fascism ("traditional" here understood as having emerged before 1945) could be divided into three "waves", or phases.[13] The first wave began shortly after the end of the First World War. The background was the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, economic and agricultural depression and

the Russian Revolution. The latter inspired communist activity across Europe, with anti-communist militias emerging in response. This anti-communist milieu later became an important recruitment ground for fascism. The first phase saw the formation of the core fascist parties in Germany and Italy, but the overall impact was limited. Fascist movements emerged also in other countries, such as Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia, but they were of little or no immediate significance. The only country where "first wave" fascism was successful in the short term was Italy, where the Mussolini-led fascist party gained power in 1922, three years after having been formed.[14]

The second wave began around 1930. A key factor was the profound economic depression, which hit most of the world after the "Wall Street Crash" in October 1929. Several European fascist parties were formed around this time. Other, already existing, parties experienced a surge in support, the most obvious example being the German NSDAP, which broke through electorally in 1930, and seized power in January 1933. Elsewhere, the impact of fascism varied. Few had anywhere near the success of NSDAP and many were minuscule. Countries other than Germany with comparatively successful fascist parties included Hungary, Romania and Belgium, but comparisons are difficult due to the fact that some fascist parties were not tested in free and open elections.[15]

It is also possible to speak of a third wave, beginning with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. The development of the war, especially the initial German successes, led to situations which fascist movements across Europe tried to use to their advantage. Not many new fascist parties were formed during this wave, but some gained power, mostly as a consequence of German occupation. At the same time the policies and ideologies of many fascist parties changed; sometimes to accommodate the demands of the occupiers; sometimes in a bid to reinforce their independence.

Sweden: weak and split fascists

The birth of Swedish fascism is usually dated to 12 August 1924, when *Svenska Nationalsocialistiska Frihetsförbundet* (SNSF; Swedish National Socialist Freedom League) was formed. The leader, the veterinary surgeon Birger Furugård, would later become a household name in Swedish fascism, but his first creation was little more than a small sect.[16] The largely Italian-inspired *Sveriges Fascistiska Kamporganisation* (SFKO; Sweden's Fascist Combat Organisation), formed in 1926, was somewhat less unsuccessful.[17] Despite their insignificance, however, SNSF and SFKO served as training grounds for future activists and leaders. In 1930 a number of groups and parties, including the national socialist SNSF and the fascist SFKO, joined forces with Furugård as leader. At the beginning of 1931 the thus created party took the name *Svenska Nationalsocialistiska Partiet* (SNSP, Swedish National Socialist Party).[18]

For two years SNSP was the dominant force in Swedish fascism. It soon developed a fair amount of propaganda activity, but it had limited electoral impact. The party received less than 1 per cent in the 1932 election to the

parliamentary second chamber, but performed strongly in certain areas, especially in Sweden's second biggest city Göteborg, where SNSP came close to a parliamentary seat.[19] Then the chaos started. In January 1933 a group led by a low-ranking military officer named Sven Olov Lindholm was expelled from SNSP, and formed *Nationalsocialistiska Arbetarepartiet* (NSAP, National Socialist Workers Party).[20] The rivalry between the SNSP "Furugårders" and the NSAP "Lindholmers" was intense, but the political differences between them should not be overstated. Both parties were national socialist, anti-democratic and anti-Semitic, and both parties used swastikas and uniforms. There was, however, a tendency for NSAP to be somewhat more left-leaning. Lindholm had established good contacts with the left-wing faction of the German NSDAP, including some who were purged in the 1934 "Night of the Long Knives".[21] Furugård, on the other hand, claimed to have the support of the NSDAP leadership, although any such contacts seem to have suffered a blow after he had made what seems to have been a somewhat embarrassing visit to Germany in September 1933.[22]

The situation soon grew even more complicated. An attempt to oust Furugård as SNSP leader failed in the autumn of 1933, and led to further defections. Meanwhile a third party, called *Nationalsocialistiska Blocket* (NSB, National Socialist Bloc) was formed. Among the initiators was the count Eric von Rosen (whose sister-in-law had been married to Hermann Göring from 1922 until her death in 1931). An army colonel named Martin Ekström was named as leader of NSB. The choice was no coincidence; Ekström had solid credentials as an anti-communist, having fought with the "Whites" in the Finnish Civil War, and later participating in the liberation of Estonia.[23] However, Ekström's political talent did not match his military record. A much-heralded opening speech in Stockholm in January 1934 was a resounding fiasco, labelled as such by contemporary observers as well as by historians, and the party never recovered.[24] NSB stumbled on until 1938, with minimal impact.

The Lindholm and Furugård parties were small but not completely invisible entities in the mid-1930s. Both were constantly involved in fights, sometimes physical, with each other as well as against social democrats and communists. In the subnational elections of 1934, they gained some representation in local councils, mostly but not only in small rural places. In Göteborg, NSAP got 4.6 per cent of the vote. This was enough to get two seats on the city council, and it was arguably the biggest electoral achievement of Swedish fascism. It turned out to be the high point. In the election to the parliamentary second chamber in 1936, NSAP and SNSP together got less than 1 per cent of the vote. The election was particularly disastrous for SNSP, which received just over 3,000 votes; in fact fewer than its reported membership (cf. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below). The party was closed down, Furugård left politics and urged his party members to join NSAP.[25] Lindholm's party thus became the main fascist force in Sweden, but was unable to take advantage of the situation. The two seats in Göteborg were lost in 1938, and the party was confined to the fringes of Swedish politics.

A key problem was the links to Germany, which towards the end of the 1930s became increasingly burdensome. In response NSAP changed its name

to *Svensk Socialistisk Samling* (SSS, Swedish Socialist Unity) in late 1938. At the same time the "full" Nazi salute was replaced by the "small" salute, and the swastika was abandoned as party symbol. A few months later, the name of the party's newspaper was changed from *Den Svenske Nationalsocialisten* to *Den Svenske Folksocialisten*.[26] These changes were largely cosmetic. Ideologically, SSS remained a national socialist party. The makeover had little impact. SSS did not participate in the elections of 1940 and 1942. In 1944 it put up candidates in 12 constituencies, but received a total of just over 4,000 votes (0.1 per cent). The party was weakened from 1939 by the fact that many of its activists volunteered in the Finnish wars against the USSR in 1939–1940 and 1941–1944, but the bottom line was clear – it did not have popular support. The Lindholm party struggled through the 1940s, and was closed down in 1950.[27]

Denmark and Norway: unwanted collaborators and Quislings

As in Sweden, Danish and Norwegian fascism began to make its presence felt during the second wave. At least in Denmark fascist groups had existed earlier, but were insignificant. A key difference between Sweden, on the one hand, and Denmark and Norway, on the other, was the development during the third wave. After the outbreak of the Second World War, Swedish fascist parties continued a decline, which had begun after 1935. In Denmark and Norway, however, fascism was given a second chance when the countries were occupied by Germany. In both countries fascists collaborated with the occupiers, but they reached a more elevated position in Norway.

Denmark had a large number of Nazi or fascist parties and organisations. A list, presumably tentative, by Djursaa contains 39 entries.[28] Almost all of these were insignificant. The main exception was *Danmarks National-Socialistiske Arbejder Parti* (DNSAP, Danish National Socialist Workers Party), which was formed in 1930.[29] Its leader from 1933 was the medical doctor Frits Clausen. Its first nine years were fairly inconspicuous, but in April 1939 the party received 1.8 per cent of the vote, which was enough to secure three parliamentary seats. The Norwegian *Nasjonal Samling* (NS, National Unity) was formed in 1933. Like the Danish party, NS made little impact before the war. It never gained representation in the national parliament, despite a marginally higher proportion of the vote than DNSAP in the 1933 election. After a disastrous electoral performance in 1936, NS almost disappeared.

When Germany occupied Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940, DNSAP and NS had high hopes that the situation would play into their hands. To some extent this was realised in the Norwegian case, but not in Denmark. There were some expectations in DNSAP that it would be asked by the occupiers to form a government – there were even tentative lists of cabinet members – but the party was always viewed with suspicion by the German authorities and was never given the opportunity to participate in, let alone form, a government.[30] Instead, the incumbent Danish government was expanded from a two-party to a four-party coalition,

and the elected parliament continued to work. In effect, the Danish response amounted to an agreement to administrate the occupation. This was considered by the occupiers as a much better solution than giving responsibility to the small DNSAP.

The parliamentary election of March 1943, in which all the traditional parties (except the communists) participated, was the big chance for DNSAP. Despite an ambitious campaign and high hopes, the party only gained an extra 12,000 votes compared to 1939, and stayed on 3 seats. The party never recovered from this fiasco. What little goodwill it may have had among the occupiers was finally lost,[31] and it was in no way able to capitalise on the collapse of national political institutions, which began in the summer of 1943. The most important contribution asked of the DNSAP during the entire occupation was to help in the recruitment of soldiers to the Eastern Front. The party was never given any political role or administrative duties.[32]

This was in stark contrast to NS in Norway. Before the occupation, NS leader Vidkun Quisling travelled to Berlin, offering his services in the event of a German occupation.[33] On the evening of 9 April, Quisling made a radio broadcast, in which he declared his intention to form a government, and presented a list of ministers.[34] At this time, the invasion was not complete. Unlike Denmark, where the German forces were merely met by isolated pockets of token resistance, it took the invaders over two months to take control over the whole of Norway. When Quisling made his broadcast, the democratic government had fled Oslo, but not yet left the country (it later went into exile in Britain). Hence, Quisling's initiative, on the day of the invasion, when intense fighting was still taking place elsewhere in the country, was regarded as a particularly serious case of national treason. It was also a case of opportunism, as NS at the time was split, and a completely insignificant political force.

Quisling was not able to form a government at once. For some months, there were negotiations between the occupiers and the established political parties to form a new government. When these negotiations collapsed in September, all parties except NS were proscribed, and NS formed a "Commissariat" government (which meant that it was directly responsible to the German commander, Joseph Terboven).[35] Quisling was not formally a minister in the government of September 1940, but he had the ear of the German leadership, a position he used to the full. On 1 February 1942, he was declared "Minister President" of Norway (a position equivalent to the heads of German states, such as Bavaria etc.), during an "Act of State" at the Oslo castle of Akershus.[36] Quisling and NS had little or no independence vis-à-vis the German leadership, but at the same time could be said to have significant responsibilities within that remit. For example, the party was able to appoint all office holders in central as well as local government, and to the highest extent possible used this opportunity to appoint its members and supporters to public posts.[37] Quisling and his party remained in these positions until liberation in 1945. Several NS officials were taken to court for treason. A few NS ministers, including Quisling, were executed.

Imitation parties?

DNSAP in Denmark, and the Swedish NSAP, SSS, SNSP and NSB, were clear-cut cases of Nazi parties. Their agenda, rhetoric, organisation, uniforms and behaviour were copies of the German NSDAP, with small variations. All these parties, except the Swedish SSS from 1939, used the swastika as the party symbol. They wore uniforms. They had their own Führers, subjected to internal cult status but mostly regarded as clowns by the outside world.[38] They were organised according to hierarchical, military-like principles. Ideologically they were close to the Nazi ideal type: authoritarian, anti-democratic, racist, anti-Semitic and corporatist, with an organic view of state, nation and people.

The first DNSAP programme was a translation of the German NSDAP 25-point programme from 1920.[39] Other programmes were somewhat more independent, without deviating significantly from the original model. There were some ideological variations. Lindholm's NSAP/SSS, as already mentioned, was comparatively left-leaning, but the "leftism" more or less disappeared towards the end of the 1930s. In all, the variations were fairly minor. Accusations of being imitation parties were indignantly denied by the fascists, sometimes with rather imaginative attempts to link their existence to the history of their respective countries. An often used argument was the claim that the swastika is an old Nordic symbol, already used by the Vikings. This may not as such be entirely without foundation, but few contemporary observers, or more recent analysts, have doubted that the inspiration to use the swastika came from Germany rather than their own forefathers. It is also true that, in contrast to their communist arch rivals whose loyalty to the USSR was seldom in doubt, Scandinavian Nazis were for the most part reluctant to openly pledge loyalty to Nazi Germany. Still, their formation and political agendas could quite clearly be seen as inspired by the successes of the German NSDAP in the early 1930s. The only partial exception was the first Furugård Nazi party in Sweden, whose inspiration was the "beer hall" NSDAP of the early 1920s.

NS in Norway was a somewhat deviant case. It did not use the swastika.[40] The NS programmes from the 1930s contained few references to race, and had no explicitly anti-Semitic content.[41] To be sure, NS was guilty of blatant racism and anti-Semitism in its propaganda, especially after 1935, but the party was not united behind such policies. Until 1938, contacts between NS and the German Nazi regime appear to have been very limited, and there are analysts who claim that Quisling's political ideas did not have significant amounts of foreign influence.[42] Then, of course, the German dependence grew in the run-up to, and during, the occupation.

Quasi-fascist parties and borderline cases

Besides the parties discussed in the previous sections, Scandinavia also had a number of parties which had elements of fascism, but whose status as fascist is not entirely clear-cut. In some cases such parties had more electoral success than

the fully fledged fascist parties. In Sweden, two deserve particular attention. *Sveriges Nationella Förbund* (SNF, the Swedish National League) was originally formed in 1915 as the youth organisation of *Allmänna Valmansförbundet*, later *Högerpartiet*; the main conservative party. In the 1930s, tension grew between the youth wing and the mother party. The former was increasingly inspired by fascist ideas, while the latter, having greeted the democratic breakthrough of the early 1900s somewhat unenthusiastically, now fully embraced democracy. The tension came to a climax in 1933–1934, when *Högerpartiet* issued an ultimatum to the youth organisation to toe the party line or to leave. The response was the latter, and SNF went its own way.[43]

At first, SNF seemed to have some potential. Three second chamber members of parliament, elected as *Högerpartiet* representatives, followed the defectors. Several *Högerpartiet* members and branches throughout the country also joined SNF. However, many of the defectors soon started to trickle back to the mother party. The SNF members of parliament failed to get re-elected in 1936, and the party then drifted into the political wilderness. It continued after the war as a small political sect, going through a number of splits and reorganisations. Remnants of the party still appeared to exist in the last few years of the first decade of the 2000s, but it has been without any significance whatsoever since the 1940s. The party had links to the newspaper *Dagsposten*, which supported Germany and received German subsidies during the war. It began publishing in 1941 and survived until 1951.[44]

The other Swedish "semi-fascist" party came from the opposite political corner. The starting point was in 1929, when a number of leading members of the Communist Party were summoned to Moscow for questioning by the Communist International. They were heavily criticised for deviating from the Moscow-directed political course, and subsequently demoted from their positions in the party leadership.[45] As a consequence the party split in two; one party recognised by Moscow, and one independent communist party. Initially, the political differences between the two parties were small (although the split was acrimonious). For a few years, they both claimed the name Communist Party of Sweden, with the Moscow loyalists adding the specification "section of the Communist International". In 1934, however, the independents changed the party name to *Socialistiska Partiet* (Socialist Party), after a number of defectors from the Social Democratic Party in Göteborg had joined.[46] For most of the 1930s, the party led a moderately successful existence as independents to the left of the Social Democrats, performing at least as well as the Moscow-loyal communists in elections.

After a disappointing election result in 1936, however, the Socialist Party fell apart. Some members went to the Social Democrats, others left politics altogether. A shrinking group, led by Nils Flyg, remained. Flyg gradually led the party to a position which, at least, could be described as pro-fascist. A household name in left-wing politics since the 1910s and a communist member of parliament since 1929, Flyg claimed that the USSR had betrayed socialism, and eventually reached the conclusion that an Axis victory in the war would create the

most favourable conditions for a workers' revolution. In August 1940, while still a member of parliament, Flyg argued for cooperation with Germany.[47] At the same time, the party's membership and electoral support had shrunk to an absolute minimum. It was annihilated in the 1940 election and lost its remaining seats in parliament. Flyg had desperately tried to avoid the split in the Communist Party in 1929, but when he died in January 1943, he had made himself a name as a vitriolic critic of the Soviet Union and an outspoken supporter of Nazi Germany. After Flyg's death, the party became little more than a pro-German lobby group, not least through its newspaper *Folkets Dagblad* which, like *Dagsposten*, was financially supported by the German regime. The newspaper and the party folded in May 1945.[48]

In Norway, three possible borderline cases will be mentioned. *Frisinnede Venstre*, from 1931 *Det Frisinnede Folkeparti*, originated from a split of the Liberal Party (*Venstre*) in 1903.[49] It cooperated with the Conservative Party for several years, but drifted away in the 1920s. At the same time the party, for several years a fairly potent political force, went into decline. By the 1936 election, in which it participated on a joint ticket with *Nasjonal Samling* and *Fedrelandslaget* (see below), it had paled into insignificance, and then disappeared. The extremism of the *Frisinnede* was somewhat questionable, however. The party programmes advocated stronger national leadership, but were not openly anti-democratic.[50]

Fedrelandslaget (FL; Patriotic League) and *Bygdefolkets Krisehjelp* (BK; National Rescue) were formed as non-political campaign organisations, but later participated in elections.[51] The latter was formed in 1931, focusing primarily on protecting farmers against the effects of the economic decline of the early 1930s. The activities of BK included interventions in the enforced auctioning of bankrupt farms, and the organisation of boycotts against those who bought farms at such auctions. It did not begin as an explicitly right-wing organisation. Its propaganda had elements of anti-capitalism, and for some time it had contacts with the Labour Party. These links, however, were cut off by the 1933 Labour Party congress. In the election of that year, BK cooperated with *Nasjonal Samling* in electoral alliances in some constituencies. The pact brought little success to either organisation, and both suffered as a consequence. BK was dissolved in 1936.[52]

Formed in 1925, FL survived longer. It started primarily as an anti-communist organisation, its working programme from 1927 requiring local branches to prevent communists obtaining leading positions in local and regional government, as well as in organisations such as youth and rifle shooting associations.[53] Later, it developed more corporatist and fascist-leaning ideas. The 1933 programme, while not explicitly anti-democratic, argued for a "National and moral regeneration", and proposed increased executive powers at the expense of parliament. Among other things, the role of the parliamentary committees was to be reduced.[54] Beginning as a pure pressure group, FL participated in the 1933 and 1936 parliamentary elections, without success. It featured in the plans of the German occupation forces to form a cooperative national government, but was

dissolved when the occupiers opted for an administration based on *Nasjonal Samling*, and banned all other parties.[55]

Denmark, finally, had several parties with an agenda which, at least to some extent, bordered on fascism. Four examples will be mentioned here. *Slesvigsk Parti* (Schleswig Party) was formed in 1920, representing the German minority in Southern Jutland, after the border changes implemented as a consequence of the Treaty of Versailles. Then, with the growth of Nazism in Germany, and intense demands of reunification by the expatriate Germans, *Slesvigsk Parti* turned towards Nazism. However, the party saw itself as a liberation movement, with limited political ambitions for Denmark as a whole, although it supported the 1940–1945 occupation. Compromised by its Nazi record, *Slesvigsk Parti* was dissolved in 1945.[56] A non-fascist successor party with the same name was represented in the *Folketing* (the Danish parliament) from 1953 to 1964, and is still active in local and regional politics.

Det Frie Folkeparti (DFF; Free People's Party) was an offspring of the pressure group *Landbrugernes Sammenslutning* (LS; Farmers' Association). As in Norway, the agricultural sector was in crisis during the 1930s, which led to a radical farmers' movement with authoritarian tendencies. LS was an activist organisation, with an agenda similar to that of the Norwegian BK (see above). Like its Norwegian counterpart, the activities of LS included interventions in the auctions of bankrupt farms. It also arranged demonstrations outside credit institutions. In July 1935 LS arranged a march from Jutland to Copenhagen, at least partially inspired by the fascist March on Rome in 1922.[57] LS began as a non-political lobby group, with links to several established parties. In May 1934, however, DFF was formed. It was joined by three LS affiliated defectors from *Venstre*, and gained five seats in the 1935 election. DFF became *Bondepartiet* (BP; Farmers' Party) in January 1939, and gained four seats in the election of that year. DFF/BP was authoritarian, and opposed to the "ruined parliamentary government".[58] The party ideology also contained elements of corporatism. It supported the German invasion, and in 1940 participated in an abortive attempt at a "united front" with DNSAP, with a view to government formation. BP was dissolved in 1945, and several of its members were subject to legal proceedings for treason.[59]

Third, there was the ambiguous case of *Dansk Samling* (DS; Danish Unity), formed by the journalist and teacher Arne Sørensen in 1936. Sørensen's political ideas, described as a "third position" between the revolutionary and the reactionary forces, were a mix of nationalism, Christianity and authoritarianism.[60] The authoritarianism, coupled with a sceptical view on political parties, gave DS a fascist image. This was later turned on its head. DS played a key role in the Danish resistance movement during the occupation, and participated in the first government after liberation in 1945.[61] However, DS lost its parliamentary seats in the 1947 election, and has been insignificant since.[62] It still exists, but has not participated in a parliamentary election since 1964.[63]

A fourth and final example was *Nationalt Samvirke* (National Cooperation), formed in 1939 by Viktor Pürschel. A long-standing Conservative member of

parliament, for a period even chair of the parliamentary party, Pürschel gradually started to go his own way. In the 1930s he became a critic of the democratic system and a supporter of Franco in the Spanish Civil War. He also made positive references to German Nazism. In 1938–1939 Pürschel defected from the Conservatives to form *Nationalt Samvirke*, but the party narrowly failed to get a seat in the election of April 1939. It re-emerged together with other groups to form *Dansk Folkeparti* (Danish People's Party) in 1941, but it had little impact. Pürschel soon left, and the party disappeared in 1943.[64]

The classification of the parties discussed in this section is quite difficult. They were all sceptical of parliamentarism and the multiparty system, but this still allows for significant amounts of variation. In Denmark, Lauridsen labels *Slesvigsk Parti* fascist/Nazi, while BP and DS are classified as right radical.[65] Indeed, *Slesvigsk Parti* was completely supportive of the Nazi regime in Germany, and wanted Southern Jutland to be incorporated into the Third Reich. BP was ready to participate in an occupation-collaboration government, but was not given the opportunity. DS, on the other hand, was a deviant case with its participation in the resistance movement. In Norway, FL was also ready to participate in a collaboration government, while the National Liberals, classified as semi-fascist by Lindström, had evaporated before this became an issue.

In Sweden, both SNF and the Socialist Party ran newspapers which supported Germany in the war and, as was later discovered, received German subsidies. In terms of programme content, Lindström labels SNF semi-fascist, but also states that the prefix could almost be deleted.[66] The party programme was not only authoritarian, but also expressed elements of a racial ideology.[67] On the other hand, an analysis of SNF activity in the Swedish parliament suggests that the qualification "semi" is justified.[68] The Socialist Party is also problematical. At least initially, much of the ideological change was in terms of the party's foreign policy rather than the programme as a whole, although other changes, such as a gradual increase in anti-Semitic statements, followed. While it is difficult to deny that the party ended up as fascist, the time point from which this epithet is justified has been subject to debate. Flyg's political transformation has been dated to varying time points, from the mid-1930s to 1942. Still, there is much to suggest that the Socialist Party did not become full-blown fascists until after Flyg's death, in January 1943. For example, Flyg never embraced the racial ideology.[69]

On the whole, therefore, the parties discussed in this section could be argued as falling somewhat short of being fascist. At the same time, they all serve as indications that fascist ideas in Scandinavian interwar politics were not confined to the "core" fascist and Nazi parties. Indeed, they sometimes also spread into the mainstream parties.

Electoral support, membership and political impact

As should already be apparent, interwar and Second World War fascism in Scandinavia had fairly limited impact. This is reinforced by its electoral

performances, summarised in Table 5.1. The only outright fascist party to gain parliamentary representation was the Danish DNSAP. The Norwegian NS actually reached a marginally higher share of the vote than DNSAP ever did, but was never represented in the *Storting* (the Norwegian parliament). In terms of political impact, both DNSAP and NS were irrelevant in the 1930s. As has already been discussed, NS then ascended to a position as a "puppet" government during the occupation, while DNSAP remained insignificant, a position which was

Table 5.1 Election results for fascist, Nazi and semi-fascist parties in the Scandinavian countries, 1932–1944[1]

Country	*Year*	*Party*	*Votes (%)*	*Parliamentary seats*
Denmark	1932	DNSAP	757 (0.0)	0 (148)
		Slesvigsk Parti[2]	9,868 (0.6)	0 (148)
	1935	DNSAP	16,257 (1.0)	0 (148)
		Slesvigsk Parti[2]	12,617 (0.8)	1 (148)
		Det Frie Folkeparti	52,793 (3.2)	5 (148)
	1939	DNSAP	31,032 (1.8)	3 (148)
		Slesvigsk Parti[2]	15,016 (0.9)	1 (148)
		Bondepartiet	50,829 (3.0)	4 (148)
		Nationalt Samvirke	17,350 (1.0)	0 (148)
		Dansk Samling	8,553 (0.5)	0 (148)
	1943[3]	DNSAP	43,309 (2.1)	3 (148)
		Slesvigsk Parti	Did not participate	–
		Bondepartiet	24,572 (1.2)	2 (148)
Norway	1933	NS	27,850 (2.2)	0 (150)
		Frisinnede	20,184 (1.6)	1 (150)
	1936	NS	26,577 (1.8)	0 (150)
		Frisinnede	19,236 (1.3)	0 (150)
Sweden	1932	SNSP	15,132 (0.6)	0 (230)
	1936	NSAP	17,483 (0.6)	0 (230)
		SNSP	3,025 (0.1)	0 (230)
		SNF	26,750 (0.9)	0 (230)
	1940	SSS	Did not participate	0 (230)
		SNF	Did not participate	0 (230)
		Socialist Party	18,430 (0.6)	0 (230)
	1944	SSS	4,204 (0.1)	0 (230)
		SNF[4]	3,819 (0.1)	0 (230)
		Socialist Party	5,279 (0.2)	0 (230)

Notes

1 Only elections to the national parliaments (lower/second chamber where applicable) are included. Figures in brackets in the final column indicate total number of seats.

2 *Slesvigsk Parti* did not put up candidates in the whole of Denmark. The party's share of the votes in Southern Jutland was 13.2 per cent (1932), 15.5 per cent (1935) and 15.9 per cent (1939). Source: Djursaa 1981b: 12.

3 *Dansk Samling* also participated in the 1943 election (43,367 votes, 2.2 per cent, 3 seats) but is not included in the table due to its anti-fascist position during the occupation.

4 SNF only participated in one constituency, the City of Stockholm, where its proportion of the votes was 1.1 per cent.

manifested after the electoral fiasco of 1943. In hindsight, 43,000 votes and 3 parliamentary seats was not such a bad performance, certainly not in comparison to other Scandinavian fascist parties, but DNSAP – and the occupying power – had much higher expectations, and the result signalled a terminal decline for the party. The Swedish parties, meanwhile, were completely minuscule, electorally as well as politically. The peak was 1.6 per cent of the vote (if the semi-fascist SNF is included) in the 1936 election to the second chamber, and they never won a seat in the national parliament.

In terms of membership, reported in Table 5.2, the impact of Scandinavian fascism was also modest. In August 1935, NS claimed to have 15,000 members, a figure whose credibility was at best questionable, especially in the light of a figure of 8,542, reported a few months later. Available evidence suggests that this was the party's pre-occupation peak.[70] The DNSAP membership was even less impressive. There was, however, a modestly increasing pattern throughout the 1930s, peaking with 5,000 members in 1939.[71] Of course, the memberships of DNSAP and NS during occupation are a different story. In such a situation, the decision to join a fascist party with governmental ambitions could be regarded as opportunism as well as political conviction.[72] Indeed, the membership records that were seized after the end of the occupation suggest that NS, which had around 4,000 members in 1939, started to grow as soon as the occupation had taken place. Between April, when the occupation began, and September, when the occupiers declared that NS was the only legal party, the membership grew by 6,049. From then, if not before, opportunism will have been a factor. Between September and the end of the year, another 15,983 joined.[73] In total, NS had 54,651 members during the 1940–1945 occupation. Of those, 2,691 had joined before 1940, while 8,371 left the party before it was dissolved on liberation in 1945.[74]

A similar pattern can be found in DNSAP. The party's modest membership in the 1930s increased exponentially during occupation, peaking at around 19,000 dues-paying members just before the *Folketing* election, held in March 1943.[75] According to Djursaa's estimation, the party had a total of circa 39,000 members throughout its existence.[76] Thus, despite increases during occupation, neither DNSAP nor NS ever became significant party organisations. The membership of DNSAP never reached 1 per cent of the Danish electorate. NS succeeded in recruiting more members, in absolute as well as relative terms, a possible explanation being that the party reached a more elevated position during the occupation than its Danish counterpart.

Sweden cannot be directly compared to Denmark and Norway because it was never occupied. In the 1930s, however, when figures are better suited for comparison, Sweden displays higher membership figures than its two western neighbours, in absolute as well as relative terms. Lööw estimates that the Swedish Nazi parties had a combined total of circa 30,000 open and secret members in the mid-1930s.[77] This figure (which also includes estimates of affiliated youth organisations and smaller parties, not included in Table 5.2) is equivalent to circa 0.8 per cent of the electorate, which is higher than the corresponding

pre-occupation figures in Denmark as well as Norway. Of the individual parties, the "Lindholmers" of NSAP, appears to have had at most 12,000 members, while the "Furugårders" of SNSP peaked at 10,000; in both cases circa 0.3 per cent of the electorate.

The Swedish figures, based on Lööw's research, may not seem very impressive. Still, as Lööw points out, they are significantly higher than earlier estimates, which had suggested maximums of between 1,000 and 7,000.[78] In addition, Lööw reports that the semi-fascist SNF had 40,000 members in 1936, and between 12,000 and 15,000 members in 1940.[79] The 1936 figure seems somewhat high, bearing in mind that the party received 26,750 votes in the election held the same year. A possible explanation could be that the party's membership records still included those who sided with the Conservative Party in the 1934 split.

Table 5.2 Membership strength of fascist and Nazi parties in the Nordic countries, 1931–1945

Country	*Party*	*Date*	*No. of members*	*M/E*[1]
Denmark	DNSAP	1931	50	0.0
		1932	100	0.0
		1933	900	0.0
		1934	2,600	0.1
		1935	2,800	0.1
		1936	900	0.0
		1937	4,000	0.2
		1938	2,000	0.1
		1939	5,000	0.2
		January 1942	16,400	0.7
		March 1943	19,000	0.8
		December 1943	14,300	0.6
		1945	12,000	0.5
Norway	NS	December 1935	8,542	0.5
		1939	4,000	0.2
		September 1940	8,700	0.5
		December 1940	24,000	1.3
		May 1945	46,280	2.4
Sweden	SNSP	1932	3,000	0.1
		1933	10,000	0.3
		1934	8,000	0.2
		1936	4,640	0.1
	NSAP	1934	12,000	0.3
		1935	10,000	0.2
	SSS	1939	10,000	0.2

Sources: Denmark: Djursaa 1981a: 47–52; Lindström 1985: 13. Norway: Dahl *et al.* 1990: 137–175; Lindström 1985: 13. Sweden: Lööw 1990: 265.

Note

1 M/E figures are the respective proportion of members of the entire electorate. Electorates are taken from elections to national parliaments (lower chamber). In non-election years, electorates have been calculated as sliding averages, based on the previous and subsequent election years.

Clearly, however, a comparison between Tables 5.1 and 5.2 strongly suggests that the member/voter (M/V) ratios among the Nordic fascist and Nazi parties tended to be high.[80] This, in turn, suggests that these parties were relatively isolated subcultures. Research by Lööw has shown how the Swedish Nazi parties demanded total loyalty and commitment from their members.[81] There is no reason why other Nordic fascist parties would have been any different. At the same time, high M/V figures were not what the parties intended. Instead, the membership was supposed to consist of only the most committed and active supporters.[82] Indeed, they fit Duverger's devotee party model rather neatly, not least due to the recurring purges of members deemed to be disloyal.[83] The problem seems to have been that they were unable to command much support beyond those who were prepared to join as members.

Conclusion: a limited legacy

On the whole, then, the extreme right legacy of the Nordic countries is limited. In fact, Finland has a stronger fascist tradition, in terms of membership as well as electoral support, than any of the three Scandinavian countries studied in this book.[84] In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, however, fascist parties and organisations were unable to exert much direct political influence in "normal" peacetime conditions. This does not mean that they should be dismissed as an irrelevance. They were small, but noisy. They featured regularly in the press, and contemporary ordinary citizens could hardly be unaware of their existence. At least for short periods, there is much to suggest that the established parties could not be entirely relaxed about the growth potential of the domestic fascist parties. Lindström argues that the crisis agreements between Social Democrats and Agrarians, which took place in Denmark and Sweden in 1933 and in Norway in 1935, ensured political and economic stability, which undermined any potential that fascism may have had.[85] With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is difficult to see how Scandinavian fascism could have been successful. Even if political and social conditions had been more favourable, there is much to suggest that the Scandinavian fascists did not have the leaders or organisations to succeed. Relating back to the framework of this book, internal supply-side factors form a key part of the explanations for the failure of fascism in Scandinavia.

At the end of the Second World War, fascism was as discredited in the Nordic countries as it was elsewhere. For obvious reasons resentment was particularly strong in Norway and Denmark, where memories from occupation were still fresh. Sweden had been spared from the war, but images and reports from liberated concentration camps, and the condition of refugees arriving in Sweden, caused disgust and outrage. In Denmark and Norway legal proceedings against collaborators, as well as a very hostile social and political climate, meant that fascists were marginalised, and in many cases left the country.[86] In Sweden some pre-war groups, such as the Mussolini-inspired *Nysvenska Rörelsen* (Neo-Swedish Movement) struggled on, but with minimal impact. Newcomers had no more success. Fascism in the Nordic countries, where it existed at all, was little

more than a number of sects, consisting of ageing veterans and a few young fanatics. Some, like the openly Nazi *Nordiska Rikspartiet* (Nordic Reich Party) in Sweden, appeared in media reports, but were mainly portrayed as an oddity. Fascism was never completely obliterated, and neo-Nazi groups started to gain momentum in the 1980s. When, however, the post-war extreme right in Scandinavia first emerged, it came from a totally different source.

Notes

1 E.g. Boëthius 1999; Thorsell 2007.
2 Djursaa 1981a: 49.
3 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 217.
4 Myklebust 1974; Djursaa 1981a, 1981b.
5 Poulsen and Djursaa 1980; Myklebust and Hagtvet 1980. See also Ugelvik Larsen 1980.
6 E.g. Hewins 1965; Hayes 1971; Dahl 1999.
7 E.g. Ringdal 1989 about Sverre Risnæs, a member of the collaboration government during German occupation of Norway.
8 Lauridsen 2002.
9 Wärenstam 1970, 1972.
10 Lööw 1990.
11 E.g. Nilsson 1998; Hübinette 2002.
12 Lindström 1985.
13 See, for example, Morgan 2003.
14 See, for example, Eatwell 1995, Chaps. 3 and 4.
15 Merkl 1980: 756.
16 Wärenstam 1972, Ch. 2; Lööw 1990: 39.
17 Wärenstam 1970, Ch. 4; Lööw 1990: 39.
18 Wärenstam 1972: 91–95; Lööw 1990: 40ff.
19 Compare Lindström 1985: 125ff.
20 Wärenstam 1972: 117ff.; Lööw 1990: 42ff.
21 Wärenstam 1972: 110f.; Lööw 1990: 87ff. At the same time it should be noted that the NSAP newspaper supported the NSADP purges of June 1934 (Lööw 1990: 97f).
22 Lööw 1990: 81f.
23 Wärenstam 1972: 142f.
24 Wärenstam 1972: 147f.
25 Lööw 1990: 48f.
26 Lööw 1990: 57ff.; Wärenstam 1972: 127ff. Lööw refers to the party as NSAP/SSS.
27 Lööw 1990: 63–73.
28 Djursaa 1981a: 17ff.
29 Djursaa's list also includes NSDAP-N, the north Schleswig branch of the German NSDAP. See further note 56 below.
30 Lauridsen 2002: 521f., 535f.; Djursaa 1981a: 33f.
31 Djursaa 1981a: 35.
32 Lauridsen 2002: 463.
33 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 82.
34 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 91.
35 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 84, 92.
36 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 91, 103.
37 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 103.
38 See, for example, the caricatures of DNSAP leader Frits Clausen; Lauridsen 2002, Ch. 13.

39 Lauridsen 2002:55.
40 The NS symbol was the "sun cross", or "sun wheel"; a cross inside a circle. The same symbol has since been used by, for example, the Swedish post-war Nazi party *Nordiska Rikspartiet*.
41 *Retningslinjer fran Vidkun Quisling. I Tidens Tegn 2 mars 1933. 1 Valgprogrammer 1933*; *Orden, Rettferd, Fred. 1. Valgeprogrammer 1933: Orden, Rettferd, Fred. Program for Nasjonal Samling (NS) 1934.* Accessed from *Vi Vil..!* (CD-ROM). The programmes from 1934 until the end of the party were virtually unchanged.
42 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 72ff.
43 Wärenstam 1965, Ch. 6. In 1969 *Högerpartiet* changed its name to *Moderata Samlingspartiet* (Moderate Party). Since 1979 it has been Sweden's biggest centre-right party.
44 Lööw 2004: 66–72. In the summer of 2008, an Internet page laid claim to the name *Sveriges Nationella Förbund* (www.nsdap.biz/snf/snf.html; accessed 17 July 2008; no longer available). The Internet address www.nsdap.biz belongs to the American national socialist organisation NSDAP/AO, founded by Gary Lauck.
45 Blomqvist 2000: 85–89; Kennerström 1974: 21–25.
46 Kennerström 1974: 98–107, 112f.; Blomqvist 2000: 116.
47 Nilsson 1985; Blomqvist 2000: 280ff.
48 Blomqvist 2000: 369ff.
49 Danielsen 1984: 190. Lindström 1985: 10 translates the name as the National Liberals.
50 Lindström 1985: 19; *Det Frisinnede Venstres program. Vedtatt på landsmøtet 27. juni 1930; Det Frisinnede Folkepartis program. Vedtatt på det Frisinnede Folkepartis landsmøte25.-26. juni 1933; Det Frisinnede Folkepartis program. Ved stortingsvalget 1936.* Accessed from *Vi Vil..!* (CD-ROM).
51 Both translations taken from Lindström 1985: 10.
52 Lindström 1985: 85–90; NorgesLexi, Pax Leksikon: Bygdefolkets krisehjelp (http://mediabase1.uib.no/paxlex/alfabetet/b/b19.html#bygdefolkets-krisehjelp, accessed 14 April 2014, URL unreliable).
53 *Arbeidsprogram for Fedrelandslagets Fylkeslag/Lokallag, vedtatt på landsmøte i Oslo, 23. og 24. oktober 1927*; *Vi Vil..!* (CD-ROM).
54 *Et norsk program. Vedtatt på Fedrelandslagets landsmøte* (1933). Accessed from *Vi Vil..!* (CD-ROM).
55 Lindström 1985: 46–49; Danielsen 1984: 190–202; NorgesLexi, Pax Leksikon: Fedrelandslaget (http://mediabase1.uib.no/paxlex/alfabetet/f/f04.html#1, accessed 14 April 2014, URL unreliable).
56 There is much to suggest that support for Nazism was very strong among the German minority in Southern Jutland (Lauridsen 2002: 30f.). An indicator of this is NSDAP-N, which was formed in 1935. An amalgamation of rival smaller Nazi parties, NSDAP-N was the north Schleswig branch of the German NSDAP, and not a separate party in its own right. It will not be further discussed here. Compare Lauridsen 2002: 528.
57 Andersen 2003: 295f.
58 Lindström 1985: 10.
59 Jørgensen 1995; Andersen 2003: 320–324.
60 Andersen 1968: 328–336.
61 Kaarsted 1993: 246f., 293f.
62 Lundbak 2003.
63 It has a live Internet page, at www.dksamling.dk/.
64 Lundbak 2003; Lauridsen 2002: 487; Kaarsted 1993: 149f.
65 Lauridsen 2002: 462.
66 Lindström 1985: 17.
67 Lindström 1985: 16–23.

68 Rodrigo Blomqvist 1993.
69 Nilsson 1985; Blomqvist 2000: 385f.
70 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 145.
71 Djursaa 1981a: 48.
72 Compare Lööw 1990: 266.
73 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 169f.
74 Dahl *et al.* 1990: 137, 175.
75 Djursaa 1981a: 48; the figure does not include circa 1,500–2,000 members, who served in the German military, and were exempt from paying dues.
76 Djursaa 1981a: 47.
77 Lööw 1990: 266.
78 Lööw 1990: 265f. The lower estimates were made by Lindström 1985: 13 (1,000) and Merkl 1980: 756 (7,000).
79 Lööw 1990: 265.
80 The so-called M/V measure; see Scarrow 2000: 86ff.
81 Lööw 1990: 278–283.
82 Lööw 1990: 279f.
83 Duverger 1964: 70; Lööw 1990: 283f.
84 Heinonen 1980.
85 Lindström 1985: 185.
86 The Swedish fascist Per Engdahl describes in his autobiography how members of his organisation *Nysvenska Rörelsen* helped Danish fascists who fled after liberation. Engdahl 1979: 200.

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6 Norway

From Lange to Jensen

Guilt by association?

For the worst possible reasons, *Fremskrittspartiet* (FrP) made the global headlines in the summer of 2011. Mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik had been a member of the party until four years before he committed his atrocities, a fact that was not lost on media reporters and commentators. There were those who argued that Breivik's infamous "Manifesto" bore a close resemblance to the programme and policies of FrP. It was a very difficult time for a party that for many years was an outsider in Norwegian politics, and was no stranger to negative media coverage, but had successfully worked its way towards a position of legitimacy and high levels of electoral support.[1]

Fremskrittspartiet's leader Siv Jensen expressed unconditional sympathy with the Norwegian Labour Party and its youth organisation AUF, which had been Breivik's target. A few days after the killings, some FrP representatives argued that the party had to reassess and rephrase its criticism of immigration. Emphasis, the argument went, should be on the costs and logistical difficulties of immigration. Alleged threats of Islam, and perceived threats against Norwegian culture, ought to be toned down. Siv Jensen herself expressed sentiments along similar lines.[2] For this she was criticised by the leader of the Danish People's Party, Pia Kjærsgaard, who said that Jensen is "lacking spine".[3]

It goes without saying that the events of 22 July 2011, and the ensuing debate about Breivik, his background and what may have triggered his actions, were unwelcome for *Fremskrittspartiet*. It certainly did not help the preparations for the upcoming subnational elections, which were due to take place in early September. Opinion polls had already indicated declining support levels for FrP before 22 July, but the election result of 11.4 per cent was worse than the polls had suggested.[4] It was, indeed, FrP's worst performance in a nationwide election since 1993.

Some felt that it was unjustified to blame FrP for the actions of a lone mass killer. The party has, over the years, harboured a few oddballs, but it has not been associated with violence. That Breivik had been a member of FrP for ten years was confirmed by the party itself. But there is little to suggest that he pursued an extremist agenda while an FrP member. Nor was he very prominent

in the party, where he did not hold any post above the local level. He seems to have been a passive member, except for a relatively short period, and he left the party in 2007.[5]

In fact, *Fremskrittspartiet* would not seem an obvious choice for someone with Breivik's extreme views. The academic literature is not unanimous in classifying FrP as an extreme right party. Cas Mudde, in his book from 2007, argues that FrP does not belong to the populist radical right party family. The main reason for this, according to Mudde, is that nativism does not constitute a core part of the FrP ideology. Instead, he classifies FrP as "a neoliberal populist party".[6] Other writers, however, do place FrP in the same category as the French *Front National*, the Belgian *Vlaams Blok/Belang* or the Italian *Lega Nord*, even if they in some cases do so with qualifications. According to Herbert Kitschelt *Fremskrittspartiet* is a "milder version" of what he refers to as the New Radical Right.[7] Piero Ignazi argues that FrP is "at the fringe of the extreme right party family".[8] Elisabeth Carter treats FrP as an extreme right party, but subclassifies it into a less radical subcategory thereof.[9] On the other hand Cas Mudde, in his 2000 book, includes FrP in a list of parties "generally considered to be members of the extreme right party family in Western Europe".[10]

Thus, the status of the party at the centre of attention in this chapter is disputed. Representatives of *Fremskrittspartiet* would no doubt protest very strongly against being included in a book with "extreme right" in the title. The classification issue not only one of labelling. We are dealing with a party that has achieved significant electoral success. If FrP can be classified as part of the extreme right family, it puts Norway into a position as one of the strongest success cases for members of that family. Indeed, as discussed later in this chapter, FrP reached government status in October 2013. There will not be time to give this new phase in the party's history more than superficial treatment, but it reinforces the point that the classification of FrP affects our understanding of not only FrP itself, but also the extreme right party family in general, as well as Norwegian politics.

The focus of this chapter will be on the internal supply-side factors identified in Chapter 3: origins, history, ideology, leadership and organisation. The main purpose is to provide a setting for a concluding discussion about the demand- and supply-side factors outlined in the same chapter, and the extent to which they fit with the patterns of success and failure of extreme right parties in the Scandinavian countries. In addition, however, the ambition is to add to the discussion about how justified it is to classify FrP as an extreme right party.

Fremskrittspartiet – origin and brief history

In a referendum held in September 1972, Norway voted No to membership of the then European Economic Community (EEC). The vote was preceded by a heated and conflictual campaign. Most of the political parties were split, and there are anecdotal stories of family rifts and disrupted friendships. In the parliamentary election held a year later, on 9–10 September 1973, the shockwaves of

the EEC referendum hit the party system. Several established parties suffered serious losses, and two new parties entered parliament.

One of the new parties was not really new. It was called the Socialist Left, and was essentially a continuation of the Socialist People's Party, formed in the early 1960s.[11] The other, however, was a complete novelty. It had the name *Anders Langes parti til sterk nedsettelse av skatter og avgifter og offentlige inngrep*, which translates into English as "Anders Lange's Party for a Drastic Reduction in Taxes, Fees and Public Intervention". Commonly, referred to as Anders Lange's Party (ALP), it was the beginning of what later became *Fremskrittspartiet*.

The founder of ALP, Anders Lange, was not a political novice. Born in 1904 he had been actively involved in the anti-socialist *Fedrelandslaget* (Patriotic League; see Chapter 5) in the 1930s. *Fedrelandslaget* is regarded as an extreme right organisation, whose ideology bordered on fascism, but during the Second World War Lange was no friend of the German occupiers, by whom he was interned on several occasions. By trade he was a farmer and kennel owner, and in 1948 he started a periodical for dog breeders, called *Hundeavisen* (The Dog Magazine; later renamed *Anders Langes avis*/Anders Lange's Magazine). From this outlet he started to put forward his own political ideas, and he made several unsuccessful attempts to form a political party.[12]

On Sunday 8 April 1973, however, Lange's political ambitions came to fruition. The location was an Oslo cinema named *Saga*, which Lange had booked for a public meeting. The cinema, which could hold around 1,300 people, was full to the rafters. The meeting appears to have been very much a one-man show. In a "marathon speech", Lange provided a detailed account of what he thought was wrong in Norwegian politics. He mocked the political establishment, much to the amusement of the audience. For example, he called the Conservative leader, later to become prime minister, Kaare Willoch "Norway's oldest foetus". Lange concluded his speech by asking whether the meeting wanted to form a party. The response was a resounding yes, and pre-printed forms for party registration signatures were circulated among the audience. The meeting also agreed to name the party after its founder.[13]

Cumbersome as it was, the full name of ALP aptly summed up the party's *raison d'être*. What Lange aimed to set up was a protest movement against high taxes and an intrusive state bureaucracy. The ground for such a protest was fertile. After a long period of Labour dominance, with a brief interruption in 1963, a centre-right government had taken office in 1965. Expectations were high among those who disliked the Labour policies of extensive welfare arrangements and a growing public sector, but they were disappointed. Crucially, the centre-right coalition failed to reduce the levels of state expenditure and taxation, which led to resentment on which ALP could capitalise.[14]

Another important part of the background was the EEC issue. As such, the EEC was not a major concern for Lange or his party. Survey evidence suggests that a majority of ALP voters were positive to EEC membership,[15] but there is nothing to suggest a clear link between previous party sympathy, that party's

official position on the EEC in 1972 and an ALP vote in 1973. The relevance of the EEC issue was more indirect. The referendum had triggered general turmoil and anti-establishment sentiment, from which a protest party could benefit. Many voters had become "homeless", which provided a new party with large numbers of potential voters who had abandoned their traditional loyalties.[16]

A parliamentary election was due to be held five months after the meeting in the *Saga* cinema. There was, in other words, not much time for candidate selection and campaign planning. Still, opinion polls suggested that the new party had a chance of success, and without any formal rules or procedures, ALP was able to set up lists in all the 19 multi-member constituencies.[17] The eventual result in the election was 5 per cent, and 4 seats in the 155-member *Storting*.[18] Excluding parties formed after splits, it was the first new party to enter the Norwegian parliament since the 1930s.

It goes without saying that the ALP result in 1973 was a shock to the other parties, but the overall political impact should not be overstated. The result was nowhere near what Glistrup and his Progress Party in Denmark would get a few months later. Lange's party did not command a pivotal position in parliament, and was not able to exert much policy influence. Divisions in the party began to surface almost immediately. Not least, there was criticism of Anders Lange's idiosyncratic leadership style, and his unwillingness to build up a functioning party organisation. In the summer of 1974 a group defected, and formed the *Reformpartiet* (Reform Party). None of the ALP members of parliament were among the defectors, but on 18 October Lange died from a heart attack. His place in parliament was taken by a 30-year-old executive for the sugar company Tate and Lyle. His name was Carl Ivar (commonly Carl I) Hagen. Belonging to those who had defected to *Reformpartiet*, Hagen initially sat in parliament as an independent, although in practice he represented the breakaway party. In the spring of 1975, however, ALP and *Reformpartiet* were reunited and Hagen joined the ALP parliamentary group.[19]

Despite the reunification, the prospects for ALP did not look too good. The parliamentary status was lost in the 1977 election, and the party seemed certain to go down in history as an ephemeral phenomenon. But even if the 1977 election was a low point, it was around this time that the foundations were laid for future success. The party took two decisions that, in hindsight, were turning points. The first was in January 1977 when the party name was changed from ALP to *Fremskrittspartiet* (Progress Party; in the following the Norwegian name and the abbreviation FrP will be used). The name was deliberately chosen to capitalise on the recognition effect of the Progress Party in Denmark.[20]

The second important decision was to appoint Carl I Hagen as leader, in February 1978.[21] Hagen's election as leader was not unopposed, and there were open divisions at the conference which elected him. At the time FrP was oscillating around 1 per cent in opinion polls. Its future was uncertain, but Hagen proved a good choice. The party soon rallied around him, and the infighting died down, at least for the time being. In the subnational elections of 1979 FrP made gains, albeit at a modest level, and in 1981 it returned to parliament with four seats.

The party was still small, and saw its parliamentary representation halved from four to two seats in 1985, but the years following the latter election would prove highly significant.

The 1985 election had been a defeat for FrP, but the result still played into the party's hands. The incumbent three-party centre-right coalition stayed in office, but it no longer commanded a parliamentary majority, as FrP now held the balance of power between the centre-right and centre-left blocs. Before the election Hagen had made it clear that his party was not neutral to who was in government – it would do everything to prevent Labour leader Gro Harlem Brundtland from becoming prime minister.[22]

It seems, however, as if the government took FrP's support for granted. This brought resentment in FrP, and nearly led to a government crisis during the budget process in December 1985. The situation was resolved following a deal between FrP and the government. It was first time FrP had participated in serious political negotiations, but the cooperation was only to be temporary.[23] In the winter of 1986 the Norwegian economy was hit by falling prices on oil. In response the government proposed a number of austerity measures in the so-called Easter Package, presented to parliament in April. Significant parts of the package, for example a number of expenditure cuts, were acceptable to FrP. More problematical, however, was the proposal of increased tax on petrol. The government presented the bill as a complete "take it or leave it" package. No attempts were made to negotiate with FrP, who voted with the opposition. The "Easter Package" was rejected, the government resigned and a minority Labour government took over.[24]

In this context, it is important to remember that the parliamentary term in Norway is fixed to four years. Premature dissolution is not possible, which means that the parliamentary parties are forced to resolve any government crisis without consulting the electorate, until the four-year term has expired. This can sometimes lead to rather precarious parliamentary solutions. The Labour government that took office in the spring of 1986 had 71 out of the 157 seats in the *Storting*. Not even with support from the left-radical Socialist Left did the Labour Party command a majority. The government would have to rely on ad hoc majorities, and was not certain to last for the remainder of the 1985–1989 parliamentary term.

In 1987, just over a year after having paved the way for a Labour government, FrP had the opportunity to once again use its pivotal position, this time to bring back a centre-right government. The Conservative, Centre and Christian Democratic parties opposed a government bill on agriculture, and it seemed certain that the bill would be defeated. The problem was, once again, that support from FrP was taken for granted. Carl I Hagen used the situation to the full. He did not declare his party's intentions until 11 June, the day before the debate in parliament. The party called a press conference, at a time that coincided with the prime-time evening news broadcast on the state TV channel NRK. Live on the TV news, Hagen announced that his party would not vote with the opposition. The Labour government could stay in office.[25]

The decisions by Hagen and FrP, twice in a period of just over a year, to cast their vote in favour of a Labour government were bold, to say the least. To have paved the way for a period of Labour government was not easy to explain for a party so unequivocally opposed to socialism. It was here, however, that Hagen's political skills came to the fore. He was able to argue that what FrP had done in 1986 and 1987 was justified in substantive terms. Especially in the latter case, he forcefully made the case that the opposition proposal, to give more money to agriculture, was economically irresponsible. Not least important, FrP showed that its support could not be taken for granted.[26]

Risky as these decisions were, they come across in hindsight as astute. The party and its leader Hagen showed that they were no pushovers, but had their own agenda. Voters began so see the party as something more than just an outlet for protest, and support for the party rose. Another factor that played into the party's hands at this time was the immigration issue, which will be further discussed below. *Fremskrittspartiet* made substantial gains in the local and regional elections in 1987, and two years later the party increased its number of parliamentary seats from 2 to 22. A third, and more permanent, breakthrough could be added to those from 1973 and 1981. Results would continue to fluctuate, but almost always at levels significantly higher than before 1987. The party now had a baseline level of support big enough to more or less guarantee permanent representation in the *Storting*.

The problems were not over, however. *Fremskrittspartiet* had established itself as a permanent, and not insignificant, force in the Norwegian party system, but it was still politically isolated by the other parties. In addition, it had serious internal conflicts. By the early 1990s three factions could be detected. There was a liberal/libertarian wing, a Christian-conservative wing and a populist wing.[27] With the partial exception of the libertarians, who were primarily based in the party's youth organisation, the factions were quite fluid. They could be associated with some individuals but they had no organisational base. Nevertheless the factionalisation led to conflicts, and there was considerable turbulence in the party. The greatest source of discord was the libertarians, who stood out compared to the rest of the party in terms of style as well as ideology. They were young, articulate, well educated, strongly committed and not afraid of controversy.[28] The FrP libertarians favoured a completely deregulated economy, drastically reduced taxes and cuts in the welfare system. They argued for a separation between the state and the Church of Norway, they opposed compulsory military service, they ridiculed the restrictive Norwegian alcohol policy and they were in principle against restrictions on immigration.[29]

The libertarians were also strong advocates of accession to the EC/EU, an issue that had re-entered the agenda after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The EC/EU and related issues became something of a hot potato in FrP. In the autumn of 1992 FrP voted for ratification of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement between the EC and EFTA, but only after a disruptive internal debate where some in the party demanded that ratification should be subject to a popular referendum.[30] Such a referendum did not take place, but there would be a

plebiscite on accession to what had now become the EU. Unlike many other comparable parties, Euroscepticism has never been a core part of *Fremskrittspartiet*'s message. The official position of FrP, as adopted at the party conferences in 1991 and 1992, was positive to EC accession, but the party was split.[31] As a consequence FrP suffered in the 1993 parliamentary election, which was dominated by the EU issue. The party's share of the vote, and number of seats, were more than halved compared to 1989. Meanwhile the unequivocally EU-critical Centre Party registered the best result in its history.[32]

After the election *Fremskrittspartiet* adopted a neutral position on EU membership. To a significant extent this was part of an effort to tame, or purge, the libertarians. Other policy and ideological decisions were taken as part of the same strategy, to unify the party and marginalise the libertarians. This led to a series of bitter battles, which culminated at the FrP national conference in May 1994. The outcome was a comprehensive defeat for the libertarians.[33] In response to the defeat at the 1994 party conference the libertarians tried to close down the FrP youth organisation, which they controlled. The FrP leadership, however, used a provision in the party rules, the so-called Stalin paragraph, to revoke the decision and retake control of the youth organisation.[34] Most of the libertarians who had not already done so left the party; among the defectors were four out of the ten FrP members of parliament.[35]

Fremskrittspartiet's official neutrality in the EU referendum meant that the party kept a low profile during the referendum campaign. The vote, held on 22 November 1994, ended in a second Norwegian No to EC/EU membership. This was a difficult time for FrP. The party was wounded, but with the libertarians out of the way, and the EU issue off the agenda, new possibilities soon emerged. Two new factors played into the hands of *Fremskrittspartiet* after 1994. The first was immigration, which had emerged in 1987 and had never quite been off the party agenda, but had been one of the contentious issues between the libertarians and the rest of the party. Largely as a concession to the libertarians, immigration had been down-prioritised in the local and regional election campaign in 1991, but it again increased in significance in the manifesto from 1993. From 1995 and onwards, with the libertarians out of the picture, the party was now able to further emphasise the issue in its propaganda.

A second issue was the welfare system and its funding. The party had been formed as a protest against high taxes and a large public sector. It had been seen by many, also inside the party, as an exponent of the growing discontent with the large welfare state, which was seen as a disincentive to work and entrepreneurship, and closely associated with the high tax burden. Gradually, however, a different kind of discontent with the welfare system was growing in the Norwegian electorate. There were reports about how the welfare system failed to deliver to its recipients, with queues and other problems in the health-care system, and difficulties for old-age pensioners to cope with the high cost of living in Norway.[36]

This was discontent that could be turned against the political establishment. The problem for *Fremskrittspartiet* was that it was difficult to advocate increased welfare spending without abandoning one of the party's flagship policies,

significant tax cuts. There were two responses to this dilemma. The first was to recycle an old argument: that immigration is costly, and a burden on the welfare system. Hence, money could be saved by stopping, or at least reducing, immigration, and by reserving welfare provisions to native Norwegians. The FrP argument that immigrants should not be a burden on the welfare system can be traced back to the 1970s,[37] but it was rather easily compatible with a reorientation towards a more positive view on the welfare state.[38]

This welfare chauvinist approach became very common among populist/extreme right parties in the 2000s. In fact, it has become something of a core ingredient in the message of many such parties across Europe.[39] In Norway, however, the dilemma of welfare spending versus tax cuts had an additional, more nation-specific, solution: Norway has oil. *Fremskrittspartiet* began to argue that the oil money should be used to fund improvements in the welfare, healthcare and pensions systems. The other parties opposed such proposals, arguing that oil is a finite resource, and that the money generated will be needed in the future, when the oil is no longer profitable. This approach to welfare funding, labelled "petroleum populism", was not entirely new – in the 1970s Anders Lange had suggested that the oil revenue could be used to abolish income tax. But in the 1990s it became a more consistent and coherent part of the FrP message.[40]

The increased emphasis on immigration brought dividends for *Fremskrittspartiet*. The party made gains in the subnational election in 1995 and the parliamentary election of 1997. The subsequent turn towards welfare chauvinism and petroleum populism, which took place towards the end of the 1990s, proved a useful addition to the FrP message. The 1999 subnational election results were slightly disappointing, but turned out to be a blip. The party was now very much in tune with public opinion. In 2000 FrP was the country's biggest party in several opinion polls, in some cases with support levels of over 30 per cent.[41] Everything seemed set for a major onslaught in the parliamentary election set for 2001.

While things were going well in the polls, *Fremskrittspartiet* was again hit by internal unrest. Carl I Hagen wanted to keep the most vociferous populists, and exponents of immigration criticism, in check. To an extent this had always been a latent conflict in the party, but with the high opinion poll ratings Hagen and the leadership began to see government participation as a possibility. The problem was that FrP still lacked legitimacy in other parties. If government participation was the aim, the party needed to get rid of its reputation as extremist and irresponsible. With this in mind, Hagen had identified a group of seven FrP members of parliament, whom he saw as disruptive and an obstacle in the quest for legitimacy.[42]

Hagen set out to neutralise the "gang of seven". Using a variety of methods, including central directives on the regional candidate selection processes, suspension, expulsion and wheeler-dealing behind the scenes, he ensured that five out of the seven dissidents were not nominated for re-election. Some of the demoted tried to take legal action against the party, but without success. Two

from the gang of seven were in fact re-elected, but one was expelled shortly after the election, and sat the remainder of the 2001–2005 term as an independent. The one remaining dissident, Øystein Hedstrøm, adopted a more Hagen-loyal approach after being re-elected, and stayed in parliament as an FrP representative until leaving national politics in 2005.[43]

This clearance process led to internal turmoil and plenty of media coverage, and *Fremskrittspartiet*'s opinion rating began to slip. Then, in the winter of 2001, the party was hit by more damaging media attention in connection with what could be summarised as a "sex scandal". It involved a series of allegations, in some cases against named individuals, but also more general accounts of what some saw as a "laddish" and promiscuous party culture.[44] Attention soon focused on the FrP deputy leader, the 32-year-old Terje Søviknes, who publicly admitted to a brief sexual relationship with a female member of the FrP youth organisation. Søviknes, and other named individuals, were subject to police investigation, but not charged.[45] Despite the fact that the allegations had no direct legal consequences, the story was politically very damaging. It damaged the party's public reputation, and also inside the party there were negative reactions.

Not least damaging was the fact that Søviknes was important in, and for, FrP. Widely regarded as Hagen's "crown prince", he was also council leader in the town of Os, just south of Bergen. Os had become something of a showcase for FrP, and received national as well as international media attention.[46] The scandal put an end to Søviknes's national political career. He was able to continue in local and regional politics, and started his fourth consecutive term as Os council leader in 2011, but was unsuccessful when he stood for the FrP national executive in 2010.[47] For *Fremskrittspartiet* the whole affair was a major blow to the preparations for the parliamentary election, due in September 2001. The eventual result of 14.6 per cent was a marginal loss compared to 1997, but a recovery compared to the situation a few months before the election.[48] In fact, the party gained one seat.[49]

The parliamentary situation in Norway is often complicated. Majority governments have tended to be rare. *Fremskrittspartiet* held the balance of power between the two main blocs after every election between 1985 and 2001, but after the show of muscle in 1986–1987, described above, the party rarely put its potential bargaining power to full use. To a significant extent this was for ideological reasons. FrP sees itself as a right-of-centre party which prefers a non-socialist government, albeit not at any cost. To be sure, FrP contributed to the fall of a centre-right minority government in March 2000, which led to the formation of a Labour government. Unlike in 1986, however, they were joined by the Conservative as well as Labour parties in voting against the government, on an issue of the construction of gas power stations. It was therefore not a question of voting with the left, and hence not too difficult to sell to FrP voters.[50]

After the 2001 election, *Fremskrittspartiet* again held the balance of power. This time, however, the party was more determined to make use of the situation. As already mentioned, one of Hagen's main reasons for the purge of unruly FrP parliamentarians in 2000–2001 was to make the party more acceptable as a

coalition partner of the other centre-right parties. The Conservatives were not hostile to the idea, but the Christian People's and Liberal parties were very firmly against a government including FrP. In the end the veto power of the two centrist parties made FrP inclusion in the government impossible.[51]

A minority coalition was formed, consisting of the Conservative, Christian People's and Liberal parties. In exchange for supporting the government Carl I Hagen wanted the post of president (speaker) of the *Storting*. He was, however, regarded as too controversial for a post whose holder is supposed to stand above party politics, and be respected in all parties. For Hagen, this was a bitter personal blow, which he expressed in an emotional speech in parliament. Still, Hagen and FrP did not want a continued Labour government, and the party instead negotiated a number of key posts in parliament, including the position as chair of the powerful Committee of Finance. This politically important post went to FrP's deputy leader, the 32-year-old Siv Jensen.[52]

The formation of the new government was described in parts of the international press as a power-sharing arrangement with FrP,[53] but this can at best be described as an exaggeration. The potential for influence by FrP during the 2001–2005 parliament was considerable, but it was not realised. Indeed, in 2003 the budget was decided after a deal had been struck between the government and the Labour Party, after negotiations with FrP had collapsed.[54] A major reason for the lack of FrP influence was resistance in the government. Not least the prime minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Christian People's Party (who had also led the 1997–2000 government), was very sceptical of FrP, and personal relations between Bondevik and Hagen were not good.

The relative lack of influence, certainly compared to the position of more or less direct policy influence held by the Danish People's Party at the same time, may have been frustrating for *Fremskrittspartiet*. It did not, however, do the party's level of support any harm. In 2002–2003 FrP again shot up in opinion polls to the levels enjoyed in 2000. Even though support levels then sank, and continued to fluctuate, FrP had built up a substantial support base. The party broke its own "personal best" electoral performance in the 2005 as well as the 2009 elections, on both occasions finishing as the country's second biggest party behind the Labour Party. Inclusion of FrP in a non-socialist government was still opposed by the Christian People's and Liberal parties, but they were not rewarded for this by the voters, and their veto power was eroded by their diminishing levels of support. In addition, the growing strength of FrP made the party increasingly difficult to avoid in a right-of-centre coalition. The election results in 2005 and 2009 made the issue academic, however, as they ended in narrow majorities for the centre-left bloc. After both elections a government coalition was formed, consisting of the Labour, Socialist Left and Centre parties – the latter party having shifted allegiance after belonging to the centre-right bloc until 2000.

Meanwhile, a key change had taken place in *Fremskrittspartiet*. In May 2006, Carl I Hagen retired as party leader after 28 consecutive years at the helm. He had by then become the longest-serving party leader in Norwegian history.

Siv Jensen was appointed as Hagen's successor. A university-educated economist, Jensen had been deputy party leader since 1998, and a member of parliament since 1997. Her parliamentary experience included the aforementioned position as chair of the *Storting* finance committee between 2001 and 2005. Under Jensen's leadership *Fremskrittspartiet* continued to perform well in opinion polls, albeit still with fluctuations. The declining levels of support for the FrP-sceptical centre-right parties meant that FrP inclusion in a putative "bourgeois" government after the 2009 election seemed a distinct possibility. Jensen was even mentioned as a possible prime minister, as FrP looked like becoming the biggest party in such a government. This was never put to the test, however, as the Labour-led centre-left coalition was able to narrowly hold on to its majority.

As can be seen in Table 6.1, *Fremskrittspartiet* has gone from strength to strength in terms of electoral support. There have been fluctuations but the troughs, such as in the early 1990s, have been followed by strong recoveries. The long-term trend is unequivocally positive. There has been a tendency to do slightly less well in subnational than in parliamentary elections, but also the former elections display an upward trend in the 1990s and 2000s, if they are

Table 6.1 Results for *Fremskrittspartiet* in nationwide elections, 1973–2013[1]

	Per cent	*Parliamentary seats*
1973 (p)	5.0	4/155
1975 (s)	1.4	–
1977 (p)	1.9	0/155
1979 (s)	2.5	–
1981 (p)	4.5	4/155
1983 (s)	6.3	–
1985 (p)	3.7	2/157
1987 (s)	12.3	–
1989 (p)	13.0	22/165
1991 (s)	7.0	–
1993 (p)	6.3	10/165
1995 (s)	12.0	–
1997 (p)	15.3	25/165
1999 (s)	13.4	–
2001 (p)	14.6	26/165
2003 (s)	17.9	–
2005 (p)	22.1	38/169
2007 (s)	18.5	–
2009 (p)	22.9	41/169
2011 (s)	11.8	–
2013 (p)	16.3	29/169

Note

1 (p) = parliamentary elections; (s) = subnational elections. The latter are elections to regional as well as local councils, held at the same time. The percentages given in the table are the party's proportions of the vote in the regional council (*fylkesting*) elections.

treated separately. The election performances are remarkable in any comparison. If we accept that FrP belongs to the extreme right party family, then it can straightforwardly be classified as one of the most successful members of that family. The 22.9 per cent of the vote FrP received in the 2009 election to the *Storting* is bettered only by the Swiss SVP (28.9 per cent in 2007) and the Austrian FPÖ (26.9 per cent in 1999). It comfortably beats any results achieved by other Scandinavian extreme right parties. Closest in a Nordic comparison is the Finnish *Perussuomalaiset*, with 19.1 per cent in the 2011 *Eduskunta* election.

The 2011 result of 11.8 per cent bucked the positive trend, but the election was held in very unfavourable circumstances, discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The parliamentary election in September 2013 signified a recovery, albeit not to the pre-2011 level. The 2013 election did, however, lead to a centre-right majority in parliament, which in turn signified another breakthrough for FrP. The Liberal and the Christian People's parties, which had previously opposed FrP government inclusion, had softened. In 2009, the Liberal leader Lars Sponheim had categorically ruled out any cooperation with FrP. For this his party was not rewarded by the voters; Sponheim even lost his parliamentary seat and resigned the party leadership.[55] His successor, Ms Trine Skei Grande, is no admirer of FrP but was less categorical in her statements before the 2013 election. Also the Christian People's Party adopted a more pragmatic approach than before.

Indeed, the two centrist parties participated in preliminary government negotiations (*sonderinger*) with the Conservatives and FrP after the election. The prospects of a four-party coalition were always limited, and after some time the Liberal and Christian People's parties abandoned the talks. They only did so, however, after having reached a cooperation agreement where they pledged to support a Conservative-FrP government.[56] On 16 October a two-party minority coalition was formed, with Conservative leader Erna Solberg as prime minister and Siv Jensen as minister of finance. FrP got six other portfolios in the 18-strong cabinet, namely children, equality and social inclusion; oil and energy; work and social welfare; justice; agriculture and transport.

Ideology

The ideological foundations of Anders Lange's Party could hardly be described as complex. The basic ideas were presented as bullet-pointed statements on posters, leaflets and newspaper advertisements announcing the inaugural meeting on 8 April 1973. Under the heading "We are sick of being exploited by state capitalism",[57] Lange's ideas were summarised into 14 statements, each beginning with the words *Vi er lei av* … (We are sick of).[58] The programme was later modified into a manifesto with 17 "We are sick of" points, and complemented by 16 demands, each beginning with the words *Vi vil* … (We want).[59]

A recurring theme in the first manifesto was resentment against the intrusive state and political establishment. Several of the points dealt with taxes; others criticised state expropriation of private property, foreign aid, the regulations and

pricing of alcohol and tobacco, and a welfare system that was open to abuse from scroungers. To all intents and purposes, the first Party manifesto was an elaboration of the full name of Anders Lange's Party – a protest against taxes and public intervention.

The FrP manifestos soon became more elaborate – and longer. A format developed with two types of manifesto. First, an election manifesto which contains quite detailed policy proposals the party intends to pursue during the forthcoming electoral term (*Handlingsprogram*). This can be quite long; in 1977 it was already 44 pages and by 2013 it had almost doubled to 86 pages (see also Table 6.2 below).[60] In addition, there is a significantly shorter "Principles" manifesto (*Prinsipprogram*; often referred to as *Fremskrittspartiets prinsipper*), which contains a declaration of the party's main ideological values. The latter document tended for many years to be 3–4 pages long, but had grown to 14 pages in 2013. These two manifestos are usually presented separately. In some years they have been put together into a joint document, but with both manifestos clearly identifiable. In the following, the *Handlingsprogram* will be referred to as election manifesto, and *Prinsipprogram/Prinsipper* as Principles manifesto.

Even though much has happened since the days of Anders Lange, there are important elements of continuity in *Fremskrittspartiet*'s ideology. Above all, the party has never abandoned the tax protest on which it was formed. Demands of low taxes have been recurring features in the FrP manifestos. Since 1996 every Principles manifesto has, verbatim, repeated the ideological declaration contained in the full name of Anders Lange's Party – "A drastic reduction in taxes, fees and public intervention" is stated as the "main goal" of the party.[61] In concrete terms, however, the tax policy has softened. The election manifestos of 1977, 1981 and 1985 advocated the complete abolition of income tax.[62] In 1989 this was softened to demanding the "lowest possible tax burden", a demand that in a slightly modified form has remained since.[63] Today the party advocates a less progressive income tax, but does not go as far as proposing a flat income tax rate.[64] Thus, while FrP still profiles itself as a tax-reduction party, the concrete policy proposals have been significantly modified – in fact they are less radical than the flat rate income tax proposed by some US Republicans, and introduced in countries such as Russia, the Baltic States, Romania and Slovakia.[65]

Nevertheless, in contrast to many other parties classified as extreme right, the economy has remained an important issue for FrP. The party has consistently, and in explicit terms, continued to favour market economics and private ownership. This is not to say that the party's economic outlook has remained static. As already mentioned, FrP has changed from welfare scepticism towards a more welfare chauvinist approach. In the 1985 Principles manifesto, FrP listed nine areas where the state should have the ultimate responsibility. This included "minimal state" functions such as defence, foreign affairs and the justice system, but also areas where private alternatives are more of an option, such as education, social care and public transport. In the latter areas, however, the need for private alternatives was emphasised. In social care, the party advocated "help to

self-help" as a basic principle, and wanted to "stop the development where publicly employed staff take over the natural functions of the family", with child-minding and care of the ill and the elderly among the examples.[66]

In contrast, the 2013 Principles manifesto is more positive to a publicly run health-care system. The party argues that it is a public responsibility to give everybody access to necessary health and care provisions, and that the state should have the main responsibility for such provisions. It is, however, also stated that individuals should be able to choose from public as well as private providers.[67] The election manifesto from the same year contains a number of proposals to ensure choice and competition in the health and welfare sectors, but with the public sector assuming overall responsibility and ensuring baseline standards.[68]

The shift towards a more positive, or less negative, perspective on the public sector is clear, but should not be overstated. The section on economic policy in the 2013 election manifesto, tellingly entitled "Market economy", contains a number of proposals to deregulate the economy.[69] In the subsection on fiscal and monetary policy, FrP states that the public sector should be cut and made more efficient, so that people get better and cheaper services.[70] The 2013 document also argues that the public sector should allow more freedom of choice, and be made more efficient, and that the use of private and voluntary alternatives in the public welfare sector should be intensified.[71]

Thus, although *Fremskrittspartiet* no longer advocates drastic reductions in the welfare system, and has a much less negative view on the public sector than it used to, the party still advocates choice, deregulation and private alternatives. This is of course reminiscent of economic liberalism and, indeed, the party has openly defined itself as liberal since 1985.[72] In the 2013 Principles manifesto FrP cites liberalism, with its belief that people themselves are better than politicians at deciding what is best for them, as the party's ideological foundation. It goes on to describe itself as a "liberal people's party".[73] As an aside it could also be mentioned that Siv Jensen, when asked in an interview about her party's nearest equivalent in Denmark, responded with the liberal party *Venstre*, not the Danish People's Party.[74]

At this stage a brief linguistic detour is motivated. When referring to itself as liberal, *Fremskrittspartiet* tends to use the Norwegian word *liberalistisk*, as opposed to *liberal*, which also exists in the Norwegian language. The distinction between these two words is not trivial. The word *liberalistisk* implies forms of liberalism which emphasise individual liberties and economic freedom. The word *liberal* can be used with reference to the ideology of liberalism in a broad sense, but is in practice often used to indicate more specific forms of liberalism, which emphasise social justice and equality. The words *liberalistisk* and *liberal* could thus be linked with their own respective subsets of liberalism; the former with libertarianism and the latter with social liberalism. The contrast between FrP and the traditional Norwegian liberal party *Venstre* is interesting in this respect. In its Principles manifesto from 2007, *Venstre* never uses the word *liberalistisk*, but the word *liberal* appears 16 times.[75]

With this in mind it could, perhaps, be suggested that what FrP adheres to is libertarianism rather than liberalism. Against this it should be noted that the

content of FrP manifestos, certainly since the early 1990s, hardly meet any definition of libertarianism. Telling examples are the scaling down of tax cut demands, and the more pragmatic perspective on the public sector. As discussed above the libertarian faction in FrP, referred to in Norwegian as *liberalistene*, wanted to take the party closer to a libertarian position, but was purged in 1994. Since then the party has, if anything, become less libertarian.

Despite the change away from radical libertarian ideas towards a more moderate position, FrP continues to position itself to the right of centre on the socio-economic dimension. It sees tax cuts as a priority, it advocates a deregulated economy and it proposes private alternatives in, for example, health care. Thus, the economic policies of today's FrP do not drastically deviate from many contemporary conservative and liberal parties. This does not, however, automatically make FrP classifiable as a conservative or liberal party. For one thing it has few, if any, links to such parties elsewhere in Europe. FrP is not a member of the Liberal International, or the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR).[76] The issue of classification will be returned to at the end of this chapter.

Moving on to immigration, it was not an issue on *Fremskrittspartiet*'s agenda in the early years. Anders Lange appears to have held views towards the right-wing end of the sociocultural conflict dimension – for example, he is alleged to have defended apartheid – but immigration was not part of his political message.[77] The 1973 "We are sick of" manifesto criticised foreign aid, but made no reference to immigration. In 1974 the ALP representative Erik Gjems-Onstad spoke out against immigration in parliament, but at the time it was an isolated occurrence.[78] The 1977 manifesto gave the issue a brief mention, referring only to labour immigration. The party advocated that a temporary stop to labour immigration, introduced by the government in 1975, should be made permanent (which it, in practice, became).[79] In the 1981 manifesto immigration was given a separate section, consisting of eight bullet-pointed proposals. The advocacy of a permanent ban on labour immigration was repeated. Refugee immigration was now mentioned, but in fairly moderate terms; there was no proposal to stop or reduce the influx of asylum seekers; nor was there a general statement against immigration as such. Several of the proposals, however, demanded in various ways that immigrants should not be given preferential treatment.[80]

The 1985 election manifesto devoted even more space to immigration. The party declared to be in principle in favour of the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour across borders. This, however, was based on the assumption that welfare and other arrangements, which have to be earned via payments or through citizenship, are not given to immigrants. Since immigrants have immediate access to the Norwegian welfare system without having paid into it, FrP argued that free immigration is impractical.[81] Instead the 1985 election manifesto proposed short-term guest worker contracts, with explicit and positive references to the system used in Switzerland. The declaration of principled acceptance but practical rejection of free immigration has been repeated in every subsequent FrP manifesto.[82]

It should be noted that, as in 1981, most of the text on immigration in the 1985 manifesto dealt with labour immigration. The aforementioned argument against

immigration could, perhaps, be termed as welfare chauvinist, but had no ethnic or cultural elements. The party still did not demand any restrictions in the acceptance of refugees; instead the willingness in the 1981 manifesto to accept refugees was repeated. Unless they had acquired Norwegian citizenship, however, accepted refugees should return to their country of origin when politically possible.[83]

The relatively refugee friendly (or at least non-hostile) 1985 manifesto was valid between 1985 and 1989. It was, however, during this period that FrP started to politicise immigration in its rhetoric, and to turn the attention to refugees. As we saw in Chapter 4, the number of asylum seekers applying to enter Norway grew quickly after 1985. In 1987 the number reached 8,600.[84] This led to frictions and growing popular discontent. FrP was the only party to bring this new issue on to the agenda, and it became a key theme in the party's local and regional election campaign in 1987. To politicise immigration was an opportunity for FrP. It gave the party another area in which the established parties could be accused of negligence, collusion and unwillingness to listen to the concerns of the people.

For Carl I Hagen the 1987 campaign contained one of his greatest political blunders. In public he quoted a letter from a "Mustafa", which contained claims of a conspiracy among Muslim immigrants planning to "take over" Norway. The letter was soon revealed to have been a forgery, and Hagen was subject to much ridicule.[85] As it turned out, however, his mistake did not prove costly. It is obviously not possible to determine the influence the letter had on the election, but the FrP result of 12.3 per cent suggests that the net effect can hardly have been negative. It was the first time the party had reached double figures in a nationwide election, and opinion polls had indicated significantly lower support levels only a month before the election.[86]

From now on, immigration was established as a permanent part of *Fremskrittspartiet*'s message. The arguments and relative emphasis varied, but it had become part of the party's political profile. This showed in the manifestos from 1989 onwards. In an analysis of *Fremskrittspartiet*'s discourse on immigration, the sociologist Anniken Hagelund identifies changes over time in how the party's argument was structured. During a first phase, in the 1980s, FrP tended to focus on the cost. Immigrants were believed to receive preferential treatment, in terms of housing schemes, support to immigrant organisations and teaching in their home language. This, the party argued, amounts to discrimination against native Norwegians, but it also takes away resources from others, in more need of welfare provisions, such as the sick, elderly and disabled.[87]

The welfare-based argument has not disappeared, but since the late 1980s it has been accompanied by cultural concerns. The starting point was arguably the ill-fated "Mustafa" letter, but the culture-based argument was later fuelled by the arrival of refugees from the Balkan conflicts, which began in 1991–1992.[88] *Fremskrittspartiet* feared that the influx of refugees from a conflict zone would bring those conflicts into Norway. In a more general sense, immigration brought the risk of a culture of violence and "gang mentality" being imported into the country, as Carl I Hagen argued.[89] In 1993, the amount of space in the election manifesto devoted to immigration increased drastically (see Table 6.2 below). In

the same year the word "ethnic" was used for the first time in an FrP manifesto, in connection with concerns for new conflicts in Europe, and the risk of antagonism between immigrant groups in Norway.[90]

The 1997 election manifesto further emphasised concerns beyond the economy and welfare system. It also contained concerns for the consequences of continued immigration, which FrP argued could lead to serious conflicts between population groups. The party went on to argue that:

> It is not immoral to believe that one must take reactions against this immigration into consideration in order to prevent conflicts. Nor is it immoral to believe that one should prevent too rapid changes in the unified character of our population. It is incorrect to call this racism when it is not based on ideas about some races being more valuable than others.[91]

This quote is interesting in several ways. Immigration is explicitly argued to increase the risk of conflicts being brought into Norway, but the perceived threat does not end there. It is also seen as necessary to "prevent too rapid changes in the unified character of our population" (*forebygge for raske forandringer av det helhetspreg som vår befolkning har*). The criterion for changes being classifiable as "too rapid", and the meaning of "the unified character of our population" are not clear. The latter could be taken as meaning Norwegian culture; it could also

Table 6.2 Space devoted to immigration in *Fremskrittspartiet* election manifestos, 1977–2013[1]

Year	*No. of words on immigration*	*No. of words in the whole manifesto*	*Per cent devoted to immigration*
1977	35	19,768	0.2
1981	100	14,928	0.7
1985	306	14,200	2.2
1989	324	16,488	2.0
1993	2102	23,290	9.0
1997	1557	28,315	5.5
2001	1993	37,528	5.3
2005	1869	44,315	4.2
2009	1237	30,907	4.0
2013	1195	40,363	3.0

Note

1 Entries are based on the FrP election manifestos (*valgprogramm*, or *handlingsprogramm*). In years when the election manifesto document also contains the Principles manifesto (*prinsipprogram*; *Fremskrittspartiets prinsipper*), the Principles part has been taken out, to improve comparability. Where applicable, indexes and lists of contents have been taken out. The absolute word counts on immigration 1977–2001 are taken from Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 267; all other entries have been measured and calculated by the author. The 1977–2001 manifestos are taken from the Party Manifesto CD-ROM *Vi Vil..!*, issued by the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, and Norwegian Social Science Data service, Bergen. The 2005, 2009 and 2013 manifestos were downloaded as PDF files from www.frp.no.

be interpreted as referring to the ethnic composition of the Norwegian people. But any such conclusions are left to the reader.

It is worth pointing out here that the words "prevent too rapid changes in the unified character of our population" do not originate from the party itself, but are a quote taken from the former Conservative Prime Minister Kaare Willoch. Hagelund suggests that FrP in this way covers its own back by quoting Willoch.[92] Any questions about what FrP really mean can be deflected to the widely respected former prime minister.[93] Nevertheless, FrP apparently finds it necessary to pre-empt criticism by following the statement up with an argument as to why the words do not amount to racism. Indeed, the tone of the entire paragraph comes across as defensive, with the repeated assertions that the beliefs expressed are "not immoral" (*ikke umoralsk*).

Whether the disclaimer against racism stands up to scrutiny is open to debate. The party warns against "too rapid" changes in its population, but adds that that no "race" is more valuable than any other. As we saw in Chapter 2, the assertion that no "race" is more "valuable" than any other is incompatible with some, but not all, definitions of racism. It could be argued to be consistent with the "equal but separate" ethno-pluralist doctrine; also labelled "culturism" or even "new racism".[94] In addition, the wording could be interpreted as suggesting that the party accepts the existence of "races", even though the word "race" is used defensively, and the notion of a hierarchy is negated.

It should be noted that the 1997 manifesto represents a high point in the rhetoric on immigration. At this time, FrP contained a number of rather vociferous anti-immigration hardliners.[95] In connection with the aforementioned clearout of the "gang of seven" in 2000–2001, however, the volume was turned down somewhat. The word "race", or derivations thereof, has never again been used in an FrP manifesto, except to state that the party denounces all forms of racism.[96] The concern for the "unified character" of the Norwegian people was also a one-off occurrence.

Subsequent FrP manifestos continue to mention immigration as a potential problem. Fears that continued asylum immigration will lead to conflicts between population groups in Norway are repeated.[97] The election manifestos of 1997, 2001 and 2005 propose a maximum of 1,000 non-Western migrants accepted into Norway per year.[98] In 2009 the numerical limit was dropped, but the party still proposed that the intake of non-Western refugees and asylum seekers should be "drastically reduced" (*begrenses kraftig*); a wording which was kept in 2013.[99] The party wants to give local councils the right to decide whether to accept asylum seekers.[100] The party also proposes restrictions on family reunifications, for example with a minimum age of 24 for spouses and a maximum age of 18 for children,[101] and mandatory expulsion of all foreign citizens sentenced to jail for 3 months or more without suspension.[102]

The above examples could be multiplied. *Fremskrittspartiet* has been an immigration-critical party since the second half of the 1980s. Immigration has, however, never dominated the FrP manifestos. As can be seen in Table 6.2, the relative space devoted to the section on immigration in the FrP election manifestos has never reached 10 per cent.

Quantitatively speaking, the emphasis on immigration peaked in absolute as well as relative terms in 1993. As discussed above the wording on immigration was arguably at its sharpest in the 1997 manifesto, but it was not given as much space as in 1993. Between 1997 and 2013 the absolute word count fluctuated, but the relative proportion of the total manifesto declined marginally but steadily. Indeed, also the absolute count has declined steadily from 2005. The data presented in Table 6.2 cast serious doubt on any notion of FrP being a single-issue anti-immigration party. It should also be mentioned here that the party's statements on immigration are largely concentrated to one section. In several election manifestos immigration issues have appeared in a section titled "Norway and the world"; in 2013 it was given its own section titled "Immigration Policy". The keywords immigr*, asyl*, refugee* and foreigner* are very rare outside this section.[103] Thus, the percentages in Table 6.2 are valid indicators of the party's relative emphasis on immigration. It is also worth mentioning that the words "Islam" or "Muslim" with derivations have not been found in any FrP manifesto between 1973 and 2013.[104]

This said, too much emphasis on the manifestos does not give the full picture of *Fremskrittspartiet*'s profile as immigration critics. As already shown, the party has for many years presented immigration as a problem, and advocated tighter immigration policies. In the Norwegian context, FrP has a long-standing profile as the most radical immigration critical of the parliamentary parties. Arguably this was the case also before immigration became a major issue in the second half of the 1980s. The rhetoric sometimes bears resemblance to more clear-cut members of the extreme right party family. The party often presents itself as brave tellers of the truth about immigration and its consequences, in a climate of silence and "political correctness".

In June 2011, for example, the FrP spokesperson on immigration and integration, Per-Willy Amundsen, stated in a parliamentary debate about immigrant criminality that FrP "will not refrain from telling things as they are, in order to be politically correct. Criminal asylum seekers are criminal asylum seekers".[105] Another example was in March 2009, when FrP deputy leader Per Sandberg made a much publicised visit to Sweden's third biggest city Malmö, which has a large immigrant population and frequent reports of crime and social problems. The apparent purpose of the trip was to highlight the negative consequences of large-scale Muslim immigration, after Siv Jensen had made a negative reference to Malmö in a speech to the FrP executive in late February.[106] During the visit, Sandberg labelled the situation in Malmö "a disaster".[107] The use of Sweden as a negative example has also been employed by the Danish People's Party.

Criticism against Islam is, in other words, not absent in the FrP rhetoric, despite the absence of references to Islam and Muslims in the manifestos (see, however, note 104). It dates back to the "Mustafa" letter in 1987, and has remained as a recurring theme. The party periodical *Fremskritt* contains many examples. An issue from January 2010, for example, contains the claim that Siv Jensen had introduced the word "sneak Islamification" (*snikislamifisering*) into the Norwegian language in 2009. The article contains a large picture of a

Swedish passport police officer wearing a hijab.[108] In an issue from June 2011, the aforementioned Per-Willy Amundsen argues that there is a link between religion and integration on the labour market, citing statistics showing that persons with a background from Muslim countries have the lowest rate of employment.[109] The rhetoric against Islam was significantly toned down after 22 July 2011, and references to Islam and Muslims were rare in subsequent issues of *Fremskritt*. In October 2011, however, the publication contained an article about alleged exploitative marriage arrangements in Islam.[110]

As we have seen, however, the *Fremskrittspartiet* defines itself as liberal. The declared adherence to liberalism in the Principles manifesto is followed up with the statement that FrP is based on "the Norwegian constitution, Norwegian and Western tradition and cultural heritage, founded on the Christian outlook on life (*det kristne livssyn*) and humanistic values".[111] Although the party obviously sees itself as a defender of the national interest, it does not define itself as nationalist.[112] Nor do the manifestos contain any explicit definitions of Norwegian nationality. The word "ethnic" does appear in the 2009 as well as 2013 documents, but not in a way that implies ethnicity as a criterion of Norwegian nationality.[113]

In this context it is worth pointing out that, unlike most contemporary extreme right parties *Fremskrittspartiet* is not Eurosceptical. Throughout its history, the official position of FrP has oscillated between neutrality and what the Norwegian party researcher Jo Saglie has characterised as "an unsteady and low-profiled yes".[114] It has, in other words, never officially been a No party. The FrP position was neutral in the 1980s, changed into a pro-EC position in the early 1990s but was readjusted into a "Yes to the EC, but a No to a union" stance in 1993.[115] Strictly speaking this should have meant support for the No side in the referendum held in November 1994, as the vote was about accession to what now had become the European Union. Nevertheless FrP decided in favour of a Yes position in June 1994.[116]

This Yes position was of a qualified nature, however, and the party kept a low profile in the campaign. Individual FrP members were free to campaign on the No side if they wished. Hagen himself argued for a Yes, but claims in his autobiography that he did so without conviction.[117] The party emphasised that it would respect the outcome of the referendum – not a trivial point to make, as the referendum was not formally binding, and there was a debate about whether a parliamentary minority could veto the constitutional amendments required for accession even if there was a Yes majority in the referendum.[118] This became academic, however, as the vote resulted in a second Norwegian No to EC/EU membership in 22 years.

The FrP position after the referendum has been at least as cautious. Like several other Norwegian parties, *Fremskrittspartiet* is latently split on EU accession, and a firm stance in either direction would cause unrest in the party. This has been the case for decades, and explains, at least in part, FrP's low profile on the issue. After the 1994 referendum, the party has not taken a stand for or against EU accession. The 1997, 2001 and 2005 election manifestos proposed

that a new membership application should be *preceded* by a referendum.[119] This was dropped in 2009 in favour of a more general commitment to respect for the popular will via referendums.[120]

Carl I Hagen, who voted Yes in both 1972 and 1994, states in his autobiography that he prefers FrP to be neutral on the EU issue.[121] He also expresses concern for the development of the EU, and believes that he would most likely be on the No side if a new referendum on accession is held.[122] Siv Jensen has been less willing to show her hand.[123] In August 2013 she claimed to have grown sceptical over time, but she also repeated the position that the outcome of a possible referendum will be respected.[124] The EU has not become easier to sell since 1994, however, and it is difficult to see how FrP could come out in favour of accession in the event of a new Norwegian referendum – if, indeed, such a referendum can be expected in the foreseeable future.

Three further points are worth mentioning in relation to *Fremskrittspartiet*'s ideology. The party's position on constitutional matters is essentially to keep the status quo, but with a few exceptions. It advocates the abolition of the regional councils (*fylkesting*), with the argument that it would save costs and reduce bureaucracy. FrP also wants to strengthen direct democracy by introducing binding referendums. Such demands appear in every manifesto since 1977. Since 1981 they have been complemented with the possibility of popular initiatives, which since 1997 have been specified as requiring signatures from 10 per cent of the electorate.[125]

Fremskrittspartiet is authoritarian on law and order issues. In recent manifestos, the party proposes more resources to the police, and generally more severe punishments for criminal offences.[126] Similar proposals can be found in the election manifestos since the 1980s. The party favours a strong defence and has always supported the Norwegian membership of NATO. It advocated Norwegian military participation in the US-/UK-led war against Iraq in 2003,[127] and wants Norway "to take active part in the fight against terror".[128]

On environmental matters, FrP has voiced scepticism in the debate about climate change. In the 2009 election manifesto, FrP argued that it is "disputed" (*omdiskutert*) whether human activity affects the natural climate shifts. The party went on to question the recommendations by, and objectivity of, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).[129] This scepticism is toned down in the 2013 election manifesto. There is no reference to the IPCC, but the party still states that there is "great uncertainty" (*stor usikkerhet*) about the relative impacts of human activity and natural climatic variations, respectively.[130] *Fremskrittspartiet* is also sceptical against measures to restrict road transport and driving, and opposes road tolls and congestion charges.[131]

Organisation and leadership

Extreme right parties often suffer from internal problems. They have an apparent tendency to attract derailed individuals who see the party as their big chance in life, perhaps to redeem earlier failures. *Fremskrittspartiet* is no exception. The difficulty has been likened by FrP representatives to what happens when a

lantern (*fjøslykt*) is hung out on a summer's night: "Then many strange things come flying".[132] In fact FrP has made positive use of these self-ironic words, which have become something of a Norwegian adage, by introducing a Lantern award (*Fjøslykta)* to long-serving or otherwise deserving party members.[133]

Fremskrittspartiet has certainly harboured a few idiosyncratic personalities over the years. Even if we take out the most capricious characters, the party has always had a strong presence of individualists with strong beliefs and determined minds. It has not been an easy task to lead such a party, something the founder and first leader Anders Lange had already experienced. In the summer of 1974, a few months before his death, Lange in fact received a letter in which the then young and unknown Carl I Hagen asked Lange not only to hand over the leadership, but to leave the party.[134] Hagen himself was later to experience many more or less open displays of disloyalty.

A key source of disagreement between Lange and Hagen was about the party organisation. Lange did not have faith in formal organisational structures, which he thought of as one of the key problems with the established parties. Hagen, however, believed that an effective structure was necessary if the party was to build on its success, and once he had become leader he started to strengthen the party organisation.

To be sure, FrP already had a fledgling organisational structure before Hagen became leader, but the current party structure was established in 1983. The party holds annual national congresses, the first of which took place in 1974. Between congresses FrP is run by a national executive (*Landsstyre*) introduced in 1974, and a smaller executive committee (*Sentralstyre*), introduced in 1976. The latter consists of 11 full and 4 deputy members. It is elected by the national congress, plus one representative each from the FrP parliamentary party and the FrP youth organisation. The *Landsstyre* consists of the members of the *Sentralstyre*, representatives from the regional party units, up to five representatives from the FrP parliamentary group and a representative from the FrP youth organisation. Since 1983, the executive committee (*Sentralstyre*) appoints within itself a working committee (*Arbeidsutvalg*).[135]

In a Scandinavian comparison, there is nothing exceptional about the thus sketched party structure. The party does, however, deviate from the norm in the criteria for allocation of national congress delegates to the regional organisations. As in the other Norwegian parties, the regional units correspond with the administrative regions (*fylke*), which in turn correspond with the parliamentary constituencies. In the other parties, however, the allocation of congress delegates is based on the membership strength of the respective party region. In FrP it is based on the total number of parliamentary seats in the constituency/*fylke* in question, in the most recent election. Not the number of seats held by FrP in the constituency, but the total number of seats allocated to that constituency. Thus, membership figures do not matter. Neither does, since 2007, the party's electoral performance in the constituency.[136]

Regional- and local-level party organisations were developed at an early stage. The party was already able to put up a list of candidates in each of the 19

parliamentary constituencies in the 1973 election, but it took a while to build up a more permanent presence throughout the country. In 1983 FrP was represented in each of the 19 regional councils, the *fylkesting*, for the first time. In 2005 and 2009 FrP had members of parliament elected from every constituency; in the former year this achievement was matched only by the Labour Party; in 2009 also by the Conservatives. In the 2013 parliamentary election, which was a loss compared to 2009, FrP had representatives elected from 17 out of the 19 constituencies.[137] *Fremskrittspartiet* does not put up a party list in every local council, but this is by no means unique; joint-, non- and cross-party lists are common in Norwegian council elections and no party put up a list in each of the 429 local council elections held in 2011.

Internal divisions have been a more or less perennial problem for FrP. There has been much dissent, splits and a long series of defections of local party units as well as members of parliament. The response by the leadership can be summarised in one word: centralisation. The Norwegian party researcher Lars Svåsand has argued that *Fremskrittspartiet* is the most centralised party in Norway.[138] The party structure has even been compared with the internally disciplined Marxist-Leninist parties. The organisational principle is that all levels in the party are bound by decisions taken by bodies higher up in the organisational hierarchy. This is reminiscent of the democratic centralism model traditionally found in communist parties.[139]

The centralisation is reflected in the organisational structure. Since 1991 the party has made it clear that it is one single organisation. All FrP members and party units are obliged to follow decisions taken by the central party.[140] This applies to the "side organisations", i.e. the FrP youth organisation, formed in 1978, and the organisation for older party members ("seniors"), initiated in 2009. Unlike many other parties, FrP does not have a women's, or students', organisation. Any decisions taken by the side organisations can be overruled by the party. This so-called Stalin paragraph was used in 1994 to invalidate a decision by the libertarian-dominated youth organisation to dissolve itself, and install a new and loyal leadership in the youth organisation.[141]

The centralised structure applies not only to the side organisations, but also to the FrP group in the Norwegian parliament. Traditionally, the Norwegian parliamentary parties have tended to be relatively independent of the extraparliamentary organisation, but following the great success in the 1989 election, the FrP parliamentary party was made subordinate to the FrP main organisation. This is manifested most importantly by the regulation that the FrP party in parliament is bound by the frames and guidelines set in the Party manifesto, and by the FrP executive (*Landsstyre*) and executive committee (*Sentralstyre*). In cases of disagreement about the interpretation of the Party manifesto, a one-third minority of the parliamentary party can enforce a referral of the issue to the executive committee (*Sentralstyre*), which will then adjudicate.[142]

The strict internal discipline applies not only to the organisational structure of the party, but also to its individual members. For several years FrP had the concept of "active resignation" (*aktiv utmeldelse*). Members whose actions were deemed as

intended to damage the party, its officials or publicly elected representatives in front of the public were regarded to have "actively resigned" their FrP membership. In other words, the member in question was not expelled, but deemed to have expelled her-/himself, without a formal procedure. Readmission could be approved by a two-thirds majority in the regional FrP committee (*Fylkesstyret*).[143] The party rules also contained provisions for expulsion in a conventional sense, as well as temporary suspensions.[144] In 2013, expulsion and active resignation were merged into a single concept, called "deprivation" of the membership, which is taken by the regional party committee or the *Sentralstyre*.[145]

On the face of it, this may come across as an approach designed to emphasise the loyalty rather than quantity of the members. The reason for this should already be apparent; *Fremskrittspartiet* has a long history of internal turmoil, and wishes to reduce the risks of future problems by ensuring that troublesome members can easily be purged. It may, in addition, also serve as a warning to those who intend to join the party. Still, it would not be fair to conclude that FrP is not interested in membership recruitment. The party not only works actively to recruit new members, it also makes conscious efforts to retain those members, by offering a wide range of courses and social/political events. In 2008, the party had 1 national, 19 regional and 350 local membership supervisors (*medlemsansvarlige*), for whom regular conferences and seminars are arranged.[146]

These efforts have not gone unrewarded. The membership figures reported in Table 6.3 may not be earth-shattering, but they do go against the general European trend towards declining party membership. Norway has not escaped this trend; in 2006, less than 5 per cent of the Norwegian electorate were members of a political party, compared to over 12 per cent in 1990.[147] But, as can be seen in the table, FrP about trebled its membership between 1998 and 2010. In the latter year, it reported the joint third highest membership of the seven main Norwegian parties. It was behind the Labour and Christian People's parties, but level with the Conservatives and well ahead of the traditionally movement-oriented Centre Party.[148] Indeed, the positive membership development has given FrP favourable press coverage.[149] The positive trend was broken in 2011 and, especially, 2012 but it is too early to tell whether this signified the start of a more long-term decline.

In terms of leadership, *Fremskrittspartiet* has been associated with strong and iconic leaders more or less throughout its existence. The only exception was the three and one-third years between Anders Lange's death, in October 1974, and when Carl I Hagen became leader, in February 1978. During this time, FrP had Eivind Eckbo as caretaker leader from 1974 to 1975, and Arve Lønnum as leader from 1975 to 1978. But it is not much of an exaggeration to state that the history of FrP is closely linked to its founder Anders Lange and two of his successors, Carl I Hagen and Siv Jensen.

Lange was the archetypical political entrepreneur and maverick. It is worth remembering that his breakthrough in 1973 was not the result of a sudden interest in politics. He had already been politically involved before the war, and he had made unsuccessful previous attempts to drum up support for a new party.

Table 6.3 Membership statistics for *Fremskrittspartiet*, 1973–2012. Total number of registered members, FrP membership as a percentage of the electorate (M/E) and members who had paid their dues by the end of the calendar year

	Registered members	*M/E*	*Paid members*
1973	1,020	0.04	n/a
1981	10,000	0.33	n/a
1989	16,874	0.53	n/a
1991	14,926	0.47	n/a
1993	13,197	0.40	n/a
1994	10,555	0.32	3,671
1995	10,932	0.34	4,976
1996	10,117	0.31	5,654
1997	12,018	0.36	6,816
1998	9,841	0,30	7,905
1999	13,907	0.42	11,224
2000	15,174	0.45	11,824
2001	16,529	0.49	12,567
2002	20,104	0.60	16,746
2003	22,420	0.67	18,839
2004	21,934	0.65	17,660
2005	20,389	0.60	16,848
2006	22,295	0.65	19,581
2007	23,916	0.70	20,961
2008	24,131	0.71	21,019
2009	26,537	0.75	22,876
2010	26,067	0.74	22,623
2011	25,397	0.72	22,310
2012	n/a	n/a	18,888

Sources: Demker and Svåsand, eds., 2005, p. 432 (Appendix, Table 8e). Figures from 2004 onwards are taken from the FrP National Executive annual reports, downloaded from www.frp.no. The party makes a distinction between "registered" and "paid" members; the latter figure includes only members who have fully paid their dues by the end of the year.

Nor was he unknown to the public. Well before the 1973 breakthrough he had held many public meetings, written letters and articles in the press and made occasional TV appearances. From these platforms he had built a reputation as a drastic but entertaining critic of the heavy tax burden and the dominance of the Labour Party.[150]

Even among those who to some extent agreed with Lange, however, he tended to be regarded as something of a buffoon rather than the provider of a feasible political alternative. Arguably, this could be said to have been the case also in 1973, with the important difference that disillusionment with the established parties had grown to such an extent that Lange to some began to appear as less impossible in comparison to the other parties. It could thus be argued that Lange's success in 1973 was not as much a question of him sensing, adapting to and seizing an emerging opportunity, as the ground having become more fertile for what he had been doing for some time. On the other hand, it is worth

remembering that Lange also benefited from having a role model in Mogens Glistrup from Denmark.[151]

Lange was not afraid of being controversial, and his often cruel jokes at the expense of established politicians went down well with his audiences. This style of rhetoric proved suitable for television, and Lange has gone down in history as something of a TV campaign pioneer in the 1973 election. Due to its opinion poll ratings, Anders Lange and his party were allowed to participate in the state television channel NRK's election programmes, an opportunity Lange used to the full. In the concluding party leader debate, he dismissed the Conservative Party's tax policies as "bluff", and was himself called a "fascist" by the representative from the far-left Red Election Alliance. Lange also made the headlines by pouring himself, and drinking, a glass of egg liqueur during the debate.[152]

At the same time, Lange could hardly be described as a brilliant orator. His speeches were entertaining but his message was simplistic.[153] This does not, perhaps, distinguish him from several more successful politicians, but his big problem was a lack of ability to play the political game, inside as well as outside his own party. Of course, Lange died just over a year after the 1973 electoral breakthrough, and any discussion about what might have happened if he had lived longer will be hypothetical. Everything, however, suggests that he would have struggled to build on the success from 1973.

A key reason for this supposition is Lange's already mentioned scepticism, verging on hostility, to a traditional party organisation. This was one of the complaints put forward by the Reform Party defectors, who of course included Carl I Hagen. An organised party structure was necessary for survival and future success, something which Hagen and others realised. It is much to Hagen's credit that today's FrP is one of the best organised parties in Norway, far from the loose movement structure favoured by Lange.

Another problem for Lange was his apparent lack of leadership skills. He saw himself as a champion for those that he claimed had no voice. This worked as long as he had everyone in the party on board, but as soon as internal debates emerged he found them difficult to deal with. It seems very much as if he did not like being contradicted, and even if he also shares this trait with many successful politicians, he lacked the interpersonal and organisational skills and authority to deal with internal debates, disagreement and dissent. Nor does he appear to have had much sense of political strategy. He felt he knew what was right, he disliked the "dirty" business of politics and he did not want to become involved in negotiations and compromises.

Thus, there is much to suggest that Anders Lange was primarily a catalyst of emerging tensions in the Norwegian electorate. In the favourable situation at hand following the largely unsuccessful centre-right governments of 1965–1971, and the turmoil surrounding the 1972 EEC referendum, he emerged as a rallying point for voters who no longer had a home among the established parties. It is, however, very unlikely that he would have been able to build on his success.

Carl I Hagen is an entirely different story. To be sure, his political legacy is by no means flawless. During his 28 years as party leader, he made a number of

mistakes and misjudgements. One of the most spectacular examples, when he walked straight into the trap of the "Mustafa" letter in 1987, has already been discussed. He has also been criticised for weakness during the internal battle with the libertarians in the early 1990s, criticism with which he in hindsight has agreed, at least in part. At least to some extent he shares the personal weaknesses of Lange. He does not like being questioned, and his personality can sometimes come across as vain, verging on narcissistic. He was, for example, unable to hide his personal disappointment when denied his "daydream" of becoming speaker of the Norwegian parliament in 2001.[154]

Hagen was, however, able to compensate for such flaws with important qualities. He developed significant political and strategic skills, and had no problems adapting to the parliamentary process. His overall understanding of the political issues as well as his grasp of detail made him a formidable opponent in debates. Whether his policy proposals were always realistic is open to debate, but they could not be dismissed as absurd the way that had sometimes been the case with Lange. His media communication technique was also more subtle than that of the party's founder.

Hagen was by no means averse to jokes and strongly worded criticism, but his main approach was more reasoned. Also when the subject matter was complex, he was able to get the main points across in a way accessible to the general public. In this context, the use of the media is of key significance. If Lange arguably discovered the impact potential of the media, in particular TV, Hagen was able to milk it to the full. For one thing, Hagen had a reputation as photogenic, at least in his younger days. More importantly, he soon developed considerable communication skills. A good example of his TV aptitude was the timing of the aforementioned press conference in June 1987, when he declared live on TV that his party would not vote to unseat the Labour government. At the time Norway still only had one TV channel.[155]

Hagen's relationship with the media was never easy – he has often referred to the national radio and TV company NRK as "ARK", implying that it is essentially a mouthpiece for the Labour Party.[156] He did, however, understand the potential of the media. His hostility to some media representatives has no doubt been genuine, but it also formed a symbiotic relationship. Hagen was able to get his message across, and what he saw as a negative bias enabled him to portray himself and his party as fearless opponents against the establishment. In exchange, he could be relied upon to deliver useful sound bites and generate attention, in a media climate that became increasingly competitive during his time in top politics.

At least as important as his media skills, has been his ability to manage the party. To be sure, there have been turbulent periods with serious infighting. The 1990–1994 battle with the libertarians was particularly damaging, and difficult to deal with.[157] This was because the libertarian faction was cohesive, articulate and driven by a coherent ideological platform, but also because Hagen was torn between agreement with the underlying libertarian ideology, a dislike of their methods and a gradual realisation that the libertarian ideas were not always in

line with public opinion. It was also during this period that Hagen's leadership dithered somewhat, until he put his foot down in 1993–1994 and, as we have seen, effectively purged the libertarians.

The hard-line anti-immigrant grouping that revolted in 2000–2001, popularly referred to as the "rascals" (*verstingene*), lacked the same cohesion and was somewhat easier to deal with. It also seems as if Hagen and the party leadership had refined the techniques to deal with internal dissent. The methods used were, perhaps, not always entirely democratic but the objective, to force compromising elements in line or out of the party, was met. The main point here is that Hagen developed considerable skills in dealing with internal dissent, which is essential in a "lantern" party. There have been more factions in FrP than those mentioned here, and this is a key reason for the centralised authoritarian structure of FrP, and the increasingly authoritarian tendencies in Hagen's leadership.[158]

Another key element in Hagen's success as party leader has been his political and ideological flexibility. As shown above, there has been an underlying continuity in the FrP ideology, but Hagen has never been an ideological purist; he has been prepared to readjust his party's message to meet shifts in public opinion. The shift towards welfare chauvinism in the late 1990s is one example. Another is immigration, where FrP has turned the volume up and down over the years. Hagen's heavy-handed treatment of the anti-immigration "rascals" in the early 2000s was followed by a period of comparatively low-key position on immigration. In 2003, however, Hagen was quick to respond, following the murder of an 83-year-old woman, for which a Libyan asylum seeker was later convicted. Hagen called Norwegian immigration policy "gullible" (*dumsnill*).[159] Another example of the flexibility under Hagen has been the reluctance against a firm position on the EU, which may not have been to the party's advantage in every given situation, but beneficial in the longer run.

The one area where Hagen did not succeed was to make the party fully legitimate in the eyes of other parties. The reasons for this are complex. It has not helped that Hagen has had strained, sometimes verging on hostile, personal relations to some other party leaders, such as the Conservative Kaare Willoch, the Christian Democrat Kjell Magne Bondevik and the Liberal Lars Sponheim. The main issue, however, has been FrP as a party rather than Hagen as a person – although the two are of course linked.

Despite misjudgements, and the failure to make the party fully government worthy, the importance of Carl I Hagen for *Fremskrittspartiet* can hardly be overstated. When he took over the leadership in 1978, FrP was close to oblivion. In 2006, when he handed over to Siv Jensen, it was the second biggest party in parliament, with a top place position a distinct possibility. He had taken the party through several serious crises. He had built up a party organisation which he then stabilised. He had attracted levels of support thought unimaginable during the early years of his leadership.

It was of course a tall order for Siv Jensen to take over from a leader that has become a legend, not only within FrP but in modern Norwegian political history. Jensen became leader a few weeks before her thirty-seventh birthday.

This could be regarded as somewhat young, but it should be remembered that Hagen had not turned 34 when he took over the leadership in the winter of 1978. Jensen was, of course, far from a political novice when she became leader. She had been a member of parliament since 1997, and she chaired the important parliamentary committee on finance between 2001 and 2005. She left that position, not because of personal shortcomings, but due to the fact that the centre-right parties had lost their overall parliamentary majority. Before her time in parliament, Jensen had worked for the FrP group in Oslo city council. She was deputy FrP leader from 1999, until becoming party leader seven years later.

Arguably, Jensen is more of a mainstream politician than Hagen who could not, or did not want to, quite shake off his populist style. She is, perhaps, not as entertaining in public as Lange or Hagen but few question her competence, and she does not to the same extent as her predecessors arouse suspicion or dislike in other parties. Her first five years in charge of the party were, on the whole, successful with good election results in 2007 and 2009. The year 2011 was more difficult. The Breivik atrocities were of course the most traumatic event, and Jensen was forced to backtrack after having said that journalistic attempts to make a connection between Breivik's attacks and FrP were as terrible as the murders.[160]

There were also internal problems in the party, including new "sex scandals", and a public quarrel with Hagen, who reacted strongly against not being chosen as the FrP representative on the Nobel Peace Prize committee.[161] There was another difficult moment when deputy FrP leader Per Sandberg was forced to apologise for having said in a parliamentary debate that the Labour Party "acted like victims" after the 22 July attacks.[162] Jensen's handling of the many problems were criticised, also internally. She seemed shaken, and her popularity ratings towards the end of 2011 plummeted.[163] The 2013 election signified a recovery, however, and Jensen was able to lead the party into government for the first time.

Hagen and Jensen's appeal to the general public should not be overstated. They are popular among FrP voters, but their overall popularity has never reached huge proportions. During the 1993 campaign, which was dominated by the EU issue and difficult for FrP, Hagen had the lowest sympathy ratings of the seven party leaders.[164] Later figures suggest somewhat higher ratings, but never anything that could be described as widespread popularity. As seen in Table 6.4, they never reached an average rating above the midpoint 5 on a 10-point scale in 2001, 2005 or 2009. Instead, they fluctuated within a fairly narrow range between 4.44 and 4.82. This means that they have consistently been below the scores of the Labour, Conservative and Socialist Left leaders.[165] Compared to other party leaders the FrP leader scores have tended to rank in, or below, the middle. Out of the seven leaders Hagen had the fifth highest score in 2001, and fourth highest in 2005. Jensen, however, had the second lowest score in 2009; the only other party leader with a score below the midpoint 5 was the Christian Democrat Dagfinn Høybråten.

Table 6.4 Average popularity ratings of Norwegian party leaders, 2001–2009[1]

	2001		*2005*		*2009*	
	Average	*Std. Dev.*	*Average*	*Std. Dev.*	*Average*	*Std. Dev.*
Fremskrittspartiet	4.63	2.87	4.82	3.00	4.44	3.02
Labour Party	5.55	2.17	6.80	2.06	6.85	2.20
Conservative Party	5.56	2.05	5.11	2.36	5.92	2.13
Centre Party	4.00	1.82	4.54	2.16	5.12	2.00
Christian People's Party	5.87	2.31	4.04	2.43	3.96	2.11
Liberals (*Venstre*)	3.96	1.93	4.38	2.09	4.57	2.33
Socialist Left	6.43	2.16	5.42	2.38	5.08	2.50

Note

1 Respondents were asked to rate the leaders on a scale from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like). The reported scores are overall averages, i.e. from all who answered the question. The table does not include ratings for the leaders of some smaller parties. Christian Democratic scores for 2001 and 2005 refer to Kjell Magne Bondevik. The Labour Party score for 2001 refers to Jens Stoltenberg. See also note 165. Table entries are calculated on the basis of Berglund *et al.* 2011, Aardal *et al.* 2007 and Aardal *et al.* 2003. The exact numbers of observations vary among different party leaders, but are around 2,000 (in 2001 and 2005) and around 1,700 (in 2009).

This somewhat negative picture needs to be qualified, however. The approval ratings of the FrP leaders vary with different indicators. Table 6.5 reports responses to a question about which party leader best represents the views of the respondent. Here, especially, Hagen comes out better. He was the second most frequently mentioned party leader in 2001 as well as in 2005. In the former year he was behind Kristin Halvorsen of the Socialist Left, and in 2005 he was beaten by Labour leader Jens Stoltenberg. Siv Jensen was the third most frequently mentioned leader in 2009, although her percentage was marginally higher than that of Hagen in 2001. The two leaders with higher percentages than Jensen in 2009 were, again, Stoltenberg followed by Erna Solberg of the Conservative Party.

The results in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 are not necessarily contradictory – it is common knowledge that the ratings of party leaders and top politicians can vary considerably depending on the indicator.[166] On the whole, however, even though the FrP leaders come out better on some indicators than others, there is no evidence that their appeal is such that a significant part of the FrP vote is due to a party leader effect. Rather, Hagen and Jensen are best described as divisive. They are very popular among their supporters, but often disliked among others. This is further underlined by the standard deviations reported in Table 6.4, which show that opinions about Hagen and Jensen are more spread out along the 0–10 scale than they are for the other party leaders. At all three time points in the table, the FrP leader has the highest standard deviation. This pattern is largely repeated back in time – FrP leaders almost always have the highest standard deviations from averages on a dislike-like scale. The same applies to the party itself – FrP and their leaders are divisive.[167]

Table 6.5 Representativeness of Norwegian party leaders in the eyes of the voters, in percentages, 2001–2009[1]

	2001	*2005*	*2009*
Fremskrittspartiet	12.9	16.4	13.4
Labour Party (J. Stoltenberg)	7.6	24.4	26.9
Labour Party (T. Jagland)	2.8	n/a	n/a
Conservative Party	12.6	8.6	15.8
Centre Party	2.1	3.8	2.6
Christian People's Party	6.6	2.9	2.6
Liberals (*Venstre*)	1.4	2.6	2.8
Socialist Left	16.2	9.2	6.7
Others	5.2	1.9	0.9
No one	28.2	27.9	25.4
DK, refusal	4.5	2.2	2.8
Total	100	100	100
Observations	2,052	2,012	1,782

Note

1 The entries in the table are based on two questions: one where the respondent is asked if any of the party leaders represents his/her views, and to those who answer yes, a follow-up question who that party leader is. The party leaders are named in the questions, and have changed over the three time points for several parties. The Christian Democratic entries for 2001 and 2005 refer to Valgerd Svarstad Haugland and Dagfinn Høybråten, respectively (see note 165). Data source: see note under Table 6.4.

More advanced research does suggest that the leader has been a contributory factor to the FrP vote, but the exact effect is difficult to isolate and the findings somewhat inconclusive. On the basis of data from 1989 and 1993, Midtbø concluded that Hagen was a clear vote-getter for FrP, although his positive impact was comparatively weak in the latter election, which was held at a difficult time for FrP with internal tensions and the dominance of the EU issue.[168] Later research has questioned Midtbø's findings, and Bernt Aardal and Hanne Marthe Narud argue that there is not much to suggest that voters come to FrP because of Hagen. Between 24 and 34 per cent of FrP voters liked Hagen better than they liked FrP in the elections from 1981 to 2001, but there was no evidence that sympathy for the leader has any greater impact than sympathy for the party on the decision to vote FrP.[169]

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the internal supply-side factors relevant to the success of *Fremskrittspartiet*. It has been shown that the party ideology has been flexible, and changed from what in the early years was a one-sided, rather simplistic, condemnation of taxes and state bureaucracy into a more diversified outlook. The party has been critical of immigration since the 1980s, but has never been a single-issue anti-immigration party. The FrP manifestos have, possibly excepting a period in the mid- to late 1990s, stayed clear of far-reaching

anti-immigration statements. The immigration issue has only for brief periods been the top priority. The party has significantly toned down its demands of tax cuts, but has never abandoned its advocacy of low taxes and a deregulated economy. It could thus be argued that FrP has, over the years, developed an ideological platform that straddles the difficult trade-off that all anti-establishment parties have to tackle – to be anti-establishment and mainstream at the same time.

On the one hand, it must maintain its anti-establishment credentials, in order to be seen as a genuine alternative to the traditional governing parties. *Fremskrittspartiet* has done so by continuously positioning itself wide of the other Norwegian parties on immigration and economic issues. On the other hand, it must steer clear of positions and rhetoric that make the divide seem too great. This FrP has done by deradicalising the demands on tax cuts, toning down the manifesto wordings on immigration, and by purging the most radical elements in the party, be they libertarians (1990s) or anti-immigration hardliners (early 2000s).

The party organisation has been significantly developed and tightened since the 1970s. Today's FrP is a highly centralised party, with an authoritarian leadership style. This may not sit easy with the ideals of internal party democracy, but is necessary for a party which tends to attract strong individuals and where internal discipline has tended to become a problem in periods when leadership authority has been weaker. It must also be remembered that the centralisation has not prevented FrP from building up a respectable membership base, very much against the Norwegian as well as broader international tide.

In terms of leadership, the significance of Carl I Hagen can hardly be overstated. Anders Lange was the catalyst that started the process, but the party is not likely to have survived without Hagen. In his prime he was highly skilled in getting his message across, via the media or to a live audience. He also became a very shrewd player of the political game, with impressive knowledge about policy as well as procedure.

Thus, internal supply-side factors cannot be overlooked when assessing the factors conducive to the success of *Fremskrittspartiet*. This is not to say that external supply-side, or demand-side, factors are not important. These have already been discussed in Chapter 4, but will be returned to in the concluding chapter, where they will be assessed together with the internal supply-side factors discussed in the country-specific chapters. The Norwegian case, however, strongly suggests that internal supply-side factors play an important part in the success of a party such as FrP. A party may have a very favourable setting, but that does not mean that success will follow by default. It needs to make use of its opportunities.

One final point about *Fremskrittspartiet* needs to be returned to. The explicit adherence to liberalism reopens the question about its classification. Extreme right parties tend not to associate themselves with any particular ideology, except in some cases nationalism or, less commonly, conservatism. They tend not to associate themselves with liberalism. Does this then mean that it is wrong to

classify FrP as an extreme right party? Representatives of the party itself would no doubt be of that view, and there are notable differences between FrP and any core extreme right ideology. The most important such difference is the prioritisation of different conflict dimensions.

Extreme right parties in general prioritise the sociocultural dimension. This is their defining characteristic; in any kind of trade-off situation or political negotiation they would prioritise issues about nationality, national sovereignty and migration over other issues. Such issues are important also to FrP, but the party would not by default let them take precedence over economic issues. The Danish People's Party, for example, would be very unlikely to step down from its main immigration policy demands in exchange for getting through a part of its programme on economic policy. For *Fremskrittspartiet*, the choice in a similar situation would be less clear-cut. It is by no means certain that FrP would miss the opportunity to get its core economic policies through, even if the deal involved concessions on immigration. In other words, the eventual decision in a trade-off situation is not a foregone conclusion.

On the other hand, even though Mudde does not classify *Fremskrittspartiet* as radical right populist, it could be argued that FrP meets his definition of such a party.[170] The party criticises immigration – nativist. It wants to increase direct democracy and referendums – populist. It advocates a stronger defence, stronger police and more severe punishments against criminals – authoritarian. The problem with this assertion is not that the FrP position in these areas is ambiguous or unstable. Rather, it is that it does not entirely capture the essence of the party. Also market economics is a core value for FrP, something which is not altered by the fact that Norwegian oil makes it possible to combine the right-wing economic outlook with welfare chauvinism. The extreme right party family, on the other hand, is characterised by a pragmatic outlook on economics. Whether this disqualifies FrP from membership of the extreme right party family, or merely makes it a somewhat deviant case in that family, is a matter of judgement. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests very strongly that even though FrP is not a typical member of the extreme right party family, it would be very difficult to justify leaving it out from an account of Scandinavian extreme right parties.

Notes

1 The events of 22 July 2011 are discussed in somewhat more detail in the first chapter of this book.

2 *Ber eget parti skjerpe ordbruken* (Asks own party to curb language) *Bergens Tidende* 28 July 2011 www.bt.no/nyheter/lokalt/Ber-eget-parti-skjerpe-ordbruken--2545321.html#.U0zifVdN1Ls (accessed 14 April 2014); *Siv Jensen angrer på ordbruk i debatter* (Siv Jensen regrets use of words in debates) *Verdens Gang*, 2 August 2011 www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10089092 (accessed 3 August 2011).

3 *Dansk partileder refser Jensen: Hun mangler ryggrad* (Danish party leader reprimands Jensen: She is lacking spine) *Verdens Gang*, 2 August 2011 www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10089142 (accessed 3 August 2011).

4 Based on poll data on voting intentions for the Norwegian subnational election in 2011; see Aardal, B (website, accessed 14 April 2014).
5 *Frp: Breivik har vært medlem og har hatt verv i ungdomspartiet* (FrP: Breivik has been a member and has held positions in the youth party) *Aftenposten* 23 July 2011 www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article4181267.ece (accessed 23 July 2011). According to the court verdict of *Oslo Tingrett*, Breivik joined the FrP youth organisation in 1997, and became a member of the main party in 1999. He briefly held local-level posts in the party as well as the youth organisation. His membership of the main party was terminated in 2006, for being in arrears with the membership dues. In 2007 he resigned the membership of the FrP youth organisation (*Oslo Tingrett – Dom. 22. Juli-saken*, 24 August 2012, p. 53).
6 Mudde 2007: 47.
7 Kitschelt 1997: 121. This classification is simultaneously applied to the Danish Progress Party (the book was written before the formation of the Danish People's Party).
8 Ignazi 2003: 157.
9 Carter 2005: 50f.
10 Mudde 2000: 185.
11 The Socialist People's Party, formed in 1961, largely consisted of expellees and defectors from the Labour Party.
12 Iversen 1998: 14f.
13 Iversen 1998: 24ff.; Hagen 2007: 47. A transcript of the whole speech has been mounted online at: http://virksommeord.uib.no/taler?id=103 (accessed 9 October 2011).
14 Kuhnle *et al.* 1986: 464; Valen and Rokkan 1974: 206; Jupskås 2009: 30f.
15 Valen and Rokkan 1974: 213f.
16 Valen 1995: 75; Jupskås 2009: 33f.
17 Iversen 1998: 37.
18 Iversen 1998: 48.
19 Iversen 1998: 60ff.; Hagen 2007: 54ff.
20 Hagen 2007: 65; Iversen 1998: 64f.
21 Hagen 2007: 69; Iversen 1998: 68.
22 Iversen 1998: 82f., 90.
23 Hagen 2007: 93–105; Iversen 1998: 90–93.
24 Iversen 1998: 94ff.; Hagen 2007: 106–117.
25 Iversen 1998: 98–102; Hagen 2007: 122–129.
26 In his autobiography, Hagen emphasises the economic aspects of the decision to back the Labour government, claiming to be proud that he put the national interest ahead of narrow party politics ("jeg [er] stolt over at vi greide å sette landets interesser foran snevre partipolitiske maktinteresser"); Hagen 2007: 128).
27 Iversen 1998: 111f.; Hagen 2007: 187f. The faction here referred to as libertarians is often called "the liberals" (*liberalistene*) in Norwegian language literature; e.g. Hagen 2007: 198; Iversen 1998: 115; Hylland Eriksen 2008: 9 (quoted in Jupskås 2009: 47). Compare also the discussion about liberalism/libertarianism in the section on ideology, below.
28 Flote 2008: 43.
29 Iversen 1998: 108ff.
30 Hagen 2007: 190ff.; Iversen 1998: 118ff.
31 Iversen 1998: 118; Hagen 2007: 192.
32 Iversen 1998: 124f.
33 Iversen 1998: 132–133; Hagen 2007: 215–223.
34 Iversen 1998: 139f.; Hagen 2007: 225f.
35 Iversen 1998: 137f.
36 Hagen 2007: 296ff., 355f.
37 Hagelund 2003: 52ff.

38 Jupskås 2009: 49; Simonsen 2007: 64f.
39 Compare, for example, Mudde 2000: 174f.
40 Simonsen 2007: 43; Jupskås 2009: 68ff. For Lange and petroleum populism, see note 153 below.
41 Hagen 2007: 355; "Fremskrittspartiet knuser Ap" (FrP crushes Labour), *Aftenposten* 15 September 2000. See also Aardal, B (website).
42 Hagen 2007: 359ff.
43 Hagen 2007: 362–380, 420; Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 258.
44 Hagen 2007: 385; "Påstand om voldtekt på Fr.p-møte" (Rape allegations at FrP meeting); *Aftenposten* 10 February 2001 http://tux1.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/d191187.htm (accessed 14 April 2014); "Anklagelser om sexövergrepp" (Accusations of sex offences), *Dagens Nyheter* (Swedish newspaper) 11 February 2001; "Allt har gått snett för Hagen" (Everything has gone pear-shaped for Hagen), *Dagens Nyheter* 14 February 2001.
45 Hagen 2007: 387f.
46 "Välkommen till Hagenland" (Welcome to Hagenland), *Aftonbladet* (Swedish tabloid) 4 September 2000 http://wwwb.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/0009/04/hagen.html (accessed 14 April 2014; note the online headline differs slightly). Local media, however, suggested that the policy impact of FrP should not be overstated; "Flertallet i Os merker ikke FrP" (The majority in Os do not notice FrP), *Bergens Tidende* 16 June 2003.
47 "Terje Søviknes fortsetter som Os-ordfører" (Terje Søviknes continues as Os council leader), *Verdens Gang* 15 September 2011 www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/valget-2011/terje-soeviknes-fortsetter-som-os-ordfoerer/a/10010205/ (accessed 14 April 2014); "Søviknes tapte toppvervet" (Søviknes lost out on top position), *Nettavisen* 25 April 2010 www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/2890847.html (accessed 14 April 2014). The reason why Søviknes was not elected to the FrP executive appears primarily to have been that he had participated in a deal that opened for local road tolls.
48 Valen 2003; Aalberg 2002: 1050.
49 This was due to the fact that the Liberal Party (*Venstre*) ended below the 4 per cent threshold, which made it ineligible for proportionality adjustment seats (Valen 2003: 183).
50 Aalberg 2001: 377f.; Hagen 2007: 350ff. In fact, the Socialist Left Party voted with the government.
51 Valen 2003: 184.
52 Aalberg 2002: 1052ff.; Hagen 2007: 399–407.
53 "Far right to share power in Norway", *Guardian* 18 October 2001 www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/18/andrewosborn (accessed 14 April 2014).
54 Aalberg 2004: 1104; Hagen 2007: 454f.
55 Aalberg 2010: 1116f.
56 *Høyre og Frp går i regjering sammen* (Conservatives and FrP to form government), *Verdens Gang* 30 September 2013, www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/norsk-politikk/artikkel.php?artid=10152286 (accessed 14 April 2014).
57 In original: "Vi er lei av å bli utbyttet av statskapitalismen". The word *utbyttet* is difficult to translate in this context; literally *utbytte* means "dividend".
58 The complete list is reproduced in Iversen 1998: 24.
59 Anders Langes Parti 1973.
60 Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 262; *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b.
61 The exact wording has varied somewhat, but the substantive meaning has not changed. "Fremskrittspartiets hovedmål er å arbeide for sterkt nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter og offentlige inngrep", *Fremskrittspartiet* 1996: 1. "Hovedmålet er sterk nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter og offentlige inngrep", *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013a: 2. See also *Fremskrittspartiet* 1997: 1; *Fremskrittspartiet* 2001a: 1; *Fremskrittspartiet* 2005: 6 and *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009a: 4.

62 *Fremskrittspartiet* 1977b: 3; *Fremskrittspartiet* 1981b: 2; *Fremskrittspartiet* 1985b: 2.
63 *Fremskrittspartiet* 1989b: 2; *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b: 14. In the latter manifesto the wording is: "The Progress Party wants the lowest possible levels of taxes and fees" (*Fremskrittspartiet vil ha lavest mulig skatte- og avgiftsnivå*).
64 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b: 12f.
65 See, for example, Keen *et al.* 2006.
66 *Fremskrittspartiet* 1985a.
67 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013a: 11.
68 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b, e.g. pages 47f and 52f.
69 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b: 7–20.
70 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b: 8. In original: "Offentlig sektor må slankes og effektiviseres slik at innbyggerne får bedre tjenester".
71 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b: 5. In original. "Fremskrittspartiet vil: at det iverksettes en egen valgfrihetsreform i offentlig sektor"; "En modernisering av Norge må derfor innebære klare krav til effektivisering i offentlig sektor, samtidig som bruk av privat og ideell sektor i offentlig velferdsproduksjon intensiveres".
72 The adherence to the liberal ideology first appears in the FrP manifestos of 1985 (*Fremskrittspartiet* 1985a, 1985b), but it was first made explicitly in a party conference speech by Carl I Hagen in 1983 (Hagen 2007: 83f).
73 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013a: 2. Quotes in original: "Fremskrittspartiets ideologiske grunnlag, liberalismen, tar utgangspunkt i at folk selv er bedre i stand enn politikerne til å bestemme hva som er best for seg og sine"; "Fremskrittspartiet er et liberalistisk folkeparti".
74 Sveriges Radio 2006.
75 *Venstre* 2007.
76 ELDR organises parties in the European Parliament, but is also open to parties from non-EU countries. The Norwegian *Venstre*, for example, is an ELDR member. In the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, FrP was in 2011 a member of the European Democrat Group (EDG) together with, for example, the British Conservative Party, Italian Popolo Della Libertá and Lega Nord, Greek LAOS, Slovak National Party, United Russia, Czech Civic Democratic Party, Polish Law and Justice and Portuguese CDS/PP.
77 Defending apartheid: Norsk Biografisk Leksikon online, http://nbl.snl.no/Anders_Lange/utdypning (accessed 28 October 2013).
78 Hagelund 2003: 52. Gjems-Onstad was expelled from the party in 1976 after a power struggle; Hagen 2007: 59–65.
79 *Fremskrittspartiet* 1977b: 16; Hagelund 2003: 49, 52f.
80 *Fremskrittspartiet* 1981b: 26.
81 *Fremskrittspartiet* 1985b: 37.
82 More recently it has been moved to the Principles manifesto (*Fremskrittspartiet* 2013a: 8).
83 *Fremskrittspartiet* 1985b: 37f.
84 Hagelund 2003: 50.
85 Hagen 2007: 137–140; Hagelund 2003: 55; Iversen 1998: 168ff.
86 Figures from the pollster MMI, now Synovate, Norway.
87 Hagelund 2003: 53ff.
88 Hagelund 2003: 55–58.
89 Hagelund 2003: 56.
90 Hagelund 2003: 55.
91 Hagelund 2003: 55f.; *Fremskrittspartiet* 1997: 74. Translation by the author, which in some details differs from Hagelund's translation. The quote in original:

> Det er ikke umoralsk å mene at man bør ta hensyn til reaksjoner mot denne innvandring for å forebygge konflikter. Det er heller ikke umoralsk å mene at

> man bør forebygge for raske forandringer av det helhetspreg som vår befolkning har. Det er uriktig å kalle slike synspunkter rasisme når de ikke bygger på forestillinger om at noen rase er mer verdifull enn andre.

92 Hagelund 2003: 64 (note 10).
93 It is also worth noting that Willoch's time as prime minister had been ended by FrP in 1986, and his relationship with Hagen had always been strained.
94 Compare Mudde 1995; Mudde 2000: 187; Fredrickson 2002: 141f.
95 Hagelund 2003: 58ff.
96 E.g. *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 33. In the 2013 manifestos, the word "race" (*ras*), with derivations, does not appear at all.
97 E.g. *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 33. In original:

> Det er grunn til å frykte at en fortsatt innvandring av asylsøkere, av bare tilnærmet det omfang som man har hatt i de senere år, vil føre til alvorlige motsetninger mellom folkegrupper i Norge. Det er etisk uforsvarlig å ikke stramme inn denne innvandringen for å forebygge konflikter i det norske samfunn.

Similar concerns, but with different wording, also appear in the 2013 election manifestos; *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b: 38f.

98 *Fremskrittspartiet* 1997: 74, 2001b: 84, 2005: 53. In 1997 the expression used was "culturally distant groups" (*fjernkulturelle grupper*); in the two latter cases it had been changed to "persons from countries outside the Western sphere of culture" (*mennesker fra land utenfor den vestlige kulturkrets*). See also Hagelund 2003: 57.
99 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 33; 2013b: 39. In original: "Norges mottak av mennesker fra land utenfor den vestlige kulturkrets begrenses kraftig".
100 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2001b: 84, 2005: 53, 2009b: 33, 2013b: 39. The 1997 election manifesto proposed the possibility of national as well as local referendums on the acceptance of asylum seekers (*Fremskrittspartiet* 1997: 75).
101 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 53, 2013b: 38.
102 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 26, 2013b: 28. This demand first appeared in the 1997 election manifesto; it also appeared in less specified terms in the 1993 election manifesto.
103 In the 2013 election manifesto, the words "refugee" (*flykt**) and *asyl** do not appear in any other sections. The word immigr*(*innvandr**) appears six times, in four other sections; once in the section on democracy (subsection on gender equality, p. 4); once in the section on European Policy (reference to labour immigration from EU countries); twice in a section on crime prevention (reference to immigrant crime, p. 28) and twice in the section on welfare (p. 58). The word foreign* (*utlen**) appears twice in the manifesto outside the section on immigration; both times in the section dealing with crime prevention. The total number of eight appearances of these four keywords outside the section on immigration policy represented an increase of one compared to the 2009 election manifesto.
104 There is a partial exception in the 2005 manifesto, a document containing the Principles as well as election manifesto, which contains a photo of a mosque in Oslo. Next to the photo is a summary of FrP's principal values, such as individual freedom, decentralisation of the power of the state, a market economy, the Christian cultural heritage and freedom of religion (*Fremskrittspartiet* 2005: 8f). Below the photo is a caption explaining that it shows the World Islamic Mission mosque in Oslo.
105 *Storting* debate minutes, 7 June 2011, issue 10, statement commenced at 13 hours 48 minutes 11 seconds (www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2010-2011/110607/10/#a20/, accessed 14 April 2014).
106 "Advarer mot muslimske ghettoer i Oslo", *Aftenposten* 22 February 2009 www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/politikk/Advarer-mot-muslimske–ghettoer-i-Oslo-5564982.html (accessed 25 March 2009).

107 "Per Sandberg: En katastrofe", *Aftenposten* 12 March 2009 www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article2974297.ece (accessed 25 March 2009). See also "Norska Fremskrittspartiet besökte Moské i Malmö", *Dagens Nyheter* 13 March 2009.
108 *Fremskritt* 1/2010 (16 January), p. 4.
109 *Fremskritt* 11/2011 (4 June), p. 3. In October 2011 Amundsen was made spokesperson on energy. His place as immigration spokesperson was taken by Morten Johansen.
110 *Fremskritt* 22/2011 (4 October), p. 4f.
111 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013a: 2. In original: "Det bygger på Norges grunnlov, norsk og vestlig tradisjon og kulturarv, med basis i det kristne livssynet og humanistiske verdier". The words "humanistic values" were added in 2009; otherwise the wording has been virtually identical since 1997 (except for minor linguistic adjustments). A similar wording, with slightly more emphasis on the Norwegian cultural heritage, appeared in the 1977–1993 Principles manifestos.
112 In 2009 the only reference to nationalism is a warning that boycotts against undemocratic states could strengthen "nationalist movements and extreme groupings in the boycotted states". *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 31. In original: "Vi er skeptiske til boikott av stater man ikke liker, siden dette kan styrke nasjonalistiske bevegelser og ekstreme grupperinger i de boikottede statene". This was dropped four years later, and the word "nationalism/nationalist" with derivations does not appear in the 2013 manifestos.
113 The word "ethnic" (*etnis**) appears 12 times in the 2013 election manifesto. Eight of those references are in connection with the Sami population. For example, FrP wants to abolish the Sami parliament (pp. 4, 84–85). In other sections the party argues that everyone should have the same rights and obligations, irrespective of ethnic background (p. 39); that public subsidies to organisations whose membership is based on ethnicity on nationality should be reviewed (p. 40); that ethnic minorities are among groups with difficulties to integrate in the labour market (p. 57); and that sport can help integrate different ethnic groups in Norway (p. 81). There is no reference to ethnic homogeneity, or ethnicity as a criterion for being Norwegian.
114 Saglie 1999: 79. In original: "et ustadig og lavt profilert ja".
115 Saglie 1999: 81–89.
116 Saglie 1999: 93; Hagen 2007: 233f.
117 Hagen 2007: 234.
118 Heidar 2001: 89.
119 *Fremskrittspartiet* 1997: 77, 2001b: 85, 2005: 50.
120 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009a: 8, 2009b: 31, 2013a: 8, 2013b: 34.
121 Hagen 2007: 192f.
122 Hagen 2007: 237ff.
123 "Ber Jensen si ja eller nei til EU", *Aftenposten* 14 July 2009 www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/politikk/Ber-Jensen-si-ja-eller-nei-til-EU-5580702.html (accessed 14 July 2009).
124 "Frp-flertall mot EU" (FrP majority against the EU), *Aftenposten* 15 August 2013 www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Frp-flertall-mot-EU-7280378.html (accessed 14 April 2014).
125 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b: 4, 2009b: 6, 2005: 12.
126 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 26f., 2013b: 30f. In original: "Vi ønsker derfor høyere strafferammer generelt sett, og en gjennomgang av straffelovgivningen" (quote from pp. 27 and 31, respectively).
127 "FrP støtter norsk Irak-deltakelse" (FrP supports Norwegian participation in Iraq); *Bergens Tidende* 9 May 2003 www.bt.no/nyheter/utenriks/Frp-stotter-norsk-Irak-deltakelse-2419362.html (accessed 14 April 2014). Norway did not participate in the initial attack on Iraq, which Carl I Hagen thought it ought to have. Norway did send troops to Iraq after the Saddam Hussein regime had been defeated, but the Norwegian participation was ended by the centre-left coalition that took office in 2005.

128 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 36, 2013b: 40. In original: "Det er viktig at Norge tar aktiv del i kampen mot terror med deltakelse i internasjonalt samarbeid og internasjonale operasjoner".

129 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 23. In original:

> Dagens debatt om klimaendringer dreier seg først og fremst om hvorvidt menneskelig aktivitet bidrar til å fremskynde eller forandre klimaendringenes naturlige gang. Dette spørsmålet er omdiskutert, til tross for det generelle inntrykket i Norge om at det interstatlige klimapanelet (IPCC) har funnet svaret. Klimapolitikken, som det interstatlige klimapanelet er premissgiver for, hviler fortsatt på et ufullstendig, vitenskapelig grunnlag. Klimapanelet blir fra flere hold beskyldt for å være ledet av politikere og byråkrater der ønsket om økte bevilgninger går på bekostning av vitenskapelige fakta.

130 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013b: 26. In original:

> De siste tiårene har vitenskapen hatt et sterkt fokus på klimaendringer som et resultat av menneskelig aktivitet. FrP forholder seg til at forskning viser at menneskelig aktivitet påvirker klimaet, men understreker samtidig at det hersker stor usikkerhet om hvor mye dette utgjør i forhold til naturlige klimavariasjoner.

131 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2009b: 66f., 2013b: 75. "Bompengeforbud for Frp", *Aftenposten* 4 May 2008.

132 This quote has been attributed to the party founder Anders Lange (e.g. Hermansen 2009: 135), but also to FrP veteran Eivind Eckbo (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 259). Eckbo's complete quote in original: "Å stifte Anders Langes Parti var som å sette en fjøslykt ut i sommernatten. Da kom det flyvende mye rart".

133 See, for example, http://archive-no.com/page/1119/2012-05-08/http://www.frp.no/Fj%C3%B8slykta+til+Hanselmann.d25-TxlDW1C.ips (accessed 14 April 2014).

134 Iversen 1998: 58f.

135 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013c: 8ff. The exact composition has varied over the years, but is described in the text according the FrP rules from 2013. The formal labels given to the respective bodies varied in the early years, but have since 1983 been as described in the text. See also Svåsand 1992: 762f.

136 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013c: 7; Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 257. A fairly complex reduction tariff, where the allocation of delegates was cut for regions where the party had received less than 8 per cent of the votes in the most recent parliamentary election, was dropped in 2007.

137 The exceptions were Nord-Trøndelag and Sogn and Fjordane.

138 Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 257.

139 Bjørklund 2003: 132f.

140 Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 257.

141 Hagen 2007: 224ff.

142 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013c: 21. In original:

> Stortingsgruppen er bundet av det program den er valgt på. Gruppen fatter suverene avgjørelser innenfor de rammer og retningslinjer som er trukket opp i partiprogrammet og av partiets Landsstyre og Sentralstyre. Ved tvil om fortolkning av partiprogrammet kan 1/3 av medlemmene anke flertallsvedtaket inn for partiets Sentralstyre til avgjørelse.

See also Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 257.

143 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2011: 2; Heidar and Saglie 2002: 62; Bjørklund 2003: 133.

144 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2011: 20f.

145 *Fremskrittspartiet* 2013c: 4f.

146 Mjelde 2008: 69.

147 Mjelde 2008: 25.

148 This is based on the total figure of registered members, i.e. 26,067. If only the 22,623 fully paid up members are counted, FrP was fourth in 2010, behind the Conservatives but ahead of the Centre, Socialist Left and Liberal parties.
149 "Frp får stadig flere medlemmer", *Aftenposten* 3 June 2009 www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/politikk/Frp-far-stadig-flere-medlemmer-5577369.html (accessed 17 June 2009).
150 An example from TV, available on the Internet, is a clip from the autumn of 1963, where Lange participates in a televised discussion about the political ideologies. His comments generate much amusement, for example when he claims that all state-run activities run a deficit, except the alcohol retailer *Vinmonopolet*, and suggests that the banks should take over the government ministries. The clip is available on the NRK website (www.nrk.no/skole/klippdetalj?topic=nrk:klipp/407077, accessed 14 April 2014).
151 Iversen 1998: 51f; Jupskås 2009: 34f; Hagen 2007: 46.
152 Iversen 1998: 46. Iversen also reports that the sales of egg liqueur by the state-owned alcohol retailer *Vinmonopolet* increased markedly after the debate. See also Jupskås 2009: 32f. and Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 255. A brief excerpt from the debate, in which Lange smokes a pipe, can be viewed at www.nrk.no/skole/klippdetalj?topic=urn:x-mediadb:19085 (accessed 14 April 2014).
153 An example from May 1974 can be seen on the Internet. In a public speech in Oslo, Lange suggests that the oil revenue could be used to take up loans big enough to abolish state tax. A YouTube clip (www.youtube.com/watch?v=NxSLa6p9mlo, accessed 14 April 2014) shows a brief extract from the speech, while an NRK clip (www.nrk.no/skole/klippdetalj?topic=nrk:klipp/407076, accessed 14 April 2014) shows a news report on the meeting.
154 *Storting* debate minutes, 9 October 2001, issue 1 (https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2001-2002/011009/1/#a2 accessed 14 April 2014). Hagen did become deputy speaker in 2005, before retiring from parliament in 2009.
155 The first independent Norwegian TV channel, *TVNorge*, started broadcasting in late 1988.
156 Hagen 2007: 267–273. The official name of the Norwegian broadcasting company is *Norsk Rikskringkasting*, commonly abbreviated as NRK. The mocking acronym ARK refers to the alleged closeness between NRK and the Labour Party (in Norwegian *Arbeiderpartiet*, often abbreviated as A).
157 See note 27.
158 Compare the discussion about factions in the early 1990s on p. 87 above.
159 "Norsk sikkerhet truet", *Aftenposten* 24 June 2003. Hagen also referred to a non-fatal shooting incident, allegedly involving two Pakistanis, at the Oslo airport of Gardermoen, and the issue of forced marriages. Two Libyan asylum seekers were arrested in connection with the killing of the 83-year-old woman. One was convicted of murder, and the other of robbery (www.nrk.no/nyheter/distrikt/rogaland/1.240763, accessed 14 April 2014).
160 "Siv Jensen beklagar drapssamenligning", *Verdens Gang* 24 July 2011 www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10080719 (accessed 14 April 2014). She was quoted to have said "I think what has happened is detestable, but I find it equally detestable that individual media try to make a connection between this man's outrage and FrP" (*Jeg synes det er avskyelig det som har skjedd, men jeg synes det er like avskyelig at enkelte medier forsøker å trekke en kobling mellom denne mannens udåd og Frp*).
161 "Carl I. Hagen: – Jeg er ydmyket", *Verdens Gang* 16 November 2011 www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/norsk-politikk/artikkel.php?artid=10023905 (accessed 14 April 2014). FrP has had one representative, Inger Marie Ytterhorn, on the five-member committee since 2000. When Ytterhorn's place was up for renewal in 2011 Hagen

wanted to take over, but a majority of the FrP parliamentary group voted to re-elect Ytterhorn. The "sex scandals" involved the arrest of a member of the FrP *Sentralstyre* and high-profile local politician for alleged sexual contacts with underage boys, and the production of child pornography ("Birkedal mistenkt for produksjon av barneporno", *Aftenbladet* 15 July 2011 www.aftenbladet.no/nyheter/lokalt/stavanger/Birkedal-siktet-for-produksjon-av-barneporno-2837292.html, accessed 14 April 2014). The affair led to an internal party commission, whose report criticised Jensen and the party leadership ("Siv Jensen slaktes av Birkedal-utvalget", *Verdens Gang* 20 October 2011 www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/birkedal-saken-i-frp/siv-jensen-slaktes-av-birkedal-utvalget/a/10022693, accessed 14 April 2014). Other stories included a local FrP politician reporting an FrP member of parliament to the police for alleged sexual assault ("Anklager FrP-politiker for sex-overgrep", *Aftenbladet* 22 November 2011 www.aftenbladet.no/nyheter/politikk/Anklager-Frp-politiker-for-sex-overgrep-2896317.html, accessed 14 April 2014).

162 "Per Sandberg i Stortinget: – Ap har til de grader spilt et offer etter 22. juli", *Verdens Gang* 23 November 2011 www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10040356 (accessed 14 April 2014). The statement was made in a question session with the Foreign Affairs minister Jonas Gahr Støre, on 23 November 2011. The full quote in Norwegian was:

> La meg først slå fast at det er ingen som prøver å spille noe offer her. Hvis det er noen som prøver å spille offer etter 22. juli, så er det til de grader Arbeiderpartiet. Og det bør dem også gjøre, for de var et av de store ofrene. Det har tydeligvis Arbeiderpartiet lagt en strategi på, å videreføre denne debatten gjennom å angripe Fremskrittspartiet.

For a transcript of the debate, see the Norwegian parliament website: www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2011-2012/111123/muntligsporretime/#a2 (accessed 14 April 2014).

163 "Ny Siv-smell: Ribbet for tillit", *Verdens Gang* 26 December 2011 www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/norsk-politikk/artikkel.php?artid=10032595 (accessed 14 April 2014).

164 Midtbø 1997: 141f.

165 This is a truth with some modification. The Labour figure for 2001 refers to Jens Stoltenberg, who became leader of the Labour Party in 2002, but was the incumbent prime minister in 2001. The formal Labour leader in 2001, Thorbjørn Jagland, received an average rating of 4.17, i.e. below Hagen. It should also be mentioned that the Christian People's Party figures for 2001 and 2005 refer to Kjell Magne Bondevik, who had not been the formal party leader since 1995. Leader for the Christian People's Party between 1995 and 2004 was Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, but Bondevik was the party's most high-profile person, and served as prime minister from 1997 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2005. Haugland received average ratings of 3.76 in 2001 and 3.14 in 2005.

166 Aardal and Narud 2003: 239ff.

167 Author's own calculations, based on Norwegian election data 1985–1997 (provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service), and Aardal *et al.* 2003; Aardal *et al.* 2007 and Berglund *et al.* 2011. In 2009 the average score for FrP as a party was 4.12; standard deviation 3.19 (scale as in Table 6.4).

168 Midtbø 1997: 146–150.

169 Aardal and Narud 2003: 232–235.

170 Mudde 2007: 20–26.

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7 Denmark

From Glistrup to Dahl

A role model for the extreme right

Norway and Denmark are often treated as twin cases in the literature on extreme right parties. This is not without justification. In both countries anti-establishment parties on the right, founded by archetypical political entrepreneurs, emerged in the early 1970s. The Danish party started first, and served as something of a role model when the Norwegian party followed suit. From 1977 both parties had identical names. There were also ideological similarities. They started as protest movements against taxes and state bureaucracy, packaging the message in fierce anti-establishment rhetoric. Immigration was added to their agenda in the 1980s, making both parties good examples of Herbert Kitschelt's "winning formula", a combination of right-wing economics, authoritarianism and anti-immigration politics. They were politically isolated, and had very little policy impact.

This similarity between the Danish and Norwegian parties is reflected in the literature, where accounts on "Scandinavia" have often tended to focus on Denmark and Norway with more passing reference to Sweden (sometimes also Finland).[1] Other accounts focus on Denmark and Norway only.[2] But if the extreme right parties in Denmark and Norway grew up as twin-like creations, they took rather different paths after having reached adulthood. A pivotal event in this development took place in 1995, when a group defected from *Fremskridtspartiet* (FP; Progress Party) to form *Dansk Folkeparti* (DF; Danish People's Party).[3] The new party soon established itself as the main force on the Danish extreme right, at the same time as it developed increasingly clear differences to its predecessor.

To a significant extent the differences between *Dansk Folkeparti* and *Fremskridtspartiet* are ideological. Another important difference is success. *Fremskridtspartiet* was never fully accepted by the other parties. *Dansk Folkeparti*, however, acted as a support party of a centre-right minority government between 2001 and 2011. From this position, DF was able to exert considerable policy influence, especially on issues related to asylum and immigration. So much so that, arguably, DF has been one of the most successful extreme right parties in Europe. Not, perhaps, in terms of electoral support, but definitely in terms of legitimacy and impact. From its position as extra-cabinet parliamentary support

party, it played an active part in the tightening of Danish immigration, asylum and integration policies.

In terms of electoral support *Dansk Folkeparti* holds its own, but is hardly exceptional, in an international comparison. The party has not, so far, been anywhere near the levels of support claimed by *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway, or continental parties such as the Swiss People's Party (SVP) and Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). Indeed, DF suffered its first ever electoral defeat in 2011. The loss of 1.5 percentage points and three seats must be considered as marginal, however, and there is much to suggest that the party has built up a stable support base of at least 10 per cent. All things considered, therefore, it is justifiable to classify DF as one of the most successful members of the European extreme right party family.

This success is notable not only in its own right, but also because the *Dansk Folkeparti* is considered by some researchers as ideologically quite radical. To be sure, this view is not unanimous. Earlier research has tended to treat Denmark as a relatively moderate case of the European extreme right. Herbert Kitschelt, for example, refers to Scandinavia as a "milder" form of the New Radical Right in his book from the 1990s.[4] In the 2000s, two schools of thought can be discerned. One continues to treat Denmark as a "mild" case, viewing DF as essentially a continuation of *Fremskridtspartiet*, and a sister party of the Norwegian FrP. Examples include Elisabeth Carter, who classifies DF as "Neo-Liberal Xenophobic", a label she also assigns to the Norwegian FrP. In a similar vein Pippa Norris implies continuity from the predecessors *Fremskridtspartiet* by claiming that DF has advocated drastic tax cuts.[5] This is, as we will see below, not inaccurate if it refers to the early years of the party, but does not capture the development in the 2000s.

Others, however, view *Dansk Folkeparti* as more distinctive in a Nordic context, and closer to a more radical, continental, extreme right tradition. Gilles Ivaldi argued in 2004 that DF belongs to a more radical subgroup of the extreme right party family, together with parties such as the French *Front National*, Belgian *Vlaams Blok* (as it then still was), German National Democrats (NPD) and British National Party.[6] Similarly, Jens Rydgren has argued that DF ought not to be treated as a sister party of the Norwegian FrP, but should instead be regarded as nearer parties such as the French *Front National* and Austrian FPÖ.[7] The Norwegian scholar Tor Bjørklund has adopted a mixed approach by treating DF and the Norwegian FrP as comparable cases, claiming that there are similarities, but also differences, between them.[8]

Denmark, and *Dansk Folkeparti*, thus provides a highly important case of the European extreme right. The significance is obviously warranted by the success – with its legitimacy and political influence, DF can be seen as something of a role model for other extreme right parties. An additional reason why the Danish case is of interest is that, as mentioned, it has been given such varying treatment in the literature. In the following, internal supply-side factors, as outlined in Chapter 3, will be applied. The chapter will deal with DF as well as its predecessor, *Fremskridtspartiet*. Emphasis, however, will be on the former. In

addition, the chapter will discuss the public policy impact of the Danish People's Party between 2001 and 2011, as this is where Denmark stands out in an international comparison. It will be argued that a key reason for *Dansk Folkeparti*'s success in terms of legitimacy and influence can be found in internal supply-side factors, i.e. within the party itself. The account begins, however, with the historical background.

Mogens Glistrup takes the stage

Viewers tuning in to the current affairs programme *Focus* on the evening of Saturday 30 January 1971 could hardly have expected that they were about to witness a key event in Danish – even European – political history. Some may even have found it difficult to concentrate on what was on offer, busy as they were completing their income tax self-assessment forms, which were due to be submitted the following day. But those who missed, or did not pay full attention to, the programme would soon become aware of what had occurred. The programme contained an interview with a man very few had heard of before. His hair was combed to cover a bald patch, he had a visible overbite and he spoke with a distinctive accent from the Baltic island of Bornholm. He was a 44-year-old lawyer, specialising in tax law – hence his appearance on the eve of self-assessment day.[9] His name was Mogens Glistrup.

It was, in fact, not Glistrup's first TV appearance, but he did not come across as entirely confident in front of the camera. His message was put across in a low-key manner rather than the confrontational style that would soon become his trademark. But in terms of content, the message was anything but low-key. Glistrup described how he avoided paying tax by creating and selling a large number of limited companies, a scheme he likened to "printing your own money". He claimed that it was possible to set your own tax rate by seeking competent advice: "if your teeth hurt you go to a dentist. If your tax hurts, you go to a tax adviser". He argued that it is immoral to pay tax, and that every *krone* paid in tax contributed to the destruction of the country. He concluded by saying that tax evaders could be compared to resistance saboteurs during the Second World War occupation – they do a dangerous but important job for the country. The interview lasted fewer than three minutes.[10] It was not a particularly hard-hitting affair. Interviewer and interviewee interacted respectfully, without interruptions or attempts to score points.[11] But the impact was immediate, profound and far-reaching. There were, of course, negative reactions, but also expressions of support. Interest in Glistrup's services as a lawyer grew, not least in his rather complex tax evasion schemes. At the same time, he began to consider the possibility of entering the game of politics.

At the time of Glistrup's seismic TV appearance, the incumbent government was a centre-right coalition. It had taken office with high expectations in early 1968, after many years of governments led by the Social Democrats. As with the Norwegian 1965–1971 centre-right government, however, the expectations turned into disillusionment. The non-socialist government did not reduce the tax

burden – if anything it increased. As shown in Chapter 4, Denmark's position as one of the tax-heaviest economies in the OECD was established around 1970.[12] Glistrup's entry into the political debate could thus be seen as a catalyst of simmering discontent. A new election was held in the autumn of 1971, which resulted in the Social Democrats returning to office, with a slender and tenuous majority. Accession to the then EEC was also on the horizon, an issue which, as in Norway, would add to the pressure on the established parties

In such a fluid situation, it is not surprising that a political entrepreneur like Glistrup saw his chance. At first he offered his services to the existing parties. A brief flirt with the recently formed Christian People's Party ended abruptly, apparently because of Glistrup's suggestion to replace the export of farm produce with pornography.[13] He does not appear to have played a significant part in the 1971 election campaign,[14] but in 1972 he was selected as a prospective parliamentary candidate for the Conservative Party, only for the decision to be overturned by a higher party level.[15] He then decided to start his own party, and did so on 22 August 1972, in a restaurant in the Copenhagen amusement park Tivoli.[16]

The party name was decided as *Fremskridtspartiet*. It was, in fact, not a new name in Nordic politics. In Finland a liberal party, in Swedish called *Framstegspartiet*, had existed between 1918 and 1951.[17] In Iceland a farming and fishing-based party, in English usually referred to as the Progressive Party, was formed in 1916 and remains a significant force in the 2010s.[18] In Sweden a party called *Framstegspartiet* had been formed in the late 1960s, but never came close to a national breakthrough and dissolved into a disparate mix of small localised populist parties using the same name, apparently without much coordination.[19] There is nothing to suggest that Glistrup had any of these parties in mind when he thought of the party name. It even turned out that an old party with the same name already existed in Denmark. Glistrup solved the problem by buying the rights to the party name.[20]

The next step was to collect the required 17,000 signatures to participate in a parliamentary election. This was completed in January 1973.[21] The first chance to meet the voters came on 4 December the same year, after a Social Democratic minister had defected and an election had been called. Opinion polls had indicated that *Fremskridtspartiet* was as good as certain to enter parliament. In April it was supported by around one-quarter of the electorate. The ratings then declined, but the party was always well above the 2 per cent representational threshold.[22] With 15.9 per cent of the vote, and 28 seats, Glistrup's party became the second biggest in the *Folketing*.[23] Also in many other ways the election shook up the party system. The leading parties were severely punished. Three new parties entered, and two older parties re-entered, parliament. The epithet "earthquake election" was eminently justified; even more so than for the Norwegian election three months earlier.[24]

The reasons for this earthquake are complex. To some extent it could be linked to tradition. The Danish party system had always been less stable than its Norwegian and Swedish counterparts, and anti-establishment challenger parties

were not a new phenomenon. The 2 per cent electoral threshold made it comparatively easy to enter parliament. An example before *Fremskridtspartiet* was The Independents (*De Uafhengige*), formed by a defector from the liberal party *Venstre* in 1953, and represented in parliament between 1960 and 1966.[25] There is also much to suggest that the party system had been subject to erosion prior to 1973. The Danish psephologist Torben Worre has noted that signs of increased electoral volatility had already begun to show in the 1960s.[26] The erosion had its roots in long-term structural changes, leading to dealignment, and was exacerbated by new political issues emerging around 1970.

The most important such issue was accession to what at the time was called the European Economic Community (EEC). Like Norway, Denmark held a referendum on accession in the autumn of 1972 – but unlike Norway, Denmark voted yes. The majority was fairly substantial, 63.3 per cent yes to 36.7 per cent no. Despite the different results, however, there were many parallels between the EEC votes in Norway and Denmark. In particular, the issue cut across traditional party loyalties.[27] Other issues contributing to the instability included the liberalisation of abortion and pornography, which triggered the formation of the Christian People's Party in 1970.[28] To this was added a growing sense of fatigue with the traditional parties and the political establishment.[29]

In this climate the ground was fertile for Mogens Glistrup. His drastic rhetoric, often with a dose of humour, against taxes, bureaucracy and the political establishment went down well among many homeless voters. Indeed, *Fremskridtspartiet* took its votes from almost everywhere: the centre-right parties as well as the Social Democrats – even the Socialist People's Party. The overall pattern, however, was that the party's electoral profile tilted somewhat to the right. Former centre-right voters accounted for more than 60 per cent of the FP vote, while around 35 per cent had previously voted for centre-left and left parties.[30]

After the breakthrough, *Fremskridtspartiet* found the going difficult. It maintained its presence in parliament, but electoral support gradually declined, to a nadir of 3.6 per cent in 1984. The party had negligible political influence, and internal splits soon developed. There was disagreement between those who wanted to build up an effective party organisation, and those who saw the party as a movement, which should be organisationally as well as politically distinctive from the other parties. Glistrup was very firmly in the latter camp, and he soon became involved in disagreements about a variety of matters, personal as well as political.

In June 1983 Glistrup's tax-evading past caught up with him. After a protracted legal process he was sentenced to three years in jail for tax fraud.[31] By this time his popularity had already declined, but the jail sentence was a decisive blow to his political ambitions. Following a humiliating vote in the *Folketing*, he lost his parliamentary immunity and was forced to serve the sentence.[32] He was re-elected to parliament in January 1984, but the *Folketing* again voted him as "unworthy" of his seat, and he had to return to prison.[33] Glistrup was given an early release in 1985,[34] and re-entered parliament following the 1987 election.[35]

He still aroused media interest with drastic statements, but his use of humour had given way to a more aggressive style.[36] Politically he was a spent force. After forming a breakaway party Glistrup again lost his *Folketing* place in 1990, this time for good.[37] In 1991 he was expelled from *Fremskridtspartiet* for having stood for another party in an election.[38]

Exit Glistrup – enter Kjærsgaard

Mogens Glistrup's jail sentence was significant for more than one reason. Following his second demotion from parliament in 1984, his seat was taken over by an unknown 36-year-old home care assistant named Pia Kjærsgaard. Having joined FP in 1978, Kjærsgaard had become a prolific writer of letters to newspaper editors, but her political experience was very limited.[39] Quickly, however, she adapted to the rules and procedures, and developed into a shrewd parliamentarian.[40] She also decided to challenge the existing power hierarchy in *Fremskridtspartiet*. More or less unilaterally, she decided that she was the right person for the post as the party's *politisk ordfører* (political chairperson).[41] In other parties this post was important, but in FP it had low status, and had rotated among the party's members of parliament. Kjærsgaard made the position her own, and used it to build a power base. She played a central role in the 1987 election campaign, and the party's gains in that election reinforced her position.[42]

The problems continued, however. A key source of conflict was strategy. In the 1970s, a divide had already developed between hardliners, who rejected deals with other parties, and pragmatists who saw negotiations and compromises as the only route towards political influence. The two factions also disagreed about the party organisation, where the hardliners were highly sceptical of the conventional party structure advocated by the pragmatists. Mogens Glistrup as a person, and his role in the party were also a constant source of controversy.[43] The situation was compounded by ideological divisions between anti-state libertarians and extreme immigration critics, and various subforms and combinations thereof. To all this could be added a dose of outright oddballs. The national party conferences could be very conflictual; entertaining to the neutral observer but damaging to the party image. Also local representatives gave FP negative press.[44] The title of a book about FP between 1989 and 1995 by the Danish historian Jens Ringsmose aptly sums up the situation: *At Least It Has Not Been Boring*.[45]

Initially Kjærsgaard belonged to the hardliner faction in *Fremskridtspartiet*, but she soon came to the conclusion that this approach was not productive for the party.[46] With Glistrup in prison FP had struck its first important political deal with the Conservative-led government, in the autumn of 1983.[47] Kjærsgaard wanted to continue in this direction, and a number of other deals were struck in the 1980s, culminating in an agreement about the entire budget in 1989. In exchange for supporting the government, FP negotiated a number of tax cuts and a reduction in staff at the Danish tax authority.[48] It has been argued that the concessions negotiated by FP in 1983 and 1989 were marginal,[49] but the deals

suggested that the party was on its way towards respectability, and were considered as victories for Kjærsgaard's pragmatic strategy.

Full respectability, however, was still some way away. There was no readiness for long-term agreements involving FP, and government participation was never seriously considered. The 1983 and 1989 deals could be described as emergency solutions for centre-right governments in difficulties. Other deals followed, albeit without much political significance,[50] and FP was also counted on when governments were formed.[51] In practice this always meant centre-right governments, even though FP liked to present itself as free of bloc politics constraints. In 1993 the Social Democrats returned to office after 11 years of Conservative-led governments. At the same time the Treaty of Maastricht, which had been a source of disagreement between the EU-sceptical FP and the pro-EU Liberals and Conservatives, was off the agenda after a second referendum had ratified the treaty, with Danish opt-outs, in 1993.

Both of these developments meant that the case for closer cooperation among the non-socialist parties grew stronger. A new election would have to be held before the end of 1994, and in June that year the party presented a pamphlet with 100 reasons for a majority consisting of FP, the Liberals and the Conservatives.[52] The pamphlet did not mention a formal coalition, but the party later announced that it was ready for government participation, although this was not formulated as a demand.[53] The initial response from the centre-right parties was positive, and the opportunity to put the idea into practice arrived when the election was announced in late August. Early in the campaign, however, the cooperation was effectively ended, when Kjærsgaard denounced a budget proposal from the two other parties.[54]

Meanwhile, the situation in *Fremskridtspartiet* was deteriorating. According to Ringsmose, there were in fact a couple of comparatively quiet years after the departure of Mogens Glistrup, but in the second half of 1993 conflicts again started simmering.[55] Pia Kjærsgaard's position was strong, but she was not in full control of the party, and attempts to marginalise her opponents met with resistance. After the loss of one seat in the 1994 election the balance of power in the parliamentary group shifted to her disadvantage. The twists and turns of the ensuing battle were complex, but without too much exaggeration it can be argued that they led to the end of *Fremskridtspartiet*.[56] The conflict came to a head at a national party conference, held in Århus from 30 September to 1 October 1995. The conference has gone down in history for the anger and hostility between the warring factions. Pia Kjaersgard and her supporters lost the decisive votes. They left the party, and formed *Dansk Folkeparti*.[57]

There was some initial uncertainty about which of FP and DF would emerge as the strongest. Soon, however, opinion polls indicated that the latter party was on top. This trend was confirmed by the local and regional elections in 1997, where DF was comfortably ahead of FP. The parliamentary election in February 1998 put an end to any remaining doubts. *Fremskridtspartiet* passed the 2 per cent threshold with a narrow margin.[58] In the autumn of 1999 Mogens Glistrup was readmitted into FP, but his public appeal was long gone and he immediately

alienated more responsible elements in the party with his extreme anti-Muslim statements.[59] The four FP members of parliament defected. They declared that they would sit the remainder of the election period under the label "Freedom 2000", but not seek re-election.[60] *Fremskridtspartiet* was annihilated in the 2001 election with 0.6 per cent. Since then the party has not been able to collect the required number of signatures to participate in a parliamentary election. It still appeared to exist in late 2013, but has been an irrelevance since 1999.[61] Glistrup died in the summer of 2008, aged 82.

Dansk Folkeparti takes over

Pia Kjærsgaard and her collaborators formed *Dansk Folkeparti* on 6 October 1995, less than a week after the tumultuous FP party conference. Kjærsgaard assumed the party leadership, and was joined by three other members of parliament elected as FP representatives in 1994. This was less than half of the FP parliamentary group, but it soon became apparent that the momentum was with DF. This was confirmed in the election of March 1998, when DF received 7.4 per cent and 11 seats. Immigration was a salient issue in the 1998 election campaign, and there is much to suggest that, in its early days, DF had already driven several other parties towards a more immigration-critical position.[62]

After the 1998 election the place of the new party as a national political force was secured. Arguably, it had also affected the political agenda. What it was lacking was direct political influence. In a parliamentary debate on 7 October 1999 the Social Democratic Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen stated that DF would never become legitimate. His words "you will never be house-trained" have become infamous, because they would be proved wrong.[63] A number of events played into DF's hands. First, Denmark held a referendum on the introduction of the Euro in September 2000. Almost all of the parliamentary parties campaigned on the yes side; the only exceptions were the parties to the left of the Social Democrats – and *Dansk Folkeparti*. The vote ended in a majority against the Euro.[64] This was a massive boost for the legitimacy of DF – the party could with some justification argue that it had stood with the people against the establishment. It was also a personal victory for Pia Kjærsgaard, who was branded *nej-dronningen* (the no queen) by the media.[65]

The year before the Euro vote, DF had already secured a coup by recruiting the Social Democrat Mogens Camre as a candidate in the EU election. The recruitment amounted to outright poaching – DF representatives made underhand approaches and, after initial reluctance, Camre agreed to change party. Having been a member of the *Folketing* between 1968 and 1987, and subsequently having worked for the Danish EU representation in Brussels, he was a major acquisition. Camre increased the party's potential to attract votes from the Social Democrats, and added valuable experience as well as legitimacy. He was duly elected to the EU parliament.[66]

Other events also worked to DF's advantage. The most important was the terrorist attacks against the USA on 11 September 2001, which seemed to confirm

the validity of DF's criticism of Islam, and reinforced the party's self-image as brave and clear-sighted exponents of the "truth". When Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, somewhat unexpectedly, called an election for 20 November 2001, the stage was set for *Dansk Folkeparti*. Immigration was the main campaign theme, not only for DF but also in general. The Liberal (*Venstre*) and Conservative parties promised to tighten immigration, and were joined by the Social Democrats. There were parties that did not join the immigration-critical bandwagon, notably the Social Liberals[67] and the Socialist People's Party, plus a number of smaller parties. For the most part, however, immigration became something of a valence issue. There was widespread agreement about the end – reduced immigration and stricter demands on immigrants. The debate was about the means, and who had the most credibility on the issue.[68] Immigration was the most common theme in the media coverage of the campaign.[69] It was important also to the voters; second only to welfare issues in terms of priority. In many ways, therefore, it could be argued that DF had set the agenda of the campaign.[70]

The outcome of the election was an unmistakeable swing to the right. The liberal party *Venstre* made massive gains and overtook the Social Democrats as the country's biggest party – the first time since 1920 that the Social Democrats had been beaten into second place. *Dansk Folkeparti* emerged as the third biggest party with 22 seats. *Venstre* leader Anders Fogh Rasmussen was given the task of forming a government and on 27 November, exactly a week after the election, a coalition was formed consisting of *Venstre* and the Conservatives. It was a minority government, and it needed support from either *Dansk Folkeparti* or the Social Democrats to get its proposals through. The latter was never seriously considered, at least not on a systematic basis. Instead DF, which had favoured a *Venstre*-Conservative coalition in the election campaign as well as during the government negotiations, was generally regarded as part of the government's parliamentary base.[71]

This was confirmed in early 2002, when DF and the government struck a deal on the budget, followed by an agreement about immigration policy in May. There were also a number of deals on less significant issues.[72] *Dansk Folkeparti* had established itself as a permanent cooperation partner of the government. It had become "house-trained". In a newspaper advertisement published in April, the party listed the achievements it had secured thus far. The list included improvements in health care, more resources to the elderly and families with children, stricter sentences for violent crime and rape and the avoidance of planned cuts in education. It also included, but was not dominated by, differences the party claimed to have made in immigration and integration policy. Decisions had been made to abolish the Council for Ethnic Equality, and remove the obligation for councils to provide teaching in mother-tongue languages, other than Danish. The party also promised more reforms on immigration and integration.[73]

This promise was met. In the next nine years, DF would participate in a series of reforms in which immigration and integration policies were tightened. It should be remembered that the government parties had themselves promised

stricter policies in the 2001 election. It is, therefore, worth noting that the immigration-tightening reforms introduced by the *Venstre*-Conservative governments of 2001–2011 did not exclusively emanate from demands by DF. Indeed, some of the policy changes were also supported by the Social Democrats. Even with these caveats, however, it is clear that the cooperation between DF and the government significantly altered Danish immigration, asylum and integration policy. At least 45 deals were struck between DF and the government between 2002 and 2011, many of which concerned immigration or related issues in some way.[74]

The resulting changes in immigration and integration policy were extensive. In January 2002, the government presented a set of reform proposals on immigration and integration. It was a complex and extensive package, but its main aim was to significantly reduce immigration to Denmark. The definition of political refugees was narrowed, by abolishing the concept of de facto refugees.[75] The required qualifying time for a permanent resident permit was increased from three to seven years. Family reunions were made more difficult, and the minimum age for the right to reunification of spouses was raised from 18 to 24. The proposals became subject to debate, inside as well as outside Denmark, but it is worth remembering that they were the government's own, and not the result of negotiations with *Dansk Folkeparti*. The reaction from DF was positive, but with the reservation that the party wanted the government to substantiate the claim that the proposals would have an actual impact on the level of immigration. In other words, DF would not accept the package at face value; it demanded negotiations, and started to show signs of impatience when the government was slow to initiate such talks.[76]

It appears that negotiations did begin in the second half of April, and on 7 May an agreement between the three parties was presented. The agreement had large similarities with the government package from January, but included a number of modifications, seemingly negotiated by DF.[77] These included the abolition of the right of asylum seekers to be provided with housing, stricter demands on asylum seekers' Danish language skills and a rule according to which asylum seekers sentenced to a prison term of six months or more were made subject to a qualifying term of ten years before they could become eligible for permanent residence. The thus amended reform package was approved by the *Folketing* on 31 May, with support from DF and the two government parties.[78] There were international reactions against the reforms. Not least in Sweden criticism was very hard, and a heated war of words broke out between representatives of the Social Democratic government in Sweden and parts of the Swedish press, on the one hand, and the Danish government and DF, on the other.[79]

In 2003 the conditions for family reunification, and the reunification of spouses, were tightened further. For example, the maximum age for children to be eligible for family reunification was reduced from 18 to 15.[80] In subsequent deals measures were taken to ensure the dismissal of unsuccessful asylum applicants, and measures against asylum seekers entering the black market for labour.[81] Even though DF was not the only party advocating tighter immigration

policy, it seems clear that the party was instrumental in pushing many of the eventual policy decisions in a more restrictive direction. The Danish scholar Jørgen Goul Andersen even argued that DF had been so successful that the party had run out of demands, and that its electoral support may stagnate.[82]

As it turned out, however, DF made gains in terms of votes as well as seats in the parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2007. The *Venstre*-Conservative government stayed in office after both elections, and the cooperation with DF continued. The election successes could be explained by a combination of internal and external factors. The party had shown itself able to take political responsibility. It was also able to argue that the "Cartoons Affair" showed that it had been right in its warnings against radical Islamism.[83] The affair began in the autumn of 2005 with the publications of satirical cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in the newspaper *Jyllandsposten*. It led to international reactions and a debate which was still ongoing at the time of the 2007 election. In addition, DF was able to fight off the challenge of the newly formed New Alliance party, which had as a key purpose to reduce DF's political influence, and take over as support party to the *Venstre*-Conservative government.[84]

Nor did *Dansk Folkeparti* run out of demands. A series of deals followed after the 2005 and 2007 elections. In March 2010 another agreement was reached, which meant the introduction of a points system for residence permits. Applicants would be scored from 0 to 100. The scoring was based on factors such as integration in the labour market, lack of dependency on welfare benefits, education, Danish language skills, passing a citizenship test with questions about Danish society, history and culture, and involvement in voluntary associations (points could be earned, for example, by being a football coach). The applicant needs to reach the maximum of 100 points to qualify for permanent residence – but those who achieve this are already eligible for permanent residence after four years, i.e. three years earlier than the minimum qualification period of seven years introduced in 2002.[85] This new system took effect from 1 June 2010. Later in the year, the criteria for reunification of spouses were altered. In many ways the criteria were tightened, but reunification was also made easier, for example, for those with higher education qualifications.[86] Thus, the reforms of 2010 were aimed to make it easier for highly qualified persons, and persons who could show that they were assimilating quickly, to gain residence in Denmark, while it was made more difficult for others.

The immigration reforms decided by the government with support from *Dansk Folkeparti* between 2002 and 2010 had the intended effects. As shown in Chapter 4, the influx of asylum seekers into Denmark was significantly reduced in the last few years of the first decade of the 2000s. The number of family reunifications also dropped. The reform process was halted in 2011, when the election resulted in a change of government. A minority coalition consisting of the Social Democrats, Social Liberals and the Socialist People's Party took office. The election was also the first electoral loss in *Dansk Folkeparti*'s history. In 2012 the new government took steps to reverse some of the reforms to which DF had contributed. For example, the points system for permanent residence was abolished.[87]

A possible reason for DF's defeat in the 2011 election was that the party had reached an agreement with the government, which included steps to phase out an early retirement pay scheme.[88] In exchange, DF had negotiated a number of concessions, which included stricter controls on the Danish borders with Germany and Sweden. This could have led to a conflict with the EU, as the Treaty of Schengen does not allow permanent border controls. The eventual proposal referred to customs spot checks, which are allowed, but the legality of the proposed controls was still debated, at the same time as DF argued that mere spot checks were not sufficient.[89] Due to the change of government this was not put to the test, but there is much to suggest that the deal contributed to DF's first-ever election defeat. The changes in the retirement pay system were unpopular among many DF voters, and it seems likely that the concessions negotiated in exchange were not considered sufficient compensation by some previous DF voters.[90]

Thus, *Dansk Folkeparti* was back in opposition, after almost ten years as government support party. In that period, it had made significant policy differences, primarily but not exclusively in immigration and integration policy. In 2003, for example, DF was responsible for the introduction of the "old-age cheque", a supplement to basic state pensioners who are not part of other supplementary pension schemes.[91] This is by some considered as one of DF's main achievements during the 2001–2011 period. Above all, DF showed itself capable of taking political and economic responsibility. The party is of course still controversial in some circles, inside as well as outside Denmark, but it is no longer accused of irresponsibility and incompetence.

Dansk Folkeparti is definitely regarded as "house-trained" among the centre-right parties, and will again become an important factor next time there is a centre-right, "bourgeois", majority in the *Folketing*. The party may not yet be ready for formal inclusion in a government, due to deep disagreements with most other parties about EU-related issues. In the longer perspective, however, government participation is a distinct possibility. It should also be remembered that even though the distance is greater to the centre-left parties, i.e. the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals, DF has participated in deals also including those parties. As we will see, the party is not particularly far to the right on the socio-economic dimension, and therefore has some room for manoeuvre in future parliamentary scenarios.

It has already been argued that DF built up a stable support base quite soon after its foundation. This is borne out by Table 7.1. To be sure, *Fremskridtspartiet*'s result from 1973 still remains an all-time record for Danish extreme right parties. In fact, FP also claims the second best result, from 1977. But, as the table also shows, FP had a very unstable support base, and never reached double percentage figures after 1979. *Dansk Folkeparti*, on the other hand, has been above 10 per cent in every parliamentary election attempted, except the first one in 1998. The 2011 result must also be seen in its political context – the party had been closely associated with the government for ten years, the last three of which had been affected by an international economic recession. In addition, as

Table 7.1 Results for *Fremskridtspartiet* and *Dansk Folkeparti* in parliamentary elections, 1973–2011[1]

	Fremskridtspartiet		*Dansk Folkeparti*	
	Per cent	*Seats*	*Per cent*	*Seats*
1973	15.9	28	–	–
1975	13.6	24	–	–
1977	14.6	26	–	–
1979	11.0	20	–	–
1981	8.9	16	–	–
1984	3.6	6	–	–
1987	4.8	9	–	–
1988	9.0	16	–	–
1990	6.4	12	–	–
1994	6.4	11	–	–
1998	2.4	4	7.4	13
2001	0.6	0	12.0	22
2005	–	–	12.3	24
2007	–	–	13.9	25
2011	–	–	12.3	22

Note
1 Entries refer to elections to the national parliament (*Folketing*). The total number of seats has always been 179, of which 4 are reserved for Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

discussed above, there is much to suggest that DF alienated some of its core voters with the agreement with the government to phase out the early retirement pay scheme. The fact that the party's loss was only marginal in such circumstances suggests that it has a sizeable reservoir of loyal voters.

Ideology

The purpose of this section is to chart the ideological development of *Fremskridtspartiet* and *Dansk Folkeparti*. Emphasis will be on the latter, while the discussion on FP will be less detailed, and mostly based on secondary sources. For *Dansk Folkeparti* primary sources will be used. Since its formation in 1995 DF has produced a total of five documents which could qualify as a manifesto. The party has also published a large number of other documents, some of which are focused on more specific policy areas, but in the following emphasis will be on the more comprehensive manifestos, titled Principles manifesto (*Principprogram*) or Working manifesto (*Arbejdsprogram*). Unlike *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway, however, the DF manifestos do not follow election years. This is partly due to the fact that parliamentary terms in Denmark are not fixed, and elections often take place with relatively short notice.

The first DF manifesto from 1995 has not been possible to retrieve. It was a brief document, consisting of ten points.[92] It could be regarded as a draft version

of the first "proper" manifesto, a 36-page, 9,700-word document presented in 1997.[93] In September 2001 a 104-page, 33,700-word manifesto was presented. It was succeeded in 2009 by an even longer manifesto – 158 pages and over 53,000 words. At the time of writing, the 2009 document is the party's most recent manifesto. The 2001 and 2009 manifestos contain detailed policy proposals in a wide range of areas, and are titled Working manifestos (*Arbejdsprogram*). The 1997 manifesto was titled *Principprogram*, although it contains principled statements as well as quite detailed policy proposals. It could therefore be regarded as a combination of a Principles manifesto and a Working manifesto.[94] In addition, *Dansk Folkeparti* adopted a Principles manifesto in 2002. The printed version of this *Principprogram* is six pages long. It is also available on the party website, and comprises 360 words. Its purpose is to summarise the party's fundamental principles, and it is not intended for review or amendments.[95] The following account will primarily draw on the DF manifestos from 1997, 2001, 2002 and 2009.

As should already be apparent from the preceding discussion, taxation was the reason why *Fremskridtspartiet* was formed. Despite many other changes, the tax issue remained central for FP as long as it was a relevant political force. The advocacy of tax cuts was wrapped into an outlook which has been described as neo-liberal, i.e. the advocacy of a reduced public sector and a general belief in private enterprise and economic deregulation. Attacks on bureaucracy was a recurring theme. It should be noted that, despite Glistrup's often drastic rhetoric, FP as a party did not advocate the total abolition of tax, or the complete dismantling of the public sector or welfare state. Rather, *Fremskridtspartiet*'s main tax policy position tended to be to raise the basic income tax allowance, which meant that the cuts would benefit those with low and medium rather than higher incomes. There are even examples of concrete negotiations with the government, where the party prioritised balanced budgets over tax cuts. To some extent this apparent inconsistency was due to the splits in the party; it did contain those who entertained fundamentally neo-liberal ideas, but also others who were more oriented towards a welfare chauvinist position. It was, therefore, only in the early years that FP could be described as a single-issue anti-tax party. Nevertheless, tax cuts never disappeared from the party's agenda, and its position on the socio-economic dimension was clearly to the right of centre.[96]

Initially, DF also advocated significant tax cuts. The ten-point programme from 1995 has been described as a "softened" version of the FP positions.[97] The same could be said of the 1997 manifesto, which argued for a considerable reduction of the overall tax burden, in combination with public savings.[98] The party gave a number of reasons why taxation policy needed to change profoundly. For example that it should pay to work, and that high taxes have produced a large "black economy".[99] It proposed a drastic cut in the income tax, with an increased basic allowance, and a flat 30 per cent rate of tax on income above that basic allowance.[100] The similarities with *Fremskridtspartiet* were still clearly visible.

In the 2001 manifesto, however, these demands were significantly toned down. The party proposed a "gradual" (*gradvis*) reduction of the tax burden, in

contrast to the 1997 demand of a "considerable" (*væsentlig*) reduction.[101] The 2001 document added that the party was opposed to tax cuts that impact negatively on fundamental welfare provisions, such as care of the elderly, pensions, health care, etc. but with the qualification that such negative impacts do not automatically follow from rationalisations.[102] It stated that it is "pointless" to propose tax cuts without specifying the consequences, in terms of expenditure cuts or the intended impact on the economy.[103] The 1997 demand of an increased basic allowance was replaced by a more general statement that the tax burden should primarily be reduced for lower income groups.[104] It did not quantify the preferred tax levels, or mention a flat rate. Thus, while the 2001 manifesto did speak positively about tax cuts, there was a clear contrast to the 1997 document. In the 2009 Working manifesto the statements from 2001 were, by and large, repeated. DF had supported a freeze on income tax decided by the government in 2001, but with the reservation that the effects on the welfare system would have to be continuously reviewed.[105]

The perspective on the public sector has gone through a similar development. In 1997 the party argued for the privatisation of an extensive range of functions.[106] The need for care and services should be defined by the state, and the funding of hospitals and care institutions should be a matter for the public sector, but the institutions themselves could be run privately.[107] In 2001, the party still spoke of the "massive growth of the public sector, which directly affects individual freedom".[108] In 2009 the wording was that the "public sector has a tendency to grow bigger", but that this does not necessarily bring improved services.[109] The toned down criticism of the public sector has been accompanied by increased scepticism of private solutions. The 2002 Principles manifesto states that care of the elderly and disabled is a public task, and that health care and hospitals should be part of the public sector, and funded by taxes.[110] The 2009 Working manifesto refers to the privatisation of care of elderly institutions in negative terms.[111] In the same document, DF is sceptical against the privatisation of public utilities, such as railways and telecommunications.[112]

Thus, while *Dansk Folkeparti* still advocates tax cuts, and does not reject private alternatives in, for example, the care sector, the emphasis and overall perspective have changed. Today's DF has moved considerably towards the middle ground in economic policy. The 2009 manifesto explicitly states that the maintenance of the welfare state [*sic*] is an important goal, and that this can only be achieved via societal solidarity and cohesion.[113] This may not make DF socialist, or anti-capitalist, but it is a clear contrast to the party's earlier positions, let alone those held by *Fremskridtspartiet*. It could be argued also that FP sometimes spoke of the need to cater for the less well-off in society, but this was wrapped in a neo-liberal package where tax cuts and privatisation were the priorities. The FP ideology has been described by Jørgen Goul Andersen as "Neo-Liberalism of the Lower Strata".[114] Today's DF has maintained the concern for the lower strata, but with little remaining neo-liberalism.

In the public discussion, the issue most commonly associated with *Dansk Folkeparti* is immigration. *Fremskridtspartiet* also developed into a strongly

immigration-critical party, but this was not the case from the beginning. The first signs of FP as an immigration-critical party can be traced back to 1979, when a local party representative named A. Th. Riemann was charged and convicted for derogatory statements about immigrants. Among other things, he was quoted as saying that immigrants "multiply like rats".[115] This was an isolated occurrence, and for a number of years the issue was largely off the agenda. As mentioned in Chapter 4, however, Denmark introduced a more generous immigration law in 1983. The government at the time was led by the Conservative Party, and the bill was supported by a large parliamentary majority – only *Fremskridtspartiet* voted against.[116] From then on the party's position as leading immigration critics was consolidated, even though the issue did not immediately become salient in the political debate.

The situation changed when a combination of the liberalised immigration law and the war between Iran and Iraq led to an influx of refugees, which put the issue firmly on the agenda. The pivotal period was 1984–1985, when a number of confrontations between Danes and asylum seekers took place, and media attention to immigration and related issues increased.[117] The response from FP was quick, and strong. Only a few months after entering parliament, Pia Kjærsgaard made immigration criticism her political trademark.[118] Mogens Glistrup launched into a vitriolic attack on immigration around the time of his release from prison in March 1985.[119] Glistrup's anti-immigration rhetoric tended to be too extreme to be taken seriously, but Kjærsgaard found the political and rhetorical balance to make the issue work to her, and her party's, advantage. From circa 1985 FP came close to Kitschelt's "winning formula", combining immigration criticism and right-wing economics. The main argument against immigration was the cost, but alleged problems, such as criminality, also formed part of the argument. The party wanted to drastically reduce the number of political refugees, and expressed scepticism about their genuineness.[120]

When *Dansk Folkeparti* was formed, immigration immediately became a profile issue. It would be too space-consuming to comprehensively account for the many manifesto statements against, and policy proposals to reduce, immigration. It should also be remembered that the 2009 manifesto is affected by the fact that many of the party's earlier policy proposals have been implemented and, as we have seen, resulted in a marked reduction in immigration. Despite variations in the concrete policy proposals, however, there is a high degree of consistency in the party's general view on immigration. The 1997 manifesto states that: "Denmark is not, and has never been, a country of immigration, and *Dansk Folkeparti* does not want Denmark to develop into a multi-ethnic society".[121] With minor linguistic variations this sentence was included in the 2002 Principles manifesto.[122] It can therefore be treated as a core element of the DF ideology.

The rejection of a "multi-ethnic" society suggests that *Dansk Folkeparti*'s definition of nationality is based on ethnicity. This is corroborated in the 2009 Working manifesto, which makes a total of seven references to "non-ethnic Danes" in the contexts of housing, education and crime.[123] The party also argues

that the rate of nativity is high among immigrant groups, and that this can have a negative impact on the composition of the Danish population and for the Danish society as a whole.[124] It should be pointed out, however, that no reference to colour or race has been found in the researched documents.[125]

Besides ethnicity, the 2002 Principles manifesto also makes reference to culture as a criterion of Danishness. It states that Denmark is based on the Danish cultural heritage, and that Danish culture should be preserved and strengthened.[126] Danish culture is defined as "the sum of the history, experiences, faith, language and customs of the Danish people".[127] The party is opposed to multiculturalism. A multicultural society, the party argues, is without internal cohesion and togetherness, and existing multicultural societies are characterised by a lack of solidarity, and often also open conflict. Denmark would be unlikely to avoid the same fate if other cultures get "decisive influence".[128]

Dansk Folkeparti does not rule out the acceptance of foreigners into Danish society, but with the reservation that security and democracy are not jeopardised.[129] The party also makes a distinction between immigrants and refugees. The latter, DF argues, should return to their country of origin as soon as the threat that made them refugees is no longer at hand. An immigrant is defined as a person who has come to Denmark to work, or has married a Dane, and is willing to live according to Danish conditions.[130] Despite these indications, however, the researched manifestos do not contain any explicit definition of nationality. The party does not specify the cultural and ethnic criteria that define Danishness; nor is there any indication of how important they are relative to each other.

What is clear is that immigration and national culture are key priorities for *Dansk Folkeparti*. Immigration is not the only prioritised issue, but it filters through the party's thinking in a wide variety of other issues. This is illustrated in Table 7.2, which reports different indicators of the relative emphasis on immigration and related issues in the DF manifestos of 1997, 2001 and 2009. As can be seen from the table, the relative size of the section on immigration (the exact

Table 7.2 Emphasis on immigration in *Dansk Folkeparti* manifestos of 1997, 2001 and 2009[1]

	1997	*2001*	*2009*
Total number of words	9,700	33,700	53,600
Total number of sections	28	21	34
Words in section on immigration (%)	458 (4.7)	2,600 (7.7)	4,500 (8.4)
Keyword hits in whole document (%)	33 (0.34)	110 (0.33)	284 (0.53)
Number of sections containing any of the keywords (%)	7 (25)	15 (71)	18 (53)

Note

1 The sources used are *Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram* 1997; *Arbejdsprogram* 2001 and *Arbejdsprogram* 2009. The 1997 and 2001 manifestos have been scanned and converted into Word format, to allow automatic word counting. The keywords used are *udlændn** (foreigner*), *indvandr** (immigr*), *flygtning** (refugee*) and *asyl** (asylum). Percentages (in brackets) are always based on the total number of words in the whole document.

title has varied) has grown, particularly between 1997 and 2001. It by no means dominates the documents, but the trend towards increasing emphasis is clear, in terms of relative size as well as absolute number of words. It can, of course, be argued that the section on immigration has never taken up one-tenth of the manifesto, but the proportion is still greater than for *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway (see Table 6.2 in the previous chapter).

It should also be pointed out that while FrP in Norway largely concentrates its manifesto content on immigration to its own section, DF refers to immigration in a variety of contexts. In 2009 for example, immigration was also referred to in sections such as economy, education, housing and labour market. The former section even had a subsection on the economy and immigration. As can be seen from Table 7.2, four selected keywords relating to immigration appeared in 15 different sections of the 2001 manifesto. In 2009 the number increased to 18. In relative terms this represented a decline, as the total number of sections had increased even more. Still, as the table also shows, the overall frequency of the four keywords has increased steadily, in absolute as well as relative terms (for definitions and calculations, see note below the table). Thus, while it would be an exaggeration to call *Dansk Folkeparti* a single-issue anti-immigration party, it is clearly a prioritised issue. As we have also seen, the experiences from negotiations with the government of 2002–2011 suggest that DF is prepared to be pragmatic on most policy areas, but is more principled on issues regarding immigration and integration.

The immigration rhetoric of *Dansk Folkeparti* can be very strongly worded. At the annual party conference in September 2001, a few days after the al-Qaeda attacks on the USA, the DF representative in the EU parliament Mogens Camre said that "all Western countries are infiltrated by Muslims, and some speak nicely to us while they are waiting to become numerous enough to get rid of us". Allegedly, an earlier draft of the speech had contained the words "kill us" instead of "get rid of us".[131] He went on to state that this "ideology of evil" should be "forced out of the Western civilisation".[132] Other speakers at the conference spoke along similar lines, for example stating that young Arabs are criminals who glorify violence, and that Islam is a terrorist organisation, which seeks to take over the world by force.[133]

Two speakers at the conference were charged under the so-called Racism Act, a law that makes it a criminal offence to make derogatory statements about groups of people on the grounds of their race, colour of their skin, national or ethnic origin or sexual orientation.[134] One was acquitted, but the other fined by an appeal court.[135] Camre was protected by his immunity as member of the European Parliament, and therefore not charged.[136] There have, however, been several other cases where DF representatives have been charged with, and in some cases convicted of, breaching the "Racism Act". In 2003, for example, four members of the DF youth organisation were given a suspended jail sentence for having authored an advertisement which linked Muslims with mass rapes and gang criminality. One of the convicted, Morten Messerschmidt, was later elected as a DF representative to parliament in 2005, and to the EU parliament in 2009.[137]

Pia Kjærsgaard has been reported for breaching the Act on several occasions, but never charged.[138] The party has often criticised the "Racism Act", claiming it is a political law which prevents open debate. The Act is not explicitly mentioned in the 2009 DF manifesto, but the party has on various occasions advocated its removal, or amendment.[139]

While *Dansk Folkeparti's* criticism against immigration has often been vitriolic, the party leadership has sometimes clamped down on party representatives deemed to have gone too far. There have been expulsions for excessive statements or for connections with organisations regarded as compromising. An example of the former is Merethe Egebjerg Holm, who was expelled for stating at the DF national conference in 2007 that all Muslims should be sent out of Europe, and replaced by Jews.[140] Organisational links deemed incompatible with DF membership have included Danish Front, whose website listed Internet links to white power football hooligan groups and history revisionist sites, and Danish Forum, which on its website made positive references to, for example, the Ku Klux Klan.[141]

As noted, the party is concerned about the nativity rate among immigrants. This was taken to its extreme by Mogens Glistrup, who explicitly concurred with Riemann's statement likening immigrants to rats.[142] The rats metaphor has not been used by Kjærsgaard, and she has reacted angrily when it has been wrongly attributed to her, even though she apparently did not denounce it at first.[143] Her reaction when alleged to have said that foreigners multiply like rabbits has not been as forceful, even though the quote appears to have been taken somewhat out of context. According to Kjærsgaard's biographer Elisabet Svane, it originates from a meeting with business representatives on the island of Fyn in 1988, when Kjærsgaard was asked about the "rats" reference. She declined to comment, but after repeated questions, she is alleged to have said, with a smile, "if only they had said rabbits".[144] This was later leaked to the press, and led to a headline in the tabloid *Ekstra Bladet*.[145]

As shown above, *Dansk Folkeparti*'s form of nationalism is a combination of cultural and ethnic elements. The party is opposed to multiculturalism, and it seeks to prevent the development of Denmark into a multi-ethnic society. These positions are not absolute. Immigration is not completely ruled out, and integration not regarded as impossible, or wrong in principle. The party's position is, however, that immigration should be at a low level, and that integration should be achieved via strict demands and well-defined criteria (compare the points system for permanent residence). Integrated immigrants are assumed to have adapted fully to Danish culture. Still, irrespective of how successful the integration is, the baseline position of the party is that immigration should be kept to such a level that the ethnic composition of the Danish population is not significantly altered. This suggests that, while the party documents contain elements of *ius sanguinis* (law of the blood; i.e. parenthood and ancestry) as well as *ius soli* (law of the soil; i.e. citizenship), DF's conception of nationality is closer to the former than to the latter.[146]

An important source of inspiration behind *Dansk Folkeparti*'s ideological development has been *Den Danske Forening* (DDF; The Danish Association).

Formed in 1987, DDF is a politically independent organisation, with an intellectual profile. Since its formation it has sought to influence the debate climate about nationalism and immigration, by providing statistics-based, as well as theoretical and philosophical, arguments. DDF has similarities to right-wing intellectual groups in France, sometimes referred to under the joint heading *Nouvelle Droite*, which have had indirect links to *Front National*.[147] The links between DDF and *Dansk Folkeparti* are also indirect, but there are high-profile DF representatives with a background in *Den Danske Forening*. In 2002 two then DF members of parliament, and one future one, left DDF after its deputy leader had referred to Islam as a "pest".[148]

Despite the severance of these personal links between DDF and DF, the importance of the former to the latter should not be understated. Jens Rydgren argues that DDF has been an important intellectual resource for *Dansk Folkeparti*, by providing the party with at least three arguments against immigration, or "frames": immigration as a threat to Danish culture and ethnic identity; immigration as a cause of crime; and immigration as a burden on the welfare state. This, in turn, constitutes a link from *Front National*, via DDF, to DF.[149] The findings presented here are in line with Rydgren's argument, with the small but important addendum that the first of the three mentioned "frames" comes across as more important than the other two in the DF manifestos. The welfare state and law and order are important issue areas for the party, but as arguments against immigration they are subordinate to cultural and ethnic identity.

The links between DF and DDF also have broader significance. The political role of groups like *Nouvelle Droite* and DDF has been to develop a "master frame", a narrative, which has proved effective for several extreme right parties. This ethno-pluralist narrative is based on the "equal but separate" doctrine, i.e. the belief that ethnic and cultural groups are of equal value, but should be kept separate. The ethno-pluralist position has the advantage that it cannot be equated to historically compromised ideologies, such as fascism, Nazism and racism. The ethno-pluralist doctrine has, therefore, provided an intellectual platform which makes it possible to criticise immigration, whilst avoiding the stigma of discredited ideologies, which would make a contemporary Western European party unelectable. At the same time, it has been argued that ethno-pluralism is a continuation of traditional fascist and racist thinking, and that this development and modernising of the older ideologies is the work of groups such as *Nouvelle Droite.*

Before we can summarise the DF ideology, a few more observations are useful. The party is very sceptical of the EU. *Fremskridtspartiet* was essentially EC positive in the beginning, although European issues were never prioritised. Later, however, FP developed in a more EU-critical direction, and campaigned for a No vote in both referendums on the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and 1993. For *Dansk Folkeparti*, EU criticism was a core value from the beginning. It campaigned for a No in the referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998 and, as discussed above, played a key part in the victorious No campaign in the 2000 referendum on the Euro. Since then, DF has argued against all attempts towards further EU integration. The party does not demand a Danish exit from the EU

but has, for example, demanded that the Treaty of Lisbon should be subject to a referendum.[150] It is also opposed to Turkish accession to the EU, because it is not regarded as a European country.[151] *Dansk Folkeparti* supports Danish membership of NATO. The party wholeheartedly backed the decision to send Danish troops to the war in Iraq, and supports participation in the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan.[152]

Dansk Folkeparti has a strong law and order profile, with stricter sentences and increased resources to the police.[153] It advocates more direct democracy, and proposes that a national referendum can be initiated by 50,000 signatures from registered voters.[154] It is positive to the monarchy, although it does not want to increase the powers of the monarch.[155] It adheres to Christian values, and wants to keep the links between the state and the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Denmark. The allegiance to Christianity is of course part of the criticism against Islam, but should not be understood solely in that context. In the 2002 Principles manifesto as well as the 2009 Working manifesto the Christian tradition is regarded as an integral part of the Danish cultural heritage.[156] In this context it is worth mentioning that DF counts a number of Church of Denmark ministers among its high-profile representatives, including the two "black priests" Søren Krarup and Jesper Langballe, both members of parliament in 2001–2011. Krarup and Langballe have been members of *Den Danske Forening*, and were among the DF representatives that left DDF in 2002.[157]

Given the Christian values and connections, it is perhaps not surprising that *Dansk Folkeparti* defends traditional family values. The 2002 Principles programme states that "the family is the core of the Danish society", and that the "close bonds between spouses, children and parents" are crucial to the country and its future.[158] In the 2009 Working manifesto, DF acknowledges the right to a place in society for homosexuals, and hate crimes and persecution of homosexuals are condemned, but it does not want "positive discrimination for homosexuals".[159] The party states that, while it fully supports rights for homosexuals, it also supports family values, with the core family as point of departure.[160] It states that alternative family forms can be as loving and secure as the traditional family, but that the alternatives should not be supported by the legal system.[161] Hence, DF opposes the rights of homosexuals to insemination, adoption of children and church weddings.[162]

Indeed, DF voted no when the *Folketing* with a clear majority decided to introduce same-sex marriages in June 2012. Individual members of other parties also voted against the bill, but DF was the only party to unanimously oppose it.[163] DF parliamentarian Martin Henriksen commented that he was "speechless" about the lack of values in *Venstre* and the Conservatives, where majorities supported the bill, and accused them of betraying fundamental family values.[164] Thus, Bjørklund and Andersen's characterisation of *Fremskridtspartiet* that it was not intolerant of diversity in lifestyles as long as it did not affect taxpayers' money, is not to the same extent applicable to DF.[165]

The contents of *Dansk Folkeparti*'s ideological statements, as stated in the manifestos, have much in common with conservatism. The positive view on

the welfare system, and the view that it should primarily, if not exclusively, be funded and run by the public sector, is by no means incompatible with this interpretation. The conservative traits are also reinforced by the nationalism, adherence to Christianity, belief in traditional family values, advocacy of law and order and the positive references to the monarchy. Such an outlook may not come across as similar to the ideologies of most contemporary conservative parties. It is, however, part of a conservative tradition, which has been called social conservatism. As we will see in the next chapter, the Sweden Democrats has taken the step to explicitly associate itself with social conservatism. *Dansk Folkeparti* has not – so far – made such a move. One reason for this could be that, unlike the other Nordic countries, Denmark has another party that explicitly calls itself conservative, which means that the "conservative space" is already occupied. There is, in fact, circumstantial evidence to suggest that DF sees itself as close to the conservative ideology at the same time as it seeks to distance itself from the nominally conservative party. An example can be taken from the 2011 election campaign, when DF representatives reacted angrily when the Conservative Party suggested the possibility of cooperation with the Social Liberals. In response EU parliamentarian Morten Messerschmidt said that DF stands for "genuine conservatism", while the outgoing member of parliament Søren Skarup called the Conservative leader "deeply compromising for conservatism in Denmark".[166]

Despite such statements, there is no evidence in the core documents that *Dansk Folkeparti* seeks to associate itself with conservatism. The word "conservative", or derivations thereof, does not appear at all in the researched manifestos. Nor does DF claim allegiance with any other ideology. In the academic literature, however, the party is unanimously regarded as a member of the extreme/radical/populist right party family. Nothing in the DF manifestos contradicts such a classification. It certainly meets Mudde's definition of a populist radical right party: *Dansk Folkeparti* is nativist (opposed to immigration), authoritarian (law and order) and populist (more direct democracy).[167] According to Mudde's earlier definitions and classifications, DF would unequivocally qualify as an extreme right party. The elements of ethnicity in the DF nationalism, furthermore, suggest that the party could be classified into Mudde's more radical subgroup of ethnically nationalist parties.[168]

At the same time it should be noted that *Dansk Folkeparti* has been careful to mark a distance to more extreme parties, for example in the European Parliament. Since 2009 DF has been a member of the Europe for Freedom and Democracy group (EFD); between 1999 and 2009 it belonged to the Union for a Europe of Nations group (UEN). The EFD contains some parties usually regarded as extreme right, such as the Italian *Lega Nord* and the Greek LAOS, but also other parties, such as the Dutch *Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij*. *Dansk Folkeparti* had no connections with the more unequivocally extreme right "Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty" (ITS) group, which was formed in 2007 but dissolved before the end of that year. Nor has DF been part of other extreme right pan-European networks, such as EuroNat. In fact, the party has not been

very active in developing international contacts. One of the few exceptions is Sweden, and Pia Kjærsgaard even appeared at an election rally arranged by the Sweden Democrats in 2010.[169]

This cautious approach to international contacts is, perhaps, more an indication of image awareness than ideological uniqueness. *Dansk Folkeparti* would no doubt disapprove of being classified as an extreme right party. But given the definition of "extreme right" presented in Chapter 2, and the evidence presented in this section, there is little room for a different classification. The party is far to the right on its prioritised sociocultural dimension, and it has never let itself be outflanked by other parliamentary parties on that dimension. Despite its apparent reluctance to develop international connections, *Dansk Folkeparti* is a fairly mainstream member of the Western European extreme right party family.

Organisation and leadership

As already discussed, organisation was one of the many sources of disagreement in *Fremskridtspartiet*. Mogens Glistrup and his followers were negative to a formalised party structure, while the pragmatists saw a functional organisation as necessary. Gradually, a formalised structure did evolve, but the FP organisation always had anomalies. One was the position as party leader. Mogens Glistrup was never the formal leader of FP, but was regarded by himself and his supporters as the de facto party leader. His title, to the extent that such was needed, was *kampanjleder* (campaign leader), or sometimes *partistifter* (party founder). Others held the positions as party chair, leader of the parliamentary group, or political chairperson, but during the first 12 years of the party the holders of these positions shifted quite frequently.[170] The situation changed in 1984 when Pia Kjærsgaard, as we have seen, more or less unilaterally took the position as political chairperson, and gradually made this position more influential. Still, although Kjærsgaard build up a considerable power base, and was often regarded as de facto leader of FP, her position was never undisputed. The party had no single formal leader, and when Kjærsgaard was unseated as political chairperson after the 1994 election, it was more or less impossible to identify who the party leader was.[171]

Besides the unclear leadership structure, another organisational problem in *Fremskridtspartiet* was the party conferences, which could often be chaotic. One reason for this was the lack of clear criteria for the selection of conference delegates. The number of delegates was not fixed, except that there was a maximum of 1,500. The total number was to be decided before each conference by the party executive, and allocated to the local party organisations on the combined basis of membership numbers and the party's most recent parliamentary election result in the respective areas.[172] Thus, while the party conference was not quite a "free for all", where any party member could turn up as a delegate, the rules and their applications were ambiguous and open for disputes. This was a big problem in a divided party such as FP. There were often rumours of how warring factions "bussed in" delegates to the party conference.[173] The 1995 party conference had

around 800 delegates, which was one-third more than usual. During the conference there were rumours of Kjærsgaard supporters being on their way to the conference, which could have affected the majority situation.[174]

Fremskridtspartiet also had an unstable membership. For 1973 the membership figure is reported as 15,000; but it then fluctuated quite wildly. The party claimed to have 11,000 members in 1982, but only 2,000 members three years later. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the FP membership was at or above 6,000, but by the time of the 1995 split it had sunk to 4,800.[175] Simply put, *Fremskridtspartiet* was not a very well organised party. This showed in a number of different ways, with the unclear leadership structure and the chaotic party conferences as key examples. A constant underlying problem was the presence of oddballs, in Danish often referred to as *landsbytosser*, individuals who increased the internal chaos and gave the party negative publicity.[176]

When *Dansk Folkeparti* was formed, one of the key challenges was to avoid the organisational problems which had been a constant problem in FP. To this end, a more centralised organisational structure was created. New party rules were adopted in April 1996, and were amended in 2003 and 2006. These rules, in Danish called *vedtægter*, have been designed to provide the party with a clear and concise structure. There is one undisputed leader (*formand*), elected by the party conference and subject to re-election every year.[177] The national executive, the *Hovedbestyrelse*, has a maximum of 12 members, of which 6 (including the party leader) are elected by the party conference, 5 from the DF parliamentary party plus the chair of the party youth organisation.[178] The deputy leader of the parliamentary party automatically becomes the political deputy leader of the party.

The national executive also appoints an organisational deputy leader among those of its members that are elected by the party conference.[179] The national party conference is held annually.[180] The annual political and economic reports by the national executive are submitted to the party conference; and the accounts subject to approval by the conference.[181] An extra party conference can be enforced by two-thirds of the chairs of the local party organisations, by the leader or by the national executive.[182] On the whole, the organisational structure of DF, as codified in the formal party rules, does not deviate strongly from other parties. There is a clearly defined leadership and a hierarchical structure, but also formal checks and balances by which the grassroots levels can hold the leadership accountable. This is not the whole story, however. The party lacks a formalised system of internal committees and working groups, which in other parties are a channel for membership influence.[183] Thus, while the formal structure of *Dansk Folkeparti* is not devoid of membership influence, it comes across as quite centralised. This centralised tendency is even more pronounced in practice.[184]

In the formal party rules, there are two main centres of power: the national executive and the parliamentary party. In practice DF has been led by a group of three persons. From the formation of *Dansk Folkeparti* until 2012, Pia Kjærsgaard was the undisputed leader. Around her she had a leadership troika which,

beside her, consisted of political deputy party leader Peter Skaarup and the chair of the DF parliamentary party Kristian Thulesen Dahl.[185] The latter also held the important position as chair of the parliamentary finance committee during the period of cooperation with the *Venstre*-Conservative government between 2001 and 2011.

Of course, many responsibilities and decisions were delegated. There have been other important persons in the party, but it is no exaggeration that the Kjærsgaard-Dahl-Skaarup troika was in overall control. Between them, the three leading personalities had a semiformal division of labour which, with some simplification, was as follows: Kjærsgaard was the main link between the party and the public. She had a decisive say in all key strategic decisions, but tended to delegate more concrete policy matters. Dahl, who was more of a "grey eminence" than the outward-oriented Kjærsgaard, tended to assume responsibility for policy detail. He was the party's spokesperson on economics. Skaarup was responsible for other policy areas, notably immigration, but was also in charge of the party organisation, even if day-to-day decisions tended to be delegated. These three leading personalities had close personal ties, and their relations have been likened to a successful three-way marriage.[186]

Besides the centralised structure, the other main organisational characteristic of *Dansk Folkeparti* is the strict internal discipline. In order to avoid the often chaotic scenes at the national conferences of *Fremskridtspartiet*, the DF party rules strictly define the criteria for the appointment of conference delegates. The principle is that each local party unit can send one delegate for every ten registered party members, or fraction thereof, as of the end of the year before the conference. But the allocation of delegates to the local party units is decided by the national executive, which thus has control of how many delegates attend the conference. The "bussing in" of extra delegates is not possible in DF.[187] There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence of how the leadership ensures that the party conferences do not get out of hand, and punish delegates deemed to be out of order. One example is from 1999 when Peter Skaarup, discreetly but openly, reprimanded a delegate who had questioned a proposal from Pia Kjærsgaard that immigrants convicted of crime should not only be expelled themselves, but followed by their relatives.[188] A more recent example is the aforementioned expulsion of Merete Egebjerg Holm after statements about Muslims at the 2007 party conference.[189]

At least as important in the quest for internal discipline is the control of the members. From the outset *Dansk Folkeparti* has been determined to avoid the "oddball problem". The principle is that it should be difficult to get into the party, but easy to get out.[190] As such, the requirements for acceptance as a member of DF, as stated in the party rules, are quite basic. Prospective members must (1) be at least 14 years of age, (2) have Danish citizenship and (3) not be a member of another party. The rules also state, however, that membership applications are decided on by the local party organisations. Crucially, the national executive has the final say on all applications.[191] In practice this means that all membership applications are examined by the central party. This was

particularly important in the early years, where it was crucial to keep the old conflicts from *Fremskridtspartiet* out of the party. In this gatekeeping process Peter Skaarup's extensive personal knowledge of the FP party organisation was valuable. He is alleged to have scrutinised all membership applications, weeding out potentially problematical entry attempts. The handling of membership matters was later delegated, but the central party office continues to vet all entry applications.[192]

The other side of the restrictive membership regime is that once acquired, membership is easy to lose. There is very little tolerance of internal dissent, and criticism of the leadership can easily result in expulsion. There have been many examples of internal disquiet in *Dansk Folkeparti*, sometimes against a perceived lack of internal democracy, sometimes against the policies pursued by the party leadership. One case of disagreement which led to internal unrest was the events in September 2008, after the verdict of the European Court of Justice in the so-called Metock case. Denmark was not directly involved in the Metock case, but the verdict had a significant potential impact on Danish immigration policy. Essentially, the Metock verdict meant that free movement across borders in the EU takes precedence over national restrictions on family reunification. This invalidated some of the restrictions on family reunions introduced by the government together with DF.[193]

Dansk Folkeparti reacted with dismay to the Metock verdict. Not only was the court decision at odds with the party's immigration policies, it also interfered with decisions democratically taken by the Danish parliament. The government, however, did not want Denmark in conflict with the EU and sought to downplay the significance of the verdict. This led to growing tensions between DF and the government, and Pia Kjærsgaard spoke out against the verdict at the national party conference.[194] A few days after Kjærsgaard's speech, however, a deal was reached between DF and the government. It contained further tightening of immigration regulations, and a commitment to a close scrutiny of the consequences of the verdict. The crucial point, however, was that the deal confirmed the government's position – Denmark would follow EU law and obey the Metock verdict.[195]

This did not go down well among many DF members and activists. According to the newspaper *Politiken*, a majority of the local party chairs thought that the party should have stood firm, and demanded that the Metock verdict be ignored.[196] But the dissenters were soon silenced. Even though there was not much disagreement between the leadership and the rest of the party about the actual issue, the former had struck an important deal. A politically difficult situation, which threatened DF's position as government support party, had been resolved, and this could not be jeopardised by internal unrest. The critics were warned by the central party, and the dissent soon died down.[197]

There were no reports of expulsions in connection with the Metock controversy, but many DF members have lost their memberships after disagreements with the leadership. The party rules state that the national executive can, with a two-thirds majority decision, expel individuals, organisations and local party associations. The

expulsions take immediate effect, and cannot be appealed.[198] Exactly how many members have been expelled from *Dansk Folkeparti* is not known, but a list compiled by the newspaper *Politiken* contains a total of 61 expulsions between 1997 and 2010. The list is unlikely to be complete, but it contains some interesting information. Of the 61 dismissals listed, 26 were for disloyalty or dissent, and 21 for extremism, in terms of statements or membership of other organisations, such as Danish Front and Danish Forum (see above).[199]

Despite the centralised leadership structure and uncompromising attitude to internal criticism and deviating opinions, *Dansk Folkeparti* can claim a positive membership development, as shown in Table 7.3. Since the formation, membership has grown steadily, reaching 6,000 in 2000 and 10,000 in 2009. To be sure, the 2013 figure of 12,064, or 0.3 per cent of the electorate, is not huge in an international or national context. Nor is it unique in the Danish context. Indeed, as Bergman and Strøm have noted, party membership in Denmark has stood up relatively well since the 1990s, certainly compared to Norway and Sweden.[200] In 2012 the DF membership figure of 10,164 was only the fifth highest, behind *Venstre* (43,835), the Social Democrats (46,328), Socialist People's Party (15,633) and Conservative Party (12,225).[201] Still, the positive membership development is a source of satisfaction in DF, and even though it does not go against the trend in Denmark, it is notable in a broader comparative perspective.

The growth in membership may come across as somewhat surprising, given the de facto lack of membership influence, the somewhat suspicious approach to

Table 7.3 Membership statistics for *Dansk Folkeparti*, 1996–2013. Total number of registered members, and the DF membership as a percentage of the electorate

	Absolute number	*Proportion of electorate (%)*
1996	900	0.02
1997	1,733	0.04
1998	3,297	0.08
1999	3,496	0.09
2000	6,433	0.16
2001	6,204	0.16
2002	6,680	0.17
2003	6,703	0.17
2004	6,615	0.17
2005	7,337	0.18
2006	8,594	0.21
2007	8,356	0.21
2008	9,973	0.25
2009	10,178	0.25
2010	10,186	0.25
2011	10,230	0.25
2012	10,684	0.26
2013	12,064	0.30

Source: Danish People's Party, annual organisational report, 2013 (*Dansk Folkeparti* 2013).

prospective new members and the uncompromising attitude to internal critics. In interviews with leading DF officials, the Danish party researcher Karina Pedersen found that the party does not even pretend to have a high degree of membership influence. One of Pedersen's interviewees said that "the members should not believe that they can join, and change the party policy", while Pia Kjærsgaard made it clear that the political line of the party is decided by the parliamentary group.[202] In other words, the party's answer to the old dilemma of internal versus societal democracy is in the affirmative; the voters are more important than the members. This is not based on any belief that the members are unrepresentative of the party's voters – empirical studies suggest that this is indeed not the case – but on the principled argument that the parliamentary party is accountable to the voters rather than the party members.[203]

Still, *Dansk Folkeparti* sees other benefits from its members. They serve as ambassadors to the local community, they provide valuable free labour and they are a source of recruitment to public office.[204] These are considered as sufficient reasons for the party to encourage membership recruitment. The party has annual recruitment campaigns. The DF Internet site has a link to a membership application page, which appears everywhere on the site, and much of the printed propaganda material contains an application form. The party provides a number of social events for its members,[205] and training for its election candidates.[206] The central party bodies have a policy of quick responses to political questions from rank-and-file members to the parliamentary group.[207] Thus, while *Dansk Folkeparti* has a conscious policy of avoiding the potential disadvantages of membership, the advantages are considered significant enough to continue investing in membership recruitment.

In terms of leadership, it has already been noted that the situation in *Fremskridtspartiet* was unclear. Mogens Glistrup was regarded by himself and his supporters as the spiritual leader of the party, even though he only rarely and briefly held any formal position that could have motivated this claim. Several leadership positions circulated among other persons, an ambiguity that made it easy for Pia Kjærsgaard to quickly build up the power base from which she gradually became the de facto leader of the party. But, as we have seen, her status in FP was never completely unequivocal. A marginal drop in the party's number of parliamentary seats in 1994 was enough to undermine her position, and start the process that led to the split of FP and formation of *Dansk Folkeparti*.

Mogens Glistrup has become a legendary, almost mythical, figure in Danish history. His political style and personality traits should already be apparent from earlier parts of this chapter. Much like Anders Lange in Norway, Glistrup was a political catalyst. He inspired and initiated the mobilisation of a new political force, but he was not able to build on his early successes. Comparisons between Glistrup and Lange are difficult, partly due to the fact that Lange was 22 years older, and died a year and a half after his party had been formed, while Glistrup's political activity continued into the 2000s. Still, some interesting comparisons can be made. There were, to be sure, important differences. For one thing,

Glistrup had the higher educational qualifications, and was regarded as highly intelligent, not only among his followers. Contemporary or posthumous assessments of Lange rarely refer to exceptional intellectual capacity. Another difference was that Glistrup was largely unknown when he made his media breakthrough in 1971, while Lange already had a public reputation as a political maverick, at least dating back to the 1960s.

But there are also important similarities. They were both archetypical political entrepreneurs, who saw themselves as the embodiment of their respective parties. They realised and skilfully used the potential of TV, and they made effective use of a drastic rhetoric, with a dose of humour. They disliked traditional party organisations, and saw their parties as movements rather than a party in the conventional sense. This view was soon met with resistance, and led to internal disagreements, which they both found difficult to handle. Also in relation to other issues, Glistrup and Lange were inept at handling disagreements and maintaining internal cohesion. In terms of public appeal, they could arouse enthusiasm and amusement, but they lacked the ability to transform this appeal to stable levels of support. They were politically isolated and never came close to political influence, partly due to their unwillingness to seek compromise but also because they were not regarded as credible by other parties. Glistrup and Lange could, therefore, be regarded as political catalysts, who emerged when the ground was fertile but were unable to build on the initial success.

The comparison with Lange can also serve as a summary of Glistrup's main political and personal traits. He was in many ways a very gifted man, but lacked some of the key qualities that make a successful politician. He was unwilling to compromise, within his party as well as in general. His frequent disagreements with party colleagues, and his conscious policy of not building up a formalised decision-making structure, led to a lack of organisational efficiency. His inability to build up lasting alliances inside the party was a major factor behind his declining importance, and left Pia Kjærsgaard with an open field when she started to build up her own power base. His all-or-nothing approach to politics entrenched his party's political isolation.

Glistrup had his admirers, but even at his peak his appeal could hardly be described as broad. According to data from the 1973 Danish election study, 17.8 per cent of respondents ranked Glistrup as the first, second or third "most sympathetic" of 10 party leaders. Well over half, 58.2 per cent, put him in the bottom 3 places. His average ranking, 7.14, was the lowest of all 10 leaders.[208] Comparable data from later years do not exist, but there is nothing to suggest that his popularity rose after 1973. His confrontational and populist style proved less effective when the novelty had worn off. Glistrup's decline was gradual, but the jail sentence in 1983 was a decisive blow. It detached him from politics for one and a half years, and it speeded up Pia Kjærsgaard's entry into parliament, which in turn further undermined his position. The ill-judged decision in 1990 to form a breakaway party and stand in an election in alliance with a populist left party was the final nail in his political coffin, but he was by then already a spent force.

In many ways, Pia Kjærsgaard is the mirror image of Glistrup. Her formal

education is comparatively modest, and she is not to the same extent as Glistrup regarded as intellectually brilliant. As DF leader she nevertheless displayed a number of key qualities that Glistrup lacked. Following the framework of Gunnar Sjöblom, Kjærsgaard's significance to the success of *Dansk Folkeparti* can be divided into three political arenas: the internal, the parliamentary and the electoral.[209]

Internally, Kjærsgaard built up an efficient party organisation, in stark contrast to the chaos in *Fremskridtspartiet*. The key organisational characteristics of DF, and the differences to FP, have already been discussed, but could be summarised as undisputed leadership, a clear decision-making structure and strict internal discipline. This has been at the expense of internal democracy and it is not too much of an exaggeration to describe the organisational culture of DF as authoritarian. But there are rational reasons for this – the turmoil in FP had to be avoided. Kjærsgaard cannot claim sole responsibility for the organisational stability of DF. The "hands-on" work was, largely, delegated. But she was aware of the potential problems when DF was formed, and she made sure that her organisational ideas were implemented. Key in this process was her selection of suitable close collaborators. The "troika" of Kjærsgaard, Dahl and Skaarup proved highly effective, internally as well as in other arenas.

In the parliamentary arena, Kjærsgaard took *Dansk Folkeparti* to a position of legitimacy and influence unimaginable when during its early years. Key to this achievement was Kjærsgaard's parliamentary experience – she had been a member of the *Folketing* for almost 12 years when DF was formed. She is regarded by many as a populist, but she belies this epithet in one key aspect – she understood, respected and aptly used the parliamentary process. She was sometimes drastic in her rhetoric, but testimony from political negotiations speaks of a serious and well-prepared politician. She tended not to be on top of every technicality – when needed, she could rely on Dahl – but few have accused her of incompetence. Not least important, she was regarded as trustworthy.[210] Key to the ten-year period of parliamentary cooperation between DF and the *Venstre*-Conservative government was mutual trust. Kjærsgaard and her small leadership group were regarded as reliable, not only in themselves, but also in the sense that their firm grip of the party meant that there would be no back-bench revolts against any deal struck with DF.[211] As a newly formed party, DF did have credibility problems. Its economic policy proposals, for example, did not add up according to external calculations.[212] But the person mainly responsible for those proposals, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, learnt his trade and since the beginning of the 2000s, opponents' criticism against DF has not focused on incompetence or lack of economic realism. In short, Kjærsgaard and DF were able to build up a reputation as a serious political force, with which constructive dialogue and cooperation was possible.

In the electoral arena, Kjærsgaard was regarded as one of her party's main assets. She featured prominently on DF campaign material, and was an experienced media performer. She did not use humour to the same extent as Glistrup. Rather, her political style is that of the indignant "ordinary" citizen. Her public

or media appearances often contained outbursts against immigration, political opponents and "political correctness". An example is a TV debate from November 2010, when she was asked about an earlier statement in which she suggested a ban against satellite dishes in immigration "ghettos". In response Kjærsgaard said that the satellite dishes are "awful" (*grimme*), and that they give the users access to over 400 Arabic TV channels, which she saw as a problem.[213] This type of rhetoric is more reminiscent of the populist outsider than someone aiming to become a unifying national leader, and could serve as an example of the style that, despite her many successes, continued to make Kjærsgaard a divisive political figure.

This divisiveness is borne out by survey evidence. Kjærsgaard had a very strong position among her admirers, but her appeal did not stretch far beyond that of her party. According to Danish Election Studies data, the average sympathy rating of Kjærsgaard, on a scale from 0 to 10, was well below the midpoint 5 in the three elections between 1998 and 2005. Her rating did go up continuously, from 3.04 in 1998, via 3.36 in 2001 to 3.92 in 2005 – but in the first and last of those years, her rating was the lowest of all party leaders.[214] Opinion polls, taken in more recent years, reinforced this impression. Kjærsgaard's popularity ratings are not consistently low; they vary over time, and depending on pollster and the construction of the question, but she tends not to be among the more popular leaders.[215] This is not only explained by the size of her party. Leaders of smaller parties than DF, such as Johanne Schmidt-Nielsen of the far-left Unity List, have in various polls exceeded Kjærsgaard's popularity.

This said, there is no doubt that Kjærsgaard had a very strong appeal in certain parts of the electorate. Research from the Danish Election Studies team suggests that Kjærsgaard is a vote-winner for DF. Of course, party leader effects are very difficult to separate from other factors, such as ideology and issues, but all the available evidence suggests that voting for DF is closely linked to positive views on Pia Kjærsgaard. In particular, this appears to have been the case in 2001, the election that led to the political breakthrough for DF. It has even been said that the 2001 election was a vote for or against Pia Kjærsgaard.[216] The situation in more recent elections is not as well documented by research. It is possible that Kjærsgaard was less of an asset to the party in the comparatively unsuccessful election in 2011, but it may be difficult to separate the impact of Kjærsgaard as a person from issue effects. The negative reaction to DF's position on the early retirement pay scheme, discussed earlier, may have affected the popularity of the party as well as Kjærsgaard personally.

On 7 August 2012, Pia Kjærsgaard announced that she was to stand down from the leadership at the DF annual conference, scheduled for the following month. She had then been party leader for almost 17 years; a long, if not unique, tenure in post-war Danish politics. It was most recently matched by Gert Petersen, leader of the Socialist People's Party between 1974 and 1991. From 2005, she had also been Denmark's longest-serving incumbent party leader. Kjærsgaard did not announce her full retirement from politics. She said that she would stay as a member of the *Folketing*, and take the newly created post as DF

spokesperson on "values". Her future role in the party was not clear, but it is likely that she will, for some time, remain an influential figure.

As she announced her retirement, Kjærsgaard nominated Kristian Thulesen Dahl as her successor. Dahl has worked closely alongside Kjærsgaard as long as the party has existed, and was not a surprising choice. Born in 1969, he has a university degree in Business Administration and Commercial Law,[217] and was first elected to the *Folketing* for *Fremskridtspartiet* in 1994. Dahl's importance for *Dansk Folkeparti* has already been discussed. From his position as chair (since 2011 deputy chair) of the parliamentary finance committee he is the party's chief negotiator, and played a crucial part in the cooperation with the *Venstre*-Conservative government between 2001 and 2011.

Conclusion

As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, *Dansk Folkeparti* is one of the most successful extreme right parties in Western Europe. The internal supply-side factors that explain this success will now be summarised. The ideology of the party has been shown to be markedly different from that of the predecessor *Fremskridtspartiet*. Elements of the tax revolt and criticism of the public sector did remain in the early years of DF, but diminished in the 2000s. This development has been gradual, and cannot be simply regarded as responses to shifts in public opinion. Rather, there is much to suggest that DF has, since its formation, gradually but consistently carved out its own ideological platform, a development which appears to have been completed with the adoption of the Principles manifesto from 2002, which is intended to remain permanent.

The ideology of the contemporary *Dansk Folkeparti* contains significant elements of welfare chauvinism; a combination of pro-welfare and anti-immigration values. Going back to the differing classifications of DF cited in the beginning of this chapter, the evidence presented is very much in concurrence with Ivaldi and Rydgren, who see DF as part of a more radical variant of the extreme right. The "neo-liberal" epithet may have had some substance in the early years of the party, but is not supported by more recent developments. The ideological contrast between *Dansk Folkeparti* of the 2000s and *Fremskridtspartiet* is clear.

The radicalism of *Dansk Folkeparti* should not be overstated. There is no evidence of racism in the manifestos, and the party has clamped down on those who have taken the immigration criticism too far. As we have seen, membership of openly racist organisations, or anti-immigration statements deemed as too extreme by the DF leadership, can lead to expulsion. The overall impression is nevertheless one of a radical anti-immigration party. *Dansk Folkeparti* presents economic as well as social and cultural reasons for being opposed to immigration, but the underlying argument is axiomatic – "Denmark is not a country of immigration, and never has been".[218] Furthermore, the party's nationalism has limited, but clear, elements of ethnicity. Integration is not impossible, but seen as very difficult, and the burden of proof rests with the immigrant. Another indication of radicalism is the emphasis *Dansk Folkeparti* puts on immigration.

To be sure, DF is not a single-issue anti-immigration party. The Working manifestos cover a wide range of policy areas, and DF did have influence in areas other than immigration during the ten years as government support party. The best example is probably the "old-age cheque" from 2003. But immigration has top priority, as is evident from the manifestos, where immigration not only has its own section, but is also woven into a number of other policy areas.

The efficiency and discipline in *Dansk Folkeparti* contrasts starkly to the chaos, sometimes verging on anarchy, in *Fremskridtspartiet*. This is, as we have seen, the result of a conscious strategy, based on the experiences from FP. As was shown above, citing Karina Pedersen's research, DF does not purport to be internally democratic. Without too much of an exaggeration, the purpose of the membership organisation is to contribute to the quest for votes. What is particularly notable is that leading party representatives state this quite openly. This is in contrast to many other parties, and could be taken as indicative of a distinctive party culture, where members are seen as important but from a distinctly vote-maximising perspective. It should in this context be pointed out that Danish parties are not legally required to be internally democratic. Despite the rather patronising perspective on the rank-and-file members, the DF membership development has been positive, which suggests that lack of internal democracy is not necessarily an obstacle to membership recruitment.

In terms of leadership, it should be obvious from the above that Pia Kjærsgaard was very important for the party during her nearly 17 years in charge. Her media technique is heavily based on indignation, sometimes verging on anger. This is probably not a recipe that would work everywhere, and she is by no means universally liked. She does, however, have a distinctive appeal, and is revered among those who agree with her politically. Kjærsgaard's contribution has also been internal. She has a very developed sense of strategy, and has proved an apt judge of the public mood. She was also instrumental in building up the party organisation, and her choice of close collaborators has been astute. Whether her, apparently unilateral, choice of Kristian Thulesen Dahl as her successor is equally apt remains to be seen.

Notes

1 See, for example, Kitschelt 1997, Ch. 4; Ignazi 2003, Ch. 8; Svåsand 1998; Andersen and Bjørklund 2000.
2 Bjørklund and Andersen 2002.
3 In line with Simonsen 2007, the abbreviation FP will be used for *Fremskridtspartiet*. This will hopefully avoid confusion with the Norwegian *Fremskrittspartiet*/FrP.
4 The title of Chapter 4 in Kitschelt 1997 is: "Scandinavia: A Milder Version Of the New Radical Right".
5 Carter 2005: 50f.; Norris 2005: 66.
6 Citation taken from Hainsworth 2008: 18.
7 Rydgren 2004: 475f.
8 Bjørklund 2008: 150, 153, 157.
9 On TV he was presented as *landsretsagfører* (High Court defence lawyer). He had also been a lecturer in Law at the University of Copenhagen, and had his own law firm.

10 The interview is extensively reported, albeit not in every detail, by Nielsen 2000: 25–27. It is also available on the Internet (www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDfjsoCqzv4, accessed 16 April 2014). According to Nielsen 2000: 25, the interview lasted 1 minute 52 seconds, i.e. 112 seconds. The duration given by other sources is similar; see, for example, Arter 1992: 362 (112 seconds); Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 30 (114 seconds) and Arter 2008: 102 (118 seconds). The YouTube clip on the Internet, however, has a duration of 2 minutes and 54 seconds, and fragments appear to be left out at the beginning as well as the end.
11 The interviewer, Orson Nielsen, had obviously realised that he was on to a scoop, and the best effect would be achieved if Glistrup was allowed to speak freely. Nielsen even tried to help Glistrup along, leading him on to some of his controversial views. It was, in fact, a coincidence that the interview took the turn it did. Initially, a less controversial interview had been held and recorded. Afterwards, in the canteen, Glistrup began to express his more controversial ideas. One of the TV journalists said that he would never dare to repeat those views on the screen, Glistrup took the bait, and the interview just described was recorded. The chain of events is described in Nielsen 2000: 19–27.
12 See Table 4.7 in Chapter 4; see also Damgaard 1990: 16.
13 Nielsen 2000: 71f.
14 Glistrup, or the issue of tax, are not mentioned in Ole Riis's report on the 1971 election (Riis 1972).
15 Nielsen 2000: 71–74.
16 Nielsen 2000: 75ff
17 In Finnish: *Kansallinen edistyspuolue*.
18 In Icelandic: *Framsóknarflokkurinn*.
19 Ekman and Poohl 2010: 43f. This party is, however, linked to what later became the Sweden Democrats (see Chapter 8).
20 Nielsen 2000: 81. The price is given by Nielsen as 800 *kroner*, at the time roughly 130 USD or 50 GBP. The already existing *Fremskridtspartiet* was the remains of an attempt to form a pensioners' party (Arter 2008: 102).
21 Nielsen 2000: 83f.
22 Borre 1974: 203f.
23 Borre 1974; Nielsen 2000: 89–95; Wickmann 1977: 14f. Four of the seats were taken by smaller parties, which had formed an alliance with *Fremskridtspartiet*. Within a year, these four representatives had left for various reasons.
24 Arter 2008, Ch. 5; Pedersen 1988: 257. The expression used in Danish is *jordskredsvalg*, which translates as "landslide election".
25 The party made a brief return to parliament in 1973–1974, due to an electoral alliance with *Fremskridtspartiet* (see note 23).
26 Worre 1987: 15.
27 Petersen and Elklit 1973.
28 Riis 1972: 252; Karvonen 1994: 125f.
29 Borre 1974: 199f. An in-depth analysis of the 1973 election is provided by Pedersen 1988.
30 Calculations based on Wickmann 1977: 32, Table 17 (table reproduced from Worre 1976).
31 Nielsen 2000: 154, 160.
32 Nielsen 2000: 164.
33 Nielsen 2000: 12f.
34 Nielsen 2000: 15.
35 Nielsen 2000: 196.
36 Andersen 1992: 204 (note 2).
37 Ringsmose 2003: 54–59; Nielsen 2000: 205ff. His new party was called *Trivselspartiet*, translated by the Danish scholar Jørgen Goul Andersen as The Party Of

Well-Being (Bjørklund and Andersen 2000: 197). Possible alternative translations could be Party of Snugness, or Comfy Party. It stood in the 1990 election in an alliance together with the populist left *Fælles Kurs* (Common Course), receiving 1.8 per cent of the vote.

38 Nielsen 2000: 208f.; Ringsmose 2003: 59ff.
39 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 33–38.
40 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 44ff.
41 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 68f.
42 Bille 1997: 106f.
43 Ringsmose 2003: 19; Bille 1997: 107. In Danish the hardliners were often referred to as *strammere*, and the pragmatists as *slappere*. The Danish scholar Jorgen Goul Andersen translates the words into English as "tighteners" and "slackeners", respectively (Bjørklund and Andersen 2000: 201).
44 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 66f.
45 Ringsmose 2003. In Danish: *Kedeligt har det i hvert fald ikke været*.
46 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 63.
47 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 41. It has been referred to as the "Rio Bravo deal", after the restaurant where FP parliamentarian Helge Dohrmann was eating when he was called to a decisive meeting with the government representatives. The deal was about child benefits; in exchange FP negotiated income tax modifications.
48 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 105; Ringsmose 2003: 45f.
49 Bjørklund and Andersen 2002: 127 call the concessions "rather small".
50 For example, legislation to fill a loophole in tax legislation, in the summer of 1990 (Ringsmose 2003: 54). Glistrup opposed the deal, and the ensuing conflict led to him forming *Trivselspartiet* (see note 37).
51 Bjørklund and Andersen 2002: 127.
52 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 127; *Fremskridtspartiet* 1994b.
53 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 128.
54 Thomsen 1995; Bjørklund and Andersen 2002: 127f.
55 Ringsmose 2003: 65ff.
56 For a brief but succinct summary of the organisational disagreements, see Bille 1997: 106ff.
57 Ringsmose 2003: 98f.; Bille 1997: 198; Sommer and Aagaard 2003, Ch. 13. According to Sommer and Aagaard (2003: 148), Kjærsgaard made the decision to leave FP on the morning after the end of the party conference.
58 Bjørklund and Andersen 2000: 200; Elklit 1999: 141.
59 For example, he suggested that Muslims (Glistrup preferred the word *muhamedaner*) who had not left Denmark within three months should be auctioned (Nielsen 2000: 233).
60 One, Tom Behnke, joined the Conservative Party in 2001. The other three left politics after the end of the election period.
61 In October 2013, the party appeared to still run an Internet website (www.frp.dk).
62 Elklit 1999; Bjørklund and Andersen 2002: 127f.
63 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 195. The word used by Rasmussen was *stuerene*, which literally translates as "house-trained". The full quote was: *Uanset hvor mange anstrengelse man gør, sa, set med mine øjne, stuerene bliver I aldrig* ("No matter how much you try, in my view, you will never be house-trained"). For a video recording of the statement, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=JvXKRGlJz50 (accessed 16 April 2014).
64 Qvortrup 2002.
65 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 219. It is, perhaps, worth pointing out that the word *dronning* (queen) in Danish has no hidden meaning or negative undertones.
66 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 226ff.; Svane 2009: 99ff.; Bille 1999. After serving as DF representative in the EU parliament for two periods, Camre retired from frontline politics in 2009.

67 In Danish, this centrist party is named *Radikale Venstre*, often referred to as just *Radikale*. Its own preferred English translation is the Social Liberal Party (www.radikale.dk), but it has also been referred to as Radical Liberals in English language literature, e.g. Andersen 2003.
68 The concept of valence was introduced in Stokes 1963; for a more recent contribution see Green 2007.
69 Rystrøm 2002: 11.
70 Andersen 2003.
71 Bille 2002a: 19; Bille 2002b.
72 Bille 2003: 931f.
73 "Facitliste for de første 150 dage" (List of results from the first 150 days) *Berlingske Tidende* 21 April 2002 (p. 3). The Council for Ethnic Equality (*Nævnet for Etnisk Ligestilling*) was an advisory unit on matters of ethnicity and discrimination. Its functions were moved to the Centre for Human Rights (Bille 2002c).
74 The figure 45 is a conservative estimate. The DF Internet site contains a page which lists agreements reached between DF and other parties. The list, which explicitly is stated not to be complete, contains a total of 44 agreements between 2002 and 2011. Not all budget deals are included; nor is an agreement about immigration from March 2010, which is listed on a different page, titled *politiske udspil* (political initiatives) – the latter is included in the number 45. Ten of the 45 agreements are primarily about immigration or related issues, but several others contained elements of immigration or related issues in some way. Some of the deals involve more parties than DF and the government parties (www.danskfolkeparti.dk/Aftaler_og_forlig.asp; click on to *vis arkiv*; accessed 29 October 2013).
75 A de facto refugee is a foreign citizen who is not a refugee according to any existing convention, but who is not sent back to the country of origin because s/he is deemed to be in danger of persecution, or other forms of maltreatment. For an analysis of the concept, and its abolition in Denmark, see Kjaer 2003.
76 Bille 2002c.
77 The word "seemingly" could, perhaps, be considered as superfluous in this context, but is used in recognition of the fact that negotiations often follow complicated patterns, which are difficult to reconstruct.
78 The proposals and reforms are summarised by Bille 2002c, and in *Ministeriet for Flygtninge* 2002.
79 Examples of press quotes: "Full fart bakåt" (Full speed reverse), *Dagens Nyheter* 12 April 2002; "Danmark ger igen med råge på all kritik" (Denmark hits back hard at criticism), *Dagens Nyheter* 22 May 2002; "Pia K: Sverige mangler en som mig" (Pia K: Sweden lacks someone like me), *Politiken* 26 May 2002.
80 Bille 2004.
81 *Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration,* 2004.
82 Andersen 2004: 169f.
83 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 6 (introductory note of the 2009 *Arbejdsprogram*).
84 Kosiara-Pedersen 2008.
85 "Dokumentation: Aftalen mellem regeringen og Dansk Folkeparti" (Documentation: The agreement between the government and the Danish People's Party), *Politiken* 15 March 2010 http://politiken.dk/politik/politikfakta/article924741.ece (accessed 16 April 2014).
86 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2010.
87 "Nu afskaffes pointsystemt for udlændinge" (Points system for foreigners to be abolished), www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik/2012/05/08/0508105607.htm (accessed 16 April 2014).
88 The retirement pay scheme, in Danish called *efterløn*, allows full or partial retirement for up to 5 years before reaching the statutory pension age of 65.

89 "Dansk Folkeparti får tre stramninger i betaling for efterløn" (Danish People's Party gets three [immigration] restrictions in exchange for retirement pay), *Politiken* 10 May 2011 http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/ECE1278452/dansk-folkeparti-faar-tre-stramninger-i-betaling-for-efterloen/ (accessed 11 May 2011); "Dansk Folkeparti: Grense-loyalitet skal bevises" (Danish People's Party: Border checks loyalty must be proved), *Information* 30 August 2011.

90 In a media interview election researcher Rune Stubager from Aarhus University suggested that DF lost votes to the Social Democrats because of the retirement pay issue ("Valgforsker: DF er lige så skyldig som K i Løkkes nederlag" (Election researcher: DF as guilty as Conservatives in Løkke defeat), *Politiken* 19 September 2011 http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/ECE1398156/valgforsker-df-er-lige-saa-skyldig-som-k-i-loekkes-nederlag/, accessed 27 June 2012). In a pre-election party leader debate on TV channel DR1, a member of the audience asked Pia Kjærsgaard why DF had broken a promise by "selling" retirement pay for something as "trivial" as increased border controls (*Hvorfor har I begået løftebrud, og solgt efterlønnen for noget så ligeyldigt som øget grænsekontrol?*). www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Temaer/2011/Valg/2011/09/13/195233.htm (accessed 27 June 2012).

91 Svane 2009: 50ff. In Danish: *ældrecheck*.

92 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 159f. It is also sometimes referred to as the "Ten-point programme" (*tipunktsprogrammet*). A possible version of the programme has been found on the Internet, but in a forum posting hostile to DF. The authenticity cannot be verified; http://dindebat.dk/kultur-samfund/31461-df-er-racister.html (accessed 29 October 2013).

93 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 6 (introductory note of the 2009 *Arbejdsprogram*).

94 In the introductory note of the 2009 *Arbejdsprogram*, the 1997 manifesto is referred to as the party's first proper Working manifesto (*Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 6).

95 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 6. Compare the Principles manifestos of the Norwegian FrP, discussed in the previous chapter, which are subject to regular review and amendment.

96 Andersen 1992: 197ff.

97 Sommer and Aaagaard 2003: 160.

98 *Dansk Folkeparti* 1997: 21f. In original: "Dansk Folkeparti ønsker det samlede skattetryk nedsat væsentligt"; "Hovedprincippet for beskatning bør efter Dansk Folkepartis opfattelse være, att skatterne nedsættes kraftigt kombineret med offentlige besparelser…".

99 *Dansk Folkeparti* 1997: 21. In original: "Skattepolitiken skal ændres markant. Dette er nødvendigt, såfremt det i det danske samfund skal kunne betale sig at arbejde"; "…medført en meget stor 'sort' ekonomi".

100 *Dansk Folkeparti* 1997: 22. In original: "Indkomstskatten nedsættes kraftigt, idet Dansk Folkeparti ønsker et højt skattefrit bundavdrag. Herudover betales en realskat på 30 pct. på al overskydende indkomst".

101 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2001: 17. In original: "en gradvis nedsættelse af skattetrykket".

102 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2001: 18. In original: "Dansk Folkeparti er imod skattelettelser som forringer grundlæggende velfærdsområder som ældreforsorg, folkepension, sundhetsvæsen, uddanelse, forskning og bekæmpelse af kriminalitet, men mener ikke, at sådanne forringelser automatisk følger af rationaliseringer".

103 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2001: 17. In original: "Det er derfor uden mening at tale om at sænke skatterne, uden at det samtidig gøres klart, hvilke offendligt udgifter, man vil begrænse eller hvilken konjunkturpåvirkning man ønsker at opnå".

104 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2001: 18. In original: "Det er først og fremmest behov for at lette skattebyrden for de små arbejdsinkomster".

105 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 137f.

106 *Dansk Folkeparti* 1997: 24. In original: "Derfor skall en lang række opgaver privatiseres og udliciteres".

107 *Dansk Folkeparti* 1997: 23. In original: "Dansk Folkeparti finder, det offentlige skal angive kravene til forskellige ydelser til landets borgere, men at det private med fordel kan stå for driften af fx. institutionerne"; "Det skal understreges, at det offentlige stadig skal stå for betalingen til eksempelvis pleje- og sygehussektoern".
108 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2001: 6. In original: "Den offentlige sektors voldsomme vækst rammer direkte det enkelte menneskes frihed…".
109 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 8. In original: "Den offentlige sektor har en tendens til altid at vokse sig større – men det er ikke nødvendigvis et udtryk for, at også servicen bliver bedre".
110 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2002. In original: "Pleje og omsorg af ældre og handicappede er en offentlig opgave … Sundhedspleje og sygehusvæsen skal være på højeste niveau og som udgangspunkt være offentligt og finansieret over skatterne".
111 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 51. In original: "Dansk Folkeparti ser med skepsis på resultaterne af udliciteringen af ældreplejen".
112 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 124. In original:

> Vi ser med skepsis på salg til private af offentligt ejede virksomheder, som udgør vigtige dele af landets infrastruktur. Hvis udenlandske kapitalinteresser har den dominerende ejendomsret til jernbanenet, post og telenet, lufthavne, naturgasnet og elværker, kan det have negative virkninger på regeringens og Folketingets muligheder for at styre udviklingen af infrastrukturen.

113 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 19. In original: "…Forudsætningen for at kunne opretholde velfærdsstaten er, at samfundet fortsat bærer præg af en høj grad af solidaritet og sammenhængskraft".
114 Andersen 1992: 197.
115 Andersen 1992: 198. The quote about rats is taken from Svane 2009: 163.
116 Nielsen 2000: 180f.; Jørgensen 2006: 133.
117 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 50, 54; Madsen 2004: 19ff., 39. Madsen shows how the frequency of immigration-related articles in the leading newspapers increased markedly in 1985.
118 Sommer and Aagaard 2003, Ch. 5. Jørgensen 2006: 129 mentions a question to the minister for labour, about unemployment among foreigners, tabled by Kjærsgaard in July 1984.
119 Nielsen 2000: 184f.
120 *Fremskridtspartiet* 1989, 1994a: 24f.; Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 51.
121 *Dansk Folkeparti* 1997: 5. In original: "Danmark er ikke, og her aldrig været, et invandrerland, og Dansk Folkeparti vender sig imod, at Danmark udvilker sig til et multi-etnisk samfund".
122 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2002: iv. In original: "Danmark er ikke et indvandrerland og har aldrig været det. Vi vil derfor ikke acceptere en multi-etnisk forvandling af landet".
123 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 24 (twice), 38, 76 (three times), 106.
124 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 22. In original: "indvandrernes ofte højere fødselshyppighed, kan inden for de nærmeste årtier få vidtrækkende, ødelæggende virkninger ikke blot for Danmarks befolkningssammensætning, men for hele samfundsstrukturen og sammenhængskraften". The wording "often higher nativity" (*ofte højere fødselshyppighed*) was a softening from the 2001 manifesto, p. 78, where it read "very high nativity" (*meget høje fødelshyppighed*).
125 The only reference to race in the 2009 manifesto is in the context of racial persecution in other countries, which DF regards as a possible reason for refugee status (*Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 23). This statement also appears in the 1997 and 2001 manifestos. None of the manifestos contain the word "white" (*hvid*) anywhere; nor has it been found in other party documents.

126 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2002: iii. In original: "Landet bygger på den danske kulturarv, og dansk kultur skal derfor bevares og styrkes[.] Kulturen består af summen af det danske folks historie, erfaringer, tro, sprog og sædvane".
127 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2002: iii. In original: "Kulturen består af summen af det danske folks historie, erfaringer, tro, sprog og sædvane".
128 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 113. In original:

> Et multikulturelt samfund er et samfund uden indre sammenhæng og sammenhold, og derfor er denne verdens multikulturelle samfund præget af mangel på solidaritet og ofte tillige af åben konflikt. Der er intet grundlag for at antage, at Danmark kan undgå at komme til at dele skæbne med andre multikulturelle samfund, hvis vi lader fremmede kulturer få afgørende indflydelse.

129 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2002: iv. In original: "Udlændinge skal kunne optages i det danske samfund, men kun under forudsætning af, at dette ikke sætter tryghed og folkestyre på spil".
130 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 23. In original:

> Dansk Folkeparti skelner mellem flygtninge og indvandrere. Efter vores opfattelse defineres flygtninge som udlændinge, der kan anerkendes som flygtninge efter FN's flygtningekonvention og som principielt skal rejse hjem, når den trussel, de er flygtet fra, ikke længere er til stede. Indvandrere definerer vi som udlændinge, der ikke er flygtninge eller familiesammenførte til flygtninge, men er kommet til Danmark for at arbejde eller er blevet gift med en dansker, og som vil leve deres liv her på danskernes betingelser.

131 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 258. In original: "Alle Vestens lande er infiltrert af muslimer, og nogle taler pænt til os, mens de venter på at blive nok til at få os fjernet". In the earlier version it had allegedly said "slå os ihjel" (kill us) instead of "få os fjernet" (get rid of us).
132 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 259. In original: "Det drejer sig om at drive denne onskabens ideologi ud af den vestlige civilisation".
133 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 259.
134 Danish Penal Code, Chapter 266b (*Straffeloven*, *paragraf* 266b).
135 The fined DF representative was regional politician Michael Rex, who had referred to Islam as a terrorist organisation (www.humanisme.dk/hate-speech/michael_rex.php, accessed 16 April 2014).
136 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 259. The European Parliament denied a police request to have Camre's immunity lifted.
137 Flink 2011, Ch. 4.
138 "Pia Kjærsgaard anmeldes for racisme" (Pia Kjærsgaard reported for racism), www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik/2006/09/28/081042.htm (accessed 1 July 2012).
139 "DF vil omskrive racismeparagraf" (DF wants to rewrite racism law). *Berlingske Tidende* 3 August 2010 www.b.dk/politik/df-vil-omskrive-racismeparagraf (accessed 1 July 2012).
140 According to news reports Holm was offered the opportunity to resign her membership before expulsion proceedings were initiated: http://nyhederne.tv2.dk/article.php/id-8653203:merethe-egeberg-holm-forlader-df.html (accessed 2 July 2012).
141 "Ekskluderede og udmeldte medlemmer af Dansk Folkeparti", *Politiken* 19 February 2010 http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/ECE905928/ekskluderede-og-udmeldte-medlemmer-af-dansk-folkeparti/ (accessed 2 July 2012). On the expulsion of members with Danish Forum connections, see Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 261ff. Danish Forum was closed down in the early 2000s. Danish Front was dissolved in 2007 (former website via http://web.archive.org/web/20050403081438/www.danskfront.dk/links.asp, accessed 16 April 2014).

142 Andersen 1999: 9f quotes Glistrup as saying in Danish: "Vi vil ikke have de luksusflygtninge ind i landet. De yngler som rotter". See also note 115.
143 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 260.
144 Svane 2009: 164. In Danish: "ja, havde man da bare sagt kaniner".
145 According to Svane (2009: 164), the headline read: "Pia Kjærsgaard om fremmedarbejderne: DE YNGLER SOM KANINER" (Pia Kjærsgaard about the guest workers: They breed like rabbits). The source *Ekstra Bladet* is also given in Nielsen 2000: 199, who specifies the date as 6 December 1990. Other sources differ. According to the writer Rune Engelberth Larsen, Kjærsgaard is alleged to have made the statement (he quotes it as "de fremmede formerer sig som kaniner") at a meeting in Odense, and the source is given as the newspaper *Politiken* 15 October 1994 (www.humanisme.dk/engelbreth09/e090615.php, accessed 16 April 2014). Other sources attributing the rabbits statement to Kjærsgaard include www.information.dk/196637 and www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/artikel/179476:Debat–Fundamentalister-og-folkefjender (both accessed 16 April 2014).
146 Compare Mudde 2000: 187.
147 For more on *Nouvelle Droite*, see, for example, Minkenberg 1997 and Bar-On 2007.
148 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 264ff.
149 Rydgren 2004.
150 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2012.
151 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 63f.
152 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 161; Svane 2009: 70f., 89.
153 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2002: iii, 2009: 33f.
154 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 12.
155 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2002: i, 2009: 11.
156 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2002: ii, 2009: 16f.
157 Langballe's son Christian, also a Church of Denmark minister, was elected to the *Folketing* in 2011.
158 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2002: v. In original: "Familien er kernen i det danske samfund"; "Det nære bånd mellem ægtefæller, børn og forældre er bærende for landet og af stor betydning for landets fremtid".
159 *Dansk Folkeparti 2009*: 120. In original: "Danskere har i generationer kæmpet for at give homoseksuelle plads og anerkendelse i samfundet på linje med heteroseksuelle. Dansk Folkeparti ønsker dog ingen positiv særbehandling af homoseksuelle".
160 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 120. In original: "Dansk Folkeparti går fuldt ind for homoseksuelles rettigheder, men vi går også ind for familieværdier med udgangspunkt i kernefamilien".
161 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 120. In original: "Dansk Folkeparti har som udgangspunkt, at man ikke lovgivningsmæssigt skal støtte op om alternative familiemønstre, selvom vi anerkender, at disse kan være lige så kærlige og trygge familier som den traditionelle kernefamilie".
162 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2009: 120. In original: "Dansk Folkeparti går heller ikke ind for homoseksuelle pars ret til kunstig insemination eller adoption".
163 "Homovielser vedtaget: Sådan stemte de" (Gay marriages carried: How they voted) www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2012/06/07/161205.htm (accessed 7 June 2012).
164 "Målløs DF-ordfører: V og K svigter familieværdierne" (Speechless DF spokesperson: Liberals and Conservatives betray family values) www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik/2012/06/07/072223.htm (accessed 7 June 2012). Henriksen's quote in original: "Jeg er målløs over den enorme værdiløshed der hersker i de borgerlige partier. V og K svigter grundlæggende familieværdier".
165 Andersen and Bjørklund 2000: 202f.
166 "DF'ere ønsker ren v-regering" (DF representatives want a single-party Liberal government) *Jyllands-Posten* 30 August 2011 www.jyllands-posten.dk/protected/premium/indland/ECE4569911/df-ere-oensker-ren-v-regering/ (accessed 16 April 2014).

167 Compare Mudde 2007: 20–23.
168 Mudde 2000: 180ff.
169 "Kjærsgaard gav SD sitt stöd i Höganäs", *Dagens Nyheter* 12 September 2010.
170 Bille 1997: 386.
171 Bille 1997: 106ff.
172 Bille 1997: 314f.
173 Kjærsgaard 1998: 172.
174 Ringsmose 2003: 98; in her autobiography, Kjærsgaard claims that the opposite took place, i.e. that her opponents were given free bus transport to the conference (Kjærsgaard 1998: 172).
175 Bille 1997: 258.
176 *Landsbytosser* is the Danish equivalent of the expression "village idiot" (literally "rural town idiot").
177 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2006, Ch. 4. The formal title of the party leader in Danish is *formand*.
178 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2006, Chaps. 4 and 5. The national executive is called *Hovedbestyrelse* in Danish. The five positions elected by the party conference have a duration of two years. Two and three of these positions, respectively, are up for re-election in alternate years.
179 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2006, Ch. 5.
180 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2006, Chaps. 3 and 4. In Danish, the party conference is called *årsmøde*.
181 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2006, Ch. 4.
182 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2006, Ch. 3.
183 Pedersen 2002: 57.
184 Pedersen 2006: 18.
185 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 273, 287; Simonsen 2007: 6.
186 Svane 2009: 89f.; Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 185.
187 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2006, Ch. 10.
188 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 176f.
189 See note 140.
190 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 261.
191 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2006, Ch. 2. In original: "For at blive medlem af Dansk Folkeparti skal man være fyldt 14 år, være dansk statsborger, og ikke være medlem af eller tilsluttet noget andet politisk parti. Lokalforeningsbestyrelsen kan nægte optagelse af et medlem. Lokalforeningsbestyrelsens afgørelse skal forelægges hovedbestyrelsen til godkendelse".
192 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 179f.
193 For analyses of the verdict, see, for example, Costello 2009 and Lansbergen 2009.
194 Svane 2009: 156f.
195 Svane 2009: 150–157.
196 "DF-bagland skoser partiledelsen" (Local level in DF defy party leadership), *Berlingske Tidende* 24 September 2008 www.b.dk/politik/df-bagland-skoser-partiledelsen (accessed 16 April 2014).
197 "Dansk Folkeparti kvæler EU-oprør" (DF stifles EU revolt), *Politiken* 26 September 2008 http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/ECE573163/dansk-folkeparti-kvaeler-eu-oproer/ (accessed 3 September 2012).
198 *Dansk Folkeparti* 2006, Ch. 10. Expulsions could be appealed in *Fremskridtspartiet*.
199 "Ekskluderede og udmeldte medlemmer af Dansk Folkeparti" (Membership expulsions and resignations in Dansk Folkeparti), *Politiken* 19 February 2010 http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/ECE905928/ekskluderede-og-udmeldte-medlemmer-af-dansk-folkeparti/ (accessed 2 July 2012). For six of the members reported as expelled, the article gives no reason. The list also contains 23 DF members who left the party of their own accord.

200 Bergman and Strøm 2011: 384; Damgaard 2011: 71f. In the longer term, going back to the 1960s, Denmark fits the global pattern of significant decline.
201 *Folketingets Oplysning* 2013.
202 Pedersen 2002: 57.
203 Pedersen 2002: 58, 2006: 15.
204 Pedersen 2002: 59, 2006: 18.
205 Pedersen 2002: 57, 2006: 12.
206 Pedersen 2002: 59, 2006: 17.
207 Pedersen 2002: 58, 2006: 17.
208 Author's computations from 1973 Danish Election Study data. Glistrup's spread of rankings was: first – third most sympathetic 17.8 per cent; fourth – seventh most sympathetic 24 per cent; eighth most sympathetic – least sympathetic (i.e. rank 10) 58.2 per cent. The second lowest average ranking was for Morten Lange of the Socialist People's Party (7.06), followed by the Conservative Erik Ninn-Hansen (6.27).
209 Compare Sjöblom 1968.
210 Svane 2009: 83f; Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 255f.
211 According to Sommer and Aagaard (2003: 252ff.), Kjærsgaard, Dahl and Skaarup enjoyed a solid reputation as trustworthy, while agreements reached with other DF representatives were less reliable, as they could be corrected by the top leadership.
212 Sommer and Aagaard 2003: 165, 196.
213 www.youtube.com/watch?v=PsdAEhAIwDo (accessed 27 August 2012). The background was an interview in a newspaper, where Kjærsgaard proposed the blocking of some Arabic TV channels, and that satellite dishes should be banned from certain housing estates. "Pia K. vil forbyde paraboler i Vollsmose" (Pia K. wants to ban satellite dishes in Vollsmose) http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/ECE1097569/pia-kjaersgaard-vil-forbyde-paraboler-i-vollsmose/ (accessed 28 August 2012); "Pia K. vil blokere arabisk TV" (Pia K. wants to block Arabic TV), *Berlingske Tidende* 20 October 2010 www.b.dk/politik/pia-k.-vil-blokere-arabisk-tv (accessed 28 August 2012).
214 Andersen and Borre 2008: 292 (Table 14.1). In 2001, one party leader had a lower average than Kjærsgaard, namely Frank Aaen of the far-left Unity List, with an average of 2.92 (Andersen and Borre 2007: 366, Table 22.1).
215 See, for example, a graph of party leader ratings between February 2009 and August 2012, based on YouGov Internet polls (http://research.yougov.dk/nyhed/politisk-barometer-august-2012/, accessed 16 April 2014). See also "Vestager og Johanne har gjort den bedste figure", *Berlingske Tidende* 14 September 2011 www.b.dk/politiko/vestager-og-johanne-har-gjort-den-bedste-figur (accessed 16 April 2014). The latter poll was by Gallup; respondents were asked a number of questions about how the party leaders had performed in the 2011 election campaign. Kjærsgaard scored high on charisma, but low on trustworthiness.
216 Andersen and Borre 2007: 369f., 2008: 294. The statement about the 2001 election being a vote for or against Kjærsgaard is from Andersen and Borre 2007: 369.
217 In Danish referred to as: *candidatus/candidata mercaturæ et juris*; often abbreviated Cand.merc.(jur.).
218 See notes 121 and 122.

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8 Sweden

From Wachtmeister to Åkesson

The last bastion

For many years Sweden was universally regarded as a case of extreme right failure. A creation called *Ny Demokrati* (New Democracy; NyD) did enter parliament in 1991 amid much publicity, but disappeared after one election period. The sudden and spectacular collapse of NyD seemed to confirm the image – and self-image – of Sweden as immune to the extreme right appeal. In September 2010, however, the picture changed with the breakthrough of *Sverigedemokraterna* (Sweden Democrats, SD). The SD result of 5.7 per cent, and 26 out of 349 parliamentary seats, should not be blown out of proportion – it was considerably below the support levels of *Fremskrittspartiet* and *Dansk Folkeparti*, and it was to be comfortably surpassed by *Perussuomalaiset* in Finland seven months later. Still, the 2010 election result sent shockwaves around Sweden, and was also noted internationally.

Sweden's position, until recently, as a 'blank space' for the extreme right has meant that it has received relatively limited attention in the academic literature. The main exceptions emanate from the Swedish sociologist Jens Rydgren.[1] The bulk of Rydgren's work was published before the breakthrough of SD, and his analysis is hence focused on explanations for the extreme right failure. This does not as such have to be a problem. For one thing, it was at the time accurate to classify Sweden as a case of extreme right failure, and there was little to suggest that the void was about to be filled. In addition, of course, failures are as useful as success cases when it comes to understanding political phenomena. The relevance of Rydgren's analysis is not as such invalidated by the growth of SD. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that the developments since Rydgren's work was published warrant further analysis.

Rydgren's classification of Sweden as a negative case was not presented in categorical or deterministic terms. He did not claim that Sweden was immune to the extreme right appeal. On the contrary he noted several factors, such as popular xenophobia, distrust in the political establishment and declining levels of party identification, which could play into the hands of an extreme right party. Indeed, Rydgren did not rule out the possibility of SD gaining momentum in the future. He did, however, argue that the party was facing a number of difficult

obstacles, notably its own compromising origins and background. These problems led Rydgren to suggest that, while an SD breakthrough could not be ruled out, it could just as well be a different party that would capitalise on the available niche in the Swedish party system.[2]

Briefly summarised, Rydgren found four main reasons for the extreme right failure in Sweden. First, traditional class loyalties have proved resilient. Second, there had been a high level of salience for the socio-economic, but low salience for the sociocultural, conflict dimension. Third, the salience for the immigration issue had been low. Fourth, there had been a relatively low degree of left-right convergence between the Social Democratic and Moderate parties.[3] Of these explanatory factors, the first three could be classified as belonging to the demand-side, while the fourth belongs to the external supply-side. Rydgren is by no means oblivious to the relevance of internal supply-side factors. Such factors are part of his theoretical framework, as well as his empirical discussion of *Ny Demokrati* and *Sverigedemokraterna*. Still, his concluding arguments have tended to focus more heavily on demand- and external supply-side factors.

As we now know, *Sverigedemokraterna* defied the expectations of Rydgren, and many others. Towards the end of the 2010–2014 parliamentary term, everything suggests that the party has established itself as a permanent fixture in the Swedish party system. The main argument in this chapter, which is in line with the book as a whole, is that internal supply-side factors are indispensable if we are to understand the initial success and eventual failure of *Ny Demokrati*, as well as the initial failure and eventual success of *Sverigedemokraterna*. In fact, there is much to suggest that *Ny Demokrati* could have established itself on a more permanent basis if it had been better led and organised, which in turn would have drastically reduced the possibility of eventual success for *Sverigedemokraterna*.

With Rydgren as the main exception, the Swedish extreme right has been given relatively little attention in the literature. Often, Sweden has tended to be treated almost in passing in comparative pieces on the Nordic countries, with most attention given to the more successful cases of Denmark and Norway.[4] The *Ny Demokrati* interlude was too brief to leave more than a handful of scholarly traces,[5] and the recent rise of *Sverigedemokraterna* has not yet resulted in major analyses, although this can be expected to change in the future. Those who did pay attention to SD before its breakthrough tended to suggest that it was too radical, of too compromising origins and too badly organised, to make a full breakthrough.

An example of this approach is Elisabeth Carter, who includes *Sverigedemokraterna* in her broad comparative analysis of European extreme right parties, but does not subject the party to much individual discussion. Carter classifies SD as a "Neo-liberal xenophobic party",[6] and goes on to categorise it as weakly organised, poorly led and divided, traits which in her comparative analysis are found not to be conducive to electoral success.[7] These classifications are not substantiated and, as should be apparent from the below, at least in part questionable. The American scholar David Art devotes more specific attention to

SD.[8] His book was published after the 2010 electoral breakthrough, but his account is based on research conducted prior to the election and he explicitly classifies the party as a failure. His criterion for success is that a party has received more than 5 per cent of the vote in three successive elections, which means that the categorisation of SD as unsuccessful would not have been affected by the 2010 election result.[9]

It is undeniable that *Sverigedemokraterna* is still small in a comparative context, but it is becoming increasingly questionable to treat Sweden as a case of extreme right failure. As will be shown below, opinion polls taken after the 2010 election suggest that it is highly unlikely that SD will lose its parliamentary status in the next election. Predictions are always risky, but it is entirely possible that the party will, after the 2014 and 2018 elections, have met Art's criterion of success. Above all, despite its hitherto limited size, the parliamentary situation after the 2010 election means that SD holds the balance of power between the two main blocs, which gives it the potential to destabilise the political system. The road to direct political influence is likely to be long, but already the entry into parliament represents a remarkable development for a party which for many years was regarded as too extreme to have any chance of electoral success. The transformation of SD into an electable force will be a key part of this chapter. First, however, the *Ny Demokrati* interlude needs to be accounted for.

The count and the servant

In the summer of 1990, the theme park and record company owner Bert Karlsson was asked by the weekly magazine *Hänt i Veckan* to select his dream government. Karlsson put together a rather eclectic list of celebrities and politicians from different parties, but he could not think of a prime minister. A friend had seen a count and industrialist named Ian Wachtmeister on a TV chat show, and liked his amusing but hard-hitting attacks on the establishment. Karlsson's friend suggested Wachtmeister as prime minister in Karlsson's dream team, and the thus completed government was presented in *Hänt i Veckan*.[10] A flattered Wachtmeister contacted Karlsson, and on 20 November the two met in a cafeteria at Arlanda Airport. The meeting resulted in a draft party programme, which was published in the leading broadsheet *Dagens Nyheter* on 25 November. Two days later the pair appeared on TV, and a snap opinion poll suggested that 23 per cent would consider voting for a party started by Bert Karlsson. The name *Ny Demokrati* was launched on 1 December, and on 4 February 1991 the constitutive party congress was held.[11]

Ny Demokrati was very much a two-man product. Although Wachtmeister was party leader, de facto from an early stage and *de jure* somewhat later,[12] NyD was widely regarded as having dual leadership. In order to understand the rise and fall of the party, therefore, some familiarity with the founding fathers is helpful. Bert Karlsson (1945–) comes from a working-class background, but soon earned a reputation as an innovative and unorthodox businessman. In 1972 he started the light music record label *Mariann*. Karlsson had marketing as well

as talent-spotting skills, and his artists frequently appeared in the Eurovision Song Contest. He also pursued other business interests, and in 1984 opened a theme park called *Sommarland*, which for a number of years was a huge success.[13]

Ian Wachtmeister (1932–) is member of a family which has had nobility status since the seventeenth century. He grew up on the family manor, and went to one of Sweden's few boarding schools. After an abortive career as a mining engineer he went into business, in 1978 advancing to managing director of the production company *Gränges Aluminium*. After six years, however, he was dismissed and although he did not abandon business, turned increasingly towards lobbyism and opinion formation. He wrote books where he mocked the political establishment and he made a series of media appearances.[14]

By the early 1990s, both Karlsson and Wachtmeister were well-known personalities in their own right, although the former was probably better known to the broader public. They were an unlikely combination. Karlsson was very much a "man of the people", while Wachtmeister did little to hide his upper-class roots. Wachtmeister's almost parodic eloquence, posh idiom and smart suits contrasted starkly to Karlsson's regional accent and more basic dress code. Yet they did have important things in common. They shared a dislike of traditional politics, they both believed that society would benefit from being run according to business principles, they were unafraid of controversy, they were prone to drastic rhetoric and they knew how to get a message across. Initially "the count and the servant" was a highly effective combination.

The political message of *Ny Demokrati* was dominated by right-wing economics. The party argued for lower taxes, a smaller public sector and deregulation. This was mixed with populist demands, such as the abolition of traffic wardens, lower restaurant prices and "more fun". Criticism against immigration was also part of the message, although it was not initially a prioritised issue. All was wrapped into a package of anti-establishment rhetoric. Opinion polls in the spring of 1991 suggested that NyD had support levels of 9 per cent or higher, and it quite soon became clear that the party would be a force to be reckoned with in the election scheduled for September. Karlsson, Wachtmeister and their supporters embarked on an election campaign, which has become legendary. They toured the country, constantly attracting large crowds, including many without any previous interest in politics.

A campaign song was produced through Karlsson's music connections, a cartoon of a male smiling face became the party symbol and the campaign meetings were full of gimmicks, at times verging on buffoonery. A very effective ploy was the use of empty bottle crates, which were piled up, and then moved around, to illustrate arguments about the economy. The mockery of the established parties, especially the impersonations of other politicians, went down well with the public. The party could not quite stay at the levels of support from the spring, but with 6.7 per cent of the vote, *Ny Demokrati* qualified for 26 seats in the *Riksdag*.

The 1991 election resulted in an unclear majority situation. Just as would be the case for *Sverigedemokraterna* 19 years later, NyD ended up in a pivotal

position between the two established political blocs. In the vote of investiture NyD abstained, thereby passively supporting the formation of a four-party centre-right minority coalition led by the Moderate (conservative) Party. Relations between NyD and the government were uneasy, however. This especially applied to the Liberal Party (*Folkpartiet Liberalerna*), whose leader Bengt Westerberg had strongly criticised NyD during the campaign and (in)famously left the TV studio on election night when Karlsson and Wachtmeister entered.

Initially NyD refrained from voting against the government, but it had no direct policymaking influence. A potential opportunity to participate in decision-making appeared in the autumn of 1992, when the Swedish currency, the *krona*, was subject to intense speculation attacks. Severe austerity measures were deemed to be necessary in order to defend the *krona*, and the government needed to find support for what would have to be unpopular proposals. NyD, however, was never seriously considered as a participant. The government as well as the opposition felt that broad political consensus was required to appease the financial markets, and two far-reaching austerity package deals were agreed between the government and the Social Democrats (SAP). The rescue attempts failed, however, and since November 1992 the *krona* has been floating freely.[15]

After the currency crisis SAP returned to an all-out opposition strategy, and further cross-bloc deals were out of the question. This could have given *Ny Demokrati* a new chance, but the party never became fully accepted by the government. NyD was involved in a number of ad hoc deals, where it occasionally had some influence on the detail, but there were no major or longer-term agreements. The party did try to use its blackmail power to put pressure on the government, but backed down when faced with the threat of dissolution and a new election.[16]

Disagreements grew within NyD, not least between Wachtmeister and Karlsson. The latter wanted the party to make full use of its blackmail potential, even if it meant unseating the government. Many years later, Karlsson still regretted that this opportunity was not taken.[17] Wachtmeister, on the other hand, did not want to be responsible for a Social Democratic return to power. As Rydgren puts it, for Wachtmeister populism was a strategic means to a political end, which in essence consisted of economic deregulation and tax cuts coupled with a tighter immigration policy. For Karlsson, populism was a goal in its own right. He wanted the party to remain independent of both political blocs, and a thorn in the side of the establishment, for reasons of principle rather than strategy.[18] Karlsson also began to feel that Wachtmeister took his hard-hitting market liberalism too far, and accused him of lacking empathy with those less fortunate than himself. Another problem for Karlsson was Wachtmeister's leadership style, which he found arrogant and dictatorial. In short, "the count and the servant" found it increasingly difficult to cooperate.[19]

The party organisation also caused problems. Having grown out of nothing, and entered parliament less than a year after the initial steps towards a party had been taken, *Ny Demokrati* had no organisational base. The selection of parliamentary candidates had been rushed, and a number of unsuitable personalities

who had slipped through the net caused the party internal difficulties and public embarrassment. The "oddball problem", which often afflicts anti-establishment parties, soon made its presence felt. The parliamentary party suffered from defections and growing indiscipline.[20]

The problems were at least as serious at the local level. Since parliamentary, regional and local elections in Sweden are held at the same date, *Ny Demokrati*'s national breakthrough more or less by default resulted in a great number of local and regional council seats, often in places where the party had no local organisation, or even candidates. This led to several council seats being left vacant, but it also meant that NyD found itself with a disparate collection of local and regional councillors, many of whom proved highly unsuitable.

Wachtmeister saw the problems, and he dealt with them in the way he was used to as a business leader. There were several expulsions, and leadership control was tightened by organisational reforms in 1992 and 1993. The latter reform was especially very controversial. It completely abolished the local organisational level, and made the party an exclusively national organisation. Local parties were made to sign franchise contracts, which gave them the right to use the party name. The central leadership could unilaterally cancel the contract if it felt that a local party had broken it.[21]

This kind of "franchise party" model was not completely original. It is, for example, used in Canadian parties, where it is regarded as a method to make subnational party levels more autonomous of the leadership.[22] In NyD, however, it was used to tighten central control, and it proved highly unpopular. It led to an internal revolt, and there were attempts to form a breakaway party. Wachtmeister became increasingly frustrated. In early 1994, when Karlsson publicly repeated his preference of a more independent stance towards the government, the party leader had had enough. On 5 February, live on TV and without prior warning, Wachtmeister announced that he would resign the leadership at the party congress in April.[23]

Although the trend in opinion poll ratings had been negative in 1993 and early 1994, *Ny Demokrati* was still above the 4 per cent representational threshold at the time of Wachtmeister's resignation announcement. In March, however, it slipped to 3.4 per cent in the authoritative SIFO poll. It was the first time that NyD had been below 4 per cent in a SIFO poll, and the party never recovered.[24] The internal situation did not help. Wachtmeister did not step down with immediate effect, but the process to select his successor started more or less at once. Different names were touted, and in April the relatively unknown member of parliament Harriet Colliander was appointed leader. Colliander commanded some respect in other parties, and there were initial hopes that her appointment would stabilise the party.

Any such hopes were soon dashed. In May Colliander and five other NyD members of parliament were persuaded by the government to support the introduction of supplementary childcare allowances. Bert Karlsson, who opposed the bill, started a process to unseat Colliander. At an extra party congress in early June, Colliander was replaced by Vivianne Franzén, whose selection was

challenged legally and the party's assets were seized. After a chaotic summer, Franzén was confirmed as leader at another party congress in August. By that time, however, the party was in irreversible decline. It had been subject to much negative publicity in the preceding months, and was no longer regarded as credible, even by those who agreed with its policies. The demise was confirmed by the election result of 1.2 per cent.

Ny Demokrati continued for some years, but it was a spent force. It was declared bankrupt in 2000,[25] but the party name continued to appear from time to time, and it is difficult to set the exact date when NyD ceased to exist. Bert Karlsson left politics in 1994. His business interests had suffered from the political involvement, but he gradually recovered, and is still actively involved in the light entertainment scene. Wachtmeister tried a number of different new projects. For the 1998 election he launched *Det Nya Partiet* (DNP, The New Party), whose message closely resembled the NyD mix of market liberalism and immigration scepticism. The party got 0.5 per cent of the votes, and then disappeared. In hindsight, it seems clear that Wachtmeister's chance went when he resigned the NyD leadership. He has never again played the same role in the political debate as he did during, and just before, his time in NyD. His resignation in 1994 signalled the end of his time in the limelight. It was also the death knell of *Ny Demokrati*.

Sverigedemokraterna

In a book commemorating the party's twentieth anniversary, *Sverigedemokraterna* describes the party formation as follows:

> On Saturday 6 February [1988], some 20 persons met in a flat in Stockholm. The aim was to form a political party. The party structure, policies and name were discussed. Of the suggested party names, *Svenska Fosterlandspartiet* can be mentioned. In the end, the name was agreed as *Sverigedemokraterna*, and it was also agreed that the party could now be regarded as constituted.[26]

This is, at best, a simplified account of how the party came into existence. There may well have been a meeting somewhere in Stockholm on the stated date, possibly along the lines described, although this also has been questioned.[27] But irrespective of what did or did not occur on 6 February 1988, the launch of *Sverigedemokraterna* had a more complex background. The party emerged from a long and complex chain of events, whose beginning can be traced almost 10, at a stretch even 20, years before the alleged meeting in the winter of 1988.

Sverigedemokraterna grew out of the remains of *Sverigepartiet* (Sweden Party; SvP) which had been formed in late 1986 as a merger between *Framstegspartiet* (Progress Party) and *Bevara Sverige Svenskt* (Keep Sweden Swedish, BSS).[28] *Framstegspartiet* had originally been formed in 1968.[29] It started as a continuation of previous attempts to promote more cooperation among the established centre-right "bourgeois" parties,[30] but relatively soon turned into a

populist protest party. After a failed attempt to participate in the 1970 election, *Framstegspartiet* disintegrated into a number of small local parties without much coordination. It appears to have been some of those local parties, primarily from the Stockholm area, that participated in the formation of *Sverigepartiet*.[31] BSS had been formed in 1979. It was an anti-immigration campaign group rather than a political party, and its publications contained racist cartoons and articles defending the apartheid regime in South Africa. The membership of BSS has been estimated at fewer than 1,000, but its propaganda dissemination was quite effective.[32] The slogan *Bevara Sverige Svenskt* became widely known, and was still used by SD in the late 1990s.[33]

Sverigepartiet appeared to have some initial momentum. The party ran community radio broadcasts, it arranged a series of anti-immigration rallies and it leafleted extensively, primarily in Stockholm. There were counterdemonstrations, but they generated publicity and SvP leader Stefan Herrmann was interviewed on TV. The counterdemonstrations intensified, however. Despite police presence violent confrontations could not always be prevented. The resilience of several party activists weakened. The marriage between BSS and *Framstegspartiet* proved uneasy, internal tension grew and SvP split into several groups.[34]

In early 1988 it appears that at least three factions laid claim to the name *Sverigepartiet*. It was one of those factions, largely consisting of former BSS members, which decided to change its name to *Sverigedemokraterna*.[35] Although *Sverigedemokraterna* has undergone many changes since its formation, today's party is the same as the one formed in early 1988. As shown by the quote at the beginning of this section SD is quite open about this, even though it tends to play down significant parts of the context, such as the links to BSS. Indeed, there are a number of features in the party history which are hardly conducive to a broad electoral appeal.

First, there were links to Nazism. In its early years, *Sverigedemokraterna* counted a number of fascist/Nazi veterans among its members and supporters. Some had been members of the Swedish parties from the 1930s and 1940s, discussed in Chapter 5 (where the following party abbreviations are explained). Perhaps the most prominent example was Gustaf Ekström (1907–1995), who was the SD internal auditor (*revisor*) in 1989 and 1990.[36] Ekström had been a member of Birger Furugård's SNSP, and joined Sven Olov Lindholm's NSAP, later SSS, when SNSP split in 1933. He served as a Waffen SS volunteer in the Second World War, and in a TV interview made in 1993 he appears unrepentant about his political and military past.[37]

Other examples included Erik Walles (1903–1991), who was a passive member of SD in the final years of his life. An academic with postgraduate qualifications, Walles had been a prominent member of NSAP/SSS. In a text published in the SD periodical *Sverigekuriren* in 1989, Walles distanced himself from the anti-Semitism of NSAP/SSS, but argued that SD and his former party had other important things in common, such as the desire to rescue the Swedish nation.[38] The party also published older material with Nazi connections, such as a posthumous article by Gunnar Prawitz (1898–1971), who had been involved in

NSAP/SSS. The article was titled "Swedish and un-Swedish", and appeared in an internal periodical circulated to SD members in 1989.[39] A somewhat younger and more actively involved veteran was Gösta Bergquist (1927–), who had been a member of the NSAP/SSS youth organisation in the 1940s. He had had links with BSS, and joined SD shortly after its formation.[40] Sven Davidson (1931–2005) had been active in Per Engdahl's fascist-oriented *Nysvenska Rörelsen*. Davidson played a leading role in BSS; he was deputy leader of SvP and was for a number of periods a member of the SD national executive, for the last time in 1993.[41]

There were also links with a fairly extensive range of contemporaneous Nazi or white power groups. The first "proper" leader of *Sverigedemokraterna*, Anders Klarström, had previously been involved in *Nordiska Rikspartiet*, an openly neo-Nazi and Hitler-admiring party.[42] According to Ekman and Poohl over one in three SD election candidates in 1994 were, or had been, linked to Nazi or white power groups.[43] The relations between such groups and SD varied locally. According to a study of western Sweden in the 1990s there were places where personal links between SD and the militant racist scene were close, and included dual memberships.[44]

A second compromising feature was the prevalence of people with criminal records in the SD ranks. Even Anders Klarström had received a suspended sentence in 1985 for vandalism, theft and illegal threats.[45] During the party's first election campaign in 1988, an SD activist and local election candidate in Malmö was convicted of assault against a 14-year-old immigrant.[46] According to a study by Stieg Larsson and Mikael Ekman published in 2001, there was a high frequency of members of the SD national executive (*Partistyrelse*) with criminal convictions during the party's early years. The exact percentages varied, but were over 40 per cent in 1991, 1992 and 1994, and over 50 per cent in 1993. There was a significant drop between 1994 and 1995, and the proportions then stayed at a lower level, but they remained above 10 per cent until 1998, where the data series ends. The SD election candidates with criminal convictions varied between 16.5 and 38.5 per cent in the elections of 1991, 1994 and 1998.[47]

Third, *Sverigedemokraterna*'s public meetings were often marred with violence.[48] The party blamed this on provocations from militant counterdemonstrators, but also on a plethora of militant racists, skinheads and/or Nazis, who supported SD. They were often drunk, they wore more or less imaginative uniforms and insignia and they indulged in Nazi-inspired chants and gestures. The party's version was that these so-called Hollywood Nazis usually were not members of SD, but attended the meetings as "hangers-on".[49] Still, the fact that a number of restrictions on the members' dress code and behaviour were introduced by SD in 1995 suggested that the problem was not entirely an external matter. The new regulations included bans on uniforms and "non-Nordic" insignia, a requirement that chants had to be approved by the party leadership, and a ban on alcohol.[50]

The situation in the first half of the 1990s is illustrated in an autobiographical account by a former white power activist. The book is not primarily about SD, but rather a powerful story of a young man's attempt to deal with a troubled

past. It is based on his own memories, as told to a therapist. Still, it gives some interesting information about SD in its early years. The author tells of how he by chance received a leaflet from *Sverigedemokraterna*, and contacted the party some time later. He was invited to a party meeting, attended by a mixture of middle-aged men and youngsters, the latter mostly with shaved heads and bomber jackets. The impression of the audience given in the book is that it was split into small groups which had little to do with each other. The author was then recruited into a small group of violent youths. He never became a formal member of SD, but he and his friends attended party meetings and spread the party message in the form of posters and stickers. For the most part, however, the group lived its own life independently of the party. The author describes how he participated in unprovoked attacks against immigrants. He also tells how the party started to change after a few years. A new leadership took the party into a different direction, and the author and his companions no longer felt welcome. They left SD and moved on to a Nazi organisation.[51]

Of course, as is often the case with autobiographies, question marks can be raised against the authenticity of the account. The author does not provide much detail about his involvement with SD, but what he does say corresponds with what we know from other sources about the party in its early years. SD was never, as such, a Nazi party. Rather, it contained a fairly disparate collection of groups and individuals, some without Nazi links, some with a Nazi past and some with simultaneous connections to Nazism and/or militant racism. The respective proportions are difficult to assess, but it was a mix that led to difficulties. The more moderate elements in the party realised that it would never get anywhere unless the most compromising features were tidied away. It is nevertheless worth noting that the more "normal" parts of SD for some years seemed able to coexist with the more extremist and militant elements. In more recent years, attempts have been made by SD representatives to play down the issue. The SD veteran Johan Rinderheim, for example, claims in the twentieth anniversary book that the party in 1988 counted around 280 members, 2 of whom were skinheads.[52] Other available information about Nazi connections and criminal records, cited above, suggests that the situation may have been somewhat more complex.

Also the first SD leader Anders Klarström had a problematical background, although it seems that the most compromising skeletons in his closet belonged to the past, before he became SD leader.[53] But it was only after Klarström had been succeeded by Mikael Jansson in 1995 that serious steps were taken to clean up the party image, with the ban on uniforms, alcohol and Nazi chants. It was at this stage that the author of the aforementioned autobiography states that he and his friends no longer felt welcome in the party. The change from Klarström to Jansson was acrimonious. Klarström was accused of financial irregularities, and there were disagreements about the political and organisational strategy, but purely personal rivalries also seem to have been a factor. According to a source quoted by Larsson and Ekman, Klarström left the 1995 party conference well before it was concluded.[54]

In many ways, Mikael Jansson was what *Sverigedemokraterna* needed. He was presentable, had a clean personal background and his only previous political affiliation had been with the Centre Party. On the other hand Jansson appears to have been a somewhat uninspiring party leader. He was not a particularly good speaker, and his public profile was very low. The party did make some electoral gains during Jansson's leadership, but progress was slow. In 1991, SD had gained two local council seats, the first in the party's history. In 1994 the number of council representatives increased to five, and in 1998 to eight. The party remained small and, despite the dissociation with the most compromising elements in the mid-1990s, it was still internally split.

Nevertheless a number of the foundations for future success were laid during Jansson's time as leader. First, as mentioned, the party got rid of a number of unsavoury individuals, and clamped down on compromising practices. In was also under Jansson's leadership that SD started to explicitly distance itself from the Nazi ideology. In the SD manifesto from 1999, Nazism is regarded as a "mirror image of Marxism", with its "führer principle, race superiority and attack wars".[55] In February 2000 Jansson denounced the Nazi ideology in the party's membership bulletin. The attack was, however, wrapped into criticism of the political establishment, which Jansson claimed has stigmatised all critics of immigration. It can also be seen in the context of a number of violent attacks, including murder, committed by Nazis in 1999, which led to media coverage in which SD's Nazi connections were exposed. It could, therefore, be argued that Jansson had tactical motivations behind the article.[56] It was, nevertheless, an important step in the development into what several years later would become an electable political force. Larsson and Ekman call it a "trend break".[57]

Second, a number of new members, who would play a central part in the development from a fringe party into parliamentary status, entered the party. The most important were Jimmie Åkesson, Mattias Karlsson, Björn Söder and Richard Jomshof. All four were students at Lund University, and they formed close personal and political ties with each other.[58] They will be returned to later. Third, the party split. In April 2001 two members of the SD national executive were unseated and subsequently expelled, and in August the expellees were joined by a group of defectors to form the breakaway *Nationaldemokraterna* (National Democrats; ND).[59] It was not the first split in the party's history, but it was a key event in the development towards electability.[60] Again, personal rivalries seem to have been a key factor in the rift, but it was more or less immediately clear that ND was more radical than SD.[61] A divide soon became apparent, where ND could be described as ethnically nationalist, while SD was more oriented towards cultural nationalism. This divide was not completely clear-cut – as we will see it would be another ten years before SD abandoned all references to ethnicity in its key ideological documents – but the difference in emphasis was clear.

Nationaldemokraterna could in no way match SD in terms of organisational size or electoral support, but gained a handful of local council seats. Its main stronghold was the city of Södertälje, which has several large immigrant

communities. The defections into ND had negative as well as positive consequences for SD. In the shorter term it was a loss for the party organisation, as it meant that SD lost some of its most committed activists. At the same time, however, many of these activists tended to be very radical, and their presence had been a liability in the quest for a broadened electoral appeal.[62] Another step towards respectability came in 2002 when Sten Andersson, a member of parliament for the Moderate Party, announced that he was joining SD. Andersson had not held any important posts in, or for, the Moderate Party, but he brought nearly 20 years of parliamentary experience into SD. He never took a leading position in SD either, but played an important role for the party on Malmö city council, until his death in 2010.[63] The 2002 election was a small but important step forwards for SD. The party more than trebled its number of votes from 1998, and the local council representation rose to over 50 seats.

The internal splits did not disappear, however. In 2005 they came to the head again, when Mikael Jansson was unseated as party leader. It seems as if Jansson, although not personally associated with the more compromising aspects of the party's past, was supported by a more traditionalist faction, while others wanted to speed up the modernisation process. One source of disagreement was campaigning. The modernisers believed that modern campaign techniques, via the Internet and the media, are more efficient than traditional labour-intensive techniques, such as leafleting and public meetings. The modernisers were also in general dissatisfied with Jansson's leadership style, which was described as "introvert". The divide was also to an extent geographical. Jansson was supported by branches in and near Stockholm, sometimes referred to as the "bunker faction", in reference to the party's headquarters, which for security reasons were located in the basement of a tenement building. The new leader Jimmie Åkesson had his main support base in southern Sweden, where the party was stronger in terms of electoral support as well as membership.[64]

Born in 1979, Åkesson was ten days short of his twenty-sixth birthday when he assumed the leadership. Under Åkesson the modernisation process was intensified, and it slowly started to bear electoral fruit. External events played into the party's hands, although the party also showed aptitude in making the most of the situation. The "Cartoons Affair" in Denmark (mentioned in Chapter 8), which first broke in the autumn of 2005, also led to an intense debate in Sweden. There were those who argued that the Danish newspaper *Jyllandsposten* had shown unnecessary disrespect when it published the drawings of the Prophet Muhammad, and that the Danish government's response to the criticism had been insensitive. Others argued that the threats and attacks on Denmark and Danish interests had very worrying implications for freedom of speech. Unsurprisingly *Sverigedemokraterna* was of the latter view. On 10 January 2006 the SD periodical *SD-Kuriren* issued on its Internet home page an invitation to make drawings of the Prophet Muhammad. Such a drawing was published on the same home page on 3 February.

This led to an international reaction. The Swedish embassy in Jordan received warnings. The Swedish foreign minister, the Social Democrat Laila Freivalds,

condemned the publication, and pleaded with SD to remove the drawing. This gave SD media attention on an issue that suited the party's agenda, and Jimmie Åkesson appeared in a brief radio discussion with Freivalds on 9 February.[65] A few days later the home pages of *Sverigedemokraterna* as well as *SD-Kuriren* were closed down. The decision to do so was taken by the Internet company Levonline, which hosted the SD websites. It soon transpired that Levonline had taken its decision after being contacted by the Swedish Security Service as well as the Swedish foreign ministry. Freivalds first denied any involvement, but when an inquiry, initiated after SD had filed a complaint to the Chancellor of Justice, showed that the foreign ministry official who had contacted Levonline had done so after consultation with Freivalds she resigned, on 21 March. Thus, SD had not only received much welcome media attention, the party had also, more or less directly, forced the resignation of a senior government minister.[66]

In 2006 the party received 2.9 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary election. The SD representation in local councils drastically increased, especially in the strongholds in southern Sweden. Just as had been the case for *Ny Demokrati*, this was a somewhat mixed blessing, as SD did not have the organisational depth to cope with all the 282 local council seats it gained in 2006. Some seats were left vacant, there were resignations, expulsions and defections, and there have been media reports suggesting that some of the elected SD councillors were not up to the task.[67]

On the other hand, the increased local representation provided a good training ground for the party's more able elements. The local and regional representation in 2006 also made SD eligible for publicly funded and salaried, politically appointed posts in some council organisations – one such post had in fact already been secured in 2002.[68] In addition, the party qualified for representation in functional council committees and courts of law.[69] On top of all this SD was able to take advantage of the generous local and national public subsidies to political parties. Already the 50-plus council seats gained in 2002 provided some revenue, and the massive increase in seats in 2006 was a major financial boost. Much of the revenue from local council representation was channelled into the central party. Subsidies from the state also began to find their way into SD. An indirect form of state funding in kind was already secured after the 2002 election, as parties with over 1 per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections are entitled to have their ballot papers printed in the next election – smaller parties have to pay for this themselves. After 2006, however, SD was also eligible for financial support from the state – parties with over 2.5 per cent of the vote are entitled to some state funding. The subsidy rises considerably if it enters parliament, at the same time as parliamentary status also entitles a party to other forms of funding.[70]

Another advantage was that the major opinion polls started to report the *Sverigedemokraterna* as a separate party, and not as part of the "others" category, in connection with the 2006 election.[71] The first time SD was above the crucial 4 per cent threshold was in late March 2007, when the relatively low-profile pollster Sentio reported the party at 4.3 per cent. On 19 April Jimmie

Åkesson participated in a live head-to-head debate on the commercial channel TV 4 against the newly appointed leader of the Social Democrats, Mona Sahlin. Who "won" the debate is a matter of judgement, but Åkesson did not make any serious mistakes, and the occasion worked to his advantage. Not only was it Åkesson's first major TV performance, it was also only the second televised TV debate for Sahlin as leader of the country's biggest party.[72] The debate may not have been decisive in SD's route towards the eventual electoral breakthrough but it gave the party a level of attention and respectability it previously did not have.

In 2007 SD was still below 4 per cent in most polls, but in June 2008 it was above the representational threshold in the authoritative SIFO poll for the first time.[73] The 2009 election to the EU parliament was a temporary setback, with 3.3 per cent and no seat. This could at least in part be explained by the fact that the party did not seem to prioritise the election. None of the leading SD personalities stood as candidates. Despite the apparent lack of effort, the party almost trebled its share of the vote from the previous EU election in 2004. If the EU election was a setback, it was a minor and temporary one. Opinion polls of parliamentary voting intentions continued to indicate that entry into the national parliament was within reach, and other events played into the party's hands. A key such event took place in the autumn of 2009. The party had been refused space to place advertisements in several leading newspapers. Jan Helin, editor of the tabloid *Aftonbladet*, declared that his paper would maintain this policy of refusal, but that the party would be allowed an opportunity to present its views in a debate article. Apparently, Helin first suggested this to Åkesson when both were waiting outside a TV studio to appear on a current affairs programme.

The offer was accepted, and an article written by Jimmie Åkesson was published in *Aftonbladet* on 19 October. As such, the contents of the 700-word article were quite predictable. There were attacks on Islam and the "multicultural establishment", but little that can have come as a surprise to anyone reasonably familiar with SD and its political outlook.[74] Still, it was met with widespread condemnation, not least by *Aftonbladet* itself. Legal experts said that the text may have been in violation of the law against persecution of population groups. Complaints were also filed, but the Chancellor of Justice decided not to pursue the case. The whole affair brought much attention to SD, and even though the media comments were as good as unanimously negative, everything suggests that the attention played into the party's hands. Virtually every pollster reported a growth in SD support, if the comparison is made between the last poll before, and the first poll after, the publication of the article. Åkesson has even spoken of a "Helin effect". *Aftonbladet* is Sweden's biggest-circulation newspaper, and Åkesson could hardly have asked for a more effective forum. In addition, of course, Helin's decision meant that the party got its message across without having to pay for what would have been a very expensive advertisement.[75]

As the 2010 election drew nearer, it seemed increasingly probable that SD would enter the *Riksdag*. On the whole, the 2010 campaign went well for the party. Again, controversy about an SD advertisement in a major media outlet

played into the party's hands. This time the adversary was TV 4, which decided not to broadcast an SD advertisement. The main argument in the advertisement was to highlight the alleged trade-off between the costs of immigration and welfare provisions, such as pensions. A voice-over said "all politics is about priorities", followed by the statement "now you have a choice". The seriousness of the choice was illustrated by two emergency brakes appearing in view, one marked "pensions" and the other marked "immigration". The film then showed an elderly lady with a walking aid (a rollator), who appeared to be chased by a group of women dressed in burkas and niqabs, some with baby prams. The voice then said "on 19 September, you can choose the immigration brake before the pensions brake. Vote for the Sweden Democrats".[76]

The advert led to a heated debate. Critics argued that it was xenophobic, some even called it racist.[77] The main reason for these epithets was the portrayal of Muslim women as a threat. SD claimed that all the film did was to illustrate an economic trade-off, and that it was not targeting immigrants or any particular group of immigrants. The head of TV 4 argued that the advert could not be shown because it was in breach of the law against persecution of population groups.[78] SD's response was that the decision amounted to censorship. The ban was not particularly effective. The advert was frequently viewed on the Internet, and a modified version was subsequently aired on TV 4. The part showing women in burkas and niqabs was covered by a screen with the text "Censored by TV 4. See the uncensored film at www.sverigedemokraterna.se".[79]

The affair allowed SD to play the role of the brave underdog, standing up to oppression by the establishment. The party also received public support from Denmark, where the story received extensive media coverage. In her weekly online letter Pia Kjærsgaard said that the Swedish press was behaving "like in a banana republic".[80] Kjærsgaard also appeared at an SD election rally in the southern town of Höganäs, eight days before the election.[81] Unlike *Ny Demokrati* in 1991, SD was not given a place in the televised party leader debate two days before the election, but it did receive a higher level of media coverage than in any earlier election.

No SD representatives were involved in serious scandals or incidents, and none of the leading candidates made any serious mistakes, at least not that received much attention at the time.[82] There were examples of negative coverage, for example about a report about rape presented by the party, in which it was claimed that immigrants were over-represented among the perpetrators. The report was heavily criticised for statistical inaccuracies and unfounded conclusions.[83] Other unflattering reports included a local SD representative in southern Sweden who had posted racist content on his blog.[84] These and other stories were negative for the party, but did not cause serious damage. Åkesson's TV and radio performances could hardly be described as spectacular, but he kept his composure and avoided serious mistakes. Attempts were made to disturb SD election meetings, but they mostly amounted to shouting and noise-making. Police protection was often present, but physical confrontations were relatively rare.

On election day the largest-circulation newspaper, the tabloid *Aftonbladet*, published a large front-page plea not to vote SD, with the slogan "we like different". Inside the paper a number of celebrities from sport and entertainment expressed their disapproval of xenophobia.[85] *Aftonbladet*'s main tabloid competitor *Expressen* had a similar front-page message, with the word "NO!" in large font, the text "today we are voting for Sweden against xenophobia" and a picture of a soiled SD ballot paper lying in a gutter.[86] Whether such propaganda attempts had the intended effect is highly doubtful. There were opinion polls close to the election suggesting that SD was not certain to pass the 4 per cent threshold, but they were in a minority. The eventual result of 5.7 per cent suggested that SD had, if anything, been under-reported in several polls.

As can be seen from Table 8.1, electoral support for SD has increased continuously since its formation. The general pattern has been that the party's electoral support has roughly doubled compared from election to election, in relative as well as absolute terms. This certainly applies to the 2006 and 2010 elections; the trend in percentages from 2002 to 2010 is almost linear. As already noted, SD has not yet surpassed *Ny Demokrati*'s result from 1991, but there is much to suggest that this is within the party's capacity in the future. As shown in Figure 8.1, which reports SD's ratings in two leading opinion poll organisations from January 2007 to October 2013, the party has only very rarely been below 4 per cent since 2010.[87] It cannot, furthermore, be ruled out that some polls still under-report the party's actual level of support. There is a tendency for SD to receive higher ratings in Internet-based polls. In 2013, the average SD rating for SIFO and Ipsos, who use telephone interviews, was 8.2 and 8.6 per cent, respectively. For the Internet-based United Minds and YouGov it was 10.9 and 11.5 per cent, respectively. This may be related to sampling issues, but it is also possible that there is still some reluctance to give SD as the preferred choice in direct communication with an interviewer.[88]

Table 8.1 Parliamentary election results for extreme right parties in Sweden, 1988–2010[1]

	Ny Demokrati			*Sverigedemokraterna*		
	Votes	*Per cent*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Per cent*	*Seats*
1988	–	–	–	1,118	0.0	0
1991	368,281	6.7	26	4,889	0.1	0
1994	68,663	1.2	0	13,888	0.2	0
1998	8,287	0.2	0	19,624	0.4	0
2002	–	–	–	76,300	1.4	0
2006	–	–	–	162,463	2.9	0
2010	–	–	–	339,610	5.7	20

Note

1 Entries refer to elections to the national parliament (*Riksdag*). The total number of seats is 349 for every year reported in the table.



Figure 8.1 *Sverigedemokraterna* in SIFO and Ipsos polls, 2007–2013 (sources: Collected by author from Internet and media sources. Sifo: www.tns-sifo.se/rapporter-undersokningar/valjarbarometern. Ipsos: Published in *Dagens Nyheter* (www.dn.se)).

Sverigedemokraterna's initiation to parliament did not pass without incident. The party representatives demonstratively left a traditional church service, which is part of the opening day programme of a new parliamentary term, after the Bishop of Stockholm had made positive references to anti-SD demonstrations, which had taken place the days following the election.[89] SD did not, however, play any part in the government formation process. Even though the incumbent centre-right government had lost its majority it was able to stay in office without a vote, as there was no formal requirement of a vote of investiture unless the sitting government had resigned as a consequence of the election result. It would have been possible to table a vote of no confidence against the government, but no such initiative was taken, in order to deprive SD of any role in the process. This meant that, even though the government had lost its majority, it was able to stay in office without active or passive support from SD.[90] This was politically important, as SD was still far from being accepted by any of the other parties.

Despite the isolation, SD has not been without potential influence since its parliamentary entry. It could inflict defeat on the government on all issues where agreement could not be reached between the government and Social Democrats or the Greens (agreements with the Left Party was also a possibility, but politically far-fetched). During the parliamentary year 2010/2011, important deals between the government and the Greens were reached on the Swedish participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and on immigration. Especially the latter eliminated SD from potential influence in its core policy area, but the party voted with the opposition in other issues, thus inflicting defeat on the government. According to statistics presented by SD, based on material gathered by the Research Service of the Swedish parliament, SD contributed to government defeats on 30 occasions during the parliamentary year 2011/2012. Not all of those matters were subject to a plenary vote, however, as the government did not always demand a vote when defeat seemed probable.[91]

The government defeats were not as such politically significant, but they reinforced the fact that the pivotal position of *Sverigedemokraterna* made the parliamentary situation precarious. This was highlighted in 2011, when the government envisaged a cut in income tax. The red-green opposition parties were against, and when SD declared that they would also oppose a tax cut, there was no majority for such a proposal. Citing an economic downturn, the government announced a few months later that the tax cut was put on hold. Whether the economy or the prospect of defeat was the real reason is open to question, but it is clear that a defeat for the government on income tax, one of its flagship issues, would have been politically very damaging.[92] The following year SD declared itself in principle positive to an income tax reduction if the government was willing to negotiate with the party.[93] This suggests that the rejection of such a proposal in 2011 was largely strategic. The route to direct political influence, along the lines of the Danish example, is still very long. Still, as the manoeuvring about income tax incident shows, SD is ready to make use of its blackmail potential.

Ideology

The ideology of *Ny Demokrati* can be quite straightforwardly summarised as a mix of market liberalism and immigration scepticism, with an additional dose of anti-establishment rhetoric. The first NyD programme of 1991 was heavily influenced by the market liberal think tank *Den Nya Välfärden* (The New Welfare), with which Ian Wachtmeister had close connections.[94] The proposals included tax cuts, a reduction of the public sector, less generous benefits systems and the abolition of private as well as public monopolies. NyD was also strongly in favour of EC/EU accession. In addition, the first NyD manifesto included tougher sentences for criminals, a review of the traditional Swedish security policy and a number of constitutional reforms, such as the separate election of the prime minister and more referendums.[95] One of the 18 pages was jointly devoted to asylum policy and foreign aid, with more space given to the latter.[96] Refugees would only be given temporary residence permits, be made to work, and given loans instead of allowances. Foreign citizens who committed serious crimes would be expelled. "Native language teaching", classes for immigrant children in their own language, should not be paid for by the state. Foreign aid should not go to dictatorships, such as Cuba and Vietnam; instead more aid should be directed to neighbouring countries, such as the Baltic States.[97]

Asylum and immigration were given increased space in the NyD manifesto from 1993. Still, these issues were placed in the middle of a 32-page document, and did not come across as a main priority. The demands were largely similar to, if not as detailed as, proposals that had been submitted in parliament by NyD representatives. They included the demand of a stricter definition of a refugee in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention, tighter rules for family reunification and a referendum on asylum policy and foreign aid.[98] By and large, the 1993 programme was an extended and elaborated version of its 1991 predecessor. The market liberalism was still pronounced, the constitutional reform proposals repeated, and the party was strongly in favour of EU membership.[99] The 1991 and 1993 manifestos also highlighted the lighter parts of the NyD message. Both documents contain a section titled "A better, funnier and less expensive life". The concrete demands included lower VAT for restaurants (so an ordinary family could eat out once a week) and a liberalised alcohol policy.[100]

The 1994 election manifesto, which was produced after Wachtmeister had left the party, differed in many ways from the 1991 and 1993 documents. Comprising four A4 pages, it was not a very professional product. There was less principled market liberalism, except for some proposed improvements for small businesses. It demanded steps against the national debt, mostly by cutting subsidies to political parties and newspapers. Other demands included improvements for the poorest pensioners, a stop to child pornography and harder measures against criminals. The 1994 manifesto also outlined a number of immigration policy proposals, largely along the lines of the cited parliamentary motions. These proposals were again placed together with demands of reduced foreign aid, in a section taking up roughly 15 per cent of the manifesto text.[101]

The fact that immigration policy took up relatively limited space in the NyD manifestos does not quite tell the whole story. The issue was part of the party message from the beginning, and the emphasis grew gradually. In a series of public meetings in the summers of 1992 and 1993 the anti-immigration rhetoric could be quite drastic. In July 1992 Ian Wachtmeister asked an audience in Göteborg: "What should we do about the Somalis? Bring them here!?", which was met with amusement.[102] In 1993, future leader Vivianne Franzén told a horrifying story about how a Muslim immigrant had ritualistically murdered his son. She also warned that Swedish children would soon be forced to turn towards Mecca.[103] There are lots of other examples of immigration-sceptical rhetoric and views among NyD representatives.[104]

To sum up, *Ny Demokrati* was a fairly mainstream extreme right party of its time. It resembled Kitschelt's "winning formula" of market liberalism, immigration criticism and elements of authoritarianism.[105] What made the party somewhat unusual was the positive view on the EC/EU. This was unequivocal in the 1991 and 1993 manifestos.[106] Ian Wachtmeister, not usually one to hand out praise across party lines, proposed a round of applause for the EU minister and chief negotiator when a completed EU accession agreement was presented to parliament in March 1994.[107] In the 1994 election manifesto, however, the EU issue was toned down. The wording was still positive, but it was mentioned only in passing and with the qualification that the people decides in a referendum.[108] It is worth noting here that NyD was able to fit the pro-EC/EU argument into its general anti-establishment rhetoric. Even though EU membership had been on the agenda since the autumn of 1990 when a Social Democratic government, rather suddenly, announced that it would initiate an accession process, NyD argued that the establishment had been slow and reluctant to get moving on the EC/EU issue. European integration was portrayed as an alternative to the "Swedish Model" of a regulated economy, high taxes and a large public sector, and a way out of the Swedish "boredom" of restrictive alcohol policy and expensive restaurant prices.

Sverigedemokraterna has produced a fairly extensive number of manifestos and policy documents since its formation in 1988. The first "proper" Party manifesto (*partiprogram*) was adopted in 1989, followed by manifestos in 1994, 1996 and 1999. The latter manifesto was long and detailed, covering a wide range of policy areas. A shorter Principles manifesto (*principprogram*) was adopted in 2003, and amended in 2005. This was valid until November 2011, when a new Principles manifesto was adopted. It is significantly longer and more elaborated than its predecessor from 2003/2005. Besides these core documents, SD has published a number of issue-specific policy programmes on, for example, immigration, as well as election manifestos. The 2010 election manifesto, titled "99 proposals for a better Sweden", is essentially in bullet-point format, without much elaboration or principled discussion. The following discussion will primarily be based on the Party manifestos from 1989, 1994, 1996 and 1999, the Principles manifestos from 2003/2005 and 2011, and the election manifesto of 2010. In addition, some of the issue-specific policy programmes will be referred to.

Similarly to *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway, but unlike *Dansk Folkeparti*, *Sverigedemokraterna* explicitly positions itself in the ideological spectrum. In the 1999 as well 2005 manifestos it defines itself as nationalist. The former document states that "*Sverigedemokraterna* is a national centrist party", and that it "celebrates nationalism, as it with such emphasis upholds the worth and interests of the own people".[109] In the 2003/2005 manifesto, SD describes itself as "a democratic, nationalist party".[110] As its ideological inspiration the party cites Swedish "national conservatism" of the early twentieth century, as well as the social democratic "people's home" (*folkhem*) concept; the purpose being to combine the principles of social justice and traditional "value conservatism".[111] The adherence to the "people's home" idea was not new; if anything it is a constant throughout the development of the party and can be found in every main ideological document since 1989. The 2003/2005 manifesto goes on at length to discuss and contextualise the nationalist principle, its components and potential threats against it.

In the most recent Principles manifesto, adopted at the SD congress in November 2011, the ideological position was redefined from nationalism to social conservatism. The introductory section states that "*Sverigedemokraterna* is a socially conservative party based on a nationalist outlook, which views value conservatism and the upholding of a solidaristic welfare model as the most important tools in the building of the good society". The party strives for "careful progress based on caution, reflection and long-term responsibility". The ambition is "to combine the best elements from the traditional right and left ideologies". Law and order, traditions and society-carrying institutions are cited as positive, as are "natural communities proved to work well[,] in the form of the family and the nation". Through the combination of freedom, security, individualism and community, the party hopes to "recreate a people's home which to the highest extent possible is characterised by security, prosperity, democracy and strong inner solidarity". The "people's home" idea remains important, and is mentioned six times in the document.[112]

Thus, *Sverigedemokraterna* redefined its core ideological identity in 2011. It was not quite a question of an overnight, or complete, transformation. Social conservatism had also been referred to in earlier manifestos, and in 2011 the party still adhered to a nationalist outlook (*nationalistisk grundsyn*).[113] The 2011 manifesto also has separate sections devoted to nationalism and the nation. Still, the shift in emphasis is apparent, and the change did not take place completely without friction. The new manifesto was passed with a comfortable majority – 125 votes against 28 – but the decision was preceded by a debate at the congress itself, as well as on various Internet forums before the congress.[114] The 2011 Principles manifesto can be seen as another phase in the party's ongoing attempt to broaden its appeal. Nationalism may not be as stigmatised as fascism or Nazism, but it is still closely associated with the legacy the party seeks to leave behind.

In contrast to other parties studied in this book, SD explicitly deals with the criteria for membership of the nation. In 2003/2005 manifesto a Swede is defined

as "someone who by her-/himself and by others is regarded as Swedish".[115] The definition is thus not ethnic, but the pre-2011 manifestos still contain references to ethnicity. The 1989 manifesto speaks of the "homogenous composition of the population" as "an invaluable asset" for Sweden,[116] which is repeated in the 1994, 1996 and 1999 manifestos.[117] It is somewhat softened in the 2003/2005 Principles manifesto, which states that a "high degree of ethnic and cultural likeness among the population" are conditions for the "common identity", which in turn is the most important factor in a "secure, harmonious and solidaristic society".[118] The party goes on to state that the nationalist principle is based on the idea of the nation state, where the borders of the state correspond with the demographic borders. "In its ideal form", SD argues, this kind of society is "demographically homogenous", but conditions inside as well as outside Sweden are such that this principle cannot be fully realised.[119]

In the 2011 Principles manifesto ethnicity is significantly played down, even though it has not completely disappeared from the party's thinking. All explicit references to ethnicity have been dropped. The only time the word "ethnic" with derivations appears is in connection with labour market policy, where the party proposes a ban on all forms of discrimination, positive or negative, on the basis of gender, age, sexual orientation, nationality or ethnicity.[120] The discussion on nationality has also changed. The nation is defined "in terms of loyalty, common identity, common language and common culture". The definition of Swedishness is elaborated. Membership of the nation can be obtained by being born into it, but also "by later in life actively choosing to assimilate into it".[121] Thus, it is made more explicit than before that ethnicity is a possible, but not necessary, criterion for membership of the nation. Elsewhere, the party states that the nation is not defined in genetic terms.[122]

The party does make a distinction between native (*infödda*) and assimilated Swedes. Regarded as the former are those who are "born or at an early age adopted to Sweden by Swedish-speaking parents, of Swedish or Nordic identity". The latter are those of "non-Swedish background who speak fluent Swedish, regard themselves as Swedish, live in accordance with the Swedish culture, view Swedish history as their own and feel more loyalty to the Swedish nation than any other nation".[123] Still, the earlier references to ethnic and cultural likeness, and demographic homogeneity, do not appear in the 2011 manifesto. It could also be noted that, until 2002, SD had opposed the adoption of non-European children.[124] This is of course in stark contrast to the 2011 definition of native Swedes, which includes persons who were adopted as children. Assimilation into the nation is regarded as possible, even desirable, and the distinction between native and assimilated members of the nation does not imply any difference in status. It is, in fact, possible for a native Swede to cease being a member of the nation. Nevertheless, the process of assimilation is described as long and full of problems. It may stretch into several generations before it is completed. "The more different to Sweden the culture and identity of an immigrant, and the bigger the group of immigrants, the more difficult the assimilation process".[125]

It goes without saying that *Sverigedemokraterna* sees immigration as a problem. Also here, however, the message has softened over time. In 1989, the party wanted to "drastically reduce immigration";[126] in 1994 to "stop all immigration from ethnically distant cultures";[127] in 1996 "stop all immigration of people whose origin is from outside the Western cultural sphere";[128] in 1999 it advocated "a strictly regulated immigration policy".[129] The 2003/2005 Principles manifesto states that immigration is not made impossible by the nationalist principle, but that "immigration should be kept at a level that does not fundamentally alter the composition of the population so that ethnic enclaves develop".[130] In the 2011 Principles manifesto:

> The Sweden Democrats do not oppose immigration, but are of the view that immigration must be kept at a level and be of such a character that it does not pose a threat to our national identity or to the welfare and safety of our country.[131]

That fact that the party in the 2000s starts to point out that it is not in principle opposed to all immigration could be interpreted as an indication of deradicalisation. This is also supported by other indicators. One example is repatriation. In 1989, the party advocated the repatriation of all immigrants of non-European origin.[132] In the 1994 manifesto this was specified to apply to all immigrants from "ethnically distant cultures" to have arrived after 1970.[133] In 1999, however, the year of entry specification was dropped, and the repatriation policy would apply to "third world" immigrants without the need for protection.[134] In the 2000s, the demand of compulsory repatriation was abandoned in favour of repatriation based on counselling and financial incentives. Such proposals appear in the Population Policy programme from 2005 and the Immigration programme from 2007.[135]

In the 2011 Principles manifesto, however, it is merely stated that those who want to return to their home countries should be given "active and generous support".[136] Thus, the party still advocates repatriation, but the rhetoric has softened. It should be mentioned that Sweden does have an official policy of voluntary repatriation, with financial incentives, although SD criticises it for being too weak.[137] The abandonment of the "1970 demand" is regarded by many, not least in SD itself, as an important step in the development towards electability.[138] Another indication of the deradicalisation is the abandonment of the term "population policy" (*befolkningspolitik*). It appears in the Party manifestos from 1989, 1994, 1996 and 1999, in the three latter cases as section headings, which among other things deal with immigration. It is not found in the 2003/2005 Principles manifesto, but is the title of the policy programme on immigration and related areas from 2002, with amendments from 2004 and 2005. The Population Policy programme was valid until 2007, when it was succeeded by an Immigration Policy programme (*Invandringspolitiskt program*).[139]

There is no clear evidence of classical racism in the researched manifestos. There are ambiguities, such as the references to "homogenous population" in the

1989, 1994 and 1999 manifestos, and to ethnic "likeness" in the 2003/2005 document. Still, there is no evidence of notions of racial purity or hierarchy. The word "race" with derivations is very rarely used, and not in a way to imply that the party supported classical racism. The 1989 manifesto contains a quote attributed to Social Democratic Prime Minister (1946–1969) Tage Erlander, in which he is alleged to have said that Sweden is fortunate to have a homogenous population in terms of, among other things, race.[140] In the 1999 manifesto, race is mentioned as part of the denouncement of Nazism discussed above.[141] The only use of the word in the 2011 manifesto is in the declaration that SD's form of nationalism is open and non-racist.[142]

Sverigedemokraterna are, however, opposed to multiculturalism. The 2011 Principles manifesto states that, irrespective of whether multiculturalism is understood as a society where different cultures are blended into a new "multiculture", or as a society where different cultures coexist alongside each other, it leads to a society characterised by rootlessness, segregation, conflicts, insecurity and reduced welfare. The party goes on to argue that this position does not as such preclude immigration; the important thing is that there is a dominant majority culture and an active assimilation policy. *Sverigedemokraterna* often refers to a change in Swedish integration policy from 1975. Until that year, the party argues, the principle was that immigrants should assimilate into the Swedish culture; since then they have been encouraged to maintain their own respective cultures. The party advocates a return to the pre-1975 policy, for example by abolishing all public subsidies intended to maintain and strengthen immigrant identity and culture.[143]

The opposition to multiculturalism puts SD close to the ethno-pluralist "equal but separate" doctrine. The party does qualify its position with the statement that immigration is not necessarily the same as multiculturalism. The key point, according to SD, is that the continued dominance of the country's own culture is not threatened. This could be interpreted as a somewhat more pragmatic position than that of, for example, *Dansk Folkeparti* whose Principles manifesto in a more direct manner states that Denmark is not, and has never been, "a country of immigration".[144] Another difference between the parties is that SD after 2011 refers to ethnicity to a much lesser extent than DF. On the other hand, *Sverigedemokraterna*'s relentless criticism of what the party often refers to as "mass immigration" suggests that the differences between the parties should not be overstated.[145]

In terms of emphasis, it is almost trivial to assert that immigration is an important issue for *Sverigedemokraterna*. As shown in Table 8.2, however, it by no means dominates the Party manifestos. In none of the documents on which the table is based do the sections on immigration take up even one-tenth of the contents. This said, similarly to *Dansk Folkeparti*, but unlike *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway, immigration and related issues are not confined to one single section. In the 2011 manifesto the immigration-related keywords (see note below the table) also appear in four other sections (section 5 on the Nation, 8 on Multiculturalism, 12 on Religion and 15 on the Labour Market). In the 1999 manifesto,

12 out of 32 sections contained at least 1 of the keywords; from 2003 onwards the spread has varied between 3 and 5 sections. This also means that it is somewhat misleading to identify one specific section on immigration on the basis of the literal title – in the 2011 manifesto also the sections on the Nation and on Multiculturalism deal with immigration and related issues. Even allowing for this problem, it is clear that immigration is a key priority for SD. This is also supported by other research. According to a comparison of election manifestos from 2002 to 2010, SD is the only one of eight Swedish parties to have devoted more than 10 per cent of the text to immigration.[146]

Other important issues for SD include law and order, and the EU. The party was in favour of the death penalty until 1999.[147] Proposals to reintroduce this policy have since been put forward to SD party congresses, but voted down.[148] Individual SD representatives, including some in leading positions, have continued to publicly express their support for capital punishment, but the official party position appears well anchored in the party majority.[149] The party profiles itself as a champion of law and order. The 1999 and 2003/2005 manifestos argue for stricter sentences.[150] The 2011 manifesto is more carefully worded about punishments, but repeats a standpoint from previous documents, that the interests of victims of crime should always take priority over the interests of the perpetrators.[151] In a separate policy programme on crime adopted at the 2011 congress the party declares that the fight against crime should, together with immigration, be a prioritised area. The 3,000-word document contains several proposals to toughen crime policy, such as the introduction of actual life sentences without the possibility of a pardon, significantly stricter sentences for violent crime, measures to make it easier to expel criminal foreigners and the

Table 8.2 Emphasis on immigration in *Sverigedemokraterna*'s manifestos of 1999, 2003/2005, 2010 and 2011[1]

	1999	*2003/2005*	*2010*	*2011*
Total number of words	9,900	3,300	1,800	10,800
Total number of sections	37	18 (4 + 14)	13	22
Words in section on immigration (%)	531 (5.4)	211 (6.4)	152 (8.4)	331 (3.1)
Keyword hits in whole document (%)	27 (0.27)	9 (0.27)	11 (0.61)	38 (0.35)
Number of sections containing any of the keywords, specified below (%)	12 (32)	3 (17)	4 (31)	5 (23)

Note

1 The sources used are *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999, *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005a, *Sverigedemokraterna* 2010 and *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a. The 1999 and 2003/2005 manifestos have been scanned and converted into Word format, to allow automatic word counting. The keywords used are *utl** (foreig*), **invandr** (*immigr*), *flykting** (refugee*) and *asyl** (asylum). Percentages (in brackets) are always based on the total number of words/sections in the whole document. See also discussion in the text.

abolition of early releases from custodial sentences for violent and drug-related crimes. The party also proposes extra punishments for multiple and repeated violent, sexual and drug-related crimes.[152]

Sverigedemokraterna has been EC/EU critical throughout the party's existence. Party leader Jimmie Åkesson has often said that his EU scepticism was a key reason why he joined SD.[153] The party opposed EU accession in the 1994 referendum, and campaigned against the Euro in the 2003 vote – although its participation in the successful No campaign did not benefit the party in the same way that it had done for *Dansk Folkeparti* three years earlier. The main criticism of the EU is that it threatens national sovereignty. Also here, however, the party's position has been modified. The 1999 manifesto states that Sweden should not be part of the EU. The EU is not explicitly mentioned in the 2003/2005 and 2011 Principles manifestos, but both documents criticise the creation of a "union", whose constitution takes precedence over the constitutions of the member states.[154] The 2010 election manifesto states that the EU membership should be renegotiated. In addition the party continues to oppose the Euro, is against Turkish EU accession and argues that the Treaty of Schengen should be renegotiated, to allow the reintroduction of stricter border controls.[155]

The party holds traditionalist views on family and lifestyle issues, but also here the position has softened. The 1989, 1994 and 1996 manifestos argued for fewer abortions, although without concrete policy proposals.[156] The 1999 manifesto proposed that the time limit for abortion should be lowered from 18 to 12 weeks after conception.[157] It has not been repeated in subsequent manifestos, but the party has continued to argue that the Swedish abortion law should be harmonised with the rest of Europe, where the 12-week time limit is common.[158] Same-sex relationships were not mentioned in the 1989 and 1994 manifestos, but were given a separate section in 1996 and 1999, each time titled "Sexually Deviant" (*sexuellt avvikande*) and with identical wordings. The party condemned harassment of the "sexually deviant", but also argued that the "glorification of the homosexual lifestyle" in the media creates "unhealthy frames of reference for young people in the process of building up their adulthood identity". In addition, SD opposed registered same-sex partnerships, argued that inheritance laws should only apply to conventional families and proposed that same-sex couples should not be able to adopt children.[159]

Since then the tone has changed. In the 2011 Principles manifesto, SD argues that all children should have a father and a mother figure, and opposes publicly sanctioned adoptions for single persons, same-sex couples and "polyamorous groups". Words such as "deviant", however, are not used.[160] The party opposed the introduction of a gender-neutral marriage law in 2009, but has since accepted this reform.[161] Indeed, *Sverigedemokraterna* has made attempts to rebrand itself as an alternative for gay, lesbian and bisexual voters. In March 2010, for example, party leader Jimmie Åkesson and second deputy leader Carina Herrstedt claimed in an *Aftonbladet* article that growing numbers of gays and lesbians were turning to SD. This, they argued, showed that it is eminently possible to combine value conservatism with respect for sexual minorities, and was

indicative of "the strong concern felt by many homosexuals of mass immigration and the anti-homo hatred given rise to by the growth of Islamification".[162] Thus, despite the continued scepticism against children being brought up by same-sex couples, SD has undergone a clear reorientation. It is unlikely to have gone down well everywhere in the party, but fits with the anti-Islam rhetoric, and can also be interpreted as part of a broader attempt to present the party as tolerant.[163]

On the economy, *Sverigedemokraterna* has consistently occupied a position best summarised as centrist. Unlike the Danish and Norwegian Progress parties, and *Ny Demokrati*, SD has no background in anti-tax protest, but nor has it ever been influenced by any form of socialism. The party has always spoken positively of entrepreneurship and small enterprises.[164] It declares itself non-socialist and supports the market economy, but with regulations, and the size of the public sector has never been of great concern to the party.[165] The 1989, 1994, 1996 and 1999 manifestos warned against concentration of private ownership into large units, but also against a planned economy.[166] The 1996 manifesto advocated the nationalisation of banks and insurance companies,[167] but this was dropped in 1999.

SD has never criticised the existence of a welfare state. The party's position has consistently been that the welfare system should in the main be publicly funded, but with private alternatives as a possible complement.[168] With some variations, these general principles can be found in older manifestos, as well as that from 2011. The economic policies of SD rely heavily on the assumption that significant amounts of public money can be saved on immigration. In the party's shadow budget proposals this has been a key source of funding for income tax cuts, and increased expenditure on welfare, health care, defence, education and crime prevention.[169] The realism of this assumption has been questioned by other parties as well as experts.[170] On the whole, however, the economy has never been a prioritised area for SD, which allows the party to adopt a fairly pragmatic approach to economic policy. An example, discussed above, was the changing positions on income tax in 2011–2012.

Sverigedemokraterna wants a stronger military defence and proposes the reintroduction of conscription. The party does not advocate membership of NATO, but accepts Swedish participation in the NATO-led cooperation project Partnership for Peace, and proposes closer defence cooperation among the Nordic countries. Otherwise the defence and foreign policy areas have relatively low priority, with the EU criticism as the main exception. SD's take on international conflicts also tends to be low-profile. The party wants to end Swedish participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, but general criticism of the international military presence in Afghanistan is not a key theme.[171] The Middle East conflict has been subject to internal divisions. There are well-known figures in SD, such as Björn Söder and the member of parliament Kent Ekeroth, who have a public profile as strongly pro-Israel.[172] Others have a more pro-Palestine outlook, and in particular this has been a source of disagreement between SD and its youth organisation SDU. In November 2011 Gustav Kasselstrand and William Hahne, chair and deputy chair of SDU, wrote an article in *Aftonbladet*

where they argued for the recognition of a Palestinian state.[173] This was very controversial in some parts of SD; not least Ekeroth was very damning in his criticism.[174]

Another example of an issue area not prioritised by SD is the environment. In the 2011 Principles manifesto the party claims that the ultimate goal of its environmental policy is an ecologically sustainable society. The route to this goal is a combination of incentives, information and technical development. The party is sceptical of what it calls "punishment of unwanted behaviour", but does not rule out measures such as economic sanctions against industries which make a profit out of pollution.[175] *Sverigedemokraterna* is open to the continuation and further development of nuclear power.[176] Unlike *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway, SD has not expressed scepticism of man-made climate change. The party's manifestos do not mention congestion charges,[177] but in the city of Göteborg SD councillors opposed the introduction of such charges, and have supported calls to subject the charges to a referendum.[178] Also in general, the party advocates more direct democracy via increased use of national as well as local referendums.[179]

In summary, the ideology of *Sverigedemokraterna* has undergone considerable changes since the first manifesto was adopted in 1989. Still in the 1990s the manifestos contained many policies and statements which were regarded by many, also inside the party, as extreme. The deradicalisation process has been gradual and protracted. It bore electoral fruit in 2010 but is arguably still in process. The most recent step was the adoption of the 2011 Principles manifesto, in which the party's ideological foundation was redefined. Nationalism was toned down, although not entirely abandoned, and the party now refers to itself as social-conservative. This is a position largely left vacant after it historically had been occupied by the Conservative (since 1969 Moderate) Party, and it does not carry the same problematical baggage as the kind of nationalism the party stood for in its early years.

It is important, however, that the party does not, at least not only, see itself as the new "pure" conservative party; it also frequently refers to the old Social Democratic catchphrase "people's home", made famous by Per Albin Hansson, at the time newly appointed Social Democratic leader, later long-serving prime minister, in a speech in 1928. The concept was not invented by Hansson, or even by the Social Democrats – it had been used by the right-wing thinker Rudolf Kjellén some 30 years earlier – but after Hansson's adaptation it has become almost synonymous with Swedish Social Democracy. It is to many Swedes an emotive phrase, associated with stable and prosperous times for the country, and can thus be used to attract disillusioned Social Democratic voters, without alienating others.[180] By combining the "people's home" with social conservatism, SD are trying to reach different constituencies – conservative, but with a social conscience; "people's home", but not socialist.

There are several other indicators of deradicalisation. Some, which date from before 2000, did not bear immediate fruit, but were important early steps in making the party electable. Key examples include the decisions to stop

advocating repatriation of all post-1970 non-European immigrants, and to cease proposing a ban on non-European adoptions. A much more recent, but equally important, change is the abandonment of ethnic criteria of nationality, and references to ethnic homogeneity as important values. Further examples of the deradicalisation process include the dropping of the term "population policy", the less specific proposals on repatriation and the *post hoc* acceptance of a gender neutral marriage law. These are all elements in *Sverigedemokraterna*'s quest to become acceptable, not only to the voters but also to the other parties.

Organisation and leadership

It should already be clear from the earlier discussion on *Ny Demokrati* that it had serious organisational problems. So much so that organisational issues played a key part in the party's sudden demise. When NyD was formed, a key aim was to provide an alternative to the established parties, not least in terms of the organisation. A key problem, however, was time – there was an election coming up seven months after the party had formally been constituted. This meant that *Ny Demokrati* was largely run on an informal basis during its first year – written rules for the central party were not adopted until 1992. The process to select parliamentary candidates appears to have been completely informal, and highly centralised. According to Paul Taggart, there were different recruitment paths, but a common one was that Wachtmeister contacted his friends, or friends of friends.[181] In his autobiography, Bert Karlsson claims that he and Wachtmeister "selected a few candidates each".[182] It also appears that some of the NyD candidates themselves took the initiative to offer their services.[183]

This rather rushed headhunting process led to problems. There was some vetting of the prospective candidates, but it is difficult to assess how meticulous it was. Bert Karlsson certainly claims that Wachtmeister selected a number of "idiots",[184] and problems in the parliamentary group emerged quite soon. Half a year after the election, in March 1992, two NyD representatives left the party, following an internal debate about the possible expulsion of John Bouvin, who had stated that Sweden should have a mix of democracy and dictatorship. Bouvin was not expelled, but the debate was so intense that two of his supporters defected, citing Wachtmeister's authoritarian leadership.[185] Bouvin made the headlines on several occasions. Probably the best known example was his criticism of development aid to African countries, which was based on the argument that it leads to overpopulation. In the "old days", he claimed, the majority of children died from starvation, or were eaten by wild animals. Then, with aid, too many children survive, which leads to "disaster".[186] Another example was a parliamentary debate in 1994, about registered same-sex partnerships, when Bouvin illustrated his argument against such partnerships with what in the minutes are described as "obscene gestures".[187]

Bouvin may be an extreme example, but the sudden influx of rather disparate individuals into the newly formed party led to difficulties. Not least problematical was the over 300 representatives elected to local councils under the

Ny Demokrati label.[188] At the subnational levels Wachtmeister, Karlsson and their aides had little or no possibility to exercise any control over candidate selection. This was left to the local parties, where such existed, which was far from always the case. In some councils the party did not even put up candidates. The election rules, however, made it possible for voters to enter names on ballot papers which had the party name printed, but were otherwise blank. As a consequence, NyD had a rather disparate collection of council representatives, including a few who did not even sympathise with the party.

Many NyD councillors featured in the media for the wrong reasons, and caused the party much embarrassment. This was the main reason for the introduction of the "franchise model" discussed earlier. It also led to a number of expulsions. Other responses from the NyD leadership included a restriction on the right to make statements in the name of the party to Wachtmeister and Karlsson, and to make the NyD parliamentarians sign a contract by which they agreed to resign their seat if they left the party.[189] This did not help entirely – Anne Rhenman defected from the party in October 1993, but sat as an independent until the end of the election period. In total 4 of the 25 NyD members of parliament left the party. One returned after sitting as an independent for one year, one resigned his seat after sitting as an independent for nine months and two stayed as independents until the end of the 1991–1994 parliamentary term.

Inspired by their background in business, Wachtmeister and Karlsson with collaborators sought to create a party organisation characterised by efficiency. In practice this meant two things: a flat structure and centralisation. The flatness was reflected in the 1992 party rules, which defined two organisational levels: local and central, in contrast to most other Swedish parties, who had at least one more level, usually corresponding with the regional councils, the *Landsting*.[190] The 1993 rules also did away with the local level, and made it clear that the local cooperation ("franchise") parties were separate from *Ny Demokrati* proper.[191] The centralisation was reflected in many ways, including the "franchise model", but also that the party was in practice led by its two founding fathers. The dominance of Wachtmeister and Karlsson was striking, and their position in the party owed much to idolisation and deference.[192] The problem with this was that the deference gradually gave way to disillusionment. Already at quite an early stage, voices were raised against what critics saw as a dictatorial leadership style, not least of Wachmeister.[193] Karlsson also began to react against this, and in his autobiography he claims that Wachtmeister humiliated many in the party.[194] The discontent grew, and was the main reason for Wachtmeister's decision to resign the leadership.

Clearly, the attempt to form a streamlined and efficient businesslike organisation did not work in practice. In the revised party rules adopted in 1993, it stated that all party members had the right to vote at the national party congress. The only requirements were that the membership had been valid for at least four months, and prior notification of the intention to participate was given.[195] This rather anarchic principle was a recipe for problems, and is likely to have contributed to the chaos at the party congresses during the process to replace Ian

Wachtmeister as leader in 1994. *Ny Demokrati* was, however, initially fairly successful at recruiting party members. According to the party's own statistics, the membership peaked at just over 9,000 in 1992. It then sank quickly, and was fewer than 1,000 in 1995, a year after NyD had fallen out of parliament. These figures may not seem too impressive, but if they are correct the Green Party had fewer members, and the Left Party only 2,000 more, in 1992.[196]

Despite the initial success, relatively speaking, in membership recruitment *Ny Demokrati* was not able to build up a functioning party organisation. This proved a major liability. The thinking behind the business-inspired organisational model may not as such have been wrong, but it required a form of leadership that neither Wachtmeister nor Karlsson were able to provide. Almost throughout its existence, *Ny Demokrati* was regarded as having dual leadership. In practice, however, Wachtmeister was in charge of the party, and he also became the formal single leader, although there seems to be some ambiguity regarding the exact date from which this was the case.[197] Karlsson continued to play a central role, but he never really tried to challenge Wachtmeister's dominance, and he was not as actively involved in the day-to-day parliamentary work.[198] When the two disagreed, such as on the issue about whether to unseat the government, Wachtmeister came out on top. This is not as such surprising. Wachtmeister has widely been described as intellectually sharp, and he was a formidable opponent in debates, internally as well as against other parties.

The problem for Wachtmeister was that his eloquence and command of facts were not complemented by other leadership skills. He could be ruthless against dissenters, but his methods and rhetoric left scars, not only among the direct targets. His hard-hitting rhetoric and arrogant style could be very effective in internal debates, but they also caused hurt and offence. Wachtmeister was perfectly capable of unsentimentally dealing with opponents, but not so good at building up alliances and bonds of loyalty. If we compare with successful party leaders, such as Carl I Hagen in Norway and Pia Kjærsgaard in Denmark, they proved apt at both. Wachtmeister also lacked endurance, as shown by his sudden resignation announcement in February 1994. Had he stayed at the helm, there may have been a fighting chance for NyD to remain above the 4 per cent threshold in the 1994 election – without him the party was completely rudderless. Whether Wachtmeister or Karlsson can be classified as charismatic is a moot point. Both Taggart and Rydgren argue that NyD met Panebianco's criteria of a charismatic party.[199] One problem with this was that the loyalty to the two founding fathers did not withstand pressures, such as Wachtmeister's autocratic leadership style. Another, as noted by Rydgren, was that a charismatic party tends to have one single leader, not two.[200]

In terms of electoral appeal, the image within the party seems to have differed from the reality. Bert Karlsson's supporters seemed to believe that the party owed most of its electoral success to Karlsson. Research from the Swedish Election Study team, however, suggests that Karlsson was not very popular in the electorate as a whole. In fact, Karlsson received the lowest popularity ratings at the time ever recorded for a party leader in a Swedish Election Study. Wachtmeister was not as

unpopular as Karlsson, but on par with the previous all-time low popularity score.[201] Among NyD voters Wachtmeister did better, but Karlsson's popularity was, again, the lowest ever recorded for a party leader in their own party. These figures suggest that, while the two NyD front figures were not overly popular in the electorate as whole, at least Wachtmeister had struck a chord in certain segments. Indeed, the evidence suggests Wachtmeister had a positive impact on the NyD result in 1991, while any Karlsson effect was considerably smaller.[202]

The chaotic process to replace Ian Wachtmeister eventually resulted in the appointment of Vivianne Franzén. She had made herself a name as an outspoken critic of immigration and Islam, and Wachtmeister regarded her as a talented speaker.[203] She had very little parliamentary experience, however, and was out of her depth in TV interviews.[204] In fairness her task was not enviable, but her appointment was indicative of the decline the party was already in. The overall evidence from *Ny Demokrati* suggests that the two founding fathers and de facto initial leaders were assets for the party at first, but less so when the novelty had worn off. By the time of the 1991 election it already seems that Karlsson may not have had as much of an appeal as was believed at the time. Wachtmeister had the competence to be a successful leader, but was let down by his own vanity and inability to create a cooperative working climate in the party.

Moving on to *Sverigedemokraterna*, it has some organisational features in common with *Ny Demokrati*. These will be returned to shortly, but there are also important differences. If NyD was created according to business principles, SD in its early years was more reminiscent of an organisation of "political soldiers", where a thick skin and bravery – often physical – were valued qualities. In some ways, SD in the 1980s and early 1990s contained elements of Duverger's "devotee party", which in contrast to the mass party placed more emphasis on the commitment and ideological awareness of its members than their quantity.[205] This parallel should not be overstated, however. It seems clear that, even though SD was very small in the early years, the aim was to build up a large membership organisation. There was an expectation that the members should be active, but no evidence of formal requirements of activity.

Initially, SD was too small to have an elaborated structure. More or less from the beginning, however, the aim was to build up organisational units at several subnational levels. An article in the internal membership bulletin from October 1989 states that the aim was to create six organisational levels, from "groups" of five to six people, via local and regional units, and clusters of regions, to the national party leadership.[206] These ideas were presented as food for thought rather than a concrete proposal, and it was not realistic in the foreseeable future to achieve an organisational presence throughout the country. The aims, however, were far from the "flat" organisational principle of *Ny Demokrati*. Gradually, SD did build up an organisation with several layers, although this process was slow. In his autobiographical account from 2013, Jimmie Åkesson says that it took two or three fax messages to the central party office before he and his friends got any response to their request to know more about the party. The first response, apparently, was "What do you want"?[207]

Even in 2006, when the party made what can be described as a partial electoral breakthrough, Åkesson describes the organisation as "not particularly big".[208] The ambition, however, has always been to build up a strong party organisation. The SD party rules from 2011 identify three main levels: central, regional (intended to correspond with the parliamentary constituencies) and local (intended to correspond with the local council areas). There is also a fourth level, called the "local working group", but it has fewer defined responsibilities than the local and regional levels.[209] In 2008 the party had 16 regional units. Nominally they covered the entire country, but in some cases the regional units covered much larger areas than the intention, which is that the party regions reflect the parliamentary constituencies.[210] In 2013, however, the number of regional units had grown to 23 (in comparison, there are 29 parliamentary constituencies).[211] The deviations from the constituency structure are not only found in parts of the country where SD is comparatively weak. In southern Sweden, where SD is stronger than the national average, several regions are amalgamated into one very big "SD *syd*" (SD South) region, which gives it a strong position at the congress. This has been an important factor in the development of the party. Jimmie Åkesson and several other leading personalities in the party are from southern Sweden, and it is also in the south that Åkesson and his allies rely on support for the ideological and organisational modernisation process.[212]

The membership size of SD from the early years is not known. According to the veteran Johan Rinderheim, the party had circa 280 members in 1988.[213] The next known figure is from 2001, when the party was reported to have 900 members. This was at the time of the split that led to the creation of *Nationaldemokraterna*. It is possible that the figure may have been somewhat higher just before, as a number of SD members left for ND at this time. In 2002 the figure has been given as 1,000.[214] The development since 2003 is reported in Table 8.3. As was the case for *Ny Demokrati*, the SD figures are hardly impressive, but there is an increasing trend. The only other party to show a positive development in the early 2010s is the Left Party. Still, although the membership of nearly

Table 8.3 Membership statistics for *Sverigedemokraterna*, 2003–2012

Year	*Total members*	*Proportion of electorate (%)*
2003	1,126	0.02
2004	1,740	0.03
2005	1,802	0.03
2006	2,523	0.04
2007	2,913	0.04
2008	3,343	0.05
2009	4,094	0.06
2010	5,846	0.08
2011	5,343	0.08
2012	7,890	0.11

Source: *Sverigedemokraterna* 2013c.

8,000 in 2012 was by far the party's highest ever, it was still the lowest of all parties represented in parliament. Nearest was the Left Party, with 12,000 members.[215]

Sverigedemokraterna has twice conducted surveys among its members, in 2008/2009 and in 2012. Results from these surveys are presented by the party in a report made available online in early 2013. Except where stated, the results reported below refer to the 2012 survey.[216] The entire survey cannot be reported here, but a few points are worthy of attention. The majority of the members have joined SD relatively recently – fewer than 20 per cent have any experience from before Jimmie Åkesson's leadership. As such this is not surprising for a party which has grown considerably in recent years. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that, despite splits and expulsions, 8 per cent of the SD members in 2012 had joined the party between the 1988 and 1995. This figure should of course be treated with caution, but based on a total membership of 5,573 at the time of the survey it would be equivalent to approximately 445 members. In terms of policy the SD members give immigration and law and order high priority, but less so to other important policy areas for SD, such as care of elderly and the EU.

The survey cannot, of course, give more than a snapshot of the membership. It may, however, be a problem for SD that such a sizeable minority of members seem to be left from the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. There is of course no further information available about this group of members, and the skinhead memoir cited above did suggest that the membership in the early 1990s was mixed between skinheads and more "ordinary" people. Nevertheless, the leadership had with regular intervals found it necessary to expel compromising members. This was underlined in October 2012, when the party announced a "zero tolerance" policy. In a letter to all SD representatives in public bodies, Jimmie Åkesson stated that there was no room for extremists, racists, justice wrecks (*rättshaverister*) or "others with a personal need for political or private excesses" in the party. Those with such tendencies were asked to leave voluntarily, or face expulsion.[217]

The policy was not new, even though it was presented as such in the letter. Also earlier, members had been expelled for extremism, or behaviour deemed to bring the party into disrepute. The term "zero tolerance" had, according to Mattsson, already been used by Åkesson in 2005, just after his appointment as party leader.[218] Still, it signified an attempt to intensify the cleaning-up process of the party, and it was widely reported in the media.[219] Shortly after the letter had been sent, however, the tabloid *Expressen* published video clips of three Sweden Democrats involved in a heated argument with Soran Ismail, a stand-up comedian of Kurdish origin, on a street in central Stockholm. The incident had taken place on 3 June 2010, over two months before the party's electoral breakthrough. It had, in fact, been reported by *Expressen* before the 2010 election, but received relatively limited attention at the time.[220]

In November 2012 the story re-emerged, when *Expressen* released video material from the incident. The affair threw SD into its most serious crisis for several years. The three SD representatives involved were Erik Almqvist, Kent

Ekeroth and Christian Westling. The former two were elected to parliament two and a half months after the incident, and held key positions in the party in November 2012, when the affair resurfaced. Westling was also a parliamentary candidate, but not at an electable place on the SD party list. The video clips show Almqvist making abusive remarks to Ismail, including the word *babbe*, a derogatory word derived from *babian*, Swedish for baboon. Almqvist is also heard referring to a female passer-by who questions their behaviour as "the little whore". Another man got involved, and the three SD representatives picked up iron bars lying on the street (apparently parts of dismantled scaffolding), seemingly preparing for a fight. The police then arrived and the situation came to an end. Afterwards the SD representatives can be heard laughing, and Ekeroth says "it is good to know that none of us backs down".[221]

The SD representatives claimed that they had felt threatened, and took the iron bars to defend themselves, an explanation Jimmie Åkesson has called "credible".[222] There is, however, little to suggest that the SD representatives were being threatened or attacked. They do not appear outnumbered and should have been able to leave the situation if they had chosen to. It is not known how the footage reached *Expressen* – it appears that the politically most damaging material had been filmed by Ekeroth, which could suggest that it reached the newspaper via an SD leak. Regardless of these issues, the whole saga was extremely damaging. The media attention was intense, and the party was forced on the defensive.[223] Almqvist and Ekeroth stepped down from their posts as SD spokespersons on economy and justice, respectively. Almqvist was also asked to resign his parliamentary seat, which he did in February 2013. Shortly afterwards he moved to Hungary.[224] Ekeroth, however, was able to stay in parliament. The reason for the difference in treatment was, according to Åkesson, that Ekeroth had not made any obvious political transgressions in the video material.[225] He did not elaborate, but probably meant that Ekeroth could not be heard using the same abusive language as Almqvist.

A further scandal broke before the end of the month. Another SD member of parliament, Lars Isovaara, claimed that he had been robbed of a bag on the way home to his parliamentary flat from a night out. He accused two passers-by, who helped him when he fell out of his wheelchair, of the robbery. The bag was later found in, and returned from, a bar he had visited. Isovaara was then alleged to have insulted a parliamentary security officer of non-Swedish origin, when refused entry into the parliamentary buildings because he did not have his ID card.[226] Isovaara resigned his seat. These incidents put the "zero tolerance" policy to a test. To some extent it is questionable whether the test was passed – there were consequences for all of the four persons involved in the two scandals, but none was expelled from the party and one was able to stay in parliament. This apparent inconsistency was noted by commentators.[227] Indeed, SD did expel several members below parliamentary level. In March 2013, 12 members were thrown out. This included Patrik Ehn, a leading local and regional council representative in western Sweden. The case against Ehn was a combination of his background in Nazi and extremist organisations and more recent statements and

events. Allegedly he had, for example, been in contact with parties such as the German NPD.[228]

The examples could be multiplied. According to an investigation by the current affairs radio programme *Ekot*, presented before the expulsions of Ehn and others, SD had expelled 30 members between the 2010 election and early 2013. This was by far the highest figure for any Swedish party; second highest was three in the Left Party.[229] The expulsions continued also after March 2013.[230] There are no available statistics of the SD expulsions from before 2010, and the more recent material, based on media and Internet sources, is also incomplete. There seems to have been an intensification of the expulsions after the announcement of the zero tolerance policy in 2012, but it is too early to tell whether this represents a more long-term shift – as just mentioned, SD had already earlier expelled more members than other parties. This ruthlessness against the rank and file has led to internal criticism in the party, also among its members of parliament.[231]

Expulsions are decided by the national executive (*Partistyrelsen*), but are prepared by a special membership committee appointed by *Partistyrelsen* within itself.[232] The member in question and her/his local organisation can submit a statement before the decision, but once decided, an expulsion cannot be appealed. The reasons for expulsion stated in the party rules are that a member works against the political aims of the party, violates the party rules or behaves in a way that damages the reputation of the party.[233] The journalists Hamrud and Qvarford identify three reasons for expulsion. First, to have committed a serious crime while holding office as an SD representative. Second, what the party refers to as "cooperation difficulties" in the party. This could involve leaks and intrigue-making. Third, political transgressions. The latter could be subdivided into two categories. On the one hand extremism, such as denial of the Holocaust or, as in the aforementioned case of Patrik Ehn, connections with parties or organisations deemed as unsuitable.[234] On the other hand, expulsions have also taken place when members are deemed to deviate too far from the party line in the opposite direction.

The latter happened to Lennart Carlström, former SD councillor in Härnösand in central Sweden. Carlström had in a TV interview expressed a pragmatic view about mosques, which he saw as "just buildings". He also said that immigrants are not a cultural threat in the area where he lives. These and other statements in the interview led to expulsion, for going against the party line.[235] There is not sufficient available material to assess the relative proportions between the different reasons for expulsion. It should also be noted that transgressions and questionable statements do not always lead to expulsion. An example is Erik Hellsborn, SD councillor in the south-western town of Varberg. After the Breivik killings in 2011 Hellsborn wrote on his blog that the massacre was caused by multiculturalism, and that Breivik had been triggered by mass immigration and multiculturalism. The SD leadership marked distance to the statements, and Hellsborn stopped blogging, but he stayed in the party and has kept his public posts.[236]

Clearly, the many expulsions are part of an attempt to build up a clean party image. In this respect there are clear parallels with the situations discussed in previous chapters, regarding *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway and *Dansk Folkeparti*. The party has a potential to attract extremists and oddballs, and must constantly be aware of members bringing SD into disrepute. A difference between SD and DF, however, is that the oddball problem is dealt with via expulsions rather than entry requirements. The SD party rules state that anyone who is not a member of another political party or a comparable national level political organisation (meaning that membership in other local parties is not ruled out), who is prepared to work for the aims of the party and who agrees to abide by the party rules, can become a member of SD. There is no mention of scrutiny or approval of membership applications, except for previously expelled members, whose re-entry applications have to be approved by the national executive.[237] This is in contrast to *Dansk Folkeparti*, where all membership applications are subject to approval locally as well as by the central party.

As such, the formal structure of *Sverigedemokraterna* does not deviate strongly from mainstream Swedish and Nordic parties. The three layers from the central to the local party levels have already been discussed. The highest decision-making organ in the party is the national congress, called *Landsdagar*, which is held every two years.[238] Until 2009, the congress was called *Riksårsmöte* and held every year. The change from annual to biannual congresses was motivated mainly by cost; it was considered too expensive to hold two national party events in the same year.[239] The other national SD event is the *Kommun- och Landstingskonferens*, often referred to as just *Kommunkonferens* The latter is mainly a forum for development of the party's policies in local and regional councils. It can take decisions, but mainly about the party line in regional and local policy matters, and does not have the same functions as the congress.[240]

In election years there is also a selection conference (*Valkonferens*), which decides on the parliamentary candidate list. For parliamentary elections SD has so far used one single national list for the whole country, and looks like doing so also in 2014. The list is formally decided by the *Valkonferens*, on proposal by a selection committee appointed by the ordinary congress. In practice, however, the SD leadership has decisive influence on the composition of the list. Before the 2010 election, the national *Valkonferens* met in late March. The list of 50 candidates proposed by the selection committee was confirmed after a secret ballot, where 105 delegates voted for, and 38 against, the selection committee proposal. During the preceding debate, the SD leadership made it clear that it wanted a competent parliamentary group, and party secretary Björn Söder reminded delegates of the problems experienced in other parties, such as *Ny Demokrati*.

Söder also remarked that the selection committee had consulted closely with the SD leadership, not least Jimmie Åkesson, when composing the list. All candidates on the list were made to sign a declaration of loyalty to the party when in public office, but also that the candidate has no criminal convictions, has never

been forcefully detained for addiction or psychiatric care and has no tax debts or payment defaults (*betalningsanmärkningar*).[241] There were prospective parliamentary candidates who were not selected due to an earlier criminal record, such as Runar Filper from Värmland in west central Sweden. He has a number of convictions from the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s for offences which allegedly include grievous bodily harm and theft. His life was by all accounts reformed after the mid-1990s and he has been elected to public office as an SD representative in his home region, but the party feared negative press if he had been selected as a parliamentary candidate.[242]

Extra party congresses can only be called by the national executive (*Partistyrelse*; PS), not by the members or subnational party units.[243] The *Partistyrelse* appoints within itself an executive committee (*Verkställande utskott*; VU). The size of these bodies is not specified in the party rules, but in 2013 the PS had 13 full members, including the party chair and 2 deputy chairs, 7 substitute members (*suppleanter*) and ex officio the chair of the SD youth organisation SDU. The VU usually consists of six persons and is, according to the party rules, responsible for the day-to-day administration of the party.[244] The PS and VU or equivalents can all be found in most other parties. On paper the formal party structure does not come across as strongly deviant compared to other parties, although there are anomalies. One is that there are relatively few ways in which members and subnational units can hold the leadership accountable. The frequency of the national congress was reduced in 2009, and only the PS can call an extra congress. There is, furthermore, no facility for a membership ballot in the party rules. Such ballots do take place in practice, but on the initiative of the PS and the only known example was when the party symbol was changed from a yellow and blue torch to a flower, the hepatica (*blåsippa*), in 2006.[245]

Thus, there are elements of centralisation in the written SD rules. There is much to suggest that this is even more pronounced in the de facto organisational structure of the party. If, as discussed in Chapter 7, *Dansk Folkeparti* was for many years in practice led by a tightly knit troika, the actual leadership of SD consists of an easily identifiable group of four young men. Besides Jimmie Åkesson they are Björn Söder, Richard Jomshof and Mattias Karlsson. This small group is often referred to as the "gang of four", an epithet that appears frequently in journalistic accounts but also appears, if somewhat sparingly, in Åkesson's autobiographical book. Other labels include the "Fantastic Four" or the "Skåne Gang" (the latter referring to the southernmost region of Skåne, an SD stronghold).[246]

As already mentioned, the four met as students in Lund in the mid- to late 1990s – Karlsson was apparently the last to join, in 1999.[247] They soon became close friends, and gradually built up a power base, first in the party's youth organisation SDU, and later in the party. Writing in 2009, the journalist Pontus Mattsson's assessment was that the four, were "in full control of the party". There is nothing to suggest that their grip on the party has weakened since. They hold the majority in the VU, and they control the parliamentary organisation built up after the 2010 election. Åkesson will be returned to shortly, but the other three need a brief description.

Björn Söder (1976–) joined SD in 1994. A qualified chemical engineer, he was previously a member of *Framstegspartiet*, one of the two groups that merged into what became SD's predecessor *Sverigepartiet*.[248] Since 2005 he has held the position as party secretary, which means that he has key influence on the party's political as well as organisational development. Hamrud and Qvarford describe him as the "steward" (*ordningspolis*) of the party. Before the parliamentary entry he had held various council posts since 1998; since 2010 he has been the leader of the SD parliamentary group. Söder has been labelled "*Sverigedemokraterna's pitbull*",[249] and can sometimes be hot-tempered in debates. At the same time he is described, also by political opponents, as sharp, on top of his brief and with a developed sense of strategy. Besides his aforementioned support for capital punishment and the state of Israel, he has also been noted for strong statements against the annual gay and lesbian Pride Festival, and parallels drawn between the political climate in Sweden and the German Democratic Republic (DDR).[250]

Richard Jomshof (1969–) joined SD in 1998.[251] He is something of a "grey eminence" in the party, and his contribution has been political as well as organisational. Like Söder he had previously been a member of *Framstegspartiet*.[252] Before becoming a full-time politician in 2006, Jomshof was a secondary school teacher. On several occasions he was dismissed from, or denied, teaching posts because of his involvement with SD.[253] Jomshof has been a full member of the PS since 2001, and was the editor of the SD periodical *SD-Kuriren* between 1999 and 2009. It appears to have been Jomshof's idea to invite readers to send in Prophet Muhammad cartoons to *SD-Kuriren*, which gave SD much publicity and led to the resignation of the foreign minister.[254] He was a councillor in the south-eastern town Karlskrona from 2002, and a regional councillor in Blekinge from 2006, until entering parliament in 2010. He is regarded as pleasant and competent by political opponents, and built up a strong public profile locally and regionally during his time as councillor. He is a hard-hitting critic of Islam, with attacks on, for example, halal slaughter and circumcision. Jomshof has been a member of the synth-pop band Elegant Machinery.[255]

Mattias Karlsson (1977–) joined SD in 1999.[256] He had not been elected to public office before 2010, but held a salaried post in Malmö city council from 2002. As mentioned in Chapter 3 above, such posts are given to parties with enough seats in the bigger city councils. Their holders are appointed by their parties and in practice work as party officials. They are free to devote some of their time to matters not directly related to the council. From his position in Malmö Karlsson thus became an important resource for the party as a whole, especially from 2002 to 2006 when SD was still very small nationally. He was the SD press officer from 2004 to 2010 and became deputy leader of the SD parliamentary group in 2012. Karlsson has been central in the ideological development of the party, and claims to have been the key writer of the 2011 Principles manifesto.[257]

There are other important people in SD, not least to have emerged in recent years. Interviewed in 2010, Björn Söder said that it was more appropriate to speak of a "gang" of 10, or even 12.[258] The composition of any such bigger

group is prone to variation, however, and the "gang of four" represent a continuity that stretches back to the late 1990s. Since Jimmie Åkesson became leader in 2005, their position has been firmly established. They are strongly committed to the ideological and organisational modernisation of the party. To make the party electable, they have ruthlessly (albeit, according to critics, not always consistently) dealt with extremists, dissenters and oddballs. They have redefined the ideological platform and they have drastically changed the party image. All four have developed into experienced politicians who, in terms of ability, would not be out of place in any other party. Their relative youth is also notable – in the 2014 election only Jomshof will have turned 40. Everything suggests that they have complemented each other effectively. They have by no means been without internal opposition, but the party's unequivocal success since the middle of the first decade of the 2000s has given them a position of authority and legitimacy which is difficult to challenge.

The leader since 2005, Jimmie Åkesson has been instrumental in the party's success. He does not meet even generous definitions of charisma, and is rarely if ever described as an inspirational public speaker. Rather, his political style is best described as low-key. He is an effective media communicator, and is always composed in interviews. He can get his message across and has never lost his nerve in a public or media situation. The journalists Hamrud and Qvarford made the interesting observation that he, unlike several other SD representatives, does not take difficult and probing questions from the media personally. Many others in SD, the journalists argue, take difficult questions from journalists as criticism, which means that an interview can easily turn into a debate. Åkesson does not fall into such a trap. He is particularly effective when faced with straight and hard quick-fire questions, a skill he puts to full use in TV debates with time constraints. He can, however, apparently get somewhat lost when required to elaborate on topics he has not chosen himself.[259]

Born in 1979, Åkesson was the youngest leader of the eight incumbent or prospective parliamentary parties during the 2010 election campaign. He has since been overtaken by Annie Lööf of the Centre Party and Gustav Fridolin of the Greens (both born in 1983) but, for some time yet, Åkesson will continue to be regarded as youthful. He cannot, however, be dismissed as a novice. In his recent autobiographical account he denies being a political broiler.[260] While this may be correct in the sense that he is not the product of a marked-out career path in an established party, he has spent a large part of his adult life in full-time politics. He has been salaried by SD since shortly after becoming party leader in 2005 (although the initial salary was apparently not very high).[261] He studied at Lund University but never completed a degree, and he has not had a job outside politics, notwithstanding a seemingly abortive attempt to run an IT business together with Björn Söder.[262] There may be downsides to this apparent lack of outside life experience, possibly not helped by the fact that he has been in what for many years was a very small and almost universally disliked party. On the other hand, his long-term commitment to SD has enabled him to develop considerable amounts of political knowledge and experience. He has spent his

entire adult life dealing with attacks on SD, so has had time to develop and refine the counterarguments.

It is of course difficult for an outsider to judge how Åkesson operates inside *Sverigedemokraterna*. Some interesting information can, however, be taken from a leadership test of Åkesson conducted by the Swedish magazine *Chef*, which specialises in leadership issues. The magazine has made a long series of tests on leading personalities in business and public life. Each leader is given a score, and added to an overall leadership "league table". The test of Åkesson draws on a number of characteristics and judgements, mostly based on anonymous party sources. They should, therefore, not be taken at face value, but treated with appropriate caution they can add to our understanding of the SD leader.[263] Åkesson's leadership is characterised as consensus-seeking, but he tends to keep the consensus within a rather confined group of five to ten people. He avoids conflict, something he confirms in his autobiography.[264] Åkesson prefers to delegate difficult personal issues to trusted people around him, and the dirty work has often been handled by Söder. Also in general, the SD leader is happy to delegate responsibility. This is by many seen as a strength, but others claim that he is unable, or unwilling, to accompany the delegation with clear instructions. On the other hand, Åkesson is given positive reviews for his ability to motivate, communicate and make decisions. The overall grade awarded by the magazine to Åkesson is, nevertheless, the second lowest given to any of the party leaders.[265]

As a leader of a party which is still very unpopular among large parts of the electorate, it is hardly surprising that Åkesson does not perform well in popularity polls. In 2010 he overtook former NyD leaders Vivianne Franzén and Bert Karlsson as the least popular party leader ever recorded by a Swedish Election Study.[266] The lack of personal popularity is reinforced by opinion polls from after the 2010 election.[267] This does not, however, say very much about Åkesson's impact on SD's electoral appeal. Like his party he is still an acquired taste; he is popular among SD supporters but not very popular elsewhere. The analysis of the 2010 election by the Swedish Election Study team suggests that any personal Åkesson effect will at most have been marginal. He does not cost his party votes, but nor is he a major vote-getter.[268] Indeed, Åkesson's role as leader is not to attract votes with charm and a strong personality. Rather, it has been to get the party message across effectively, while avoiding being associated with the party's negative stereotypes, such as extremism and quirkiness.

In this respect, Åkesson has been a very successful leader. In many ways he has found his own style. There is little of the indignation often shown by Pia Kjærsgaard, or drastic humour sometimes used by Ian Wachtmeister or Carl I Hagen. He can hardly be described as exciting, but nor is he provocative or off-putting. His general political competence is not without gaps and, if the analysis in *Chef* is anything to go by, his style of leadership can be improved. Still, he has provided what a party in SD's position needs – someone who calmly and effectively can get the message across. His political style is more focused on the message than on himself as a person. His awareness of the party's problems has also been important. Together with his closest allies he has identified, and been

able to implement, the changes needed to move the party away from the political fringe. In these respects, Åkesson's leadership has been crucial to the recent successes of *Sverigedemokraterna*.

Conclusion

In a book on the Swedish and Norwegian party systems from 2005, the chapter on the populist right deals with *Fremskrittspartiet* and the defunct *Ny Demokrati*. *Sverigedemokraterna* appears in a chapter entitled "The far right: the electoral losers", together with minuscule entities such as *Nationaldemokraterna* and the Norwegian *Fedrelandspartiet*.[269] Since then the picture has been transformed. The argument in this chapter is that the rise of SD cannot be understood without taking internal supply-side factors into account. This will be returned to in the comparative concluding chapter, but here it can already be asserted that the ideological and personal changes in SD have been crucial to the party's success. It is often argued that the leader is not everything, but it seems abundantly clear that if Mikael Jansson had held on to the leadership a few years longer than he did, the route to success for SD would have been delayed. The same applies to the ideological changes. *Sverigedemokraterna* of the mid-1990s, or even early 2000s, was not a feasible choice, except to a marginal part of the electorate. Today's party has undergone a complete overhaul, and it has paid dividends.

Of course, outside events have played a part. The decision by a foreign minister to influence an IT company to close down websites run by SD gave the party welcome, and not entirely negative, media attention. It also let the party claim a major political scalp. The decision by a newly appointed leader of the country's biggest party to take on Jimmie Åkesson in a live TV debate, at a time when SD was well below 4 per cent in most opinion polls, did no harm either. Neither did the decision by the editor of the country's biggest-circulation newspaper to deny SD a paid advertisement, but allow a free debate article. The same can be said about the decision by TV 4 to block the party's TV advert, when it could easily be viewed on the Internet. The examples could be multiplied. The point, however, is that even if these and other decisions by the political and media establishment helped SD, they were hardly decisive. The key factor was that a sufficient number of voters who are concerned about immigration, and who think that it is an important issue neglected by the other parties, had now found a party worth their vote. A party that not only shared their views, but expressed these views in non-racist and non-extremist language. A party that had thrown off the burdensome SD baggage from the 1980s and 1990s. A party they could vote for without feeling guilty.

The fact that SD had the personnel to make the most of available opportunities was of course a contributory factor. The recruitment of Sten Andersson in 2002 was a help in this respect, but it is questionable how decisive it was and Andersson has not so far been followed by other significant recruitments. Rather, SD has relied on people with a long history in the party. Åkesson grabbed with both hands the opportunity to debate with Mona Sahlin on TV. He by no means

swept the floor with Sahlin, but he performed adequately, and that was sufficient. The decision, apparently by Jomshof, to invite controversial cartoons for publication on an SD-run website was a bold one, but it paid off – the SD leadership had understood the dynamics of the political situation in the wake of the Danish cartoons affair, and acted accordingly.

Similarly with the *Aftonbladet* article and the TV 4 advert, the party judged the political situation correctly – it would be vilified by the media and established parties but the message would reach potential voters. The main point, however, is that even if these and other events had not occurred, the outcome would not have been drastically different. The argument is not to put the SD breakthrough in deterministic terms. Rather, it is that the party had learnt its lesson, and provided potential voters with an attractive package. A package which, as long as it was kept intact, would have delivered sooner or later – irrespective of outside events. If Åkesson had made a fiasco out of the debate with Sahlin, it would have been a very serious blow. But if Sahlin had refused to debate with Åkesson, it would at most have temporarily delayed the process.

Of course not everything is rosy for SD. The many expulsions give the party bad press. They show that, despite repeated assurances to the contrary, SD still harbours a worrying underbelly of oddballs and people with dubious political views and connections. The party can most certainly not afford too many "iron bar" affairs. Despite a recent rise in membership, SD also remains organisationally weak. There is latent discontent against the centralisation of the party, which could erupt if the positive trend in the polls is broken. The party is still far from being accepted by the other parties, and the road to a position of policy influence, similar to that of *Dansk Folkeparti* in 2001–2011, remains long. Still, *Sverigedemokraterna* is very unlikely to disappear as quickly as *Ny Demokrati* did. The party will remain a fixture in the Swedish party system. And it has a leadership with the ambition and competence to, eventually, reach a position of influence.

Notes

1 Rydgren 2002, 2006.
2 Rydgren 2006: 119f.
3 Rydgren 2002, 2006.
4 E.g. Kitschelt 1997; Andersen and Bjørklund 2000.
5 Exceptions include Taggart and Widfeldt 1993, Taggart 1996 and Rydgren 2006: 29–86.
6 Carter 2005: 51.
7 Carter 2005: 92.
8 Art 2011, Ch. 3, pp. 86–98.
9 Art 2011: 4ff.
10 The whole list, except Wachtmeister, appears in Karlsson 2007: 165f. The TV chat show, called *Gäst hos Hagge*, had first been broadcast in April 1989. It can be viewed in its entirety via www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-mh5gCAXoo (accessed 17 April 2014). Karlsson's dream government was presented in *Hänt i Veckan*, issue 37/1990 (Tamas 2004: 400).

11 Based on Rydgren 2006: 30f.; Levin 2004: 147–156 and Karlsson 2007: 165–168. The dates given in the text are taken from Levin 2004: 154f.
12 See note 197.
13 Levin 2004; Karlsson 2007, *passim*.
14 Levin 2004: 149ff. Wachtmeister's books included *Ankdammen* (The Duck Pond, Wachtmeister 1988) and *Elefanterna* (The Elephants, Wachtmeister 1990). See also note 10.
15 For a more detailed discussion about *Ny Demokrati* and the 1992 currency crisis, see Widfeldt 2004: 159f.
16 Rydgren 2006: 76f.
17 Karlsson 2007: 175f.
18 Rydgren 2006: 74.
19 Gardberg 1993: 44f.
20 Rydgren 2006: 73f.
21 Rydgren 2006: 72f.; Widfeldt 1999: 43ff.
22 Carty 2004.
23 Rydgren 2006: 78ff.; Levin 2004: 212.
24 Figures taken from Oscarsson 1998: 328f.
25 "Nu har Ny demokrati gått i konkurs" (*Ny Demokrati* has now gone bankrupt), *Aftonbladet* 30 September 2000.
26 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2008a: 194 (the pagination ends two pages earlier). *Svenska Fosterlandspartiet* can be roughly translated as Swedish Fatherland Party. Text in original:

> 1988. Lördagen den 6 februari samlades ett tjugotal personer i en lägenhet i Stockholm. Syftet var att bilda ett politiskt parti. Man diskuterade partiets utformning, politik och namn. Bland de namnförslag som nämndes kan nämnas Svenska Fosterlandspartiet. Till slut enades man om namnet Sverigedemokraterna, och man enades även om att partiet nu skulle anses vara bildat.

The text has previously been published on the party's Internet home page (Ekman and Poohl 2010: 74). In 2012, however, the SD home page merely reported the date of the formation, without further details.
27 According to Ekman and Poohl 2010: 74, one of those involved claims in an interview that there was no formal meeting, as described by SD. The interviewee is Johnny Berg, who briefly was the SD spokesperson before leaving politics in late 1988 (Larsson and Ekman 2001: 112).
28 Lodenius and Larsson 1991: 34 give the date of SvPs' formation as 16 November 1986, but the exact date varies in other sources.
29 This was before the formation of the Danish and Norwegian namesakes, but the name had already been used by parties in Finland and Iceland (see p. 130).
30 These earlier attempts resulted in the formation of *Medborgerlig Samling*, a cross-party centre-right list presented in southern Sweden in the parliamentary elections of 1964 and 1968, gaining three seats on the former occasion.
31 Lodenius and Larsson 1991: 59–63; Larsson and Ekman 2001: 89–94. See note 248.
32 Lodenius and Larsson 1991, Ch. 1 (racist cartoon and quote defending apartheid on p. 29); Larsson and Ekman 2001, Ch. 3.
33 This is shown on images from an SD rally in November 1998, published in the party periodical *SD-Kuriren*, 33/1998, p. 7.
34 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 97–105; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 55–63.
35 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 107–111; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 74f.
36 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 117f., 341. According to this source, Ekström was also a member of the SD national executive (*Partistyrelse*).
37 Lööw 1999: 210. The interview with Ekström was made in January 1993, and appeared in a two-part TV documentary entitled *Blågul Nazism* (Yellow and blue Nazism). See bibliography: "Other media sources".

38 "En nationell rörelse för ett halvsekel sedan" (A national movement half a century ago), *SD-Kuriren* 7/8 1989. Lodenius and Larsson 1991: 51; Larsson and Ekman 2001: 119ff. Walles had earlier been known for his book *Jazz on the Attack* from 1946, in which he argues that jazz music can only be understood against the background that it was created by "intoxicated negroes" in a "brothel environment".
39 "Svenskt och osvenskt", *Sverigedemokraternas Medlemsbulletin*, November 1989; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 147.
40 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 65f., 116f.; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 32, 75.
41 Larsson and Ekman 2001:62f., 341; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 31, 53, 110.
42 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 125; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 76, 78.
43 Ekman and Poohl 2010: 147ff.
44 Blomgren 1999: 53f.
45 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 125f.; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 78f.
46 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 127f.; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 77. The activist Ulf Ranshede had also been convicted of similar crimes earlier, but received suspended sentences. This time he received a two-month jail sentence.
47 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 225f.
48 A graphical account of such a meeting, held on 30 November 1991, appears in Tamas 2004. See also Larsson and Ekman 2001: 140ff. and Ekman and Poohl 2010: 100ff.
49 Rinderheim 2008.
50 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 168f.; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 112. It should be noted that SD never had its own party uniform; the practice clamped down on was the use by individuals or small groups of a variety of other outfits.
51 Egonsson 2012: 45f. (receives SD leaflet), 59ff. (first SD meeting), 93f. (exit from SD).
52 Rinderheim 2008: 94. Rinderheim had been involved in the formation of SD. He left the party for a few years in the 1990s, but returned to hold a variety of positions. Larsson and Ekman (2001: 108) regarded Rinderheim as SD's "chief ideologue". In the 2000s, he was the chair of the SD district of greater Stockholm and Gotland, and a city councillor in Nynäshamn, but following a dispute with the central leadership, he left the party in August 2008.
53 In the very beginning the party did not have a formal leader, but a position as spokesperson, which was first held jointly by Leif Zeilon (Ericson) and Johnny Berg (see note 27). Klarström took the post in late 1988, and shortly afterwards became the first "proper" party leader. See Larsson and Ekman 2001: 112.
54 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 150–157; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 108f. Klarström then left politics, and apparently changed his political views (Ekman and Poohl 2010: 109).
55 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999: 4.
56 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 170ff.; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 163f.
57 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 170.
58 Ekman and Poohl 2010: 123f.
59 Ekman and Poohl 2010: 125ff.
60 In 1995, a number of radical elements had defected from SD to form *Hembygdspartiet* (Homeland Party); Ekman and Poohl 2010: 109f.
61 Larsson and Ekman 2001: 183–186.
62 Ekman and Poohl 2010: 126f. *Nationaldemokraterna* was disbanded in April 2014.
63 Ekman and Poohl 2010: 129ff.
64 Slätt 2005; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 132f.
65 http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=1637&artikel=792444 (accessed 17 April 2014).
66 Mattsson 2010: 74–77; Åkesson 2013: 84f.; *SD-Kuriren*, issue 67 (March 2006), p. 6. Freivalds was also under pressure for other issues, primarily her handling of the Tsunami disaster in December 2004, but the closure of the SD websites was the decisive factor.

67 E.g. "*Sd:s stolar i kommunfullmäktige tomma*" (SD council seats left empty), *Ystads Allehanda* 4 August 2007; "*Sd-motioner endast teknikaliteter*", (passive SD councillors) *Sydöstran* 1 August 2007. See also Poohl and Hjälte 2007.
68 Lindohf & Hjälte 2007.
69 "*Sverigedemokrater i domstolarna*", *Svenska Dagbladet* 18 October 2006 www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/sverigedemokrater-i-domstolarna_362444.svd (accessed 18 October 2006). The SD representation in the court system is mostly concentrated to the 96 local *Tingsrätter*. Instead of a jury system, Swedish courts employ a system of lay judges (*nämndemän)* appointed by the local councils, which in practice means that they are appointed by the local political parties.
70 "På jakt efter mer makt" (Aiming for more power), *Dagens Nyheter* 21 October 2007 www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/pa-jakt-efter-mer-makt/ (accessed 17 April 2014). State subsidies to political parties are regulated by law; *Lag (1972:625) om statligt stöd till politiska partier*.
71 The SIFO and Synovate polls started reporting SD as a separate party shortly before the election, in the very frequent polls published in the run-up to election day. They then continued to report SD separately after the election. Most other opinion poll organisations started doing so at the beginning of 2007.
72 Isaksson 2008: 346f. Sahlin's first TV debate was against Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt in March 2007, a few days after Sahlin had become party leader.
73 In 2007, SD reached 4 per cent or more in polls by Sentio Research (March) and Demoskop (May, September and October). In 2008, the party registered 4 per cent or more in polls by SIFO, Demoskop, Skop, Sentio Research and Novus Opinion.
74 "Muslimerna är vårt största hot" (The Muslims are our greatest threat), *Aftonbladet* 19 October 2009 www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/debattamnen/politik/article12049791.ab (accessed 19 October 2009).
75 This brief account is based on Häger 2012, Ch. 8, which provides a detailed discussion of the article, its background and its consequences.
76 www.youtube.com/watch?v=XkRRdth8AHc (accessed 17 April 2014).
77 Hamrud and Qvarford 2010: 271.
78 Hamrud and Qvarford 2010: 273.
79 www.youtube.com/watch?v=nXTDtIQXYbA (accessed 17 April 2014).
80 www.danskfolkeparti.dk/Svensk_presse_opfører_sig_i_som_i_en_bananrepublik.asp (accessed 17 April 2014).
81 "Kjærsgaard gav SD sitt stöd i Höganäs" (Kjærsgaard gave SD her support in Höganäs), *Dagens Nyheter* 12 September 2010.
82 One incident, which occurred in early June 2010 involving two future SD members of parliament, was reported in the press the week before the election, but received limited attention at the time. This was the so-called iron bar affair, which became a major media story in November 2012. It will be discussed further below.
83 Hamrud and Qvarford 2010: 267ff.
84 Hamrud and Qvarford 2010: 291f.
85 *Aftonbladet* 19 September 2010. In original: *Vi gillar olika*.
86 *Expressen* 19 September 2010. In original: *Nej! I dag röstar vi för Sverige mot främlingsfientligheten*.
87 The figure only reports poll from SIFO and Synovate/Ipsos, but the author has also collected and compiled opinion polls from Demoskop, Novus, United Minds, Sentio, Skop, YouGov and Statistics Sweden (SCB). In 2011 SD was below 4 per cent in one poll; Synovate in August ("Fyra partier under riksdagsspärren", *Dagens Nyheter* 26 August 2011); in 2012 and 2013 the party was never below 4 per cent in any poll by the cited companies. The highest rating in 2012 was 12.3 per cent (Sentio, November). Sentio reported the party as above 10 per cent also in October and December. Other polls reporting SD above 10 per cent were SIFO (December),

United Minds (November) and YouGov (December). In 2013, the highest SD rating was 14.1 per cent (Sentio, October). All the other mentioned pollsters except SIFO and Skop had SD above 10 per cent in at least one poll.

88 Figures calculated by author; based on polls from January until the end of October 2013.

89 "Hård kritik mot SD:s uttåg" (Hard criticism against SD walk-out), *Dagens Nyheter* 6 October 2010.

90 SD did not have enough seats to enforce on its own a motion of no confidence, which requires support from at least 35 members. A vote of confidence or investiture counts as rejected unless it is supported by more than half of all members of parliament, irrespective of abstentions or absences. This in practice means that abstentions are regarded as passive support for the government. Thus *Ny Demokrati* passively supported the formation of a centre-right minority coalition in 1991 by abstaining in the vote of investiture. After a constitutional amendment confirmed in November 2010, a vote of investiture will in the future be mandatory after every election.

91 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2012a.

92 "Regeringen lyckas slå två flugor i en smäll" (Government kills two birds with one stone). *Dagens Nyheter* 17 August 2011.

93 "SD: Vi behöver ett femte jobbskatteavdrag" (SD: We need a fifth income tax deduction), *Aftonbladet* 28 June 2012 www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/article15045706.ab (accessed 17 April 2014).

94 The organisation still exists; its Internet page can be accessed via www.dnv.se/. It was formed in 1988 by Patrik Engellau who had previously worked for *Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen*, a predecessor of *Svenskt Näringsliv* (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise). Wachtmeister had even made an abortive attempt to make The New Welfare into a political party in the spring of 1990 (Levin 2004: 151).

95 *Ny Demokrati* 1991, pp. iv (constitutional reform), v (taxes), vi (EC, foreign and security policy), vii (crime), ix (public sector and monopolies) and xiii (sickness benefits and retirement schemes). The constitutional reform proposals were based on MOU 1988.

96 The entire printed document of the 1991 NyD programme consisted of 20 pages, excluding the cover. The first 16 pages consisted of the actual manifesto, and the remaining 4 pages of an Appendix with statistics about how taxes could be reduced.

97 *Ny Demokrati* 1991, p. viii.

98 *Riksdag* motions 1991/92:SF622, Sf630 and K217; 1992/93:Sf22 and SF628; 1993/94:Sf621. Available via www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/.

99 *Ny Demokrati* 1993a.

100 *Ny Demokrati* 1991: xvii, 1993a: 32. In original: "Ett bättre, roligare och billigare liv". The alcohol reform proposals were specified in a separate section.

101 *Ny Demokrati* 1994.

102 Observation by the author, Göteborg (*Bältesspännarparken*), 31 July 1992.

103 Rydgren 2006: 54. The murder Franzén was referring to had been committed by a mentally ill immigrant. There was no evidence that it had been ritualistic, or linked to religion. See Levin 2004: 202f.

104 See, for example, Rydgren 2006: 51–57; Gardberg 1993: 100ff.

105 Kitschelt 1997: viii.

106 *Ny Demokrati* 1991: 6, 1993a: 18.

107 *Riksdag* minutes 1993/94:68 (2 March 1994); speech 7, www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Kammaren/Protokoll/Riksdagens-snabbprotokoll-1993_GH0968/ (accessed 17 April 2014).

108 *EU? Javisst! Du bestämmer* (EU? Yes! You decide). *Ny Demokrati* 1994: 4. The same message also appeared on NyD election posters. *Ny Demokrati* later changed into an EU-critical position, but this was when the party was no longer significant.

109 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999: 4. In original: "Sverigedemokraterna är ett nationellt mittenparti … Sverigedemokraterna hyllar nationalismen därför att den så eftertryckligt hävdar det egna folkets värde och intressen".

110 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005a: 4. In original: "Sverigedemokraterna är ett demokratiskt, nationalistiskt parti".

111 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005a: 4. In original: "Vi har idémässigt låtit oss inspireras av såväl det förra sekelskiftets svenska nationalkonservatism som delar av den socialdemokratiska folkhemstanken. Syftet är att kombinera principen om grundläggande social rättvisa med traditionella värdekonservativa idéer".

112 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 3, *Inledning*. In original:

> "Sverigedemokraterna är ett socialkonservativt parti med nationalistisk grundsyn, som betraktar värdekonservatism och upprätthållandet av en solidarisk välfärdsmodell som de viktigaste verktygen i byggandet av det goda samhället … Sverigedemokraterna eftersträvar ett försiktigt framåtskridande som baseras på varsamhet, eftertanke och långsiktigt ansvarstagande. Partiets ambition är att kombinera de bästa elementen från de traditionella höger- och vänsterideologierna. Vi bejakar lag och ordning, gemensamhetsskapande traditioner, samhällsbärande institutioner och bevisat välfungerande naturliga gemenskaper i form av familjen och nationen … Genom att basera vår politik på ovan nämnda strävanden och genom att kombinera frihet och trygghet, individualism och gemenskap, hoppas vi dock kunna återskapa ett folkhem som i så hög grad som möjligt är präglat av trygghet, välstånd, demokrati och en stark inre solidaritet.

113 The Swedish word *grundsyn* is in some dictionaries translated into English as "basic view". Possible alternative translations could be "fundamental view", or "foundational view".

114 "SD antog nytt partiprogram" (SD adopts new Party manifesto), *Expo* online http://expo.se/2011/sd-antog-nytt-partiprogram_4539.html (accessed 17 April 2014). For the debate before the congress, see, for example, Larsson, J. (blog of Joakim Larsson, SD council representative and employed by the SD parliamentary office: http://jockelarson.wordpress.com/category/sverigedemokraterna/riksarsmoten-sverigedemokraterna/, accessed 18 July 2013).

115 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005a: 6, seventh paragraph. In original: "svensk är den som av sig själv och som av andra uppfattas som svensk".

116 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1989: 11. In original: "Sverigedemokraterna anser att Sverige i sin homogena befolkningssammansättning haft en ovärderlig tillgång".

117 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1994: 10; *Sverigedemokraterna* 1996: 11, section *Befolkningspolitik* (population policy); *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999: 14. Wording in original language identical to note 116. The 1989 (p. 3), 1994 (p. 4), 1996 (p. 4) and 1999 (p. 3) documents also state that the party believes that a culturally and ethnically homogenous nation is better suited for a democratic development.

118 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005a: 5. In original: "Den viktigaste faktorn i ett tryggt, harmoniskt och solidariskt samhälle är den gemensamma identiteten, vilken i sin tur förutsätter en hög grad av etnisk och kulturell likhet bland befolkningen".

119 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005a: 5. In original:

> Den nationalistiska principen bygger på idén om nationalstaten, att statens territoriella gränser ska överensstämma med de befolkningsmässiga gränserna. I sin ideala form är alltså ett sådant samhälle befolkningsmässigt homogent. De rådande omständigheterna i Sverige och i omvärlden ornöjliggör att principen praktiseras till fullo.

120 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 22. In original: "Vare sig negativ eller positiv särbehandling på basis av kön, ålder, sexuell läggning, nationalitet eller etnisk tillhörighet

skall vara tillåtet på den svenska arbetsmarknaden". The main purpose of this proposal is to argue against positive discrimination on the labour market.

121 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 9. In original:

> Sverigedemokraterna definierar den svenska nationen i termer av lojalitet, gemensam identitet, gemensamt språk och gemensam kultur. Medlem av den svenska nationen kan man enligt vår uppfattning bli genom att antingen födas in den eller genom att senare i livet aktivt välja att uppgå i den.

122 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 8. In original: "Eftersom vi definierar nationen i termer av kultur, språk, identitet och lojalitet, och inte i termer av historisk nationstillhörighet eller genetisk grupptillhörighet, så är vår nationella gemenskap öppen även för människor med bakgrund i andra nationer".

123 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 9. In original:

> Som infödd svensk räknar vi den som är född eller i tidig ålder adopterad till Sverige av svensktalande föräldrarmed svensk eller nordisk identitet.Som assimilerad till den svenska nationen räknar vi den med icke-svensk bakgrund som talar flytande svenska, uppfattar sig själv som svensk, lever i enlighet med den svenska kulturen, ser den svenska historien som sin egen och känner större lojalitet med den svenska nationen än med någon annan nation.

124 In the 1994 manifesto, the adoption of non-Nordic children should be "strictly restricted" (*starkt begränsas*); in 1996 the adoption of children from outside "the western cultural sphere" (*den västerländska kulturkretsen*) should "cease" (*upphöra*); in 1999 the adoption of children of "non-European origin" (*ursprung utanför Europa*) should cease (*Sverigedemokraterna* 1994: 11, 1996: 12, 1999: 15. The advocacy of a ban on non-European adoptions was abandoned at an extra party congress in December 2002 (Åkesson 2008: 12f.).

125 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 9. In original:

> På samma sätt som den som är född in i en annan nation senare i livet kan bli en del av den svenska nationen menar vi också att man även som infödd svensk kan upphöra att vara en del av den svenska nationen genom att byta lojalitet, språk, identitet eller kultur. Det faktum att vi ser assimilering som möjlig och eftersträvansvärd är inte detsamma som att vi också ser den som okomplicerad. Assimileringsprocessen är ofta lång och problemfylld och historien visar att det ibland kan ta flera generationer innan den är slutförd och i vissa fall lyckas den inte överhuvudtaget, utan leder istället till uppkomsten av segregerade och särkulturella samhällen. Ju mer en invandrares ursprungliga identitet och kultur skiljer sig ifrån den svenska nationens och ju större gruppen av invandrare är, desto svårare blir assimileringsprocessen.

126 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1989: 11. In original: "Sverigedemokraterna anser att Sverige måste kraftigt begränsa invandringen…"

127 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1994: 10. In original: "Sverigedemokraterna vill stoppa all invandring av människor från etniskt avlägsna kulturer".

128 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1996: 11. In original: "Sverigedemokraterna vill stoppa all invandring av människor som har sitt ursprung utanför den västerländska kulturkretsen".

129 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999: 14. In original: "Sverigedemokraterna vill därför ha en starkt reglerad invandringspolitik".

130 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2003/2005: 6. In original: "[Den nationalistiska] principen omöjliggör inte invandring. Däremot måste invandringen hållas på en sådan nivå att den inte i grunden förändrar befolkningssammansättningen på så vis att etniska enklaver uppstår."

131 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 14. In original: "Sverigedemokraterna motsätter sig inte invandring, men menar att invandringen måste hållas på en sådan nivå och vara av en sådan karaktär att den inte utgör ett hot mot vår nationella identitet eller mot vårt lands välfärd och trygghet".
132 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1989: 11. In original: "… verka för återflyttning av invandrare av utomeuropeisk härkomst".
133 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1994: 10. In original: "Sverigedemokraterna vill stoppa all invandring av människor från etniskt avlägsna kulturer. Stora resurser måste avsättas för att skapa förutsättningar för att de som kommit till vårt land efter 1970 ska kunna återvända till sina respektive länder inom en snar framtid". See also Larsson and Ekman 2001: 166f.; Rydgren 2006: 110f.
134 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999: 14f. In original: "Det finns idag stora befolkningsgrupper av nyligen inflyttade människor från "tredje världen" som är helt alienerade från det svenska samhället … Sverigedemokraterna vill därför verka för återflyttning av sådana invandrare därest inget skyddsbehov föreligger".
135 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005b: 2; *Sverigedemokraterna* 2007: 7f.
136 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 15. In original: "Ett aktivt och generöst stöd skall … ges till de invandrare som önskar återvända till sina hemländer".
137 See, for example, *Riksdag* motion 2012/13:Sf316, by Jimmie Åkesson and six other SD representatives: www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Motioner/En-ansvarsfull-invandringspoli_H002Sf316/?text=true (accessed 17 April 2014).
138 E.g. Jomshof 2008: 181.
139 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005b, 2007.
140 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1989: 1. Erlander is alleged to have said this in 1965, in a comparison between Sweden and the USA, but no exact source is given.
141 See notes 55–57.
142 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 8. In original: "Sverigedemokraternas nationalism är öppen och ickerasistisk".
143 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 13. In original:

> Sverigedemokraternas … blir starka motståndare till mångkulturalismen som politisk idé och samhällssystem … Huruvida slutmålet med de mångkulturalistiska strävandena är att skapa ett samhälle där alla nationella kulturer upplöses- och sammanblandas till en ny gemensam mångkultur eller om det är att särkulturellt samhälle där en mängd vitt skilda nationella kulturer existerar parallellt inom samma stat, är för oss ovidkommande. Vår uppfattningär att bägge dessa scenarion kommer att leda till ett försämrat samhällsklimat med ökad rotlöshet, segregation, motsättningar, otrygghet och minskad välfärd som följd. Värt att notera är att förekomsten av invandrare och utländska kulturimpulser inte per automatik gör ett samhälle mångkulturellt enligt vår definition. Ett samhälle likt till exempel det svenska samhället på 1960-talet, med en uttalat överordnad majoritetskultur och en aktiv assimileringspolitik … är … inte att betrakta som en mångkultur enligt vår definition. Vårt alternativ till mångkulturalismen är en återgång till en gemensamhetsskapande assimilationspolitik liknande den som rådde i landet fram till år 1975, där målsättningen är att invandrare skall ta seden dit de kommer och på sikt överge sina ursprungliga kulturer och identiteter för att istället bli en del av den svenska nationen … allt statligt och kommunalt stöd som syftar till att invandrare skall bevara och stärka sina ursprungliga kulturer och identiteter dras in.

144 See Chapter 7.
145 The phrase "mass immigration" (*massinvandring*) appears once in the 2011 Principles manifesto (*Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 14). It is regularly used by SD representatives in parliamentary documents and debates.

146 Widfeldt, forthcoming. The exact percentages devoted to immigration in SD election manifestos were 13.1 (in 2002), 20.2 (in 2006) and 12 (in 2010). The method of measurement is not the same as the one used here.
147 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1989: 14, 1994: 13, 1996: 14.
148 This happened most recently in 2009, when a motion by Joakim Larsson to introduce capital punishment lost with 120 votes to 3 (Larsson, J.: http://jockelarson.wordpress.com/2009/10/, accessed 17 April 2014). Larsson claims on his blog that he was subject to heated attacks from the party leadership during the debate.
149 An example is Björn Söder, SD party secretary since 2005. Söder does not, however, appear to pursue the issue (Mattsson 2010: 44f). According to a survey by the tabloid *Aftonbladet* in 2009, 31 per cent of SD local councillors were in favour of the death penalty (*SD visar sitt rätta ansikte*; SD shows its true face, Aftonbladet 22 February 2009 www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article12044592.ab, accessed 1 August 2013).
150 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999: 17f., 2005a: 9.
151 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 25. In original: "Brottsoffers och potentiella brottsoffers intressen måste i alla lägen sättas framför brottslingars intressen".
152 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011b. Life imprisonment without a time limit already exists in Sweden, but it is possible to apply for pardon. Since 2006 it has also been possible to apply to have the sentence converted into a fixed term sentence. According to an article in the journal of the Swedish Bar Association, 31 such applications had been received by late 2008, of which 17 had been approved. The successful applicants had served, or would serve, an average total of 22 years on their release. See www.advokatsamfundet.se/Documents/Advokaten/Advokaten_8-08_LR.pdf /. The cited article is on p. 33f. (accessed 17 April 2014).
153 Åkesson 2008: 7.
154 *Sverigedemokratetna* 2005a: 7, 2011a: 28. Latter document in original: "Vi ser med stark skepsis på samarbeten som tar sig överstatliga former, det vill säga då det bildas en politisk union, vars konstitution står över medlemsstaternas".
155 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2010: 7.
156 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1989: 9, 1994: 11, 1996: 12.
157 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999: 15.
158 The party made this proposal in parliamentary motions, for example 2012/13 So574, signed by Julia Kronlid and four other SD representatives.
159 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1996: 9, 1999: 10. In original:

> Trakasserier mot sexuellt avvikande är kriminella handlingar och bör bestraffas … Förhärligandet av den homosexuella livsstilen inom t.ex. massmedia skapar osunda referensramar för unga människor som håller på att bygga upp sin vuxna identitet. Registrerat partnerskap för homosexuella skall inte tillåtas. De särskilda arvsregler som gäller de på heterosexuell och monogam grund bildade familjerna skall endast avse dessa, d.v.s. inte gälla andra samlevnadsformer som homosexuella par, polygami m.fl. Homosexuella par och polygama familjer skall inte få adoptera barn.

160 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 15.
161 *Sverigedemokraterna: Fler homo- och bisexuella söker sig till oss* (Sweden Democrats: More homo- and bisexuals are coming to us), *Dagens Nyheter* 26 July 2010.
162 *SD – ett parti för HBT-personer* (SD – a party for Homo- Bi- and Transsexuals), *Aftonbladet* 30 March 2010. Quote in original: "Det är också en tydlig indikation på den starka oro som många homosexuella känner inför massinvandringen och det homohat som den tilltagande islamiseringen medför".
163 Hamrud and Qvarford 2010: 104–119.
164 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1989: 6f., 2011a :21.
165 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1989: 6f., 2011a: 21.

166 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1989: 6, 1994: 6, 1996: 7, 1999: 7f. The wording is identical in each document:

> Sverigedemokraterna vill bevara den blandekonomiska struktur varpå dagens samhälle vilar. Vi vänder oss emot en alltför stark privat maktkoncentration såväl som ett socialistiskt planhushållningsystem. Marknadsekonomiska principer skall vara vägledande för den näringspolitiska utvecklingen. Då kan samhället bäst tillvarata den enskildes initiativkraft och flit.

167 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1996: 7.
168 *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999: 16f., 2011a: 23.
169 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2012b; *SD vill spara på flyktingar* (SD wants to save on refugees) *Riksdag & Departement* 26/2012.
170 *SD vill minska invandring med 90 procent* (SD wants to reduce immigration by 90 per cent), *Dagens Nyheter* 27 September 2012. *Borg: Kostnaderna för invandring skulle öka* ([Finance minister Anders] Borg: The cost of immigration would increase), *Dagens Nyheter* 3 October 2012.
171 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2010: 6.
172 Mattsson 2010: 47, 55f.
173 *SD måste erkänna en palestinsk stat* (SD must recognise a Palestinian state), *Aftonbladet* 7 November 2011 www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/article13896118.ab (accessed 4 August 2013).
174 *Ledande SD-politiker kritiserar* SDU (Leading SD politicians criticise SDU); *Expo* onlinehttp://expo.se/2011/ledande-sd-politiker-kritiserar-sitt-ungdomsforbund_4490.html (accessed 17 April 2014).
175 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 27.
176 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 26.
177 This also applies to the party's Policy programme for local councils from 2013 (*Sverigedemokraterna* 2013a).
178 SD has also submitted motions to parliament, proposing that the congestion charges in Göteborg be subject to a referendum, but the party has not brought up congestion charges more in general.
179 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011a: 4.
180 For a discussion of Per Albin Hansson and the "people's home" concept, see Sejersted 2011: 159–162.
181 Taggart 1996: 125.
182 Karlsson 2007: 168.
183 For example Stefan Kihlberg, who represented NyD in parliament 1991–1994 (Levin 2004: 159).
184 Karlsson 2007: 168.
185 Rydgren 2006: 73f.
186 Rydgren 2006: 55; www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPv6w26U6vs (accessed 17 April 2014). The words in the YouTube clip differ somewhat from Rydgren's quote; it is possible that Bouvin made the statement on more than one occasion, with variations in the exact wording.
187 *Riksdag* minutes 1993/94:119 (7 June 1994), speech no. 102, www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Kammaren/Protokoll/Riksdagens-snabbprotokoll-1993_GH09119/ (accessed 17 April 2014). The gestures were an attempt to illustrate a distinction between "not normal" and "normal" sexuality. An excerpt from the debate, with the gestures, can be viewed on www.youtube.com/watch?v=FMJzGof08gM (accessed 17 April 2014). Bouvin later became leader of NyD, 1997–1998, but by this time the party was insignificant.
188 According to Statistics Sweden 1991: 499, NyD received a total of 335 local council seats, but these were in some cases in practice left vacant because the party had no candidates, or candidates who resigned at once.

189 Rydgren 2006: 74.
190 *Ny Demokrati* 1992.
191 *Ny Demokrati* 1993b.
192 Taggart 1996: 127.
193 Rydgren 2006: 72f.; Taggart 1996: 126.
194 Karlsson 2007: 173–178; see also Gardberg 1993: 45.
195 *Ny Demokrati* 1993b.
196 Widfeldt 1999, Appendix II. The NyD membership figures between 1991 and 1995 are reported on p. 310.
197 According to Taggart 1996: 125, Wachtmeister was formally elected as the sole leader in 1992, but in his official Riksdag biography, he is given as NyD chairperson from 1991 (*Enkammarriksdagen* 1971–1993/1994, vol. I: 192).
198 Gardberg 1993: 44f. In his autobiography, Karlsson (2007: 174) states that he normally spent two days a week in parliament.
199 Taggart 1996: 136; Rydgren 2006: 64.
200 Rydgren 2006: 85.
201 Karlsson's negative record has since been surpassed by *Ny Demokrati* leader Vivianne Franzén in 1994, and SD leader Jimmie Åkesson in 2010 (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013: 318).
202 Gilljam and Holmberg 1993: 98–108.
203 In a radio documentary from 2006, Wachtmeister calls Franzén "one of the best public speakers [*folktalare*] Sweden has ever seen". "Ny Demokrati – en politisk historia" by Björn Häger. Available as MP3 file via http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=909&artikel=879920 (accessed 17 April 2014). The quote from Wachtmeister appears just after 39 minutes into the programme.
204 This is the author's own judgement, based on his own memories plus video recordings from the 1994 election campaign.
205 Duverger 1964: 70.
206 "Partiets organisatoriska uppbyggnad" (The organisational structure of the party), no author given, *Sverigedemokraternas Medlemsbulletin* October 1989.
207 Åkesson 2013: 33.
208 Åkesson 2013: 88.
209 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011c.
210 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2008b.
211 http://sverigedemokraterna.se/vart-parti-2/sd-lokalt/ (accessed 2 October 2013).
212 Ekman and Poohl 2010: 345f.
213 Rinderheim 2008: 94.
214 The figures from 2001 and 2002 are from Widfeldt 2008; original source Wikipedia (no longer accessible). The 2001 membership figure is reported to be from June, which was at the time of the SD-ND split.
215 Wrede and Dellby 2013.
216 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2013b, where the survey methodology is also explained. Both surveys were sent to the entire party membership. The first survey was conducted in late 2008 and early 2009. A total of 820 members responded, 314 online and 506 by mail questionnaire. Based on a total membership of 3,343 (as of 31 December 2008), this meant a response rate of 24.5 per cent. The second survey was conducted in the summer of 2012. A total of 2,831 members responded, all online. Based on a total membership of 5,573 (as of 31 August 2012; not reported in Table 8.3), this meant a response rate of 50.8 per cent. The party's report states that the responses in both surveys were largely representative of the total membership in terms of gender, age and geographical location. The only partial exception was that the oldest age group was underrepresented in the purely Internet-based 2012 survey.

217 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2012c. In original:

> I vårt parti finns inget utrymme för extremister, rasister, rättshaverister eller andra med ett personligt behov av politiska eller privata utsvävningar … Den som känner sig träffad av eller har problem med dessa skarpa formuleringar bör genast lämna Sverigedemokraterna frivilligt. Det skulle bespara oss en hel del arbete. Den som ändå väljer att stanna kvar, kommer inom kort att bli föremål för personärende och uteslutning.

218 Mattsson 2010: 24. See also Åkesson 2013: 219.

219 E.g. *Jimmie Åkesson rensar ut i partiet* (Jimmie Åkesson clear-out in party), *Dagens Nyheter* 13 October 2012.

220 *SD-toppar i bråk med komiker* (SD top names in row with comedian), *Expressen* 14 September 2010 www.expressen.se/nyheter/val-2010/sd-toppar-i-brak-med-komiker/ (accessed 17 July 2013).

221 www.expressen.se/tv/nyheter/inrikes/sds-riksdagsman-bevapnar-sig-med-jarnror/ (accessed 17 April 2014). There are several clips on the Internet. The words *SD* and *järnrör* will bring hits on Google as well as YouTube.

222 Åkesson 2013: 188.

223 The story first appeared in *Expressen* on 14 November, and made the remaining press the following day. It was then reported extensively for several days.

224 *Almqvist: Därför flyttade jag till Ungern* (Almqvist: That is why I moved to Hungary), *Aftonbladet* 29 April 2013. His reasons were that national conservatism and nationalism are the norm in Hungary, and that he felt threatened by "subcultural groups" after his exit from the parliament meant that he lost his personal protection from the Swedish Security Service.

225 *Ekeroth kvar trots järnröret* (Ekeroth stays despite iron bar) *Dagens Nyheter* 16 November 2012.

226 *Ny skandal skakar SD* (SD shaken by new scandal) *Dagens Nyheter* 29 November 2012.

227 E.g. the political columnist Maria Crofts in *Dagens Nyheter*: *Visa att nolltoleransen gäller, Åkesson* (Show that the zero tolerance counts, Åkesson) *Dagens Nyheter* 29 November 2012.

228 *Tolv personer utesluts ur SD* (Twelve people expelled from SD) *Göteborgs-Posten* 18 March 2013 www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.1429305-tolv-personer-utesluts-ur-sd (accessed 17 April 2014); Åkesson 2013: 95f.

229 *30 sverigedemokrater uteslutna sedan förra valet* (30 Sweden Democrats expelled since last election), http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=5437808 (accessed 4 October 2013).

230 E.g. *SD utseluter gruppledare i Halland* (SD expels [regional council] group leader in Halland), *Göteborgs-Posten* 19 September 2013 www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2045077-sd-utesluter-gruppledare-i-halland (accessed 17 April 2014); *SD-toppens attack mot Leman* (Top SD name's attack on [expellee Martin] Leman), *Borås Tidning* 18 September 2013 www.bt.se/nyheter/svenljunga/sd-toppens-attack-mot-leman(3944056).gm (accessed 17 April 2014).

231 E.g. Alfsson, T., http://thoralf.bloggplatsen.se/2013/04/17/9741108-uteslutningar/ (accessed 2 November 2013).

232 This is noted in an article on Jimmie Åkesson by the magazine *Chef*, see note 263.

233 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011c: 11. In original:

> Uteslutning av medlem som överträder kraven i 1 kap 2 § eller som på annat sätt genom sitt uppträdande skadar partiets anseende verkställs av partistyrelsen med omedelbar verkan. Medlemmen i fråga och styrelsen i den kommunförening vederbörande tillhör ska före beslutets fattande beredas tillfälle att yttra sig…

234 Hamrud and Qvarford 2010: 233f.

235 *Utseluts ufrån SD efter Moskéuttalande* (Expelled from SD after Mosque statement), *Expo* 8 February 2012 http://expo.se/2012/utesluts-fran-sd-efter-moskeuttalande_4747.html (accessed 17 April 2014); *Utsparkad ur Sverigedemokraterna* (Kicked out of Sweden Democrats), SVT *Mittnytt* online 8 February 2012 www.svt.se/nyheter/regionalt/mittnytt/utsparkad-ur-sverigedemokraterna (accessed 17 April 2014).

236 *SD-politiker delar Breiviks åsikter* (SD politician shares Breivik's views), *Aftonbladet* 26 July 2011 www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/terrordadetinorge/article13379160.ab (accessed 17 April 2014). Hellsborn is reported to have also earlier made controversial statements. *Erik Hellsborn har varit i blåsväder förr* (Erik Hellsborn has been in trouble before), *Hallands Nyheter* 28 July 2011 http://hn.se/nyheter/varberg/1.1306166-erik-hellsborn-har-varit-i-blasvader-forr (accessed 17 April 2014). The blog is still accessible, but there is no entry after 23 July 2011 (Hellsborn, E.). The controversial entry about Breivik appears to have been omitted, or possibly edited.

237 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011c: 10. In original:

> Varje person som inte tillhör annan partipolitisk eller därmed jämförbar organisation på nationell nivå och som vill verka för Sverigedemokraternas syfte samt ställer sig dessa stadgar till efterrättelse kan vara medlem i partiet … För tidigare utesluten person gäller att partistyrelsen ska godkänna dennes medlemsansökan.

238 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011c: 14.

239 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2008b: 9.

240 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011c: 21f.

241 Such a form has to be signed by prospective SD candidates at all levels. The form is available on the Internet, e.g.: https://vingaker.sverigedemokraterna.se/files/2013/06/Vandelsförsäkran.pdf (accessed 2 November 2013).

242 *Intern kritik mot SD-lista* (Internal criticism against SD list), *Svenska Dagbladet* 27 March 2010 www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/politik/valet2010/intern-kritik-mot-sd-lista_4488881.svd (accessed 17 April 2014). The details about Filper are taken from Hamrud and Qvarford 2010: 222–225.

243 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011c: 16.

244 *Sverigedemokraterna* 2011c: 17f.

245 Åkesson 2013: 80.

246 Mattsson 2010: 24; Åkesson 2013: 58, 69. It should perhaps be noted that only Jomshof and Söder are from Skåne, while only Söder and Karlsson have lived there since they entered frontline politics. Åkesson and Jomshof are based in the neighbouring south-eastern district of Blekinge.

247 Åkesson 2013: 58.

248 Orrenius 2010: 209. Parts of Framstegspartiet continued as a separate party.

249 Orrenius 2010: 209.

250 Ekman and Poohl 2010: 223f., 331–334; Mattsson 2010: 42–46; Orrenius 2010: 209f.

251 According to Mattsson 2010: 48, Jomshof joined SD in connection with the 1999 election to the EU parliament, but Åkesson (2013: 57f.) states that Jomshof took a central role in the SD youth organisation SDU from its inception in 1998.

252 Mattsson 2010: 48; Orrenius 2010: 212; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 334. According to Ekman and Poohl, and Mattson, Jomshof had briefly been a member of the youth organisation of the Moderate Party before joining *Framstegspartiet*.

253 Orrenius 2010: 33–47; Mattsson 2010: 49.

254 Åkesson 2013: 78.

255 Ekman and Poohl 2010: 334–337; Orrenius 2010: 33–47, 212f.; Mattsson 2010: 47–50.

256 Åkesson 2013: 55; Ekman and Poohl 2010: 339. Orrenius's (2010: 210) claim that Karlsson joined in 1998 is not supported by other sources.

257 Karlsson, M. (http://sdkarlsson.wordpress.com/about/, accessed 13 October 2013).

258 Hamrud and Qvarford 2010: 174f.

259 Based on Hamrud and Qvarford 2010: 253.
260 Åkesson 2013: 88.
261 Åkesson 2013: 81.
262 Åkesson 2013: 63.
263 Except where stated, the following judgements are based on *Chef* magazine, 1 July 2013 http://chef.se/jimmie-akesson/ (accessed 13 October 2013).
264 Åkesson 2013: 83.
265 Åkesson's total score was 25 out of 40; the lowest score for a party leader was given to Göran Hägglund of the Christian Democrats.
266 Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013: 318. Comparable data on party leader popularity exist from 1979 onwards.
267 See, for example, an Ipsos poll reported in *Dagens Nyheter* 25 February 2013 (*Centerns ledare tappar stödröster*/Centre leader loses support votes), in which 13 per cent of respondents answered that they trust Åkesson; a reduction of 3 percentage points compared to the previous poll in October 2012.
268 Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013: 333–339.
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9 Conclusion

The time has now come to pull all the previous strings together. In the past five chapters demand-side, external supply-side and internal supply-side factors have been examined. The purpose of this final chapter is to bring some order to all the evidence gathered. In the process some new insights about extreme right parties in general, as well as Scandinavian politics in general, will have been gained.

First, we need to establish a number of key time points, where extreme right parties broke through, or were significantly strengthened. Of course, any attempt at a reasonably nuanced and profound understanding of factors explaining the success of extreme right parties cannot be too closely focused on single years, or elections. Still, the years about to be identified can serve as useful points of reference in the following discussion.

The first such time point was 1973, when the Danish Progress Party and Anders Lange's Party in Norway broke through. The problem here is that not much of the demand-side and external supply-side data go that far back in time, but where possible the conditions for extreme right success in the early 1970s will be discussed. The 1973 breakthrough was not lasting, however, and the Norwegian party almost disappeared before it made a second breakthrough in the early 1980s. Now named *Fremskrittspartiet*, the party was still quite small in the first half of the 1980s, but it then established itself as a permanent parliamentary force.

In Denmark the Progress Party never repeated its breakthrough result from 1973, but it did make some short-term gains in the mid- to late 1980s. The party then declined again, and has been insignificant after the split with what quickly became *Dansk Folkeparti* in 1995. *Dansk Folkeparti*, in turn, had its main breakthrough in the 2001 election. It can be argued that the process that led to the position as a government support party in 2001–2011 cannot be reduced to a single election, but it is nevertheless clear that the events in 2001 were decisive in the transformation from a small breakaway party into a significant and influential parliamentary force. It was also in the 2001 election that DF established itself at a stable support level of over 10 per cent. In Sweden the two main time points are 1991 and 2010. In the former year, *Ny Demokrati* broke through, coming from nowhere into parliament. Nineteen years later *Sverigedemokraterna* repeated the achievement, albeit after many more years of trying.

Demand-side factors

Immigration was not a salient issue at the time of the 1973 "earthquake" elections in Denmark and Norway. Asylum immigration started to increase in the 1980s, especially from 1984–1985 onwards, in all the three Scandinavian countries. There is much to support the supposition that the growth in support for *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway was linked to an influx of asylum seekers from the mid-1980s. Similarly in Denmark, *Fremskridtspartiet* did make gains in the second half of the 1980s when asylum immigration had entered the agenda, but the gains were relatively modest in comparison with FrP in Norway. If we move on to the 2000s, there was an increase in asylum seekers in both Denmark and Norway around 2000. Certainly in Denmark this fits with the growth in support for DF in the 2001 election. Thus, there is some support for the notion that increased immigration triggered increased support for extreme right parties in Norway as well as Denmark.

The problem with the immigration factor is that it does not fit Sweden. No extreme right party emerged there in the 1980s, despite the fact that Sweden had significantly more asylum seekers, in absolute terms as well as relative to the own population, more or less continuously from the mid-1980s until 2009. No matter how one counts, or how the figures are presented, there is no way around this problem – if the level of immigration is a decisive a factor, an extreme right party should have emerged in Sweden much earlier than it did. *Ny Demokrati* did arrive on the scene in 1991, but it was a fairly small party and, above all, it did not last. True, the demise of NyD in 1994 did coincide with a reduction in the asylum intake, but the levels in the 1995–1999 period were still higher than in Denmark, where *Dansk Folkeparti* was able to establish itself at this time, and Norway, where FrP recorded its best parliamentary election result, thus far, in 1997.

Moving on to public opinion about immigration, data are scarcer and therefore difficult to apply over a longer time period. The European Social Survey data from the 2000s, however, suggest that Sweden had the most pro-immigration public during the first decade after the turn of the century. Interestingly, this coincides with the run-up to *Sverigedemokraterna*'s breakthrough in 2010. On the other hand, the 5.7 per cent received by SD in 2010 was of course considerably lower than the support levels for DF in Denmark and FrP in Norway around the same time – even FrP's result at a very difficult time in 2011 was more than twice the SD proportion of the vote in 2010.

One problem here, however, is methodological. There is plenty of country-specific data on opinions about immigration, but they do not always add much clarity. The Swedish immigration-friendly profile in the ESS data is not supported by the SOM figures cited in Chapter 4, which continuously indicate significant pluralities agreeing with the proposal to reduce the number of refugees. Conversely, the image of Denmark as particularly immigration-hostile has also been questioned, for example by Hans-Jørgen Nielsen's research (see Chapter 4). It seems, therefore, that we are lacking precise research instruments for the

comparative measurement of attitudes to immigration. We need to probe deeper than basic questions about general agreement or disagreement about immigration. A possible example is the Norwegian annual survey by Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB), referred to in Chapter 4, which asks a battery of questions tapping opinions about different aspects of immigration. This may, however, not solve the problem. The figures quite clearly indicate a more immigration-friendly opinion climate during the first decade of the 2000s, but support for FrP grew in 2005 as well as 2009.

Clearly, then, immigration is problematical as a factor. Levels of immigration have at best limited explanatory power. As far as opinions about immigration are concerned, the lack of comparative systematic data makes conclusions difficult. Also here, however, the evidence we have is ambiguous. The ESS data from the 2000s, where Sweden displays the most immigration-friendly opinion climate not only in Scandinavia but in all the surveyed European countries, may on the one hand explain why support levels for SD were still low before 2010, certainly compared to FrP in Norway and DF in Denmark. On the other hand, the ESS data are more difficult to reconcile with the fact that SD grew steadily in opinion polls at this time, and of course made its full electoral breakthrough in 2010. Again, the problem could be methodological. Majorities or pluralities holding pro-immigration views is one thing – what really is important is what goes on in the immigration-critical segments of the electorate. In Sweden, everything suggests that the proportions of immigration-critical voters have consistently been big enough to sustain a party capable of a permanent foothold in parliament – what for many years was lacking was the incentive for the immigration critics to translate their views into votes.

Also when it comes to the economy, there are question marks. Norway did have an economic downturn in the late 1980s, when GDP sunk and unemployment rose. Denmark suffered a similar decline at the same time. These downturns coincided with increased support for FrP in Norway as well as *Fremskridtspartiet* in Denmark. Sweden did not have a recession in the 1980s, and the economy was still quite strong when *Ny Demokrati* broke through in 1991. Then followed a very sharp decline, not least with historically high levels of unemployment, a few years into the 1990s. This, however, largely coincided with the collapse of *Ny Demokrati*. Again, therefore, Sweden is the anomaly. The same applies to the tax burden. In all three Scandinavian countries, the proportion of taxes relative to GDP has for several decades been very high in an international comparison. In Denmark and Norway this triggered breakthroughs of populist tax protest parties in 1973. In Sweden, however, where the tax burden was for long periods the highest in the OECD, no such party broke through until 1991. And, as we know, it lasted only three years.

In terms of turnout there has been a decline over time in all three Scandinavian countries. The country where it has stood up best is Denmark, where of course *Dansk Folkeparti* has established itself at stable levels above 10 per cent. Sweden, on the other hand, had steadily declining turnouts from 1970 to 2009 but, the NyD interlude excepted, no extreme right breakthrough until 2010. In

terms of trust, the available information covers a much shorter period, but the ESS data in Table 4.7 do not indicate that the breakthrough of *Sverigedemokraterna* took place as part of a wave of growing discontent. In Denmark and Norway, the shortage of data makes it difficult to draw conclusions about whether rises in extreme right support could be linked to changes in trust. From a different perspective, however, the case of Denmark is particularly interesting. The ESS data suggest growing levels of trust in the 2000s, and the Eurobarometer data reported by Norris, cited in Chapter 4, indicate very high levels of satisfaction with the performance of the Danish democracy. The causal background to this is likely to be complex, but the high levels of trust in Denmark in the later years of the first decade of the 2000s occurred after several years of restrictive immigration policies, influenced by *Dansk Folkeparti*. Thus, the breakthrough or growth in support of an extreme right party is not unequivocally the result of discontent. This is also supported by the Swedish data. Furthermore, however, the Danish example suggests that a successful and influential extreme right party can in fact contribute to increased political trust.

In summary, however, demand-side factors are problematical as explanations for extreme right success. There is some support for the relevance of demand-side factors in Denmark and Norway, but this is in several instances negated by Sweden, which has had the highest levels of immigration, clearly declining turnouts and, according to country-specific data, continuously declining levels of trust for a long period (compare Holmberg's data, cited in Chapter 4). Thus, even though demand-side factors may seem compelling in some country cases, their general applicability is questionable.

External supply-side factors

The relative permissiveness of the Danish and Norwegian electoral systems clearly seems to have contributed to the breakthrough of *Fremskridtspartiet* and *Anders Langes Parti* in 1973. Later, the low thresholds in Denmark and Norway contributed to the re-entry into parliament of *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway in 1981, and allowed the Danish party to stay in parliament, despite sinking to 3.6 per cent in 1984. Later, however, FrP in Norway and *Dansk Folkeparti* established themselves at levels where any representational thresholds became academic. Sweden has the most restrictive electoral system of the three studied countries. This may well have delayed the breakthrough for *Sverigedemokraterna*, whose 2.9 per cent in 2006 would have been enough for parliamentary representation in Denmark. The 4 per cent threshold in Sweden did not, however, prevent *Ny Demokrati* from breaking through in 1991. Indeed, since the 1980s, the Greens and Christian Democrats have also entered parliament from the outside.

At least as important, albeit in a somewhat unexpected way, is the impact of public funding of political parties. It has been generally assumed, largely drawing on Katz and Mair's cartel party thesis (cited in Chapter 4), that public subsidies to political parties serve to perpetuate the dominance of the already

established parties. The fact that party subsidies were introduced relatively late in Denmark could, perhaps, support such a hypothesis. So could the fact that Sweden has had extensive subsidies to political parties since the mid-1960s. On the other hand, subsidies had existed in Norway for some time when *Anders Langes Parti* broke through in 1973. The Swedish case could, in fact, serve as an ever clearer counter-example. As discussed in Chapter 8, *Sverigedemokraterna* has received considerable amounts of local and regional party subsidies since 2002, and was even eligible for state funding after 2006. For an outsider party, SD could draw on considerable resources for the breakthrough election campaign in 2010. A significant part of the campaign budget originated from local and regional subsidies channelled to the central party. Thus, public funding of political parties could in fact have the opposite effect to what the cartel thesis holds.

A key explanatory factor in the literature is left-right convergence. Left-right convergence in the form of cross-bloc coalitions is very unusual in the Scandinavian countries. Possible exceptions have been limited, and hardly ever involved significant parties from both sides of the ideological divide. What may be of relevance in this context are situations where centre-left and centre-right governments have followed each other without much notable change in policy. Clearly, the disillusionment following the centre-right governments in Norway in 1965–1971 and Denmark in 1968–1971 have often been cited as key reasons for the earthquake elections in 1973. Again, however, Sweden is a problem. Sweden had six years of centre-right governments between 1976 and 1982. These governments had a number of problems, and did not, for example, reduce the overall tax burden, as seen in Table 4.7. This was not followed by an extreme right breakthrough. When *Ny Demokrati* did break through in 1991, it was after nine years of Social Democratic government, which was unseated by a centre-right coalition. Thus, disillusionment with a centre-right government, or shifts back and forth, does not seem to have general explanatory power.

Left-right convergence, measured as voters' average placements of the mainstream left and right parties on a 0–10 left-right scale, was reported in Table 4.10. There is some support for left-right convergence being a factor behind the pivotal success election for *Dansk Folkeparti* in 2001. The distance between the Social Democrats, on the one hand, and the Liberal and Conservative parties on the other, narrowed from 1994 to 2001. It then grew again, but at a time when DF was more firmly established. Similarly Norway displayed left-right convergence in the second half of the 1980s, which was when FrP climbed above the 10 per cent level for the first time. On the other hand, when FrP topped the 20 per cent level for the first time, in 2005, it coincided with a widening gap between the Labour and Conservative parties. In Sweden, changes in the distance between the Social Democrats and the Moderates fit the rise and fall of *Ny Demokrati* rather neatly. There was, later, a narrowing trend from 1998 onwards, but it peaked in 2006, and the gap had actually widened somewhat in 2010, when SD broke into parliament. In addition, the distance between the Social Democrats and Moderates is continuously significantly greater than the

corresponding differences in Denmark and Norway. Again, there is some support for left-right convergence as an explanatory factor in Norway and Denmark, while the evidence from Sweden is somewhat less clear-cut.

The final external supply-side factor is the possible existence of an extreme right legacy. None of the three countries studied here has such a legacy of any significance. The interwar and wartime extreme right movements and parties were very weak. Only in Denmark did they gain peacetime parliamentary representation out of their own strength. Denmark and Norway experienced Nazi occupation, but Denmark was ruled by a "normal" Danish government until the last two years of occupation, when the country was ruled directly by the occupiers. The Danish Nazi party and comparable organisations were marginalised throughout the occupation. Norway had a different situation, being led by a "puppet" collaboration government from September 1940, and with Vidkun Quisling as a kind of proxy dictator from 1942 until liberation. This regime was, however, imposed by the German occupiers, and there is nothing whatsoever to suggest that it had even limited popular support. Sweden had several Nazi and fascist parties and organisations, but they were all insignificant.

On the whole, then, there is some support for left-right convergence as a credible explanatory factor. This was supported by voters' placements of the mainstream parties in Denmark in the 1990s and early 2000s, and in Norway in the 1980s. In Sweden, however, the SD breakthrough in 2010 came at a time when the gap between the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party widened, albeit marginally. A less rigid reading of the Swedish data could, however, make it possible to argue that several years of a narrowing gap between the two main parties on the left and right before 2010 had paved the way for an SD breakthrough. The other external supply-side factors, electoral systems and extreme right legacies, have limited explanatory value. At least in the Swedish case public funding of political parties may, in fact, have been a help rather than an obstacle.

Internal supply-side factors

The internal supply-side factors discussed in this section are origins, ideology, organisation and leadership. Beginning with the former, it should be quite obvious from Chapter 8 that *Sverigedemokraterna* carries a heavy historical burden. It was never a Nazi or fascist party in terms of ideology or organisation, but it has had a problematical presence of skinheads, and individuals with direct or indirect links to outright fascist or Nazi groups, historical or contemporaneous. There is little doubt that the origins and early history of *Sverigedemokraterna* delayed the eventual breakthrough. None of the other parties discussed in the previous chapters have anything like the same historical burden. The biggest problem for *Dansk Folkeparti* and *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway was probably the presence of mavericks and "oddballs", what in Norway became known as the "lantern" problem. This was something both DF and FrP had to deal with, but it was more an organisational issue rather than a problem of core identity, which it to some extent still is for SD in Sweden.

Moving on to ideology, the in-depth account of party ideologies in the three country chapters had the broad and descriptive aim of providing an ideological profile of the main contemporary extreme right parties in Scandinavia. Of course, however, the main purpose was to fit the account of the party ideologies into the explanatory framework of this book. As argued in Chapter 3, the challenge for an extreme right party is to provide an ideological package which taps into discontent with the political establishment and immigration, but manages to avoid stigmatised anti-democratic and racist discourses. This can, but does not necessarily, entail a "winning formula" à la Kitschelt, or a "master frame" as highlighted by Rydgren (both cited in Chapter 3). The focus here has been broader, and aimed (1) to establish the relative emphasis given to immigration in the Party manifestos and (2) to analyse in an open-ended manner how the studied parties approach issues related to migration and nationality.

In terms of relative emphasis, FrP devoted nearly one-tenth of the 1993 election manifesto to immigration (Table 6.2). This was an aberration, however, and the relative emphasis has steadily declined since. In the manifestos of *Dansk Folkeparti* the specific section on immigration grew in absolute as well as relative terms between 1997 and 2009 (Table 7.2), while the fluctuations in the SD manifestos lack a clear trend (Table 8.2). The difference between FrP and the other two parties is that FrP tends to concentrate immigration to one single section in the manifesto, while SD in Sweden and, especially, DF in Denmark spread references to immigration and related issues into several sections. In the Danish case, 18 out of 53 sections in the DF Working manifesto of 2009, i.e. every third section, had some references to immigration or related areas. The corresponding figure for the SD Principles manifesto of 2011 is 5 sections out of 23, i.e. roughly every fifth section. Besides a section devoted to immigration, the SD manifesto from 2011 also had sections on nationalism, the nation and on multiculturalism. In Norway, the corresponding figure for the FrP election manifesto of 2013 was 5 out of 15 sections, but the references to immigration and related issues are very scarce outside the core section on immigration policy.

This does not make DF, FrP or SD single-issue anti-immigration parties. They have all, more or less throughout their existence, provided comprehensive manifestos covering a wide range of policy areas. The only possible exception would be FrP when it was called *Anders Langes Parti*, and the single issue then was not immigration, but taxes and state bureaucracy. Still, there is no doubt that immigration has developed into a core issue for DF in Denmark. Even if this is not quite captured by attempts to quantify the contents of the DF manifestos, it is clear that immigration filters through a large part of the party's thinking. The same largely applies to SD in Sweden. It could even be argued that immigration is more fundamental to SD than to DF, as immigration was the sole political issue on which SD was formed. When DF was formed as a breakaway party from *Fremskridtspartiet*, it imported significant parts of the tax protest from the old party. Quite soon, of course, immigration also developed into the core profile issue for DF. For FrP in Norway the situation is different; the party has at times emphasised immigration, and the rhetoric against, for example, Islam has at

times been quite hard-hitting, but immigration has only rarely dominated the party profile the way it does for DF and SD. For FrP the socio-economic dimension is as important as the sociocultural dimension; for DF and SD the latter is clearly prioritised.

The three parties differ in ideological identity. FrP in Norway adheres explicitly to liberalism, while SD in Sweden since 2011 has defined itself as a socially conservative party. There is no reason to question the genuineness of these affiliations, but they can also serve as legitimising alibis – any accusations of fascism or racism can be rebutted with references to the ideological identity given in the respective Principles manifestos. Liberalism and conservatism are not stigmatised ideologies. In addition, and this may well have played a part in at least the Norwegian case, explicit adherence to an established ideological tradition, free of stigma, could serve as a defence against accusations of populism, and a lack of seriousness. *Fremskrittspartiet*'s affiliation to liberalism dates back to the 1980s, while SD took the final full step towards identifying itself as conservative much more recently. In both cases, however, it can be seen as a key step in the quest for legitimacy and mainstream status. *Dansk Folkeparti*, however, does not appear to have considered such a step as motivated. As discussed in Chapter 7, DF representatives have in the political debate sometimes made statements which make it sound as if they adhere to conservatism, but this is not reflected in the manifestos. A possible reason is that there already is a nominally conservative party in Denmark, while the links between the Swedish Moderates and conservatism are somewhat more tenuous. Obviously, SD has arrived at the conclusion that the ideological position of social conservatism is not occupied by any other Swedish party.

Only SD devotes any space in the manifestos to the definition of the own nationality. This definition has shifted over the years. Until 2011 the SD manifestos included references to ethnicity, even though it was never presented in categorical terms, and with decreasing emphasis. The 2011 Principles manifesto contains only one, substantively fairly trivial, reference to ethnicity. In the Danish case, ethnicity remains a key point of reference. DF does not explicitly state that ethnicity is a criterion for Danishness, but the 2002 Principles manifesto as well as the 2009 Working manifesto reject a "multi-ethnic society", and the latter document makes several references to non-ethnic Danes, in connection with education, housing and crime. In Norway FrP makes very few references to ethnicity, except in connection with policy proposals regarding the Sami population. The radicalism of DF should not be overstated – it does not completely reject immigration, does not regard assimilation as impossible and it makes no reference to colour. In comparison with SD and FrP, however, DF comes across as the more radical. This was not always the case, but has become so due to the deradicalisation of SD. The clearest example of is SD's abandonment of references to ethnicity. A possible interpretation is that the problematical origin and background has forced SD into a less radical position than DF, which is not burdened with the same kind of background.

Whether the researched manifestos represent a "winning formula" or an ethno-pluralist "master frame" is open to question. Beginning with the former,

only FrP of the surviving extreme right parties in Scandinavia can be said to fit Kitschelt's "winning formula" of immigration criticism, authoritarianism and market liberalism. In the past this also applied to *Ny Demokrati*, at least as long as Ian Wachtmeister was influential in the party, and *Fremskridtspartiet* in Denmark, from the time immigration became part of the agenda. DF and SD, however, do not fit the winning formula. They can hardly be described as socialist, but the economic and welfare policies of at least DF would not be out of place in many contemporary social democratic parties. SD is more ambiguous – it is not socialist, but nor does it take any market liberalism very far. The party simply does not prioritise economic issues, which allows considerable flexibility, as shown by the shifting positions on income tax in 2011–2012. DF has taken its welfare chauvinism further than SD, but they also have a degree of pragmatism, as shown by the agreement with the centre-right government to phase out the retirement pay scheme before the 2011 election. Irrespective of details such as these, Kitschelt's winning formula would be stretched into absurdity if SD and DF can be argued to fit it.

As for the ethno-pluralist master frame, characterised by the "equal but separate" doctrine and a focus on culture rather than race, Jens Rydgren has argued for its relevance to the Danish case, as discussed in Chapter 7. There is no problem agreeing with this view – DF as well as FrP and SD have found ways of arguing against immigration that avoid racist thinking. Still, this leaves room for variation. An example just mentioned is the references to ethnicity, which can be found in the DF manifestos, but have disappeared in SD and have rarely if ever appeared in the FrP documents. Another difference is multiculturalism, which is criticised in DF as well as SD manifestos. FrP warns against the dangers of immigrant cultures bringing conflicts into Norway, but the manifestos do not refer to multiculturalism. Generally speaking, however, it can be concluded that all three parties provide a discourse which is consistent with the ethno-pluralist master frame. In the Swedish case we have seen how SD abandoned the ban on adoption of non-European children and the wholesale repatriation of post-1970 immigrants in favour of a more coherent ethno-pluralist outlook, with elaborated criticism against multiculturalism.

Still, ethno-pluralism may not hold the entire answer. It is probably possible to make oneself unelectable with rhetoric which is compatible with the ethno-pluralist master frame, but still be considered as too abrasive by potential voters. Conversely, it is possible to provide effective arguments against immigration quite independently of the master frame – unless it is very broadly defined. The potential extreme right voters want fewer immigrants, and are not necessarily concerned with the principled separation of cultures. All three Scandinavian parties have provided arguments against immigration that enabled them to tap into this potential vote. These arguments can have different foundations. Some are economic – see, for example, how SD claims to be able to spend more on welfare by cutting immigration. Others are focused on social aspects – all three parties link immigration to crime, and warn against the ghettoisation of housing estates. Yet other arguments may be cultural – but focused on, for example, the

alleged dangers of Islam rather than any principled rejection of the mixing of cultures. They are all presented in a way that does not easily open up for accusations of racism. Of course, such accusations still occur in the media and political debate, but the important point for an extreme right party is that they can be rebutted in a way that satisfies potential voters. In this sense the Scandinavian extreme right parties have found respective formulas that work. These formulas are not identical – as already argued DF is more radical than FrP and, at least since 2011, also SD. They are also not necessarily identical with the ethnopluralist frame. The manifestos of DF and, especially, SD contain elaborated criticism of multiculturalism, while there is very little of this in the FrP documents. In the Swedish case the eventually successful ideological package is the result of a long deradicalisation process – only in 2007 was the term "population policy" abandoned. Also FrP has deradicalised after a phase with rather far-reaching manifesto formulations in the 1990s. In the case of DF, the position on immigration has on the whole been rather constant. DF also differs in the sense that it has what to all intents and purposes is an "eternal" Principles manifesto, whose purpose is to give the party ideological stability.

There are also differences in terms of what the ideology consists of besides immigration criticism. All three parties display elements of welfare chauvinism, although this is most pronounced in DF. The Norwegian FrP is the most market liberal of the three, even though it had stepped down from earlier radical positions in, for example, tax policy. The FrP combination of welfare chauvinism and market liberalism made somewhat easier by the fact that the Norwegian oil makes it possible to "have the cake and eat it too". The oil is also a possible reason why FrP stands out as the most sceptical to man-induced climate change, although the rhetoric was toned down in 2013. All three parties have a strong law and order profile, and all contain elements of populism in the sense that they advocate more referendums. DF and SD are EU critical, although SD does not emphasise this in its 2011 Principles programme. FrP has a more cautious approach to the EU, and it is possible that the party may come out on the No side if the issue returns to the Norwegian political agenda. All three parties display elements of traditionalism regarding family and lifestyle choices, although SD has modified its position on same-sex relationships. Here, DF stands out as the most traditionalist.

It is still possible to see a common core of immigration criticism, welfare chauvinism and elements of authoritarianism. Despite these commonalities there is still room for important variations. Partly, as just exemplified, in terms of what the core ideological ingredients are complemented with. In addition, however, there are important differences in terms of the reasoning underpinning the immigration criticism. In the SD case it is based on a rather elaborated criticism of multiculturalism. Such criticism is also found in DF, but is arguably subordinate to the axiomatic position that Denmark is not a country of immigration. The Norwegian party occupies a third position – the point of departure is that people should be able to freely move across borders, but that this is not practical as long as this means a burden on the welfare system. The underlying FrP position is

thus practical and economic, which is in clear contrast to DF and SD. This does not, as shown in Chapter 6, prevent FrP from matching the Swedish and Danish parties in terms of anti-immigration rhetoric. Another difference is that even if three common core values can be identified in all three parties, immigration is the priority for DF and SD. For FrP market economics are as important, which makes the party a deviant case in comparison to other extreme right parties, not only in the Scandinavian context.

In terms of organisation, there are also differences between the three parties. None has a large membership, although all three have experienced a positive membership development since 2000 – it remains to be seen whether the recent drop in FrP is temporary. Nevertheless, DF and FrP have developed rather efficient party organisations. SD seems to be somewhat behind in this respect. All three parties are centralised. This is particularly the case in FrP and DF, where the internal culture can be described as authoritarian. The difference with SD is one of nuance rather than kind, and the changes in SD party rules in 2011, for example by decreasing the frequency of the party congress, amount to further centralisation. All three parties have regular purges of party members deemed unsuitable. DF (at least until 2012) and SD are in practice led by very small tightly knit groups of individuals. These centralist and authoritarian tendencies could be interpreted as indicative of an authoritarian party culture. To at least as significant an extent, however, they have been driven by practical necessities. All three parties, as well as NyD in Sweden and FP in Denmark, have been affected by the "lantern" problem – they attract personalities which can easily give the party a bad reputation. In both NyD and FP, this contributed to the eventual downfall of the party, and it has provided recurring problems for SD and FrP. DF has been better at managing the issue.

The many membership purges give the parties occasional bad press, not least as the expellees sometimes get a few moments in the media spotlight where they can vent their frustration. In the longer term, however, they must be considered as necessary. The damage of a few media interviews with angry expellees does not match the potential damage the expellees could create if they were allowed to stay in the party. For the party reputation the effect can be dual. On the one hand, repeated purges give the impression of a party with a seemingly endless supply of extremists and oddballs. On the other hand, they can be seen as evidence that the party leadership is resolutely dealing with the issue. The problem may then be if the media coverage gives the impression of inconsistency, that some with extreme views and irresponsible behaviour are allowed to stay in the party. In the case of DF, it is questionable whether lower ranking members would have got away with Mogens Camre's statements in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. In SD, its differential treatment of Almqvist and Ekeroth in the "iron bar affair" seems to have been motivated by different uses of language – the brandishing of iron bars was apparently considered as excusable.

Still, it seems clear that all three contemporary parties have found an organisational model that works – even though SD seems organisationally somewhat weaker than DF and FrP. The contrast to the two failed parties FP and NyD is

clear. In both the latter parties organisational issues were a constant source of internal disagreement. Such latent disagreement has also existed in DF, FrP and SD, but it has been dealt with efficiently by the leaderships. The evidence presented here suggests that it is possible to identify an ideal typical organisational model specific to extreme right parties. This model is highly centralised, with authoritarian treatment of political deviations and dissent, and a low degree of internal democracy. Some of these tendencies may also be found in other parties, but the difference in the extreme right parties is that they do not even pretend to be internally democratic. The approach to membership seems to be "take it or leave it". Interestingly, this has not prevented the parties studied in this book from bucking the international declining trend in party membership. More research is needed here – Karina Pedersen's study of DF, cited in Chapter 7, is a useful early step.

Clearly, leadership is central to extreme right parties. The account in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 has hopefully made it clear the charisma is at best of limited relevance. Of the different party leaders discussed in these chapters, Mogens Glistrup may possibly be described as charismatic, although it did not last long beyond the 1971–1973 breakthrough. The same could, perhaps, be said of Ian Wachtmeister – he may have shown signs of charisma during and just after his breakthrough, but the novelty wore off relatively quickly. In Anders Lange's case it is questionable how charismatic he even was in the first place – remaining video clips suggest that he did not have the oratory skills of Glistrup or Wachtmeister in their prime. Of the more recent leaders, elements of charisma may, at a stretch, be detected in Hagen and Kjærsgaard, but this is tenuous and it actually misses the most important aspects of their leadership. The more recent leaders, Siv Jensen, Jimmie Åkesson and Kristian Thulesen Dahl, are anything but charismatic – but they are still very important for their respective parties.

Instead of charisma, four key qualities have been decisive. First, a capacity to get the message across. The exact technique has varied, from Hagen's mocking populism via Kjærsgaard's indignation to Åkesson's almost minimalist style. The point is that it works, given the national context. Kjærsgaard's angry outbursts would not work in Sweden, while Åkesson's low-key approach would not get very far in Denmark. These differences are of course related to the respective national political and media climates, which have not been researched here. It seems quite clear, however, that Åkesson's ability to get the message through in quick sound bites has been important for a party whose media opportunities, especially initially, have tended to be brief and infrequent. At least as important for Åkesson has been his ordinariness – his appearance belies any notions of extremism and quirkiness, which is crucial for a party with SD's origins. Siv Jensen's approach has more been to appear as a mainstream politician. Her style of communication does not deviate in any profound way from the other Norwegian party leaders. Unlike her predecessor Hagen, there are not even traces left of the anti-politics style which was quintessential to the party's founder Anders Lange.

The second has been to create and maintain internal stability. This has been crucial in all three parties. This has been achieved by a degree of ruthlessness

but, as shown by the example of *Ny Demokrati*, unsentimentality and authoritarianism is not enough; it has to be complemented with an ability to build alliances. Wachtmeister's attempt to run the party according to business principles may have led him in the wrong direction in this respect, but it may also be worth remembering that he had by all accounts not been an unequivocal success in business either. Hagen in FrP is a good example of someone who was able to combine the ruthlessness with an ability to make friends as well as enemies. Without a resource of loyal collaborators it is difficult to see how he could have dealt with the libertarians in the 1990s and the "rascals" in the early 2000s. A help in dealing with dissent is of course that things in general are going well for the party. Hagen's purge of the "rascals" was against the backdrop of extremely strong poll ratings, and the unrest in DF over the Metock verdict may have been more difficult to quell if the party did not have such a long list of concrete policy successes to show for its cooperation with the government. Similarly, Jimmie Åkesson's internal leadership skills may not be fully tested until the party experiences an electoral setback, or a more than temporary slip in the polls.

Third, the successful party leaders have shown political and ideological flexibility. The problems for unsuccessful leaders such as Glistrup and Wachtmeister were their stubbornness and inability to reappraise their own beliefs. In contrast, Hagen's ability to read and adapt to the popular mood has been key to the successes of FrP. Similarly the deradicalisation process of SD, which was intensified under Åkesson's leadership, has been crucial to the eventual breakthrough. DF has also shown flexibility, with the gradual abandonment of the tax cut demands inherited from FP, in favour of a pronounced welfare chauvinism, which has proved a successful mix.

A fourth key leadership quality has been general political competence. Carl I Hagen's often populist rhetoric owed some of its punch to the fact that, a few mistakes notwithstanding, he knew what he was talking about. Other populist politicians, not least on the left, tend to respond to complex figures and statistics with sweeping dismissals, often to the effect that they were false screens designed to cloud the reality. Hagen was not incapable of such rhetoric, but he often showed himself to be every bit as much on top of the figures as those he was debating with. He also learnt the parliamentary procedures, and the denial of his "day dream" of becoming speaker of the *Storting* had nothing to do with any lack of competence. In the eyes of the other parties, Hagen's long-standing reputation as a divisive populist made him unsuitable for different reasons. Kjærsgaard, Dahl and Jensen have also displayed considerable policy and procedural competence. The possible exception here may be Jimmie Åkesson, who also has significantly less parliamentary experience. Åkesson is by no means an inexperienced politician, but he has so far spent most of his time as party leader in charge of an extra-parliamentary party, and he has no experience of top-level political negotiations. Both Dahl and Jensen had extensive such experience when they became leaders. Åkesson can by no means be said to have been out of his depth in parliament, but there is anecdotal evidence, for example by the journalists Hamrud and Qvarford cited in Chapter 8, that there are gaps in his knowledge. Such gaps can, of course, diminish over time.

In all, then, leadership is extremely important. It is quite possible that FrP would not have survived as a party if Hagen had not become leader in 1978. *Dansk Folkeparti* owes much if its success to Kjærsgaard and, as argued in Chapter 8, *Sverigedemokraterna*'s breakthrough would almost certainly have been delayed if Mikael Jansson's attempt to hang on the leadership in 2005 had been successful. Conversely, *Ny Demokrati* may well have survived if it had been led by someone with better leadership skills and political *fingerspitzengefühl* than Ian Wachtmeister. Of course, it is very difficult to isolate the aspects of leadership which distinguish failure from success. In terms of sheer intellectual capacity, Glistrup and Wachtmeister probably trump most of the other party leaders discussed here – Hagen may come closest to matching them. But political skills are not only, perhaps not even primarily, about intelligence. They are a combination of intellectual, organisational and communicative abilities, where intelligence is necessary but not sufficient.

You make your own luck

What has emerged from this summary discussion is that demand-side factors explain very little. They are not completely irrelevant, and in a broader sense they provide the necessary foundation for the growth of extreme right parties in Western Europe. It is, however, questionable how much they explain in terms of variations, increases and declines in extreme right success. Demand-side factors are not constant, but slow-moving. Above all, they are so strong everywhere that the impact of any variations is limited. There are, arguably, sufficient levels of anti-immigration and anti-establishment feelings in every Western European country to sustain an extreme right party with a support base of at least 10 per cent of the electorate. This is certainly the case in the three Scandinavian countries studied here. Thus, while demand-side factors may well be part of a broader explanatory model accounting for the emergence of post-war extreme right parties, their usefulness when it comes to understanding variations in their success is highly limited.

External supply-side factors also have problems. Electoral systems may play a part, but only in a very basic sense – some countries have systems which make it especially difficult for new parties to break into the party system. The majoritarian systems in France and, especially, the UK are clear examples. Variations in proportional systems have, at most, effects at the margins. If the representational threshold in Sweden had been 2 per cent instead of 4, SD would have broken into parliament in 2006. But the higher threshold merely delayed the eventual breakthrough. In 1973, no PR system threshold of any kind would have prevented *Fremskridtspartiet*'s breakthrough in Denmark. A higher threshold may later have thrown the party out of parliament, but the prospects of a rather quick return would have been high.

Left-right convergence is also somewhat problematical. The data reported in Table 4.10 do indicate some support for the idea that diminishing ideological distances between the mainstream left and right parties are conducive to extreme

right success. The Swedish data also point in this direction, with the qualification that the converging trend peaked in the election preceding the SD breakthrough. A problem is that the theory about left-right convergence is not sufficiently refined, or clearly operationalised. Are we talking about the size of the difference, or about converging trends, irrespective of size? In Sweden there have been large differences between the Social Democrats and the Moderates throughout the 1979–2010 period. On the other hand, these differences showed a diminishing trend long before SD was anywhere near a breakthrough. And, of course, they increased slightly at the time of the eventual breakthrough. Clearly, therefore, although left-right convergence is of relevance when it comes to understanding the conditions for extreme right success, more research is needed. For one thing, the operationalisation of left-right convergence used in Chapter 4 may have to be refined. It could, of course, also be argued that irrespective of variations in the positioning of the mainstream parties, there will in contemporary Western democracies almost always be sizeable proportions of the electorate who do not consider any of them as feasible alternatives.

Clearly, then, while demand-side and external supply-side factors are by no means irrelevant, the evidence gathered in the preceding chapters suggest very strongly that internal supply-side factors are decisive. Demand-side and external supply-side factors were less favourable to *Ny Demokrati* in 1994 than they had been in 1991. Still, popular discontent about immigration and with the political establishment was still significant enough to sustain an immigration-critical anti-establishment party big enough to stay in parliament. What these voters did not want, in the middle of an economic recession with high unemployment, was immigration criticism coupled with hard-hitting market economics and a strongly pro-EU message. What they most definitely did not want was a rudderless party paralysed by internal battles. Thus, the disappearance of *Ny Demokrati* was almost exclusively driven by factors in the party itself. The same can be said about *Sverigedemokraterna*. The demand, and political opportunities, was already there in the 1990s, but the party was too compromised by its origins, ideology, inept leadership and questionable membership composition to be able to capitalise. If another immigration-critical party had emerged in 2000, without the burdensome baggage SD was carrying, this party may well have been able to capitalise on the fertile ground that there unquestionably was. No such party emerged. Those who tried, for example the SD defectors *Nationaldemokraterna*, tended to have at least as serious problems as SD. In the meantime, SD was undergoing a transformation process, which bore fruit in 2010.

The same reasoning can be applied to Denmark and Norway. In both countries the respective extreme right parties have shown ideological adaptability. They have had competent leaders, with communicative as well as organisational skills. Not least important, certainly in the Danish and Swedish cases, an ability to choose suitable close allies in the top leadership has been a very important factor. They have also been able, after initial difficulties, to build up a functioning party organisation. The strength of the organisation is not decisive, but what has been extremely important is to ensure that the organisation and membership

do not provide obstacles to success. To this end, a centralised structure and an authoritarian leadership style have been important contributory factors.

Of course, external events have played a part. The referendum on the Euro in 2000, the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the Muhammad cartoons crisis in 2005–2006 have all played into *Dansk Folkeparti*'s hands. But none of these events was decisive, and would not have helped DF if the party had not been able to make political capital out of them. In 2001, there was no party in Sweden remotely able to capitalise on the reactions following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The same can be said about 2003, when the Euro was rejected in a referendum after a heated and divisive campaign, in which SD played a very minor role. By 2006, however, *Sverigedemokraterna* had a leadership with the aptitude to make the Muhammad cartoons crisis work to the party's advantage. In fact, although the cartoons crisis was centred on Denmark, it probably made more political difference in Sweden. *Dansk Folkeparti* was already well established in 2005–2006, but for SD it was a key event in the party's breakthrough process. The party used the situation to the full, and in the process was able to claim a major political scalp in the form of a social democratic minister for foreign affairs.

Thus, the concluding argument is that, while demand-side and external supply-side factors are not irrelevant, internal supply-side factors are decisive. All the three countries studied here have had high levels of immigration, and distrust in political elites. They have also had trends of diminishing differences between the mainstream parties. Still, the successes for extreme right parties have varied. The explanations for these variations can only be found in the extreme right parties themselves. The recipe for success is not straightforward, and varies according to the party's own background as well as country-specific conditions. It is up to the party itself to find the recipe that suits its own country. *Sverigedemokraterna* failed to do so for many years, but when Jimmie Åkesson and his "gang of four" took control of the party, the route to the eventual breakthrough was staked out. The party makes its own success. In the Scandinavian countries, the external conditions have been there, at least since the early 1990s. What has varied has been the existence of a party able to make use of the available opportunities.

And then…?

In late 2013, the Scandinavian extreme right was entering a new phase. *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway had just entered government. *Dansk Folkeparti* was in opposition, but doing well in the polls and poised for a major onslaught whenever there is a new election. If that election, which at the time of writing appears decidedly possible, results in right-of-centre majority, DF is as good as certain to again play a major part in the policymaking process. *Sverigedemokraterna* are also going from strength to strength in the polls. They are nowhere near a position of legitimacy and influence like those of FrP or DF, but their apparent growth is such that their capacity to disturb the work of a future government, of whatever constellation, is likely to increase after 2014. Not least, SD may be big

enough to necessitate some form of cross-bloc cooperation, which could fuel further growth in SD support. This book has not covered Finland, but the True Finns Party, *Perussoumalaiset*, was the third biggest party in the 2011 election with over 19 per cent of the vote, and came close to being included in the subsequently formed government. Opinion poll ratings suggest that the party will continue to be a significant force in Finnish politics.

Thus, extreme right parties have arrived to stay in the Nordic countries. Their future success will no doubt fluctuate. It will, for one thing, be interesting to see how FrP in Norway is affected by the government experience. But even those who do not like it will have to accept that the extreme right as a political force will, in the foreseeable future, remain as a permanent fixture in the Nordic party systems. That this will have consequences should be apparent already from this book. Denmark changed considerably during the nearly ten years of direct policy influence by *Dansk Folkeparti*. Some would argue that this has had negative consequences for the social and political climate. Others would point to the fact that, as shown in Chapter 4, political trust in Denmark grew to the highest levels in Europe during the years when DF played a direct, systematic and continuous part in the policymaking process. Whether the elevation of FrP to government status will have the same effect on Norway remains to be seen. In Sweden, the de facto cordon sanitaire against SD is unlikely to be broken after the 2014 election. If, however, the 2014 election results in another unclear majority situation, and a change from a weak centre-right to a weak centre-left government, or a cross-bloc coalition, support for SD could continue to grow. If SD has played its cards right in the meantime, the party could thus be in a strong bargaining position after the 2018 election, especially as several of the veto parties will have changed leaders by that time.

The extreme right will not go away. Those who want to restrict its influence would probably do well to realise this fact.

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