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**Portuguese Colonial
Military in India**
Apparition of Control,
1750–1850

Teddy Y.H. Sim

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*Dedicated to
our Fathers and Stewart*

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This book is a follow-up of some aspects of the research undertaken more than ten years ago. In-between working on other projects which were more germane to teaching, the continued exploration of the subject-matter of this book permitted a broader historical appreciation of the Portuguese overseas as well as India, a culturally rich and diverse society that defies any one unitary understanding of it. The interest was sustained over the years through visits to Portugal (and its archives), visits to India and specifically to its western parts, presentations in seminars drawing upon parts of the ideas written about in this book, supervision of a part-time PhD candidate who was ready to spar over historical issues pertaining to early modern India, as well as encouraging and generous friends who spared the time to host or connect-up with me when I was in the different places.

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Singapore
December 2021

Teddy Y.H. Sim

CONTENTS

1	Literature Survey and Military Developments in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries	1
	<i>Introduction</i>	1
	<i>Brief Literature Review</i>	2
	<i>Military Developments in the Early Modern and Globalizing Period</i>	7
	<i>Line-Up of Chapters</i>	19
	<i>Conclusion</i>	21
2	Developments of the Metropole and Empire on the World Stage	23
	<i>Introduction</i>	24
	<i>Developments Around the World in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries</i>	25
	<i>Colonial Military Enterprises in Brazil and East Africa</i>	31
	<i>The Portuguese in the East from the Sixteenth Century to the Early Eighteenth Century</i>	40
	<i>Conclusion</i>	43
3	Development of the Portuguese Colonial Military in India 1780–1850	45
	<i>Introduction</i>	46
	<i>Strategic Context of the Estado Da Índia</i>	47
	<i>Trends in Military Establishment</i>	58

	<i>Reading the Profile of Soldiers</i>	71
	<i>Conclusion</i>	84
4	Non-war Violence in Portuguese India, 1780–1850	87
	<i>Introduction</i>	88
	<i>Social System and Conditions of Employment</i>	89
	<i>Uprisings in Goa</i>	100
	<i>Other Facets of Non-war Violence in Society</i>	108
	<i>Conclusion</i>	114
5	The Portuguese in the Seas of Western India	115
	<i>Introduction</i>	116
	<i>Situation in the Seas and Coastal Areas of Western India</i>	117
	<i>Nature of Portuguese Navy and Coastal Defence System in India</i>	123
	<i>Trade, Rivalry and Potentiality of Violence on the Sea</i>	129
	<i>Conclusion</i>	138
6	Portuguese Defence and Activities in Goa During the Indian Mutiny	141
	<i>Introduction</i>	142
	<i>The Larger Context of Developments Outside Goa</i>	142
	<i>Specific Developments in Goa During the Indian Mutiny and Military Deployments</i>	146
	<i>The Aftermath and Legacy</i>	151
	<i>Conclusion</i>	157
7	Epilogue	159
	<i>Introduction</i>	160
	<i>Portuguese in India in the Transitional Period from Eighteenth to Nineteenth Century</i>	160
	<i>Comparison of Portuguese with Dutch Experience in India in Context of British Developments</i>	163
	<i>Conclusion</i>	170
	List of Portuguese Governors/Viceroy of India (1758–1871)	173
	Glossary	175
	Bibliography	181
	Index	197

ABBREVIATIONS

AHM	Arquivo Histórico Militar
AHU	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino
BA	Biblioteca de Ajuda
B.G.E.I.	Boletim governo do Estado da India
BHdC	Bosquejo historico das comunidades das aldeas dos concelhos das Ilhas, Salsete e Badez
BN	Biblioteca Nacional (Portugal)
CU	Conselho Ultramarino
EIC	East India Company (British)
HAG	Histórico Arquivo de Goa
I.A.C.M.	Biblioteca do Edificio do Instituto para os Assuntos Cívicos e Municipais
KNLF	Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army)
VOC	Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company)

LIST OF MAPS

Map 2.1	Brazil in early 1800s (adapted from J.H. Elliot, <i>Empires of the Atlantic world</i> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 354 (Map 3.2)	36
Map 2.2	Portuguese east Africa in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (adapted from maps in M. Newitt, <i>Portuguese settlement on the Zambesi</i> , London, Longman, 1973, pp. 77 and 219)	39
Map 3.1	The Bombay Presidency (adapted from Bombay Presidency map in Digital South Asia library, Imperial gazetteer of India vol. 8)	50
Map 3.2	Map of Goa (old and new conquests)	64
Map 5.1	Sea battles of Portuguese navy in western Indian Ocean in the eighteenth–early nineteenth centuries. S. Monteiro, <i>Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa</i> vols. VII–VIII (Lisbon: Livraria Sá da Costa Editora, 1996–1997), from vol. VII, pp. 173, 185, 189, 203 and 256, from vol. VIII, p. 13. Tracing from the southern coast of India, (i) battle off Calicut-Cochin in 1762, (ii) battle off Goa in 1777, (iii) battle off Diu in 1774, (iv) battle off Mocha in 1779, (v) battle near Mozambique channel in 1808, (vi) battle off Delagoa Bay in 1805. (<i>Note</i> The locations indicate the approximate and not exact positions of the battles or skirmishes)	126

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1	Military forces of Mysore and the Marathas	29
Table 2.2	Demographic data of selected regions of the Portuguese empire	37
Table 3.1	Demographic data of Estado da Índia	53
Table 3.2	Information on forts in the New Conquest areas	57
Table 3.3	Military structure and units of the Estado da Índia from 1770–1870	61
Table 3.4	Chart of forces under the Estado da Índia in 1821	68
Table 3.5	Revenues and expenditures of the Estado da Índia 1720 and 1816	71
Table 4.1	Sampling of use of auxiliary and allied forces in campaigns in 16–eighteenth centuries	92
Table 4.2	Sampling of members of Noronha family serving the Estado da Índia	94
Table 4.3	A sampling of remuneration (annual) of soldiers in the Estado da Índia in 1816 (in xerafins)	98
Table 4.4	Exiles (degradados) and trend of exiles for India and Mozambique	100
Table 7.1	Military force and organization of the English EIC and Dutch VOC/colonial state (for comparison)	171



CHAPTER 1

Literature Survey and Military Developments in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Abstract Goa's military history, and to some extent its history of violence, cannot be readily linked to its present incarnation as a laid-back tourist haven. But in fact, Goa does have a rather peculiar military and developmental history that explains its present. The literature survey shows that the diverse Portuguese military and colonial history towards and after the turn of the millennium is still uneven but has become more sophisticated. This introductory chapter lays certain bases for the message of the entire book, i.e., the military history of the Portuguese in Goa was nothing like that of their larger British counterpart in India; it was a case study in weakness rather than of a hegemon. The chapter also lays out the outline of the subsequent chapters, which trace the evolution of the Portuguese colonial force in India and the conflicts it engaged in during the transition from the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century.

Keywords Military history · India · Portuguese · Goa · Globalization

INTRODUCTION

While casual observers believe Goa's colonial past to be militarily sterile or un-violent, history tells us something very different: apart during the sixteenth century, Goa was militarily engaged. At the same time,

it continued to be connected (politically, economically, militarily)—if in an inconspicuous way—to the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While India might continue to be linked with the institutional (including judicial and military) history of the British Raj, suggestions of war and other military matters in the context of today’s tourism-oriented Goa seem like an anomaly. There are three developments from the period 1750–1850 that might dissociate Goa’s past from its present: (i) although the Portuguese, unlike the British, did not bequeath an institutional or military tradition to India, the Portuguese in Goa possessed a certain military prowess in the mid-eighteenth century before undergoing some degree of demilitarization towards the first half of the nineteenth century; (ii) the Portuguese military experience in India was a unique case of a colonial military instrument operating out of weakness (although it was at times able to summon together a respectable force to deter its enemies); (iii) Goa also did not experience severe disorder when India slipped into instability in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Furthermore, for present Goans, examining the history of the colonial period might conjure up strong reactions. Thus, probing into the colonial and military heritage presents a forgotten tradition, a disconnect out of sync with contemporary awareness.¹

The introductory chapter locates the military history of Portugal, and especially its colonies in the East and India, in the context of what has been written in the sub-fields of colonial and military history, in the process justifying the military history of Goa as a niche area worthy of investigation. The second section probes into the key forces undergirding global developments in the transition from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century and how Portugal’s eastern colonies might have fitted into global military history or the history of violence. Finally, the flow of the book’s argument is discussed via a suggested hypothesis as well as a brief description of the line-up of chapters in the book.

BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW

The colonial historiography of Portugal has gradually embraced the approaches of European (and, to a lesser extent, British and American)

¹ E. Luce, *Strange rise of modern India* (London: Little Brown Books, 2006); see also K. Forrester, *Banyan tree adventures: Travels in India* (Aldersford: O-Books, 2018); V. Pinho, *Snapshots of Indo-Portuguese history* (IV) (Panaji: V. Pinho, 2009).

historians. The work of Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, who wrote *Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial* in the early 1980s and drew from the Annales tradition, re-evaluated developments in the metropole and colonial economic history. The Pombaline period in Portugal (1756–1777) was well researched in the 1990s, with writers such as K. Maxwell noting that ‘although Brazil was the most important of Portugal’s overseas dominions in the eighteenth century, the Asian and African territories had not ceased to be objects of imperial concern to the government in Lisbon’.² The publication in the 1990s of *História de Portugal* and *História da expansão Portuguesa*, coordinated by José Mattoso and Francisco Bethencourt et al., brought together an array of respected scholars and accumulated knowledge of historical developments in the metropole and its colonies.

Military history written in the 1930s, most notably that authored by C. Sevalgem (1931), was meticulously narrated but took a dry chronological approach. Portuguese accounts written in the eighteenth century were battle-centric narrative history, similar to some extent to that written by G. Malleon for the British. Examples of these may be seen in ‘New Account of Important Victories [Arranged with the Coming of] D. Luiz de Menezes, Conde de Ericeira’ by J. Machado de Sousa; ‘An Account of the Conquest of the Forts of Alorna, etc., by D. Pedro de Almeida e Portugal, Marquis de Castello Novo’ by M. Antonio de Meirelles; and ‘Account of the Wars in India from the Years 1736 to 1740’ by Diogo da Costa.³ One does not, however, see many histories of small military units in the Portuguese context; one of the few examples may be seen in *Companha do Humbe* (Company of Humbe) by Luís de P. Guimarães, written in the 1930s.⁴

² K. Maxwell, *Pombal: Paradox of the enlightenment* (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), p. 128. C. Sevalgem, *Portugal military* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1994). V. M. Godinho, *Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial* 2 vols. (Lisbon: Editoria Presença, 1981). A case is made for the economic history of Portugal, see P. Lains, “The internationalization of Portuguese historiography: View from economic history”, *e-Journal of Portuguese History* vol. 1.2 (2003), 2 pp.

³ G. Malleon, *The decisive battles of India, from 1746 to 1849* (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1885). The Portuguese accounts such as “New account of [...] victories [of] D. Luiz de Menezes”, “An account of the conquest [...] of Alorna” and “Account of wars in India” could be located in the Portuguese archives.

⁴ Luís de P. Guimarães, *Companha do Humbe* (1897–1898) (Lisbon: np, 1938).

An important work on the eighteenth century that documented the adversaries the Portuguese confronted and the systems by which these adversaries were organized was *Sistema marcial Asiatico* (Asian martial system) by D. António José de Noronha.⁵ Other works from the nineteenth century that probe into the people under rule include *Historical Sketch of the Communities of the Villages in the Islands, Salsette and Bardez 1852* (Filipe N. Xavier, 1852) and ‘Converted Bramanes of Salsete’ (BN, No. 7540). One of the most important early writers and humanists who contributed to knowing the ‘other’ was Joaquim H. da Cunha Rivara, who arrived in Goa in 1855 and lived there for 22 years. His *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental* (Portuguese oriental archive), compiled from the ‘Boletim do Estado da Índia’ (Bulletin of the [Portuguese] State of India), gave the nitty-gritty details of everyday governance.⁶ More specialized works on the ethnography of inhabitants of India appeared only in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.⁷ Going into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and catching up with the sub-fields of Cultural or New Cultural Studies, there is a tendency for works (for instance, in the edited volume *O governo dos outros*) to examine colonial history for issues of ethnicity and identity in relation to the governance of colonial subjects. On the Portuguese in

⁵ C. Radulet, *Sistema marcial asiático, político, histórico, genealógico, analítico e miscelâneo* (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1994). See Ethel M. Pope, *India in Portuguese literature* (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1989), p. 198. It should be noted that the Portuguese had begun to study Indian languages, as revealed by the publication of books such as *Mabratti Grammar*, *Indostana (Urdu) Grammar* and *Vocabulary in Bengali*; this was in tandem with the efforts of British antiquarians and orientalist in the eighteenth and especially nineteenth centuries to study scientifically the cultures and subject peoples under colonial rule.

⁶ Joaquim H. da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental* (New Delhi: Asian Education Services, 1992). Rivara’s other more specific work on the subject is *Brados a favor dos comunidades* (A book in favour of the communities of the villages of the State of India) (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1870).

⁷ F.N. Xavier, *Historical sketch of the communities of the villages in the islands, Salsette and Bardez* (1852); Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental* (1877); L. Mandes, *A Índia Portuguesa* (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1997); J.H. Cunha Rivara, *Brados a favor dos comunidades* (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1870); A.B. de Bragança Pereira, *Ethnography of Portuguese India* (1923). The examples of the old manuals for studying the various language such as Marathi, Urdu and Bengali could be located in the Biblioteca Nacional (Portugal). Ismael J.A. Gracia, *Catalogo dos livros do assentamento da gente de guerra que veio do reino para a India desde 1731 até 1811* (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1893).

India before the modern period, Angela B. Xavier's works since 2000 on Goa have mapped out, for instance, how the Portuguese utilized the symbolism associated with the various colonial institutions to gain control of the local population, beyond what 'hard instruments of colonialism' (use of arms) could enforce.⁸

Nova História Militar de Portugal, which contains a collection of writings by respected scholars on an array of topics, is a well-grounded work that canvasses the new military history of Portugal. A survey of the topics discussed in volumes 2 and 3, which touches on the period between sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, reveals a broad range from the art of war, military education and culture to the different branches of the armed services (such as the navy or sub-branches of the land forces such as the militia); wars in different periods (for instance, War of Restoration, War of Spanish Succession); wars in the empire and colonies (in India, Brazil and Africa); as well as the applicability of theoretical modelling (such as the Military Revolution debate) on Portugal's endeavours and developments. Assessments of works covering such a range of military activities across time and geographical regions show them to be barely even.⁹ Despite setbacks after the first era (1497–1663) of empire building in the East, Portugal kept up with military developments in the metropole—although this did not always translate into effective performance in wars at home. For a brief period under the union with Spain (1580–1640), Portugal initiated a second period of imperial expansion in the Americas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Considering the military experiences in the Americas and Asia, the results were mixed but did not appear to be dismal.¹⁰

Nova História Militar de Portugal also heralded new opportunities for cross-disciplinary research to contribute to the study of military

⁸ Ângela B. Xavier, *A invenção de Goa* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciência Sociais, 2008); Ângela B. Xavier, "Ser cidadão no Estado da Índia (século XVI–XVIII): Entre local e o imperial", in A.B. Xavier and C.N. Silva, eds., *O governo dos outros: Poder e diferença no império português* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciência Sociais, 2016), pp. 216–92.

⁹ Survey of Teixeira N.S. and Barata M.T. eds., *Nova história military de Portugal* 5 vols. (Lisbon: Circulo de Leitories, 2003).

¹⁰ N.S. Teixeira and M.T. Barata eds., *Nova história military de Portugal* vol. 2–3 (Lisbon: Circulo de Leitories, 2003).

history.¹¹ How did new social or cultural history inform the works on military history in the colonies? It appears, from surveying the contents of *Nova História Militar*, that the efforts were relatively uneven. As the Portuguese adopted weapons from their fellow Europeans in the metropole, for instance during the Seven Years' War or the Napoleonic Wars, there was potential for the Portuguese armed forces to adopt organizational practices from the host states. Nevertheless, a hybrid set of practices usually developed. Whether these practices were actually more modern or simply perceived to be so depended on their effectiveness in battle and/or sustainability in the recipient organizational structure. This was also the experience in the colonies when new weaponry and practices were introduced: new ways of doing things needed to be adapted to indigenous cultures and customs.¹² There is evidence, as discussed by E. Carreira and P. Shirodkar, that French and British arms were adopted in Portuguese India to some extent during the Seven Years' War and Napoleonic Wars respectively.¹³

The military history of Portugal (and its colonies) appears to have developed in tandem with the general and colonial history of Portugal. However, the sub-fields of coverage of the different geographical regions, especially pertaining to India and the Far East, have been uneven. Extending further from the new social/cultural history, and in line with the new branches of history writing from the 1990s—such as the history of the environment, history of medicine, history of science and technology, etc.—there is room, as K. Roy opined, for the 'new military history' to join these new impulses and break new boundaries.¹⁴

¹¹ J. Varandes, "História militar em Portugal: Um projeto do Ensino universitário em rede", *Revista Militar* vol. 2602 (2018), pp. 949–56. See specifically for instance, A. Teixeira, *Fortalezas: Estado Português da Índia* (Lisbon: Tribuna, 2008).

¹² For instance, see V. Alexandre, "O liberalismo português e as colónias de África, 1820–39", *Análise Social* vol. XV (1980), pp. 61–62.

¹³ E. Carreira, *Globalising Goa, 1660–1820: Change and exchange in a former capital of empire* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2014), pp. 131–60 and P. Shirodkar, "British occupation of Goa", in P. Shirodkar ed., *Researches in Indo-Portuguese history* vol. 1 (Jaipur: Publication Scheme, 1998), pp. 229–50.

¹⁴ K. Roy, *War and society in colonial India* (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p. 2.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EARLY MODERN AND GLOBALIZING PERIOD

The time frame of this book coincides with the last phase of the early modern period and the radical transition from the ancient regimes to the mid-nineteenth century. Such a timeline is not free from problems or bias as the histories of some non-Western societies do not always align well with the classification of an intermediate period between the Middle Ages and the modern period.¹⁵ From a broader perspective, the final stages of the early modern period transitioning into the modern witnessed increasing internationalization of conflicts, such as the Seven Years' War and Napoleonic Wars.¹⁶ There was also a gradual but steady increase in world trade from the seventeenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century (although the extent to which early modern societies were impacted remains a highly debated issue).¹⁷ The timeline of the book coincides with the emergence of Great Britain as a hegemon in the subcontinent.¹⁸ The external stimuli of this period, with their associated domestic developments, impacted the lives of people across India as well as the course of events in Portuguese Goa. The British in the mid-eighteenth century intensified their competition against the French for political and economic influence in India (which ended dismally for the latter). Britain's wars with the Marathas in the early nineteenth century weakened the latter's hold in Central and South India, which caused unrest along the borders of Goa. Although the Indian Mutiny (1857–1858) is usually understood to have had a limited effect outside North India, the British suppression of the mutiny led to the formation of the Raj—British direct rule—and the re-establishment of order

¹⁵ J.A. Goldstone, "The problem of the early modern world", *Journal of Economics and Social History of the Orient* vol. 41 (1998), pp. 249-84.

¹⁶ Earlier wars such as P. Emmer, "The first global war: Dutch versus Iberia in Asia, Africa and the New world, 1590–1609", *e-Journal of Portuguese History* vol. 1.1 (2003), pp. 1–14. See also D. Baugh, *The global seven years war* (New York: Routledge, 2014) and A. Mikaberidze, *Napoleonic wars: A global history* (Oxford: OUP, 2020).

¹⁷ Refer website <https://www.metricinvestments.com/history-of-international-trade> (accessed 11 May 2021), specifically data by Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor (2003).

¹⁸ See for instance, R.J. Moore, "Imperial India, 1858–1914", in A.N. Porter and A.M. Low eds., *Oxford history of the British empire: The nineteenth century*, vol. III (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp. 422–46 and S. Tharoor, *The British empire in India: Era of darkness* (New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2016).

in the areas surrounding Goa. The other colonial powers were gradually outcompeted, and the surviving autonomous native states were increasingly deprived of their jurisdictional powers as the British consolidated their strategic control over the subcontinent after the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁹

Why Goa? And why choose to examine its colonial military history? Colonial history is usually focused on more ‘successful’ enterprises such as those of the English or the Dutch. Within the Portuguese empire, other than the glorious period in the sixteenth century and the climactic struggles in the seventeenth, the later centuries of Portuguese rule in India were usually seen as part of, and continued to be affected by, the image of the ‘decadent East’: for instance, in sources such as *Memorias sobre as possessões na Asia, escriptas no anno de 1823* (Memoirs on the possessions in India, written in the year 1823).²⁰ In Goa, and generally in the East, the exploits of colonial military forces were likewise largely focused on the glorious period(s), overlooking developments beyond the seventeenth century. There was also a tendency for the military history of Goa before World War Two to be subsumed under the narrative of the British Raj.²¹

It should be borne in mind that the Estado da Índia of the eighteenth century experienced not only existential challenges but also boundary changes to the territories under its charge as well as alterations in the mode of the territories’ jurisdictional administration. The Estado at the beginning of the eighteenth century lost its enclaves on the coasts of India but retained substantial tracts of territories in western India. The Estado would soon lose its North Indian territories, with successor powers filling the power vacuum in the long Mughal decline in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries. The loss of Bassein in 1739 resulted in

¹⁹ See Johnson & Browning’s 1860 map of India, Ceylon, Birmah, [...], detailed map accessed at <https://www.raremaps.com/gallery/detail/69997/johnsons-hindustan-or-british-india-johnson-browning>. Alvin Johnson issued his illustrated family atlas from 1860 and was one of the most significant atlas publishers of the second half of the nineteenth century. The French continued to retain the port-settlements of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Yanam, Mahé, and Chandernagore. Denmark-Norway only sold Tranquebar to the British in 1868.

²⁰ Goncalo de M. Teixeira Pinto, *Memorias sobre as possessões na Asia, escriptas no anno de 1823* (New Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1859).

²¹ See for instance, Uma P. Thapliyal, *Military history of India* (New Delhi: Rupa Publication, 2018).

imminent threats that led to strategic decisions being taken to extend the Estado's frontiers in Goa. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Estado had lost its key settlement in Mombasa along the Mozambique coast for about 50 years (barring a brief reversion in 1728). Portugal's remaining settlements along the coast as well as inland explorations were elevated to a *captainia-general* (captaincy-general) in 1752, which signalled their increased autonomy. Portuguese East Africa (consisting of Mozambique and Zambezi) was made a province directly responsible to the metropole in 1836, after the Portuguese Liberal (Civil) War (1828–1834) and the abolition of the Overseas Council (1833). In the Far East, the Portuguese still retained Macau, although the right of sovereignty was granted to the colony in the 1780s. Macau became 'the integral territory of the Kingdom of Portugal in 1822', and an aggressive governor attempted to assert Macau's sovereignty vis-à-vis China in 1844–1846 in the aftermath of the Opium War.²² Timor, in the East Indies, continued to be closely linked to Macau in trade and jurisdiction and was delinked from the Estado in 1844 (before being returned in 1856). The sprawling and nebulous settlements and territories of the Estado were rationalized in terms of the chain of accountability and jurisdictional boundaries in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As well as supporting one another—tenuously—in times of crisis, they remained linked by trade as well as, informally, in diaspora movements.

The period explored in this book (1750s–1850s) locates the world in a transitional time when certain trends and driving forces were being unleashed and/or maturing and metamorphosing. These trends and forces were: (i) rise of company and monopoly trade as well as challenges to this and associated privatization; (ii) gradual intensification of colonialism in the pre-industrial period (appropriation of activity by the state, also leading to expansion and increasing demarcation of territories); (iii) early modern military globalization (arising from intensified colonial wars as well as transfer of arms and military technology); and (iv) dissenting or revolutionary forces within and outside Europe. These trends, which are discussed by scholars in the rich field of historical globalization such as S. Conrad and J. Osterhammel (2018), P. Stearns (2019) (in the form of trade/war and globalization, imperialism/colonialism, revolutions), are

²² Antonio da S. Rego, *O ultramar português no século XVIII* and *O ultramar português no século XIX* (Lisbon: Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1966/1967). Timor was briefly detached from Macau in 1850.

each subject matters of intense discussion in themselves, and the discussions can at times contradict one another.²³ This book will focus on the aspect of military globalization in its application to the peculiar case study of colonial Goa.

Trade and globalization are valid but debated topics when applied to the discussion of the early modern period. Although the term ‘globalization’ has been applied to the economy and commerce of the past, arguments can be made for and against its effects in the early modern world. In one measured argument, for instance, Jan de Vries invoked the ‘hard’ (quantitative) and ‘soft’ (qualitative) approaches to trade and globalization but concluded that commerce was still limited for early modern Europe and the rest of the world.²⁴ The general economic environment in the colonial age, as De Vries noted, was more protective than free, although private English traders were eroding the profits of European monopolistic companies in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. European maritime empires gradually evolved into territorial empires as they bid to control markets and resources.²⁵

Studies have begun to position the transition of Goa during this dynamic and globally interactive period. Maria de J. dos Mártires Lopes in her *Goa Setecentista: Tradição e modernidade* (Eighteenth-century Goa: tradition and modernity) (1999) has argued that eighteenth-century Goa

²³ Refer S. Conrad S. and J. Osterhammel, *The emerging modern world* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2018) and Stearns P., *Globalization in world history* (New York: Routledge, 2019).

²⁴ Jan de Vries, “The limits of globalization in the early modern world”, *The Economic History Review* vol. 63.3 (2010), pp. 710–33. See also corroborating data on world trade mooted in Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor (2003).

²⁵ World-system proponents did not give enough credence to Asian trade although the California school conferred a role for China in the world-system in their intense debates. Of the economists who gave important consideration to ‘concrete’ data and impact of world trade, what might be deemed as ‘hard’ evidence by one group (for instance, Williamson and O’Rourke [2002]) might be regarded as ‘soft’, from certain perspective, in another (Flynn and Giraldez (2004)). For de Vries, the ‘process of globalization’ was a more concrete process compared to the phenomenon of imperialism (or colonialism); which was deemed more as an outcome. See de Vries, “Limits of globalization in the early modern world”, pp. 710–33. On the other references, see J. Williamson and K. O’Rourke (“After Columbus: Explaining Europe’s overseas trade”, *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 62, 2002, pp. 417–56) and D. Flynn and A. Giraldez (“Path dependence, time lag and the birth of globalization: A critique of Williamson and O’Rourke”, *European Review of Economic History*, vol. 8, 2004, pp. 81–108).

experienced a period of change, especially during the Pombaline era.²⁶ Ernestine Carreira's *Globalizing Goa* (2014), collating her works over the years, showcases issues regarding Portugal's interactions with the French, most notably in terms of military assistance and proselytizing collaboration; its global trade in slaves with Brazil (before the latter's independence); as well as the image of women and aspects of customs (hospitality) practised in Goa.²⁷ Although earlier works such as that by G. Clarence-Smith (1985) implied that Goa was on the decline and becoming inconspicuous, Celsa Pinto (1994; 2003) has argued that there was some revival of commerce in the early nineteenth century and that the economy of Goa was not as dilapidated or unchanging as usually understood. Pinto (2017) has also traced in two volumes the lengthy shift of the capital from Old Goa to Panjim between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Paulo T. de Matos and J. Lucassen mapped out the labour and work occupations of the population of Goa towards the mid-nineteenth century.²⁸ Aspects of Angela B. Xavier's works on Goa, for instance, demonstrated how the Portuguese evolved the colonial regulatory institutions on the ground to interact with the local population in maintaining colonial rule.²⁹

Overlapping with the discussion of global commerce and the phenomena of colonialism and imperialism, the inexorable drive of capitalism to acquire resources as well as capitalism's sustainability were established and questioned by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Their critique aligned with the observation that late-nineteenth-century imperialism appeared more aggressive when it came to the forced acquisition of land and resources, although more contemporary research has also indicated complex motives (beyond a desire for land and resources) for

²⁶ Maria de J. dos Mártires Lopes, *Goa Setecentista: Tradição e modernidade* (Porto: Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 1999).

²⁷ E. Carreira, *Globalizing Goa, 1660–1820: Change and exchange in a former capital of empire* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2014).

²⁸ C. Pinto, *Situating Indo-Portuguese trade history: A commercial resurgence, 1770–1830* (Kannur: Irish, 2003). C. Pinto, *Trade and finance in Portuguese India* (New Delhi: Concept publishing, 1994). C. Pinto, *Colonial Panjim: Its governance, its people* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2017). C. Pinto, *Anatomy of a colonial capital: Panjim* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2016). Paulo T. de Matos and J. Lucassen, "Goa at work around 1850", IISH Research paper no. 54 (2020).

²⁹ Xavier, *A invenção de Goa*; Xavier, "Ser cidadão no Estado da Índia (século XVI–XVIII): Entre local e o imperial", pp. 216–92.

imperialism in the industrial age.³⁰ What can be ascertained is that Britain was the first state to have achieved industrial capitalism in the period 1750–1850 and it actively attempted to foment a system of status quo in order to attain this. First-age European imperialism was focused on coastal areas in Asia. The rival colonial powers in India were the first to break this pattern by acquiring large tracts of territories inland.

Attempts have been made to neutralize the discussion of the traditional paradigms of imperialism. Theorists focusing on macro explanations—such as I. Wallerstein, in contrast to earlier theorists such as W. Rostow—have advocated for the different phases of colonialism/imperialism to be viewed through the prism of a more systemic model (world-system theory). Portugal is depicted in Wallerstein’s work (1974–1980) as participating in the luxury spice trade in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century while its more prestigious counterpart on the Iberian peninsula attempted to achieve hegemony over Europe.³¹ Later discussions, for instance in C. Daniels and M. Kennedy’s *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas* (2013), have even reversed the core-periphery (metropole-colony) conceptions.³² B. Yun-Casalilla (2020) used the term ‘globalization’ to argue that the phenomenon of the Portuguese enterprise abroad could be seen not only in spatial but also in temporal terms. While the corporatist model of the Iberian states in venturing abroad was effective in the sixteenth century, it was not necessarily so in the seventeenth century.³³ From the perspective of political economy, from the 1970s attempts have been made to probe into the notions of power, resource mobilization, and the state’s relations with the economy. Deeper

³⁰ P. Kratoska, *High imperialism, 1890s–1930s* (New York: Routledge, 2001); older works such as H. Gollwitzer’s *Europe in the age of imperialism, 1880–1914* (New York: WW Norton, 1979) also discusses multifaceted reasons.

³¹ I. Wallerstein, *The modern world system* vols. I–II (New York: Academic Press, 1974–80). See also M. Pearson, *Before colonialism: Theories on Asian-European relations, 1500–1750* (Delhi: OUP, 1988), pp. 32–50.

³² C. Daniels and M. Kennedy ed., *Negotiated empires: Centers and peripheries in the Americas* (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 105–42.

³³ B. Yun-Casalilla, *Iberian world empires and the globalization of Europe, 1415–1668* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). The continued resilience of the Iberian states, and in certain instances revival of power and influence, was a testimony to their strength, attested to by writers such as D. Goodman and J. Habron. *Spanish naval power, 1589–1665* (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) and J. Habron, *Spanish experience of sea power: Trafalgar and Spanish navy* (Annapolis: US Naval Academic Press, 2004).

insights into the dynamics of the state power and resources appeared to be achieved with works analysing the phenomenon of war and the rise of European fiscal states in the early modern period.³⁴ This book will look at specific sub-fields and paradigms that can lend a hand to account for the unusual case of colonial Goa. Goa's distinctive characteristics included the following: (i) its survival in British-dominated India (where most of the other colonial powers had been ousted), and (ii) the continued role and utility of the colonial military in an externally pacified environment as well as continued activities and skirmishes of a (remnant) colonial naval force in the Arabian Sea.

Although there was intense colonial rivalry and competition in India, the rationale for the British decision not to permanently annex Goa (barring brief occupations during 1797–1798 and 1802–1813) could be understood for the following reason and sequence of developments. There was a diminution of the French threat on the seas and in India, which permitted increased assertiveness of British patrolling in parts of the Indian Ocean (further facilitating the enforcement of abolitionist measures as the 1800s progressed). The survival of the Portuguese State of India in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries may be attributed to (i) the strategic stabilization of the immediate external political security environment in India; (ii) the maintenance of a fiscal extractive regime (although this was drawn from a limited economic base in Goa which at times also experienced a fluctuating political economic environment)³⁵; and (iii) the maintenance of the colonial military force, which relied on a variety of indigenous personnel (Luso-descendants, Hindus, Ranes and minority tribes). Although each of these reasons for the prolongation of the Estado involved a military-security dimension, the causes were likely to be associated on the ground and in an increasingly connected world to other facets of the Goan (colonial) settlement and society. The early modern phenomenon of globalization may also be linked with the Military Revolution (MR) debate, a view explaining

³⁴ Jan Glete, *War and state in early modern Europe: Spain, Dutch republic and Sweden as fiscal-military states* (New York: Routledge, 2002); S. Dunn, D. Grummitt and H. Cools, "War and the state in early modern Europe: Widening the debate", *War in History* vol. 15.4 (2008), pp. 371–88. See also B. Downing, *Military revolution and political change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) and B. Porter, *War and the rise of the state* (New York: Free Press, 1994).

³⁵ The fluctuations included for example the re-organization of Estado da Índia colonies in the Indian Ocean and farther East as well as loss of Brazil trade after 1822.

how maritime European powers acquired colonies and induced intensified conflicts around the world in the early modern period to the early decades of the nineteenth century. This may be perceived as analogous to the phenomenon of ‘military globalization’ discussed by D. Held or R. Keohane and J. Nye, for instance, in more contemporary theories. The MR theory, first mooted by Michael Roberts in 1955 and popularized by G. Parker (1988),³⁶ has for over half a century expanded to account for the different agencies explaining Europe’s rise to dominance by shifting emphasis to the emergence of the modernizing centralized state organization, culture, naval developments, as well as stress on the non-European world, and a focus on the process of diffusion and adaptation of military organization, tactics and technology. It is observed, for instance, in the works of J. Black,³⁷ that the thrusts and scopes of discussion became less centred on technology and more on factors associated with various aspects of societies. J.C. Sharman’s work (2019), although casting considerable doubt on the first MR theories, attempted to bring together the ideas of J. Black and W. Lee (2016, involving a cultural explanation) to provide an explanation to the interconnecting dynamics of the European presence on the ground. Elsewhere, studies discussing the rise of the European fiscal state by J. Glete (2002) and S. Dunn et al. (2008) have shifted the focus of attention from military forces to the mobilizing

³⁶ M. Roberts, *The military revolution, 1560–1660; an inaugural lecture* (delivered before the Queen’s University of Belfast) (Belfast: M. Boyd, 1956). G. Parker, *The Military Revolution, 1500–1800: Military innovation and the rise of the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (first edition 1988)). The first theories refer to paradigms which explain the rise of the modern (Western) state through military innovation such as the mass adoption of muskets (Roberts), the building of star fortress (G. Parker) etc. that had impacts on the organization of state and society.

³⁷ J. Black, *War in the early modern world* (New York: Routledge, 2005); J. Black, *War and the world: Military power and the fate of continents, 1450–2000* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). C. Rogers, *The Military revolution debate: Readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1995). Some tenets of Black’s observations are as follows: (1) Black posits that the adoption of military technology (for instance, cannon or small arms) was undertaken after the tumultuous (religious) wars of the first half of the seventeenth century, not earlier. (2) Black accounts for non-European conflicts outside Europe and highlights that these were not necessarily inferior in their conduct or organization to those in Europe. Moreover, many focused on well-known conflicts or successful battles. Less-successful engagements have their lessons, and interludes between conflicts were equally important periods for developments in weaponry.

institutions deemed to be the basis of the early modern state.³⁸ In this connection, the pitfalls highlighted in critical reviews on MR theories—such as the evolution-revolution debate, with its technology-centred and Euro-centric foci—were beginning to dissipate from the 1980s, and there emerged a tendency for the theories of military revolution to approximate general military history.

At the same time that MR theories might have become more generalized in their explanations, parallel arguments have also been made for the avoidance of the use of the term ‘Military Revolution’. Critics such as F. Dores Costa (2018) have argued for abandoning the term. Contributors to the preeminent *Nova história militar de Portugal* are generally cautious about the applicability of MR modelling.³⁹ Autonomous discourses have, for instance, arisen in the fields of new social and cultural history whose discussion overlapped with military history without necessarily invoking the MR theme. Reasonably sophisticated studies have been conducted on the primacy of social or cultural inputs in the forging of an Indian soldier (or vice versa) during the colonial period. Studies revealing a social aspect—for example, S. Alavi’s work exploring how sepoys influenced the way the East India Company (EIC) operated and P. Rosen’s and D. Kolff’s works examining the extent to which the military or military culture affected social stratification—appeared in the 1970s and 1980s.⁴⁰ Cultural studies, of which several sub-strands can be detected, delved, for instance, into how the image of the sepoy was affected by orientalism (see,

³⁸ This deepens the discourse raised by C. Tilly (1985) and F. Lane (1953) delving into the nature of governments or their societies and how resources might be mobilized under different regimes. See Glete, *War and state in early modern Europe: Spain, Dutch republic and Sweden as fiscal-military states*; S. Dunn et al., “War and the state in early modern Europe: Widening the debate”; Downing, *Military revolution and political change*. See also C. Tilly, “War making and state making as organized crime”, in P. Evans et al. eds., *Bringing the state back in* (Cambridge: CUP, 1985), pp. 169–86 and F.C. Lane, “Economic consequences of organized violence”, *Journal of Economic History* vol. 18.4 (1953), pp. 401–17.

³⁹ F. Dores Costa, Review of ‘The Military Revolution in early modern Europe: A revision’, *e-Journal of Portuguese History* vol. 16.2 (2018), accessed at <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:841404/>.

⁴⁰ S. Alavi, *The sepoys and the company: Tradition and transition in northern India, 1770–1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); P. Rosen, *Societies and military power: India and its armies* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996); D. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and sepoy: The ethnohistory of the military labor market in Hindustan, 1450–1850* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990).

for instance, C. Wickremesekera [2002] and P. Bandopadhyay [2014])⁴¹ or how the idea of race/martial race theory impacted Indian society (see, for instance, D. Peers [1995], K. Teltscher [1995], K. Roy [2011])⁴² or, more broadly, to what extent the Indian military system was influenced by British imperialist or traditional Indian cultures. J. Lynn, while not dismissing the role of military technology, has presented a complex picture of how the pragmatic (social/cultural) mentalities, combining the restraining social/cultural norms of indigenous society and British training and organization, came together to create a reasonably effective sepoy under the EIC. Further, Lynn probed beneath the narrative into situations in which the discourse/perception of war might coincide with or deviate from the reality of war.⁴³

The MR debate has not totally fizzled out: a conference centred on the theme was organized in Portugal as recently as 2018 and published as a series of essays in an edited volume in 2021.⁴⁴ It is still possible to perceive the case study of a colony (such as Goa) via shades of MR modelling if its prescribed features are not dogmatically applied. Beyond the initial European exploration and intrusion into the non-European world in the early modern period, there was usually a process of resistance, negotiation and (mutual) adaptation in the recipient societies. Specifically in terms of technological diffusion, certain Western military technologies could be perceived (rightly or erroneously) by their users (and those who later wrote about their use) as having some

⁴¹ C. Wickremesekera, *Best black troops in the world: British perceptions and the making of the sepoy, 1746–1805* (Delhi: Manohar, 2002); P. Bandopadhyay, *From Plassey to Partition and after* (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2014).

⁴² K. Teltscher, *India inscribed: European and British writing on India, 1600–1800* (Oxford: OUP, 1995); D. Peers, *Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial armies and the garrison state in early nineteenth-century India* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995); K. Roy, *War, culture and society in early modern South Asia, 1740–1849* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).

⁴³ J. Lynn, *Battle: A history of combat and culture* (New York: Basic Books, 2004). The other terms used in the model are: (i) perfected reality (ideal scenario of war that the society creates in line with what it is able to accept); (ii) refusal to consider a certain scenario as war (this represents a step further from ‘perfected reality’ where society refuses to consider this and does not even bother to create an alternative); (iii) extreme reality (scenario of war that occurred outside the norms/ethics of society), (iv) alternative discourse (society creates this to explain extreme reality).

⁴⁴ Conference “Military revolution in Portugal and its empire”, Evora, Portugal (June 2018). A. Muteira et al. eds., *First world empire: Portugal, war and military revolution* (Thames: Routledge, 2021).

form of a lead over technologies possessed by local indigenous powers and/or utilized as bargaining chips in the building of alliances against a host of rival colonial and indigenous powers in a particular region of conflict—not unlike the diffusion dynamics discussed in modern ‘Military Globalization’ theories. On the ground, the innovation or application of particular military technologies/practices/organizations in a host or guest society, combining revolutionary-evolutionary tendencies, may be better perceived as ‘circumscribed’ or ‘episodic’ rather than a uniform application to the host/guest society under discussion. Strands of more diverse MR explanations have been advocated over time. C. Rogers, for instance, has suggested that ‘the military revolution can best be compared with the concept of “punctuated equilibrium evolution” (a theory originating in biology)’; in this conception, short bursts of rapid military innovation were followed by longer periods of relative stagnation.⁴⁵ If Rogers’ line of argument is seen hand in hand with a generic product life cycle theory, an innovative military technology (or practice/organization) is expected to undergo an anticipated process of its own rise and decline (and/or failure) in development.⁴⁶

Studies have progressed since the study by Moore Stephen, who advocated that the Portuguese expeditions in the Indian Ocean, most notably by Afonso de Albuquerque, constituted a ground-breaking military exploit. Later assessments deem that MR theories were only peripherally and tenuously applied to Portugal and its discovery and expansion overseas in the sixteenth century.⁴⁷ On the ground, whether in the metropole or in the colonies, the military forces of Portugal maintained a semblance of European-ness even though the technologies or practices seldom originated from Portugal. Portugal in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries manifested this development. The recipient society, whether it

⁴⁵ C. Rogers ed., *The Military Revolution debate: Readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe* (New York: Avalon Publishing, 1995), pp. 76–77.

⁴⁶ A. Saaksvuori, *Product lifecycle management* (New York: Springer, 2008). See also R. Bess, “Seven reasons why products fail” (2021), accessed at <https://280group.com/product-management-blog/7-reasons-products-fail/>.

⁴⁷ M. Stephen, *Albuquerque* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892) and Roger L. de Jesus, “Gunpowder, firepower and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century”, in P. Malekandathil et al. eds., *India, the Portuguese and maritime interactions* vol. 1 (New Delhi: Primus Books, 2019), pp. 220–31. See also F. Jacob and G. Visoni-Alonzo, “The theory of Military Revolution: Global, numerous, endless?”, *RUHM* vol. 3 (2014), pp. 189–204.

was a colony or a society yet to be subjugated, as highlighted earlier, exhibited its own process of resistance, negotiation and adaptation. The element of ‘culture’ is invariably a key input in the discussion of this interaction. It is in locating the social-cultural-military history nexus that a credible explanation may be found for either Portugal’s remnant military enterprise in India or Britain’s rising empire building there between 1750 and the 1850s. Lynn’s characterization of the functionally optimal sepoy discussed earlier epitomized a tactical-level explanation that can be seen in works (for instance, by C. Bayly) discussing the wider paradigms of the British making inroads in India in the transitional period in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—the East India Company achieved a workable paradigm of a capitalized-coercive model that managed to achieve hegemony over large parts of India.⁴⁸ The diffusion dynamics of the EIC military model had run their course at the end of the 1700s and the beginning of the nineteenth century, manifested as fissures in the system that culminated in the 1857 Mutiny.

On the revolutionary forces that developed at the end of the eighteenth century and reverberated in no uncertain terms at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the generic (J. Goldstone) and European phenomena (for instance, the French Revolution or revolutions of the 1830s) might be relatively well enunciated and researched, more exploration can be undertaken of movements in the non-European (particularly the Indian Ocean) world. Akin to the ‘seventeenth-century crisis’, research into the early nineteenth century—by, for instance, R. Trevers—has surmised that intra-state upheavals outside Europe, especially in India, were fuelled by their own socio-economic dynamics rather than fervour or ideologies emanating from Europe.⁴⁹ In the case of a mature colony such as Goa, there is cause to probe, in the context of a more stabilized external environment, the probable reasons for the disaffections and uprisings there.

⁴⁸ Lynn, *Battle: A history of combat and culture*. See C. Bayly, *Indian society and the making of the British empire* (Cambridge: CUP, 1988) and P. Marshall, *Bengal: The British bridgehead* (Cambridge: CUP, 1988).

⁴⁹ R. Trevers, “Imperial revolutions and global repercussions: South Asia and the world, 1750–1850”, in D. Armitage and S. Subrahmanyam eds., *Age of revolutions in global context* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 144–66.

LINE-UP OF CHAPTERS

The main thesis of this book posits that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Goa as a Portuguese colony was becoming a relatively inconspicuous place in the context of the British consolidation and domination of India and located itself decidedly in the periphery (vis-a-vis the centre). Its colonial military, except for the exploits and defensive actions undertaken in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, suffered from the systemic malaise that was more than the degenerative and corruptive culture alleged in the Black Legend. Although this colonial instrument of arms appeared to be able to carry out its missions and uphold its routine duties, the survival of the *Estado da Índia* could not be attributed solely or fully to this instrument of state. During a period when migration and creolization intensified, the co-option of indigenous groups in the *Estado* led the mixed classes to evolve deep interests that resisted reforms. The increasing politicization of the seas and privatization of trade rendered the colonial fleet defunct as it attempted to catch up with technology and strove to fulfil certain routine duties. On the non-military front, Goa appeared to be a relatively peaceful place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; and if there were episodes of increased violence, they were due more to internal than external crises. The British and Dutch colonial militaries played a more prominent role in the growing of the two respective empires over the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Portuguese military in Goa performed a more passive role compared to its British and Dutch counterparts, or its compatriot militaries in Africa, which were still expanding.

This chapter discusses the trends and driving forces, particularly in the area of pre-modern military developments and globalization, and the ways in which these could interact with peculiar holdings of colonizing powers in Asia in the late early modern period to the mid-nineteenth century. Chapter 2 provides the background and wider context to Portuguese military developments and history in India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The chapter discusses Portugal's wars in the metropole and in the East before the eighteenth century as well as military developments and violence in Brazil and East Africa. In the context of the larger argument, how the Portuguese East (specifically Goa) arrived at a relatively constricted state at the dawn of the nineteenth century (amidst some revival in trade) as well as its linkages with other parts of the empire are discussed.

Chapter 3 traces the nature of warfare and military developments of the Portuguese in India from the late eighteenth century until the early period of the nineteenth century (overlapping with the reigns of Maria I to Maria II in Portugal). Specifically, it examines the military establishment, the types of troops and their recruitment as well as remuneration. The discussion focuses on the way in which the combination of organization and equipment (which was not always cutting edge), creole-staffed colonial military and ad hoc deployment of indigenous hires factored as inputs and how the colonial force transitioned from a campaigning into an internal pacification force. The chapter also locates the survival of Goa in the context of evolving diplomacy in the region, Goa's precarious finances, as well as the British re-establishment of order in the areas outside it.

Chapter 4 looks at non-war but military-related violence in Goan society. From 1780 to the 1850s, Goa—like much of India—experienced the rise and ebb of the Marathas, not only in terms of its political environment but also in its socio-economic entanglements (at the frontiers and when the Marathas were hired as auxiliaries). Other than the jostling for influence by the creole Indo-Portuguese group, the non-war violence in the region of Goa also showed how the use of marginal groups in colonial governance and the military contributed to the colony's internal tensions. In close conjunction, the chapter also discusses how the first Goan police force evolved as the capital of Portuguese India shifted from Old Goa to Panjim.

Chapter 5 surveys the development of the Portuguese navy in India in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as well as the situation on the seas and in the coastal areas of western India during that period. Specifically, the need for continued trade and supply to resource-scarce Goa prolonged the utility of the little fleet, at times replenished with small- to medium-sized warships, that the Portuguese possessed in the Western Indian Ocean. Finally, there is a brief discussion of maritime violence in this part of the world in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The penultimate chapter (Chapter 6) reviews the not-so-well-known events of the Indian Mutiny outside North India in relation to developments in Goa and traces certain legacies linked to present-day Goa. Finally, the epilogue sums up the main messages of the book and compares the Portuguese colonial army to other colonial militaries (in particular, the Dutch and British) in the region.

CONCLUSION

Goa's military history, and to some extent its history of violence, cannot be readily linked to its present incarnation as a laid-back tourist haven. But in fact, Goa does have a rather peculiar military and developmental history that explains its present. The literature survey shows that the diverse Portuguese military and colonial history towards and after the turn of the millennium has become more mature. Nevertheless, works on the military histories of colonial East and South Asia still pale in comparison to the narratives and analyses by scholars on the metropole or South America. This book has taken a particular path to probe into the military phenomenon intersecting with facets of society in Goa, embracing themes of globalization, imperialism/colonialism, as well as revolution. The book hopes to show, in short, that the military history of the Portuguese in Goa was nothing like that of their larger British counterpart in India. It was a case study in weakness rather than of a hegemon. Beyond setting the necessary underpinnings, this chapter lays out the outline of the subsequent chapters, which trace the evolution of the Portuguese colonial force in India and the conflicts it engaged during the transition from the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century.



Developments of the Metropole and Empire on the World Stage

Abstract This chapter surveys the broader forces that were operating in the transitional world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While the development of weaponry was fairly gradual and limited during the First Industrial Revolution, Western states were slowly making headway in several parts of the world where effective defence could not be organized or the terrain was not overly challenging. The varied military entities that Portugal implanted across its colonies in Brazil and East Africa are discussed in terms of the mode by which they were set up as well as the similarities, differences or linkages they had with the experience in Goa or the metropole. In the colonies, the colonial military in Brazil appeared to have more similarities than did its counterpart in East Africa with the military in Portugal or even Goa. The final section of the chapter also sets up the context of the Portuguese presence in India before the eighteenth century.

Keywords Globalization · Military developments (Portugal) · Brazil · East Africa · Goa

INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at the wider forces operating in the world and how Portugal and its colonies (particularly its militaries) evolved across space and time in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The introductory chapter of this book surveyed the literature in a few interrelated sub-fields and revealed the somewhat paradoxical situation of the colonial state and military (i.e., the state apparatus in stasis and some advances in the military). In its broadest definition, imperialism may be seen as a driving force for development in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century world. Early modern capitalist states embraced mercantilist agendas that spilled into the political and economic measures they undertook. Part of the resources appropriated from the colonies and extra-European world were channelled to the operation of the instrument of arms; how the instrument of arms evolved and/or was deployed thus becomes an important consideration in understanding how an early modern colonial society was built up. Few state entities were able to isolate themselves from the larger developments or forces at play. Even a laidback outpost like Goa experienced some form of a race and catch-up game. Hence, the dynamics and spread of military technologies and their organizations as well as how they were adapted or installed in the local context, among other (non-military) factors, became important inputs that could prolong the survival or hasten the end of colonies in maritime empires.

This chapter looks at the broader forces that were operating in the transitional world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the second section, the extent to which Portugal conformed to or deviated from the European experience, especially in war and its practices, is analysed via the phenomenon of globalization and its effects. At the same time, the varied military entities that Portugal implanted across its colonies in Brazil and East Africa are discussed in terms of the mode by which they were set up as well as the similarities, differences or linkages they had with the experience in Goa or the metropole. Finally, the context of the Portuguese presence in India before the eighteenth century is set up for later discussion in the book. In terms of overall argument, the characteristics and dynamics of the military endeavours of Portugal and its colonies across time and space within and outside Asia are discussed so that specific developments in Goa in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries can be juxtaposed in the wider comparative context.

DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

The period of the eighteenth (especially from the second half) to the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the first industrial revolution in the history of human development/civilization. The Industrial Revolution facilitated a transition to new manufacturing processes in Europe. While the harnessing of new sources of power—which permitted the development of machine tools—and new mechanized processes and systems had the potential to improve the qualitative and quantitative aspects of production, which could in turn translate into effectiveness on the battlefield, the input of these new sources of power was not yet apparent in the strategic competition of states in the eighteenth century. Although the full benefits of the Industrial Revolution would not be reaped until the mid-nineteenth century, there was—arising from the revolution, which preceded the Napoleonic Wars—a substantial increase in enlistment and size of armies during the wars. This necessitated a corresponding surge in organizational and production capacity of war resources. Meanwhile, a series of prerequisite and/or concurrent changes were in place for Britain to be ready to industrialize.¹ These changes were occurring both within the country—in agriculture (for instance, improvements in cropping and breeding techniques, land enclosure reforms) and transportation (infrastructure)—as well as overseas—the availability of its colonies as resource bases and markets for goods. This accounted for why no other state came close to Britain in becoming the (first) industrial state between 1750 and 1850.² Portugal made some progress in its economic sectors and industries, especially during the period of Pombal (1750–77), but its link of dependency with Britain (bounded by the treaty of 1703) as well as the subsequent loss of the colony of Brazil in 1822 (along

¹ P. Deane, *First industrial revolution* (Cambridge: CUP, 1980). See also S. Conrad and J. Osterhammel, *The emerging modern world* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

² J. Davis and P. Mathias, *The first industrial revolutions* (Hoboken: Basil Blackwell, 1990). See also P. O'Brien, "Provincializing the First Industrial Revolution", Working paper GEHN (2006). Although Britain might manifest more definitive signs for the materialization of the (first) industrial revolution, O'Brien has reminded and urged that the phenomenon be seen as global history because the resources from the extra-European world (extracted via imperialist intrusions there) were crucial inputs in the change.

with the latter's resources and markets) stunted the country's path of industrialization in the nineteenth century.³

In the context of the technological shifts over the long haul of the seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century, there was relatively limited change in the development of weaponry. Instead, minute adaptations were made to specific firearm types (handheld and cannon), and their deployment led to the optimization seen in Napoleonic armies in the early nineteenth century. The developments in weaponry can be broadly summarized thus: (i) the development of breech-loaders from muzzle-loaders supported by more foolproof ignition (matchlock to flintlock) as well as the fixing of the bayonet on the firearm (to double it as a weapon for hand-to-hand combat); (ii) the adoption—and subsequent reduction in size—of cannon used on land, leading to their increased mobility on the battlefield. This was accompanied by the development of artillery fortresses, which, although sidelined in the Napoleonic Wars, held their own at different times in the eighteenth century and during the Crimean War; (iii) the increase in size, speed and firepower of naval vessels, mediated by the adaptation of cannon development for use on ships of the line.⁴

On the ground in Asia, military and technological developments in Europe (in the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century) impacted, to varying degrees, the Europeans' interactions and clashes with indigenous

³ Pombal's first minister-ship of Portugal strove to create a conducive environment for the people undertaking business and curbed the influence of land owners, nobility and the Church. Investments and developments were undertaken in the silk, glass and iron-working sectors although the large landowners and innumerable subsistence farmers continued to resist any deep-seated change to the agricultural sector. See L. F. Costa, *An economic history of Portugal* (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), K. Maxwell, *Pombal: Paradox of the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), J. M. Pedreira, "The obstacles to early industrialization in Portugal, 1800–1870", in J. Batou ed., *Between development and underdevelopment: Precocious attempts at industrialization of the periphery* (Droz: Genebra, 1991), pp. 347–79.

⁴ R. Ford and R. Grant, *Weapons: Visual history of arms and armor* (London: DK, 2016); see also Diagram Group, *Weapons: International encyclopedia from 5000 BC to 2000 AD* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1990).

powers. Collating information from an array of works,⁵ some characteristic developments may be observed: (i) Western arms (and their associated organizations), in collaboration of indigenous allies, were able to make advances largely along the coasts and on islands in Asia.⁶ (ii) European navies were usually able to assert a certain degree of control on the high seas. On coastal waters and inland rivers, colonial navies had to be willing to adopt or adapt smaller indigenous vessels and combined with the maturing mode of amphibious warfare, to achieve the control over the coastal areas (ii).⁷ (iii) The Europeans did not always have their way, centralized agrarian states in Asia that were already able to marshal resources to fight sophisticated wars against one another were able to hold the Europeans at bay if they adopted some of the latter's weaponry as part of their hybrid armouries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁸ Indigenous states were, however, stunted in their adoption of European military technologies in the early modern period, due to the complex political-cultural dynamics in the recipient societies.⁹ P. Lorge has described how the Mughals failed to consolidate their rule in Central and South India despite their ability to field overwhelming numbers of foot soldiers and substantial numbers of cannon against the Marathas. K. Roy, surveying the capability of the later Maratha armies and the armies of

⁵ G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), pp. 115–45; J. Black *War in the early modern world* (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 87–128 and 147–76; P. Lorge, *The Asian military revolution* (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), pp. 66–132; G. Scammell, “Indigenous assistance in the establishment of Portuguese power in Asia in the sixteenth century”, *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 14.1 (1980), pp. 1–11; W. Lee, *Waging war: Conflict, culture and innovation in world history* (Oxford: OUP, 2016), pp. 254–92.

⁶ Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West*, pp. 115–45; Lorge, *The Asian Military Revolution*, pp. 66–132; Scammell, “Indigenous assistance in the establishment of Portuguese power in Asia in the sixteenth century”, pp. 1–11.

⁷ J. Glete, *Warfare at sea, 1500–1650* (New York: Routledge, 2002), R. Harding, *Sea power and naval warfare* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

⁸ J. Black, *Introduction to global military history* (New York: Routledge, 2018); see also J. Black, *Rethinking military history* (New York: Routledge, 2004). See also Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West*, pp. 115–45; Black, *War in the early modern world*, pp. 87–128; Lorge, *The Asian Military Revolution*, pp. 66–132.

⁹ W. Lee, *Waging war: Conflict, culture and innovation in world history* (Oxford: OUP, 2016), pp. 1–8.

the other indigenous regional powers (refer Table 2.1), was of the opinion that they achieved—at most—a ‘limited military modernization’.¹⁰

Given the reverses that European powers could also face in the East, what was often not stressed about was, whether at the prime or ebb of their strength, colonial powers also needed to adapt their military forces in deployments and conflicts outside Europe. In the campaigns led and colonies acquired by maritime European states, the management of colonial forces, undergirded by extended periods of conflict, needed to deal with the mixing of European and indigenous personnel. Colonial armies did not operate according to an ‘ideal’ mode of deployment like European armies did, and they likely embraced peculiar local practices if they hired certain numbers of indigenous men-at-arms or if the colonials themselves had been stationed in a certain locality over an extended period of time. Hence, the delicate and at the same time ‘optimal’ mix in the composition of the colonial force and the training/organization of the men-at-arms could constitute as inputs in the gradual but painstaking advances that the European powers were making in Asia.¹¹ Moreover, the state/colonial state could rely on a repertoire of instruments, including diplomacy, to maximize its benefits in its relations with its potential allies and adversaries.

The possible link between war-related violence and political developments can theoretically be informed by the presence of a broader non-war violence—what social scientists term ‘structural violence’.¹² Early modern monarchies that were more absolutist, corporatist or liberal drew from a common root of medieval constitutionalism but did not emerge in the same manner.¹³ Dissatisfactions against monarchical impositions could be demonstrated in a range of negative sentiments in various societies, which could result in resistance to cooperating with authority, or social

¹⁰ Lorge, *The Asian Military Revolution*, pp. 133–53; K. Roy, *Oxford companion to modern warfare in India* (Oxford: OUP, 2009), pp. 62–107.

¹¹ See J. Black, *Warfare in the eighteenth century* (London: Cassell, 1999), pp. 58–93. See also Lynn J., *Battle: A history of combat and culture* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), pp. 145–78.

¹² A. Dilts, “Rewriting John Galtung’s concept of structural violence”, *New political science* vol. 34.2 (2012), 191–94; S. Malesevic, *Sociology of war and violence* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010).

¹³ See B. Downing, *Military revolution and political change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

Table 2.1 Military forces of Mysore and the Marathas

	<i>Mysore army</i>	<i>Maratha army</i>
Composition of force	<p>During Second Anglo-Mysore war (1780–1784), 24,000 regular infantry, 60,000 irregular infantry, 12,000 siladari cavalry, 70 guns</p> <p>Tipu sultan's field force during the Third Anglo-Maratha war (1791), 45,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 100 guns</p>	<p>Maratha army at the time of the Battle of Panipat (1761), 55,000 cavalry, 8–9,000 gardi infantry, 200 guns^a</p> <p>Maratha force at Assaye during the Second Anglo-Maratha war (1803–1805), 16,000 infantry, 38,000 cavalry, 245 guns</p>

^aMaratha army after 1772 (Peshwa period) and in the course of the 3 Anglo-Maratha wars were fought under the condition of a divided confederacy. Source: K. Roy K., *Oxford companion to modern warfare in India from eighteenth century to present times* (New Delhi: OUP, 2009), pp. 64 and 69; S. Millar, Assaye 1803 (Oxford: Osprey, 2006), p. 27; K. Roy, *India's historic battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004), pp. 84–85

disruption and rioting in a volatile situation. Revolution, which J.A. Goldstone saw as culminating from multidimensional causes, presented as a certain climax along this scale of structural and non-war violence.¹⁴ Although few major interstate conflicts occurred between the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) and the Crimean War (1853–1856), the revolutions in 1830–1848 established elective assemblies and abolished signorial rights in certain states in Europe. Elsewhere, as advocated in the essays in the edited volume *Age of Revolutions in Global Context 1760–1840* (Armitage and Subrahmanyam 2010), the revolutions in Europe were thought to possibly influence and interact with those in other parts of the world, most notably the revolutions and independence struggles of states in South America.¹⁵ Still on the world stage in the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century, states in Europe, most notably France and Britain, experienced centralizing and decentralizing tendencies.¹⁶ Revolution was undergirded more broadly by a parallel trend of a ‘civilizing mission’ (the Glorious Revolution and Enlightenment), pushing for the dignified treatment and rights of the ‘ordinary man’ and masses.¹⁷ Across Europe, the gradual consolidation of states and stabilization of vast tracts of lands, as affirmed in, for instance, V. Lieberman’s widely debated study,¹⁸ led to the demolition of walls in cities as well as confiscation of personal arms from the common people. While states attempted to rein in their militaries, police forces were created in the cities to regulate the civil peace. Cross-referring the long-term data of M. Roser and M. Clodfelter,¹⁹ the decrease in the absolute number of deaths from war and non-war causes becomes increasingly obvious from 1800, although the

¹⁴ J. Goldstone, *Revolution and rebellion in early modern world* (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 1–62 and 169–348.

¹⁵ D. Armitage and S. Subrahmanyam, *Age of revolutions in global context* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

¹⁶ In France, state centralization continued to evolve after Louis XIV’s reign. In Britain, ‘centralization’ took place under the parliament and the new constitution (limiting the king’s power) after the 1688 glorious revolution.

¹⁷ See M. Wiesner-Hanks, *Early modern Europe, 1450–1789* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).

¹⁸ V. Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: CUP, 2009).

¹⁹ Refer website ourworldindata.org (accessed 01 May 2021); see also M. Clodfelter, *Warfare and armed conflicts: A statistical reference* (Jefferson: McFarland & Co., 2002).

death rate (per 100,000) still had regular peaks—between major wars—right into the modern era.²⁰ The thesis can be a broad and complex one: war-making dynamics (and their associated explanations) can have a role to play even in a stagnating state or colony. War and its mobilizing activities—for instance, mobilization of resources, disruption arising from military activity—could also affect the development of a state or colony and its associated society in the form of non-state violence linked to war.

COLONIAL MILITARY ENTERPRISES IN BRAZIL AND EAST AFRICA

The Portuguese army in the metropole recruited foreign nationals to help train its men on occasion and in rare periods of exigency (such as at Alcacer-Quibir) filled its ranks with mercenaries over the long haul of the early modern period. On its own (apart from the Habsburgs), the Portuguese in Europe has not been assessed to have embraced MR to any reasonable extent (especially in comparison with the Dutch under Maurice of Nassau (r. 1618–25)).²¹ The co-option of allies and the recruitment of natives were often underestimated, although, comparatively speaking, Iberian-affiliated colonial forces recruited fewer pure-blooded natives vis-à-vis mixed-blood indigenous people.²² Colonial armies of Iberian states past their prime appeared to have performed admirably in defending their colonies against incursions from competitive powers as unexplored lands shrank and colonial borders began to meet. The degree of success—or lack of it—demonstrated the adaptive or maladaptive abilities of the colonial armies, in which the survival of the colonies depended on complex factors that included harsh environments. At the same time, the varied

²⁰ Goldstone, *Revolution and rebellion in early modern world*; B. Downing, *Military revolution and political change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); B. Porter, *War and the rise of state* (USA: The Free Press, 2002); see also Armitage and Subrahmanyam, *Age of revolutions in global context*.

²¹ P. de Brito, “Knights, squires and foot soldiers in Portugal during the sixteenth century Military Revolution”, *Mediterranean Studies* vol. 17 (2008), pp. 118–47. O. van Nimwegen, *The Dutch army and Military Revolutions* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010).

²² See comprehensive survey by G. Paquette, *The European seaborne empires* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019). The older series of works which gives a broad comparative narrative can be found in the Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish and British seaborne empires authored respectively by C.R. Boxer (first two), J.H. Parry and J. Black [publishers: Hutchinson & Co. (1969, 1965, 1966), Yale University Press (2004)].

nature of warfare on the borderlands in Brazil and East Africa made it difficult not only to compare the places but also to differentiate between outright military-related and non-military-related violence.²³

In the seventeenth century, when the Portuguese were suffering a string of reverses in Asia, their engagements in Brazil brought some balance and reprieve to the decline. A number of provinces in Brazil, such as Bahia and Pernambuco, had come under attack and were lost during the Habsburg Union. These places were restored during the period of the union and especially during the War of Restoration.²⁴

Portuguese armies in colonial Brazil were organized along similar lines as those in the metropole and consisted of regulars, militias and *ordenanças* recruited from the white, mulatto (mixed) and black populations.²⁵ The military engagements in Brazil against the Dutch revealed that while the Dutch possessed overall numerical superiority in manpower during 1647–48 in the Pernambuco theatre, their advantage was not always brought to bear in the battles of Guararapes. C.R. Boxer did not have a high opinion of the Portuguese warring abilities abroad (especially in Asia), although the battles of Guararapes showed the Portuguese to be much more adaptable, marching into battle through marshes rather than regular roads.²⁶ Although both sides utilized indigenous allied troops at various points in the conflict, the Portuguese appeared to have deployed them more readily and more effectively compared to the Dutch.²⁷ Regarding other Europeans, the Portuguese sometimes allied

²³ G. Scammell, “Pillars of empire: Indigenous assistance and the survival of the Estado da Índia, 1600–1700”, *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 22.3 (1988), pp. 473–89. See also Paquette’s *European seaborne empire*.

²⁴ Boxer, *The Portuguese seaborne empire, 1415–1825*.

²⁵ Artillery soldiers, as in the metropole, were paid more than the other arms of services. See H. Kraay, *Race, state and armed forces in independence-era Brazil: Bahia, 1790s–1840s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 82–106.

²⁶ Boxer, *The Portuguese seaborne empire*, pp. 113 and 117. See also P. Puntoni, “As guerras no Atlântico sul: A restauração” in M.T. Barata ed., *Nova história militar de Portugal* (Lisbon: Círculo de leitores, 2004), pp. 285–87 and S. da Rocha Pita, *História da América Portuguesa desde o ano de 1500 s do seu descobrimento até o de 1724* (Lisbon: Publisher Lisboa, 1730).

²⁷ The Dutch were more evenly matched in numbers with the Portuguese in the Second battle of Guararapes and used more European mercenaries. The Portuguese and their indigenous allies had used irregular tactics against the Dutch who were more accustomed to open engagements in battles. See Rocha Pita, *História da América portuguesa desde o ano de 1500 s do seu descobrimento até o de 1724*.

with, for instance, the Spanish (West Guarantica, 1750s) and at other times rallied against them (Sacramento, 1678–79; Pardo, 1761), usually fielding several thousand men and amassing up to 20,000 combatants, such as in the War of Pardo.

The regular forces of Brazil from independence (1822) until the mid-nineteenth century drew legacies from the Portuguese colonial army and were largely organized in battalions (especially infantry), regiments of cavalry, as well as smaller units of artillery, all totalling about 15,000 men. The Brazil army was made up of this 15,000-strong mixed black and white force of the National Guard in addition to a 30,000-strong Volunteers of Fatherland black force. Because of the availability of a large number of auxiliary troops behind the front line in addition to the buildup of a credible artillery, the regular Brazilian forces were able to maintain a forward aggressive strategy.²⁸

Although the Portuguese had been in Brazil since 1500,²⁹ there were areas in the interior that were unexplored in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the captaincies continued to evolve in the 1820s (see Map. 2.1, see also Table 2.2). It would be untrue to assert that the chartered companies started by the Portuguese performed dismally in all theatres. The Grão-Pará, Maranhão and Pernambuco companies set up in the Pombaline period managed the slave, cacao, cotton and sugar trades as well as developing the colonial markets for Portuguese manufactures to some extent. The companies, particularly the colonies in Grão-Pará and Maranhão, also acted on behalf of the Crown to develop the latter's military and administrative presence in the Amazon region. The monopolistic control and extraction provoked reactions not only within the circles of the colonial elites (opponents of Pombaline reforms in the metropole and in the colonies) but also from those who had been excluded from trade (smugglers) as well as the labour (native and African) forced to work on the plantations. Research on these reactions has become a mature field of study, although neither this chapter nor book can do justice to it. Suffice it to highlight that the Portuguese companies in Brazil assumed a greater

²⁸ See G. Esposito, *Armies of the war of triple alliance* (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), pp. 34–37. Brazil fared very well in the war of the Triple Alliance.

²⁹ Portuguese fleet under Pedro Alvares Cabral 'claimed' Brazil in 1500 although it would not be till the 1530s that the first settlement was founded and colonization expanded from there. See L. Bethell, *Colonial Brazil* (Cambridge: CUP, 1987); C. Boxer, *The golden age of Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

role and responsibility than did their counterparts in India. Second, the Portuguese expeditions in Brazil, akin to the Portuguese conquest of Goa, solicited indigenous assistance in the sixteenth century. Although Portugal (like Spain) was able to suppress indigenous resistance in the Americas and occupy large parts of the South American continent over time, it was able to secure only a limited sphere of control, mostly along the coasts, on the Indian Subcontinent and other parts of Asia, where local powers were able to field a sophisticated bureaucracy or gunpowder weapons. In the Americas, the indigenous population that were not persecuted or did not contract diseases brought by the invaders were pressed into plantation slave work; this sparked rebellions against the colonizers.³⁰ The mode of mobilization of indigenous labour in Brazil was more similar to that in East Africa than to the tax farms in India, although the plantation systems were somewhat different. This leads to a third point in which Miguel D. Cruz reminds that the mobilization and organization of the Portuguese colonial forces, incorporating white and indigenous groups, also reflected a balance of socio-political forces of the groups in the colonial society. It is clear from a survey of the wars in the Americas that the Portuguese authorities were able to raise larger forces for war compared with their colonial counterparts in India. The Portuguese colonial armies of Brazil bore more similarities with that of Goa than with those of East Africa. With the shifting of the Portuguese court to Brazil during the Napoleonic Wars, and the secession of Brazil from Portugal following the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1820 (with Pedro IV, son of João VI, assuming rulership in Brazil), it was not surprising that Portugal's structures of governance and military institutions were replicated to some extent in Brazil. The deployment of different types of forces evolved a (new) synthesized mode of warfare (*Guerra Brasileira*). On the fluctuating frontiers of colonial society, non-military violence cannot be perceived as having been distinct from military-related violence. The breakdown of order along the routes of travel gave rise to complex negotiations of

³⁰ One such rebellion was the revolt of the Tomoyo confederation. The performance of the indigenous labour did not always meet the expectations of the plantation owners; who went on to import African slaves. Revolts by African slaves, such as that led by Zumbi dos Palmares, were also frequent in the course of the nineteenth century. See L. Bethell, *Colonial Brazil* and B. Fausto, *A concise history of Brazil* (Cambridge: CUP, 2014).

power between various local groups (the metropole, locally appointed royal representatives, local elites) in the New World.³¹

The Portuguese wars in East Africa in the early modern period have been described and analysed by M. Newitt. The Portuguese arrival in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century adopted the approach of establishing fortified points and fortresses along strategic locations in coastal areas around the rim of the ocean. Whether in the Americas or Africa, the Portuguese began to explore inland from the sixteenth century and acquired sizeable territorial dominions in the following century. While it is often believed that aggressive colonial expansion occurred during the period of the Second Industrial Revolution from the 1870s with improvements in medicine, the Portuguese had already navigated the interior of the Americas and Africa by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Newitt asserts that the Portuguese had navigated upriver along the Zambezi and exerted informal influence as well as collaborated with local indigenous powers in the interior.³² Early Portuguese warfare in eastern Africa was characterized to some extent by amphibious as well as siege fighting. The loss of Mombasa (to Muscat, Oman) in the 1730s after some hard fighting diminished the Portuguese influence along the eastern coast but did not eliminate the Portuguese presence.³³ The rise

³¹ Carla M.J. Anastasia, *A geografia do crime* (B. Horizonte: Editoria UFMG, 2005). Anastasia highlighted instances of bandit figures and their gangs, such as Mão de Luv in Mantiqueira (between São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro) and Macacu (in Rio de Janeiro) as well as Januário in Tamandua (in Santa Catarina), and how these threatened the people and wealth moving on routes along the border or between provinces. The evolution of the colonial provinces in Portuguese South America can be traced from Bethell's *Colonial Brazil*. See also T. Skidmore, *Brazil: Five centuries of change* (Oxford: OUP, 2009) and B. Fausto, *A concise history of Brazil* (Cambridge: CUP, 2014). See Miguel D. da Cruz, "The Portuguese army in late-eighteenth century Brazil: A colonial elite or a metropolitan force?", *War and Society* vol. 39.4 (2020), pp. 234–55.

³² Differentiation is usually made between the Portuguese along the coast and the Afro-Portuguese inland. The latter were adventure-settlers who had established lineage and marriage with the indigenous chieftains inland and built *prazos* (land bestowed by grant) guarded by sizeable *chikunda* (slave armies). Even though the grants were made by the king, royal power had little effect inland as changes in ownership and violations in land grant size (more than 500 leagues) were rife. See M. Newitt, "Portuguese warfare in Africa", "Portuguese warfare in Africa", paper delivered at Contemporary Portuguese Politics and History Research Centre, accessed at <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/politics/cphrc/section/article/Newitt1.htm>.

³³ Mombasa underwent another round of tussle between the Portuguese and Muscat during 1727–28 and was briefly returned to Portuguese rule in 1728–29. A series



Map 2.1 Brazil in early 1800s (adapted from J.H. Elliot, *Empires of the Atlantic world* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 354 (Map 3.2)

Table 2.2 Demographic data of selected regions of the Portuguese empire

<i>Areas Sub-periods</i>	<i>Brazil</i>	<i>Africa</i>	<i>Asia</i>	
1747	62%	9%	15%	243,000
1776	69%	8%	12%	272,000
1800	81%	5%	9%	402,000
1816	80%	6%	10%	580,900
1870	—	51%	40%	615,000

Source Adapted from Paulo T. de Matos, “As estruturas demográficas do Estado da Índia, 1750–1820”, V.M. Godinho, *Estrutura da antiga sociedade Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Arcádia, 1971), G. Clarence-Smith, *The third Portuguese empire, 1825–1875* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 74

of Zanzibar in the 1780s after a brief revolt against the Omani sultanate limited the Portuguese presence along the coast. Inland, a very different type of war was going on—the Afro-Portuguese private/*chikunda* armies were far from uniform (made up of recruits from various tribes in the region), and wars fought in the north and south Zambezi against the Portuguese were different in nature (guerrilla warfare in the north and more regular warfare, involving sizeable armies, in the south). Before 1860, as the exploration of the Zambezi River became more intensive, the Portuguese usually did not have enough firepower to hold at bay the indigenous armies, which were far more numerous.³⁴ In the wars between the prazos and indigenous tribes, the opposing forces might have been more evenly matched in numbers, but the goals were cattle and slaves.³⁵

As in Brazil, although the Portuguese were already in East Africa in the 1500s (they stopped by in 1498 before sailing for India), they made efforts to re-establish the prazo plantations, after a bout of natural disaster and epidemic, in the interior around the mid-1800s (see Map. 2.2). It should be remembered that the loss of key settlements, most notably

of Omani sultans ruled the city until 1824–26 when the British established a brief protectorate there.

³⁴ The machine gun was invented in the 1860s but not widely adopted yet. Newitt, “Portuguese warfare in Africa”.

³⁵ M. Newitt, *Portuguese settlement on the Zambezi* (London: Longman, 1973); see also G. McCall Theal, *History and ethnography of Africa south of Zambezi* (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910).


Mombasa, along the Mozambique coast on the eve of the eighteenth century provided the impetus, as in the case of Goa, for the consolidation of the remnant coastal Portuguese forces and the push farther inland. In East Africa, companies were formed only towards the end of the nineteenth century to manage the commerce there. Earlier, in the 1700s, a number of committees and boards had been formed to manage the trade of Mozambique. The mobilization of labour in East Africa was undertaken through the prazo system, which was largely outside the control of the Crown. Although expansion under the prazos was able to inch into the interior of Zambezi, this was achieved against open and insurgent resistance. The private armies of the prazos could be sizeable, ranging from a few thousand to more than 10,000³⁶; these numbers approximated the size of the colonial armies raised in Brazil. In East Africa, as elsewhere, there was no clear line between raiding for resources and actual warring carried out by Europeans and indigenous tribes inhabiting the Zambezi. At the turn of the nineteenth century—when the slave trade was at its peak—slave raiding was undertaken not only by the Europeans but by the tribal chiefdoms themselves as well, and this created a heightened atmosphere of constant violence.³⁷ While the forced movement of people associated with the slave trade on the East African coast continued into the nineteenth century despite British abolitionist measures being gradually imposed across the Indian Ocean,³⁸ the liberalized migration of Goans (Luso-descendants and natives) between the East African coast and Goa persisted. A number of these personages took up key political and military roles in the prazos.³⁹

³⁶ The prazos went into a decline in the 1830s arising from droughts and epidemics. When they were consolidated a decade later, the metropole government attempted again to gain control of the interior regions of Zambezi and struck alliances with a few of the several (re-constituted) Afro-Goan or -Portuguese families. See M. Newitt, *A history of Mozambique* (London: Hurst & Co., 1995) and A. Isaacman and D. Peterson, “Making the Chikunda: Military slavery and ethnicity in southern Africa”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 36.2 (2003), pp. 257–81.

³⁷ Theal, *History and ethnography of Africa south of Zambezi*, p. 324.

³⁸ In the 1860s, the da Cruz family which resisted the metropole-allied forces continued to rely on the slave trade that was transacted on the rivers in Zambezi. See Newitt, *A history of Mozambique* and Isaacman and Peterson, “Making the Chikunda: Military slavery and ethnicity in southern Africa”, pp. 257–81.

³⁹ C. Perreira, “Cogwheels of two empires: Goan administration within nineteenth century British Indian ocean empire”, conference paper, nd, np. In the attempted revival



Map 2.2 Portuguese east Africa in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (adapted from maps in M. Newitt, *Portuguese settlement on the Zambesi*, London, Longman, 1973, pp. 77 and 219)

after the 1830s, the major families which led this initiative were less ‘muzungu’ or ‘white’ rather than (native) Indian in origins; for instance, the da Cruzes, the Perreiras, the Anjos and the Ferrãos (the Silvas were deemed to have come from Portugal).

THE PORTUGUESE IN THE EAST FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY TO THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The Portuguese expedition into the Indian Ocean was undertaken in an environment of Reconquista on the Iberian Peninsula. The spirit of the campaign continued after the last Muslim kingdom of Grenada fell in 1492. The Ottoman empire in the East conquered Constantinople in 1453 and maintained its expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which interrupted the Levant trade. The small four-ship expeditionary fleet of Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope and entered the Indian Ocean, reaching Calicut in 1498, with the motivations of ‘God, gold and glory’. The Portuguese search for gold took the form of the procurement and attempted monopoly of spices and other luxury goods. The Portuguese quest to dominate trade in the Indian Ocean has long been assessed by scholars to have been limited. The Portuguese model of advancement in the Indian Ocean was premised upon a nascent mercantilist framework driven by the accumulation of bullion from trade and intermittent raiding to reduce the competition. The attempted monopolization of commerce, initially under the aegis of the Portuguese Crown, was gradually liberalized to have licences (*cartazes*) dispensed to different parts of the inter-port trading network. When these measures did not work, the Portuguese did not hesitate to adopt the model of their adversaries—i.e., a chartered company—although the attempted emulation, for instance in 1628, faced insurmountable challenges. These challenges included Estado merchants and colonial officials sabotaging one another, as well as fierce rivalry between the English and the Dutch. In armed engagements on the high seas with native combatants, the Portuguese appeared to have an advantage over their adversaries, although the lead was not necessarily maintained in shallower coastal waters or on land. Other than open conflict, opportunistic or institutional plundering was part of the activities of the Portuguese coming into the Indian Ocean region. Hence, the early Portuguese presence has been sometimes described, not without debate, as violent and militarized.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ G.D. Winius and B.W. Diffie, *Foundations of the Portuguese empire, 1415–1580* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978). The maritime raiding nature of the Portuguese in the early period of their arrival in the Indian Ocean is well-accounted for. Later works by M. Pearson (*Before colonialism: Theories on Asian-European relations, 1500–1750*, Delhi: OUP, 1988) for instance have attempted to link-up discussions between the Portuguese maritime raiding (and its associated effects such as coercion and violence)

In the seventeenth century, the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean began to engage their Dutch and English rivals. The Luso-Dutch rivalry was in part a result of the two countries' entanglements in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Part of the Seventeen Provinces (Dutch republic), which revolted against Habsburg Spain (1581–1795)—barring a brief truce in 1609–21—fought an extended war against the Spanish. From 1580 to 1640, the Spanish king also inherited the Portuguese throne. This embroiled Portugal and its empire in a world-wide struggle with the Dutch. The Iberians and the Dutch were engaged in a series of theatres, with a mixture of gains and losses. These theatres ranged from the west coast of Africa and the Atlantic islands to the New World (the Spanish were in large parts of South America and the Caribbean and the Portuguese in Brazil) and Asia (which had Portuguese across the breadth of the Indian Ocean and the Spanish in the Philippines). These areas held immense resources, such as slaves, silver, spices, for the Iberian empires. Between 1590 and 1609, overlapping with the early period of the inception and expansion of the VOC, the gains were—ironically—limited. During the rest of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese would go on to lose strategic bases across the Indian Ocean and seas of the East Indies, most notably Ormuz (1622), Melaka (1640), parts of Maluku (1650s), Colombo (Ceylon) (1656) and Mombasa (1698). The diminution of the Portuguese dominions and networks in Asia needs to be seen in the context of the broader Portuguese empire. We are led to believe, although not without debate, that the Habsburg monarchs, from Philip II, had conceived of a grand strategy to counteract the Dutch and English on a global scale.⁴¹ The Iberian presence in Asia, as P. Emmer and other scholars remind us, was 'extremely limited'. It would not be surprising if the weaker parts of the empire were attacked

and the mode of economic interaction (in particular, capitalism). Other writings such as A. Disney's "Vasco da Gama's reputation for violence: The alleged atrocities in Calicut in 1502" (*Indica* vol. 32.1 (1995), pp. 11–28) have also attempted to explain scholars' exaggeration of Portuguese violence in the Indian Ocean and contextualize this against the values of the day.

⁴¹ Teddy Y. H. Sim, "Iberians in adjacent seas: A survey of their piratical and smuggling activities in relation to war and political economy of the South China Sea", in *Piracy and surreptitious activities in the Malay Archipelago and adjacent seas* (Singapore: Springer, 2014), pp. 146–50; see also G. Parker, *The grand strategy of Philip II* (Yale UP, 1998).

by the Dutch first.⁴² G. Ames has argued that the Portuguese attempted to fight back in the Indian Ocean during the Restoration period.⁴³

The Portuguese State of India in the early part of the eighteenth century experienced one of its most serious existential crises and strove to transition into a newer model for survival into the modern age. The core territories of Portuguese India along its northern and central-western coastline (Baçaim, Damão and Diu, as well as Goa) faced another round of attacks from an indigenous power, the Marathas, at the end of the 1730s. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the usual voyages to the Indian Ocean via the Brazil route had matured into a commodities trade as the Portuguese Crown liberalized controls. After the mid-eighteenth century, the increased British presence in Northeast India led to the formation of a commodities market that would serve the China market. While the attempts by the Portuguese to set up chartered companies did not last, various creole (Portuguese) and especially native subgroups adapted to trade along the commercial axis shifting to the northeast. C. Pinto's research affirmed this resurgence in trade between 1780 and 1830. Although the budget of the Estado was tight and sometimes spilled over, it was mostly balanced, with a large proportion of revenues being devoted to defence and maintenance (including maintenance of naval vessels); in this sense, the nature of this early modern colonial state was still relatively militarized although the proportion of human and material resources devoted to the security of the colony was increasingly limited in the context of the newly discovered trade.

The Estado continued to face external stresses from rival European colonial powers on the subcontinent in the eighteenth century. While the major colonial players transitioned to forge expansive territorial empires in India, the Portuguese also moved in a similar direction but more intently for survival reasons. E. Carreira was of the opinion that the Portuguese in Goa (and their colonial military force) were influenced by the French to some extent until the Seven Years' War. Goa was indeed involved in intense diplomatic politicking in an attempt to desist from being dragged into the Anglo-French rivalry. Joseph Marquis Dupleix, appointed as the governor general of all French territories in India, had arrived in 1742

⁴² P. Emmer, "First global war: The Dutch versus Iberia in Asia, Africa and the New World, 1590–1609", *e-Journal of Portuguese History* vol. 1.1 (2003), p. 2.

⁴³ See G. Ames, *Renascent empire: The house of Braganza and the quest for stability in Portuguese monsoon Asia, 1640–83* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000).

and unleashed a series of wars from the west coast of India on British positions from Madras to Calcutta. As wars became more widespread and intense in the early modern and modern periods, seen in the militarily upgraded state of indigenous polities such as Mysore and the Maratha empire (see Table 2.1), the capacity of the Portuguese colonial state to wage war was sustained. The Portuguese colonial army appeared to have caught up with the latest military organization and equipment as it deterred rival Europeans and engaged native counterparts (usually against larger numbers in the latter case).⁴⁴ The heightened external threats and the military campaigns initiated to acquire additional territories increased the degree of resource extraction and in turn evoked reactions from the local leadership and society.⁴⁵ Although remnant colonies from the Indian Ocean region and Far East (except for Macau) were becoming less lucrative for the metropole, the colonial state in its limited form kept up with some intermittent economic and military routine activities to maintain links with its dominions across Asia.

CONCLUSION

The transitional period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed a number of developments in Britain that would be collectively associated with the First Industrial Revolution (1760–1840). These developments included the Agricultural Revolution as well as other developments that preceded it, since the effects of industrialization were not obvious until the nineteenth century. While the development of weaponry was fairly gradual and limited during the First Industrial Revolution, Western states were slowly making headway in several parts of the world where effective defence could not be organized or the terrain was not overly challenging. The militaries of the Iberian states (particularly the Habsburgs) were foremost in their arms and military organization in Europe in the sixteenth century but lost their edge after that. Outside Europe, the colonial military in Brazil had more similarities than did its

⁴⁴ It has been discussed in past and contemporary works that the Asian states had been catching-up in military technology; see Roy, *Oxford companion to modern warfare in India*.

⁴⁵ This can be discerned from the published primary source by F.N. Xavier, *Bosquejo historico das comunidades das aldeas dos concelhos das Ilhas, Salsete e Barez* (Goa: L & L, 2012).

counterpart in East Africa with the military in Portugal or even Goa. The colonial militaries in Brazil and East Africa were able to field larger forces than was the State of India. More importantly, both evolved peculiar modes of military operations and institutions. On the frontiers in Brazil and East Africa, it was not easy to differentiate military- from non-military-related violence. For the Portuguese in the larger perspective, who were still in the exploratory and expansive phase, there was greater propensity for trade, resource mobilization and the instrument of coercion to be organized under a chartered company in Brazil than in the East or in East Africa. In the Indian Ocean and farther east, the Portuguese suffered marked reverses after the glorious phase in the sixteenth century. Although a remnant collection of Portuguese colonies survived after the onslaught of the Dutch and English in the seventeenth century, they continued to struggle in the eighteenth century and managed to stabilize themselves only after the mid-century. The eclectic collection of colonies under the purview of the Estado da Índia also meant some of them continued to be in decline while other parts became detached and held better prospects. In terms of the overall message of this book, the colonies under the Estado were not archaic or isolated from major trends (political and military) in the Asian and wider world. ‘Redundant’ places—in the scheme of the Portuguese imperial design—in the Portuguese East such as Goa did not need to be given up. The next two chapters will look at the Estado as it battled redundancy and kept up a repertoire of activities to maintain its survival and security while transitioning into the nineteenth century.



Development of the Portuguese Colonial Military in India 1780–1850

Abstract The chapter focuses on the development and transition of the security environment and colonial military of the Estado da Índia from the latter half of the eighteenth century to the early decades of the nineteenth century. The British absorption of Indian capital and the allegiance of certain classes of natives as well as concurrent wars waged against the major native regional powers were gradually transforming the subcontinent. In a scenario where the Estado was not making lucrative profits (compared to earlier centuries), and given that its military capacity was sometimes in doubt, it had to rely on diplomacy in its interaction with states and non-state groups in its immediate surroundings and farther afield. Although the colonial military force in Goa managed to keep up with some upgrades in weaponry (especially in artillery) and organization, it was constituted predominantly of Luso-descendant mixed-blood troops and relied to some extent on the support of auxiliary troops. However, at the same time, this Luso-descendant-staffed military force was increasingly becoming a liability.

Keywords British imperialism in India · Estado da Índia (Goa) · Diplomacy · Luso-descendant · Auxiliary force · Maratha

INTRODUCTION

From the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, the world entered a more assertive phase of imperialism, trade and revolutionary and industrial activities. In the military sphere, although Portugal kept up with some advancements, this was attained at a limited level of performance. When the French armies invaded Iberia during the Napoleonic Wars, the Portuguese engaged in protracted warfare under British tutelage against the aggressor. Overseas in the colonies, the Portuguese performance was uneven—expansive in Brazil (but lost to revolutionary fervour in the early nineteenth century) and East Africa despite setbacks in the early eighteenth century, but in India and farther east (perhaps with the exception of Macau) relegated to an ossified state and even facing imminent collapse before the mid-eighteenth century. This chapter affirms the complex nature of the social-political landscape of the colony of Portuguese Goa and the regions adjacent to it from the eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century. The broad regions outside Goa were gradually stabilized under the pacification efforts of the Bombay Presidency. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the colonial army of the Estado da Índia was still on a trajectory of expansion and it appeared to be able to secure its gains in the New Conquests areas (although it was increasingly becoming cumbersome). This army was also an eclectic one given the different components of the forces that served in it.

Chapter 3 focuses on the development and transition of the security environment and colonial military of the Estado da Índia from the latter half of the eighteenth century to the early decades of the nineteenth century. The chapter will also probe into the structure of the Portuguese colonial military force in India in the eighteenth century and especially at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which had reached a certain apogee in its evolution and before it was tipped to transform (again) in the next few decades. In a scenario where the Estado was not making lucrative profits (compared to the earlier centuries), and given that its military capacity was sometimes in doubt, it also relied on diplomacy in its interaction with states and non-state groups in its immediate surroundings and farther afield. Further on the soldiery in the colonial force, the chapter also probes into the profiles of the men-at-arms as well as their background and propensity to engage in military conflicts.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE ESTADO DA ÍNDIA

The survival of the remnant Estado da Índia cannot be understood solely from the point of view of the colonial military. The instruments of state of the colonial military as well as diplomacy contributed to sustaining the long-term survival of the Estado. The diplomacy of the Estado in the early modern period took the path of experimenting with and adapting to a nascent international system in the making vis-à-vis local power politics in Asia—although, as Afzal Ahmad has pointed out, the diplomacy that the Portuguese practised on arrival in the Indian Ocean appeared to be more aggressive, premised upon the use of coercive force and motivated by the residual crusading zeal coming out of Europe in its struggle against the Ottomans. At the strategic level, the room for Portugal's diplomatic manoeuvring—whether in Europe or outside it—became increasingly 'constrained' due to the intensification of rivalry between the big powers in Europe (most notably France and Britain), although the actions of Europeans in the colonial world did not always conform to what had been agreed in treaties concluded in Europe. The British-French rivalry in Europe had a spillover effect on the conduct of affairs in the non-European colonial realm. Between France and Portugal, the latter was hard pressed not only in the secular sphere but also in the religious sphere to align with the diplomatic demands of France. Other than the covetous designs of France on the west coast of India, it was also increasingly competing with Portugal for the favour of the papacy as the 'standard bearer of the faith'.¹ Transitioning into the nineteenth century, Portugal's limited diplomatic options led to Britain's occupation of Goa during the Napoleonic Wars. The emergence of a unipolar world, helmed briefly by Britain around the mid-nineteenth century—especially on the subcontinent of India—brought Portugal even closer to Britain, although the latter did not always have the interests of Portugal in mind despite their age-old ties (going as far back as the 1373 treaty).²

¹ Teddy Y.H. Sim, *Portuguese enterprise in the East: Survival in the years* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 88 and 148.

² Britain had at various times acted unfavourably against the interests of Portugal overseas in India. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Portugal's interests were 'marginalized' in the Congress of Vienna. See S. Martínez, *História diplomática de Portugal* (Coimbra: Almeida, 2010), pp. 355–67. See also Teddy Sim, *Portuguese enterprise in the East*, pp. 88–89.

According to A. Ahmad, on the Indian Subcontinent, the Portuguese became ‘more peaceful’ with the neighbouring rulers only from the 1620s and 1630s. Portuguese relations aimed to ‘take advantage of the different [native] rulers’, although this created ‘suspicious and fragile relationships [in the long run]’.³ In the eighteenth century, Portuguese diplomacy in India continued to be complex. The sentiments are clear in the instructions of the outgoing viceroy, the Count of Ericeira, to his incoming counterpart in 1724: to continue to ‘play politics among the *mouros* [Muslims] and the Europeans’.⁴ In the case of small states such as Bijapur (under the Adil Shah Dynasty in the fourteenth century to the seventeenth century, and under the Nizam of Hyderabad and later Marathas in the eighteenth century), Ponda and Margão, Ahmad points out that they were ‘[treated contemptuously] and insulting words used to describe Indian diplomats and the governors’.⁵ Anthony Disney is of the view that over time the Estado began acting more like a territorial Asian state.⁶ Overall, the conduct of diplomacy on the Indian Subcontinent, from the perspective of a European state, was a complex affair that could entail diplomacy with a host of sociopolitical entities ranging from a formal state to a caste group in a locality. On the Portuguese side, diplomatic relations were not always undertaken by elite appointees of the Estado but could involve *religiosos* (clergy), natives and *degradados* appointees (appointed at the level of *capitão*); the last category sometimes contributed to ‘damaged relationships with Indian states’ due to their ‘lack of culture and education’.⁷

From the *Sistema Marcial Asiático* (Martial system of Asia) and contemporary maps, it is apparent that the mid-eighteenth century saw the ascendancy of Shah Alam II, which—although it was a reasonably lengthy reign (1760–1806)—was beginning to see one of the largest

³ A. Ahmad, *Indo-Portuguese diplomacy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (Delhi: Originals, 2008), pp. 352 and 362.

⁴ BN, Instructions to D. Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro, Códice 1455, ff. 33v–40v. See also Teddy Sim, *Portuguese enterprise in the East*, pp. 79–84.

⁵ Ahmad, *Indo-Portuguese diplomacy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, p. 363.

⁶ See A. Disney, “The Portuguese empire in Asia, 1550–1650”, in J. Correia-Afonso ed., *Indo-Portuguese history: Sources and problems* (Bombay: OUP, 1981), pp. 148–62.

⁷ Ahmad, *Indo-Portuguese diplomacy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, p. 352. See also Teddy Sim, *Portuguese enterprise in the East*, p. 81.

regional competitors (Maratha confederacy) to the Mughal regime disintegrating itself. The other sizeable regional competitors on the subcontinent were the Nizam's dominions, Mysore, and the Sikh state (breaking away at the end of the eighteenth century from the Marathas). The smaller players in the vicinity of Goa were Mangalore, Karwar, Kolhapur, Satara and Punem (a remnant branch of the Marathas). The disintegration of the Maratha state brought the Portuguese back to the situation when they had first arrived in the sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century, i.e., when the polity of India was fragmented.⁸

These native political entities, big or small, had fluid and constantly shifting interstate relations typical in the fragmented situation of polities in India.⁹ Even after their incorporation into the residencies and agencies in the British empire, some entities were allowed to maintain a military force (for instance, the Hyderabad in 1798, Indore in 1818) and others continued to engage in intrigues within the new boundaries of the treaties imposed on the Indian states. The colonial policy for India in the aftermath of the Third Anglo-Maratha War aimed to incorporate the defeated or broken-up states under the direct or indirect rule of a capitalist-legalistic system permitting the East India Company to trade and gradually harness revenues and resources in India. The doctrine of subsidiary alliance, which had been initiated by Lord Wellesley and carried out in earnest by Mountstuart Elphinstone (Marquess of Hastings), led to the setting up of two residencies and an agency in the Bombay Presidency on the western Indian coast.

A number of former *jagirdars* or *zamindars* seceded from the confederacy, while the four main royal houses (Gaekwads of Baroda, Holkars of Indore, Scindias of Gwalior and Malwa and Bhonsales of Nagpur) continued to exist in their diminished form or autonomously as princely states after 1818. Referring to Map. 3.1, Mangalore was split between Bombay and Madras Presidencies. Karwar came under British rule after the Third Anglo-Maratha War. Kolhapur was more or less annexed by the British in the early 1860s. Satara was granted brief autonomy prior to 1839 before being ceded to the Bombay Presidency. Punem also came under the Bombay Presidency in the early years of the nineteenth century.

⁸ António José de Noronha (Carmen Radulet ed.), *Sistema Marcial Asiático* (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1994), pp. 171–79 (chapter III). V. Kadam, *Maratha confederacy: Study in its origins and development* (New Delhi: M. Manoharlal Publisher, 1993).

⁹ *Sistema Marcial Asiático*, pp. 171–99.

A report on ‘the territories conquered from the paishwa (peshwa) (chief minister)’ gave an idea of the strategic environment on the north and central-western coasts of India.



Map 3.1 The Bombay Presidency (adapted from Bombay Presidency map in Digital South Asia library, Imperial gazetteer of India vol. 8)

As for the two political entities (Kolhapur and Sawantwadi) near Goa, these continued to be involved in politicking against each other and against other succession polities in the region. Kolhapur had survived the Third Anglo-Maratha War by ‘siding with the British [during the conflict]’.¹⁰ Kolhapur under Bara Sahib (the second son of Shivaji) was aggressive between 1822 and 1829 that the British were ‘obliged’ to act against it. Kolhapur initiated aggression against the neighbouring chiefs, bullied the *jagirdars* in south Maratha territories and harassed the British domains.¹¹ Bara Sahib was forced to sign two treaties with the British between 1826 and 1827 to reduce his army, accept the advice and ministerial appointment of the British, as well as cede lands (as security) and pay compensation. The treaties revealed that some areas in and around Kolhapur were ‘places of general resort for robbers’, which provided additional impulses for British annexation of its territories.¹² Although Bara Sahib passed away in 1838, Kolhapur appeared to be reasonably curtailed for much of the 1830s. Internal dissensions and rebellions caused the British to intervene further such that although management was ‘restored to the Raja’, important powers of state were in the hands of the British or British-influenced appointees.

The British attempted to form an alliance with the Sawantwadis against Kanhoji Angria (of Colaba) and at times brokered a peace between the Sawantwadis and Kanhoji Angria in the early eighteenth century.¹³ The British also played a role in mediating relations between the Sawantwadis and Goa (or Kolhapur), for instance, offering custom exemptions for the imported commodities enjoyed by the Raja of Kolhapur in exchange for a treaty being struck.¹⁴ Their being labelled as pirates by the British was one of the key reasons why the Sawantwadis were curtailed in treaties and prevented from obtaining seafaring and warring equipment.¹⁵ Through subsidiary treaties with *jagirdars*, the British assumed the role of regency for the feudal land grant owners and exhorted them to pay their dues

¹⁰ *A collection of treaties, engagements and sunnuds relating to India and neighboring countries* vol. IV (compiled by A.C. Talbot) (Calcutta: Foreign office press, 1876), p. 386.

¹¹ *A collection of treaties, engagements and sunnuds relating to India*, p. 387.

¹² *A collection of treaties, engagements and sunnuds relating to India*, p. 410.

¹³ *A collection of treaties, engagements and sunnuds relating to India*, p. 435.

¹⁴ *A collection of treaties, engagements and sunnuds relating to India*, pp. 456–57.

¹⁵ *A collection of treaties, engagements and sunnuds relating to India*, pp. 442–43.

to the Peshwa. The clauses in the treaties further exhorted the *jagirdars* to pay their dues even though they might not have ‘[any] connexion [*sic*] to him [the Peshwa]’; they were also to refer to the British colonial government for the settlement of any disputes.¹⁶

The Estado had aspired to absorb the intermediate regions between the broken-up Maratha states and itself from the mid-eighteenth century. While the New Conquests might be gloriously accounted for, the fluctuations of the alliances, continuous open war and absence of full control in the newly acquired territories pointed to a region of decentralized order maintained at a local level. The (New Conquests) regions underwent a process in which the situation was initially fluid and fluctuating on the ground but became more stabilized. However, these regions never attained the same degree of control as the Old Conquests areas. One can discern a few characteristics of this region as it evolved from the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century (refer Table 3.1). First, these provinces had a sparser population density (even in the mid-nineteenth century).¹⁷ Second, the migratory infiltration (and settlement) of European (Portuguese) and those of mixed descent, which may be seen from the different vocations in which they arrived, such as trader, missionary or soldier, was limited.¹⁸ Third, prior to the arrival of the Portuguese, the area had been cultivated and administered to some extent. This writer agrees with P. Axelrod that the New Conquests regions and immediate areas outside them did not lapse into a more anarchical state of development.¹⁹ Fourth, the military was stationed only in key settlements and inadequate in exerting full control.

The intrigues and conflicts of the Estado da Índia often revealed its complex entanglement with the regional and immediate neighbouring power entities in the period 1750-1850s. The Marathas were obviously concerned over whom the Portuguese sided with; the Peshwa ‘agreed to

¹⁶ *A collection of treaties, engagements and sunnuds relating to India*, p. 415. See also E.W. West, *A memoir of the states of the southern Maratha country* (Charleston: Nabu Press, 2010).

¹⁷ Paulo T. Matos and J. Lucassen, “Goa at work around 1850”, IISH Research paper no. 54 (2020), p. 11.

¹⁸ V. Madhu Gawas, *Human rights and indigenous peoples in Goa* (Panjim: Broadway, 2016), 166pp.

¹⁹ P. Axelrod, “Living on the edge: The village and state on the Goa-Maratha frontier”, *Indian economic and social history review* no. 45.4 (2008), p. 555.

Table 3.1
Demographic data of
Estado da Índia

	1817–1821	% of whole population	% of Hindus / <i>gentios</i> ^b
Goa, Salcete & Bardez	185905 ^a	61.1	12.3
Damão & Diu	30,689	10.1	
New Conquests (NC)	87,578	28.8	
Bicholim	9538	3.1	96.0
Canácona & Cabo de Rama	12,785	4.2	85.0
Pernem	23,358	7.7	90.9
Pondá	35,023	11.5	84.8
Tiracol	375	0.1	
Angediva	744	0.2	
Sanquelim	5755	1.9	

^aOf the near 186 thousand in Goa and surrounding regions, the population of Goa accounted for 33.5 thousand with the remaining population divided roughly equally between Bardez and Salcete

^bPercentage for NC computed for years 1816–1820, percentage for Goa and surrounding regions computed for years 1814–1819
Source See also Paulo T. de Matos, “Population censuses in the Portuguese empire, 1750–1820: Research notes”, *Romanian Journal of Population Studies*, accessed at <https://publications/population-census-in-the-portuguese-empire-1750-1820-research-notes/56616>; Paulo T. de Matos, “The population of Goa, 1720–2011: Elements for a global vision”, in P. Malekandathil et al. eds., *India, the Portuguese and maritime interactions* vol. 1 (New Delhi: Primus Books, 2019), pp. 346–71; Paulo T. de Matos, “As estruturas demográficas do Estado da Índia, 1750–1820”, paper delivered at the 14th International seminar on Indo-Portuguese history (Feb 2013) in New Delhi

hand-over to the Portuguese certain villages [of certain annual value], on condition that no forts were to be erected [there] and the Portuguese [were] not to render assistance to the enemies of the Peshwa [especially Mysore]’.²⁰ The Bounsulos committed themselves as a tributary state but

²⁰ F.C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India: Being a history of the rise and decline of their eastern empire* (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1894), pp. 438–39.

did not always pay their dues or refrain from incursions into the territories of Portugal or its vassals. They sometimes collaborated with the Portuguese against their enemies, as in the repelling of Kolhapur. The Raja of Sunda had also largely submitted his kingdom to the Portuguese, due to the threat from the Marathas.²¹ The 1780s saw Tipu Sultan taking over from his father (Hyder Ali) and initiating a series of wars against the British until the end of the century, sealing the fate of the kingdom.²² Mysore and its wars affected the Portuguese in India through the territories Mysore tried to control (for instance, ports in Kanara and Fort Piro) or rival European powers it tried to collaborate with.²³

In the New Conquests provinces, it was not only state or quasi-state entities that had a tendency to shift allegiances; sociopolitical groups identified by De Kloguen and Bragança Pereira also constantly changed their loyalties. The Ranés of Satari, for instance, were descended from a certain Maratha (Hiroji Rane) who came to Goa in the fifteenth century. Over time, the Ranés became the 'Lords of Satari' and laid claim to many *mocassos* which earned them a portion of the rent or produce from the land. The Portuguese advance to Satari was lost and regained a few times from the 1740s to the 1780s. Although the Ranés swore allegiance to the Portuguese at some point, they also revolted 17 times from 1746 to 1852. To be sure, the Portuguese had to play a balancing act in Satari because other than the Ranés, they also had to please the Brahmins, Sardessais (Marathas), Dubashis and Nadkarnis, who served useful functions (for instance, moneylending or providing connections) other than martial skills. The Portuguese lured the Ranés with awards of lands, although this sometimes ate into the benefits of other groups such as the

²¹ Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, p. 449.

²² Nizam Ali had allied with Hyder Ali to attack the British in 1771. See Lord Egerton, *Indian and oriental arms and armour* (New York: Dover Publications, 2002), p. 32. The British rallied the Marathas and the forces of Nizam Ali (Hyderabad) against Mysore. See Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, p. 449.

²³ Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, p. 446.

gauncars.²⁴ Hence, Portugal's solicitation of various collaborator groups was a precarious and delicate balancing act.²⁵

The system in operation over the New Conquests provinces of Pernem, Bicholim, Ponda, Satari, Sanguem, Quepem and Canacona was expectedly far from having any semblance of uniformity. Each area was composed of its peculiar local social-power groups in addition to the different larger regional powers threatening it. The New Conquests areas, apart from needing to maintain a set of records for tax purposes, were still run as they had been in Maratha country.²⁶ The Maratha system had never been a centralized administrative structure, even during the periods of the empire and Peshwa administration (1674–1713, 1713–1772). K. Roy has raised the issue of the weakness in Maratha military fiscalism. At the local and rural levels, the villages were managed by *patils* (headmen), who were also the chief *gauncars* and judicial officers. Apparently, the hierarchical structure above the village (*mahal*), called the *camara geral*, continued to function; and the Order of 1766 stipulated who could vote and who could not as well as persons who could be employed to man the local security system.²⁷

The New Conquests territories, which were acquired over a period of time in the eighteenth century, took time to (re-)stabilize in the final period of the century transitioning into the nineteenth century. Some general observations can be made from a survey of the forts and fortifications erected in the New Conquests areas. First, the importance of a fort was not determined by its size. Second, the system of forts operated hand in hand with the hierarchical system of colonial troops. Third, the 'irregular' nature of forts stemmed from the geographical constraints of

²⁴ The Portuguese sometimes made decision to overlook the grievances of the *gauncars* such as in the case in 1824. See V. Pinho, *Snapshots of Indo-Portuguese history* vol. IV (Panaji: V. Pinho, 2009), pp. 61–65.

²⁵ There was a certain degree of deference of the local rulers towards the Portuguese even though the latter might not be able to exert their control in these areas. The Portuguese asked local rulers for help although the process was not always smooth as seen in the case of dispatching of troops by Krishnarao Gurkar in 1748. Transcribed Marathi documents from *Purabhilekh-Puratatva* vol. VII (Jan–Jun 1989), pp. 63 and 65.

²⁶ A. Kulkarni, *Marathi records on village communities in Goa archives* (Lisbon: Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical, 1985), p. 899.

²⁷ *Gauncars* "did not enjoy the right to vote at the mahal assembly [level]". See Kulkarni, *Marathi records on village communities in Goa archives*, p. 901. K. Roy, *The Oxford companion to modern warfare in India* (Oxford: OUP, 2009), pp. 70–86.

the land. Fourth, substantial parts of the New Conquests territories were only pacified to large extent in the mid-1830s.

Referring to Table 3.2, one can get a glimpse of the forts in the New Conquests regions. The fort of Sanquelim in Satari was a fort of the first order during the Pombaline period even though it was small and had few cannon.²⁸ In another example, Nanuz was a small fort of the second order, also in Satari, in the second half of the nineteenth century. Wars over territories of the New Conquests showed that forts in the area changed hands in the half-century from the 1740s to the 1780s. This necessitated the sending of a field force to the scene to retake the forts and drive away the attackers. A number of forts in the New Conquests area were built by native rulers before the land came into Portuguese control. Even if the forts were later modified by Portuguese occupiers, the changes were minuscule. It might be of interest to note that indigenously built forts leveraging on the natural features of the land were often able to nullify the effect of gunpowder weapons, and this enhanced the ‘difficult[y] and prolonged sieges [in their taking by the enemies]’.²⁹ In any case, these forts—accustomed to the use and spread of firearms over a long time—were built at a low height compared to medieval castles.³⁰ Comparing the forts in the Old and New Conquests areas, or those constructed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with forts constructed in the eighteenth century, one finds that forts constructed from scratch (not surprisingly) were likely to possess more European features (for instance, a pentagonal shape with angular bastions). Also, there were fewer forts in the New Conquests areas than in the Old Conquests areas (Salcette, Goa island, Bardez), even though the former held more lands. P. Shirodkar has presented a list of (extinct) forts beyond the list provided in the *Monções do Reino* (Monsoon books). The forts in the New Conquests areas usually presided over small population settlements such as at Usgao (village), Mandangad (small town), Cuncolim, Betul (Quepem). The forts were not always located in terrains that were deemed strategic.

²⁸ Apparently by 1870, there was “no more military nor fiscal importance” associated with the fort. See P.P. Shirodkar, *Fortresses and Forts of Goa* (Panjim: Directorate of Art and Culture, 2015), p. 166.

²⁹ J. Gommans, *Mughal warfare* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 134.

³⁰ See for instance M.S. Naravane, *The heritage sites of maritime Maharashtra* (Mumbai: Maritime History Society, 2001), pp. 30–45 and 135–75.

Table 3.2 Information on forts in the New Conquest areas

<i>Fort</i>	<i>Origins, date transfer</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Armaments</i>	<i>Date disuse, other comments</i>
Cabo da Rama (Kholgad)	Built before 1680(?)	Coastal Canacona	Irregular fort, 20 cannons, 10 in 1856	Gradually became less important in second half of nineteenth century
Ponda (Phonda/Antruz)	Built by mid-sixteenth century	Ponda	“small irregular pentagonal fortification”, 12 cannons (1832)	1836—last time its gun went into action. Scene of intense battle in 1739/1740s
Rachol (Raitur, Raichur)	Built before 16 century	Border Salcete and Ponda	65–70 cannons (1770s)	In ruins in 1850s
Chapora	Completed in 1721	Bardez	Small garrison and company of grenadiers outside 1770s	Briefly changed hands in 1739 (→Sawant Bhonsles)
Dicholi (Bicholim)	An important town in seventeenth century, hence protected to certain extent	Bicholim	NA	NA
Khorjuvem (Corjuem)	Fort on island of same name gifted by Mughals in 1704	Bicholim	NA	Taken back from Bhosale in 1741. Abandoned in 1834
Sanquelim (Sankhli)	Inherited from Mughals	Bicholim	Fort of first order during Pombaline period even though it was small. Irregular pentagon with few cannon points	By 1870, no military importance
Nanuz	Erected by Adil Shah or Sawant Bhosales	Sattari	Small fortification. Designated fort of second order in 1859	Rebels hid here during the Ranis Revolt

Source P.P. Shirodkar, *Fortresses and forts of Goa* (Panjim: Prasad Lodayekar, 2015)

TRENDS IN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Broad observations can be made of the Portuguese colonial military in India as it evolved in the early modern period. First, the military structure was regularized in the Estado da Índia since the seventeenth century to the (early) nineteenth century and witnessed the influences from different European (Spanish, French and British) states. Second, with the maturation of the force, the Luso-descendants constituted a sizeable and important subgroup in the organization and resisted drastic reforms. Third, the military officers arriving from Portugal and the artillery officers in Goa were the most progressive elements in the Portuguese colonial military force. Some of them were deployed strategically near the capital and were rewarded with better privileges. Fourth, natives were recruited to some extent, but their numbers (in terms of proportion of overall force) did not increase to levels approximating those of the East India Company armies in India. Finally, exiles who were sent to Goa, as discussed, deteriorated in quality (committed graver crimes) and were probably remunerated badly. However, it might be noted that all personnel—white, exiled or indigenous—had a chance of being channelled to third-line forces when they were no longer effective or became too old.

Vitor L.G. Rodrigues has discussed the Portuguese colonial and military enterprise in India in the early period (sixteenth century) of the Portuguese presence there. Despite the unflattering description of the Portuguese colonial military by C.R. Boxer,³¹ the strongest impetus to build a modern force came from the efforts of the second governor of the Estado da Índia, Afonso de Albuquerque. There was an attempt to build a force that could deploy in ‘squares’, an advanced tactical manoeuvre in Europe, as well as a minimal force of cavalry. These initiatives were, however, short-lived, as the remnants of the reforms were reversed shortly after Albuquerque’s tenure.³² In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Spanish *terços* (military units) inherited from the Habsburgs were adapted and evolved to become smaller—from the ‘ideal’

³¹ C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese seaborne empire, 1415–1825* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969), p. 117.

³² Vitor L.G. Rodrigues, *De Goa de Albuquerque à Goa Seiscentista: Aspectos da Organização Militar da Capital do Estado da Índia* (Lisbon: Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical, 2001).

Spanish strength of 2,000 to 600 in four companies each by the 1690s.³³ E. Carreira reiterates from Boxer's work that the Portuguese in India did not have any regular army corps before the 1660s (coinciding with the rise of the Marathas); they only had *companhias* (companies), which were mobilized or demobilized according to needs.³⁴ The artillery arm took up 'a more permanent presence in the form of the *troço de artilheiros* (artillery section) in 1677', while the cavalry was organized in a *companhia* in 1688. The colonial military forces were already grouped into three lines or levels of forces by the War of Restoration (1640-68).³⁵ Some of the fitter members of the *miliçia* (militia) were chosen to form six new auxiliary *terço* units for the frontier defence of the Estado da Índia in the 1730s.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the *terço* was replaced by the *regimento* (regiment) under a new *Ordananças* (ordinance). In the metropole, an infantry regiment was to have ten to twelve companies (organized in two battalions from 1735). Cavalry regiments were supposed to have the same number of companies. In the colonies, expeditionary forces sent to India in 1740 were composed of 2,000 men in four battalions.³⁶ In the second half of the eighteenth century, inspired by the French model, the Portuguese—along with some other European armies—took an interest in forming and experimenting with the *legião* (legion). Carreira affirms that the formation of some of the earliest regular military units of the Estado was linked with the input of French mercenaries employed. In terms of employment of native people as soldiers, there was a

small sepoy regiment [that was created during the viceroyship of the Conde da Ega in the Pombaline era] to guard territories belonging to the kingdom of Sunda. Its 1,200 men were to be recruited amongst the soldiers and traditional chiefs (Desais) of the former king's army. It was an autonomous body [which included] an artillery corps, infantry and cavalry.

³³ P. Abbott, *Rivals of the Raj: Non-British Colonial Armies in Asia* (Nottingham: Foundry Books, 2010), p. 123.

³⁴ E. Carreira, *Globalizing Goa, 1660–1820: Change and exchange in a former capital of empire* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2013), p. 138. Carreira writes that the first infantry regiment (later named *Regimento Velho*) was "not founded until 1671".

³⁵ Abbott, *Rivals of the Raj*, p. 123.

³⁶ Teddy Sim, *Portuguese Enterprise in the East*, pp. 94–105 and 165–74.

Goan Christian Brahmins [who were attracted to the regiment] were kept in subordinate positions despite Pombal's laws against discrimination.

In terms of the development of an artillery unit, some sources attribute the formation of a more regular *companhia* of artillery to the 1730s (specifically 1735). Carreira views the creation of an artillery regiment, which was made up of three companies of gunners, sappers and artificers, as a Pombaline innovation.³⁷ She believes that Pombal's reforms translated into improved fighting capacity, which helped the Portuguese to 'annex Bhoale territories [later]'.³⁸ Many French mercenaries gradually left the Estado by 1764 following their decline after France's defeat at Plassey.

Referring to Table 3.3, some observations may be made. The change from a company to a regiment reflected the trend of an increasingly larger and more autonomous artillery arm. As artillery fortresses and countermeasures against the increase in fortifications developed in the seventeenth century, the arms and services in the artillery unit of the Portuguese Indian colonial army became more sophisticated. This could be seen in the incorporation of additional troop types such as *artilheiros* (artillerymen), *bombeiros* (bombardiers), *mineiros* (miners). The professionalization at large, in the form of staff officers overseeing the increasingly complex military operations, also saw *estado maior* (staff officers)—most notably quartermasters—added to the personnel complement of the artillery regiment of the Pombaline period. The variety of calibres found in the *mapa de artilheira e petrechos* (chart of gunners and equipment), from 0.5-, 1-4-, 6-, 8-9-, 12-, 16-, 24-, 36- to 48-pounder cannonball, showed that not only field-grade pieces but culverin-sized/swivel and gigantic pieces were procured for the defence of forts—although it must be mentioned that only 'strategic' forts were well supplied. *Bomba* (explosive-type) calibre shots were also requisitioned. It is certain from the charts that *monteiro* (mortars) were part of the inventory, but whether *obuseiro* (howitzers) were in use is uncertain.

³⁷ Carreira, *Globalizing Goa*, pp. 143–45.

³⁸ Carreira, *Globalizing Goa*, p. 146. The succession of Maria I gave rise to antagonism against the former first minister; one can make a conjecture as to the extent to which some of Pombal's reforms were dismantled.

Table 3.3 Military structure and units of the Estado da Índia from 1770–1870

		<i>Types of units, strengths, allies</i>			
		<i>Before 1800</i>	<i>1820 and after</i>	<i>1834</i>	
			<i>1869 / 72</i>	<i>1841 and after</i>	
Goa & Old Territories	3 reg. of infantaria, 3 units of militia, 3 terço of auxiliaries, terço of reserves (ordenança), 1 reg. of artillery	2 (Goa) + 3 reg. of infantry, 1 reg. of artillery, 2 bat. of sepoy, 1 + 3 + 3 reg. of militia Later, 1 com. of moors (mouros) (militias and reserves supposedly abolished)	4 bat. of infantry and light infantry (caçado) (Goa), 1 reg. of artillery, reg. of militia, 1 com. of moors	2 bat. of infantry, 2 bat. of light infantry (caçado), 1 unit/reg. of artillery, 1 unit of engineers, 1 com. of moors (later → 1 unit of municipal guard)	1 bat. of infantry, 3 bat. of light infantry, 1 reg. of artillery, 1 unit of engineers, 1 unit of municipal guard (guarda municipal) (6-com. bat., with smaller company strength)
New Conquests	1 unit royal volunteers (voluntarios reais)	4 reg. of infantry		In 1850s, second (2 ^o) bat. infantry stationed in Old territories. British assistance during period of Indian Mutiny	
Other territories outside Goa (Diu, Damão)		3 + 3 reg. of infantry, 1 unit of sepoy		2 + 1 com. of light infantry	

(continued)

Table 3.3 (continued)

<i>Types of units, strengths, allies</i>			
<i>Before 1800</i>	<i>1820 and after</i>	<i>1834</i>	<i>1841 and after</i>
Campaign/aid to other colonies in the East	Troops from Goa to Macau	Troops from India to East Africa	2 bat. of infantry at Macau and Timor (with detachments of artillery units)
			Reinforcements to be organized from the metropole

Abbreviation reg.—regiment, bat.—battalion, com—company. Compiled from: Abbot P., *Rivals of the Raj: Non-British colonial armies in Asia* (Nottingham: Foundry Books, 2010).

The Estado da Índia gradually transitioned from a maritime to a land-based empire (see Map 3.2) during the eighteenth century. The implication is that there was a greater emphasis on inland compared to coastal fortresses. The reacquisition of Bicholim (Dicholi) in the beginning of the 1780s put the Portuguese in a ‘well-entrenched [position] in northern Goa. Prior, they had already possessed Satari with Sankhli fort and towards the north-west, they had acquired the fort of Terekhol’. The conquest of Pedne in 1788 completed ‘the conquest of present-day Goa’.³⁹ While a relatively large body of troops was stationed at Ponda (near the western border of Ponda Province), no extensive investments were made to upgrade the fortifications and they were mostly ‘irregular pentagonal’.


The employment of *nativo* (natives) in the army in the second half of the eighteenth century was made clear in the *mapas gerais* (general charts) of the artillery regiments of 1780 and 1781.⁴⁰ At times, the term *naturae* is used in place of *nativo*.⁴¹ The use of *naturae* is observed at the level of second lieutenant (or *alferes*) in the general charts. The shortage of Portuguese soldiers was naturally more serious than the shortage of native soldiers given the preference for persons of European or white origin. The rest of the rank and file were distinguished in terms of Portuguese- and native-born. Non-elite military units employed more ‘indigenous’ (versus native) patented (commissioned) officers during and after the Pombaline period.

Other terms are encountered in documents and sources describing the different subgroups of personnel serving in the colonial military. In *Sistema Marcial Asiático* (Martial System of Asia), which describes developments in the second half of the eighteenth century, *sipaes* (sipais) is mentioned in a loose way to refer to second- or lower-line troops in the service of the Estado da Índia. Specifically, the personnel in the Corpo Volante (loose body of troops) dos Sipaes had Portuguese names and were likely to be made up of mixed blooded or converted natives. From the 1750s, sipais were increasingly drawn from indigenous people, and their officers could be Hindus and Muslims. The term *nativo* was

³⁹ Shirodkar, *Fortresses and Forts of Goa*, p. 146.

⁴⁰ Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU), Índia Conselho Ultramarino (CU), Maço 356.

⁴¹ Luso-descendants were sometimes labelled as ‘natives’, this was probably understood from the perspective that they were born locally.



Map 3.2 Map of Goa (old and new conquests)

applied to them as well as to African soldiers. The terms *indigena* (indigene) and *mestiço* (mestizo), by contrast, could cross-apply generally in modern ethnic and/or colonial studies research and in the latter case, also applied specifically to studies in Portuguese colonial domains in South America.⁴² Finally, the terms *Luso-descendente da Índia Portuguesa* and *Indo-Portugues* used in more modern colonial research on Goa is a more nuanced term that transcends specific historical usage to refer to

⁴² J.E. Mangan, 'Mestizos', *Oxford bibliographies*, accessed at <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199730414/obo-9780199730414-0240.xml>.

a Portuguese-descended person of the (Portuguese) State of India or a person of Portuguese and Indian descent. The term ‘Goan’ is an even more contemporaneous and wider usage that refers to a person or citizen from the region of Goa who could be Portuguese descendent, Indian or aboriginal ancestry (and increasingly, involving a diasporic identity in the nineteenth century and after).⁴³

Regardless of any distinction made among the different types of military units, core military formations were sometimes called upon to serve and stationed in the district localities. The number of deserters in the general charts of artillery units for 1780 and 1781, also distinguished in terms of Portuguese- and native-born, reveals that there were not many. Given the rate of attrition and the limited term of service (for native personnel, it was four years), soldiers needed to be transferred from other places.⁴⁴ Elsewhere, native or white soldiers from the forts, *marinha* (navy) and *legião voluntario* (volunteer legion) were sent to the auxiliaries or back to Portugal when they were no longer effective or when their term of service was completed.⁴⁵

During the period of the Napoleonic Wars, Sir William Beresford was appointed as a marshal (1807–1820), which gave him seniority over the Portuguese officers in Portugal. The Portuguese army was organized along British lines. The Portuguese troops under training practised British drill, were armed with British weapons, and were provided with uniforms from Britain. A substantial part of the increased forces was paid for by British subsidies. A network of support services such as a quartermaster general’s department, magazines, a hospital and even an intelligence-gathering unit was formed, befitting the creation of a modern military force in Portugal. Some units of the Portuguese army were deployed in Brazil. In Goa, British help came in the form of a garrison stationed in the city. This force consisted of ‘over 600 men of European Regiment No. 77 and three battalions of native troops or sepoy numbering 1,800’, although the original scheme called for the deployment of 1,000 men to

⁴³ Teotonio R. de Souza, “Is there one Goan identity, several or none?”, *Lusotopie* no. 7 (2000), pp 487–95. See also discussion in historical text, António J. de Frias, *Aureola dos índios, & nobiliarchia bracmana: Tratado historico, genealogico, panegyrico, politico, & moral* (Bombaim: Livraria Fialho, 1892).

⁴⁴ AHU India CU Maço 356.

⁴⁵ AHU India CU Maço 384.

be ‘furnished by H.M.’s 75, 77 and 84th regiments’.⁴⁶ The British military units were also rotated in practice: ‘Regiments nos. 80 and 84 went to Bombay and Regiments nos. 78 and 86 came to Goa. Thus, the three battalions of native troops in the auxiliary British detachment comprised [over 3,000] men besides the exchange of 60 men of artillery of the Regiment’.⁴⁷ Apparently, part of the Portuguese colonial force in Goa was organized (and paid) by Britain during the period of British occupation (1812–1815). A proposal to keep the grenadier battalion ‘separate and distinct was not accepted by the Governor of Goa’ as British troops were gradually withdrawn from 1812.⁴⁸ The Portuguese governor of Goa ordered ‘the Captain of the Legião of Ponda [to keep a close surveillance on British movements during the British occupation]’.⁴⁹ Scott Myerly discusses the use of the British military uniform, equipment and drill to create a ‘spectacle’ that reinforced the image of British military superiority. Portuguese colonial troops in India, conforming closely to the uniform colours back home and updated in organization and equipment, conveyed the same effect.⁵⁰ On the battlefield, especially in the eighteenth century (for instance, as depicted in *Sistema Marcial Asiático*), the new arms and formations of the Portuguese had a much more concrete effect.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century and at the start of the revolutionary period in Europe, India’s colonial forces underwent another reorganization. In 1796, the garrison of Goa consisted of two infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, two legiões of royal volunteers, one body (*corpo*) of sipais, four companies of cavalry, three *terços* of auxiliaries and three *corpos* of *miliças*.⁵¹ At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the

⁴⁶ Shirodkar quotes this from Arquivo Histórico Goa (AHG), Monções do Reino no. 183A, fl. 8. Letter of the Governor of Goa to Visconde de Anadia dated 16 March 1804. Shirodkar also refers to a letter quoted in Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, p. 453. From P.P. Shirodkar, ‘British occupation of Goa’, in P.P. Shirodkar, *Researches in Indo-Portuguese history* vol. 1 (Jaipur: Publication Scheme, 1998), pp. 229–258.

⁴⁷ Shirodkar quotes this from HAG, Monções do Reino no. 186, fl. 91.

⁴⁸ Shirodkar quotes this from HAG, Monções do Reino no. 192B, fl. 656r–v, 659.

⁴⁹ Shirodkar quotes this from HAG, Cartas e Ordens Portarias no. 83, fl. 25r–v, instruction of 12 Nov 1801.

⁵⁰ Scott Myerly, *British military spectacle: From Napoleonic wars through the Crimea* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996).

⁵¹ There was also the Partido Corpo Volante de Sipais. The military formation of auxiliaries numbered near 8000 men.

colonial army of India ‘remained as it had been during the Revolutionary Period’.

The colonial military of Portuguese India was a culmination of a force that was still capable of campaigns in the eighteenth century. In the early nineteenth century after the Napoleonic wars, prior to the civil war in Portugal and the outbreak of a series of revolts in Goa, the colonial force was experiencing a number of stresses arising from its (ethnic) composition, size and structure. Referring to a chart of forces under the Estado da Índia (in India) dated 1 January 1821 (Table 3.4) on the eve of the Revolution in Goa, the following observations may be made. First, the total strength was registered at 6,589. This was a substantial increase from the figure in the mid-eighteenth century, when the Estado was beginning to be transformed into a land-based empire. Second, the Goa islands and area (including the capital at Panjim), not surprisingly, had the highest allotment of forces: slightly more than one-third of the entire force in India. Third, the frontier provinces of Bardes, Ponda and Salcette accounted for slightly more than half the total strength. The difference in strength in the provinces might be accounted for by the presence of a hostile neighbour or continuance of an expansion or pacification campaign in the area. Fourth, with the loss of the Province of the North, the surviving and isolated cities there took up 4–5% each of the allotment of forces.⁵² The chart of forces may be corroborated by De Kloguen’s *Historical Sketch of Goa*, which details the state of forces in 1827:

Formerly there were three Regiments and a legion of Infantry in the colony; at present there are eight Battalions, and a small company of Artillery, in the parish of St. Agnes, west of Pangim; the whole amount to between 7 and 8,000 men, mostly natives, although, intermixed with many Europeans. Each battalion is commanded by a colonel, and there is a commander-in-chief, with the title of field-marshal, or Mariscal de Campo; there is no cavalry. Except the superior officers, all the others are indifferently Europeans or natives; there are four forts, Aguada, Murmagao, Reis, opposite to Pangim, and Cabo.⁵³

⁵² Arquivo Histórico Militar (AHM) DIV2/05/3/02/49.

⁵³ Denis L.C. de Kloguen, *A historical sketch of Goa* (facsimile of 1831 edition, 1993), p. 161.

Table 3.4 Chart of forces under the Estado da Índia in 1821

		<i>Officers of high ranks</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Officers of low ranks</i>	<i>All the positions</i>
Goa	2 regiments of infantry	6	74	881 ^a	961 ^b
	2 battalions of caçadores (light horsed infantry)	4	28	811	842
	Regiment of artillery	1	30	226	258
	Regiment of milícias (militias)	2	34	358	396
Ponda	Regiment of infantry	4	57	1256	1317
Bardes	Cavalry (unit)		4	13	17
	Regiment of infantry	3	57	1248	1308
	Cavalry (unit)		3	23	26
Salcette	Regiment of milícias	3	33	310	346
	Regiment of milícias	3	49	491	543
Damão (city)	Regiment of infantry	3	26	313	342
Diu (city)	Regiment of infantry	3	19	91	113
	Unit / body of sipaes (sepoys)	1	9	112	122
Total		33	423	6133	6589

Chart of bodies of forces under the Estado da Índia dated 1 January 1821

^aThe numbers recorded for the low-ranking officers and general ranks—881 = 599 + 282,

^b961 = 638 + 323

Source AHM/DIV2/05/3/02/49.(2)

The following further observations may be made: first, the forces of the Estado had a weak cavalry (an insignificant proportion of the entire force). Second, almost all the important provinces and frontiers (except Goa) had a regiment of infantry (about two-thirds of the total forces); this is understood to have been composed of soldiers of either European or Portuguese descent or white native birth (*casados*). Third, white indigenous subjects born or residing in Portuguese India and conforming to less stringent requirements were recruited into militia formations and formed

slightly more than one-tenth (11%) of the total forces. Fourth, soldiers of native descent formed about 15% of the total forces and were deployed as *caçadores* (mounted light infantry) in Goa and presumably as foot soldiers in the city of Diu. Fifth, the location of a force of sizeable proportion (one-third) in Goa appeared to conform to the idea of keeping a reserve in or near the capital and in a strategically located province, ready to be shuttled to any province under threat. It is surprising that no mention is made of deployment in the province/territory of Sanguem. Sixth, the Estado deployed military units in designated sizes and types of regiments and battalions.⁵⁴ The strength of the regimental- or battalion-sized force varied within the Estado as well as externally compared to forces of similar units in metropole Portugal and British India during the same period. The infantry regiment varied in strength from 113 (in the city of Diu) to 1,317 (in the province of Ponda). The weak cavalry prevented this military arm from being constituted into any recognizable units apart from being labelled as ‘cavalry’.⁵⁵ Finally, until the early 1820s, since the Portuguese colonial force was still on a path of expansion, its personnel did not face the immediate threat of retrenchment.

We may sidetrack to discuss some aspects of the finances of the Estado da Índia to get a sense of the dilemma, in context of the Portuguese East as well as the larger empire around the world, posed by the requirements of maintaining the colonial force in Estado.⁵⁶ Referring to Table 3.5, around the 1720s and on the expenses of Goa, an examination of expenses shows that the biggest sums were charged to the viceroy, the inspector general of the treasury (*vedor geral da fazenda*), and to various

⁵⁴ The Portuguese overseas regiment eventually evolved to comprise 2 battalions in the 1870s.

⁵⁵ AHM DIV2/05/3/02/49.

⁵⁶ Researching the financial aspects of Portuguese accounts of the pre-modern period can be a reasonably challenging task. Portugal did not adopt modern double accounting until the reforms of Pombal in the second half of the eighteenth century; its empire (in India and the Far East) was supposed to have followed suit from about the same period. Currently, while a unitary monograph on the accounting or fiscal history of Portugal may not be readily available, the field is, by contrast, more developed for Brazil. A small book on the specific history focused on Portugal is traced to a 1979 Lisbon-published title (refer M. Noel Monteiro’s *Pequeno História Contabilidade*). A general title focused on Brazil in the area published in São Paulo in 1997 is A. Lopes de Sá, *História Geral e das Doutrinas da Contabilidade*. For pre-eighteenth century accounts of the empire (notably, India), a specialist who have worked on developments in commerce relating to the Estado da Índia have commented that entries “might [often] not correlate to one another”.

military personnel for the day-to-day business and defence of the eastern capital. For the other ports and settlements, part of what they collected had to be transferred to Goa. A significant part of these expenses was also retained for military maintenance and defence. Bassein and a large part of the Province of the North still existed before 1739. Places which relied on land revenues allocated a relatively lower proportion of their expenses to naval matters, even though Bassein, for example, was a ship-building centre.⁵⁷ Around the 1820s, the troops ‘absorbed about 60 per cent of the public expenses [of Goa]’ (1,060 thousand out of 1,779 thousand xerafins; up from the previous 690 thousand xerafins, 35% less). The ‘regular’ troops were reduced while the men in the fortified points in the Estado were increased.⁵⁸ The constant wars of Uspá and Rarim as well as the expeditions of Siam and Timor, in addition to construction of a frigate in the navy, fueled the substantial military expenditure of the Estado. In Diu, military expenses (ground troops and navy) accounted for roughly half of the total revenues (53,965 out of 97,636 xerafins). The limited expenditure on naval maintenance in Diu was only a fraction of the expenditure of the settlement. The expenses at Damão were uncertain.⁵⁹ It was clear that the nature of expenses on the ground troops and the navy was shifting and favouring the former although the Estado da Índia continued to have some commitments on the sea.

In 1850, R. Pelissier writes that the strength of the Portuguese army in India to be 4000. Putting this context of the colonial strength in the 1850s pegged to be about 8000 (6400 infantry + 1500 artillerymen), the colonial military in India (still) occupied a sizeable proportion of the entire colonial armed force since the loss of Brazil. Naturally, there is room to discuss the numbers more critically. Assessing the metropolitan military strength in the 1880s, Pelissier points out that there is room to discount the number by up to one-third (18,000 could be accounted for in a force of about 27,000). Assuming the task of recruitment to be equally challenging in the colonies alludes to a force of about 2600 in India. It should be noted that the numbers for colonial strength probably does not take into account the indigenous or any allied forces supporting

⁵⁷ AHU, Códice 475, Recenseamento receitas e despesas da India, ff. 1r–49r.

⁵⁸ AHU, Códice 475, Recenseamento..., ff. 1r–49r.

⁵⁹ See *Memorias sobre as possessões na Asia, escriptas no anno de 1823* by Gonçalo de M. Teixeira Pinto (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1859), pp. 32 and 43–44.

Table 3.5 Revenues and expenditures of the Estado da Índia 1720 and 1816

	1720	1816
Revenue of Estado ^a	5,127,000 ^b	1,898,041 ^c
Expenditure of Estado (military)	1,412,467 ^d	1,149,569 ^e

^aFigures in xerafins

^bExcluded revenues from Mozambique, Congo and Senna. Figure from Macau also not included

^cRefers to public income or rent; included revenues from Damão and Diu but did not include figure from Macau. The figure was lower compared to that in 1720 partly arising from the loss of settlements and territories (eg. Baçaim and Mangalor)

^dFigure excluded expenditure undertaken for Mozambique, as it is, the sum constituted slightly more than one-third of total revenues

^eTotal public expenses was about 1.67 × larger vis-à-vis the military expenses. Military expenditure at Damão was estimated at about half of public expenses. Naval expenditure was only given at Diu although no exact figures were recorded (a fraction of 52,965)

Source J. da Cunha Rivara, *Possessões Portuguezas na Ásia escriptas no anno de 1823* (Novo Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1859), pp. 32–33. Resenceamento receitas e despesas da Índia Cod 475 AHU

the Portuguese garrison in Goa, Timor or the prazo in Zambesi. The abolition of the colonial army of India in 1871 and the establishment of the strength at a thousand at the beginning of the twentieth century appeared to affirm the long-term (if uncoordinated) streamlining of the colonial military.⁶⁰

READING THE PROFILE OF SOLDIERS

The last of the ‘great campaigns’, which lasted into the 1780s, demonstrated that the Portuguese in India were still able to marshal the necessary resources and manpower, in conjunction with Machiavellian diplomatic manoeuvrings, in acquiring the inland territories of the ‘New Conquests’. The military campaigns were executed with various types of forces fielded directly by the regular colonial army or indirectly by auxiliaries from the peripheral areas. The first chapter of the book has described various versions of the Military Revolution (or Globalization) and related

⁶⁰ See R. Pelissier, *As companhias coloniais de Portugal, 1844–1941* (Lisbon: Editoria Estampa, 2006).

cultural theories as well as their possible stances that this book could be intertwined with in discussion. These theories can work with cultural explanations to partly account for the prolongation of the (Portuguese) State of India. The assessment of the efforts to expand inland (New Conquests campaigns) in the eighteenth century showed that being well-equipped was a necessary prerequisite for the acquisition and maintenance of the (New Conquests) territories. Although the campaigning armies managed to reach the frontiers of Satari, Sanguem, Canacona, Pernem and Bicholim (which approximated to the boundaries of the modern state of Goa), this was no guarantee of success and could be achieved, among other factors, with the assistance of auxiliary and allied troops. Even after the (New Conquests) areas had been secured, the trajectory of the colonial army was not a static development; the force needed to be rationalized (and upgraded further) after the mid-nineteenth century in order to sustain the colony of Goa into the twentieth.⁶¹ This section probes into the possible (martial) orientations that could be manifested by the different categories of troops as well as how these orientations might facilitate the troops' effectiveness or ineptness in military engagements in wars or security duties. It also delves into specific encounters in skirmishes or battles that the forces of Goa were engaged in on the state frontiers. One can discern a number of categories of regular and irregular forces from the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century that made up the Portuguese colonial army in India: (1) European Portuguese and *casado* or whites of native birth, (2) white or mixed subjects of native

⁶¹ This, in addition to the British 'guarantee', permitted the Portuguese to hold on to Goa till its independence in 1961. By then, the Portuguese forces there were not able to withstand the vastly improved Indian army. The strength of the Indian army in 1965 stood at 700,000 (half a million in 1947) with a sizeable contingent of tanks and warplanes (700 + each). See Carlos A. de Moraes, *A queda da Índia Portuguesa: Cronica da invasão e do cativo* (Lisbon: Editoria Estampa, 1980). The total strength of the Portuguese army at the beginning of 1960 was a little more than a tenth of that of the Indian counterpart although this was increased to slightly more than 210,000 by the early 1970s. By then, the Portuguese army, equipped and upgraded with mobile artillery support, armoured vehicles and warplanes were able to execute a reasonably successful guerilla war in Angola and Mozambique. From a strategic perspective, it would be questionable if Portugal was able to sustain a prolonged conflict against India even if it brought its expeditionary forces from Africa to bear on the subcontinent (note: India also faced more than one adversary at the beginning of 1960s; i.e., Portugal and Pakistan). In essence, Portugal had not kept with the modernization of its arms in the first half of the twentieth century and had once again, sacrificed its interests in India in face of multiple threats; playing out the scenario of the Dutch-Portuguese war in the seventeenth century.

birth or residing in Portuguese India, (3) native sepoys of indigenous (Indian) descent and auxiliary/allied troops of similar descent, (4) troops of other indigenous descent created for specialized functions (for instance, the moors) and (5) 'native' sepoys of African origin.

The point of view of high-ranking functionaries may be gleaned from *relaçams* (reports or narratives) such as the 'Report of Victories Advanced in India against the Maratha Enemy' and 'Report of the Progress of Portuguese Arms in the State of India'. Traditional narratives in military history are still centred in a limited way on the great man as well as on operations and campaigns in wars, whether in the metropole or overseas. In the reports, the main protagonist, such as D. Luis C.I. Xavier de Menezes (Conde da Ereceira), D. Pedro Miguel or another appointee, is regularly compared to ancient heroes.⁶² Although the period of the New Conquests is deemed to have been between 1765 and 1788, the genesis and early campaigns were undertaken as early as the 1740s. D. Pedro Miguel de Almeida Portugal, the Count of Assumar, had a wealth of experience and served in a variety of military positions before being appointed as viceroy of India. The military leaders' reports acknowledged that the Estado was facing indigenous enemies that were often well-equipped with gunpowder weapons. The temperament of the count as a military commander veered towards aggressiveness:

In 1746, D. Pedro Miguel, the count of Assumar, chose Alorna to extend the nascent New Conquests. He had fewer than 5,000 troops and 1,000 sepoys. He judged his forces to be insufficient to execute a siege and chose instead the much riskier and more costly tactic of storming the fortress. [...] During the attack his troops negotiated the trenches and forced their way through two strong gates, which exacted a severe toll on the Portuguese side. As D. Pedro Miguel himself reported, '[o]ur losses were enormous'; [in part arising from the fact that] the enemy was also armed with many muskets and cannon. Five hours of hand-to-hand combat—the

⁶² See for instance 'Relaçam das victorias alcançadas na India contra inimigo Marata, sendo Vice-rey dequelle estado o illustrissimo e excelentissimo D. Luis Carlos Ignacio Xavier de Menezes'; 'Relaçam dos progressos das armas Portuguezas no Estado da India sendo Vice-rey e capitam general do mesmo estado Vasco Fernandes Cesar de Menezes', and 'Relaçam dos successos da Índia de D. Pedro Miguel'. The sources can be consulted at the Biblioteca Nacional (Portugal).

‘hardest fighting’, as the marquis admitted—eventually saw the castle fall into Portuguese hands.⁶³

The saga continued. By the 1780s, the Maratha empire had become a confederacy (begun in the 1770s), which implied that relations between the decentralized entities and Goa became more fluctuating and posed a threat to Goa intermittently. In the short space of time between 1783 and 1788, the Bounsulos had switched from being hostile towards Goa to becoming its ally. Goa’s wars on the northeastern frontiers, the theatre of war of the Count of Assumar’s campaign (involving Alorna), had always been a challenging sector. It saw the least advances in terms of New Conquests territories acquired. Manoeuvres of the Bounsulos and Portuguese in 1783 saw the former menacing Bicholim (the main town and settlement in that sector) and coming close to threatening the Portuguese capital in India and other key settlements on the Mandovi River. The Portuguese amassed their forces in the core Old Conquests areas and left auxiliary forces to garrison the key settlements. Forces of 3,000–4,000 were marshalled against each other, with the Portuguese gaining a marginal victory due to the British supplying arms and munitions to the Bounsulos. In the 1788 round, hostilities between the Bounsulos and Kolhapur led the Portuguese to support the former, and the two were jointly able to constrain the ambitious thrusts of the Raja of Kolhapur.

Over the long haul of the eighteenth century, although the *relaçams* tended to over-glorify the achievements of the Portuguese, it was clear that the Portuguese, even though they possessed sizeable strength, did not have a clear advantage over their adversaries. The treatise *Sistema Marcial Asiático*, written by D. António José de Noronha, which was not a personal account per se, affirmed less-than-desired observations about the Portuguese colonial army in India in relation to its foes. Its survey of the landscape revealed a situation in which: (1) the allies of Goa as well as the turncoats who served at the lower levels of the Portuguese colonial military could augment the strength of the force by several thousands⁶⁴;

⁶³ Danvers, *Portuguese in India*, pp. 418–21.

⁶⁴ *Sistema Marcial Asiático*, p. 118.

and (2) the Portuguese relied on a repertoire of instruments to preserve the survival of Goa, of which the military was not the most important.⁶⁵

While a high functionary from Portugal or Goa was expected to be dutiful in his military responsibilities, the business of war-making in Portuguese soldiery in the East was not very disciplined—and even chaotic at times—in certain quarters. The Portuguese appeared to have progressively adopted newer weaponry and the associated drills in the metropole and in the colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Overall, the Portuguese appeared to be able to create a buffer zone over the Old Conquests territories in the eighteenth century, although the depth of this zone was uneven: thinnest along the northern frontier and possessing some depth along the central and southern parts of Goa.

A middle-ranking soldier from Portugal (Francisco Rodrigues Silveira) in the sixteenth century demonstrated his awareness, revealed through a compilation of his memoirs, of the early weakness of the Portuguese colonial army in India. Silveira was dispatched to India in 1586 and returned 12 years later to Portugal, where he lived for the remainder of his life until 1634. The period in which Silveira lived appeared to overlap with the lifetime of the more well-known Diogo do Couto (1542–1616), who wrote the *Soldado Prático* (Practical soldier)—a work that critiqued how the Estado da Índia had operated. The inefficiency of the Estado, iconized as the ‘Black Legend’ by G. Winius, has been heavily criticized in some quarters as a clichéd portrayal. Silveira’s memoirs, written at a time when Portugal was in union with the foremost military power in Europe (Habsburg Spain), did not appeal to a general cause for the ineptness of the Estado but pointed to specific reasons for the recruitment of poor-quality soldiers as well as why Portuguese soldiers resorted to an ‘aggressive and unruly’ mode of attack. Going into the eighteenth century, the recruitment pool for soldiers remained inferior, although the increased regimentation over time seems to have brought about a more orderly approach in battle (owing to the need to face numerically larger local foes).⁶⁶ Silveira’s memoirs revealed a voice that harboured aspirations for the Habsburg colonial establishment. Going by J. Lynn’s

⁶⁵ *Sistema Marcial Asiático*, p. 115.

⁶⁶ A. de Costa Lobo, *Memórias de um soldado da Índia* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1877), chs. 4 and 18. Diogo do Couto, *Soldado pratico* (Lisbon: Sa da Costa, 1937).

discourse-reality model, there was a clear gap between the intended military reform hoped for and the reality on the ground, owing to a variety of reasons.⁶⁷

For military personnel in the eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century, there were likely other motivational inputs that affected their psyche. A preliminary survey of the insurrections and civil wars that dotted the period from 1780 to the 1850s reveals a rivalry between lower- and higher-ranking groups whose schism was not limited to the military establishment; it was complicated further by the interjections of other groups such as the (indigenous) Ranes. Could the revolutionaries have harboured an early or romantic sentiment of nationalism? Although a peculiar genre of literature on romanticism and nascent nationalism relating to Portugal was growing in Europe (such as the writings of Almeida Garrett), Fernando Costa Dóres has questioned whether nationalism could be identified in Portuguese soldiers, especially if they were serving overseas in the early nineteenth century.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ One might be reminded that the Portuguese had failed to reform militarily during the time of Afonso de Albuquerque (Governor of the Estado da Índia 1509–1515). See F. Pedrosa, *Alfonso de Albuquerque e a arte da guerra* (M. Martins: Municipal of Cascais, 1998).

⁶⁸ F. Costa Dóres, *Insubmissão: Aversão ao serviço militar no Portugal do século XVIII* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2010), p. 458. On the sideline, Garrett's work such as *Camões* could be deciphered on a number of levels that defied a unitary interpretation: A) The age of revolution following the Napoleonic Wars was a complex period. The revolution of Porto represented a claim to restore the marginalized status of Portugal vis-à-vis Brazil (from which the royal family had shifted to during the Peninsular War), to expel the political and commercial influence of the British as well as to give voice to the Portuguese third estate (by limiting the role of the monarchy through the constitution). Shortly after, conservative forces under Prince Miguel revolted against this constitutional order and many liberals were driven out of the country; Garrett being one of them in exile in France. At the individual level, Garrett's hope to return to the country represented a desire for a certain liberal order and going back to his homeland. There was some allusion to the 'fatherland' in the poem although the extent to which this represented a widespread or coherent sentiment needed to be scrutinized carefully. B) Beyond the literal wish of reinstatement and liberty, the *Camões*, modelled upon the *Lusiads*, was also enmeshed with Portugal's myth of messianism and Sebastianism. From the mythologized schema of the fifth empire of João V, the *Camões* symbolized the hope for a messianic saviour that could help salvage Portugal from its low point in the post-Napoleonic period. There was certainly room for the emotions released in the Romantic Movement to interact with the extreme folklore circulating in (recalcitrant) circles or groups which refused to submit. C) The *Camões* was also an affirmation of the struggles the men going to India and the East was facing but 'ironically' without the 'higher' exhortation to being motivated by any

Is it possible to fathom what native soldiers were thinking? Lynn has constructed an archetypal image of Indian sepoy in the service of the East India Company. These supposedly invincible military personnel of British India were the cornerstone of multiple expeditions to various parts of Asia and Africa. Indeed, historians of British imperial history have long acknowledged the crucial input of the resources and manpower of India in the forging of the empire. Lynn goes a step further than J. Black: while the latter urged readers to consider the limits of British arms outside climactic battles (for instance, the guerrilla-style warfare of the Marathas), Lynn has focused on the level of the individual soldier—i.e., the red-coated sepoy did not feel alienated or out of place picking up Western weaponry or executing an associated drill on the battlefield. The British Indian sepoy was able to do this due to the ‘Indian values of duty, loyalty and honor’, which were uniquely combined with Western weaponry and techniques, ensured by a reliable and stable bureaucracy.⁶⁹ The sublime message of the European influence and way is not to be underestimated; it is at the crux of the debate over whether Western technology, weaponry and the associated organization of manpower and training (or its absence) were key to the building of the ‘modernized’ army (or relegated it to defeat). Located in the context of the discourse of British imperialism on the Indian subcontinent, the British enterprise has been best described as ‘Anglo-Indian’; the sepoys’ collaboration with the British might not be differentiated from the bankers’ (comprising for

sentiment of early nationalism. It affirmed the depilated and lamentable destinies of these men who often ended the last days of their lives in India. In several instances in the book, the *Camões* reiterated the celebration of the first Portuguese conquistadores to the East. D) The Romantic Movement took upon different emphases in different countries across Europe. In Britain, colonialism under the Movement led to the revaluation of the other civilizations and peoples that the colonizers came across; eventually leading to the call for abolition. This impulse did not attract much following elsewhere in the other colonial powers. At a certain point in the poem, the *Camões* made appreciation of the friendship of a slave (Jau) to the Portuguese adventurer in the East; one could make a conjecture whether there was a tinge of empathy for the indigenous people even though Portugal only reluctantly complied with Britain’s maritime policy.

⁶⁹ See Wayne Lee, Review of ‘Battle: History of combat and culture from ancient Greece to modern America’ (New York: Westview Press, 2003), H-war (H-net reviews in humanities and social sciences) (2005), accessed at <https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=10357>.

instance, traders, moneylenders, etc., according to K. Leonard) desertion of native rulers.⁷⁰

At the turn of the eighteenth century into the nineteenth century, the Portuguese did not resort to recruiting or relying on the natives en masse; they harnessed the Luso-descendant (Indo-Portuguese) class, which could be perceived, according to V.E. Anderson, as a Eurasian stratum in Iberian colonial settlements.⁷¹ The survey of the strategic situation of the Estado da Índia has speculated about the possible rivalries and tensions between subgroups in the Portuguese colonial army in India. J. Forjaz and José F. de Noronha pointed out the differentiation between the Goans (Goeses) and Luso-descendants and how the latter formed a

⁷⁰ K. Leonard, “The great firm theory of the decline of the Mughal empire”, *Comparative studies in society and history* vol. 21.2 (1979), pp. 151–67. At least three paradigms of viewing the technological-cultural debate in India can be raised in the discourse and discussion: 1) Culture/society affecting military institution and warfare. S.P. Rosen belongs to this first category and thinks that social classes in India affect military mobilization. S. Alavi discusses about the military labour market and highlights there appeared to be a preference for the peasantry while T. Heathcote thinks that British recruitment of natives could come from across diverse classes in India employed as hereditary, mercenary and allied troops. D. Peers veers to the other side of the extreme to assert that the British empire and its military exploits were premised on “opinion and military reputation”, reinforcing the master–slave (dominant-subordinate) rhetoric. In this direction, scholars such as J. Black (2009) asks for conflicts and military clashes in different civilizational areas to be seen in merit from their own contexts. Explanations based solely on cultural reasons are also present. C. Wickremesekera sees the military encounter between Britain and India predominately as a ‘clash of cultures’ without either side being deemed more superior. P. Stanley’s work points out that even ‘white’ soldiers had a degree of variance in their categorization and characteristics. Another paradigm of viewing the technological-cultural debate in India is: 2) Military institution/warfare affecting culture and society. While a host of theorists in military revolution believes in technology or weapon-led military changes leading to shifts in societies, historians who are less deterministic such as Black (1999) argues for an institution/organization-centred explanation in the Western successes. A third paradigm is: 3) Military institution/warfare and culture/society mutually influencing each other in varying degrees. Writers such as P.H. Kolff thinks that caste was less important in relation to military recruitment in north India although Indian soldiers were influenced by the classical texts to some extent. K. Roy (2004) in trying to couch the narrative of Indian military history from the early modern and colonial periods in the context of new military history paradigm argues for an ambivalent and limited revolution on the subcontinent. Elsewhere, J. Lynn has presented a complex picture of the sepoy, depicting how, in joining the EIC army, he remained “a civilian at heart while becoming a soldier by profession”; in this way, the sepoy embraced his social class as well as became a more effective soldier.

⁷¹ V.E. Anderson, “The Eurasian problem in nineteenth century India” (Ph.D thesis, University of London, 2011).

distinctive subgroup.⁷² Towards the mid-nineteenth century, Paulo T. de Matos and J. Lucassen, drawing upon the *Maritime and Colonial Annals*, categorized military personnel as a limited subgroup of dependents of households. This group, then deployed in the six fortresses, had diminished in size since the reforms from the 1840s compared to the deployment in the early nineteenth century.⁷³ While the image of the Portuguese colonial army during the New Conquests campaigns in the eighteenth century might have been that it was martial and still capable of campaigning, this impression was gradually transformed into an image of it being ceremonial and sedentarily garrisoning. Transitioning into the nineteenth century, Goans and Luso-descendants who emigrated to look for employment also took up vocations in the British colonial military that were increasingly non-combat (apart from irregular mercenary appointments), such as musicians (fifers or drummers) and apothecaries.⁷⁴ Valerie Anderson pointed out in her study that Eurasians outside Goa ‘were forced to gravitate between the extremes of the pure European and native Indian [categorization]’.⁷⁵ The Luso-descendants in Goa were also slipping into this predicament, as their economic position and privileges deteriorated.⁷⁶ In subsequent epochs (the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century before the Second World War), the impetus for reform sidelined the Luso-descendants as a sociopolitical group in the Portuguese colonial army in India. P. Abbott notes that there was an increasing tendency to hire European troops in the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. The tactical approach was for the European troops to be screened by auxiliary troops in skirmishes and battles.⁷⁷

⁷² J. Forjaz and José F. de Noronha, *Os Luso-descendentes da Índia Portuguesa* vol. I (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2003), pp. 25–33.

⁷³ P.T. Matos and J. Lucassen, “Goa at work around 1850”, IISH Research paper no. 54 (2020), pp. 16–17.

⁷⁴ Anderson, “The Eurasian problem in nineteenth century India”, pp. 208–21.

⁷⁵ Anderson, “The Eurasian problem in nineteenth century India”, pp. 270–76.

⁷⁶ See P. Malekandathil, “Economic processes, ruralization and ethnic mutation: A study on the changing meanings of Lusitanian space in India”, *Itinerario* vol. XXXV(2), 2011, pp. 45–59 and C. Pereira, “Cogwheels of two empires: Goan administration within the nineteenth century British Indian ocean empire”, conference paper, nd, np.

⁷⁷ Abbott, *Rivals of the Raj*, pp. 140–50.

Regarding native or indigenous (Hindu) soldiers, the *Sistema Marcial Asiático* had brought about an awareness of the contribution of auxiliary and allied troops, whose roles were often overlooked. Natives were ‘hired’ in the Portuguese colonial military in India in two or three ways. In the region of the New Conquests, they were recruited directly in the third-line forces that garrisoned the area. Second, they staffed the auxiliary forces supplemented by the chiefs of allies in times of war. Third, local-level security, if it was not disrupted by war, relied on the services of watchmen who looked after the villages in traditional arrangements.

In a society regulated by the hierarchy of caste, the lives of the different classes and subgroups were influenced by the faiths (and associated life stages) they embraced. In the regions of the New Conquests, the auxiliary soldier was more likely to be a Hindu than a Christian. In the New Conquests areas, people worshipped local deities who were variants or avatars of the mother goddess along with Shiva and Vishnu—the latter two locally known, among other names, as Mahishasurmardini Mallikarjun and Parshuram respectively.⁷⁸ These deities were embedded in the common mythology of Hinduism. The values linked to war were also gleaned from the morality of war enunciated in the sacred texts. There was a tendency for heroes to be worshipped as cults. D. Kosambi has pointed out a number of sixteenth-century heroes and heroines at the local level who were cultified.⁷⁹ At the broadest and highest level, Shivaji was lauded in the *Sivabharata* in the manner of the *Mahabharata* (or *Ramayana*) in his fight against the Islamic sultanates or the Mughals.⁸⁰ Ballads and folk tales based on Shivaji roused the sentiments of ordinary Marathas. Folk tales also conveyed the values one should emulate. A sampling of stories shows that values such as loyalty, humanness, patience—encapsulated to some extent in the deity of Vithoba, an

⁷⁸ Rajendra P. Kerkar (TNN), “Revering mother goddess in her various avatars”, *Times of India*, 7 Oct 2019, accessed at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/revering-mother-goddess-in-her-various-avatars/articleshow/71470842.cms>.

⁷⁹ D. Kosambi, *Myth and reality: Studies in the formation of Indian culture* (New Delhi: Sage, 2016), p. 119.

⁸⁰ Kaushik Roy, *Hinduism and the ethics of warfare in South Asia* (Cambridge: CUP), p. 202.

avatar of Krishna—were promoted among the lower classes and ranking soldiers.⁸¹

The values of daily life, conflict and war, gleaned from religious texts and folklore, would go hand in hand with bread-and-butter concerns to permit a native sepoy and auxiliary soldier to function in his vocation; although in practice on the ground, the degree of regimentation and associated interference would be more obvious among regularly employed sepoy. According to a contemporary account of sepoy employed by the EIC, there were differences between troops trained and regulated by the Western (British) regimental culture and those that were not. Irregular units of men (formerly under French service as Alcegols)⁸² attached to EIC sepoy companies from Oudh were ‘still regulated by their own customs’ and continued to revere French colours as they had been recruited by the French. On the ground, the caste system was known to operate along more fluid lines.⁸³ The military profession was ‘[not] the exclusive monopoly of the kshatriya caste’.⁸⁴ In the pre-modern period of India, members of the priestly, farming and even trader classes served as soldiers.⁸⁵ Regarding the Maratha castes, contemporary letters describe

⁸¹ The values were promoted in stories such as “Lord Vithoba coming to Pandhapur”, “Wise ministers”, “Parvatibai outwitting the dacoits”. In the same way, ‘superstitions’ (sati in “Sati Godawari”) were spread in the populace. See I. Sheorey, *Folk tales of Maharashtra* (KL: South Asia Publisher, 2000). The superstitions of the Marathas, whether attributed to the dignified Indian princes or the lower-ranking soldiers, were observed in the letters. The Portuguese did not appear to hire the Kunbis (landless labourers or tillers) directly in the soldiering role to any extent. If their labour was used, it was likely to be made through the informal contribution system.

⁸² These irregulars who were armed according to “the fancy of each individual” had a habit of “charg[ing] the enemy in a gol (mass)”. See *Letters from a Maratta camp* (Series Constable’s Oriental miscellany) (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1892), p. 50.

⁸³ P.C. Chakravarti, *The art of war in ancient India* (Delhi: Low price publications, 2010), pp. 76–82.

⁸⁴ Chakravarti, *The art of war in ancient India*, p. 78.

⁸⁵ The Arthashastra approves “of the employment of vaisya and sudra troops in the army”. In the Arthashastra, the prerequisites of a higher-ranking official were outlined. The minister or higher official (*Amatyah*) were those who had a list of characteristics and duties ascribed to them (*Amatya-sampat*): He should be well-trained and endowed with foresight, with strong memory; bold; well spoken; enthusiastic; be good in their expert field; learned in theoretical and practical knowledge; pure of character; of good health, kind and philanthropic; free from hate and enmity; he should not be lazy or indecisive and finally, dedicated to dharma. Those who lack one or a few of these characteristics should be considered for middle or lower positions in the administration, working under

them in two broad categories: Brahmins and other classes. The latter comprised a number of sub-classes such as shepherds and tillers.⁸⁶ Due perhaps to the fact that there was high wealth disparity in Indian society across time ('being strangers to comforts of domestic society [and as a result of] the unsettled life they led'), (low-ranking) Maratha soldiers were '[usually] quarrelling with their chiefs, always about their pay; [at times] with utmost indifference, ranging themselves on the side of his [chief's] adversary, and the next day returning to their former master'.⁸⁷ The degree to which the situation was better or worse in the regular British sepoy battalions was thus closely dependent on the sepoys' regularity of pay, an observation made also by Lynn. Given the limited reliability in the payment of salaries to the Portuguese colonial army in India, the military labour market of Maratha recruits in the New Conquests territories was open to employment by the Portuguese or the British across the border.⁸⁸

Finally, there were the minority troops, such as the *mouros* or the Africans, who were hired in small numbers over time. T. Walker, writing about African slave-soldiers in India, reminds the reader about soldiers from outside India, for instance, Turkish or African soldiers, being deployed there. Walker notes in the Portuguese case that the use of slave-soldiers was never professionalized and that they were deployed 'only temporarily [and] against external aggression'.⁸⁹ Connecting this observation with the employment of guards in the protection of the governor or viceroy, the latter was by contrast employed on an as-needed basis and (probably) against internal disturbance or threat. The Portuguese had deployed African slave troops against the Dutch and French in South America and continued this practice in the nineteenth century. The issue of the use of African slave-soldiers was entangled with the abolitionist trend in Britain, which was sealed with the Slavery Abolition Act of

the supervision of more senior officials. This applied to military appointments as well. See further in Chakravarti, *The art of war in ancient India*, p. 81.

⁸⁶ *Letters from a Maratta camp*, p. 77. The letter also described their skin color (Brahmins being more fair), daily customs such as the clothes they wore.

⁸⁷ *Letters from a Maratta camp*, pp. 77–79.

⁸⁸ *Letters from a Maratta camp*, p. 219. See also Abbott, *Rivals of the Raj*. This had been a persistent problem over time, refer Costa Lobo, *Memorias de um soldado da India*.

⁸⁹ T. Walker, "Slaves or soldiers? African conscripts in Portuguese India, 1857–60", in I. Chatterjee and R. Eaton eds., *Slavery and South Asian history* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp. 235–36.

1833 as well as the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1842. Although Walker's article was focused on the (slave) status of personnel taking up duties in India in 1857, one can venture to make a conjecture of a more general profile of the African slave-soldier. For a start, scholars studying the African continent, its communities and diasporas have long cautioned about viewing the slave-master relationship in Africa from the perspective of the Western conception of legalistic ownership and property. The period from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century was a phase of maturation of the *prazo* system in East Africa (concentrated around certain locus areas such as Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, Quelimane and Rios de Sena); hence (referring to Table 3.3), expeditionary forces assembled and dispatched from there were presumably culled from the private armies of *prazo*-holders (or *senhores*) friendly to the governor or private (African) soldiers in the latter's hire.⁹⁰ Scholars studying wars and conflicts in Africa have attested to the fact that Africans could '[wage war] with finely worked iron weapons as good [...] as Portuguese and Spanish steel'.⁹¹ Different opinions, however, have been presented about the utility of firearms before the Second Industrial Revolution, with most opining that they were of limited effectiveness. *Prazo* military personnel fought in a traditional manner and were at times armed with firearms.⁹² Returning to the discussion of the *mouro* guards, the military formations composed of them were not always made up of Muslim mercenaries. During the period of the Restoration (1640–1668), the viceroy's guard under the Count of Linhares (1629–1635) was composed of about 1,000 European soldiers. In the early nineteenth century, the guard under Viceroy D. Manuel F.Z. de Portugal e Castro (1826–1835) was *mouro* in

⁹⁰ A. Isaacman and D. Peterson, "Making the Chikunda: Military slavery and ethnicity in southern Africa", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* vol. 36.2 (2003), pp. 257–81. Newitt M., *A history of Mozambique* (London: Hurst & Co., 1995).

⁹¹ M. Newitt, "Portuguese warfare in Africa", paper delivered at Contemporary politics and history research center (2000), p. 9, accessed at <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/politics/cphrc/scetions/articles/newit1.htm>.

⁹² Newitt, "Portuguese warfare in Africa". R. Gray thought firearms could win individual battles but not wars; J. Thornton thought firearms did not affect the outcome of the conflict in Angola; J. Miller thought that possessing firearms had a greater symbolic rather than actual effect (such as attracting allies). One also needs to perceive conflicts in Africa in context of the different war objective there; i.e., the plunder of resources rather than the control of lands and territories.

nature (*Companha mouro de guarda da governador*), possibly to ‘counter-balance the [Luso]-descendants’.⁹³ From the scaled model replica of the fort-palace of the viceroy of Goa in the eighteenth century, modelled under the coordination of the Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses (National Commission for the Commemoration of Portuguese Discoveries), one can readily exercise one’s imagination in assessing the strength of the defences buttressed by the wall of the fort-palace as well as the quarters and arsenal of the viceroy’s guard.⁹⁴

CONCLUSION

The British had perched themselves along the eastern and western coasts of India as well as in Northeast India by the Battle of Plassey. The British absorption of Indian capital and the allegiance of certain classes of natives as well as concurrent wars waged against the major native regional powers were, as discussed by scholars such as P. Barua or C. Bayly, gradually transforming the subcontinent.⁹⁵ On the west coast of India, the disintegration and reintegration of power entities altered the strategic and local political dynamics in the region, which in turn affected the conduct of diplomacy and deployment of the colonial military of the Estado da Índia. Coupled with the reduced need to maintain a bulky colonial army in India, the greater need for synchronization of resources and military manpower across the empire provided an impetus for the reform of the Portuguese colonial military. To assess the problems of the Portuguese colonial army in India, its nature and structure in the early nineteenth century have been analysed. Although the (colonial) force managed to keep up with some upgrades in weaponry (especially in artillery) and organization, it was constituted predominantly of Luso-descendant mixed-blood troops, who were increasingly deemed ineffective. A closer examination of the profile and experience of the soldiery reveals that

⁹³ AHU, N;°2122_ACL_SEMU_DGU_Livro, updates of the Guarda municipal de Goa. See also Abbott, *Rivals of the Raj*, p. 134.

⁹⁴ Mafalda S. da Cunha coord., *Os espaços de um império* (Lisbon: CNCDP, 1999), pp. 92–93. Project led by Atelier H. Carita.

⁹⁵ See P. Barua, “Military developments in India, 1750–1850”, *Journal of Military History* vol. 58.4 (1994), pp. 599–616 and C. Bayly, *Indian society and the making of the British empire* (Cambridge: CUP, 1988).

although the main colonial force continued to be credible in the eighteenth century, its success was buttressed by the support of auxiliary troops as well as other instruments of state. Indeed, the men-at-arms, whether Luso-descendants or indigenous sepoys, could be led to perform marginally effectively on the battlefield in India. However, this force (constituted of Luso-descendants) was increasingly becoming a liability (seen in the increasing manifestations of protests discussed in the next chapter). In the context of the main thesis of the book, this chapter affirms that the Portuguese colonial army in India was able to adapt and upkeep a semblance of a force which the (Portuguese) colonial government was able to deploy in its expansion and maintenance—although this force was at the same time outgrowing its need and lapsing into stagnancy. The next chapter will probe into the dissensions of the force in India as well as other non-war violence associated with it.



Non-war Violence in Portuguese India, 1780–1850

Abstract The chapter highlights the somewhat inconspicuous tensions and conflicts in the Portuguese colonial military in India that were not always associated with open and direct war. The uprisings in Goa in the first decades of the nineteenth century were relatively un-violent. A survey of social tensions and insurrections between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shows that the dissatisfactions and frustrations of officers and men were not always limited to the mixed group or class but could also involve elitist military men as well as indigenously recruited auxiliaries. Other than uprisings that erupted due to inadequate remuneration or recognition, among other reasons, non-war violence could also be generated from what armies did to civilians, ritual group violence, protest and organized crime affiliated with sub- and ethnic-group politics in colonial Goa.

Keywords Globalization · Non-war violence · Revolt · Uprising · Military-induced stress (on civilian society)

INTRODUCTION

The strategic environment of central-west India, which bordered Portuguese Goa, underwent a breakdown and reconstitution of political power in the transition from Mughal to Maratha dominance. This region was broken down into major constituent royal houses of the Maratha confederacy as well as non-Maratha political entities. In the frontier and transitional areas secured by the New Conquests, a variety of sociopolitical subgroups—as in the broader situation of central-west India—could be persuaded or dissuaded from aligning with the Portuguese cause. Over the long haul of the eighteenth century, Portuguese arms hand in hand with diplomacy and the support of a host of local allies on the ground were able to precariously but gradually hold the lands gained in the New Conquests campaigns. However, the colonial military force that accomplished this feat was also at the same time hampered by its size and internal dissensions, evoking a call from the metropole for a more streamlined force from the 1840s. This chapter affirms that the tensions and conflicts in the Portuguese colonial military in India were not always associated with open and direct war. The dissatisfactions could arise from the perceived inequitable dispensation of benefits to different segments of the colonial military. The absence of an external threat implied that the military or other apparatus of a colonial state could be deprived of its impetus for radical reforms. Beyond formal conflicts, the wider society could also experience indirect impositions related to war or structural/situational tensions fostered by the colonial military.

First, Chapter 4 will probe into the disparities of remuneration or recognition in different segments of the regular and irregular forces serving the colonial military. Second, the uprisings in Goa in the first decades of the nineteenth century will be examined. The final part of the chapter will inquire specifically into possible stresses that the colonial military imposed on the larger Goan society in a number of arenas: (i) the extreme measures that the colonial army imposed on civilians (due to war), (ii) possible ritualized group violence fostered by the force, as well as (iii) its capacity to cope with organized crime. In terms of the overall thesis of the book, despite a tumultuous start in the nineteenth century (occupation by the British during the Napoleonic wars), the structure of violence that undergirded the colony and settlement of Goa was relatively benign.

SOCIAL SYSTEM AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

The corporatist feudal system identified certain criteria for identifying the races of personnel (and their advancement) in the Portuguese colonial force in India. The religious factor, as highlighted by C. R. Boxer, continued to be a criterion for advancement even though the progressive Pombal regime had asked for Christian mixed ethnic personnel in the colonies to be given the same opportunities. In the eighteenth century, as we have seen in the artillery regiment, a further distinction was made on the grounds of whether the convert was a Portuguese from Portugal, or whether he was of mixed ancestry or an indigenous person who had been converted. Regarding indigenous unconverted Indians, the works of Denis L.C. de Kloguen and Bragança Pereira reveal more about the classes and subclasses of natives who held military positions in the Portuguese colonial military. De Kloguen describes a fourth class of ‘Chardo’ who ‘pretended to be of the Chatria (warrior) caste’. Pereira, within the larger racial/religious categorization of Catholics and non-Catholics (Hindus and Mohamedans), identifies the subclass of Marathas (under the Hindu category) in Goa, the subclass of Rajputs in Damão, as well as the Dessaiados in (the councils of) Pernem, Sanquelim and Ponda (the same as the Dessais in the sepoy regiment during the viceregal reign of the Conde da Ega).¹ Ângela Barreto Xavier queries whether there was a recognition that Brahmins might be viewed as Hindu rather than Chardo nobility.² Overall, P. Malekandathil, among others, affirms that the Portuguese authorities, particularly in the New Conquests areas, tolerated unconverted natives and permitted them to be recruited into the local militias.³ It should be borne in mind that within the Catholic faith, the institution of the church and the religious orders had been competing with

¹ The ‘Dessayes’ submitted to the King of Portugal in 1746. See F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India: Being a history of the rise and decline of their eastern empire* (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1894), p. 417.

² Ângela Barreto Xavier’s work on Goa (*A invenção de Goa: Poder imperial e conversões culturais nos séculos XVI–XVII*, Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2008) maintains that control and hegemony was made possible via a Christian ideological psyche. See also treatment on a schema and ideology in António João Frias’ *Aureola dos Índios* (Bombaim, Livraria Fialho, 1892).

³ P. Malekandathil, “Economic processes, ruralization and ethnic mutation: A study on the changing meanings of Lusitanian space in India”, *Itinerario* vol. XXXV (2), 2011, pp. 3–4.

the military for (white and mixed-descendent) recruits since the seventeenth century. This competition also extended to the enrolment of native recruits as well. The number of native clergy at the beginning of the eighteenth century and at the end of Pombal's period (or beginning of the reign of Maria I) was pegged, probably exaggeratedly, at 2500 and 3000 respectively.⁴

The population in the New Conquests regions of Goa appeared to be attracted, to some extent, by the benefits of surrendering to Portuguese rule, although not necessarily through outright conversion.⁵ The traditional nature of warfare on the Indian subcontinent supported a mode of shifting loyalties but also a shifting social classification. Shifting social classification meant that social subgroups or jatis that switched allegiance and subscribed to the ranking hierarchy of the new masters stood a chance to reap newfound benefits and social status. This is not to say that resistance to a centralizing tendency did not exist: the Rajputs, for instance, fiercely resisted the Mughals and British before being embraced by the presiding regimes. The British utilized the natives in the colonial military more intensively than did the Portuguese, and they adapted some form of a nascent martial race system before the 1850s.⁶ The Portuguese

⁴ Pombaline curtailment of the church and religious orders (in particular, the Jesuits) limited the influence of this institution but the impact appeared to have affected 'white' clerical appointees more vis-à-vis native appointees on the ground in India. This would account for the (still) substantial numbers of native clergy in India even giving allowance for exaggeration. Pombal broke off relations with Rome in 1760 when he could not, rallying with the other states of Europe, to get the Pope to suppress the Jesuits. See Carlos M. de Melo, *The recruitment and formation of the native clergy in India* (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1955), pp. 173–77 and 185.

⁵ There has been some debate on the issue of the origins of the Charodo. P. S. Pissurlencar thinks that the Charodo constituted a distinctive class on its own. N. Xavier thinks this class attained in the territories of the Old Conquests a position "comparable to the *dessais* and *gãocares gentios* in the New Conquests". See Mártires Lopes, *Goa setecentista: Tradição e modernidade* (Porto: Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 1999), p. 104. B. Pereira thinks that the confusion arose because the Charodo probably belonged to the military tribes (formerly Maratha) then residing in the Old and New Conquests. The founding of a Seminary of the Carmelita Order from 1750 which was composed of Charodos added to the mystification of the class. Mártires Lopes thinks the Charodos were all converted and the evidence on the group for some of the issues discussed was scarce at best.

⁶ A. Verghese, *The colonial origins of ethnic violence in India* (Redwood: Stanford University Press, 2016).

deployed some native troops, at times marshalling them against white colonial troops in uprisings.⁷

The contribution of the auxiliaries at times constituted a respectable component of the colonial military operating beside the regular army of the Portuguese in India. There is no reliable data on the use of auxiliary troops by the Portuguese colonial army in India. The non-Portuguese element in Afonso Albuquerque's expeditionary forces in the sixteenth century varied to a great extent depending on the exigency of the campaign. Dom António José de Noronha,⁸ in accounting for the 'forces of Goa and their decadence' in the eighteenth century, made a spirited argument to 'continue [revive] the grand project of Albuquerque (in the way he had utilized indigenously recruited soldiery)'.⁹ Referring to Table 4.1, a preliminary survey seems to indicate that the proportion of auxiliaries in the Portuguese colonial army in India decreased over the period of three centuries since they arrived.

In the competition for advancement and privilege, Luso-descendants (Luso-descendentes) personnel took a reasonably long route to attain rank or status in the military organization and the larger society. The majority of the population in Goa and the Old Conquests territories were Christians. Among the Christian population were converted Goans and Luso-descendants; the latter were depended upon to some extent to fill administrative and military roles. From the compiled genealogy of Luso-descendants, it is clear that many of them served in the Old Conquests areas. There were five prominent family names associated with those who arrived in the sixteenth century, settled in the Estado, and contributed

⁷ R. Burn, *The Cambridge History of India* vol. 4 (Cambridge: CUP, 1937), pp. 16, 97–99, 244, see also V.A. Smith, *The Oxford history of India* (Oxford: OUP, 1923), pp. 673–80.

⁸ António José de Noronha hailed from an illustrious family (among the five big names during the glorious sixteenth century of the Portuguese in the East) who held important appointments pertaining to overseas affairs in Portugal or field appointments in India. António José came from the fifth generation of a line which branched off under Gil Eanes de Noronha (who married four times). He was born in Old Goa in 1720 and passed away in Panjim in 1778. He was a controversial figure and undertook a variety of portfolios from teaching, as bishop in a military order to being a commander of the Legião da Ponda; including being conferred a honorific title from the Mughals. His immediate cousins also saw services either in the King's colonial army in India or as mercenaries.

⁹ António José de *Noronha* (Carmen M. Radulet ed.), *Sistema Marcial Asiático* (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1994), pp. 31–47.

Table 4.1 Sampling of use of auxiliary and allied forces in campaigns in 16–eighteenth centuries

<i>Event Troop type, nos. and proportion</i>	<i>Defence of Cochin in early 1500 s</i>	<i>Campaign of Albuquerque at Aden in 1513</i>	<i>Preparation for taking of Diu 1530</i>	<i>Defence of Goa in 1570</i>	<i>Beginning of Joao V's reign, before New Conquests (early 1700s)</i>
Auxiliaries	1000 Naires	800 Malabares	2000 Malabares. Logistics: 4000 Malabares seamen, 800 Malay oarsmen, 8000 Moorish slaves	Logistics: 1500 slaves and militiamen	400 Brahmins and Chardos 1000 sepoy
Proportion	About 7 × Portuguese soldiers deployed	About 0.5 × Portuguese soldiers deployed	Slightly more than 0.5 × Portuguese soldiers deployed		0.33 × Portuguese soldiers deployed 0.25 × Portuguese soldiers deployed

Source C. Selvagem, *Portugal militar* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 1994)

to the administrative, military and religious services there. Referring to Table 4.2, those linked to the five great names, for instance the Noronha, continued to hold positions in (military) leadership.¹⁰ The document list of local-born (*naturais*) officials (military officers) of the Estado da Índia of 1842 shows that the average age of military personnel before reaching the ranks of captain and major was in the forties. Most had served more than twenty to thirty years before reaching the rank. There were a couple of officers who attained the rank of captain after fewer than

¹⁰ A sampling (refer table 4.2) of members of the Noronha family holding positions and responsibilities relating to the Estado da India reveals that those of the mixed lineage held fairly reputable positions across a number of generations. Data drawn from J. Foraz and Jose F. de Noronha, *Os Luso-descendentes da India Portuguesa* vol. III (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2003), pp. 22–31. Hereafter, *Os Luso-Descendentes*.

twenty years and would have been in their thirties.¹¹ These two officers came from the elite arm of the artillery.¹² Lieutenants usually attained their rank more than a decade but less than twenty years from the time they were recruited as soldiers or cadets. Second lieutenants achieved their position in less than or slightly more than ten years.¹³ Regarding the white non-Portuguese soldiery, Carreira outlines the contribution and service, including promotion and career prospects, of French mercenaries in the Portuguese colonial army in India. Second-line white and mixed-descendant soldiers were subject to the criteria system of religious or race yardsticks when it came to recognizing effort.¹⁴ Although these criterions were relaxed during the Pombaline era, varying systems of criterions could be applied to previously conquered territories (Old Conquests) and newly conquered ones (New Conquests).

Native or indigenous soldiers recruited via the civilian or military agent of the *gauncares* or *dessaidos* (agent of tax farmers in Old or New Conquests) formed a relatively important component of the Portuguese colonial and military enterprise in India. The complex nature of the conflict undertaken by the Portuguese over the long haul of time highlighted the need for a corps of diplomatic agents and spies. P. S. Pissurlancar has described some of the native or indigenous families serving in diplomatic and military capacities for the Estado da Índia. Of the families surveyed, the Valaulicar family participated in and contributed to the diplomatic and military activities of the Portuguese in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Vittogi Sinai Gorqui, son of Vitola Rau Gorqui, served as captain and commander in a campaign on the Portuguese side. In keeping with the strategy of deploying the first-line colonial force to the most needed place, Portuguese agents kept a very close tab on the movements of the ruler of Punem and other figures

¹¹ A major (João Manuel Lopes Ferreira) attained his rank after 19 years and was only 44.

¹² One other officer who attained the captain rank in exactly 20 years was also in the artillery unit. A major, 42, who attained his rank after a usual length of time (35 years) came from the engineer corps.

¹³ AHM DIV2/05/5/14/106; see also AHM DIV2/05/4/5/06.

¹⁴ Carreira raises to attention the work of a French historian (Anne Kroel) on the subject of whether there was a migrant mercenary population in the region/Asia. Refer A. Kroel, “Les marchands interlopes dans les eaux indiennes à la fin du XVIIe siècle”, in D. Lombard eds., *Marchands et hommes d'affaires asiatiques dans l'océan Indien et la Mer de Chine* (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1988), pp. 183-91.

Table 4.2 Sampling of members of Noronha family serving the Estado da Índia

<i>S/No</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Family name</i>	<i>Year (and place) of birth</i>	<i>Marital status (family in marriage union)</i>	<i>Place of dwelling</i>	<i>Positions/responsibilities held by person</i>	<i>Children and their prospects</i>
01	Gil Eanes de Noronha e Sarmento	NORONHA	1663 (Cochin)	Married to [Sousa Coutinho]	Cochin/duties in different places, e.g., Baçaim, Sofala	Served as captain of forts, commander of armada	III (2 ⁰), 10 × children (1 in navy, 2 in military, 1 sacerdote/confessor; 2 of whom participated at Mombasa)
02	Henrique de Noronha e Sarmento	NORONHA	1684 (Baçaim)	Married to [Pereira Coutinho]	Pangim	Served as captain Goa	IV, 9 × children (2 × military, 2 × friar)
03	Gil Eanes de Noronha Sarmento	NORONHA	1726 (Baçaim)	Married to [Pereira de Lacerda]	Pangim	Captain of infantry Agoada	V, 5 × children
04	Manuel António de Noronha e Sarmento	NORONHA	1761 (Agoada)	Married	??	Served in guard of armada India	VI, 1 × child
05	Lourenço de Noronha e Távora	NORONHA	Unknown (Lisbon)	Married 2X; first to [Melo]	Moved to India in 1720; Goa	Served in a variety of high posts, e.g. captain-general Mozambique	(3 ⁰) Married to high dignitary (1 serving as viceroy of Brazil)
06	Luis Inácio de Noronha e Távora	NORONHA	1730 (S. Pedro)	Married to [Lobato de Faria]	India	Served in high posts, e.g. commissioner, captain-general	II, 3 × children (1 serving in navy)

<i>S/No</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Family name</i>	<i>Year (and place) of birth</i>	<i>Marital status (family in marriage union)</i>	<i>Place of dwelling</i>	<i>Positions/responsibilities held by person</i>	<i>Children and their prospects</i>
07	Lourenço Vicente Cristóvão João de Noronha	NORONHA	1773 (Pangim)	Married to [Costa de Ataide e Teive]	Goa	Served in posts in navy, e.g. captain-of-sea-and-war	III, 11 × children (2 serving in military)

Source J. Foraz and Jose F. de Noronha, *Os Luso-descendentes da Índia Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2003), pp. 22–31. Roman numerals (eg. I, II etc.) indicate the different generations, X⁰ indicates the branch of the family (if not indicated, data referred to the main or primary branch)

of the confederacy.¹⁵ The indigenous rulers and Portuguese (Virvader of Sunda) cooperated with and relied on each other for intelligence for use in their diplomatic or military activities, for instance in 1749 and 1796.¹⁶ In a scheme initiated in 1753, the *corpo volante* (loose body of troops) during the viceregalship of Conde Rio Pardo had twenty-nine of the forty companies of auxiliary troops (2000 men) being led by men of ‘indigenous names’ (which meant they were not converted natives or Luso-descendants). While seven of them were listed as captains, the rest (twenty-two) might have led as headmen of their villages. It was expected that the men who filled the common soldiery had many indigenous people among their ranks.¹⁷

The socio-economic condition of the core areas of the Estado da Índia was at best mediocre in terms of returns. The annual income of the upper class did not ‘exceed Rs 2000 in the nineteenth century’.¹⁸ The economy in the early period of the Portuguese presence in India was geared towards ‘defending Portuguese possessions and trade in the East as well as to cater for the needs of the upper class’.¹⁹ Although traders in the Estado adapted and tapped on the new currents of entrepot commerce in the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century, the economy did not become more self-sufficient and had to import necessities. The gap in productivity and the need to accept imported prices did not help wages to catch up with inflationary trends. The cost of living was ‘noted to be high in the nineteenth century’.²⁰ Ordinary soldiers were far from

¹⁵ P. S. Pissurlencar, *Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India* (Goa: Tip. Rangel, 1952), pp. 348–528. Hereafter, ADPI.

¹⁶ Transcribed Marathi documents from Purabhilekh-Puratatva vol. IV (Jul–Dec 1986), p. 69. Purabhilekh-Puratatva vol. VII (Jan–Jun 1989), p. 65.

¹⁷ Miguel Vicente de Abreu, *O governo do Vice-Rei Conde do Rio Pardo no Estado da India Portuguesa* (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1869), p. 89. Hereafter, *O governo do Conde do Rio Pardo*. See also HAG, Gaocares no. 7662.

¹⁸ Fatima da Silva Gracias cites this from Kloguen’s. *An historical sketch of Goa in Health and hygiene in colonial Goa* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1994), p. 117.

¹⁹ Silva Gracias, *Health and hygiene in colonial Goa*, p. 23.

²⁰ Silva Gracias, *Health and hygiene in colonial Goa*, pp. 37–38. In the 1780s, an arroba of pork was sold for 5 xerifins, the same weight of pork sold for 24 tangas in the 1790s. In the mid-nineteenth century, a laborer earned a daily wage of 16 reis. In a year, he earned 16 xerifins assuming employment for 300 days. 1 rupia (before 1870) = 2 xerifins = 10 tangas = 600–720 reis (1 tanga = 60 reis).

being wealthy and were likely to be involved in smuggling businesses.²¹ Soldiers were ‘a visible component of the city population’.²² Lower-ranking soldiers could be classified as part of the ‘urban poor’ before the eighteenth century. Payment in arrears continued to be common owing to the tight fiscal situation as well as the administration’s mismanagement of the Estado.²³ On top of remuneration lagging behind inflation, the widening gap in compensation between higher- and lower-ranking soldiers became an increasingly urgent problem. In Iberian as well as colonial society, having some form of public appointment (in this case, being a soldier) led to respect in the eyes of fellow compatriots, even if these positions did not pay too well.²⁴ Referring to Table 4.3 of a list of pay for different ranks of soldiers in 1816, one finds that, first, a reasonably high-ranking military man such as a *capitão de mar e guerra* (appointment on the sea) was able to earn only a fraction of the income earned by the upper class (Rs. 750). Second, there was variation in payments for personnel of the same rank; in a more favourable assignment, a captain earned only a miserable Rs. 288—although he probably would have been able to boost his income through some illicit means. The *sargento-mór*, a rank equivalent to major, could have a pay that was lower than a captain’s, possibly due to the lesser importance of the location he was sent to (S. Thiago versus Cabo de Rama). Third, the pay of lower-ranking soldiers (*officiaes inferiores* versus *officiaes de patente*) from the island of Estevão was not reflected on the list. The pay of an indigenous *alfêres*, Sadassiva Gopalá Sinay, whether serving as part of the obligations rendered by a *dessaido*, at the post at Tonca, was not listed. Remuneration in the traditional political economic context in India could refer to payment in kind rather than monetary payment.²⁵ As a brief comparison with the (British) company’s

²¹ Silva Gracias, *Health and hygiene in colonial Goa*, p. 29. See also A. Disney, “Smugglers and smuggling in the western half of the Estado da India in the late 16th and early seventeenth centuries”, *Indica* vol. 26 (1989), pp. 57–75. See also Mártires Lopes, *Goa setecentista*, p. 123.

²² Silva Gracias, *Health and hygiene in colonial Goa*, p. 25.

²³ *O governo do Conde do Rio Pardo*, p. 74.

²⁴ Gonçalo de M. Teixeira Pinto wrote the *Memorias sobre as possessões Portuguezas na Asia* (New Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1859), p. 64. Hereafter, *Memorias*.

²⁵ Refer also to entry in *Livros dos Monções* no. 167.

Table 4.3 A sampling of remuneration (annual) of soldiers in the Estado da Índia in 1816 (in xerafins)

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Payment</i>
Sargento-mór	492 (S. Thiago), 576 (Carambolim, Naroá), 816 (Agoada), 1040 (Mormugão), 1120 (Sanquelim)
Alferes	276, no pay indicated for Sadassiva G. Sinay at Tonca
Capitão	400, 576
Tenente	324, 432
Tenente coronel	600 (S. Bras), 1120 (Alorna)
Capitão de mar e guerra	1500

Source Miguel V. de Abreu, *O governo do Vice-Rei Conde do Rio Pardo no Estado da Índia Portuguesa* (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1869), pp. 74–75

remuneration in India, there was some evidence that the EIC might be paying a little better compared to the Portuguese or Asian hirers.²⁶

Private soldiers or mercenaries, European and native, operated under various flexible regimes of hire in India. Mártires Lopes highlights that ‘some Hindu capitães de sepais were at the same time in the service of [more than one indigenous king]’.²⁷ Carreira brings attention to the work of a French historian, Anne Kroel, on the subject of whether there was a migrant mercenary population in the region and generally in Asia. Luso-descendants or Goans who had moved to the British territories or kingdoms of neighbouring rulers constituted a mercenary market; the armies of the Marathas or Tipu Sultan attested to the fact that a certain number of European mixed-blood personnel were employed. Beyond the mercenary market, and corroborating the findings of P. Malekandathil, Goans were also leaving Goa to look for jobs

²⁶ E. Odegard, “In search of sepoy: Indian soldiers and Dutch East India Company in India and Sri Lanka, 1760–95”, *War in History* vol. 7.1 (2021), pp. 1–20. British sepoy pay in the 1760s was established at Rs 7 per month. See also Manimugdha S. Sharma, “Were army pay and perks better under the British?”, *The Times of India* (6 Jul 2015), accessed at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/were-army-pay-and-perks-better-under-the-british/articleshow/47952190.cms>. The article quoted from Dr Gajendra Singh who taught Asian history at the University of Exeter who established that sepoy pay in 1860 was Rs 7 monthly. In some quarters, one rupee has been pegged to 200 reis in certain historical contexts.

²⁷ Mártires Lopes, *Goa setecentista*, p. 112.

outside the military.²⁸ The Portuguese colonial military did not only solicit for native recruit and assistance, the (Portuguese) colonial government attempted to procure the (espionage) service of, for instance, an English soldier to provide information in the form of military or weapon design.²⁹ Specifically in the military sphere, Goans found appointments in the EIC and native armies (such as the Maratha army); one such posting involved a certain Portuguese by the name of ‘Noronha’ leading the Peshwa’s artillery (of the Marathas) and had under him a number of European artillerymen.³⁰ In another instance, a Portuguese in the rank of a major (Pinto) commanded a battalion on the Maratha side that saw action against the British counterpart in the battle of Kirkee (5 November 1816).³¹ Mercenary contractors in India, comprising Europeans such as English, Irish, French, Portuguese, operated in the mode of Italian condottieris and had evolved sophisticatedly. Between these and the armies of the EIC for instance, there existed an array of agents assisting in recruiting men-at-arms or mobilizing resources on campaigns. Outside the battlefield and along the chain of supply, Portuguese were also hired to cast guns for the Peshwa’s forces.

Referring to Table 4.4 and tapping on the data from T. Coates’ work, one can probe this issue with respect to the dispatch of *degradados* (exiles) to the East. There were certain ten-year periods during which more *degradados* were sent overseas. In the time span under investigation here (1780–1850s), the revolutionary period and the period of Brazil’s independence were two such periods. Portugal had joined Spain in trying to forestall France (unsuccessfully) in the Pyrenees in 1794. In the meantime, the Portuguese were divided between supporting the French versus the British, and it was an unstable period in Portugal. In the second instance, the independence of Brazil was likely to have diverted part of the stream of prisoners to India. Gonçalo de M. Teixeira Pinto’s *Memoirs sobre as possessões Portuguezas na Asia* (Memoirs on the Portuguese Possessions in Asia, 1823) highlighted the (naturally) poor quality of the prisoners coming to India and made a few proposals: first, *degradados*

²⁸ Malekandathil, “Economic processes, ruralization and ethnic mutation”, pp. 45–59.

²⁹ S. Sen, *The military system of the Marathas* (Calcutta: Book Company, 1928), p. 142.

³⁰ R. Butalia, *The evolution of artillery in India: From the battle of Plassey to the revolt of 1857* (Mumbai: Allied Publisher, 1998), pp. 872–873.

³¹ K. Roy, *Oxford companion to modern warfare in India from eighteenth century to present times* (New Delhi: OUP, 2009), ch. 2.

Table 4.4 Exiles (degredados) and trend of exiles for India and Mozambique

<i>Areas Years</i>	<i>Mozambique (1)</i>	<i>India (2)</i>	<i>Total (T) / (2) as a proportion of (T)</i>
1772–81	35	34	328 (10.4%)
1782–91	21	41	414 (9.9%)
1792–1801	62	208	586 (53.5%)
1802–11	51	158	533 (29.6%)
1812–21	19	111	527 (21.1%)
1822–31	439	906	3830 (23.7%)
1832–41	170	254	1144 (22.2%)
1842–51	366	751	2920 (25.7%)
1852–61	498	56	2664 (2.1%)
1862–71	484	32	3354 (1%)

Source Adapted from T. Coates, *Convict labor in the Portuguese empire 1740–1932* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), table 5 and appendices

coming to India should not be more than forty years of age and should be fit to carry out their duties (especially military). They would be expected to make up for the work owed quarterly if they were not able to fulfil their quotas. Second, this did not apply to those who were assigned to the agricultural sector. Third, degredados with wives or families would be exempted from paying for their passage. Fourth, upon completing their sentences, they would be approved for a place to stay and given some support. This monetary support would be provided by the relevant civil authority and the procedures routinized. Teixeira Pinto was proud to point out that these measures were not very different from the policies adopted by the British at Port Jackson; perhaps to assert that Portuguese practice was not inferior to that of the British.³²

UPRISINGS IN GOA

The trend of force reduction from the 1820s to the 1840s gave rise to intra-organizational and factional conflicts, which in turn exacerbated tensions in the different subgroups. This was partly manifested in the outbreak of uprisings in the early 1800s that involved the metropole, Luso-descendants and native military men presenting—but not always

³² *Memorias*, pp. 95–97.

getting—their demands. The reduction of the colonial military force on the frontier, facilitated by the pacification of the frontier region between Goa and the expanding and consolidating Bombay Presidency, might have reduced interstate tensions, but this situation was neutralized by the imported insurgency from the British territories.

Although the Estado da Índia was not the ‘most prestigious place’ to serve in (compared to Brazil), educated second-born were still channelled to this part of the empire before the eighteenth century.³³ The government of Goa was forced to resign in 1821, a year after the Liberal Revolution in Portugal. Antonio A.B. da Costa’s *Revoluções Políticas da Índia Portuguesa* (Political Revolutions of Portuguese India)³⁴ shows that the First Provisional Committee (Junta) was made up of those who led the revolution as well as some who joined later, such as Manuel José Gomes Loureiro. Marshal Manuel Corrêa da Silva e Gama frequented the Military Academy of Goa and started his career in the navy. He returned to the army as an adjutant-general (with the rank of colonel) and was promoted to brigadier (1810) and marshal (1819).³⁵ The Military Academy of Goa had been set up by the Overseas Council in 1733 with classes in navigation. Classes in artillery were added in 1759. Part of the broader underlying and long term reasons for the outbreak of the 1821 revolution in Goa was the participation of educated military officers. The artillery arm was the most advanced in the army, and training involved sophisticated calculations in mathematics and engineering. Another member of the committee, Marshal Manuel Godinho de Mira, came from a family of soldiers who arrived in India (with their father’s generation) during the Pombaline period. He and his siblings had successful careers in the military.³⁶ The *desembargados* (judges) on

³³ Malfada S. da Cunha, “Portuguese Nobility and Oversea Government: Return to Portugal (16th to 17th centuries)”, in E. van Veen and L. Blusse eds., *Rivalry and conflict* (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), pp. 35–49. See also Nuno Gonçalo F. Monteiro, *O crepúsculo dos grandes: A casa e o património da aristocracia em Portugal, 1750–1832* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 2003).

³⁴ Antonio A. B. da Costa, *Revoluções políticas da Índia Portuguesa no século XIX* (Margão: np, 1896). Hereafter, *Revoluções Políticas*.

³⁵ He had to seek refuge in Bombay in the aftermath of the revolution although he was nominated to take up position in the Conselho da Prefeitura in 1835.

³⁶ Manuel Godinho de Mira (senior) entered the military in India in 1774 as a lieutenant in the artillery and rose to the rank of marshal in 1810. He was conferred as a fidalgo cavaleiro da Casa Real in 1811 and was engaged in the first marriage to

the committee, Teixeira Pinto³⁷ and Duarte Leitão, attended the University of Coimbra before serving in India.³⁸ The leadership of Goa during the revolutionary years after the Napoleonic Wars consisted of military and non-military families from Portugal that had established themselves in Goa.

The first revolution in Goa to take place in the nineteenth century, led by members of the military, spurred other uprisings in the colony. The ‘Manifesto by the Lower-ranking Officers of the Army of Goa’ addressing the public alleged that the government of Goa had maligned these soldiers.³⁹ The lower-ranking officers felt they were not being appreciated for what they did, i.e., defend against external enemies and maintain internal peace; hence, they took the initiative to petition to a higher authority. They were also of the opinion that the problem was widespread and not confined to Goa.⁴⁰ The first protest provoked other officers who aligned themselves against the manifesto. The reactionaries held a poor view of the lower-ranking officers in the colonial force and did not believe that pagans or half-pagans (*gentios*) existed in the army. The signatories of the ‘Protest to Manifesto’, not surprisingly, included a number of personnel from the advanced and progressive artillery unit. Among the personnel who tried to suppress the lower-ranking officers, their family backgrounds were similar to those who had initiated the revolution.⁴¹

the family of Assa Castelo-Branco. The Godinho de Mira name became a prominent Luso-descendant family. Refer also *Os Luso-Descendentes*, pp. 197–200.

³⁷ Refer *Memorias*.

³⁸ While Duarte Leitão continued to serve in the Relação de Goa, Teixeira Pinto was ‘intimidated’ and left for Rio de Janeiro. Gomes Loureiro also attended the University of Coimbra and served as the Chanceler da Relação (before returning to Portugal). *Tratado de todos os Vice-reis e Governadores da Índia* (Lisbon: Editorial Enciclopedia, 1962), p. 199. Hereafter, *Tratado de todos os Vice-reis*.

³⁹ AHU India CU Caixa 448, “Manifesto que ao public Inferiores que compoem o Exercito de Goa” and “Protesto de parte da Officiadades de Goa contra o manifesto de outra parte”.

⁴⁰ AHU India CU Caixa 448, “Manifesto” and “Protesto”.

⁴¹ AHU CU (1822). There was for instance, Gonsalves de Macedo, who was a captain when the revolt took place in Goa in 1821. Apart from being in a prestigious military unit, Macedo, whose grandfather was already in India at the end of João V’s reign, also came from a soldiers’ family. Enrolled in 1802, Gonsalves de Macedo was eventually promoted to colonel in 1852 and Commandant of the Province of Canácona.

The findings of the 1787 Pinto Conspiracy provide some signposts and stimuli for discussing the upheavals of the nineteenth century. First, the participation of mixed race officers from the military unit stationed in the peripheral province of Ponda indicated a certain degree of inequality (indigenous personnel were not able to be promoted to patented officers). This problem was unlikely to be resolved in the nineteenth century. Scholars such as Celsa Pinto and Maria de J. dos Mártires Lopes have queried the extent to which the conspiracy, even if it was carried out, embodied the interests of a wide spectrum of society. The conspiracy attracted the support of the Brahmin (Chardo) class and lower-rank clergy for the same reason (i.e., stunted careers) encountered in the military. Non-military individuals whose interests had been denied, for instance Fr. José Gonsalves and Fr. Caetano F. de Couto (who failed to obtain their bishoprics), were also involved in the uprising.⁴² Mártires Lopes asks whether the education received by the conspirators made them more liberal minded. The episode in 1787 also saw the danger of a foreign power colluding with the conspirators although M. Lopes thinks that this appeared to be part of a ploy to divert attention rather than genuine sedition. P. Malekandathil is of the opinion that a critical number of Catholic priests and a handful of high-ranking military men had engineered the 1787 revolt; the attempt to link up with external forces such as Tipu sultan also saw a more credible argument.⁴³ Yet other scholars, such as Ramos Luís de Oliveira, have asked readers to reflect on the conspiracy vis-à-vis the nature of society and State of Portuguese India.⁴⁴

The end of the Civil War (1826–34) in Portugal guaranteed by the major powers of Europe translated into the installation of a prefect in Goa. The Estado da Índia was reduced to ‘the status of an overseas province’ in 1834 but ‘retained much of its separate character’.⁴⁵ Mozambique was made province directly responsible to the metropole in 1836 two years later. The reforms were most notably associated with the initiatives of Sá da Bandeira of 1834, which involved changes in organization and

⁴² C. Pinto, *Revolt of the natives of Goa 1787: The forgotten martyrs* (Goa: Concept Publishing, 2013), p. 174.

⁴³ Malekandathil, “Economic processes, ruralization and ethnic mutation”, p. 11.

⁴⁴ Ramos Luís de Oliveira, *D. Maria I* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2010).

⁴⁵ The Overseas Council was abolished in 1833.

mode of recruitment. The proposed reforms, as revealed in later correspondence between the metropole and a far eastern colony, urged for a streamlining and improvement in efficiency by which the colonies and their military affairs were organized.⁴⁶ The garrison of Mozambique, with which the Estado da Índia and outposts in the Far East were still intimately linked—at least militarily—demonstrated the extent or limits of the progress: (i) the units in the capital were organized along the lines of battalions in different arms; (ii) the troops, whether in the capital or outside it, had an injection of outside elements, including *degradados* from Portugal and Canarin Indians.⁴⁷ The use of Canarin soldiers was an apt reminder that the Portuguese colonial military had once been heterogeneous in its cross-territorial deployments, since these soldiers were included in campaigns in East Africa and the Far East in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁴⁸ Between 1780 and 1850, referring to table 3.3, specific injections of troops from Goa to Macau⁴⁹ could be seen in a 100-man musketeer-sipae company in 1784, 100-plus-man companies in 1806 (including an artillery company), a 400-man battalion (Príncipe Regente) in 1810, 200-strong seamen in 1823,⁵⁰ and a 100-man (excluding officers) auxiliary expeditionary force in 1849. Some of these troops were on a prolonged deployment outside Goa. Mozambique also continued to rely on Goa for a variety of goods, especially cloth and military items.⁵¹ In terms of military supplies, arms, gunpowder and (military) uniforms

⁴⁶ Biblioteca do Edifício do Instituto para os Assuntos Cívicos e Municipais (I.A.C.M.), Povir, issue 133 March 1900.

⁴⁷ The limits included: i. a large proportion of the troops was still privately or feudally recruited; ii. the European element of the colonial troops was still composed of *degradados* (rejects from metropole); iii. indigenously recruited troops were still enlisted by force rather than induced to serve via lucrative reward (better pay and stature in society). Refer Rui Bebião, “Organização e papel do exército” in José Mattoso directed, *História de Portugal* (Lisbon: Estampa, 1998), p. 225.

⁴⁸ M. Newitt, “Portuguese warfare in Africa”, paper delivered at Contemporary Portuguese Politics and History Research Centre, accessed at <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/politics/cphrc/section/article/Newitt1.htm>.

⁴⁹ Amando A. Cação, *Unidades militares de Macau* (Macau: Gabinete das Forças de Segurança de Macau, 1999), pp. 17–22. Macau also received injections of troops from Portugal.

⁵⁰ Príncipe Regente Battalion was disbanded and restituted until substituted by artillery battalion of the first line in 1845.

⁵¹ Oliveira, *D. Maria I*, p. 206.

arrived from Damão. A crisis in East Africa in the 1780s led to the sending of an expedition (from India) and expansion of the garrison there.⁵²

As seen in *Revoluções Políticas da Índia Portuguesa*,⁵³ the period between 1834 and 1841 witnessed the earliest signs of streamlining that the Portuguese would strive to implement in the eastern colonial military until the third quarter of the nineteenth century. However, any initiatives were dissipated by a series of revolutions and counter-revolutions that reflected the personal, political and European-Luso-descendant tussles. Marshal Correia began restoring stability after a prefect had been appointed to head the new government, after the Concession of Evoramonte was signed in 1834 in Portugal. A counter-revolution led by higher officers from Portugal of the First (Infantry) Regiment guarding the capital and the Artillery Regiment deposed the prefect. The protagonists who helmed the successive coups, councils of government and rival regimes consisted of men of mixed motivation and background.

A quick survey of the different personages involved in the upheavals and governance of Goa gives an idea of the diversity of characters and events involved: Bernardo Peres da Silva, who was appointed prefect in 1834, was an Indo-Portuguese trained in medicine; he tried to enforce liberal laws and reforms after 1834, but that invoked reactions from the local nobility and elites, leading to a revolt. João C.P. da Rocha de Vasconcelos, who was one of the leaders of the revolt against the 1834 government helmed by Bernardo Peres da Silva and presided over the 3rd Provisional Committee (1835–37), was a soldier who had a varied career (including a stint in Russia). António F. de Santa Rita Carvalho, who headed the 15th Council of Government (1838–39), was an archbishop-elect who was not confirmed at the time of his arrival. José A. Vieira da Fonseca was a soldier who briefly assumed the post of the 86th governor of India (1839) after being involved in the Civil War and led the armada of India. Finally, António Ramalho de Sá, who was a member of the 17th Council of Government, was a magistrate who had served in Mozambique and India. The array of characters revealed that while the leadership might not have been among the most privileged in Portugal, they certainly possessed diverse experiences and professional

⁵² Oliveira, *D. Maria I*, p. 206.

⁵³ This was a document signed in May 1834 in Evoramonte (Alentejo) between the Constitutionals and the Miguelites that ended the period of civil war (1828–34) in Portugal.

links with India that demonstrated a cosmopolitan outlook, reminiscent of the globe-trotting personnel serving the empire in the seventeenth century, as discussed by A. J. Russell-Wood.⁵⁴

The short span of time from 1842 to 1844 saw the transition of three governors-general; a coup on the last was narrowly averted. While the military forces jostled to secure warehouses for military supplies and gunpowder, the prisons were laid open. Troops outside the capital—consisting of Ranes sipaes—were summoned to attack the Fourth Regiment at Gaspar Dias, where a massacre resulted. The pacification of this first wave of insurrection led to the sentencing of those who robbed and killed indiscriminately. The unrest did not end there.

The new governor (José J. Lopes de Lima) hoped to carry out sweeping reforms but was incapable administratively and not on good terms with the military.⁵⁵ A new decree reduced the overall strength of the colonial army (to just over 4,000 men) and, more important, ‘combined the separate forces in India’. The military unit of the battalion was instituted as the basis of the military structure in the metropole, although the reforms did not persist beyond 1844 due to continued instability. The colonial army then possessed two battalions of infantry, two battalions of *caçadores* (mounted light infantry), a regiment of artillery, a corpo of engineers, a company of *mouro* (Moorish) guards (for protecting the viceroy) and three veteran companies. The Provisionary Expeditionary Battalion to Goa, which could be traced from its arrival in 1834, had soldiers implicated in the Revolt of 1842, after which the unit was disbanded.⁵⁶ After being deposed, Lopes de Lima plotted with the help of some officers to steal arms for a revolt to remove José Ferreira Pestana (91st governor of India), but he did not succeed.

Almeida Garrett’s book-length poem *Camões*,⁵⁷ written in 1825, was a re-rendering of *Lusiads*⁵⁸ to some extent and dubbed the ‘poetic paradigm of early political and literary nationalism [modelled on German

⁵⁴ A. J. Russell-Wood, *The Portuguese empire: A world on the move* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

⁵⁵ José Lopes de Lima insisted on the sending of a battalion of troops from India despite the strong protest of its commander. This later resulted in the revolt of the battalion and the vacation of the governor’s post by José Lopes de Lima.

⁵⁶ AHM DIV2/05, Catalogo Índia, see specifically AHM DIV2/05/5/4/109.

⁵⁷ Luis Vaz de Camões was a sixteenth-century Portuguese poet in India.

⁵⁸ *The discovery of India* was an epic poem.

sentiments]’.⁵⁹ Seen at the level of colonialists on the ground, *Camões* was an affirmation of the struggles faced by the men going to India and the East but ironically without the higher exhortation to be motivated by any sentiment of early nationalism. The struggles of those who went to India were affirmed by the lamentable destiny suffered by these men, who often reached the end of their lives in India. At other times, *Camões* reiterated the celebration of the first Portuguese conquistadores to the East.⁶⁰ The writer of the book resonates the doubt raised by Fernando Costa Dorez, who questioned whether the nationalism experienced by Portuguese soldiers overseas was real.⁶¹ Costa Dorez was of the opinion that *nação* or *patria* could refer just to the familiar ‘homeland’ one was coming from but not (yet) to the more complex collective consciousness of the masses after the French Revolution.

In addition to insurrections originating in the regular regiments of the Estado da Índia, the auxiliary and allied troops guarding the territories of the New Conquests were prone to colluding with cross-border insurrectionists or as a group even seceded. Although the borders and frontier regions were gradually pacified, the Portuguese territories in India not only had their own share of uprisings but were impacted by surreptitious plots and upheavals in the British territories. Shirodkar pins the rebellion of Dipa Rane in 1852 to the additional taxes and ‘social measures against the customs of the [indigenous] people’, which provoked their reaction and uprising (led by Dipa Rane) in Satari. Attacks made into Embarbaçem, Bicholim, Cananoca and Quepem by Dipa Rane made the Portuguese ‘panicky and even inclined to take the help of [jailed] Baba Dessaye implicated in an earlier insurrection (Sawantwadi, 1844)’.⁶² The

⁵⁹ S. Parkinson, C. Alonso and T. Earle, *A companion to Portuguese literature* (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2013), pp. 110 and 117.

⁶⁰ Camões, canto terceiro, stanza XVII.

⁶¹ F. Costa Dorez, *Insubmissão: Aversão ao serviço militar no Portugal do século XVIII* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2010), p. 458.

⁶² Shirodkar, *Researches in Indo-Portuguese history* vol. 2 (Jaipur: Publication Scheme, 1998), pp. 174–175. The debate exists as to how the Portuguese classified or recognized “insurrection”, see Shirodkar, *Researches in Indo-Portuguese history*, p. 179. It appears that by the 1850s, a system of police station was set up in the various territories of British India, the Portuguese police system only appeared in India after 1870. A unit of police and two other companies of police were stationed in Goa, Damão and Diu during the 1870 reform. A body of police was raised in Macau as early as 1840s. See C. Belsa, “Estado da Índia: Ameaça externas e internas”, in M.T. Barata and N.S. Teixeira

Portuguese had been careful to ensure that the revenue and potential for growth in agriculture and commerce were not overly curtailed.⁶³

OTHER FACETS OF NON-WAR VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY

This section will discuss aspects of non-war violence that relate to the colonial military institution. The broad background of the evolving security situation from the north to central-western India has been analysed in Chapter 3. There was a certain flux and fluidity on the ground in the regions of the New Conquests in Goa, which lasted until the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. While the Portuguese had attempted to introduce ordinances to reorder village governance in the New Conquests regions, these ordinances did not prioritize Luso-descendentes or Christians as in the Old Conquests areas. Hence, to reaffirm P. Axelrod's thesis, the understanding of the Goan locality is moulded by a mixture of circumstantial (prompting change) and historical (premised on continuity) agency, and there appears to be an inclination to favour a more stable paradigm of interpretation of the sociopolitical scene, with implications on the analysis of violence. Aspects of violence that can be traced are: (i) what the colonial armies imposed on the civilians (arising from war), (ii) possible ritualized group violence engaged in by the force, as well as (iii) the force's capacity to cope with organized crime. The discussion of the last topic will also probe into the early evolution of the police force in Goa.

A sampling of the entries collected from *Historical Sketch of the Village Communities of the Councils of the Islands (Goa), Salsete e Bardez* (Filippe N. Xavier, 1852) illustrates a range of obligations, extractions, penalties and violence that could affect the lives of those living in Portuguese India. First was the oppression or lack of choice among the people in helping to maintain defence or a body of military men in Goa. Under 'ordinary' circumstances, a royal letter (1707) had asked that the locals be given the choice to serve in the military or offer a monetary contribution in exchange (11,000 xerafins).⁶⁴ At other times, there was not much

directed, *Nova história military de Portugal*, vol. 3 (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2004), pp. 311–312. See also Cação, *Unidades militares de Macau*, p. 19.

⁶³ HAG, Monções do Reino no. 325, fl. 237.

⁶⁴ See Filippe N. Xavier, *Bosquejo historico das comunidades das aldeas dos concelhos das Ilhas, Salsete e Badesz* (Goa: L&L, 2012), docus. 28 and 31, pp. 254. Hereafter, BHdC.

choice, and extortions might be employed on the part of the colonial state to obtain the necessary monetary contribution—and not necessarily on a one-time basis.⁶⁵ In extreme circumstances, for instance in 1740, the *camara geral* of Bardez was expected to raise 50,000 xerafins which were expected to be paid directly to the Bhonsales who threatened the province.⁶⁶ Theoretically speaking, the resources were supposed to have been obtained through appropriate channels (and not indiscriminately) via merchants or shops. Breakouts of open wars and conflicts, especially in the seventeenth century,⁶⁷ imposed direct and indirect costs on non-military inhabitants of the Estado. External invasions into the territories of Portuguese India cost the state tens of thousands of xerafins.⁶⁸ Goa had always needed to import some of its basic commodities. War and enemy incursions were causing a great shortage of various commodities such as wheat (*trigo*), rice (*arroz*), vegetables (legumes) and other necessities (*mantimentos*). Goan officials involved in the extraction of resources often appropriated part of these for themselves. The officials were also constantly making new impositions on a variety of commodities such as salt and wine.⁶⁹ In the war against the Marathas in the eighteenth century (1740–60s), which threatened Goa to some extent, the Portuguese appeared to be well-stocked in terms of equipment and ammunition of war; but the treatise *Sistema Marcial Asiático* reminded the contemporary audience that there were moments when Goa was unable to sustain itself with respect to rice (and a variety of other foodstuffs).⁷⁰ From documents in *Historical Sketch of the Village Communities*, we know that the town council (*camara geral*) of Bardez, for instance, sometimes opposed

⁶⁵ BHdC, docu. 41, pp. 247 and 267.

⁶⁶ D. Kosambi, *Myth and reality: Studies in the formation of Indian culture* (New Delhi: Sage, 2016), p. 174.

⁶⁷ Maratha threat in the late seventeenth century came in the form of the attacks from Sambaji (1657–1689, eldest son of Chhatrapati Shivaji) and the Mughals. The Mughals at the end of the seventeenth century was still a formidable power. Under Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), the empire was fighting wars in the Deccan and further south to put down uprisings or challenges from newly arisen powers such as the Marathas. BHdC, docu. 28, pp. 247–51.

⁶⁸ The repeated incursions by Sambaji on two occasions into Bardez, Candolim and Calangute in 1688 incurred heavy costs on the Estado.

⁶⁹ BHdC, docu. 28, p. 249.

⁷⁰ *Sistema marcial Asiático*, tomo 2, cap 1, ff. 9–10 (p. 111).

the taxation of the lands even though these lands were subjected to enemy incursions and violence.⁷¹ The frustrations could increase when the alleged sum raised were linked to the ‘maintenance of three companies of soldiers which were never in existence!’⁷²

While more explicit evidence of ritualized violence might not be available for Goa, the at times biased court judgements against the indigenous or tribal groups vis-à-vis the converted classes represented an indirect oppression or violence on the former. The fierce competition between sub-caste groups such as Brahmins and Chardos was clear when the *regimento* stipulated that the two factions had to contest alternately for posts in village communities (and hold them for a period of up to three years only).⁷³ We can also take a look at the case of indigenous or tribal groups living outside the urban or settled areas. Vijay M. Gawas reminds us that the Gauncari system was created before the arrival of the Portuguese. While the codification of the system by the Portuguese might not have specifically created a prejudice against the weaker groups, the outcome of the exercise was that many of the tribal groups lost lands to the more affluent or upper classes. Part of the reason was attributed to the illiteracy of the aggrieved groups. It should be noted that not all tribal groups were weak, as the *religiosos* ‘played a role to keep the Christian Gawdas (divided further into Christian and Kunbi Gawdas) divided [in order to better manage them]’.⁷⁴ The more affluent classes also played the *sakharechi suri* (Marathi-Konkani for ‘sugar knife’)⁷⁵ card to diffuse the anger in the groups that lost the lands.⁷⁶

Finally, the actualization of the Portuguese colonial legal code was a function of the surveillance and coercion that could be brought to bear.

⁷¹ BHdC, docu. 28, p. 249.

⁷² D. Kosambi, *Myth and reality*, p. 174.

⁷³ Carmo D’Souza, “The village communities: A historical and legal perspective”, in C. Borges et al. eds., *Goa and Portugal: History and development* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 2000), pp. 111–21.

⁷⁴ Vijay M. Gawas, *Human rights and indigenous peoples in Goa* (Panjim: Broadway Publishing, 2016), pp. 14–15.

⁷⁵ Provision of non-essential luxury commodities. See Gawas, *Human rights and indigenous peoples in Goa*, p. 16.

⁷⁶ See also R. Bhandari’s *Goa* (New Delhi: Roli Books, 1999, ch. VII, pp. 135–44) for a general introduction of the four major tribes in Goa: the Gowdas (Gawdas), the Kunbis, the Velips, and the Dhangars.

This discussion will undertake to probe into organized (as opposed to petty) crimes of certain magnitude, such as bands of robbers, that if rife enough had the potential to diminish the early modern fabric of stability of society at large. While the ordinances of law were most closely adhered to in the Old Conquests territories, the government bulletin (*boletim governo*) of the Estado da Índia revealed that as late as 1840 the colonial government faced problems in carrying out the law in the New Conquests areas.⁷⁷ Indigenous customary punishments, prescribed in Maratha areas before the coming of the British, overlapped to some extent with practices undertaken in the frontier zone of Goa:

Murder, unless attended with peculiar atrocity, appears never to have been capital, and was usually punished by fine. Highway robbery was generally punished with death, because it was usually committed by low-caste people—the punishment depended on the caste of the criminal rather than the nature of the crime. A man of ‘tolerable’ (reasonably high) caste was seldom put to death. The other punishments were hanging, beheading, cutting to pieces with swords, and crushing the head with a mallet. Brahmin prisoners who could not be executed were poisoned. Mutilation was very common. Imprisonment in hill forts and dungeons was common. Hard labour in the building of forts was not unknown. Flogging was very common in trifling offences, such as petty thefts, etc. The most common of all punishments was fine and confiscation of goods.⁷⁸

New laws sought not only to restore stability but to ‘regulate’ certain sources of extraction by the authorities. The Portuguese did not think that prior laws could be compared to Portuguese laws; for instance, native law did not possess a civil component. In the Portuguese conception, what was classified as a grave, minor or public crime also had to conform to statutory law.⁷⁹ The system of judiciary and administration was clearly still evolving 60 years after the New Conquests territories were ‘conquered’, while Hindu law was gradually ‘[getting] disused’.⁸⁰ Given the sparse garrisoning strength on the ground on top of the belated setting up of

⁷⁷ *Boletim governo do Estado da Índia* (B.G.E.I.), 14 September 1840.

⁷⁸ M. Elphinstone, *Report on the territories conquered from the Paishwa* (Charleston: Nabu Press, 2010), pp. 40–41.

⁷⁹ As opposed to customary law, usually decided by local jurist or members of the local community.

⁸⁰ *Report on the territories conquered from the Paishwa*, p. 39.

a coherent police system, communities and villages needed to take care of matters relating to justice on their own.⁸¹ In the frontier zone of the Estado bordering the British Indian territories, even caste-related disputes were ‘expected to [be] settled within the district or village’.⁸² Linking to developments in British India, the appointment of William H. Sleeman in the 1830s as the head of the Special Operations Thuggee Department gave an indication of the severity of the problem the British were facing in the aftermath of the Anglo-Maratha Wars.⁸³ Although there did not appear to be a widespread banditry problem in the New Conquests and frontier territories in the early nineteenth century, these areas were never secured to any great extent with the minimal colonial forces deployed there. Thuggee reports from the British did update of severe disruptions in the neighbouring areas near Goa.⁸⁴

Dilip Kumar, who wrote about the history and evolution of the Goa police, believed that Portuguese India did not have a progressive or systematic police force. The shift of the capital of the Estado da Índia from Old Goa to Panjim, according to C. Pinto, was formally recognized only in 1843. Although a series of reforms were introduced before the mid-nineteenth century, it appears that the police force was not constituted until late in the century. Developments in Europe and the British colonies in India showed that the notion of the ‘modern police force’ began to be instilled and trialled only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Traditionally, armies in the pre-modern period undertook the role of keeping law and order. In practice and on the ground, locally organized or quasi-military forces had probably been organized to fulfil a variety of domestic security and ad hoc duties even though the terminology was not formally used.⁸⁵ In the early modern period, Bourbon

⁸¹ There was supposed to be a *Polícia do concelho* in Panjim in 1842. See C. Pinto, *Colonial Panjim: Its governance, its people* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2017), p. 112.

⁸² *Report on the territories conquered from the Paishwa*, p. 62.

⁸³ Mark Brown, “True crime: William Sleeman and the thugs”, in K. Brittlebank ed., *Tall tales and true: India, historiography and British imperial imaginings*, (Clayton: Monash University Press, 2008), pp. 71–85.

⁸⁴ See *Boletim governo do Estado da Índia*, 24 August 1840. See Pinto, *Colonial Panjim*, p. 137 (table 7.1) for a glimpse of the types of crimes committed in Panjim in the 1880s.

⁸⁵ C. Emsley, *A short history of police and policing* (Oxford: OUP, 2021), see introduction of book.

France has been touted as one of the first states to have established a police force; this became a (first) uniformed police during the later revolutionary period. Meanwhile, the first semblance of a modern police force was formed in metropolitan London in 1829, in the heart of industrial Britain. This force acted within the parameters set by a police act rather than the authority of the monarch. In Portugal, the Intendance of Police was resurrected in 1780 under the magistrate-reformer Pina Manique, after its debut during the Pombaline period. Although the force was still beholden to the monarch, there was an attempt to differentiate its uniform from that of the military troops.⁸⁶ In the British Indian colonies, there was some reliance on the indigenous system in the local security setup, although the presidencies upgraded elements of the police setup at different times. Although governor generals such as Richard Wellesley had appointed a police head at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Bombay Presidency used the court *faujdar* (police) to control the police force only in 1853 (an initiative of Warren Hastings) while the Madras Presidency undertook reforms after the Indian Mutiny in 1857.⁸⁷

Kumar's assessment of the Portuguese police force in Goa needs to be seen in context. The development of local security in the Portuguese Estado was part of the matrix of the regular colonial force, local defence force and village defence (the police was not constituted yet). Kumar recounts an 'admirable' history of the Portuguese colonial army in India. Local security in frontier areas was heavily dependent on indigenous forces.⁸⁸ Leaving aside the question of the evolution of Goan villages, local security in the countryside was maintained via a decentralized system that was closely intertwined with the pre-Portuguese Maratha security and tax system. The position of village watchman (*jaçla*) was usually filled by a degraded *mabar* or *mang* (administrative division beneath the *prant*). He was often helped by the marginalized tribes of the region. The village 'police'—led by the *patil*, who was the village chief and also the chief judicial officer—drew upon the same pool of men or tribes from which irregular soldiers (*sibandis*) and the body of a watchman's underlings

⁸⁶ S. Trindade and Manuel dos R. de Jesus, *Subsídios para a história da polícia Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Escola superior de polícia, 1998), pp. 463–78. See also L. Abreu, *Pina Manique: Um reformador no Portugal das luzes* (Lisbon: Gradiva, 2013).

⁸⁷ D. Kumar, *Goa police: History and evolution* (Np: N.V. Padmaja, 1999), pp. 19–44.

⁸⁸ Pinto reminds that in Panjim the 'police' force was manned partly by 'mouros' before mid-nineteenth century. Refer Pinto, *Colonial Panjim*.

were drawn. The pre-Portuguese or pre-British system, although lacking a codified set of laws or procedures, was a relatively effective arrangement. It functioned to a certain extent as the colonial powers consolidated their control in northern and central-western India, where disorder and violent robbery were limited, affirming the thesis that the breakdown of order in the post-Mughal period was not advanced in these parts.⁸⁹

CONCLUSION

Analysing the remuneration of a sampling of military personnel reveals them to have been underpaid relative to market wages—although they may have been compensated with benefits such as prestige, representation in village councils, exemption from tax payment. A survey of social tensions and insurrections between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shows that the dissatisfactions and frustrations of officers and men were not always limited to the mixed group or class but could also involve elitist military men as well as indigenously recruited auxiliaries. Other than uprisings stemming from inadequate remuneration, among other reasons, non-war violence could also be generated from what armies did to civilians or ritual group violence, protest and organized crime affiliated with sub- and ethnic-group politics in colonial Goa. Although the Portuguese incursion into the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century, with its aim of forced conversions, has been portrayed as militaristic, the conquests (New Conquests) in the eighteenth century and the subsequent administration of these territories appeared to be more benign, utilizing natively recruited troops who sometimes even interfered in the politics of the capital of Goa. The next chapter will probe into the developments and activities of the Portuguese in the seas adjacent to Goa in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

⁸⁹ Police at the district level was led by the mamlatdar and at the level of the big city by the kotwal. V.S. Kadam discussed the paragana administration in the Maratha confederacy (*Maratha confederacy: Study in its origin and development*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1993, ch. 4, pp. 59–72).



The Portuguese in the Seas of Western India

Abstract The strategic survey of the Western Indian Ocean unveiled the major and minor players in the Western Indian Ocean region: the English, Dutch, Omanis, Sidis, Angria, sea bandits and smugglers. Britain's acquisition of bases and advances in the abolitionist campaign indicated a gradual progression in the demarcation and politicization of the sea space, as discussed by E. Mancke. While attempts were made in Portugal to reform the naval establishment (to which the overseas colonies were linked in jurisdictional powers) in terms of organization, unit types, etc., the changes were not always effected in the colonies as jurisdictional powers were being devolved in the colonies during periods of tumultuous developments. Other than a survey of skirmishes on the western coast of India, the chapter will also probe whether this sea region had become a potentially more violent place as the British established a more sustained presence there.

Keywords Western Indian Ocean · (Portuguese) colonial navy · British maritime supremacy · Zanzibar (Omanis) · Piracy

INTRODUCTION

Having looked at the terrestrial developments in Goa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this chapter will probe into the adjacent seas of western India to investigate the challenges facing the colonial state during the transitional period from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century. The land and sea frontiers were usually more contiguous than one thinks. This was the case with the coastal colonial state of Goa, even though contemporary developments indicated that it had become a more land-based entity. In the periodization discussed in the book, the trade undertaken by agents related and—especially—unrelated to the Portuguese State of India provided some input in the finances of the colony—and hence its security and survival to some extent. An outcome of the discussion of this chapter is: although the Portuguese managed to catch up with some aspects of naval technological developments and sustained a routine escort operation (after periods of neglect and decline), the host of challenges that arose, such as increasing British political-military assertion in the sea regions in the Indian Ocean and privatization of trade, obviated the need for the colonial navy.

The chapter will first survey the political threats and scenario in the western sea region of India. The second part of the chapter will examine the evolution of the Portuguese navy, its coastal defences, as well as its engagements with adversaries in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It will also attempt an assessment of the navy's capacity. In the process, the transition from sail to steam power and the limited adoption of the new technology will be discussed. Finally, the chapter will examine whether the western sea region manifested increased elements of violence with the coming of a more sustained British colonial presence as well as a more liberalized environment of migratory and commercial movements in the midst of the abolition of slavery between the 1820s and 1850s.¹

¹ Abolition in the Indian Ocean was not strictly bounded in the period stipulated. Beyond the mid-nineteenth century, pockets of slave trade and smuggling continued in the western Indian Ocean, most notably those linked to the east African coast.

SITUATION IN THE SEAS AND COASTAL AREAS OF WESTERN INDIA

The period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a transitional time in the Indian Ocean. The Dutch made a bid against the Portuguese for the Indian Ocean and the other seas in the first half of the seventeenth century, taking settlements and outposts from the Portuguese. The VOC was saddled by a series of wars (1652–1654, 1665–1667, 1672–1674) with Britain in the second half of the century. When the wars resumed slightly more than a century later (1780–1784), London had surpassed Amsterdam as the financial centre and the Dutch had lost a number of bases and colonies in the Indian Ocean and shifted to consolidate themselves in the East Indies. The Dutch ceded their trade and fortification points along the western coast of India (for instance, Cochin and Quilon in Malabar) and Ceylon to the British during the French Revolutionary Wars. Their gradual strategic retreat to the East Indies was motivated by a mix of external and internal factors. The external motivation came from their defeat and attrition in the Indian Ocean; the internal reason stemmed from the need of the Dutch to develop better planning and governance in the East Indies after their indiscriminate acquisition of bases in the seventeenth century.²

The forging and consolidation of the British empire in the Western Indian Ocean before the mid-nineteenth century, in essence, the process of formation of the ‘British lake’, has often been overlooked.³ The matter of securing the use of a host of defence and resupply positions in the seas of the East Indies weighed heavily on the mind of British Admiral Peter Rainer, who led the effort in establishing the British presence there in the period 1794–1805.⁴ Selected ports and coastal settlements (or groups of these) in the Indian Ocean trade network were key to establishing control in any part of the following sea areas: (i) Cape of Good

² I. Burnet, *East Indies: The 200 year struggle between the Portuguese crown, the Dutch East India Company and English East India Company for supremacy in the eastern seas* (Kenhurst: Rosenburg publishing, 2017).

³ See for instance, J. Black, *The British seaborne empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) and H.V. Bowen et al. eds., *Britain’s oceanic empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds* (Cambridge: CUP, 2012).

⁴ P. Ward, *British naval power in the East, 1794–1805: The command of admiral Peter Rainer* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).

Hope, (ii) Mombasa, Zanzibar, Madagascar, (iii) Muscat, Ormuz, (iv) Maldives, (v) Bombay, Bassein, Surat, (vi) Goa,⁵ (vii) southwestern coast of India (for instance, Calicut, Cochin) (viii) northeastern coast of India (for instance, Calcutta, Chittagong), (ix) southeastern coast of India (for instance, Madras, Pulicut, Pondicherry), (x) Ceylon (Trincomalee), (xi) Melaka (Straits of Melaka), Bencoolen or Batavia (close to the Sunda Strait).⁶ Portugal's experience in securing control over parts of the Indian Ocean space in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also involved securing (and later losing) a number of the places on this list. It was also obvious from Rainer's correspondence that even if the colonial power possessed control of some or all of these places, defending and protecting trade vessels sailing between points required the deployment of sizeable naval strength—either stationed in ports (offering surveillance and interception) or escorting merchantmen in convoys on their voyages.⁷

⁵ C. Pinto, *Situating Indo-Portuguese trade history: A commercial resurgence, 1770–1830* (Kannur: Irish, 2003), p. 79. Goa served as a base for re-exportation trade (and not a good one at that) and feeder for Portugal's trade.

⁶ The first strategic point involved the rounding of the African continent at (i) Cape of Good Hope. Although the Dutch had arranged for a group of Protestants to stay in the town of the namesake and it remained in their hands until 1814, there were other settlements-of-stop in the area and ships passing through were not interdicted. After circumventing the tip of Africa, a ship sailed up the eastern coast of Africa for some distance before crisscrossing the Western Indian Ocean. Colonial powers had at different times attempted to control part of this coast or the islands close to this (ii) for instance, Mombasa by Portuguese 1593–1698, Zanzibar by Britain in 1880s, Madagascar by France in 1880s. In sailing for the western coast of India from Africa, (iii) the Maldives or more directly, strongpoints along the Malabar Coast became points to interdict or repel ships attempting to trade on the lucrative coast. Ships sailing to India from the Persian Gulf (and increasingly the Red Sea especially after 1869) usually tried to secure points at the mouth of the gulf and/or along the coast of Persia, (iv) for instance, Muscat and Ormuz held by Portuguese in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Ports in north India (v) such as Bombay, Bassein, Surat had been held by the Portuguese but gradually relinquished to the British or reverted to indigenous portents. The city of Goa located roughly at the centre of the western coast of India has been discussed by E. Carreira (2014). Along the eastern coast of India, a series of settlements from the northeast to southeast (Coromandel) length of the Indian coast presented as stopover or replenishing points before going further east and leaving the Indian Ocean. These were (vi) Calcutta and Chittagong etc.; as well as (vii) Madras, Pulicut and Pondicherry etc. Between the western and eastern coasts of India, colonial powers had tried to secure (viii) Ceylon (Trincomalee) as the island could disrupt traffic between coasts. Ships leaving ports from the Coromandel coast could leave the Indian Ocean via the Straits of Melaka or Sunda Straits. See Ward, *British naval power in the East*, pp. 122–48.

⁷ Ward, *British naval power in the East*, p. 142.

As early as the Seven Years' War, and certainly by the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had started to emerge from amongst the powers in Europe and was poised to expand its outposts and territories around the world. Indeed, beginning with the lease or ownership of Madras and Bombay in India in the seventeenth century, Britain's contest with the Dutch and the French through the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (1815) had, barring the remnant presence of French ports, led to the securing of its control over stretches of the western and eastern coasts as well as ports of India and Ceylon. It also gave the British diwani over vast tracts of territories in northeastern India. Across vast stretches of the Indian Ocean, the British had secured control of a number of islands in the southwest (such as the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles) and southeast (such as the Andaman islands; and even caretaking some of the islands in the East Indies region). By 1843, the British had secured Aden and its strategic namesake gulf.⁸

One of the greatest challenges to European and British hegemony in the Western Indian Ocean came from the kingdom of Oman and Zanzibar, referring to the same political entity but different dynastic phases of the kingdom. In the early eighteenth century, the Yaruba Dynasty and administration had built a formidable fleet, incorporating European-style warships and guns, that was able to challenge the Portuguese presence in the Western Indian Ocean and along the coast of East Africa. At Mangalore (1708), for instance, several Omani frigates and three or four *terranquins* were marshalled against a Portuguese frigate, a galliot and two *manchuas*, with substantial losses on the Omani side. In the Persian Gulf and nearer to the Muscat home base (1719), two Omani *naus* (with superior gun complement compared to the Portuguese war vessels) and two frigates were rallied against three Portuguese *naus* and a frigate, again with serious losses on the Omani side. Although the Omani fleet did not triumph on many occasions, the gradual pressure enable the Omanis to besiege and conquer the important fort of Mombasa in the 1730s. The Omani fleet deteriorated in the transition between the dynastic changes, but the Al Busaidi administration was able to reinstate a fleet under the second sultanate of Said bin Sultan. The sultan built a modest fleet of four ships (equipped with 40 guns) and 25 coastal boats, which was expanded later. More importantly, he was able to flexibly build and utilize

⁸ P. Kennedy, *The rise and fall of British naval mastery* (London: Penguin, 2017).

diplomatic relations with foreign powers (including his enemies) to carve out a space of autonomy and commerce; this continued as Zanzibar and was separated from Oman in the second half of the nineteenth century (1856).⁹ While Portugal's scarce (*socorro*) voyages, protected by a limited convoy, continued to operate between the East African coast and Goa, private merchants trading between the two coasts might opt to carry the Portuguese flag and licence or more likely negotiate with operators in the formal and informal network carrying commodities and slaves between these regions.¹⁰

Although the Mughals have often been portrayed as uninterested in the maritime presence, the western coast of India had always been teeming with local fishing and trading operators who sought to defend themselves and their turfs. At times, the Mughals would jointly patrol with groups such as the Sidis and/or grant the surveillance and protection of certain coastal regions and trading traffic to these groups. The Sidis were sidelined in the eighteenth century when the Marathas ravaged the north and central-western parts of India. Angria, a sub-branch of the Marathas, established its power from its base at Vijayadurg (refer Map 3.1). Unlike the Omanis, Angria operated lateen-rigged vessels of medium dimensions and utilized tactics of skirmishing with light war craft. Angria sought to disrupt the regular supply voyages to Goa, and the limited colonial fleet attempted to deter these voyages with a mixture of success and failure. A squadron of 13 Portuguese *parangues*, for instance, failed against six *palas* and nine *galvetas* from Angria in 1740. This resulted in the loss of a rice shipment destined for Goa. Clearly, the development of smaller indigenous oared vessels was not a foolproof response against local adversaries.¹¹

The aforementioned discussion tracing the rising influence and assertion of British power in the Indian Ocean affirms the early modern phenomenon of increased expansion and politicization of the oceanic

⁹ S. Greville, "Said Ibn Sultan", *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Said-ibn-Sultan> (accessed 01 Jun 2021). Foreign consulates were set up in Zanzibar by United States (1837), Britain (1841), France (1844).

¹⁰ Saturnino Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* vol. VII (Lisbon: Livraria Sá da Costa Editora, 1996), pp. 65–66 and 111–15.

¹¹ Abdul Shariff, *Slaves, spices and ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an east African commercial empire into the world economy* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987). See also Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* vol. VII, pp. 155–56.

space written about by E. Mancke.¹² More recent writers on the slave trade and piracy in the Indian Ocean (2013–2016) have tried to highlight that operators of illegitimate activities and power-holders in local regions probably overlapped in their spheres of interests and activities.¹³ Scholars such as Benedicte Hjejle have also tried to draw links and similarities between the indenture system, which evolved in the Indian Ocean in the nineteenth century, and the slave system before this. The Indian indenture system or migration began as ‘a direct response to the shortage of labour in the [sugar] plantations following the abolition of slavery in the British Empire’.¹⁴ The British attempted to establish a new system for rectifying the abuse and ambiguity in the supply of labour that was adapted for the Indian Ocean region. Recruiters and middlemen, who included local power and illicit operator groups, were pursued by British ships where surveillance and enforcement could be carried out.

With Britain’s declaration of the abolition of slavery in 1834, a steady constriction of the slave trade occurred only as the British were gradually able to assert their control over strategic points in the Indian Ocean. Although research on the Atlantic slave market is invariably more sophisticated, the latest research on slavery in the Indian Ocean market has shown that the figures involved in the latter theatre were also substantial. From 1500 to 1850, about 820,000 to slightly more than a million slaves were circulated within as well as to markets outside the Indian Ocean markets by all the major and secondary colonial powers (such as Britain, France, Holland, Portugal). Looking specifically at slaves shipped from the Atlantic and Asian sides of Africa (southeast Africa), it is noted that the figures from the latter were about half of the numbers shipped from the former in the seventeenth century; the figure was four-fifths of the Atlantic numbers in the eighteenth century; this figure was

¹² E. Mancke, “Early modern expansion and politicization of oceanic space”, *Geographical Review* vol. 89.2 (1999), pp. 125–36.

¹³ R. Allen, *European slave trading in the Indian Ocean, 1500–1850* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014); R. Allen, “Re-conceptualizing the new system of slavery”, *Man in India* vol. 92.2 (2012), pp. 225–45; L. Subramanian, *The sovereign and pirate: Ordering maritime subjects in India’s western littoral* (Oxford: OUP, 2016).

¹⁴ R. Huzzey, “When is a slave not really a slave?”, *History Today* (Dec. 2012), pp. 48–55. B.V. Lal ed., *The encyclopedia of the Indian diaspora* (Singapore: Editions Didier Miller, 2009), p. 46.

further increased to five-sixths of the Atlantic numbers in the nineteenth century.¹⁵

G. Clarence-Smith discussed a number of Portuguese merchants who stayed in the East and traded slaves, although he cautioned that there was no coherent picture of the trade. Some of the names mentioned are: Manuel Pinto da Fonseca, Joaquim Ferreira dos Santos, José Bernardino de Sá and António José de Seixas. The narratives of the FONSECAS, the SANTOS, the SÁS and the SEIXAS would not be too different from the story of Jacinto Domingues, a multifaceted trader who operated on the legitimate and illicit fronts, which will be discussed in the last section. These families were likely to have been linked to a source of finance in the metropole. They were relatively prosperous in the first half of the nineteenth century and continued to trade clandestinely in slaves even though Britain declared the ban in 1834. The operations of these families were—unsurprisingly—linked to Brazil (known as Rio slavers) as slave labour from the Asian market was channelled to serve manpower needs in the Americas.¹⁶

Referring to Map 3.1 on the Bombay Presidency, one can imagine circles of control associated with the forts and ports (such as Janjira and Anjanvel) linked with the various regional powers on the western coast of India. We can corroborate from G. Campbell's work that the procurement of slaves was usually executed by a variety of stakeholders, which might include European and indigenous players that crisscrossed different spheres of influence.¹⁷ The slaves could be secured under mutually arranged or hostile conditions, and the subjects of the undertaking might have permitted themselves to be sold under voluntary conditions or coerced to be auctioned under involuntary conditions. With the gradual pressure and tightening surveillance by the British in the Indian Ocean, notably after 1834–35, not only did the Portuguese merchants have to

¹⁵ G. Campbell, *Structure of slavery in Indian Ocean Africa and Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2004). See also G. Campbell, "Slavery in the Indian Ocean world", in G. Heuman and T. Burnard eds., *Routledge history of slavery* (New York: Routledge, 2010), ch. 3.

¹⁶ Clarence-Smith, *The third Portuguese empire*, pp. 54–56. It might be noted that Brazil had become independent in 1822.

¹⁷ Campbell, *Structure of slavery in Indian Ocean Africa and Asia*.

relinquish their slave business, but even a respectable power such as Zanzibar was eventually forced to shift from the slave to the clove trade as it increasingly clashed with the British in the region.¹⁸

NATURE OF PORTUGUESE NAVY AND COASTAL DEFENCE SYSTEM IN INDIA

In the more formal sphere of military operation, the ability of the Portuguese colonial fleet operating in the Western Indian Ocean region was dwindling in absolute and relative terms vis-à-vis its rivals and adversaries; and this had a direct impact on the effectiveness of the security or escort activities it undertook. René Pélissier affirms that the Portuguese naval and mercantile fleet had been stagnating or declining since the seventeenth century and especially over the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.¹⁹ The intensity of armed hostility undertaken on the ground in the Indian Ocean has also been noted by Saturnino Monteiro to have been limited in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries compared to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the whole, there appeared to be a tacit understanding that the naval presence and capacity of the Portuguese in the East lapsed into a certain degree of decay.²⁰

The early naval command of the Estado da Índia had under it a royal shipyard, a warehouse, a high sea fleet and a galley fleet. The loss of the Estado's northern territories in 1739 somewhat diminished the naval maintenance capacity, although there was an attempt to reorganize the arsenal of Goa in the second half of the eighteenth century to improve the efficacy of production and supply of equipment and parts. The administration of the colonial navy in the region underwent dramatic changes from the final decades of the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, partly due to political changes in the metropole and partly due to the pressing situation on the ground in the Indian Ocean. Despite the limited efforts devoted to the colonies (especially in Asia), reforms were implemented, partly under the aegis and influence of the British, to erect

¹⁸ Shariff, *Slaves, spices and ivory in Zanzibar*.

¹⁹ René Pélissier, *As companhas coloniais de Portugal* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 2006), p. 27.

²⁰ J. Moreira Silva, *Das naus à vela às corvetas de ferro* (Paredes: Tribuna, 2012), pp. 125–27.

a more sophisticated structure and military units of arms mostly in the metropole²¹—for instance, setting up marine regiments, separating the management of ships from the naval administration, setting up schools of training and decentralizing measures to devolve jurisdictional power to the colonies (formation of captaincy).²² Despite the constraints, a survey of the skirmishes between Goa and its adversaries shows that the Portuguese continued to deploy mid-level rated sailing warships in the Indian Ocean as well as rely on an array of indigenous craft in their convoy activities.

Skirmishes on the seas in the period of João V were fought against fellow Europeans, the Omanis as well as natives in India. The Portuguese could match with the French and achieve an edge against Omanis possessing similar war technologies, but they did not prevail against Angria when a rated sailing warship could not be dispatched. Monteiro's chronological account and assessment of the Portuguese navy in the eighteenth century appears to show that it kept up with warship technology and skills during the reigns of José and Maria I. The lists and number of skirmishes and battles on the seas were comparable, giving allowance for bias, in the first and latter halves of the eighteenth century. The geographical area of conflict spanned the northern and especially the southern coasts of western India, and as far away as the Mozambique coast in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese navy in India tried to keep up with escort duties in several places, particularly along the coast of South India, partly because Goa still had some trade and—more important—needed supplies from these places. An analysis will be made of the engagements in different theatres to determine how effectively the relatively small Portuguese navy was operating along the coast of India and in the western parts of the Indian Ocean against other colonial navies and modernizing indigenous fleets.²³

Referring to Map 5.1, the *palas* (Indian vessels with two or three masts) encountered by the Portuguese in a skirmish of 1774 along the

²¹ As discussed elsewhere in chapter 3, the Portuguese resisted the British request to amalgamate their forces in Goa.

²² The structure would undergo further rationalization in 1656. See Moreira Silva, *Das naus à vela às corvetas de ferro*, p. 111.

²³ Saturnino Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* vol. VII (Lisbon: Livraria Sá da Costa Editora, 1997); see also Y.H. Teddy Sim, *Portuguese enterprise in the East* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

western coast of India could carry up to 24 guns and slightly over 150 men per vessel; *galvetas* carried up to seven guns and were manned by 60 men. At times, even a Portuguese *fragata* (frigate with 44 guns and 240 men) suffered when faced with a number of smaller enemy vessels, as in January 1763. In January 1796, a Portuguese *corveta* defended against a small fleet (three *palas* and six *manchuas*) from Culabo. The nine guns of the *corveta* and muskets operated by soldiers on board the ship kept Maratha ships at a distance and prevented the enemy from boarding, forcing the latter to retreat.²⁴


Along the coasts of South India, the Angria fleet had been reduced by the English after a series of expeditions. Angria's control and raiding along the coast from Vijayadurg (or Vijayadurga, above Melondim) to Jaigad (Jaigarh, below Dabul) on behalf of the Marathas was drastically reduced in 1764 even though the leader of Angria (Tulagi Angria) escaped capture. For the rest of the century, the coast was only subjected to 'sporadic attacks of the Marathas (distinguished from Angria) and other [small states]'.²⁵ In January 1762, a 70-gun *nau* and 40-gun *fragata* proceeded to Cape Comorin to escort a ship that was coming from Macau as well as another coming from the Coromandel Coast. The Portuguese squadron was attacked on its way back to Goa by a small Maratha fleet of six *palas* and more than 20 *galvatas*. The attack took place using artillery fire and attempted boarding, although in the end the superior Portuguese guns appeared to prevail. The squadron continued its escort duty to accompany the merchant ships up north.²⁶ In engagements along the coast of India, indigenous adversaries continued to rely on boarding as a key tactic in fighting the Portuguese on the sea even in the eighteenth century. A rated sailing warship—or an unrated warship such as a corvette or sloop-of-war—was usually able to defeat a numerically superior attack by the natives, although the situation sometimes became precarious.

In another account ten years later (1772) involving activities in south Goa, there was mention of a 36-gun *fragata* as well as another *fragata* that completed its run in North India with a Portuguese *pala* and *patacho* (locally adapted vessels). The merchant of the ship coming from Macau (Joaquim M. de Brito) had asked the English for an armed escort from

²⁴ Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* VII, p. 189.

²⁵ Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* VII, p. 174.

²⁶ The capitão-de-mar-e-guerra was rewarded with a foro de fidalgo belatedly.



Map 5.1 Sea battles of Portuguese navy in western Indian Ocean in the eighteenth–early nineteenth centuries. S. Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* vols. VII–VIII (Lisbon: Livraria Sá da Costa Editora, 1996–1997), from vol. VII, pp. 173, 185, 189, 203 and 256, from vol. VIII, p. 13. Tracing from the southern coast of India, (i) battle off Calicut-Cochin in 1762, (ii) battle off Goa in 1777, (iii) battle off Diu in 1774, (iv) battle off Mocha in 1779, (v) battle near Mozambique channel in 1808, (vi) battle off Delagoa Bay in 1805. (Note The locations indicate the approximate and not exact positions of the battles or skirmishes)

Goa to North India. The Macanese ship was taken by the Marathas despite flying an English flag and after a hard fight by its defenders (notably Domingos de Oliveira). In the same year, a greater defeat was faced by the Portuguese when a 40-gun *fragata* (*Santa Ana*) was taken by the Marathas. The *fragata* suffered multiple explosions when fire (*incendio*) lighted up the gunpowder, and the ship was taken after a hard fight upon being boarded. The Goa authorities assembled an expedition

(led by the warship *Nossa Senhora da Penha de França*) to attempt to recover the captured merchantman at Angediva (where it had last fought against the *Santa Ana*). The expedition was supported by smaller support ships such as the *pala São Pedro* and the *patacho São Miguel*, although the merchantman was secured in the end via negotiation (1776) rather than through military action.²⁷

Across the Western Indian Ocean, along the Mozambique coast, the French ambassador who secured a voyage back to Europe on the Portuguese *corveta* (*Nossa Senhora*) was intercepted at Moca (Mocha) in 1779 by an English *corveta*.²⁸ The stand-off between the Portuguese and the English occurred against the backdrop of the end of the Seven Years' War, but the French were still actively politicking with indigenous powers such as the Marathas and Mysoreans in the competition with the English in India. There appeared to be no obvious winner in the skirmish, although the English vessel was more aggressive and its casualties were known while the Portuguese number was unclear; the protagonists (for instance, Azevedo de Brito) of *Nossa Senhora* were all promoted.²⁹ In another skirmish more than two decades later (1805), the Portuguese engaged against a local people (Sacalaves) near the Gulf (*baía*) of Lourenço Marquez, where the Portuguese also had a fort. The Sacalaves gathered 60 vessels to attempt an attack on Quirimbas (between Port Amelia and Cape Delgado) along the coast of Mozambique and were intercepted by a Portuguese *goleta* (vessel with two square sails, manned by about 30 sailors and slightly more soldiers apart from the officers and non-commissioned officers). There appeared to be no conclusive outcome to the engagement.³⁰ When it came to engagements across the seas to the west of India, there was a chance that an adapted indigenous vessel deployed on the Portuguese side or even a rated sailing warship could succumb to overwhelming adversary numbers or a stroke of bad luck. Although the English were longtime allies of the Portuguese, Portuguese

²⁷ The Maratha fleet withdrew to Vijayadruga (Griem) which had apparently fallen into Maratha hands even though it was supposed to be returned to Goa by Angria. See Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* VII, pp. 187–88.

²⁸ Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* VII, p. 203.

²⁹ Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* VII, pp. 203–207.

³⁰ Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* VII, p. 256; S. Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* vol. VIII (Lisbon: Livraria Sá da Costa Editora, 1997), p. 13.

vessels could be intercepted by the English during periods when the French attempted to foment antagonism and form new alignments.

The development of the sailing warship took place over a long period of time—more than 300 years—from when the lateen sail in ships was combined with the ship structure of a cog to produce the first carracks. The subsequent developments of the *nau* and galleon, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were not always distinguishable from each other. The development of this category of ship had gravitated towards increased size and tonnage (reaching a cumbersome 2,000 tonnes). The trend of warship development after the Restoration (1640) followed the progress made by the English and French rating system for this category of ships. The Portuguese in the eighteenth century did have a ship of the line (of 70 guns) ordered for the Indian Ocean, and differentiation was made for frigates (*fragatas*) when a fleet was assembled there.³¹ The development of the sailing ship and its warring capacity reached its apogee in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By this time, top-level ships of the line could attain 5,000 tonnes, carry about 120 guns and sail at 10 knots (approximately 20 km/h). In the meantime, the Americans had perfected sleek clippers that were able to cruise at about 16 knots (approximately 30 km/h), which explained why vessels setting off from North America or Europe could reach China in a few months! The shift to steam-powered ships was not a singular development but involved several small changes over 100 years from the eighteenth century before this new mode of power could be fully harnessed. Technology was applied to the design of ships (such as experimentation with a paddle- and screw-propeller, the use of metal in shipbuilding) in the context of industrial developments (for instance, the industrial production of iron). From the 1840s, military technology supported by the nascent Industrial Revolution was further introduced in the navy in the form of rifled cannon as well as high-explosive ammunition encased in shell casing. There was substantial resistance by Portuguese admirals in endorsing the new technological innovations.³² In 1860, there were 2,500 sailors under 220 officers manning 25 warships carrying 250 cannon; whatever steamships

³¹ Teddy Sim, *Portuguese enterprise in the East*, p. 34. See further in J.H. Parry, *Trade and dominion: European overseas empires in the eighteenth century* (London: Praeger, 1971).

³² Monteiro, *Batalhas e combates da marinha Portuguesa* VIII, pp. 11–12.

the navy possessed at this point were imported.³³ The Portuguese navy began to acquire more steam-powered and armoured vessels only from the 1860s.

The forts along the coast were still being used in the eighteenth century, but they were increasingly becoming obsolete in the nineteenth century. As a case study, we can take a look at the almost 180,000m² fortress of Cabo da Rama, among the biggest of the few Portuguese forts in Portuguese Goa (in Canacona). In the seventeenth century and right up to the eve of the New Conquest campaigns, the fort was under a Maratha feudatory. Before its conquest, the fort was usually not armed in times of peace. As a fortification point, Cabo da Rama was ideal for monitoring the sea and coastal region of southern Goa. Although Angria was defeated in the 1750s, its dynastic family continued to hold Fort Kolaba until the 1840s. The fort was described as being ‘irregular’, and the bulwarks—as apparent from drawings of the fort—had moats outside the entrance; the façade was armed with 20-something cannon at its peak (in the 1770s, when reputedly military officers and military units were stationed there). The fort was, ‘according to Lopes Mendes, [in the 1860s] no longer militarily important as the situation was quite secure for the Portuguese [by then]’.³⁴

TRADE, RIVALRY AND POTENTIALITY OF VIOLENCE ON THE SEA

Until the nineteenth century, even though the British possessed several strategic bases in the Indian Ocean, they had never achieved full hegemony in this sea region. If the earlier section of the chapter has made an argument that an ascending British power had made some progressive and concrete advancement of power, the section on the *modus operandi* of the Portuguese navy shows that the remnant of the Portuguese force

³³ Pélissier, *As companhias coloniais de Portugal*, p. 27. In the 1880s, comparing Holland with Portugal, a country of comparable size in population and territories, the former was able to field 797 mercantile ships (with a total tonnage of 875,000) while Portugal was able to put up 491 ships (with a tonnage of 90,000). The strength of the Portuguese fleet, according to Pélissier, did not increase significantly for the second half of nineteenth century up till the end of the monarchy.

³⁴ P. Shirodkar, *Fortresses and forts of Goa* (Goa: Prasad Lolayekar, 2015), pp. 83–90.

in the Indian Ocean was barely able to maintain limited routine operations. This section further argues simultaneously for a perspective that the political regimes presiding in the Indian Ocean manifested only a limited or marginal degree of control. The two scenarios were not necessarily conflicting. Works such as *The Limits of British Colonial Control in South Asia* (Tambe and Fisher-Tine, 2008), *Subaltern Lives: Biographies of Colonialism in the Indian Ocean World* (Anderson, 2012) and *Desertion in the Early Modern World* (Van Rossum and Kamp, 2016) give the idea that many individuals who dwelled in the British areas of control or spheres of influence operated under circumstances of fluidity and uncertainty rather than a regime of predictable order.³⁵ Before this, historians such as H. Furber, O. Prakash and P. Marshall highlighted the increasingly prominent role of English private traders in the eighteenth century.³⁶ The activities of subaltern groups and actors such as ‘sailors, prostitutes, escaped convicts or pilgrims’ are discussed in *Limits of British Colonial Control*, beyond the usual focus on merchants and their network. In *Subaltern Lives*, C. Anderson builds on the works of prominent scholars such as M. Vink and M. Pearson for a more sophisticated conception of the (sea) space and the subgroups operating in it. For Vink, ‘one way forward [is] for a new thalassology that respects the flexibility of the Indian Ocean as a geographical and virtual space [focusing] on the movement of individuals, communities and cultural practices’.³⁷ For Pearson, history (of the Indian Ocean; for that matter on land as well) can be ‘constituted through overlapping [or shared] spaces of governance, mobility and experience’.³⁸ In the edited volume *Desertion in the Early Modern World*, while the peripheral sector is sometimes perceived

³⁵ A. Tambe and H. Fisher-Tine, *The limits of British colonial control in South Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2008); C. Anderson, *Subaltern lives: Biographies of colonialism in the Indian Ocean world* (Cambridge: CUP, 2012).

³⁶ H. Furber, *Rivals of trade in the Orient* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976); O. Prakash, *European commercial enterprise in pre-colonial India* (Cambridge: CUP, 1998); P. Marshall, “Private British trade in the Indian Ocean before 1800”, in O. Prakash ed., *European commercial expansion in early modern Asia* (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1–25.

³⁷ C. Anderson, *Subaltern lives: Biographies of colonialism in the Indian Ocean world, 1790–1920* (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), pp. 8–9. Refer M. Vink, “Indian Ocean studies and the new thalassology”, *Journal of Global History* vol. 2 (2007), p. 52.

³⁸ Anderson, *Subaltern lives: Biographies of colonialism in the Indian Ocean world*, p. 9. Refer M. Pearson, *The Indian Ocean* (London: Routledge, 2003).

as ‘unorderly, irrational or aberrant’, M. van der Linden has attempted to argue that deserters operated according to a certain logic: ‘however they [might] be oppressed or humiliated, they [still tended] to walk with dignity’. Reiterating the uncertainty of the transitional space, whether the deserter had made a calculated or a rash decision, there was always the possibility (however unlikely) that the perpetrator wished to return to the original place of oppression.³⁹

This chapter will not delve into the individual lives of people going about their business in the Western Indian Ocean region. It will discuss certain well-known appointees and operators from the Portuguese State of India who functioned under different authorities (at times akin to assuming multifarious identities) and extended their linkages to lucrative markets in eastern Hindustan. Whether an individual or a state was deemed a pirate in the Indian Ocean (or elsewhere) over time could be a matter of discussion. The political economy of local regions, especially coastal, in different parts of the world necessitated raiding—sometimes labelled as banditry—as part of routine life, dispute and politicking in indigenous societies. The intervention of the British on the western coast of India in the intrigues of local power struggles led to labels that persisted into the twentieth century. Angria was one such case. The rulers of Angria had started as commanders of Shivaji and the Maratha navy. By the 1750s, the fragmentation and internal politicking of the Maratha state led to the Peshwa asking for British assistance to suppress his own navy and the navy of Tulaji Angria. The end of that process saw the British gradually asserting some control along the western coast of India; by then the vessels of Angria were labelled as ‘outlawed’ or ‘piratical’ even though Angria lingered on in these waters until the 1840s.⁴⁰

The contradictory developments on the seas (politicization, demarcation and privatization) contributed to the increasing challenges faced by

³⁹ See A. Tambe and H. Fischer-Tine eds., *The limits of British colonial control in South Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2008) and M. van Rossum and J. Kamp, *Desertion in the early modern world* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016). See also Teddy Y.H. Sim, “The Portuguese in the adjacent seas: A survey of their identities and activities in the Eastern Indian Ocean”, in *Piracy and surreptitious activities in the Malay Archipelago and adjacent seas, 1600–1840* (Singapore: Springer, 2014), pp. 163–77. Instances of Portuguese *lançados* have been noted to clamor for the recognition of the Estado after they had made their fortunes.

⁴⁰ M.S. Naravane, *The heritage sites of maritime Maharashtra* (Mumbai: Maritime History Society, 2001), pp. 26–29.

chartered companies (most notably the EIC and VOC) and eventually their disintegration.⁴¹ With the Estado left very much to its own devices and the remnant of the fleet at skeletal strength in the Napoleonic Wars and the tumultuous period after, trade appointees engaged in competition against the EIC and at other times made liaisons on its behalf. The increased movements across the ocean space were not only facilitated by an expansion of trade but led to increased interaction and migration in coastal settlements in these regions.⁴² The Portuguese-affiliated appointees and operators discussed in the upcoming paragraphs coped and adapted in order to survive and even flourish.

Jacinto Domingues represented Portuguese (Lisbon) merchants who wished to revive the inter-Asian (Portugal-Asia) trade. This trade had diminished relative to intra-Asian trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Jacinto was a soldier (*capitão-mor de mar e guerra*) and was for a period in charge of the Portuguese *feitoria* (trading station) in Surat. His appointment at the trading station clearly facilitated the trade he undertook in the city, along the western coast of India and even to Brazil. While tending to his textile business in Surat, Jacinto saw an opportunity to extend the trade to Damão. He was able to obtain an exemption from ‘the payment of export duties [of the town] as well as import duties at Lisbon’. Smugglers and contrabandists (probably involving officials of the Estado) brought goods from Surat into Damão so that they would fit the exempt status, in the process causing revenue losses for Damão. The competition created by this trade in textiles was ‘more than an irritant to the British interests [in Surat]’.⁴³ Through manipulative means, Jacinto was able to seize a proportion of the textile trade from the British. The latter used strong-arm tactics to influence the Nawab of Surat to put an embargo on Jacinto’s trade. In the end, possibly by colluding with Jacinto’s enemies (the Loureiros based in Bombay), the British levied on him an allegation of arms trade linked to Tipu Sultan. This attempt was unsuccessful, but the British eventually had him replaced by Jose Gomes Loureiro at Surat. Jacinto was able to continue to operate in India because

⁴¹ The VOC was dissolved in 1799. The EIC on the other hand was forced to divest itself of its commercial trading assets in India to the UK government in 1833.

⁴² P. Havik and M. Newitt, *Creole societies in the Portuguese colonial empire* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).

⁴³ Pinto, *Situating Indo-Portuguese trade history: A commercial resurgence*, p. 49 and 55.

he had the support of the highest-ranking people in Portuguese India such as the Conde de Poalvide and the Visconde de Anadia.⁴⁴ The story of the Domingues family revealed a number of names of people who had dealings with them, either working for the family or in some sort of competition against them—for instance, Jose Gomes Loureiro and the governors of Damão. These people did not behave too differently from Jacinto, possessing an official status but likely to be undertaking some form of surreptitious activities to fill their own coffers; they formed one level of people intensely involved in the activities of the Western Indian Ocean.⁴⁵

G. Clarence-Smith has attributed the survival of remnants of the Portuguese empire in the East to the ‘activities of the creoles, with their familial, cultural and economic links with Portugal’.⁴⁶ The trading world of the Souzas and Barretos has been described by C. Pinto. The families had interests and linkages from Macau and the metropole in Portugal to Brazil as well as India and the Indian Ocean. Miguel de Lima e Souza was a civil servant in the English East India Company and was at some point appointed by the Portuguese colonial government as the *Tenente coronel e commandante batelão dos defensores Portuguezes de Bombaim* as well. His brother was ‘one of the chief suppliers of Indian cargoes to Luso shippers’ and moved to Madras when Bassein fell prior to the mid-eighteenth century. Due to the relative unprofitability of ports in Goa,⁴⁷ the brother had tried to ask the Goa authorities for competitive terms.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Pinto, *Situating Indo-Portuguese trade history: A commercial resurgence*, pp. 52 and 59.

⁴⁵ Pinto, *Situating Indo-Portuguese trade history: A commercial resurgence*, pp. 56–57 and 173.

⁴⁶ Clarence-Smith, *The third Portuguese empire*, p. 22.

⁴⁷ Pinto, *Situating Indo-Portuguese trade history: A commercial resurgence*, p. 71. Profits were four times lesser in Estado ports compared to non-Estado ports.

⁴⁸ Pinto, *Situating Indo-Portuguese trade history: A commercial resurgence*, p. 69. Antonio de Souza (younger brother of Miguel) asked for protection for vessels trading in Asian waters; especially from pirates which ‘infested the coasts of Malabar, Konkan, Damão and Diu’. He also asked for a fixed duty to be ‘charged on all goods irrespective of the quantity sold’. Special exemption and rates are further requested for goods going to Portugal, Asia or inland (India), transshipment, specie as well as for the different merchants (Portuguese, Armenian or Asian).

The Barretos were located in Calcutta and were relations of the Souzas.⁴⁹ Jose Barreto and Luis Barreto e Souza were established commercially in Bengal and Goa and were among the ‘chief suppliers of opium to Macau’. The Barretos also ‘supplied indigo to the English East India Company’, operated the Hindustan Insurance Company (which catered to customers like the Farias),⁵⁰ were involved in the coastal trade in rice, and ‘commanded great respect in the Lisbon circles’.⁵¹

Indigenous traders of the Estado da Índia such as the Saraswats, Baniyas, Canarins, Parsis and Mohammedans were deeply connected into the business networks of India as well as across the ocean in East Africa. The Baniyas of the Estado specialized in East Africa commerce, dispatching ships with ‘rice and other provisions to Mozambique [in return for] prized ivory, slaves and gold’.⁵² They were eclipsed by the Saraswats in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Saraswats (Brahmins), many of whom came from Cumbarjua (in Goa), had been involved in the local economy, serving as ‘kulkarnis, tax-farmers, intra-locality (Asian) trade [etc.]’ and comprised a substantial fraction of the tax farmers (renda-holders) or Hindu merchants in Goa, exerting ‘a virtual stranglehold over the Goan economy particularly the commercial arena [into] the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’.⁵³ The Mhamai family, which Pinto features in her narrative on Portuguese India over the transitional period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had family members who were appointed as ‘one of the four official brokers of Goa customs’, managed revenue farms in Bicholim and Salcete—especially in tobacco

⁴⁹ Pinto, *Situating Indo-Portuguese trade history: A commercial resurgence*, p. 73. Jose Barreto (senior and junior) were nephews of Minguel de Lima e Souza and Antonio de Souza.

⁵⁰ The Farias who were based in Calcutta and later in Bombay also traded heavily in opium.

⁵¹ Pinto, *Situating Indo-Portuguese trade history: A commercial resurgence*, p. 74. Where ever they were, the Barretos and Souzas were involved in philanthropic activities. Recent research on mixed race Chinese merchants in China reveals that philanthropic activities were important channels in building the business network; see B. Goodman, “What is in a network? Local, personal and public loyalties in the context of changing conceptions of state and social welfare”, in N. Dillon and J. Oi eds., *At the crossroads of empires* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 155–78.

⁵² C. Pinto, *Trade and finance in Portuguese India* (New Delhi: Concept publishing, 1994), p. 57.

⁵³ Pinto, *Trade and finance in Portuguese India*, pp. 53–54.

(which ‘formed a principal source of revenue of the Estado’)—as well as ‘functioned as provision suppliers and state shipyard contractors’. In the early nineteenth century, the Mhamais were able to ‘acquire the leverage [and] build up contacts, [offer adjoining] brokerage and insurer’s services [and became the] agents for the French at Mahe, the Maratha court and even Mauritius’. The Mhamais met with misfortune when Viceroy Conde de Rio Pardo set up policies to ‘eliminate fraudulent practices and abuses’. The business continued to ‘exist [for some time] under Venkatesha and Narayana, in the 1820s and 30s under Suba, Bably and Jagarnath Kamat, and in the 1830s and 40s under Vithal Kamat who was engaged in the tobacco trade with Brazil’.⁵⁴ E. Carreira notes that the loss of the trade of Brazil (after its independence) caused Goa to be increasingly relegated to an enclaved status.⁵⁵ The Canarins (native Christians) usually had Portuguese-sounding names (for instance, Rogerio de Faria, Antonio M. Pereira, Sebastião Gracias, Ignacio S. de Silva) and were ‘difficult to distinguish [from people of] ethnic Indian origin’. Like indigenous Hindu merchants, prominent Canarins received appointments in Portuguese outposts outside Goa and set up shop as traders in many places along the coasts of the Indian subcontinent. Rogerio de Faria, for instance, was the director of the *feitória de Surrate* (Surat factory), was known as the merchant prince in Bombay, and had settled from Bengal to Bombay in addition to maintaining favourable relations with the Portuguese court even when in exile in Brazil. In the 1830s, de Faria’s ships would ‘leave the west Indian littoral laden with opium for China and return with Chinese tea, porcelain, silks and sundries’. He was ruined only due to a misjudgement in supporting and betting on the deposed governor of Goa in 1835 (Bernardo Peres da Silva).⁵⁶

While the terrestrial and security aspects of the Estado had become more circumscribed and stabilized transitioning from the eighteenth

⁵⁴ From the search of the Mhamai family collection in XCHR (1827, 1828, 1805–80), documents relating to the transactions and activities of the (Mhamai) family was greatly diminished after 1830. See also Pinto, *Trade and finance in Portuguese India*, pp. 55–56.

⁵⁵ E. Carreira, *Globalising Goa, 1660–1820: Change and exchange in a former capital of empire* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2014), p. 128.

⁵⁶ Pinto, *Trade and finance in Portuguese India*, pp. 58–60. De Faria was beholden to Jamsetji Jejeebhoy and Motichund Amichund subsequently and lost his credibility with the merchants and financiers of western coastal India; before further misfortune “befell him”.

century to the early nineteenth century, the security trend in the maritime sphere continued to be relatively hostile and complex. The perception was more pronounced on the seas because, referring to Table 3.5, a substantial part of the colonial state revenues was still devoted to maintaining an established behemoth in the form of the oversized army and increasingly out-of-use fortresses, leaving little for the navy. On the seas, sizeable war vessels accompanying the convoying operations had dwindled from their heyday in the sixteenth century, although they were buttressed by a host of locally constructed vessels. Nevertheless, a range of logistical support was necessary even for the operation of the limited convoying activities taking place. These were provided by appointees in ports that only saw limited Portuguese influence as well as creole and indigenous merchant agents who had businesses there. C. Pereira has shown that agents of the Estado provided logistical support for EIC vessels sailing from the west coast of India to the east and played a crucial role in supplying trading fleets and their convoys moving across the western and eastern coasts of India; the same agents were also likely to be providing support for what limited activities the Portuguese continued to carry out in the region.⁵⁷ In terms of the violence experienced by the functionaries or agents, the survey in the earlier sections has shown that Portuguese fleet actions in the Indian Ocean region were directed largely against local raiders and pirates, who continued to linger into the 1840s.⁵⁸ While A. Pelucia's research shows that the throne sanctioned privateering (which she terms 'corsairing' as opposed to 'pirating'), the licencing of privateering would presumably be less meaningful in the Western Indian Ocean as the Estado became less aggressive and its activities more limited. By contrast, other Europeans, for instance the French, organized a fleet of privateers from Port-Louis from 1793 which caused damages of over 150 vessels and posed a serious concern to the British during the period of the Napoleonic wars.⁵⁹ A more subtle form of tension occurred with appointees undertaking surreptitious activities themselves. Emrys Chew and Beatrice Nicolini have affirmed, for instance, that the sultanate of Muscat in Zanzibar engaged in illicit arms trade in building its power and

⁵⁷ A.D.S.F., serie nos. 1241 and 1251, Livro das receitas (e despesas) dos effeitos [...] construção da curveta nova.

⁵⁸ AHU, India CU, Maço 384, entry on sailing along the western coast of India (to Bombay) and probability of encountering pirates.

⁵⁹ Carreira, *Globalising Goa*, p. 120.

control in the Western Indian Ocean. Such activities were associated with an implicit violence, as perpetrators of surreptitious activities—as A. Karras has highlighted—had the propensity to defend themselves if discovered, although they usually sought to avoid attention. The surreptitious activities undercut the English profits at Surat and other ports along the coast, and warships of the East India Company had an incentive to deter these activities. When Company ships came in contact with the smugglers, the latter was likely to resist if trapped, leading to open and hostile conflicts.⁶⁰

Beyond the merchants, licit and illicit, individuals or groups of individuals were also peddling mercenary services across the western and eastern halves of the Indian Ocean, although the market at the beginning of the nineteenth century was no longer as lucrative as it had been in the earlier two centuries. Research on the coastal Bengal region before the Battle of Plassey (1757) has shown the area and the adjoining regions in mainland Southeast Asia (such as Burma) to have been markets where mercenary services were sold. Portuguese and creole (or mix descendant) merchant-adventurers and mercenary soldiers who dealt in trade or the manufacture of Portuguese arms commanded a high premium.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese were present in a sprawl of minor settlements in the region such as Sripur, Chandecan, Bakla, Catrabo, Loricul, Bhulua, Hijili, Pipli and Balasore.⁶¹ They were found in some numbers in Hooghly, Midnapore, Chittagong, Noakhali, Bakargani and Dacca, although in the last four places they were known as *feringhis*, indicating a greater degree of social stratification compared to the seventeenth century. Descendants of the Portuguese or mixed races in the later periods (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) were known by certain family names and followed the professions of their predecessors as traders or mercenaries—initially in the armies of the native rulers and later in the EIC armies.⁶² The Calcutta annual directory

⁶⁰ C. Pereira, “Cogwheels of two empires: Goan administration within the nineteenth century British Indian Ocean empire”, conference paper, nd, np. B. Nicolini, “Slave trade in the western Indian Ocean during the nineteenth century: The role of Baloch mercenaries”, in A. Koen et al. eds., *The Baloch and others: Linguistic, historical and socio-political perspectives on pluralism in Balochistan* (Np: np, 2008), pp. 327–44. A. Karras, *Smuggling: Contraband and corruption in world history* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

⁶¹ A. Campos, *History of the Portuguese in Bengal* (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1999), p. 88.

⁶² S. Reid, *Armies of the East India Company, 1750–1850* (Oxford: Osprey, 2009), p. 37.

and almanac provided Portuguese-sounding names of the Portuguese volunteer forces for the defence of the city, which included captains, lieutenants and ensigns. F.W. Birch's census of 1837 pegged the number of Portuguese (Luso-Indians) in Calcutta at slightly over 3,100, in addition to the slightly over 4,700 Eurasians mentioned.⁶³ The Luso-Indians were distinguished by their status in society rather than ethnicity. Other than mercenary soldiery, another vocation that Portuguese or mixed Portuguese were likely to take up was being lascars on ships. In researching lascars in Indian Ocean seafaring, A. Jaffer affirmed that a fair number of them could be found among indigenous Indian sailors and that British sea captains of EIC ships were reasonably suspicious of them: 'although they possessed the (seafaring) skill, they [also] easily accommodated to the customs and prejudices of the native crew'.⁶⁴

CONCLUSION

The chapter takes a turn away from developments on land to survey Portuguese activities in the Western Indian Ocean related to Portugal's dominions in Goa. The strategic survey unveiled the major and minor players in the Western Indian Ocean region: the English, Dutch, Omanis, Sidis, Angria, sea bandits and smugglers. Britain's acquisition of bases and advances in the abolitionist campaign indicated a gradual progression in the demarcation and politicization of the sea space, as discussed by E. Mancke (1999). While attempts were made in Portugal to reform the naval establishment (to which the overseas colonies were linked in jurisdictional powers) in terms of organization, unit types, etc., the changes were not always effected in the colonies as jurisdictional powers were being devolved in the colonies during periods of tumultuous developments (such as the transfer of the Portuguese court to Brazil during the Napoleonic Wars, civil war in Portugal). A survey of skirmishes from the western coast of India to as far as East Africa reveals that the Estado da Índia was minimally protecting convoys on the seas. The Portuguese navy could repel indigenous adversaries most of the time if a rated vessel

⁶³ Campos, *History of the Portuguese in Bengal*, p. 194.

⁶⁴ A. Jaffer, *Lascars and Indian Ocean seafaring, 1760–1860* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2015), p. 142.

was part of the protection. The chapter also discusses a network where the operators assumed multiple roles or identities and there was some probability of their surreptitious activities being exposed and resulting in outright violence if uncovered. The upcoming penultimate chapter will return to the terrestrial story and examine the role of Goa in one of the most shattering events in Hindustan in the mid-nineteenth century.



Portuguese Defence and Activities in Goa During the Indian Mutiny

Abstract The chapter briefly connects the 1857 Indian Mutiny to its historiography. The activities and entanglements that insurgents undertook in the British-subjugated states adjacent to Goa had some effect on the Portuguese colony. This, added to the frustrations and concerns of the Portuguese colonial government over reform (especially military) and maintenance of security in Goa, led to specific deployments by the Portuguese during the mutiny. Even though the effects of the Indian Mutiny on Goa might have been indirect, one can talk about specific impacts on the city: disturbances were imported from adjacent British-subjugated states; there was continual unreliability with indigenously recruited mixed race troops; improvisations were urgently made to bring in outside troops to bolster security in Goa. Colonial states such as Goa strove to evolve and consolidate themselves in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Keywords Indian Mutiny · Goa · British · African troops · Consolidation

INTRODUCTION

The narrative of the book so far has been to trace the nature of warfare and military developments of the Portuguese in India from the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, probe the internal dissensions and uprisings in India and relate how remnants of the colonial flotilla gradually engaged in fewer hostilities as the larger security framework of the Western Indian Ocean evolved. To reiterate a main thesis of the book, although the colonial instrument of arms of the Estado da Índia appeared to be able to carry out its missions and uphold its routine duties to some extent, this instrument of state was not solely or fully responsible for the Estado's survival, as deep-seated interests from indigenous mixed classes resisted reforms to streamline. These developments culminated to some extent in the immediate decades following the mid-nineteenth century.

This chapter briefly connects the 1857 Indian Mutiny to its historiography. The activities and entanglements that insurgents undertook in the British-subjugated states adjacent to Goa had some effect on the Portuguese colony. This, added to the frustrations and concerns of the Portuguese colonial government over reform (especially military) and maintenance of security in Goa, led to specific deployments by the Portuguese during the mutiny. Finally, the chapter looks at the aftermath of the 1857 uprising that linked to another noticeable event involving insubordination in 1870. The continuities and discontinuities of the Portuguese colonial military force vis-à-vis late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century developments are also briefly discussed. Overall, how the saga and evolution of the colonial military culminated in the second half of the nineteenth century and the implications it had on the military heritage of Goa are teased out.

THE LARGER CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE GOA

On the international stage, the uprisings in India discussed by R. Travers (in *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context*, 2010) had broken out against a centralized agricultural Mughal regime; which was considerably weakened by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Compared to the Indian Mutiny, which was argued in certain quarters to have been driven by some form of proto-nationalism, the uprisings in Goa, even those occurring in the 1870s, were assessed as non-nationalistic and their protagonists were emphatically highlighted to have 'refrained from

committing acts of violence [despite being well-armed]'.¹ Whether seen in terms of the corporatist or caste-based society (varying, not surprisingly, according to the length of time the colony had been governed), the Indo-Portuguese in the old territories and the indigenous Hindu sepoys in the new/outer territories were clamouring for their privileges rather than breaking free from Portugal. This is contrasted with developments in corporatist societies in South America, most of which had become independent by the mid-nineteenth century. While colonies in South America might have achieved their independence due to a mix of larger forces at work and contingent dynamics on the ground, these corporatist societies were still highly segregated and their populations were 'not fully cognizant or possessed a full expression of voice of their participative role in societies' as was the case in Western Europe.²

The Indian Mutiny relating to the British in Hindustan has been well analysed.³ The causes of the mutiny are usually attributed to a combination of the long-term erosion in the power and wealth of the zamindars, remnants of power groups which were still loyal to the Mughal cause, as well as zealous Muslim Maulvis. Meanwhile, the imposition of the Subsidiary Alliance by the British from the 1820s led to the appointment of resident advisers, which in turn resulted in the encroachment and redistribution of agricultural lands. There was also Thomas Macaulay's initiatives in religious proselytization and education which led to a rise

¹ P. Kramat, "Mutiny in the Portuguese Indian army", in P. Kramat ed., *Farar far: Local resistance to colonial hegemony in Goa* (Panaji: Institute Menezes Braganza, 1999), p. 75.

² The limitations and challenging route that states and economies in South America experienced aligned with the motive of I. Wallerstein in the world-system theory in explaining their stunted development in the twentieth century. This observation may be sustained to some extent as the most promising economies in South America continued to falter in the 2000s.

³ The Indian Mutiny was a complex event that has seen rich and diverse research being performed on the area. Traditional interpretations can be seen in, for instance, V. Smith and P. Spear, *The Oxford history of India* (Oxford: OUP, 1981). One of the sizeable projects which featured in the last several years was: Crispin Bates, *Mutiny at the margins: New perspectives on the Indian uprising of 1857* vols. I–VI (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2013). Critical discussions in historiography can be seen, for instance, in H.E. Raugh, "The battle of the books: An Indian Mutiny historiography", *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. 94.380 (2016), pp. 294–313. A voluminous collection of titles and sources brought together during the 150th anniversary of the event was *The Raugh bibliography of the Indian Mutiny* (Amherst: Herlion and Company, 2016).

in converts.⁴ Finally, the rumour about cartridges of new rifles being smeared with the fat of cows or pigs proved to be the ultimate straw for the outbreak of the biggest uprising in 1857. The course of the mutiny can be viewed in three sub-phases: (1) from summer 1857, the outbreak of uprising at Barrackpore and Meerut and the lifting of siege at Delhi and defeat of Nana Sahib; (2) from autumn 1857, the fight and lifting of sieges at Lucknow and Cawnpore; and (3) from 1858, the defeat of Tantya Tope (nephew of Nana Sahib) and the Rani of Jhansi (queen of the Maratha state of Jhansi), childhood friends who were both linked to military leaders close to Peshwa Bajirao II.⁵

Beyond Indo-Gangetic Plain of Hindustan, tensions and even small-scale uprisings occurred in central India (present-day Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh), Hyderabad and Mysore.⁶ Although these states had not participated actively in the Indian Mutiny, they experienced some degree of stress associated with the British presence in these regions. Depending on their demeanour and character, British resident advisers assigned under the Subsidiary Alliance had the potential to come into conflict with indigenous rulers if they were overly insistent about their worldview or lacked tact in their dealings. Malwa, in central India, experienced heightened internal turmoil, although this did not erupt into a full mutiny.

⁴ The terms of the Subsidiary Alliance treaty were:

- (i) The ruler will not keep an army of his own.
- (ii) British troops would be stationed permanently in the Indian ruler's territory.
- (iii) The ruler would have to pay for the maintenance of these troops. The payment could be made in cash or kind, or by ceding a part of the ruler's territory.
- (iv) It was compulsory for the Indian ruler to house a British resident in his court.
- (v) The ruler could not employ any non-British Europeans in his service or dismiss those who were there.
- (vi) The ruler could not enter into any alliance with any power without the consent of the Company.
- (vii) The ruler had to acknowledge the dominion of the British.

⁵ See relevant entries in P.J. Taylor, *A companion to the Indian Mutiny of 1857* (Oxford: OUP, 1996), pp. 170, 234 and 324.

⁶ See K. Srivastava, *Revolt of 1857 in Central India* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1966); K. Venkatasubba Sastri, *Administration of Mysore under M. Cubbon* (London: Allen & Urwin Ltd, 1932), O. Khalidi, *British residency in Hyderabad* (London: Bacs, 2005).

Although the military capacity of the Marathas was supposed to be severely curtailed after the Third Anglo-Maratha War and any remnant powers reduced accordingly afterwards in the Subsidiary Alliance, the Marathas still fielded prominent leaders of the Indian Mutiny. Leaders such as Nana Saheb, Tantya Tope, the Rani of Jhansi and Rango Bapuji Gupte of Satara posed a serious challenge to the British during the uprising. The insurgency in the dissolved state of Satara, for instance, was plotted by Gupte, Nana Sahib and Tantya Tope—although the plans were exposed before the revolt could occur. The Indian Mutiny also involved diverse groups of pillagers who were least concerned with the British; the anarchy experienced during the mutiny was likely to have resurrected dormant local thug groups that had supposedly been pacified in the 1830s. Furthermore, P. Shirodkar has pointed out that while the 1857 mutiny might have been the most coordinated uprising until then, there were countless other uprisings and plots that were likely to have occurred in the British territories. These spilled over the borders of Portugal's newly conquered territories in India when their surreptitious activities were exposed in the vicinity of Goa. A quick examination of the insurrections of Sawantwadi (1844) reveals that the Portuguese in Goa proactively monitored the interactions of the remnant Maratha states and local groups that could manifest as threats for the colonial state. In the 1844 incident, the Portuguese in Goa who tussled with the Marathas of Sawantwadi (rallied under the Bhonsale royal family) were covetous of the land borders between Sawantwadi and Pernem. At the same time, an uprising that broke out in Sawantwadi was sparked by an insurrection in Kolhapur, another rival state to Goa. Eventually, the Wadi rebels '[took] shelter in Goa under the Portuguese' although they would have had no qualms about '[appealing] to the British government' for help against their aid-provider.⁷ While the uprising in western India might not have been as intense as the one in North India, the close links between several states and peoples in southern Maratha country and Goa did create a certain degree of unrest there.

⁷ P. Shirodkar, "Luso-British relations vis-à-vis 1844 insurrections of Kolhapur and Sawantwadi", in *Researches in Indo-Portuguese history* (Jaipur: Publication Scheme, 1998), pp. 148–64. See AHU, SEMU N° 1909_2_ACL_SEMU_DGU_Caixa 2, entry on fugitives crossing the boundaries between British and Portuguese areas and crimes that arose as a result of these transgressions.

SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS IN GOA DURING THE INDIAN MUTINY AND MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS

Other than the possibility of imported revolt, long-term domestic developments in Goa revealed that measures directed at the military community and larger society exacerbated competition in resource redistribution. The 1850s began with the Dipa Rane rebellion of 1852, itself intimately tied to the long-term strife and politicking in the region. One can speculate the rebellion to have partly arisen from attempts by the Portuguese colonial government to increase its control or uniformization of society. These centralizing efforts included harsh measures to extract taxes from inamdars as well as new social measures that were ‘against the customs of the people’.⁸ Liberal Governor José Ferreira Pestana, who undertook two terms of appointment in India, was probably like other British or European officials sent to the East believing European values, education and reforms to be good for the natives. Two succeeding governors, the metropolitan and artillery officer José Januário Lapa and the metropolitan and cavalry officer António de Vasconcelos Correia—both technocratic and bureaucratic in their administrative orientation—exhibited early tendencies towards ‘civilizing’ missions.⁹

On the ground, there was indeed ‘bitter and acrimonious debate’ in the mid-nineteenth century on the continuance of the *comunidades* (village communities). Many called for their abolition, while others equally defended their existence and pressed for the preservation of the rights and privileges of the gauncars, which the latter had been enjoying for ages’.¹⁰ The debate did provoke a series of contemporary writings on the subject of *comunidades*.¹¹ Those who defended the system had a certain

⁸ Inams is defined as gifted and mocasso lands; or rent-free lands [granted] on condition of service. See Shirodkar, “Insurgency, 1857 mutiny in western India and the Portuguese”, in *Researches in Indo-Portuguese history* vol. 2 (Jaipur: Publication scheme), p. 174.

⁹ Editorial Enciclopedia, *Tratado de todos os vice-reis e governadores da Índia* (Lisbon: Editorial Enciclopedia Ltda, 1962), pp. 218–23.

¹⁰ Remy Dias’ review and survey on studies on village communities in Maria de Lourdes B. da Costa Rodrigues ed., *Bosquejo historico das comunidades* (Goa: L & L, 2012), pp. 14–15.

¹¹ The debate pertaining to the continuance or abolition ‘ended in the appearance of an article’ by J.H. da Cunha Rivara. This was a “coup de grace to the polemics that were going on in Goa” that led to further works by “scholars and administrators like Thomaz N. da Serra e Moura, José I. de Abranches Garcia, Manoel de Carvalho, Antonio A. Bruto

appreciation of it and believed in its workings. Those who were against it thought the abolition of the *comunidades* and their *camara geraes* (representative body of village communities at the provincial/taluka level) could break the monopoly of landownership in the *comunidades* and bring about a fairer distribution of assets to the enterprising capitalists that would lead to ‘an economic revival of Goa’.¹² It is clear that whichever side of the debate was favoured, the traditional collaborators’ (gauncars’) assets were to be more rigorously assessed in the hope that they might be taxed further, or their assets and privileges were to be distributed among other ‘new capitalist’ members of the community even though those who defended the gauncars appeared to have some form of unspoken interest or link with this group. Modern works by Teotonio R. de Souza, Joseph Velinkar, P.S. Pissurlencar and Remy A. Dias, for instance, have studied the *comunidade* and its impact on the society and economy of Goa, aspects of life in the *comunidade*, and ‘how the state [was slowly usurping] on its authority’. In the provinces of the New Conquests,¹³ it was recognized that while the implementation of the *comunidade* system might be nominally in place, it was implemented at a less intense level.¹⁴

da Costa, José M. de Sá, Julio M. de Vilhena, José M. Teixeira Guimares and Antonio E. da Almeida Azevedo” focusing on different aspects of agrarian Goa. See *Bosquejo historico das comunidades*, pp. 16–17. Two further notable works in favor of the preservation of the comunidades are: *Defensa dos direitos das gaocarias, gaocarias e dos seus privilegios, contra a proposta da sua dissolução e divisão das suas terras* by Filipe N. Xavier (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1856) and *Brados a favor dos comunidades* by J.H. da Cunha Rivara (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1870). Of the works that argued for the abolition, a series of articles and responses (“O meu voto”, “Ao redactor do boletim...”, “Uma palavra”, “Duas palavras”) can be found in the Boletim do governo do Estado da India no. 34 (Apr 1857), no. 43 (14 Jun 1856), no. 51 (1856), no. 87 (1857), no. 95 (1857).

¹² *Bosquejo historico das comunidades*, p. 15.

¹³ Filipe N. Xavier, *Collecção de bandos... que servem de leis regulamentares para o governo economico e judicial das provincias denominadas das Novas Conquistas* 3 vols. (Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1840–1851) offered a glimpse of the system in place in the territories of the New Conquests up to the eve of the 1850s.

¹⁴ See Teotonio R. de Souza, *Medieval Goa* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1979), Joseph Velinkar, *Comunidades de aldeia em Goa e sua evolução* (Np: np, nd) and Remy A. Dias, *The socio-economic history of Goa with reference to the comunidade system* (Ph.D thesis, Goa University, 2004).

The year in which the Indian Mutiny occurred saw the simultaneous breaking out of uprisings in Kolhapur, Bombay and Belgaum. Disturbance associated with the grease in the new cartridges was also the cause of the outbreak of the mutiny by the native infantry regiment in Kolhapur in July 1857.¹⁵ The second mutiny broke out in December 1857 after Kolhapur had been attacked by insurgents. In Bombay, skirmishes occurred between ‘British policemen and soldiers from the native infantry regiments stationed [in the city] in September 1857’.¹⁶ Belgaum, to the south of Goa (in Karnataka), also experienced some disturbances.¹⁷

Some degree of military plotting and manoeuvring nevertheless took place in Goa. Shirodkar has shown that the Portuguese in India experienced their own share of uprisings, plots and upheavals in the British territories that affected the Portuguese territories directly. The cause of the rebellion of Dipa Rane in 1852 might be pinned to the additional taxes and ‘social measures against the customs of the [indigenous] people’, which provoked the reaction and uprising of Dipa Rane from Satari and intrusions into Embarbaçem, Bicholim, Cananoca and Quepem. This made the Portuguese ‘panicky and even inclined to take the help of [jailed] Baba Dessaye implicated in Sawantwadi Insurrection (1844)’.¹⁸ The Portuguese had been careful to ensure that the revenue and potential for growth in agriculture and commerce were not overly curtailed.¹⁹ In the rebellion of Dipa Rane, the British supported the Portuguese

¹⁵ 27th native infantry regiment “broke ranks on 31st July 1857”. See V. Naregal, “The mutiny in western India: The marginal as regional dynamic”, in C. Bates ed., *Mutiny at the margins*, vol. 1 (London: Sage, 2013), pp. 167–86.

¹⁶ Naregal, “The mutiny in western India: The marginal as regional dynamic”, pp. 167–86. The plot in Satara (Maharashtra) was foiled in June 1857 “when the suspected rebels were apprehended a week before the imminent attack”.

¹⁷ P. Shirodkar, “Insurgency, 1857 mutiny in western India and the Portuguese”, in *Researches in Indo-Portuguese history* (Jaipur: Publication Scheme, 1998), p. 183.

¹⁸ Shirodkar, “Insurgency, 1857 mutiny in western India and the Portuguese”, pp. 174–75 and 179. The debate exists as to how the Portuguese classified or recognized ‘insurrection’. It appears that by the 1850s, a system of police station was set up in the various territories of British India. A unit of police and two other companies of police were stationed in Goa, Damão and Diu during the 1870 reform. See C. Belsa, “Estado da Índia: Ameaça externas e internas”, in M.T. Barata and N.S. Teixeira directed, *Nova história militar de Portugal* vol. 3 (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2004), pp. 311–12.

¹⁹ HAG, Monções do Reino no. 325, fl. 237.

colonial government when a political agent (Belgaum) and police superintendent (Sawantwadi) were ‘instructed to remove in the interior any persons aiding the Goan insurgents and to move the people from Satari away from the frontier [possibly to eliminate the aid given by these people to the insurgents]’.²⁰ It would be naïve to think that Luso-British cooperation was unshaken in this round of sociopolitical upheaval; Dipa Rane ‘wrote to Mr H.L. Anderson (Secretary of Government of Bombay) to try and persuade of the [Portuguese wrong] and plead [for his] friendly protection’.²¹ It is clear that the Portuguese authorities kept close tabs on the internal strife the British Indian dominions were experiencing because ‘if disturbance erupted in Bombay or Madras Presidencies, a crisis would develop for the Portuguese possessions’.²² An uprising in Kolhapur was supposed to have been instigated by the 27th Regiment of Native Infantry even though standard historiography on the Indian Mutiny usually asserts that the upheaval did not affect areas in central and southern India.²³

Although the Indian Mutiny caused more scare than actual threat,²⁴ on the ground deployments did take place in February 1859 when António de Vasconcelos Correia’s (93rd governor of Portuguese India) ‘wariness of his native soldiers’ led him to move a battalion of *caçadores* (light infantry officered by Europeans) from the border to guard the governor’s palace in Panjim and shifted a larger battalion of Indo-Portuguese infantry to the frontier provinces in the hope that ‘their potential for mutiny’ might be minimized.²⁵ Timothy Walker discusses the rationale for this:

²⁰ Shirodkar, “Insurgency, 1857 mutiny in western India and the Portuguese”, p. 177. On the British side, the effect of the event spread as far as Canara as the Magistrate “responded to tighten the security in his province”.

²¹ Shirodkar, “Insurgency, 1857 mutiny in western India and the Portuguese”, p. 178.

²² Shirodkar quotes this from AHG, Correspondencia para o Reino no. 2633, fl. 6v–7v.

²³ Shirodkar, “Insurgency, 1857 mutiny in western India and the Portuguese”, p. 183. Other documents can also be located voicing the concern of an uprising by the Marathas in the south, refer BA, Ms. 54-XIII-32, no. 30, 2 fl.

²⁴ T. Walker, “Slaves or soldiers? African conscripts in Portuguese India, 1857–60”, in I. Chatterjee and R. Eaton eds., *Slavery and South Asian history* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), p. 254.

²⁵ Walker, “Slaves or soldiers? African conscripts in Portuguese India”, p. 252.

During the period of crisis in British India, the more numerous regular infantry, broken into smaller units and under the close supervision of their European officers, could better control access to Goa, denying admission to outside agitators and censoring printed materials that crossed the frontier. At the same time, dividing this mixed-race battalion among Goa's numerous border posts and ordering them to conduct regular small-unit patrols greatly reduced the likelihood that the native troops would conspire to unite in rebellion.²⁶

There appeared to be a preference among the leadership to deploy European troops. A curious document, perhaps in reaction to the British request for help, reported that there was no European sepoy in Goa and the force was 'composed of local people with the exception of about 200 Christian sepoys [and these] were comparatively poor fighters'.²⁷ The observation that there were no European sepoys most likely meant that there were no pure European soldiers or mercenaries, since a Portuguese governor general had deemed these personnel to be able to secure the Estado. Elsewhere, a document signed by Sá da Bandeira debated the possibility of raising a legion of European troops because indigenous soldiers were likely to rebel in any joint operations with the British.²⁸ Shirodkar highlighted instances whereby the British asked for passage through Portuguese Indian territories. This was corroborated by a document dispensed from Lisbon by Sá da Bandeira himself.²⁹

The leadership in Goa was also desperate enough to attempt to procure the services of African slave soldiers, even though this had the potential to complicate the Luso-British treaty regulating the trade and trafficking of slaves. Walker reminds us, corroborating M. Newitt's observations, that slaves had been armed during crises in Portuguese colonial history and the practice remained 'current in the nineteenth century'.³⁰ The use of slaves in the military was not widespread because 'arming [them]

²⁶ Walker, "Slaves or soldiers? African conscripts in Portuguese India", p. 252. Walker cites this from AHG, no. 1449, fl. 81r-v.

²⁷ Shirodkar quotes this from HAG, Correspondencia para o Reino no. 2633, fl. 6v-7v.

²⁸ BA, Ms. 54-XI-13, no. 27, first part of document before the appended update of India.

²⁹ Shirodkar, "Insurgency, 1857 mutiny in western India and the Portuguese", p. 184. Refer BA, Ms. 54-XIII-32, no. 30, 2 fl.

³⁰ Walker, "Slaves or soldiers? African conscripts in Portuguese India", p. 240.

always involved risks and costs—the calculated risk of facilitating rebellion by slaves who had military experience, and the costs of rewarding their military service [or losing them].³¹ After a period of ineffectual implementation of abolitionist measures from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1842 put ‘a definitive end to slave trafficking from Portuguese Africa to any destination in the Indian Ocean’.³² Not only was the governor of Mozambique facing a genuine ‘lack of men and means’, but sending slave soldiers across the sea would run the risk of their being labelled as contraband and ‘subject to interception and confiscation by the British navy patrols’.³³ Bolstering the discussion further was a document of April–May 1857 referring to 70 ‘black’ soldiers who could be sent to the Estado da Índia and how these were to be organized into ‘companies of the flank’ of the colonial army of the Estado as well as incorporated into the artillery regiment. The secretary of state of naval and overseas matters instructed the Portuguese governor general of India to make arrangements for the provision and transportation (via merchant ships) of these soldiers. The scribbled comments on the document confirmed the number of soldiers and pointed out that European officers needed to be appointed to accompany them and asked for the matter to be treated with urgency.³⁴

THE AFTERMATH AND LEGACY

Rebello da Silva (1822–1871), who for a large part of his career served as a scholar academic, was part of the administrative and ministerial team (Conselho Superior de Instrução Pública) headed by the Duke of Loule (whose family, at the end of the civil war in the 1830s, was eligible for succession to the Portuguese throne). The major reforms initiated in India included the following: (i) military reforms (discussed further below) were targeted at the rationalization of the force structure and centralization across the region; (ii) in administration, the reforms did away with the apparatus of the earlier colonial structure and implemented

³¹ Walker, “Slaves or soldiers? African conscripts in Portuguese India”, p. 241.

³² Walker, “Slaves or soldiers? African conscripts in Portuguese India”, p. 244.

³³ Walker, “Slaves or soldiers? African conscripts in Portuguese India”, p. 250.

³⁴ See document in cache(s) BA, Ms. 54-XI-13 and BA, Ms. 54-XIII-32. Meanwhile, an array of transfer of personnel can be seen in HAG, Livros dos Monções no. 368.

some form of centralization; (iii) in education and instruction, different types of specialized instructions were introduced; (iv) in health administration, medical education was introduced in the colonies and pharmacies were set up; (v) railway building was conceived; (vi) in penal administration, the reforms refined the management of the *degradados*³⁵ in the colonial settlements; and (vii) a patriotic spirit was fostered to counter external threats and competition (for instance, the increased frequency of smuggling activities or emergence of new competitive ports).³⁶ The reforms of Rebelo da Silva injected an element of modernization in the colonies. However, pragmatic and economic considerations often required the mines in the colonies to be lucratively extracted to finance them, which potentially slowed the progress of the reforms. Furthermore, the insistence on standardization and hope of harnessing patriotic fervour were not always practical or possible.

Although the police force was slow to be set up (Chapter 4),³⁷ the shift from Old Goa to the new capital city at Panjim had been gradually effected (and officially pronounced) from the 1840s (1843). The reforms implemented in the colony were manifested in the infrastructure setup in the new city. The setting up of the system of primary and secondary education, for instance, apart from the education offered in the Military Academy, resulted in at least 11 schools on the islands via the *portaria* (ordinance) of 1842. The Medical School of Nova Goa (Escola Médico-Cirúrgica de Nova Goa), inaugurated in 1842, started classes even though it faced opposition from the metropole in the following decade. Other official and military structures that were set up or maintained in the city included, for instance, the palace of Panjim, the Gaspar Dias fort, the new public jail and the telegraph services (which established optical signal communication between the capital city, Aguarda, Reis Magos and Cabo). In Old Goa and the islands, the factory for the production of (gun)powder as well as the fortifications at Aguarda and Reis Magos was also repaired or expanded. In essence, there appeared to be an attempt,

³⁵ Persons who were deported or exiled.

³⁶ Antonio da S. Rego, *O ultramar português no século XIX* (Lisbon: Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1966), p. 121.

³⁷ The Portuguese colonial government in Goa notified in July 1870 of the regulation of the body of the police force of the city of Nova Goa (Regulamento, Corpo da policia da cidade de Nova Goa). See C. Pinto, *Colonial Panjim: Its governance, its people* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2017), p. 113.

as C. Pinto argued, to restore ‘the Goa Dourada’ (golden age of Goa), especially beyond the mid-nineteenth century.³⁸

Elaborating on the developments of the colonial military colonies, specifically in Africa and Asia, from the 1840s there appeared to be a trend of attempted professionalization and decentralization (collaborating with indigenous or allied forces in patrolling or limited engagements). Attempts to create a centralized strategic or reserve force at various times designated Goans, Europeans or Africans as the core of that force, although these schemes did not work out satisfactorily in the eighteenth to the early part of the nineteenth century. The onslaught of the Indian Mutiny underscored the need for European troops and highlighted the use of black African troops in guarding the security of Goa—a realization the British quickly came to. The British strove to rebalance the proportions of native forces recruited from ethnic subgroups, which were perceived as less loyal vis-a-vis European troops.

The challenges of reforms, which were debated in parliament in the metropole, were reported in a journal in a colony in the East in the 1870s.³⁹ A number of issues plagued the reforms. First, finances continued to be a problem (lack of *orçamento*). The journal, however, acknowledged that military organization in the colonies was too important to be left to those with business interests. This reflected the trend that the British East India Company had also absolved its responsibilities in India and elsewhere. Second, there seemed to be a need and desire to harmonize the system so that officers and soldiers, for instance, might have better opportunities for deployment and career mobility. The irregularity in the system was causing a lack of discipline and gaps in the recognition of merits in servicemen; this situation was prevalent in Africa as well as India. Third, to handle uprisings in the colonies and probably cope with external threats or undertake punitive expeditions, there was a need to build an effective strategic or core force. Reform

³⁸ Pinto, *Colonial Panjim*, pp. 65–68; see also V. Pinho, *Snapshots of Indo-Portuguese history* (IV) (Panaji: V. Pinho, 2009), pp. 102–103, 105–107 and 116 and C. Madeira Santos, “Entre velha Goa e Pangim: A capital do Estado da Índia e as reformulações da política ultramarina”, Centro de Estudos de História e Cartografia Antiga paper series (no. 243) (Lisbon: Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical, 2001). It might be of interest to note that prior and up till the Pombaline period in Goa, there was a brief attempt to relocate the capital of the Estado from Old Goa to Mormugão.

³⁹ I.A.C.M. Biblioteca do Edifício do Instituto para os Assuntos Cívicos e Municipais, *Povir*, issue 133 March 1900.

of the Portuguese colonial military was needed so that Lisbon could be prepared for contingencies—for instance, the rebellion in India. Internal dissensions in Goa dotted the timeline over the longer nineteenth century (1840s, 1850s, 1870s, 1890s), although their significance was not always accorded the needed context or weightage. Portugal's wars of expansion in the second half of the nineteenth century were fought largely in Angola in the 1850s and the Zambezi region in the 1890s. In the campaign in Africa, the need to call upon home troops, combined with the necessity of summoning reinforcement auxiliaries from nearby or other colonies, made the need for better organization more urgent. An instance of an effective organization of such a force was later seen in the company of Humbe (consisting of Portuguese and indigenous soldiers) operating in Angola.⁴⁰ Moreover, the inefficacy of the military in important places, some of which did not have any artillery, could not be tolerated any further in view of the progress of modern warfare. Other strands of the debate continued to ask whether a regular nucleus of effective troops could be raised from the indigenous or native population.⁴¹

Given the intermittent uprisings in Goa in the half-century from the 1820s, it was not surprising that there was intense reaction and resistance to the reforms enacted in 1869–1870. The process devolved into a negotiation between the mutineers and colonial government over the privileges that could be retained by personnel of the Goan army. Between the two uprisings in 1870, the demands of the colonial government were to: (1) reduce the standing colonial army by more than half (about 60%); (2) reduce the substantial number of commissioned, noncommissioned, and other petty or low-ranking officers (corporal); (3) reduce the *soldos* (pay) by half (50%); (4) reduce the deficit of the colonial government by four-fifths (83%); and (5) permit the deployment of the army of Goa to other parts of the empire in times of exigency, facilitating a more efficient allocation of manpower and resources for the defence of Portugal's colonies in Asia and East Africa. The revolt of early 1870 instantly forced the government to relinquish or grant concessions to all the measures in the reform. Soldiers (including officers) were allowed to serve until they passed away. This, along with the other compromises, immediately frustrated the plan

⁴⁰ Humbe referred to a place in Angola; hence, the company (military) that was stationed there was named as the “company of Humbe”.

⁴¹ I.A.C.M., *Povir*, issue 133 March 1900.

to rationalize the budget. In fact, the deficit might even have been aggravated because soldiers' pay was to be raised and retirement benefits to be dispensed.⁴² The government in Portugal replaced the governor general and insisted on restoring the decree of 1869. This provoked the mutineers to launch another round of uprising. In this round the mutineers' demands catered, for instance, to the niche subgroups asking for promotions for officers, renumerations (and pensions) for low-ranking officers such as sergeants, better service conditions for musicians. Despite being severely outnumbered (400 versus 1,600), the mutineers were persuaded to return to their barracks. P. Kramat points out in her analysis that the mutineers were not aggressive in either incident.⁴³

Compared to developments in Africa (which included the western part and the coast of the Indian Ocean), events in Goa—and, to some extent, the surrounding seas—were less tumultuous. The involvement of local mixed race was limited by 1870 as the size of the army was reduced. Other native and minority soldiers continued to press for their privileges as reinforcements from the metropole became increasingly scarce.⁴⁴ The Third Empire, which stretched into the twentieth century and overlapped with the reign of the Salazar regime (1932–1968), was assessed in terms of its acquisitions in the scramble for Africa between 1885 and 1914 to be 'relatively successful'. It was able to acquire 11% of the population of the total colonial population there; this was comparable to the figures attained by France (15%) or Germany (9%).⁴⁵ From the end of the nineteenth century to the First World War, there was a rising trend of nationalism across India, which culminated in a more fervent phase by the 1930s, exacerbated by the onset of the Great Depression in that decade. The

⁴² The pay was made equal to that paid to a soldier of the army of Portugal although this was still paid in the currency of Goa. See Kramat, "Mutiny in the Portuguese Indian army", p. 72. Kramat consulted the *Boletim of the Estado da Índia*, 28 Jan 1879 (no. 8), pp. 77–86 and *Boletim*, 1 Feb 1879 (no. 9), pp. 93–96. The mutineers were also expected to be pardoned.

⁴³ Kramat also added that the uprisings were, unlike the Indian Mutiny, far from being able to be interpreted as 'nationalistic' in any way. See Kramat, "Mutiny in the Portuguese Indian army", p. 79.

⁴⁴ R. Pelissier, *As companhias coloniais de Portugal* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 2006), pp. 310 and 419.

⁴⁵ Britain was at the head of the list controlling 30 per cent of the population while Belgium and Italy held 7 and 1 per cent of the population, respectively.

impact of the Depression on India has been investigated to some extent.⁴⁶ India experienced some degree of economic stringency and disruption, as did Goa, which needed to import certain necessary commodities even under unfavourable terms of trade.⁴⁷

Aside from the quelling of an insurrection in Goa in 1895, there were only isolated military activities in this theatre. The nature of the authoritarian and colonial regime implied that the colonial populations were likely to be repressed in their proto-nationalistic aspirations and day-to-day affairs. The phenomenon of Goan nationalism was complex. First, part of the creole and/or native population, who fielded the early nationalists, had also identified with the Portuguese colonizer.⁴⁸ Second, following from the first point, the pre-war nationalistic fervour in Goa was influenced by Gandhi's satyagraha (non-violent struggle) movement, although the impulse appeared to be weakened by divisions in Goan political society. Third, the freedom struggle of Goa was alleged to have been sparked by an ethnic and agrarian uprising led by the Ranes or sardesais of Satari (although T. Souza has attempted to dispute this).⁴⁹ Finally, overlapping partly with the third point, members of the colonial military, as has been highlighted in this and earlier chapters, had participated in uprisings, but these had not always been rallied under a coherent banner of nationalism. Discussions of the Goan identity, especially in the post-colonial period, are entangled with the larger Indian identity and the nationalistically, ethnically and religiously charged sentiments prevalent in contemporary politics.⁵⁰ Overall, despite the gradual simmering of nationalism as well as a degree of repression in daily lives in Goa, the city and province of Goa in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth appeared to be relatively peaceful.

⁴⁶ D. Rothermund, *India in the Great Depression* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1992).

⁴⁷ Murelle M.L. da Costa, "History of trade and commerce in Goa, 1878–1961" (Ph.D thesis, Goa University, 2002).

⁴⁸ The regime claimed its overseas colonies to be an indivisible part of the metropole, and the population was granted limited franchise from the 1820s. The administrative service (in particular from the 1930s) drew upon the service of the 'elites of Goa'; see Pinho, *Snapshots of Indo-Portuguese history*, pp. 182–85.

⁴⁹ Teotonio R. de Souza, *Goa to me* (New Delhi: New Concept, 1994), pp. 154–99.

⁵⁰ P. Gupta, *Portuguese decolonization in the Indian Ocean world: History and ethnography* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).

In the contemporary period, commentators have discussed the issue of Goans' lack of interest in the military vocation or career.⁵¹ There has been little analysis of this perhaps inconspicuous phenomenon. Those who rebut the observation have pointed out that Goa fielded a defence minister—Manohar Parrikar, who served in 2014–2017. Parrikar steered ‘the Ministry through the tough challenges of [terrorist] attacks and responded to these with exemplary boldness’.⁵² The late minister was posthumously conferred the Padma Bhushan (third-highest civilian award in the Republic of India), and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses was renamed the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Apart from the prestigious personage of Parrikar, there were men such as Brigadier Ian da Costa, a Goan, who served in the military. Nevertheless, on the issue as to why fewer Goans were joining the army, nobody had a satisfactory answer.⁵³ This writer will venture to conjecture that, in light of historical developments and the associated decline of the martial tradition in Goa, the development of the place as a laid-back tourist destination from the nineteenth century might have contributed to a lack of interest in this specific public service.

CONCLUSION

Although traditional historiography on the Indian Mutiny (1857) appears to be little associated with developments in South India, regional and revisionist literature is gradually unearthing or making linkages to disturbances that occurred in localities in the South. Even though the effects of the Indian Mutiny on Goa might have been indirect, one can talk about specific impacts on Goa: (i) there was a realization that indigenously recruited troops might not be reliable in guarding the security of the colony; (ii) although attempts to improve the efficacy of the

⁵¹ TNN, “Few Goan takers for army careers”, *Times of India* (29 Oct 2015), accessed at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/few-goan-takers-for-army-careers/articleshow/49573948.cms>.

⁵² PTI, “Government renames IDSA as Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses”, in *The Economic Times* (18 Feb 2020), accessed at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/government-renames-idsa-as-manohar-parrikar-institute-for-defence-studies-and-analyses/articleshow/74191082.cms>.

⁵³ ‘Diary of an infantryman’, accessed at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUomyT1qNQg> (17 Jun 2020); see also book by Ian da Costa, *Diary of an infantryman* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2013).

colonial military force were not making much progress, urgent improvizations were made to bring in African troops to bolster security in Goa; (iii) disturbances (in the form of instigators of potential uprisings) from adjacent British-subjugated states slipping into Goa were a constant hazard; and (iv) similar to developments in British-controlled areas, broad post-Mutiny measures aimed at centralization, uniformization, and the building of social services or infrastructures were undertaken to consolidate the colonial state of Goa. The outbreak of uprisings from 1869 to 1870 was a result of tussles between the colonial government and, in particular, creole (Indo-Portuguese) soldiers in the colonial army. Although the colonial army was successfully reduced on those occasions, not all the agendas of the proposed military reforms were actualized. In the attempted uprisings, the participants—whether indigenously recruited soldiers or *Ranes*—were more interested in securing their privileges than pushing for independence from Portugal.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the semblance of a new force did emerge from 1870, and it went on to incorporate technological upgrades from the Industrial Revolution. The Portuguese colonial army in deployment between colonies (for instance, East Africa and India) in the Indian Ocean did not score spectacular victories, and an overall message of weakness rather than strength described the survival of the Portuguese dominions. If any martial heritage could be linked to the Portuguese colonial presence in India before the nineteenth century, the tradition was clearly dispelled or shattered in the first half of that century.

⁵⁴ This was verified again in the 1895 uprising.



Epilogue

Abstract In summing up the book, a few salient messages might be highlighted: the period from 1750 to the 1850s was a highly transitional time frame in which the world experienced gradually increasing trade, linkages, as well as intensive and escalating conflicts. The location of the military history narrative and the Portuguese colonial case study during this period highlights a diverse empire in action as well as an agglomeration of colonies of different nature in interaction. Colonies that were less strategic or profitable could, surprisingly, continue to survive in an increasingly globalizing world. Sectarian subgroups in the military organization pressured the colonial administration to assert their interests in an increasingly connected world. At the same time, the comparison of the Portuguese with the Dutch and British colonial military forces showed that formidable and weak forces had both similarities and dissimilarities; the colonial militaries in India, for instance, whether they were deemed relatively more or less ‘successful’ in the nineteenth century, were constantly evolving; and even the weakest among them (Goa) continued to spend a substantial proportion of the (colonial) state revenues on defence and security.

Keywords Colonial military · East India company · Dutch · British · Hegemony of the weak

INTRODUCTION

The book has probed, via several chapters, facets of the Portuguese colonial military in Goa. While this force was still making fresh conquests and breaking new ground in the eighteenth century, it did not engage in any trailblazing feats in the early nineteenth century. On the broader front, skirmishes across the Western Indian Ocean and military activities in colonies farther afield that were affiliated with Goa are also discussed in two chapters in the book. This closing chapter will refresh and sum up aspects of the thesis raised in the introductory chapter. As a parting exercise, a brief discourse in comparison will also be undertaken of the colonial military enterprise of Goa vis-a-vis other colonial enterprises in close proximity or competition. It is hoped that the relative significance (or insignificance) of the Portuguese military endeavour in Goa will be elicited in the process.

PORTUGUESE IN INDIA IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FROM EIGHTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURY

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly between 1750 and 1850, witnessed tumult and change in various parts of the world. This book has undertaken to delve into a number of trends and driving forces associated with European political and military activities at the regional level in India during the period, these were: (i) intensification of colonialism; (ii) challenges to European chartered company and monopoly trade as well as associated privatization; (iii) diffusion and adaptation of European military developments; and (iv) revolutionary sentiments arising from globalized or localized pressures. In an increasingly connected world fuelled by overlapping trends, few regions were free from the influence of these forces.

The Portuguese colony of Goa in India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, beyond the New Conquests period (1760–80s), was becoming a relatively inconspicuous place in centre-periphery relations in the context of the British consolidation and domination of India. This was notwithstanding the fact that research has revealed there was a revival or boost in commerce spearheaded by indigenous traders (particularly Saraswat Brahmins), among other commercial subgroups. Although indigenous and mixed-descent traders continued to trade along the western coast of India and Bengal, the colonial state apparatus did

not have the means to tax the profits of such activities, and thus its ports did not become more competitive or bring in more revenues. At various points in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there were even discussions with the British to have Goa occupied or sold—even as the external threats gradually dissipated.¹

Goa's colonial military, except for the exploits and defensive actions undertaken in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, suffered from the malaise alleged in the Black Legend. This malaise, following the critique of A. Disney, did not refer to generic corruption but to the sectoral interest (or factionalism) associated with the Indo-Portuguese personnel in service in the army as well as the wider society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The failures of attempts to form trading companies could be traced to the same factionalism, although not necessarily involving Luso-descendants.

Although the Portuguese colonial army appeared to be able to carry out its missions and uphold its routine duties to some extent, the survival of the Estado could not be attributed solely or fully to this instrument of state. Diplomacy obviated the need to engage in unnecessary conflicts or to commit the already scarce resources of the Estado in order to ensure its survival. The Estado was supposed to have behaved more like a state entity as it gained more territories, but the task of diplomacy in India was complicated by the appointment of ill-suited diplomatic representatives as well as a host of sociopolitical groups that the Estado had to engage with on the ground. Negotiations on the ground were made even more difficult by uncoordinated negotiations in the metropole. Fortunately, the treasury was able to raise the necessary finances to pay for the costs of garrisoning as well as continuing skirmishes along the border in the 1810s. The treasury continued to be burdened by military expenses. The expenses were estimated to have increased from 30 per cent to 50 per cent in the context of reduced revenues a century later (Table 3.5). The proportion of military to overall expenditure increased from the early eighteenth to the early nineteenth century.

The Portuguese colonial military co-opted substantial indigenous auxiliary forces in its campaigns in the sixteenth century and continued to utilize these in the eighteenth century. While the regular component

¹ E. Carreira, *Globalizing Goa, 1660–1820: Change and exchange in a former capital of empire* (Goa: Goa 1556, 2014), pp. 95–130. Calcutta attempted to acquire Goa (with Diu and Damão) again without success in 1839.

of the colonial force continued to increase in size in the early nineteenth century, the mixed European-indigenous classes that evolved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries developed deep interests that resisted reforms to streamline. Indo-Portuguese soldiers appeared to have deteriorated in their fighting capacity in the early nineteenth century; this was affirmed by the (urgent) need to resort to African and other troops when tensions increased due to the Indian Mutiny. Elsewhere, one is reminded (again) that there were a number of strata of Luso-descendants, and a small group of these who served as military engineers continued to receive privileged treatment and contributed to military and non-military (civil) constructions.²

In the transition from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth, the increase in British influence on the subcontinent shifted the economic foci of traders to the British areas (Bombay and Calcutta) as well as gradually marginalized Goa and segments of the relatively immobile population (most notably, the soldiery) in the colony. Although the borders were stabilized in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and Goa appeared to be more peaceful, the unequal distribution of resources and privileges, in addition to the infusion of disaffected elements from the British territories, led to increased tensions in the arena of non-state conflict. It appeared that the dissatisfaction of uprisers had more to do with the limited distribution of privileges than any politically motivated sentiments.

On the seas in the Western Indian Ocean, the increasing politicization of the sea space and privatization of trade rendered the colonial fleet defunct, although it attempted to catch up with technology and strove to fulfil certain routine duties. The continuance of these duties reflected Goa's need for the supplies of certain staples and commodities from outside. The loss of Bassein and naval establishments in the eighteenth century, the landward expansion of the Estado, as well as the neglect of the metropole due to the upheavals there led to a tilt in the allocation of resources in the colony towards terrestrial priorities.

In the context of compatriot colonies and their militaries in East Africa and Brazil (before independence), the Estado appeared to exhibit more linkages with Africa than with Brazil, due to proximity. East Africa was

² Alice S. Faria, "O papel dos luso-descendentes na engenharia militar e nas obras publicas em Goa ao longo do século XIX", in A.T. Matos and J.T. e Cunha eds., *Goa: Passado e presente* vol. 1 (Lisboa: Universidade Católica Portuguesa and CHAM, 2012), pp. 225–37.

still expanding in the first half of the nineteenth century, although the metropole had little control over this, and the prazo system was beginning to lapse into decline. The Portuguese were more inclined to rely on companies to manage a range of (colonial) activities, including exploration and security, in Brazil compared to their counterparts in East Africa or India. The relative geographical proximity between Goa and East Africa only gave rise to limited cultural affinities at the formal Estado level and deeper affinities at the informal diasporic level. By contrast, broader cultural affinities could be found between Brazil and Goa at the formal Estado level, although the latter was left largely on its own to manage its affairs during the periods when the Portuguese court moved to Brazil or when it was experiencing revolutions and civil wars in Portugal in the 1800s. The peculiarities of these links were noticeable in the colonial armies raised in East Africa and Brazil. On the ground, it was not always possible to distinguish violence associated with formal and informal coercive activities to secure slaves. In keeping with external colonial developments, the increasing prohibition of the slave trade by the British affected the receipts of not only the prazo owners but also investors from the metropole who had invested in the trade.

COMPARISON OF PORTUGUESE WITH DUTCH EXPERIENCE IN INDIA IN CONTEXT OF BRITISH DEVELOPMENTS

The arrival of Europeans in India in the early modern period (1400–1800) was in three major overlapping waves: the Iberians in the sixteenth century; the Dutch (and, to a lesser extent, the English and French) in the seventeenth; and the increase in prominence of the English in the late eighteenth century transitioning into the nineteenth.³ This perspective (of outlining the three waves of Europeans) does not attempt to marginalize the presence of other European groups in India such as the Danes and Swedes but highlights those that attempted some form of terrestrial hegemony on the subcontinent of India.⁴ Of the three phases and colonial powers involved, the Portuguese attempt has been fairly well

³ G. V. Scammell, *The world encompassed: The first European maritime empires, 800–1650* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

⁴ A. Sinha, “Swedes in the Indian Ocean: Their maritime initiative during the eighteenth century”, *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* vol. 73 (2012), 1125–31 and R. Stow, “Denmark in the Indian Ocean, 1616–1845: An introduction”, *Kumapi* vol 1.1 (1979), pp. 11–26.

documented and assessed, and the British endeavour in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has also been relatively well researched and debated.⁵ However, the Dutch period of attempted hegemony in India has received relatively limited treatment, because the Dutch gradually shifted their locus of power to Java in the East Indies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁶ Compared to the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, the Dutch appeared to have fostered a stronger position of power on the subcontinent in the seventeenth century. How, then, did the situation of the Dutch devolve to a state in which they had to abandon most of their footholds there? One might explore a few lines of inquiry in relation to this question as well as in context of the Portuguese and British experience in India, although the brief comparative treatment will only scratch the surface of such a complex topic.

First, how and to what extent, was the Dutch chartered company model instrumental in forging (or losing) the Dutch enterprise in India? The chartered company might have been ‘a most spectacular instance of the coalescence of market and state’.⁷ The Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie, VOC), according to certain unofficial estimates, was one of the biggest company in history; (even) surpassing the British EIC.⁸ By contrast, the Portuguese attempts at

⁵ Assessments of these can be found in, for instance, M. Pearson’s *Before colonialism: Theories on Asian-European relations* (Delhi: OUP, 1988) and O. Prakash’s *European commercial enterprise in pre-colonial India* (Cambridge: CUP, 1998). Voluminous treatments can be seen in, for instance, F. Bethencourt and K. Chaudhuri eds., *História da expansão Portuguesa* 5 vols. (Lisbon: Circulo de Leitorias, 1998) and the Oxford Press-published, *The Oxford history of British empire* 5 vols. (Oxford: OUP, 1998–2001).

⁶ Although the Dutch were in Batavia in Java as early as 1619, the city only gradually became the capital of the Dutch in the East after the series of defeats in the Anglo-Dutch wars (1652–54, 1665–67, 1672–74). In 1669, the Dutch VOC still possessed a reasonably strong colonial military force on land and sea—150 (armed) merchantmen and 40 warships as well as an army of 10,000 soldiers and sailors (in addition to 50,000 employees), see I. Burney, *East Indies* (Kenthurst: Rosenberg Publishing, 2013), p. 116. The VOC expanded its territorial control of Java from the 1680s (occupation of Banten).

⁷ J. Nijman, “The VOC and the expansion of the world-system, 1602–1799”, *Political Geography* vol. 13.3 (1994), 225. See also F. Gaastra, *The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and decline* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003).

⁸ Quora, “What is the difference between the Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company?”, accessed at <https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-the-Dutch-East-India-Company-and-the-British-East-India-Company-Why-the-similar-names-Which-one-was-bigger>.

forming a company in India on a number of occasions (for instance, 1628 and 1743) had been foiled owing to a variety of reasons.⁹ The Dutch chartered company in the colonial and in particular, the eastern context acted not only as a commercial entity but embraced full repertoire of activities that would be associated with a fully operating (indigenous) state. The conduct of military and security (protection) activities in the British and Dutch cases were largely undertaken by the companies while these activities continued to be assumed by the colonial state in the Portuguese case. The ‘ease’ with which allies or collaborators could be solicited on the local scene may be linked to some extent to the state of polity (consolidated versus fragmented) identified during the long haul of the Mughal period (1526–1857). The weakening of the power in the (Mughal) centre did afford the Europeans a chance to extend themselves. Part of the discourse was also intertwined with the extent to which the larger political economic system of early modern India had broken down.¹⁰ The (Dutch and English) commercial companies and the

⁹ A. Disney, “The Portuguese in India: The first Portuguese India Company, 1628–33”, in *The Portuguese in India and other studies* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 148–62. Teddy Y. H. Sim, *Portuguese enterprise in the East* (Leiden: Brill, 2011). The specific reasons for why the companies did not succeed were: (i) their weak starting base (little demand for the commodity being traded owing to surreptitious activities) as well as (ii) political economic reasons (factions in the colonial officialdom sabotaging one another).

¹⁰ A. Ali, “Recent theories of eighteenth-century India” in P. Marshall ed., *Eighteenth century in Indian history* (Oxford: OUP, 2003), pp. 90–99. The transition through the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries witnessed the assertion of British influence in India in the political and economic spheres. This process has been intensely debated revolving around the issue of the ‘bifurcation’ of the (eighteenth) century as well as what is known at times as the ‘Dark century’ of modern Indian history. The discussion is also bifurcated along a north–south debate. The debate has long veered away from the big-event and the traditionally (Oxford-)interpreted history of India (such as that written by V. Smith) since the 1980s. In the series under ‘Oxford debates in Indian history and society’, the decline of the Mughal empire in India has been accrued to a multitude of internal and external causes; least of all to British interference. Mughal decline could be categorized in a broad and/or complex way into the reasons such as—Mughal rulers and their religious affiliation/policy, the assignment (zamindari/jagirdari) system, role of bankers/merchants, broader cultural/strategic reason, rising regional elites, interference of British, etc. The debate revolved the timing and phases, extent of overlap as well as the continuity/discontinuity of the factors. A major crux of the discussion was the degree to which the Mughal (or its successor) regime had deteriorated or its social-economic subgroups collaborated with the coming of the British. In the western part of centre-south/south of the subcontinent (or specifically the Bombay presidency), where Portuguese Goa was closely linked to in terms of territorial, economic and cultural

Portuguese State in India acted more submissively but flexibly utilizing a number of channels of communication up till Aurangzeb's (Alamgir I) reign (r. 1658–1707).¹¹ Although the Dutch had been ascribed as 'reluctant imperialist' by G. Winius and M. Vink, they were aggressively engaged in the expansive territorial wars against indigenous kingdoms in Ceylon as well as in political factionalism in Bengal, against local potentaries such as Siraj-ud-Daula and Mir Jafar, and even involving in a battle (Bedara or Hoogly) there in the late Mughal period.¹²

In terms of its commercial agendas, the VOC was able to procure a part of the produce of the local (agricultural) communities and transact these (spices, textiles, tea, coffee as well as other commodities) in the commerce lucratively to some extent for the Asian-Europe trade and intra-Asian trade. M. Pearson, in assessing I. Wallerstein's world system model, grappled with the Portuguese and other European enterprises in the Indian Ocean and admitted that the impact of European insertion and activities in the region could be 'varying [depending on the] place, time and product'.¹³ This took into account the more voluminous data—compared to the Portuguese case—that could be gleaned from the Dutch archives and where the 'role of the Asian trade [could be more readily ascertained]'. Looking at the case of the pepper trade and attempted control by the Portuguese and Dutch of the sources of supply of the commodity and its markets,¹⁴ the Dutch requisitioned the commodity from the markets in south India and appeared to be able to commandeer a larger proportion of the market at their height in the seventeenth century compared to Portugal. The latter was only able to buy about 10 per cent of the pepper being imported into Europe. This is seen in context

affairs, the pace of (British) imperialism and capitalism held similar and dissimilar points in developments vis-a-vis those in the north.

¹¹ G. van Meersbergen, "The diplomatic repertoires of the east India companies in Mughal south Asia, 1608–1717", *The Historical Journal* vol. 62.4 (2019), pp. 875–98.

¹² The Dutch had actively supported Mir Jafar against Siraj but lost the battle of Hoogly. In Ceylon, the Dutch areas of control were not appreciably extended compared with the Portuguese dominions.

¹³ M. Pearson, *Before colonialism: Theories on Asian-European relations, 1500–1750* (Delhi: OUP, 1988), pp. 32–75.

¹⁴ The case of the commodity of pepper is discussed arising from the fact that the Portuguese trade at the height of their activities in the Indian Ocean was associated with the transaction of this good, this made for a good contrast with the Dutch who also held this good in some importance at their peak in the seventeenth century.

of increasing production in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹⁵ On the eve of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war (1780–84), the spices of all kinds still ‘accounted for 35 per cent of the total auction proceeds of the VOC’. Having fought very hard to secure their control, spices (in particular, pepper), ‘contrary to general opinion in the literature, continued to be lucrative until [the company’s] demise’ and it (the company) continued to be ‘a [very] important supplier’.¹⁶ Depending on the perspective taken, it has been touted that the Dutch were seriously challenged competing in the textile market against indigenous Asian traders.¹⁷ If judged against a harsher criteria, one couldn’t be sure if they had attained their goals; only indigenous powers such as Travancore and Mysore were able to achieve monopolistic and monopsonic control of pepper when they took over Cochin and Calicut, respectively, in the eighteenth century.¹⁸

Juxtaposing the extraction of the colonial powers (B) against the expenditure on the (colonial) military (A), the proportion of A to B had always been substantial for the Portuguese in India (Table 3.5), amounting up to one third when the revenues were more abundant in the early eighteenth century. While expenditure did not vary drastically in the early nineteenth century, the proportion was affected adversely as a result of decreasing revenues (extraction). The Portuguese did, with

¹⁵ Refer Pearson, *Before colonialism: Theories on Asian-European relations*, pp. 32–75; O. Prakash, *European commercial enterprise in pre-colonial India* (Oxford: OUP, 1998); Teddy Y. H. Sim, *Portuguese enterprise in the East* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 120–26. The annual quantities carried by the Portuguese in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were pegged at 20,000 q (quintal) (80% of cargo of ship taken up by pepper, 5 ships per year), 2000 q (>10% of cargo of ship taken up by pepper, 5 ships per year) and 200 q (>10% of cargo of ship taken up by pepper, 1–2 ship per year), respectively. For the Dutch, although they were not carrying as much pepper in terms of proportion of cargo of ship, they were able to commandeer more ships for carrying the good in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (seventeenth century: 50% of cargo of ship taken up by pepper and decreasing; 15% of cargo of ship taken up by ceramic/textile and increasing; 10 ships per year; eighteenth century: $\geq 10\%$ of cargo of ship taken up by pepper, 40–50% of cargo of ship taken up by textiles as well as 25% of cargo of ship taken up by coffee/tea; 3–5 ships per year).

¹⁶ E. M. Jacobs, *Merchants in Asia: The trade of the Dutch East Asia Company during the eighteenth century* (Leiden: CNWS, 2006), p. 277.

¹⁷ Jacobs, *Merchants in Asia*, p. 279.

¹⁸ The Dutch, and certainly the Portuguese before them, potentially increased the arms race and militarization (as well as associated violence) in south India through the pepper-arms trade exchange. See Winius and Vink, *The merchant-warrior pacified*, p. 102.

mixed results, attempt to reform the agriculture in Goa and raise the taxation of the limited trade coming into the ports as the nineteenth century progressed.¹⁹ The data for revenue incomes and (military) expenses of the EIC and VOC (in India) were disparately collected and bore, at first glance, limited compatibility for comparison. The figures for the VOC in India were clearly only available for the eighteenth century for two reasons—the company was dissolved in 1799 and by the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824, the Dutch agreed to evacuate their last colonies on the subcontinent. The figures revealed that in the 1760s, the military expenses of the Dutch enterprise in India exceeded close to one time more the revenues collected arising from the war in Ceylon.²⁰ By the third or fourth decade of the nineteenth century after the Dutch established in the East Indies (present Indonesia) a system of tax farming which required a portion of agricultural produce to be devoted to the colonial government for export (cultivation system), they were, like the British, able to increase their revenues more than tenfold.²¹ Although figures for military expenditure was not readily available, we understand from later developments towards the end of nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth that expenses for the KNLF (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) continued to occupy a substantial portion of the total revenues (and frequently formed the cause of the deficit).²² The figures for the EIC can be drawn from the splendid compilation that J.F. Richards has made in the article ‘Finances of the East India Company’ which points to an expenditure to total revenue (A/B) proportion of two third in the 1760s; this proportion was maintained at below 50 per cent after about 80 years after military expenditure increased by about tenfold and revenues more than tenfold.²³ Comparing the European capacities to

¹⁹ See C. Pinto, *Colonial Panjim: Its governance, its people* (Panjim: Goa 1556, 2017).

²⁰ G. Winius and M. Vink, *The merchant-warrior pacified* (Delhi: OUP, 1991). The figures for revenues and military expenditures for the 1760s were pegged at 2,467,168 fl. / 4,166,641 fl. (guilders). R. Barendse in the Arabian seas gave the conversion rate between sterling pound and guilder to be at 1 £ = 2 fl.

²¹ C. Fasseur, *The politics of colonial exploitation: Java, the Dutch and the cultivation system* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 37. The figure for revenues for 1830-40s was pegged at 74,398,471 fl.

²² B. Landheer, “Financial policy of the Dutch East Indies”, *Far Eastern Survey* vol. 10.17 (1941), pp. 195–200.

²³ J. F. Richards, “Finances of the East India Company”, working paper 153/11, London School of Economics (University of London), 2011. The figures for revenues

make extraction in India, only the British were able to raise their extraction to the next level when it gained the diwani rights to Bengal in the treaty of Allahabad (1765).²⁴ Overall, in terms of proportion of (military) expenditure to revenue, while the Portuguese did not trail very far behind the British, they had not overspent compared to the Dutch partly because the colonies under their control in India had passed their expansive phase.

The resources extracted were deployed crucially but increasingly into the instrument of coercion necessary for the safe passages, whether on land or on sea, of the economic activities undertaken. There was little doubt that the colonial army and navy played a key role in the continued or loss of presence of the Dutch in the East. The crux of the debate revolves around whether the VOC had lost its balance in military expenses. In context of the other colonial militaries in Asia, the colonial military played a more prominent role in the growing British and Dutch colonial empires over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Portuguese military in Goa performed a more passive role compared to its British or Dutch counterparts, which was still expanding. In this direction, the military personnel in proportion of all colonial personnel was increasing in the Dutch and British case in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries while it was on a declining trajectory in the Portuguese case.²⁵ All the forces professed and attempted to increase Europeanization in the colonial armies although in practice, substantial indigenous forces were incorporated or utilized as part of allied or auxiliary forces. The British would be the only force which utilized a large proportion of indigenous personnel although the Dutch after their 1830 revamp and Portuguese after their 1840 reform, formally employed more indigenous forces or at least, reduced the influence of the entrenched mixed race subgroups in

and military expenditures for the 1760s and 1830-40s were pegged at 1,483,500 £ / 903,053 £ and 19,296,626 £ / 8,616,891 £ respectively.

²⁴ Although C. Bayly has traced the complex systemic transition in north India in the eighteenth–nineteenth centuries, he was criticized to have marginalized the ‘drain’ and negative effect of the British there. See I. Habib, “The eighteenth century in Indian economic history”, in L. Blusse and F. Gaastra eds., *On the eighteenth century as a category of Asian history* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 227–31.

²⁵ G. Malleon, *Decisive battles of India: From 1746 to 1849 inclusive* (Np: Wentworth Press, 2019); P. Abbott, *Rival of the Raj* (Nottingham: Foundry Books, 2010); S. Reid, *Armies of the East India Company* (Oxford: Osprey, 2009); W. Skyes, “Vital statistics of the East India Company’s armies in India”, *Journal of Statistical Society of London* vol. 10.2 (1847), pp. 100–31.

the organization (see Table 7.1). However, whether in terms of military or commercial activities, the Dutch managed to co-opt auxiliary men-at-arms in campaigns or (friendly) local merchants in trade. Given the keen sense in the Dutch for trade, in addition to the penchant for industrious preparation and efficiency, they naturally possessed a good combination of traits for actualizing commerce and capitalism in the early modern period, although the Dutch faced a greater problem of balancing their political economic agendas (i.e. to undertake more trade or war/conquest). Seen in the larger perspective of the colonial activities of the different European states around the world, the VOC ‘loss of India’ was balanced by its consolidation of power in the East Indies (and ousting of the British from there). Likewise, Portuguese gains and losses a century earlier during the period of the Habsburg Union (1580–1640) were also advised to be seen in terms of their endeavours in the Americas and in Asia.²⁶

CONCLUSION

The period from 1750 to the 1850s was a highly transitional time frame in which the world experienced gradually increasing trade, linkages, as well as intensive and escalating conflicts. The location of the military history narrative and the Portuguese colonial case study in India during this period highlights a diverse empire in action as well as an agglomeration of colonies of different nature in interaction. Colonies that were less strategic or profitable could, surprisingly, continue to survive in an increasingly globalizing world. Sectarian subgroups in the military organization pressured the colonial administration to preserve their interests in an increasingly connected world. Personnel and military forces, European and indigenous, were influenced and upgraded with new equipment. This contributed to the discourse of an imperialistic world that was less deterministic and hegemonic in interpretation. At the same time, the comparison of the Portuguese with the Dutch and British colonial/military forces showed that formidable and weak forces had both similar and dissimilar features. In terms of the sub-genre of history, the military history of India may be supplemented with a new military history narrative of Goa that embraces the social, military and maritime angles

²⁶ C. R. Boxer C. R., *The Portuguese seaborne empire, 1415–1825* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969), p. 148.

Table 7.1 Military force and organization of the English EIC and Dutch VOC/colonial state (for comparison)

	1780	1830–1840s
English East India Company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consisted of 3 provinces (presidencies) of which Bengal was the most prominent and largest. • Strength (Bengal) 52,400; (Madras) 48,000; (Bombay) 15,000 (1773). • Troops organized in regiments and battalions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total (average) strength 235,446 (native) and 14,584 (European). • Breakdown (Bengal) 121,091/5,034 (rate indigenous employment 0.04), (Madras) 64,482/5,883 (rate indigenous employment 0.09), (Bombay) 49,873/3,667 (rate indigenous employment 0.07)
Dutch VOC/colonial state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strength 9,173 (excluding 858 artillerymen). • Use of natives described as ‘auxiliaries’ but more mixed in deployment in the field. Tendency to use foreign mercenaries. • Troops organized in regiments and battalions. • Troops listed appeared to be serving in Java although the artillery unit was supposed to operate in India and Java; troops listed as serving in India in 1680–90 s included 3,000 in Ceylon and Coromandel as well as 400 + in Malabar) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Re-organization of colonial troops as KNIL in 1830. • Strength 13,545 (of which 7,243 were of indigenous origins, rate indigenous employment 0.53). • Troops organized in units of mobile corps (of 1 × battalion infantry, 1 × company artillery and 1 × company cavalry). • In the battle of Bedara or Hoogly, the Dutch were able to field 850 Europeans (local Chinsurah garrison and substantial reinforcements), 1,100 native Indian and substantial Malay troops (from Batavia)

Source G. Malleon, *Decisive battles of India: From 1746 to 1849 inclusive* (Np: Wentworth Press, 2019); P. Abbott, *Rival of the Raj* (Nottingham: Foundry Books, 2010); S. Reid, *Armies of the East India Company* (Oxford: Osprey, 2009); W. Skyes, “Vital statistics of the East India Company’s armies in India”, *Journal of Statistical Society of London* vol. 10.2 (1847), 100–131

that formed the wider diverse history of India. The long-term implications of Goa's weak military history are also worth reflecting on. The military history of what appears to be a laid-back place should not be ignored; in everyday life, Goa has its fair share of conflict-related sayings, such as 'Dukhovlo paim kurddo. Sadhli torxikar, na tor bhikar'.²⁷

²⁷ Translated as the 'wounded leg is blind' (further suggesting that conflict will likely aggravate only to grow into antipathy, create withdrawal or cause infighting) and '(addressed properly,) conflict can lead to change, innovation, personal and professional growth, and countless other items that often end-up as missed opportunities'. See R. Dias, 'A historian's reading of Konkani proverbs related to everyday conflict and management down the ages in Goa', *Vidyaagar University Journal of History* vol. VI (2017-18), pp. 173-74.

LIST OF PORTUGUESE GOVERNORS/VICEROYS OF INDIA (1758–1871)

Manuel de Saldanha e Albuquerque (Count of Ega)	1758–1765
Governing council	1765–1768
João José de Melo	1768–1771
José Pedro da Câmara	1774–1779
Frederico Guilherme de Sousa Holstein	1779–1786
Francisco da Cunha e Meneses	1786–1794
Francisco António da Veiga Cabral da Câmara (Count of Sarzedas)	1794–1806
Bernardo José Maria da Silveira e Lorena	1806–1816
Diogo de Sousa (Count of Rio Pardo)	1816–1821
Provisional Junta	1821–1823
Manuel da Câmara	1823–1825
Governing council	1825–1826
Manuel Francisco Zacarias de Portugal e Castro	1826–1835
Bernardo Peres da Silva	1835
Manuel Francisco Zacarias de Portugal e Castro	
Joaquim Manuel Correia da Silva e Gama	
Governing council	1835–1837
Simão Infante de Lacerda de Sousa Tavares	1837–1839
José António Vieira da Fonseca	1839
Manuel José Mendes	1839–1840
Governing council	1840
José Joaquim Lopes Lima	1840–1842
Governing council	1842
Francisco Xavier da Silva Pereira (Count of Antas)	1842–1843
Joaquim Mourão Garcez Palha	1843–1844
José Ferreira Pestana	1844–1851

(continued)

(continued)

José Joaquim Januário Lapa	1851–1855
Governing council	1855
António César de Vasconcelos Correia (Count of Torres Novas)	1855–1864
José Ferreira Pestana	1864–1870
Januário Correia de Almeida (Count of São Januário)	1870–1871

List of Mughal Rulers (1760–1857)

<i>Titular name</i>	<i>Birth name</i>	<i>Reign years</i>
Shah Alam II	<u>Ali Gauhar</u>	1760–1788
Jahan Shah IV	<u>Bahadur Jahan Shah</u>	1788
Shah Alam II	<u>Ali Gauhar</u>	1788–1806
Akbar Shah II	<u>Mirza Akbar</u>	1806–1837
Bahadur Shah II	<u>Muhammad Bahadur Shah Zafar</u>	1837–1857

List of Maratha Rulers (1682–1818)

Period of Maratha empire.

Shivaji's (founder of Maratha empire) line of rulers started to fragment during and especially after the fifth ruler (Shahu I, 1682–1749).

Peshwa period.

<u>Baji Rao I</u>	1720–1740
<u>Balaji Bajirao</u>	1740–1761
<u>Madhav-Rao I</u> (succession became hereditary)	1761–1772

Period of Maratha Confederacy.

Maratha empire transited into confederacy after 1772 (end of reign of Madhav-Rao I) and was divided into a number of semi-autonomous states such as Peshwas* of Pune, Holkars of Indore, Scindias of Gwalior, Bhonsales of Nagpur.

*The line of succession of the Peshwas continued in Pune—Narayan Rao (1772–1773), Raghunath Rao (1773–1774), Madhav Rao II (1774–1796), Baji Rao II (1796–1802), Amrut Rao (1802–1803), Baji Rao II (1803–1818).

GLOSSARY

- Artillery fortress** Also known as bastion fortress or *trace italienne*; referring to a style of fortification that evolved during the early modern period in Europe in response to the development of gunpowder and cannons
- Artilheiro** Artilleryman
- Battalion** Initially referring to ‘part of regiment’, the unit of military formation, typically pegged at a strength below 1000 men, was gradually adopted in the eighteenth century.
- Brahmin (or chardo)** Referring theoretically to a class (varna), composing of intellectuals or priests, recorded in the Hindu sacred texts (such as Rigveda).
- Bhosale** Referring to a major group in the Maratha confederacy (1772–1818).
- Canarin** Indians in ‘Portuguese-controlled’ territories who had converted to Christianity; they were recruited as soldiers and often deployed in early Portuguese campaigns in the East.
- Camara geral (or Senado da camara)** Municipal council
- Captainia** Captaincy, usually refers to a colonial unit of governance in Portuguese Americas.
- Corveta** Corvette, a class of warship pegged below the sixth rate in the classification of warship in the age of sailing; equivalent to the sloop-of-war.

- Chatria (or kshatriya)** Refers to the warrior class (varna) in the theoretical conception of society (undergirded in the Hindu sacred texts); the term could embrace broad subgroup classifications in historical society.
- Comunidade** Village community
- Corpo** The term was sometimes seen in names of military formation, for example, 'corpo volante', referring to 'free' or 'more flexible' arrangement of troops (that could be smaller or larger than equivalent regular regiment/battalion unit).
- Degradado** Refers to persons in Portugal and its empire who might be serving a penal sentence and/or in exile.
- Dessai** Hereditary landed gentry at the district level. 'Sardessai' refers to official helming the office at that level.
- Dubashi** Interpreter
- Desembargado** Magistrate or judge of high court.
- Estado da Índia** State of India; loosely applied to all Portuguese settlements between Cape of Good Hope to Japan. Colonies such as Portuguese Mozambique and Macau, for instance, were separated from the Estado in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Goa was converted into an 'overseas province' in 1842.
- Fragata** Frigate, referring to a 6-rate warship in the age of sail.
- Faujdar** Mughal military governor
- Gauncar** Hereditary shareholders in a village community.
- Gawda** Refers to a indigenous (aboriginal) people in Goa.
- Guilder** (Abbr. fl.) currency from fifteenth century to 2002. The value may be roughly equated to 0.38 sterling (pound).
- Inamdar** Holder of a hereditary tax-exempt or privileged tenure.
- Indigena** Indigenous, refers to ethnic 'Indians'.
- Indo-Portuguese** Refers to offspring of Portuguese settlers and soldiers in mainly Portuguese territories of Goa, Bardez and Salcete; as well as in lesser numbers in the New Conquests territories in India. The nineteenth century also saw increased diaspora of this group to the other colonies of the Portuguese empire in Asia and Africa as well as British territories in India.
- Jagirdar** Holder of an assignment of land or land revenue.
- Jati** Divisions in the social (caste) system in India. The division or subdivision on the ground was influenced by endogamic, occupational, restrictive diet and other social criterions. The caste system was officially abolished in India in 1950 although the system could still affect aspects of life there.

Kunbi Cultivator or peasant.

Lascar Native (or mixed descendant) seaman, these were frequently hired on European vessels sailing in the Indian Ocean and eastern seas.

Legião The French used this to recruit foreign soldiers; the most famous being French Foreign Legion first formed in 1831. A 'British Legion' had been organized via this unit of military formation. The structure of the (French) foreign legion consisted of 7 battalions of 8 companies each (112 men per company). The Portuguese Legião dos Voluntarios Reais in India (Ponda) was composed of 24 companies (of about 1300 persons) in 1780 (and supplied with over a thousand firearms).

Luso-descendente / Indo-Portuguese See Indo-Portuguese.

Miliçia Refers to the second line troops recruited from the locality in Portugal and the empire. This overlapped to some extent with the Ordenanças but distinguished from this during War of Restoration when it and the Ordenanças were designated as second and third line troops, respectively.

Mestiço (mestizo) Mixed blood, in the Americas, they were also known as Mulatto.

Mouro Moor, loosely used by Portuguese to refer to Muslims.

Marinha Navy

Maulvi Refers to a teacher in Islamic law.

Nativo (/naturae) Native, refers to local born.

Nadkarni/Naique/Naik Refers to subgroup of people of the Hindu Kshatriya class from Goa, Karwar, Ankola, and Supa/Joida. They were landowners and also known as the Charodos in 'Portuguese-controlled' territories. They might use titles like Phal, Shet, Raut, Prabhu, Naik, Gauns and Sar in their names followed by appellation 'Dessai'.

New Conquests (Goa) Refers to territories in Goa conquered by the Portuguese in the eighteenth century, the most intense campaigns were deemed to have taken place in the reigns of José I (1750–1777) and Maria I (1777–1816).

Nau A Portuguese 3- or 4-masted ocean sailing carrack.

Ordenanças This body of soldiery had its beginnings from the sixteenth century. Although Afonso Albuquerque (1509–15) in India and D. Sebastian (r. 1557–78) in north Africa used it to raise troops, the initiative faced resistance from the nobility in India and Portugal. During D. John IV and War of Restoration, men between 16 and 60 were recruited in the Ordenanças. The Ordenanças (third line terço) in India

were modernized during Pombaline period and were supposed to be abolished in India between the 1820 and 1840s but the organization lingered on (in Portugal, it was replaced by the National Guard).

Old Conquests (Goa) Refers to territories in Goa conquered by the Portuguese from early sixteenth century (Diu and Damão not included). The district divisions in Goa were Bardez, Salcete and Tiswadi (islands).

Presidency Refers to an equivalent of a 'province' in India under the English East India Company during the period 1757–1858. The 3 presidencies were the Bombay, Bengal and Madras presidencies.

Peshwa 'Prime minister' in the Maratha empire.

Prazo Land or right granted in a contract; the use of the term was specific to areas controlled by Portuguese in East Africa (i.e. Mozambique and Zambesia).

Pala Refers to an indigenous sailing vessel, other examples of these could also include terranquin, manchua, parague; these vessels were differentiated by the number of masts, sails and tonnage they were built with.

Quintal 128 pounds (lb) or 58 kilogrammes (kg).

Regiment A unit of military formation, typically pegged at a strength below 1000 men, that was gradually adopted in the seventeenth century.

Religioso Refers to a person or functionary in the Christian faith and establishment.

Renda Rent; income or tax extraction from sub-contracted farm.

Sipae The term was used loosely in primary documents and contemporary authors to refer to second or lower line troops in the service of the Estado da Índia. The personnel in Corpo Volante (loose body) dos Sipaes had 'Portuguese' names. From 1750s, sipais were increasingly drawn from indigenous people and the officers commissioned from Hindus and Muslims. The term '*cipai*' was also applied by the Portuguese to African soldiers.

Sardessai (or dessai) See 'dessai'

Shiva (ch 3) Refers to one of the principal deities in India, the deity was one of the 'triple deities' (or Trimurti). Worship of the deity had also taken the form of popular sect movement (Shaivism) from the pre-medieval period. In the local context of Goa and adjacent regions, Shiva's incarnation was also worshipped as Mallikarjun.

Socorro Aid or relief.

Ship-of-the-Line Refers to a multiple-decked warship that was developed in the age of sail (seventeenth to eighteenth centuries) which engendered the adoption of the line-of-battle naval tactic.

Sibandi Soldier

Third empire The third era of Portuguese empire is typically associated to begin with the independence of Brazil in the 1820s (to the relinquishing of the colonies in the post-Second World War era). The first and second era refers to the Portuguese coming to Asia in the sixteenth century and the Portuguese building of empire in Brazil in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Taluka Refers to a territorial division, other examples of division could also include the tappa and paragana, etc.

Vedor geral da fazenda Superintendent, comptroller or treasurer

Vishnu Refers to one of the principal deities in India, the deity was one of the 'triple deities' (or Trimurti). Worship of the deity had also taken the form of popular sect movement (Vaishnavism) from the pre-medieval period. In the local context of Goa and adjacent regions, Vishnu's incarnation was also worshipped as Parshuram (Rama with an axe).

Vithoba A Hindu deity worshipped predominantly in Maharashtra and Karnataka. The deity was generally considered as a manifestation of the god Vishnu and his avatar, Krishna.

Xerafim Unit of currency in Portuguese India. 1 xer (xerafim) = 300 reis = 0.5 Rs (rupee) = 2.3 fl (guilder) = 0.9 £ (pound).

Zamindar Hereditary landed gentry

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INDEX

A

- Abolition, 9, 71, 77, 116, 120, 121, 146, 147
- Anglo-Maratha wars
 - Third war 1817–18, 49, 51
- Artillery fortress, 26, 60, 175

B

- Baji Rão (Bajirão, Maratha peshwa 1796–1802), 174
- Battalion, 33, 59, 65–67, 69, 82, 99, 104, 106, 149, 150, 175–177
- Bhonsale, 49, 109, 145
- Bombay, 46, 48, 49, 66, 101, 113, 118, 119, 132, 134–136, 144, 148, 149, 162
- Bounsulo, 53, 74
- Brazil, 3, 5, 11, 13, 19, 24, 25, 31–34, 37, 38, 41–44, 46, 65, 69, 70, 76, 99, 101, 122, 132, 133, 135, 138, 162, 163, 179

C

- Calicut, 40, 41, 118, 167
- Camara geral, 55, 109, 175
- Captainia, 175
- Ceylon, 8, 41, 117–119, 166, 168
- Chikunda, 37, 38
- Civil war 1826–34 (Portugal), 103, 105
- Cochin, 117, 118, 167
- Colonial
 - colonialism, 5, 9, 10, 12, 21, 77, 160
 - military, 2, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19–21, 24, 28, 32–34, 38, 42–44, 46, 47, 49, 58, 59, 63, 65–67, 69–72, 74, 75, 79, 80, 82, 84, 88–93, 99, 101, 104–106, 108, 114, 123, 142, 146, 148, 151, 153, 154, 156, 158, 160, 161, 165, 167–170
 - navy (marinha), 65, 70, 116, 123, 124, 169, 177

D

- Damão, 42, 53, 61, 68, 70, 71, 89, 105, 107, 132, 133, 148, 161, 178
 Degredado (exile), 135, 176
 Dessai, 176–178
 Diu, 42, 69, 70, 107, 148, 161, 178

E

- Early modern, 7, 15, 16, 24, 27, 28, 31, 35, 42, 43, 47, 58, 78, 111, 112, 120, 163, 165, 170, 175
 -globalization, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19
 East India Company (EIC), 15, 16, 18, 49, 58, 77, 81, 98, 99, 132, 136–138, 153, 168
 Dutch (VOC), 8, 19, 20, 31, 32, 40–42, 44, 82, 117–119, 138, 163–166, 168–170
 -English (EIC), 8, 10, 40, 41, 44, 99, 125, 133, 138, 163–165, 178
 Empire, 5, 8, 10, 18, 19, 24, 31, 40–43, 49, 55, 63, 67, 69, 74, 76–78, 84, 101, 106, 109, 117, 133, 137, 154, 165, 169, 170, 176–179
 Estado da Índia (State of India), 5, 8, 13, 19, 42, 44, 46, 47, 52, 58, 59, 63, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 75, 78, 84, 92, 93, 96, 101, 103, 104, 107, 111, 112, 116, 123, 131, 134, 138, 142, 151, 176, 178

F

- Frigate (*fragata*), 70, 119, 125, 126, 176

G

- Gauncar, 176

Gawda, 176

Globalization (early modern), 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 21, 24

- Goa, 1, 2, 4–11, 13, 16, 18–21, 24, 34, 38, 42–44, 46, 47, 49, 51, 54, 56, 58, 63–72, 74, 75, 79, 84, 88–91, 96, 98, 101–114, 116, 118, 120, 123–127, 129, 133–135, 138, 139, 142, 145–148, 150, 152–158, 160–163, 165, 168–170, 172, 176–179

I

- Imperialism, 9–12, 21, 24, 46, 77, 166
 Indian Mutiny, 7, 20, 113, 142–145, 148, 149, 153, 155, 157, 162
 Indian Ocean, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 35, 38, 40–44, 47, 114, 116–124, 127–131, 133, 136–138, 142, 151, 155, 158, 160, 162, 166, 177
 Indigenous (indigena), 6, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 26–28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 42, 43, 58, 63, 68, 70, 73, 76, 77, 80, 85, 89, 93, 96, 97, 103, 107, 110, 111, 113, 118, 120, 122, 124, 125, 127, 131, 134–136, 138, 142–144, 148, 150, 153, 154, 160–162, 165–167, 169, 170, 176, 178
 Indo-Portuguese, 20, 78, 105, 143, 149, 158, 161, 162, 176, 177
 Industrialization, 26, 43

K

- Kolhapur, 49, 51, 54, 74, 145, 148, 149
 Kunbi, 110, 177

L

Lima, José Joaquim Lopes (Governor of State of India, 1840–42), 106

Luso-descendants

(Luso-descendentes), 13, 38, 58, 63, 78, 79, 84, 85, 91, 96, 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 161, 162, 177

M

Macau, 9, 43, 46, 104, 107, 125, 133, 134, 176

Maratha, 7, 20, 27, 42, 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 59, 73, 74, 77, 80–82, 88–90, 98, 99, 109, 111, 113, 114, 120, 125–127, 129, 131, 135, 144, 145, 149, 175, 178

Milícia (militia), 59, 66, 177

Military Revolution, 5, 13, 15, 17, 31, 71, 78

Mombasa, 9, 35, 38, 41, 118, 119

Mouro (moor), 48, 82, 83, 106, 113, 177

Mozambique, 9, 38, 83, 103–105, 124, 127, 134, 151, 176, 178

Mysore, 43, 49, 53, 54, 144, 167

N

Napoleonic Wars, 6, 7, 25, 26, 30, 34, 46, 47, 65–67, 76, 88, 102, 119, 132, 136, 138

Native, 8, 31, 33, 38–40, 42, 43, 48, 49, 56, 58, 59, 63, 65–69, 72, 73, 77–81, 84, 89, 90, 93, 96, 98–100, 111, 124, 125, 135, 137, 138, 146, 148–150, 153–156, 177

New Conquests, 46, 52, 54–56, 71–74, 79, 80, 82, 88–90, 93,

107, 108, 111, 112, 114, 147, 160, 176, 177

O

Old Conquests, 52, 56, 74, 75, 90, 91, 93, 108, 111, 178

Ordanenças, 59

P

Peshwa, 50, 52, 55, 99, 131, 178

Pinto Conspiracy, 103

Plassey (Battle), 60, 84, 137

Pombal, 25, 26, 60, 69, 89, 90

Ponda, 48, 55, 63, 67, 69, 89, 103, 177

Portugal, 2–6, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 24–26, 31, 34, 39, 41, 44, 46, 47, 54, 55, 58, 65, 67, 69, 72, 73, 75–77, 89, 91, 99, 101–105, 113, 118, 120, 121, 129, 133, 138, 143, 145, 154, 155, 158, 163, 166, 176, 177

Prazo, 35, 37, 38, 71, 83, 163, 178

Presidency

-Bombay, 46, 49, 101, 113, 122, 149, 165, 178

R

Rane, 13, 54, 76, 106, 156, 158

Reconquista, 40

Regiment, 33, 59, 60, 63, 66–69, 89, 105–107, 124, 148, 151, 175, 176, 178

Religioso, 48, 110, 178

Revolution, 9, 15, 18, 21, 25, 30, 76, 101, 102, 105, 163

S

Satara, 49, 145, 148

Satari, [54](#), [55](#), [72](#), [107](#), [148](#)
Sawantwadi, [51](#), [107](#), [145](#), [148](#), [149](#)
Sepoy (sipac), [15](#), [16](#), [18](#), [59](#), [63](#), [65](#),
[73](#), [77](#), [78](#), [81](#), [82](#), [85](#), [89](#), [98](#),
[106](#), [143](#), [150](#), [178](#)
Shah Alam II (Mughal emperor,
1760–88), [48](#)
Socorro, [178](#)
Surat, [118](#), [132](#), [135](#), [137](#)

T

Third Empire, [155](#), [179](#)

Tilly (Charles), [15](#)

V

Violence (structural/non-war), [20](#),
[28](#), [30](#), [85](#), [108](#), [114](#)

Z

Zambezi, [9](#), [35](#), [37](#), [38](#), [154](#)

Zanzibar, [37](#), [118–120](#), [123](#), [136](#)