

The Ili Rebellion: Muslim Challenge
to Chinese Authority in Xingjiang,
1944-49

Linda K. Benson



THE ILI REBELLION

LINDA BENSON

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THE MOSLEM CHALLENGE TO CHINESE AUTHORITY IN XINJIANG 1944-1949



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PREFACE

In November 1944, in a remote part of northwestern China, a group of Turkic Moslems and White Russians rose against the Chinese government and established an independent Islamic state. Their ultimate goal was to oust the Han Chinese from the whole of what they referred to as East Turkestan, the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

The formation of a new republic is likely to be a matter of international interest, but the new East Turkestan Republic, remote as it was, received almost no attention at the time of its formation; up to the present day no detailed account of its existence has been published in English. When I first read of this small state in the middle of the Eurasian continent and discovered that it had existed for six years before it was swallowed by the more powerful revolutionary forces of the Chinese Communist Party, I became intrigued by this fascinating subject and the many questions—indeed, mysteries—that surrounded it.

Who were these rebels, and what was the motivation behind their “Three Districts Revolution”? Were they the agents of the Soviet Union, as most available sources suggested? Or were they Turki patriots, fulfilling the old dream of an independent Turkestan? And what was the fate of the leadership in 1949?

A search through libraries revealed that there was little information on Xinjiang as a whole for this period, and detailed accounts of the region’s history were not to be found outside a few specialized libraries. Part of the reason for this appeared to be that Xinjiang is physically remote from the centers of civilization in Europe and Asia—a geographic fact that makes the region one of the world’s most mysterious and romantic. Xinjiang lies within China and yet is not a part of it, for the peoples and history of this region are more closely related to those of Central Asia, of which it is a natural extension both culturally and geographically. Deserts cover much of its territory, and the remainder boasts high mountains with lush pastureland in their foothills, suitable for animal herds but not for traditional Chinese

agriculture. Thus, despite the fact that Xinjiang formally became a province of China in 1884, it attracted few Chinese settlers. Those who did arrive in this land “beyond the jade gate” were mainly soldiers sent to man the garrisons and through whom the Chinese continued their hold on the region; a smaller number were government officials and traders, hoping to acquire some of Xinjiang’s fabled riches. In the 1940s the majority of the population was the same as it had been for centuries—Moslem Turks. The largest group, people today known as Uighurs, lived in the region’s oases while smaller, more traditional peoples like the Kazaks followed their herds in the region’s rich pasture lands.

Like a true crossroads of great cultures, Xinjiang’s history offers much of interest. The region has been scarred by past waves of invasion, rebellion, and short-lived independent states, seeking to control the lucrative Silk Road which once directly linked the area to both China and the Middle East. Even in more modern eras, only the most intrepid of explorers—and the inevitable Chinese government officials—reached Xinjiang, a situation that has only recently begun to change.

Xinjiang offers much to interest scholars in many disciplines, but little work has actually been done. The reasons are only partly due to its extreme geographic isolation. There are also linguistic barriers. The greatest amount of information available is in Chinese, a language that takes time to learn to use. Other relevant materials are in Turkish and Russian, of which the same is true. Another major difficulty lies in locating the source materials. They are scattered and difficult to find; moreover, when located, they are difficult to obtain access to, due to the politically sensitive nature of this area. In other cases materials are available, but they remain unclassified and unregistered, so that consulting them is time-consuming and somewhat haphazard. When material is found, it is sometimes in forms difficult to read, due to the aging of a poor-quality medium, or damage. The reason why many works on Xinjiang have relied on existing English language sources becomes obvious.

Yet the questions about Xinjiang and the East Turkestan Republic remained, and as I became more involved in the search for information these questions quickly were joined by new ones. For example, it was often hard to make out just who the people involved were, where they came from, and what they did. If one of them was met only through a non-Turkic

source, then his very name stayed in doubt. If he was met in several sources in different languages, then it had to be established whether he was one or several persons. (I hope I have avoided the possible pitfalls; I have come across one secondary work where the existence of two versions of one name has led the author to believe two people are in question. He deserves sympathy.)

The more I inquired, the more involved I became in trying to untangle the events and answer some of the questions about this mysterious republic of Uighurs, Kazaks, and Russians. This study is the result. It is an investigation of Chinese government policy in Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949 as seen in the Chinese response to the Ili Rebellion and the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic. It is based on sources drawn from many repositories and collections. It is not an exhaustive work—no study of Xinjiang can be when major sources are incomplete and records not available. But it does manage to move beyond currently available sources on the period and so contribute to our understanding of what occurred in this region during the period in question.

Before beginning the story, it is necessary to ask the reader's indulgence and present a certain amount of introductory material. The following linguistic note explains the choices of form and of romanization for terms from the various languages, so that the reader is prepared for the "new" form some proper names assume. The next section offers a description of the sources used and a brief discussion of the problem of political bias, which affects almost every source used.

The text itself begins with a general introduction to this research, outlining its scope and purpose, as well as establishing the historic and theoretical context. [Chapter 2](#) introduces the general field of Republican China's national minority policy; [chapter 3](#) offers geographic and historic background to Xinjiang. Together, these chapters provide the necessary background for an understanding of the Ili rebellion and the Chinese government's response.

Linguistic Note

Xinjiang lies geographically within Central Asia. As a result, materials concerning its history are to be found primarily in three languages—Chinese, Turkish, and Russian. Problems occur in rendering all of these languages into English and in translating between them, especially in the case of names. The following discussion on forms of romanization used in this study indicates the extent of some of these problems.

There are currently several methods of romanizing Chinese, the most recent of these being the system called “pinyin” developed in the People’s Republic of China. As this form is the simplest and easiest form of romanization currently in popular use, it is the form used in this study. However, certain names that have a well-established and generally accepted English form, such as Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen, have been used as such in the text. All Chinese names are listed in pinyin, Chinese characters, and the Wade-Giles system in the glossary.

The form of romanization of the Turkic languages used is modern Turkish, which, with one modification, has been adopted for several reasons. First, Xinjiang’s Turkic languages form one branch of Turkish, to which they are closely related. Variations among the Turkic languages are small so that speakers can generally understand each other whether they were born in Turkey or northwestern China.

The Turkish “c” is pronounced as an English “j.” In this study the “j” has been used to replace the usual “c” so that names are more readily recognizable—e.g., Ahmet Jan instead of Ahmet Can. With only a few exceptions, such as the “c” and the “g~” (which is silent), the vowels and consonants are pronounced as in English. A pronunciation guide to the Turkish alphabet is given in [appendix C](#).

Second, although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has developed a romanized form for Uighur and Kazak based on the pinyin system, it has created new written symbols that make recognition and pronunciation of words and names by English speakers difficult. Furthermore, dictionaries for the pinyin form of Uighur are of limited vocabulary and do not include proper nouns and names, so that there is no authoritative guide to the writing of names and titles—an important consideration in this work since

the names of Turkic individuals have often been a cause of confusion to researchers and readers alike. The use of Turkish to systemize transcription helps to clarify the identity and proper titles of important figures in Xinjiang's modern history.

A further impetus to the use of Turkish is the fact that there are now many works available in the Turkish language concerning Xinjiang, written in most cases by persons—or their direct relatives—who were involved in Xinjiang's modern history. The names in these books are in their Turkish forms and are far more complete than the names of Turkic individuals in Chinese language accounts, which are often abbreviated to the point of confusion; for instance, “Aisha” is commonly used to refer to Mr. Isa Yusuf Alptekin. The use of the modern Turkish form is clearly more accurate. Further discussion of the Chinese transliteration of Turkic names is in [appendix C](#), which includes a list of Xinjiang Turki people's names, along with their Chinese forms in characters and in pinyin, as well as their common English renderings, many of which reflect their origins in Chinese sources.

There are, however, some exceptions to the use of modern Turkish for Xinjiang place names. Because the region is multiethnic, many of the towns and cities as well as geographic features bear several names. A good example is the city that the Chinese call “Tacheng” on the Sino-Soviet border. In addition to its Chinese name, it also appears on some maps as “Chugachak” or “Qoqek.” This is the town's Mongolian name. Because the area is also the home of Manchu troops sent out to man the border under the Qing Empire, it has also been called “Tarbagatai,” the name given to this outpost of the Manchu Empire by the Qianlong emperor in the eighteenth century. However, Xinjiang's Kazaks call the same town “Savan.” This example can be easily matched elsewhere in the province. The question of what to call a city, or a mountain, or a river, has consequently been something of a problem. The PRC has clearly had its own troubles deciding whether to use the local language name—and if so, *which* local language name—or the Chinese form. They have compromised, so that today the regional capital is called “Urumqi,” the old Uighur name for the city, whereas the Chinese name “Tacheng” has been retained for the town on the Sino-Soviet border. Chinese names have been given to “Yining” (formerly Kulja), “Kashi” (Kashgar), and “Shache” (Yarkand), while local names are

retained for “Aksu” and “Emin.” This practice is a clear recognition of the problems of nomenclature in Xinjiang.

In most cases, names in this work follow current Chinese practice. In instances, however, where the currently used name is not easily recognized as the name of a city that also has a generally accepted English form of its name, the latter is used, as with Kashgar and Yarkand.

The romanization of Russian names has also been problematical: some occur only in Chinese or Turkish sources that do not include the original Russian. Moreover, in the instances where English sources refer to Russians in Xinjiang, the forms used do not appear to conform to any particular system. As a result, Russian names are not given in strict keeping with any standardized form, although the names of authors follow the standard Library of Congress form.

Sources

In general, the history of the independence movements among national minorities in China during the twentieth century has received little attention from scholars of contemporary Chinese history. One reason for this has been the difficulty in locating primary sources, a problem that has also plagued other areas of research for the Republican era but which is particularly true of events in the border areas.

In recent years, however, two factors have made previously unavailable materials accessible. One is that the political climate has changed sufficiently in various countries to enable foreign scholars to use formerly inaccessible records and documents related to this area. The second factor is that the thirty-year period for which many Western governments' files remain closed has now passed for the events of the 1940–1950 decade. Thus relevant materials in the United States and Great Britain are now available for examination. As a result, it has been possible to explore more fully the many questions related to minority issues in such border areas as Xinjiang.

The existence of national repositories like the U.S. National Archives and the British Public Record Office gives the neophyte false illusions about the location of sources. Not all countries are so fortunate. In the case of China, materials in the National Library in Beijing are not always available for consultation, and there are few open depositories of official documents. The National Library has organized a group to collect materials related to Xinjiang and Islam in China, but what it will produce is still conjecture. In Taiwan, many more sources are available but in various places and in varying degrees. It is to be hoped that in the future more materials from these two places will be available to interested scholars.

The major sources for the present study include both newly accessible materials and previously available but unexplored materials in Chinese, English, Turkish, and Russian. Of basic importance are the official Xinjiang Provincial Government records and the local Xinjiang newspapers of the period. Certain records of the Xinjiang Provincial Government (of the Republican period) are available at the National History Institute (Guoshi Guan) in Xindian, Taibei, Taiwan. Other repositories of relevant materials in Taibei are the Archives of the Guomintang Party History Commission

(Dangshi Hui) at Yangming Shan, and the Bureau of Investigation (Diao Cha Ju) at Xindian. Access to these materials remains on a formal basis; usually one can only see those documents that one specifically requests, and as some documents remain unclassified, finding relevant materials can be problematic. After spending a considerable amount of time in Taipei, however, and having had the good fortune to elicit the sympathetic interest of officials as well as of local scholars interested in China border area research, I was able to see many items from these Taiwan collections.

One of the important holdings of the Guomintang Archives is the *Xinjiang Daily* in its original form. As this newspaper was the official organ for the Nationalist government in the region, it offers an excellent view of the Nationalist interpretation of local events as they happened. Unfortunately, neither the Guomintang Archives nor any other institution holds a complete run of this paper. As a result, it has been necessary to collect runs of the paper held in the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and Taiwan. Between the microfilms of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., and the National Library of China in Beijing, as well as the Taiwan collection, I have seen a great deal of the *Xinjiang Daily* covering the years 1944–1949, but a complete run of the paper does not now appear to exist, even using these various repositories. It should also be noted that the China microfilms were made from poor originals (as can be readily seen from the fragile condition of the issues available in Taiwan). On occasion, therefore, the notation “unclear” is entered for some names and data—indicating an especially faded or torn original.

In addition to the *Xinjiang Daily*, other important newspapers from Xinjiang include two published in the East Turkestan Republic between 1946 and 1949. These are the *Minzhu bao* (Democratic daily) published in Chinese in Yining, and a few issues of *Minsheng bao* (People’s livelihood daily), also published in Chinese, in Tacheng. Some issues of these papers are held at the Library of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford. Although the collection is fragmentary, most of it dating only from the year 1947, the available issues make a fascinating addition to sources on Xinjiang during this period.

Issues of important Chinese periodicals on Xinjiang are also held at the Hoover, including *Aertai* (Altai), *Hanhai chao* (Desert tide), and *Tianshan huabao* (Tianshan pictorial). These offer some of the most nationalistic of

the Turki writings of the period. (The British Library in London also holds good originals of the latter.)

No less important than the Chinese sources mentioned above are the files of the Public Record Office (PRO) and the India Office Records (IOR) in London. The information derived from the careful, detailed reports of the British consular officials who served in Urumqi and Kashgar is indispensable to an understanding of the period and its complexities. These British materials are among the most accessible and complete of all foreign government records for Republican Xinjiang.

Also interesting and important are materials in the National Archives of the United States. A series of reports by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and by U.S. consular officials in Urumqi complement the British and Chinese sources. A portion of the U.S. consular reports are contained in the series "Foreign Relations of the United States: The Far East" (FRUS), which includes both Xinjiang consular reports and other correspondence related to the situation in Xinjiang during the 1940s.

Another important cache of materials exists in the Soviet Union. Although direct access to these holdings is not possible, there is indirect knowledge of Soviet runs of East Turkestan newspapers, for instance, in the dissertations of Kutlukov and Mingulov. In particular, the studies by Kutlukov frequently cite *Azad Sharki Turkestan* (Free East Turkestan), so that it is possible to ascertain the contents of many of that paper's issues. The heavy reliance on Marxist interpretation, however, occasionally intrudes to detract from otherwise interesting work that has useful comments to offer on the driving force behind the rebellion and on several key events during the period in question. There is also in his work a tendency to take at face value and without critical comment any information published in the East Turkestan newspapers, but this nonetheless adds to our knowledge of the East Turkestani press.

Together, these materials, in Chinese, English, and Russian, present a fascinating picture of the political maneuvering and conflict in Xinjiang among the Chinese, the native Xinjiang population, and foreign powers, all of whom pursued their own goals in this strategic region after World War II.

Collections of secondary printed sources dealing with Central Asia used in this research include the Owen Lattimore Collection held at the Brotherton Library, University of Leeds, England. This consists of

Lattimore's own extensive collection of books and pamphlets on Central Asia, including a wealth of titles on such wide-ranging topics as geography, ethnography, and politics. In London, other interesting collections are held at the British Library, the Central Asian Research Centre, and the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies. All of these have holdings in both Chinese and English.

Collections of books in Chinese that provided general background for this research include those in the libraries of National Zhengzhi University in Taipei, the library of the Xinjiang Provincial Government (Taiwan), the University of Hong Kong library, and the holdings of the University Services Centre in Kowloon, Hong Kong.

In addition to the above sources, yet another language, Turkish, offers materials on Xinjiang's modern history. After 1949, many Kazak and Uighur refugees from Xinjiang made their way to Turkey, where the government—and the closeness of traditions and language—made them welcome. Although many were not well-educated people, the tradition of oral records among the Kazaks, especially, has meant that accounts of their histories have been kept alive in the traditional way. Today, books based on this oral tradition have been published, many of them dealing with events in Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949; their origin in traditional style accounts for the scarcity of dates and, certainly, for the heroic style in which most are written. Many also reflect the bitter intervening years of refugee life in a foreign country, but nonetheless, used with caution and restraint, they also constitute a valuable source of information, especially on the current Kazak interpretation of the 1944–1949 period.

Where possible, I followed up the use of these primary and secondary printed sources with interviews. By far the largest group of interviewees are former residents of Xinjiang, many of them national minorities from the Ili valley area. Among those interviewed are people of Uighur, Kazak, Sibo, Hui, White Russian, and Han Chinese nationalities. The list (given in [appendix D](#)) also includes both British and American nationals who were in Xinjiang during the period in question in official and unofficial capacities.

Besides often being a pleasant and extremely stimulating experience, interviews also served several important functions. First, they often corroborated existing accounts; they also resulted in the addition of further details to these accounts, particularly with regard to personalities active in

the region at the time. Interviews also furthered my understanding of the role played by rumor in a region where communication was notoriously poor and a general lack of education among the population made them especially susceptible to the forces of rumor.

Afternoon talks held with Xinjiang Kazaks over bowls of hot salted tea offered a vital sense of the times in which these events took place. The insecurity, the doubt of official versions of the news, the fear that marked everyday life for many people in Xinjiang, and the complexity of the relationships between nationalities were clearly conveyed during memorable interviews with former Xinjiang residents.

Most of these interviews took place over a period of time, although some individuals could only be interviewed once or twice due to extenuating circumstances. As most of these people were trying to recall events that occurred some forty years ago, specific dates and sometimes details were missed, and often, depending on when and where the individual was living in Xinjiang, their individual accounts of the period were incomplete. The educational level and political bias of individuals were also factors that had to be taken into account when assessing a particular individual's contribution. But much information could be checked, at least partially, against existing accounts. Generally speaking, the interviews with members of the national minority peoples to a large extent reflected the records of "professional" observers such as the British and American representatives in Xinjiang; in many cases interviewees were able to fill in certain gaps in existing accounts with information that appears both reasonable and accurate. In cases where the accounts of interviewees are uncorroborated, however, this is indicated in the text or footnotes. In instances where important individuals have not been available for interview, autobiographies have had to substitute. Fortunately for this study, several important individuals have been able to record their memoirs, including Burhan Shahidi, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, and Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra (now deceased).

Although today much material and many individuals are available for consultation, it must be pointed out that virtually all are influenced to some degree by their political views, which reflect in turn their national origin. This bias can most easily be seen in the fact that some printed sources, for instance, choose to omit information on entire incidents or series of events if the events tend to reflect negatively on the author's country or

government. At several points in the following pages, there is discussion on the conflict of opinions among sources or the deletion of materials in some accounts. This type of discussion has been included primarily to show that, first, the establishment of the actual course of events in Xinjiang during this time is, in itself, a difficult task, and, second, that caution in using virtually all the materials is a constant necessity, with sources being carefully cross-checked against each other at each stage of consideration.

Another problem is the patchy nature of much of the material. As mentioned earlier with regard to the *Xinjiang Daily*, complete runs of some newspapers do not exist, and the discovery of government documents is sometimes no more than serendipity. This has made it necessary to extend the search for relevant materials to institutions in various countries and in a number of languages. The gaps in the historical account have thus been reduced, and the interpretation of Xinjiang's modern history can once again be brought out into what will hopefully be fruitful discussion in the coming years.

For much of its history, Xinjiang has been an isolated area; this situation was just beginning to change when, in 1949, another kind of isolation began. After Xinjiang's incorporation into the PRC, the region was, for some years, closed to all but the most sympathetic of journalists. Today this situation has changed in at least one respect. Parts of Xinjiang can now be visited with relative ease, via train and air links with most major cities in China. Research facilities in Xinjiang and throughout China are not, however, yet at a point at which they can accommodate all interested foreign scholars. Even when access is gained, many materials remain unclassified and uncollected; persons in authority often seem unsure as to what exactly the holdings of the nation's repositories are. Nonetheless, the acquisition of valuable microfilm from the National Library of China in Beijing and books acquired in Urumqi both contributed to this study.

While in Xinjiang, I was also able to observe for myself something of the continuing difficulties between Han Chinese and Moslems in the palpable tension visitors experience when traveling in the region. A personal visit also conveys something of the grim grandeur of the Gobi Desert, and the incredible logistic obstacle this presents to any Chinese government intent on binding this vast territory to the Chinese state. Altogether, there is today a wealth of firsthand material on Xinjiang available to the researcher, albeit

only in countries that are literally at opposite ends of the earth. Used together, these materials now permit the presentation of a reasonably full analysis of the twists and turns of Chinese Nationalist policy in Xinjiang and its response to the formation of the East Turkestan Republic. Above all, this information points to the growth of nascent Turki nationalism in Xinjiang, rooted in the pervasive anti-Han Chinese sentiment that, more than any other factor, marks Han Chinese-national minority relations during this period.

In writing and researching this book, I accumulated debts of the most unrepayable kind, and I gratefully acknowledge those to whom I owe so much. The counsel of James Macdonald, University of Leeds, England, has been of inestimable value; indeed, without his guidance and encouragement, this research might never have come to fruition. I am grateful to the many friends and colleagues I have had the pleasure of meeting during the course of my work. I thank them all—in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Great Britain, Sweden, and the United States, for kindnesses great and small. Special thanks are owed to Makbule Wang Shuli and her family for unfailing support during my years in Taiwan and for an enduring friendship. In a rather different sense, I am grateful, too, to the people of Xinjiang to whom I owe much for serving as a source of inspiration. Finally, I thank all the members of my family who, despite the miles that so often separated us, were nonetheless always there.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND MEASUREMENTS

Abbreviations

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
Cn	Chinese Central Government currency, Republican period
ETR	East Turkestan Republic
GPP	Government Political Program
MPR	Mongolian People's Republic
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
Xn	Xinjiang dollars, Republican period

Measurements

charak	20 pounds
hectare	2.471 acres
jin	2.205 pounds
sheng	31.6 cubic inches, or approximately one pint


MAPS


Eurasia

Political Map of Xinjiang, 1940s

Xinjiang's Natural Resources


Area of Xinjiang controlled by the East Turkestan Republic, 1944–1950






Xinjiang's Natural Resources

Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
✱	✱ Beryl	⇄	• Spodumene
●	• Gold	⊖	• Oil field
▲	▲ Copper	×	✱ Gypsum
△	△ Lead	◆	• Sulphur
■	■ Tungsten	⊙	• Mica
◇	◇ Molybdenum	▽	▽ Jade
□	□ Iron	⊕	⊕ Salt field
▭	▭ Coal field	+	+ Uranium





Area of Xinjiang controlled by the East Turkestan Republic, 1944–1950

THE ILI REBELLION

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In the early morning hours of November 7, 1944, Moslem Turks in China's far northwestern province of Xinjiang attacked the Chinese garrison stationed in Yining, the principal city of the Ili valley, near the Sino-Soviet border. Despite the fact that the Moslem rebels were, at the outset, vastly outnumbered by the Chinese troops, they quickly gained effective control of the city and within days had succeeded in forcing the Chinese into the confines of their main headquarters, the local airfield barracks, and a temple on the outskirts of the town. Secure in their expectation of ultimate victory, the Moslems declared the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic (ETR) on November 12, 1944. This new Moslem state's declared objectives were to establish freedom and democracy for the Islamic peoples of the Turks' ancient homeland, and to oust all Chinese from the whole of what they referred to as Turkestan, the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

By 1945, the military forces of the ETR had successfully driven Chinese troops from all towns and border posts in the three northwesternmost districts of the province. Their troops pushed as far east as the Manas River and were poised for an advance that would have taken them to the very gates of the provincial capital itself. Hurried diplomatic activity and a personal appeal to the Moslems by Chiang Kai-shek led to negotiations between representatives of the independent three districts and the Chinese central government, which resulted in a peace agreement, signed by both sides in 1946.

The course of this rebellion and succeeding events in this remote part of the world have long been a subject of interest, but nearly all of what happened—especially the interrelation of political and ethnic forces—has been shrouded from view and described only in the briefest form in reference works of a general nature. Today there are newly available materials that provide information that makes it possible to elucidate the

development of Chinese policies in this strategic border area between 1944 and 1949 and so assess a complex and fascinating period in Xinjiang's modern history.

Such an assessment is the object of this study. Through an examination of Chinese objectives and policy implementation during the existence of the ETR, it will be demonstrated that Chinese policies in Xinjiang served to increase local antipathy among Moslems toward the Han Chinese and, inadvertently, to foster the nationalism nascent in Chinese Turkestan for nearly a century. While aiming to bring about "unity among nationalities" (*minzu tuanjie*) in Xinjiang, Chinese policy and implementation were in fact divisive, ultimately driving Han and Moslem farther apart and exacerbating existing tensions in the region.

Further, despite clear evidence presented to the central government by its own representatives in Xinjiang on the need for immediate and extensive reform in provincial administration and in Chinese border policy in general, such reform was never seriously undertaken. An extensive program of political, economic, and social reform was indeed adopted by the region's first multiethnic coalition government in 1946, but a state of tension constantly existed between this and the basic objective of the central government, which was the restoration of the region as an integral part of China. With this objective, Xinjiang was treated on different levels, one responding to the nationalities problem, the other reasserting the status of the area as basically that of a Chinese province. Despite recognition of the demands of the region's multiethnic population, the core of Chinese policy continued to be military and political domination by the Han Chinese minority.

The provisions of the Peace Agreement of 1946—which might have led to real reform on the local level—were never fully implemented. A major reason for this was the interference in civil government by the local Chinese military establishment in Xinjiang. They were assisted in foiling the attempt at reform by many Chinese bureaucrats who continued to wield the power of great inertia; their resistance to change and the constant lobbying of government by local Han Chinese intent on maintaining the predominance of Han Chinese in government posts slowed the effects of any reform directives issued by the coalition. The reforms begun under the coalition

faltered by early 1947, and with the removal of the coalition chairman, Zhang Zhizhong, in May 1947, the reform movement collapsed.

A further aspect of Chinese policy—one that worked directly against China's own interest in maintaining its position of supremacy in Xinjiang—was the central government's chosen interpretation of the significance of the "Ili Incident," as it is called in Chinese history. Even before the full details of the affair were available, Chongqing decided that this was a Soviet-backed insurgency movement. Despite later information to the contrary, which emphasized the need for immediate reform to ensure lasting peace among the region's nationalities, the central government continued to blame the incident on the USSR. Military reports emphasized the propinquity of the three districts and the Soviet Union, and Chinese officials, anxious to absolve themselves of any blame or responsibility for the events of 1944–1945, privately condemned the Soviet Union for its action.

There was undoubted tacit support from the USSR, but other factors account for the widespread attraction of the ETR movement. One was increasing Moslem hostility toward all Han Chinese as a result of the excesses of Sheng Shicai, under whose rapacious hand countless underground resistance groups had formed, particularly in the northern, Kazak-dominated part of the region. Such hostility, in turn, contributed to the upsurge in Turki nationalism that made the ETR of 1944 initially a popularly supported nationalistic movement, aimed at establishing an independent Turki homeland.

The central government itself also contributed directly to the fostering of Turki nationalism by its intransigence on the questions of autonomy and self-determination in China's border areas. Representatives of Xinjiang in the Chinese capital had long been lobbying the Nationalist government to give Xinjiang Moslems consideration equal to that accorded the Tibetan and Mongolian minorities in China. But, with the formation of the independent ETR, the Chinese attitude on this issue hardened. Chiang Kai-shek's conviction that the Soviets were behind the ETR gave him full justification for repeated refusal to entertain any discussion of the possibility of autonomy for Xinjiang or to accord it any special status beyond that of an ordinary Chinese province. By not recognizing the political aspirations of the proud and determined Turki population, the government even managed

to alienate the members of the Turki elite who had previously been pro-Chinese.

The events in Xinjiang during this intriguing period of modern history did not, of course, occur in a vacuum. The dramatic takeover of a Chinese garrison town in remote Xinjiang in 1944, and succeeding events in the region, form part of an overall pattern of fragmentation within China that began with the birth of the Chinese Republic in 1911. By the time Moslems were establishing their own government in Xinjiang in 1944, the Chinese Republic had been struggling against national disintegration continuously for over thirty years.

Challenges to central control came first from among the Chinese themselves, with warlords and political factions straining to pull parts of the nation under their control. Between 1910 and 1928, in particular, the nation was torn by factionalism. When Chiang Kai-shek emerged as head of government in 1928 he won recognition from many of the principal warlords and political groups of China, but during the chaotic period that led to World War II, his government's control over much of China was tenuous, and in the country's borderlands, including Xinjiang, Nationalist Chinese control was virtually nonexistent. In these remote regions, warlords ruled independent of outside control and, while some paid nominal allegiance to the Nationalist cause, men such as Ma Bufang in Qinghai province and Sheng Shicai in Xinjiang were able to rule their respective provinces as private fief-doms into the 1940s.

The Japanese invasion of northeastern China presented a more radical challenge to central government authority. Chiang used this threat to rally Chinese factions in a common cause. It enabled him in the early 1940s to unite dissident Chinese political factions and to launch a drive to reassert Nationalist influence in many of the regions that had been formerly quasi-independent. Chiang successfully lured, cajoled, or forced militarist regimes in the areas of Yunnan, Qinghai, and Sichuan back into the nationalist fold. A major coup came in 1944 when he was able to remove the warlord Sheng Shicai from Xinjiang and appoint his own man, Wu Zhongxin, as governor of the province, thus ending a decade of virtual independence of the region.

Even as the Nationalist government began to draw segments of the nation closer to the central government, in the Chinese borderlands the non-Chinese inhabitants increased their own efforts at establishing or, in some

cases, maintaining their independent status vis-à-vis the Nationalist government in Chongqing. Among such groups were the Turki peoples of the far northwest who rose in rebellion in the Ili valley before the new governor could consolidate Nationalist power in the region.

Chiang viewed the problem in Xinjiang as similar to the situation elsewhere in China where local warlords or factions challenged his authority. Chiang's basic objective in Xinjiang was thus the same as in other areas of opposition: to maintain the traditional borders of China and to prevent any person or group from establishing regional power bases that could threaten his own government.

The circumstances in Xinjiang, however, were in many ways quite unlike conditions that prevailed in provinces populated by Han Chinese. These circumstances make the "Ili Rebellion" of particular importance to students of history, geopolitical behavior, and international relations. First, there was the geographic reality of the situation. Xinjiang was (and, to a large extent, remains) a remote, rugged region of mountains and deserts, populated by non-Chinese, the vast majority being Moslems of Turkic origin who were, at best, reluctant citizens of the Chinese state. Even during the most peaceful of times, Chinese authorities had found it difficult to maintain control over the area, and the increasingly beleaguered Chiang government was in no position to consider use of military force, the traditional means of enforcing Chinese dominance in this border region. For this reason, a new direction in Chinese border policy had to be followed, at least until the situation in China proper stabilized.

Second, the three districts of the ETR were contiguous with the Soviet Union, which had a long-standing interest not only in the three districts themselves but also in the rest of the province. From the late nineteenth century onward, the USSR had established itself as the province's foremost trading partner, a status that was strengthened under the rule of Sheng Shicai in the 1930s. Furthermore, it had stationed its own troops in Xinjiang as far east as the town of Hami, ostensibly to prevent any Japanese attempt to cut off the region from the rest of the country.

Besides commercial and military involvement, it was also in the Soviet Union's best interests to maintain a careful watch on the development of nationalism and independence movements among Xinjiang's Moslem population since such tendencies could influence the USSR's own Moslem

minorities. Clearly, the Soviet Union could not afford disinterest in Xinjiang's affairs.

Well aware of the Soviet position with regard to Xinjiang, the Chinese government was developing and consolidating Sheng's belated attempt to reverse Russian encroachment in the region when the Ili rebellion took place, with at least the acquiescence of the USSR; when the local Moslem forces outmatched the substantial Chinese forces then stationed in the region, the Chinese turned toward an international solution, seeking to use diplomatic means to restore their control. The "Ili Incident" thus moved beyond the sphere of purely domestic politics and became part of the complex negotiations among the USSR, the United States, Britain, and China during the summer of 1945.

Third, the situation was a challenge to prevailing Guomintang ideology on the subject of China's national minorities and the border regions. The Guomintang emphasized the sanctity of the traditional Chinese borders and the responsibility of Chinese leadership to preserve such borders intact for future generations. Chiang himself wrote the Guomintang doctrine that declared that all national minorities were, in fact, simply branches of the greater Chinese race, varying in culture and language only by virtue of their relative isolation from the Chinese mainstream over a period of centuries (see [chapter 2](#)). Being thus defined as Chinese, the diverse peoples of the vast border regions had no historical or cultural justification for demands of separation from the Chinese motherland.

The ETR was a direct challenge to this ideology as well as to continued Chinese control over the whole of Xinjiang province. In meeting this challenge, Chiang did not swerve from his primary objective of maintaining direct Chinese control over the borderlands, but he was forced to follow new policies of compromise and conciliation to end this Ili crisis.

Problems related to the minority peoples of China have usually been considered as a part of China's domestic politics. This was a natural development, in terms of academic study, since Chinese political and military control periodically extended to the vast homelands of the peoples who are today termed "national minorities" by the People's Republic of China. Further, information on Chinese relations with national minorities was mainly in the Chinese language, so that anthropologists and historians

whose initial interest had been China and Chinese culture began the modern studies of minority affairs in China.

The key to interpreting the events of this century in the Chinese borderlands, however, lies only partly within a Chinese framework. Because the cultures, religions, languages, and histories of these peoples are the result of historic development quite different from that of China and the Chinese, it is more useful to place these peoples and their twentieth-century struggle for independence in a different context. That is, first, to view their modern history as emerging from circumstances and perceptions uniquely their own and distinct from that of the Chinese, and second, to view their struggles against Chinese domination not as “rebellion” against Chinese rule, but as an attempt to win political and military control over what they themselves viewed as their traditional homelands. In other words, the peoples of the Chinese borderlands were waging what are today referred to as national liberation struggles, their aim being to set up independent states free of outside control. The framework for discussion thus moves beyond the realm of Chinese domestic politics and into the volatile sphere of twentieth-century nationalism.

Placing China’s nationality question into this context means that the issues and questions involved are seen not only as an aspect of Chinese politics, of which they remain an integral part, but also as an aspect of a greater international phenomenon of the years after World War I—the rise of nationalism among minority nationalities throughout the world. This basis for analysis is particularly useful for Xinjiang, whose peoples have strong cultural and historic ties to three great cultural traditions: China, Russia, and the Middle East.

Such an approach also serves to emphasize the fact that the upheaval in Xinjiang in the 1940s was similar to that of other colonial or “subject” peoples who were contained within larger political entities, and whose unity of purpose was supplied by unified opposition to the states of which their homelands constituted a part. The cohesion this opposition provided has been a principal element in many national independence movements.

Parallels between events in Chinese Central Asia and other areas on the peripheries of the USSR and China also take on new significance viewed from this standpoint. Of particular interest for Xinjiang studies are the movements in Iran and Iraq during the same period, where Kurdish and

Azerbaijan republics were established under Soviet tutelage. While comparison of the Soviet role in the various Moslem republics established on the Soviet periphery during the 1940s is beyond the scope of this work, future research may be better able to describe the parallels and differences between events in Xinjiang and these regions as a result of the information presented here.

Nationalist Chinese policy in Xinjiang, the primary subject of the present work, is also placed in an extended context for, in essence, Chiang Kaishek's government was faced with the same problem that challenged many governments after World War II, namely, how to respond to the newly awakened nationalism of ethnic minorities which increasingly threatened the old national boundaries and the established international order from Asia to Europe. The reaction of the Nationalists to this problem was similar to that of other governments which, having initially refused to recognize the nature of these struggles, were forced by circumstances to come to some kind of agreement with the new militant nationalists' demands. Thus, the interaction between the Nationalist government in China and the "rebel" government in northwestern Xinjiang in 1944 is a part of the post-World War II pattern of breakdown in the old colonialist and imperialist system, and the seemingly inexorable growth of national liberation struggles in the twentieth century.

CHAPTER 2

National Minority Policy in Republican China

During the course of its long history, the Chinese state gradually expanded into the vast and sparsely populated lands that surrounded it, a process that followed the rhythm of the rise and fall of dynasties in its movements of conquest and retrenchment. Characteristically, this involved the Chinese state in the need for military and diplomatic policies, the classic version of the former being pacification and of the latter the exploitation of differences among the peoples of the border territories, using the barbarians to oppose the barbarians, in order to prevent the coalescence of forces that would threaten the Chinese state.

While China had formally incorporated some borderlands such as Mongolia and Xinjiang into the Chinese state by the end of the nineteenth century, these regions continued to challenge Chinese efforts at control. The advent of the twentieth century and the Chinese Revolution in 1911 did not end centuries-old divisions; on the contrary, in some border areas, the desire to be free of Chinese rule gained new impetus from the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist winds that gathered force after the collapse of the Qing court.

In terms of Chinese attitudes toward the border areas, the Revolution of 1911 meant little actual change in traditional Chinese policy. Although Dr. Sun Yat-sen eventually adopted the Wilsonian call for self-determination for ethnic minorities in China as the basis for Guomindang policy, the successive central governments established after 1911 took no positive steps toward a formal national minority policy. Weak and factionalized, during Sun's lifetime the central government was barely able to maintain its own often superficial hold on the reins of power. Thus warlords continued the old imperial style of rule in many of the border regions, employing both military force and "divide and rule" tactics to maintain their positions of power.

In Tibet and what was formerly called Outer Mongolia the local governments maintained virtual independence from the central government from 1914 onward. Tibet continued its guarded relations with the various Chinese governments established after 1911, but the Chinese, who continued to claim sovereignty, never exercised even a small degree of control in the region.¹ Mongolia, having eliminated most of its Han Chinese population at the time of the Chinese Revolution, came under the protection of the Bolshevik government after 1917. From that time onward, Chinese control was limited to brief periods of dominance in Inner Mongolia.²

With Chiang Kai-shek's assumption of Guomindang leadership on Sun's death in 1925, the latter's program of autonomy and self-determination as the basis of the Nationalists' national minority policy was dropped. Chiang's primary objective with regard to the minority areas was to hold these territories as an integral, indivisible part of the Chinese state. All political action in the borderlands was designed to serve this one paramount aim.

Sun Yat-sen's National Minority Policy

During the first decade of the Chinese Republic, while the problem of national unity dominated political affairs, relatively little attention was paid to the national minority question. But under the influence of Wilsonian doctrine and Soviet advisers, Sun gradually turned his attention toward minority affairs. Writing on the subject in 1918, he called for the eventual “dying out of all names of individual people inhabiting China.”³

At that time five nationalities were recognized as being part of the Chinese nation: Manchu, Mongol, Tatar, Tibetan, and Han. Lacking detailed information on the many ethnic groups living within China's borders but aware of the need for unity within China if it was to survive as a modern state, Sun advocated the “dying out” of names of nationalities so that China could follow the example of Switzerland and more especially of the United States, which, in his view, was a nation able to “satisfy the demands and requirements of all races and unite them in a single cultural and political whole.”⁴

On the basis of such statements Sun's early views on the question of ethnic minorities have been called assimilationist. In the sense that Sun hoped for a united China where all national groups were integrated as part of the state, he can perhaps be termed as such, but Sun's use of the United States and Switzerland as examples for China to emulate clearly shows that he would have found a kind of cultural pluralism acceptable even in the early 1920s. A longer quotation from the same source makes this evident:

There are still many people suffering from unjust treatment; the Chinese people must assume the mission of setting free these people from their yoke, in the sense of direct aid for them or uniting them under the banner of a single Chinese nation. This would give them the opportunity to enjoy the feeling of equality of man and man, and of a just international attitude, i.e., that which was expressed in the declaration of the American President Wilson by the words “self-determination.” Up to the moment of reaching this political stage, our work cannot be considered as finished. This is the meaning of nationalism—but “positive” nationalism and to this we must give special attention.⁵

As Sun's thinking on the minority question evolved, he became committed to the idea of self-determination for China's ethnic minorities. In January 1923 the Sun-Joffe Manifesto was issued calling for autonomy and self-determination, and the following year this call was made part of the Guomindang's political platform adopted at the first National Congress in April 1924. Article 4 of the *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* drawn up by the congress stated unequivocally that racial minorities in China were to be helped and guided toward self-determination and self-government should they so desire.⁶

The two basic principles that, theoretically at least, underlay Guomindang policy with regard to national minorities were basic equality for all nationalities in China and the right of self-determination for those peoples who chose the road of independence. As neither the party nor the central government was then in a position to act on such principles, however, no details of how such a policy would be implemented were issued.

Policy Changes Under Chiang Kai-shek

Major changes in the basis of minority policy began with the assumption of control over the Guomindang by Chiang Kai-shek, successor to Sun upon the latter's death in 1925.

Chiang's view of the minorities within China was that they were simply one part of the greater Chinese race. Although centuries of relative isolation had led to some distinctive differences in language and culture within China's borders, Chiang contended that all had originally been part of the ancient Chinese race. The ethnic minorities were not, in his view, *minzu*, but rather they were *zhongzu*. The former term can be translated as nationality, but the latter means simply one branch of a single tribe.⁷

As all of China's peoples were of a single basic root, Chiang declared that there could be no reasonable basis for granting any minority group the right to seek self-determination or independence from the motherland. Rather, Chiang foresaw a return to the original state of affairs in China in which all peoples were assimilated into one single race. This would be assisted by an assimilationist government policy that was almost totally unyielding in its efforts toward enforced national unity.

Where Sun's views had been formed by Soviet advice and Wilsonian doctrine, Chiang viewed all the old imperial Chinese territories as permanent and indivisible parts of China. The Provisional Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period, promulgated in Nanjing in June 1931, pointedly included the de facto independent regions of Mongolia and Tibet as part of the territory of the Republic of China, and the proposed Constitution of 1934, in Part I, Article 4, listed all the provinces and the "areas" of Mongolia and Tibet, adding that no alteration should be made in this territory.⁸ In 1943 Chiang himself wrote, "There is not a single piece of territory within these areas... which can be torn away or separated from China, and none of them can form an independent unit by itself."⁹

Chiang's views dominated official policy, but they were by no means unanimously supported by all his staff or all political factions. General Zhang Zhizhong, who became governor of Xinjiang, and others in the government were cautious proponents of cultural pluralism, advocating the acceptance of the various nationalities as semi-autonomous units with the

right to eventual self-determination and, in the interim, the right to control their own cultural and local affairs.

One school of thought went as far as to advocate a federalist form of government as a possible solution to the continuing rebellions against Chinese rule in the “frontier” areas.¹⁰ As Owen Lattimore has pointed out, however, only the Chinese Communist Party openly proposed a federalist type of government. Based on Soviet policy, in 1930 the First All-China Congress of Soviets announced that non-Chinese nationalities in China should have the right to determine whether they wished to secede or remain within the Chinese state.¹¹ Although by 1945 Mao Zedong no longer included secession as a right, he continued to advocate the right of national minorities to self-determination.

Chiang Kai-shek’s own seemingly intransigent views on the question of self-determination were modified only once after his assumption of leadership during the Republican era. In August 1945, when China’s claims to Outer Mongolia were the subject of international interest, Chiang referred to Dr. Sun’s earlier policies, his words reflecting Sun’s self-determinist views: “Our people should realize that if we ignore the aspirations of these racial groups for freedom and restrain their urge for independence and self-government, it will not only be contrary to the spirit of our National Revolution, but will also tend to increase friction between the racial groups.”¹² He noted that in 1924 Dr. Sun had graciously received representatives from Mongolia and had treated them as members of a friendly neighboring country. And, as if in anticipation of the result of the coming plebiscite in Mongolia, Chiang advocated China’s recognition of the region as an independent state. As for other minority groups, he stated: “We should honestly aid all racial groups which have given evidence of their capacity for self-government and have shown a spirit of independence. We should help them achieve national independence through self-determination.”¹³

The suggested procedure for the groups that wanted this independence was to make known their desires “in a friendly spirit and through legal channels” so that the government could then determine whether they “have the capacity for self-government and a strong determination to attain independence and are politically and economically ready for both.”¹⁴ The

central government then would voluntarily help them to realize their freedom and would hold no ill will against them if they chose to leave their mother country.

The intent of the speech was clear: the Chinese government would accept the independence of Mongolia, but in any other instance it would be the central government that would determine whether a minority group was ready for self-government, not the peoples themselves. While parts of the speech sounded conciliatory, the basic premise of Chiang's policy remained unchanged. By reserving for itself alone the final decision as to the legality or practicality of minority aspirations, the government affirmed its sovereign rights over territories that, even as Chiang spoke, were in open revolt against his government on just this issue.

This particular speech must have been heard with considerable consternation in border areas where representatives of the local peoples had been trying since the 1930s to get Chiang to give them a hearing on the question of possible future autonomy. Contingents from Inner Mongolia, for instance, had tried to meet with Chiang or his representatives since the early 1930s to present their case for autonomy. They were met with "scorn, insult, ignorance, and lack of interest" in the words of one source close to such Mongol nationalists.¹⁵ In November and December 1946, Uighur representatives spoke to reporters of the Central News Agency, restating their hopes that autonomy for minority nationalities would be included in China's new constitution, then under discussion throughout the country. The Uighur representative Ahmet Jan Kasimi even cited Sun's earlier programs in support for his request.¹⁶ His pleas were echoed by representatives of the Miao people of Southwest China.

Despite these public and private pleas to Chiang for autonomy, or at least the promise of future autonomy, for border areas such as Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, and despite the statements in the 1945 speech cited above, the 1947 Constitution adopted by the government included little mention of minority peoples and listed virtually no concession to national minority cultural sensibilities.

This constitution, which went into effect on December 25, 1947, briefly referred to the larger national minorities in Chapter 13, Section 6, which dealt with "Frontier Regions." The two articles in this section accorded

legal protection to minorities in these regions to insure their “status” and further pledged to give special assistance to them in carrying out their local “self-government work.”¹⁷

Neither the term “status” nor “special assistance” is explained, and either statement could easily mean greater—not less—central government interference in local affairs. The term “self-government” referred specifically to the type of local government then envisaged for all of China, under which the local governments were empowered to pass laws and measures governing local affairs as long as such laws did not infringe on the powers of the constitution.

Other specific “self-governing” powers were outlined in chapters 10 and 11, the latter including special provisions to protect the Mongolian units of local government called “leagues” and “banners” and to honor the self-government system of Tibet.¹⁸ There were no specific provisions by which these governments were supposed to operate, however, and there was no mention of any type of autonomy or eventual self-determination for these or any other national minority groups in China.

Chiang’s intransigence on the matter of self-determination reflected the bitterness of China’s recent past. Weak Chinese governments had been unable to maintain control over Tibet or Mongolia, and powerful neighbors had evinced their eagerness to annex further Chinese territory from the time of the Chinese Revolution onward. Chiang’s determination that no further lands be lost was, in the circumstances, an understandable, even admirable goal. But beyond this goal of maintaining Chinese sovereignty in all traditional Chinese territory, policy goals in the borderlands were vague, and national minority policy was for the most part a response to circumstances rather than a case of government initiative for positive action.

Policy Implementation

As mentioned previously, during the early years of the Republic, the border areas continued to fall under the domination of warlords or local provincial elites. Sun Yat-sen's policies of equality and self-determination for ethnic minorities could not be implemented. Nonetheless, some government machinery was set up to deal with minority affairs. The old Court of Colonial Affairs (Lifan Yuan),¹⁹ a holdover from the Qing government, was abolished and replaced in 1912 by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau, which, despite its name, also dealt with affairs of other minority groups in China. The bureau was dissolved in 1914 and reorganized as the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry, under direct control of the president of the Republic. Given the disturbances then affecting China, this ministry developed "no plan of administration." After the Nationalist government was established in Nanjing in 1928, the ministry was again the subject of reorganization and was renamed the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. Despite the new title, it was considered to have ministerial status under the Executive Yuan.²⁰

There has been little detailed study of the workings of this body, but there is no doubt that its opportunities for action were severely limited by the political and military situation that existed throughout China during the Republican period. Thus it appears to have been primarily an advisory and planning group. The lack of information and understanding of various minorities and the shortage of bilingual personnel to deal directly with minority representatives doubtless further impaired its abilities.

In practice as well as in theory, central government policy under Chiang Kai-shek was aimed at establishing Guomindang preeminence in the border regions and irrevocably tying these areas to the Chinese state. Since the traditional means of using the military to assure control of the borderlands was not an option available to Chiang, he used whatever means were available to him. He became adept at using the shifting domestic and international political and military alliances to extend Nationalist control in national minority areas. Wherever possible, he entered into coalitions with local warlords and provincial elites to establish a semblance of central government authority in areas that had slipped from its control. Up to the

end of World War II, he had to be content with lip-service paid to the Nationalist cause by such men as Ma Bufang in Qinghai and Sheng Shicai in Xinjiang, who, despite pledges of allegiance to the central government, continued to rule their respective provinces independently. When opportunity presented itself, however, Chiang moved to draw such men closer to the government. For instance, in 1944 and 1945, he astutely took advantage of the rapid changes that accompanied the last stages of World War II to remove Sheng from Xinjiang and Long Yun from Yunnan, replacing both men with appointees of his own choosing.²¹

Chiang also successfully used international means to further his pursuit of Chinese control in the minority areas. In Xinjiang, he sought to balance Soviet presence with that of the United States and Britain by inviting these two powers to open consular offices in Urumqi, where the USSR had been officially represented for many years. Further, he did not hesitate to ask for the assistance of these governments' representatives in forestalling Soviet moves in this particularly sensitive border area (see [chapter 4](#)).

Although Chiang enjoyed some success in using diplomatic means to further Nationalist control in the border regions, the Nationalist record in other aspects of policy vis-à-vis minority areas was far less impressive. In particular, the Chinese sought to foster a sense of national unity among national minorities through economic development programs, education, and resettlement of refugees in the borderlands. As shown below, little was actually accomplished in any of these areas.

Various government agencies periodically published reports on the proposed reconstruction work to be carried out in border regions once peace was restored. One of the subjects receiving the most attention was economic development. The government sponsored surveys, and the National Resources Commission prepared reports on the underdeveloped borderlands, indicating the existence of vast reserves of natural resources and drafting plans for their future exploitation. Transport, communication, basic education, and public hygiene were also mentioned in such reports as basic necessities for improving social welfare of the borderlands' inhabitants.²²

In the area referred to as "frontier education," the Nationalist government itself admitted that it "did not follow any systematic trend until 1939."²³

Subsequently, however, it established provincial departments of Mongolian and Tibetan education under the Ministry of Education. These were to provide all border districts with “modern education and citizenship training, language, vocational, and hygienic training.” Further, at the secondary level, education was also to foster “a clear understanding of the Chinese race and nation.”²⁴

In 1945, the Ministry of Education adopted an “adaptation policy” for frontier districts. Under this policy, the old practice of emphasizing the teaching of the Chinese language was to be relaxed because, as one source candidly put it, “this policy never produced satisfactory results.”²⁵ The new system was to allow students to have free choice in the language of instruction, and Chinese language classes were no longer compulsory. Textbooks in both local languages and Mandarin were to be prepared to enable this new policy to be carried out. As the government lacked both the power and the finances for the proposed development of frontier education, however, little was actually accomplished in education in the border regions.

A further means of strengthening ties between the central government and the outlying regions was to be through the introduction of Han Chinese settlers into minority areas. Such settlers were promised government aid, and small groups were sent to areas like Xinjiang. The Northwest, in particular, was considered ripe for such programs as it had been depopulated in the rebellions of the nineteenth century and had suffered from periodic disturbances ever since. The introduction of these settlers was seen not only as a means to change the ethnic balance of the region but also as a way to encourage the ultimate assimilation of the non-Chinese population. The limited attempt to resettle people in Xinjiang in 1944 was unsuccessful, however. Local opposition (discussed in [chapter 3](#)) plus a general unwillingness among refugees in China proper to move to remote border regions were two major obstacles that the government was unable to overcome.

The Nationalist government was unable to implement fully any of the programs proposed above. Even if it had been able to do so, there is serious question as to whether these policies would have received much support from the national minorities for whom they were intended.

Pronouncements on national minority regions under the Nationalist government primarily reflected the major concern of the government with regard to China's border areas: to prevent further disintegration of the Chinese state. The Chinese chose to invest the limited resources available in the one aspect of border policy that had shown proven results. This was to station Nationalist troops loyal to the central government in those regions considered at risk from external or internal threat. As will be seen in the following chapters, in the case of Xinjiang this choice of policy did not necessarily best serve Chinese interests in maintaining control of the borderlands.

CHAPTER 3

Geographical and Historical Background to the Rebellion

Located north of Tibet and west of Mongolia, Xinjiang is one of the most isolated regions in the world. At 1,500 miles from the national capital of Beijing, officials in Xinjiang's capital of Urumqi have responsibility for administering a vast, distant land that includes within its boundaries massive mountain ranges and thousands of miles of rocky, dry deserts. Called "Chinese Turkestan" by such famous explorers as Sir Aurel Stein and Sven Hedin, it is today known as the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and covers one-sixth of China's total territory, making it the largest administrative unit in China.

Geographically, the region's 640,000 square miles are roughly divided into the northern third, traditionally called Dzungaria, and the larger southern two-thirds, which boasts the massive Takla Makan Desert and some of the world's highest mountains. Between the two sectors lie the Tianshan Mountains, which run from the eastern border with Gansu all the way across the region to the Soviet Union, where this natural barrier of rock and ice turns south-southwest toward Afghanistan, forming part of the Sino-Soviet border from the Ili valley to the Pamirs, in the far southwestern corner of the region.

Mountains also ring most of Xinjiang. In the north and northeast the Altai Mountains straddle the border with the Mongolian People's Republic. In the northwest are the Tarbagatai Mountains, which form part of the northern Xinjiang-Soviet border. In the far southwest, the Tianshan merge with the mountain ranges that form the southern border of the region with Tibet: the Pamirs, the Karakorams, and the Kunlun ranges, which in turn march toward China proper. Completing the circle, in the east are the Qilian Shan, which extend north and east from the Kunlun. These mountain formations leave only a few natural corridors into Xinjiang, the most convenient of

which is the Gansu corridor, which links Xinjiang to China proper via the great Gobi Desert. On the other side of the region, mountain passes on the northwestern Sino-Soviet border offer much easier access to the Soviet Central Asian Republics, a geographic fact that has influenced development in the Northwest throughout the modern period.

There are two desert areas within the region. In the north, mountains ring the Dzungarian Plain, which itself contains several small desert areas. In the more arid south, mountains surround the 142,857 square miles of the Takla Makan Desert. Rivers flow out of the mountains and are lost in the sands of this vast desert, but along the larger of the southern area's rivers are oasis settlements that were once way-stations for traders on the Silk Road, two branches of which once passed through Xinjiang, linking it with China and the Islamic east. Today the oasis towns are the home of the region's Uighurs, who have adapted to the harshness of the land over centuries, resulting in a lifestyle that could, according to residents, be virtually paradisiacal.

Without its rivers and lakes, the region would be uninhabitable. Several major rivers—the longest of which is the Tarim—water the oasis settlements of the south while in the north smaller rivers flow down from towering mountains to the Dzungarian Plain, making possible the abundant pasture lands that are the basis of the northern nomad economy. As long as the region was not overpopulated, water resources made life in both oasis settlements and pasture areas pleasant and, during some periods of relative peace, even idyllic.

Natural Wealth

The rough beauty of Xinjiang disguises the immense natural wealth that lies below the surface. The gold mines of the Altai Mountains and the fine jade of Khotan have been famous throughout China for centuries, and officials dispatched to the far northwest of China were known to return with plentiful supplies of both precious commodities.¹

Coal and oil were known to exist in both quality and abundance. Local residents talked of using oil from Wusu with no refining, and coal could be had by taking a bucket and shovel and collecting a supply for personal use without much effort.²

Other riches in Xinjiang were revealed in the course of twentieth-century exploration, which uncovered deposits of tin, quicksilver (mercury), uranium, lead, copper, iron, and massive reserves of oil.³ Because much of the early exploration was undertaken by Soviet experts during the period of Sheng Shicai's rule in Xinjiang, figures on the amounts of mineral wealth mined up to 1949 are scarce. According to one source, in 1942, oil wells at Wusu were said to be producing 150 tons of crude oil daily, or 25,000 gallons of petrol a month.⁴ Later research in the Karamai region revealed oil deposits estimated at two billion metric tons, or 90 percent of China's total oil reserves.⁵

Other areas in northern Xinjiang were also producing minerals in the 1940s, most of it going to the Soviet Union. "Wolfram"—or tungsten—was being mined near Fuwen (Koktogai) in the Altai Mountains, with one source estimating that in 1946 some 2,000 tons of wolfram-bearing ore was hauled to the USSR by truck. Also known to be in the Altai area are deposits of beryl and spodumene. The former is the source of beryllium, which forms an alloy widely used in atomic reactors; the latter is also called lithium aluminum silicate and is used in thermonuclear explosives.⁶

In addition to the oil and minerals found in the northern region, the Ili valley region on the Sino-Soviet border boasted its own store of valuable mineral wealth, including deposits of iron ore, molybdenum (a lead ore), tungsten, surface coal, petroleum, uranium, and gold. Copper deposits are nearby.⁷

Thus the three districts that were involved in the rebellion of 1944 contain some of the largest, richest deposits of mineral wealth in Xinjiang. While most local inhabitants may not have known of the potential riches these minerals represented—nor of their importance in production of strategic arms—the Soviet Union recognized their value and was able to exploit part of the cache of natural wealth in the 1930s.⁸ Certainly Xinjiang's natural resources constitute one reason for continued Soviet interest in China's great Northwest.

During the decade of the 1930s and into the early 1940s, the amount of trade in nonferrous metals from China to the Soviet Union varied. There are no separate figures for the minerals extracted from Xinjiang. [Table 1](#) gives the known extent of Sino-Soviet trade. By 1943 much of this trade was via Xinjiang, with 2,786 metric tons of tungsten ore, 10.1 metric tons of tin, and 1.5 metric tons of quicksilver passing through customs posts in Xinjiang en route to the USSR.⁹

Prior to 1949, however, the most important trade in natural resources was in the sale of livestock and animal products. Trade between Xinjiang and the USSR in these important raw commodities fell when Sheng reoriented himself toward the Nationalists. The extent of the resulting disruption in trade is clearly indicated in the Soviet statistics for the period, summarized in [table 2](#).

An American report of 1945 noted that the Soviet deficit in wool, cotton, leather, and meat would be large in the years 1945–1950, with wool requirements falling short by 20,000–80,000 metric tons and meat by some 40,000 tons annually.¹⁰ Such shortages would mean that the natural wealth of the three districts would certainly invite attention from the USSR, whose own resources and ability to produce raw materials had been dramatically reduced during the war years. Under the influence of Sheng Shicai, Xinjiang had contributed to the USSR war effort. Disruption of such supplies doubtless refocused Soviet interest in this border region, whose residents had intermittently raised the flag of rebellion against their Chinese rulers.

Sino-Soviet Mineral Trade in 1938 and 1940 (metric tons)

Mineral	1938 total production	Amount to USSR	%	1940 total production	Amount to USSR	%
Tungsten	14,113	3,400	24	8,757	1,600	18
Antimony	11,616	5,950	51	7,528	1,315	17
Tin	13,282	1,060	8	17,278	1,550	9
Quicksilver	19.3	–	0	117.3	50	43

Source: U.S. Office of Strategic Services, “Russo-Chinese Relations and Potential Soviet Contributions to China’s Postwar Economic Development,” R & A Report No. 3331, August 31, 1945, p. 13.

Cultural and Historical Background

The following brief survey of the region's nationalities is based on a number of studies that detail the cultures and history of the peoples of Xinjiang.¹¹ In the course of the survey, two basic points will become clear. First, the people of this area were not, as has been suggested in some recent work,¹² divided into irreparably antagonistic groups. Despite ethnic divisions and variations in lifestyle, the vast majority of the region's people were Turkic Moslems, and this dominant majority was clearly distinguishable as a single group who considered themselves to be separate from the Han Chinese, not only because of religious differences but also on the basis of race.¹³

Second, the ETR elite were far from being the simple-minded country folk that some Chinese and other sources would have one believe. In the 1940s, there existed among Xinjiang's Moslems an educated, nationalistic elite that wrote and spoke with conviction against Chinese policies in the Northwest and demanded Chinese recognition of Turkic nationalities' political aspirations. They wrote on behalf of the region's Moslem population, which shared a long, often bloody history of invasion, colonization, and rebellion.

The Moslem groups of modern Xinjiang are, in name at least, related to historic, nomadic groups or nations that populated the vast reaches of Central Asia during its ancient and modern periods. The first group of these nomads to settle and establish an empire were the Uighurs, whose first empire was located on the Selenga River, in present-day northern Mongolia, in the seventh and eighth centuries. In AD. 840, this empire was destroyed by another nomadic group, the Kirghiz, namesakes of the modern Kirghiz in the USSR and Xinjiang. Remnants of the Uighur empire moved into the present-day area of Xinjiang, gradually establishing themselves in the oasis cities there, mixing with the local Persian-Turkic population.¹⁴

Table 2

Soviet-Xinjiang Trade, 1942–1949

Item	Amount/value	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
				Soviet Exports to Xinjiang					
Cotton cloth	1,000 meters	9,811	2,661	1,840	3,933	6,102	7,942	10,410	12,449
Clothing	1,000 rubles	1,099	2,343	167	129	358	394	348	601
Sugar	Tons	2,202	309	40	402	1,159	1,954	909	1,129
Tea	Tons	69	10	3	16	186	94	132	167
Oil/petroleum products	Tons	1,338	42	–	491	1,599	741	600	1,046
Total trade	Million rubles	21.9	11.6	3.3	7.7	23.8	22.1	30.4	36
			Xinjiang Exports to the Soviet Union						
Wool	Tons	4,864	811	157	2,089	1,267	1,697	1,061	1,166
Sheep & goats	Thous. head	481	2.5	469.4	315	334.9	399.9	344.5	319.3
Cattle	Thous. head	18.1	0.5	18.3	41.4	48.2	21.3	34.7	35.2
Horses ^a	Thous. head	50.2	2.2	19	25.5	–	–	–	–
Hides	Thous. head	1,597.8	13.34	8.4	123.1	62.6	55.8	404	435
Pelts	1,000 rubles	3,100	69.5	91.6	1015	1,240	2,195	1,391	1,299
Total trade	Million rubles	56.4 ^b	3.3	23.2	22.5	23.8	22.1	30.4	36

Source: M. I. Sladkovskii, *Istoriia torgov-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii S. S. S. R. s Kitaem* (Moscow: Nauka, 1977). Figures for 1942–1945 are given on p. 277, and figures for 1946–1949 are on p. 290.

^a No figures for horses are given in the 1946–1949 period.

^b In the same author's earlier work on the same subject, he gives the figure of 45.4: no reason is given for the discrepancy. See M. I. Sladkovskii, *Ocherki ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii S.S.S.R. s Kitaem* (Moscow, 1947), p. 276.

The Islamization of the Turkic groups in Xinjiang began in the tenth century. By the time of the Mongol invasion some three hundred years later, Islam was widespread throughout the region.

During the period of Mongol dominance in the Central Asian steppe, small Uighur states continued to exist in Xinjiang, and educated Uighurs

from these oasis cities became influential in the Mongol court. The Uighurs are credited with teaching the illiterate Mongols to write using the Uighur script, which the Uighurs themselves later abandoned in favor of the Arabic script, the written form of the Koran and the basis of their new religion.

With the decline of Mongol control in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the oasis states in Xinjiang briefly enjoyed an independent existence, free of control of either the powerful Turkic Khanates to the west or the Chinese Ming dynasty to the east. Ruled by the descendants of Mongols who had become Turkicized and adopted Islam, the oasis people gradually became a mix of Turkic and Mongol stock overlaying the previous Indo-European groups that, by this time, were totally submerged in the new Turkic culture of Xinjiang.

The Turkicized Mongol rulers gave way in turn to a new ruling class that migrated to Xinjiang from the Khanates in the west. The new elite were Turkic religious leaders who gained political as well as religious control over the oasis towns by the seventeenth century.¹⁵ By this time, however, China was under the strong and aggressive Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty, who were determined to extend Manchu control into Central Asia. In the eighteenth century they invaded Xinjiang, taking control of the cities on the once famed Silk Route and imposing military rule over the region through the establishment of garrisons in major cities.

To rule this vast border land, the Qing used several classic Chinese policies. One was *yi yi zhi yi*, or using the barbarian to fight the barbarian. In other words, by pitting various groups against one another and thereby dividing them, the Chinese could forestall the formation of large alliances or coalitions that could threaten the Chinese state. The Qing also relied on military presence, and the Manchu troops sent to the far northwest were encouraged to settle in the region with their families.

A series of rebellions against the Qing began almost immediately, increasing in intensity and duration until a major revolt occurred near the end of the nineteenth century. This revolt was put down only after a decade of effort by forces under General Zuo Zongtang. In the face of General Zuo's superior organization and leadership, the Turkic forces of Xinjiang and neighboring Gansu province were defeated. In 1884, the northwestern

region was officially incorporated into the Chinese Empire as “Xinjiang,” or the “New Frontier.”

Xinjiang Provincial Government

When Xinjiang's status was raised to that of a province in 1884, it was ruled under the same system of organization as that of other Chinese provinces. Officials were appointed to the provincial bureaucracy for varying lengths of time by the imperial government in Beijing. Although Xinjiang offered the possibility for collection of great personal wealth, posts in the far northwest were often given as punishment to wayward members of the Qing bureaucracy, and appointments to the border regions were generally considered demotions within the ruling hierarchy.

The typical provincial government under the Qing included a governor who often was able to exercise considerable personal power. In the case of Xinjiang, because of the distance from the capital, the head of government treated Xinjiang as his personal fiefdom, a process that culminated under Sheng Shicai, whose pro-Soviet rule in Xinjiang was virtually independent of the central government.

Underlying the traditional Chinese bureaucracy in Xinjiang were the native leaders of the region, many of whom were given official status by the Chinese and incorporated into the system of administration. In Xinjiang under the Qing there were six classes or ranks of “beg” or “bek” (the latter being local pronunciation in which “g” becomes a “k” sound), ranging from the highest, “Akim beg” or local governor, to the lowest, “Mirabu beg” or superintendent of agriculture (see [table 3](#)).

The begs had considerable power among the oasis Turks. They were responsible for the collection of taxes, and a portion of local tax revenue invariably adhered to their purses. Often they were wealthy local merchants who used their official posts to ensure the most favorable environment locally for their business enterprises.¹⁶ It should be noted that corruption in Xinjiang was thus not the prerogative of only the Chinese—it was accepted practice in dealing with officials of any nationality in Xinjiang, as elsewhere in China. Among the nomadic peoples, the traditional tribal chieftains were held responsible for the actions of their people, but these men were not given official Chinese rank.

At the time of Xinjiang's formal incorporation into the Qing empire, the Ili area became the westernmost outpost of the Manchus. This region had

already been the object of bitter Sino-Russian rivalry in the 1870s.¹⁷ In recognition of the Ili area's particularly important strategic position, the Qing appointed a special military governor based in the town of Suiding, twenty-five miles west of Yining, to oversee this sensitive border region. The military governor of Ili was assisted by two assistant military governors and by ambans, officials who dealt with civil affairs stationed at Yining and Tacheng respectively.¹⁸ Thus, the three districts that would form the East Turkestan Republic in 1944 were under special military rule up to the end of the Qing.

Table 3

Local Administration of Xinjiang under the Qing

Rank	Title	Pinyin	English
First	Akim Beg	Aqimu Boke	Local governor
Second	Ishhan Beg	Yishenhan Boke	Assistant governor
Third	Shang Beg	Shang Boke	Collector of revenues
Fourth	Katsonatchi Beg	Gezaneiqi Boke	Assistant collector
Fifth	Hasun Beg	Hazi Boke	Judge
Sixth	Mirabu Beg	Milabu Boke	Superintendent of agriculture

Source: H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, trans. A. Beltchenko (Beijing, 1910), p. 440.

Notes: "Akim" refers to the Turkish "hakim" or judge; "mirabu" may be derived from "memur" or civil servant. The other titles, like "shang," appear to be of Chinese origin.

After the Chinese Revolution of 1911, there was initially little change in the system of administration in Xinjiang. The governor resigned, but his replacement was a Qing-trained official named Yang Cengxin who continued to rule the region in much the same way as his Qing predecessors. In fact, rather than lessening provincial government control, Yang moved to increase it. For instance, in 1915 he decided to make the region's local "district elders" more directly accountable to him by declaring that they first be elected and then recommended for their posts by the local Chinese magistrate. Yang himself would ultimately confirm or reject the appointments.¹⁹

Yang kept close control over Xinjiang until his assassination in 1928. His replacement, Jin Shuren, was unable to maintain the control that marked Yang's rule. Despite the fact that Jin increased the number of secret police and placed members of his family in the highest posts of government, he was unable to emulate Yang's personal domination. Corruption and a deteriorating local economy led to a series of insurrections beginning in Hami in 1931.²⁰ This pattern of insurrection quickly expanded, and in November 1933 Moslem forces in Kashgar declared the establishment of the first East Turkestan Republic.

At this time in Xinjiang several groups were contending for leadership. In southern Xinjiang, the Moslem religious leader Hoja Niyaz claimed a wide following, as did another religious leader, Sabit Damullah. In the Hami area and eastern Xinjiang, however, people looked toward members of the Ma family, of Hui nationality, which was then a considerable force in neighboring Gansu and Qinghai provinces. In the Turfan area was yet another leader, Mahmud Muhidi. Of all these men, Hoja Niyaz claimed the largest following.²¹ There was conflict, however, between personalities and the different goals of these various movements. These differences contributed to their defeat and to the rise of Sheng Shicai.

Educated in Japan, Sheng was ambitious and clever enough to see the opportunity inherent in a posting to Xinjiang. In 1931 he left Nanjing, where he had been an officer on Chiang Kai-shek's staff, and not long after his arrival in the far northwest succeeded in establishing himself as an up and coming young military leader in the region. Upon his successful dispersal of the rebel forces in Hami, Turfan, and southern Xinjiang, Sheng became de facto ruler of the province. Initially, he led a reform-oriented administration, drawing heavily on the Soviet model. Indeed, Sheng fostered and developed close ties to the USSR and received extensive Soviet financial aid to enable him to begin modest reforms and reconstruction in the area. Toward the end of his rule, however, his government, like its Chinese predecessors, suffered from endemic corruption and from military interference in government at all levels. Like Yang, he kept close personal control of the military, and he expanded the already extensive secret police force. By the end of his reign, both the military and the secret police served as finely honed tools that allowed Sheng to carry out a reign of terror that

distinguished itself even in Xinjiang's bloody history. Estimates of people killed under Sheng Shicai run from 80,000 to 100,000.²²

Such abuses led to organized resistance throughout the province. Chinese sources refer to assaults on settlements and military outposts as "bandit attacks." Although the object of some of these raids may have been booty, they also aimed at challenging Sheng's increasingly oppressive regime.

The importance with which Sheng himself viewed "bandit attacks" can be seen in his efforts to disarm the Kazaks in particular. According to both Chinese and Kazak sources, Sheng successfully disarmed many camps of Kazaks through a variety of tactics. A common ploy was to capture a Kazak leader and hold him for ransom, payable in Altai gold and weapons.²³ In one case, Sheng forced a group of Kazaks to leave Xinjiang by promising them he would return the severed head of one of their revered ancestors if they would leave the Altai.²⁴ Through such tactics, Sheng kept Kazak resistance from reaching full-scale rebellion during his years in Xinjiang.

With the advent of World War II, Sheng's support from the USSR dwindled and he gradually began to turn toward the Chinese central government. In January 1943, he allowed the Guomindang to open a provincial headquarters in Urumqi. On the sixteenth of the same month, Sheng was named chairman of the Xinjiang branch of the Guomindang.

In spring of the same year, at the invitation of the central government, the United States opened a consulate in Urumqi. This was part of the government's attempt to draw international attention to the situation in Xinjiang and to try to balance Soviet official presence in the region, which included five separate Soviet consulates, three of which were in the districts that were to become the new ETR.

An even clearer sign of Sheng's new orientation was seen in May when the Soviet-Xinjiang Trading Agency began winding up its affairs. Finally, in autumn 1943, Soviet troops stationed in Hami were withdrawn to the Soviet Union. At the end of 1943 a British intelligence report noted that the Russian (Soviet) presence in Xinjiang had virtually disappeared.²⁵ This did not mean that Soviet interest in the region had lessened, nor did it mean that the Soviets closed any of their five consular offices in the region. Nonetheless, the year 1943 did see the groundwork laid for the reestablishment of Nationalist control in the Northwest. Despite Sheng's

continued control over the military and over his extensive secret police network, Nationalist influence in Xinjiang was, at long last, on the increase.

The major concern of the central government had been what it considered to be the threat of Soviet takeover in Xinjiang. During Sheng's period of control in the province, however, the central government had made no official complaint to the USSR over what the Chinese considered Soviet encroachment in the Northwest. With Sheng now turning away from the Soviets, the Nationalist government chose to react to any real or imagined Soviet provocation through official channels. In March 1943, a series of border incidents occurred on the Sino-Soviet border; the Chinese officially protested these on March 9, 1943, demanding that the Soviets end invasion of Chinese air space and complaining of harassment of Chinese border guards.²⁶ Although there was no clear result to either the border incursions or the official complaints, the Chinese were indicating quite clearly to the USSR that they intended to limit the Soviet role in the Northwest and would expose internationally any perceived encroachment in order to prevent Soviet infringement of Chinese territorial integrity.

At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek continued economic discussions with the USSR. These, too, were aimed at demonstrating Nationalist intentions to expand their presence and influence in the border region. In 1944, the USSR agreed to sell its aircraft plant in Urumqi to the Chinese for U.S. \$500,000 in cash and \$3,500,000 worth of sheep on the hoof, to be delivered to the USSR in the Tacheng area of Xinjiang.²⁷ Talks on the continuation of Soviet airline service in the region continued during this period.

Both the talks on economic arrangements in Xinjiang and the official complaints over Soviet border incursions were part of Nationalist efforts to dislodge the Soviets from Xinjiang. During the period under Sheng Shicai the region had been almost totally oriented toward the USSR, with Soviet advisers, geographers, and even military units entering the region by invitation.²⁸ The Nationalist government now sought to reorient the region toward Chongqing and to establish the area firmly within the Chinese, not the Soviet, sphere of influence.

During the summer of 1944, Sheng became increasingly paranoid about his enemies. Using this paranoia to their advantage, the Nationalists offered

him a “safe” job in the Chinese capital, and in September 1944 Sheng finally accepted this position, leaving the province he had dominated for nearly a decade.

But even as Sheng prepared to go, forces of rebellion were already marshalled in the more remote areas of the province. These forces were in part a result of Sheng’s regime, which had in its last years become increasingly brutal and repressive. This had resulted in pervasive anti-Han Chinese sentiment throughout Xinjiang among both the Moslem majority and the smaller non-Moslem groups in the province. This antipathy was also fueled by another important force in the area—a growing sense of Turki nationalism. In 1944 Xinjiang was already the scene of extensive if uncoordinated local efforts by organized, anti-Chinese resistance groups. Sheng’s policy of repression of these organizations directly aided in the dissemination of local nationalist ideals and popularized the idea of an independent Turkestan, thus leading directly to the Ili rebellion.

Xinjiang's Nationalities

Because of Xinjiang's remoteness and the disturbed conditions in the region as well as in China proper during most of the twentieth century, demographic information on Xinjiang has, until recently, been limited. Most population figures for the province during the 1940s are no more than estimates because of the difficulties then involved in collecting such data. The most accurate numbers available come from the 1945–46 provincial census, the results of which are given in [table 4](#). As the original government report itself points out, the figures are not completely accurate because officials were unable to verify census reports from the three districts of Ili, Tacheng, and Ashan.

Of the fourteen groups listed in the table, seven are Moslem, including the Uighur, Kazak, Uzbek, Taranchi, Tatar, Tajik, and Kirghiz. Together, these people accounted for 92 percent of the region's population in the 1940s. In addition to their shared religious heritage, all except the Tajiks speak related Turkic dialects, and all had once fought the same enemy, the Han Chinese. Thus the majority of the Xinjiang people in the mid-twentieth century held in common a shared history of rebellion as well as shared religious belief, and similar cultural and historical traditions.

[Table 4](#)
Xinjiang Population by Nationality, 1945

Nationality	Population
Uighur	2,988,528
Han Chinese	222,401
Hui	99,607
Kazak	438,575
Mongolian	59,686
Russian	19,392
Uzbek	10,224
Taranchi	79,296
Tatar	5,614
Tajik	8,210
Kirghiz	69,923

Nationality	Population
Sibo	10,626
Solon	2,506
Manchu	762.
Total	4,015,350 (as given)

Source: She Lingyun, “Economic Construction in Xinjiang as a Means to Secure Peace,” *Tianshan yuegan* 1 (October 15, 1947): 21.

In the early twentieth century, the settled Turkic speakers of Xinjiang were known simply as Turks or Turki in the writings of the day.²⁹ This reflected both their mixed Turkic-Mongol heritage and their separation from other Turkic peoples of the Russian steppe. The name “Uighur” was reintroduced to Central Asia and Xinjiang in the 1920s after a hiatus of nearly a thousand years. The modern use of the name Uighur began under the influence of the newly established Soviet Union in 1921. At a Tashkent conference of Uighurs living in Soviet Turkestan, representatives of Turkic peoples decided to adopt the name Uighur for people who lived in, or were originally from, the settled oases of Xinjiang, although they themselves pointed out that the modern Uighurs should not be confused with the ancient Uighur empire.³⁰

The relation between this name and the Turkic peoples who lived in Xinjiang by the beginning of the twentieth century was remote, but the conference adopted the name nonetheless, and some attempt was made within the USSR to popularize its use. The name was not used in Xinjiang, however, until the rise of pro-Soviet Sheng Shicai in 1933. By Sheng’s decree, the name Uighur was to be used officially as the proper name of the settled Turks of the region. For at least one foreign observer, however, the use of the name was “ludicrous.”³¹

In fact, the introduction of the idea of fourteen separate nationalities in Xinjiang was primarily the result of Sheng’s efforts. To foster acceptance of these fourteen names, Sheng encouraged the establishment of cultural societies for each group and promoted the publication of “Uighur” language newspapers. In the local press and in China proper itself the description of Xinjiang as the home of fourteen separate nationalities gained popularity during Sheng’s rule.³² Among local people, however, pockets of resistance

to the “new” names rose. Local Turki intellectuals preferred to use the term “Turkestan” to identify their homeland and used “Turk” or “Turki” as the most appropriate name for the Moslem Turkic-speaking majority.³³

The introduction of the “new” names, then, was initially a political act and only partially reflected the reality of the ethnic divisions among Xinjiang’s peoples. The most important division was actually on the basis of lifestyle; the population was generally divided into two broad groups. The majority was composed of sedentary farmers and traders of the oases settlements, and a minority consisted of nomadic herdsmen. This difference divided the sedentary Uighur, Uzbek, Tatar, and Taranchi from the nomadic Kirghiz, Tajik, and Kazaks, the latter being by far the most numerous and influential among Xinjiang’s nomadic groups.

Differences in lifestyle led to variation in degree of religious orthodoxy and educational level and also in the degree of response to increasing Chinese presence in Xinjiang. Isolated from the mosque and medresse—the religious schools that were virtually the only form of education available in Xinjiang for many years—the nomadic Turks tended to be less orthodox in religious observance. Women were not veiled in the usual Islamic style, although Tajik and Kirghiz women wore distinctive headdresses covering the hair but leaving the face exposed. The seclusion of women was simply not practical in a society in which women did much of the work around the camps. Further, few religious rites were observed regularly, and although teachers and religious leaders were respected—even venerated—among the Kazak Turks and other groups, contact with such people was irregular at best. The nomadic lifestyle also affected the educational level of the Kazaks, among whom the illiteracy rate was extremely high.

Xinjiang’s nomads, especially the Kazaks, developed a merited reputation as warriors. Kazak traditional songs and poems emphasize this warrior tradition, which was especially strong among Kazaks of the Greater and Middle Horde who populate Xinjiang’s pasture lands. (Most of the Kazaks in the USSR are of the Greater Horde as are Kazaks of the Ili valley.) Fierce and loyal fighters, the Kazaks were willing to go against seemingly insurmountable odds when led by one of their own “batur” or heroes. Kazak troops, it will be seen, were the backbone of the 1944 anti-Chinese forces.

While the degree of religious orthodoxy and differences in lifestyle divided the sedentary Turks from the nomads, both were inheritors of the same linguistic traditions and of Islamic culture. In the twentieth century, with its stirrings of nationalism and open revolt against colonial and imperialist powers, both of these groups were influenced by the ideas of the modern age, including Pan-Turanianism, Pan-Turkism, and Turkic nationalism. Such ideas influenced the educated elite of the towns and cities of Xinjiang and, to a lesser extent, the nomadic groups of the Altai. Leaders from among both Uighur and Kazak groups made the long and difficult journey to Mecca on “haj,” and they brought back new ideas as well as deeper respect and understanding of their own Islamic culture. Leaders who carried the title of “haj” were assured of high status upon their return from Mecca, and their views and opinions, influenced by contacts outside the narrow parameters of Xinjiang, carried considerable weight.

Change in Xinjiang on the basis of these ideas alone, however, would probably have been a different, and possibly slower, process had it not been for the exploitative policies of the Chinese sent to administer the region in the twentieth century. This and the concomitant weakening of the Chinese government offered both common cause and opportunity for revolt to Xinjiang’s increasingly anti-Chinese population.

Non-Moslem Peoples

The waves of invasion into Xinjiang over the centuries had also resulted in the settlement of non-Moslem peoples in the area of Chinese Turkestan. Most of the non-Moslem groups were relative newcomers. The Manchu groups, for instance, dated from the period of Manchu rule in China proper. Sent out as soldiers to man the new Manchu garrisons in Xinjiang, and thus isolated from mainstream Manchu culture and from the lure of Sinicization, Xinjiang Manchu groups retained their Manchu language and customs.³⁴ Today they are divided into three separate nationalities, on the basis of their tribal origins in the former Manchurian homelands. These three are the Sibo, the Solon, and the Manchus themselves.

As a result of proximity to expanding Imperial Russia, the region also had a small Russian population. This group received a considerable boost after the Bolshevik victory when many “white” Russians entered the region in the 1920s, seeking refuge from the new Soviet regime. Some of these moved on to Chinese coastal cities, but others remained and settled in the Ili valley region where they bought farms or entered into business as traders.

Also present in Xinjiang as a result of history and proximity were the Mongols. Often allies of the region’s Altai Kazaks, these people were as much traditional residents of Xinjiang as the Kazaks with whom they shared pastures on occasion. Although the Mongols were Lama-Buddhists, the nomadic lifestyle and shared economic concerns of the two groups led to close relations and even to intermarriage.³⁵

The Hui, Chinese Moslems

Culturally between the Moslem peoples of the Northwest and the Chinese cultural tradition of which they are also a part are the Hui or Chinese Moslems. Traditionally, China's Moslems are said to descend from Arab traders who entered China during the Tang dynasty and stayed, becoming Sinicized in all but their religion. Today's Hui are hardly distinguishable from ordinary Han Chinese, yet they maintain their separateness by adhering to their religion and, to as great an extent as possible, marrying only other Moslems.

The position of the Hui in the Northwest has periodically shifted from pro- to anti-Han Chinese. In the nineteenth century, the Hui were definitely allies of their Moslem coreligionists against the Han. Upon the defeat of Moslem forces by General Zuo in 1877, fierce retribution was handed down against them as traitors, while the Turkic rebels were treated much more lightly, being mere barbarians.

In the twentieth century, the Hui suffered along with their Moslem brothers under Chinese administration. Like other Xinjiang residents, they, too, looked for reform in the 1930s and 1940s, and, like all other groups, they felt the sting of Sheng's reign of terror in the last years of his rule in Xinjiang.

The Han Chinese

The largest and most influential group of non-Moslems in Xinjiang were the Han Chinese, numbering 222,401 according to the provincial census of 1946.³⁶ The largest concentration of Chinese was in the provincial capital, where they accounted for 55 percent of the population; most Chinese were in the provincial capital or Urumqi district, which together had 136,808 Han Chinese residents, or 61.5 percent of all Chinese in the province.³⁷ The remainder were scattered throughout the province, usually in larger towns or cities where they were part of the local bureaucracy or engaged in trade.

Traditionally, Chinese did not willingly choose to leave their ancestral homes in China proper for the “barbarous” border regions beyond Yumen, the “Jade Gate” that marks the end of China’s Great Wall and of traditional China. Only after 1884 when the region became a province was there a small migration of Han Chinese into the region. This was mainly due to General Zuo’s pacification campaign in the Northwest, as a result of which many Chinese soldiers were introduced to the region’s possibilities. The traders who had followed the army to provision it also found Xinjiang a land of opportunity, and many of these, mainly Hunanese from General Zuo’s home province, elected to stay and trade in the province. Others entered the local Chinese bureaucracy. The men from Hunan became so entrenched in the region that it earned the epithet of “Hunan colony.”³⁸

In the twentieth century, most Han Chinese in Xinjiang were part of the government, soldiers in the many garrisons throughout the province, or traders. Few were involved in farming or herding, and therefore they were not competing with the local population for the limited available land resources. They did, however, require the stationing of mainly Han Chinese troops, to protect both Chinese territorial rights and the trade in which they were involved. Chinese troops were stationed in every district, but the largest garrisons were in Urumqi, Kashgar, Yarkand, Aksu, and Yining. They represented Chinese authority in the Northwest, and they came to dominate the towns in which they were stationed, both economically and militarily—a situation that continued throughout the Republican period.

Ethnicity and Rebellion in Xinjiang

Conflict between the ruling Chinese minority and the region's Moslem majority had its roots in the Qing dynasty, when repeated rebellions against Qing rule were sparked by colonialist policies in the area as well as by extreme cultural differences between the Chinese and the indigenous Moslem population. These differences were exacerbated by religious and linguistic divisions but also by the presence of international powers engaged in "The Great Game"—international rivalry over spheres of influence in Central Asia. While the political machinations of Russia and Great Britain did not directly influence political affairs within Xinjiang, the presence of these states' representatives did serve as one conduit for political concepts from the West to enter the region, specifically the idea of nationalism and the right of self-determination for separate ethnic entities encompassed within large nation-states. In Xinjiang, this idea was given greater impetus by the Russian Revolution and ultimately manifested itself in the growing desire among Xinjiang's Moslem elite for control over the region's domestic affairs and, eventually, for independence for all of Turkestan.

As mentioned previously, a first attempt to establish an independent Turki state in 1933 had failed, crushed by Chinese forces under Sheng with assistance from the USSR. The second attempt had the benefit of this experience. This time, the leaders of the provisional Turkestan government carefully secured Soviet promises of noninterference with their plans to establish an independent state in Xinjiang (see [chapter 7](#)). Without Soviet neutrality, no such independence movement could survive; and without benefit of this lesson of history, the Ili rebellion could not have succeeded.

Nor could it have succeeded without the widespread and popular support that the forces of rebellion enjoyed in the Moslem areas overrun in 1944–45. The abuses perpetuated by successive Chinese regimes, which culminated in the rule of Sheng Shicai, had prepared the population to accept yet another attempt at self-rule. One measure of the extent of popular support for this rebellion can be seen in the growth of resistance organizations, aimed, it should be clearly understood, at ousting Han Chinese from Xinjiang.

In the years prior to the rebellion at Yining, a committee was organized that reportedly was responsible for planning the rebellion of November 1944. References are made to a Xinjiang Turkish People's Liberation Council in both Chinese and American sources.³⁹ The Soviet author Mingulov also refers to such a group, as did Governor Zhang Zhizhong, who called this planning body simply the "Yining Committee, predecessor of the East Turkestan Republic, established to throw off Chinese rule."⁴⁰

According to Kazak accounts, an Organization for the Protection of the Nation was established in the Altai area of Xinjiang under the leadership of Yunus Hakim during the late 1930s.⁴¹ Branches of this organization were said to exist throughout the Altai. Sheng's spies were able to gather information on this organization, and in March 1940 he managed to capture and arrest some 350 of its leaders. Not all the leadership was eliminated by these arrests, and mobilization against the Chinese continued under such men as Osman Batur and Ali Beg Hakim (see [chapters 6 and 7](#)).

By 1942 organizations among both the Uighur and Kazak Turks were actively opposing Chinese rule; such groups were not only a cause of the rebellion of 1944 but also served to propagate the extant ideas of Turki nationalism in Xinjiang and encouraged Moslem zeal for an independent Moslem state.

Economic factors also influenced Xinjiang's flow toward rebellion in the 1940s. With Sheng in control of Xinjiang, the province had continued to issue its own currency, but, in addition, the local economic system used Mexican silver dollars, gold taels, and Russian rubles. Reestablishment of Nationalist control meant an inevitable increase in the amount of inflation-ridden Nationalist currency, certainly an unwelcome development for merchants and local people alike.

Further, the newly appointed Guomindang governor, Wu Zhongxin, was slow to make any announcement on Nationalist plans for currency unification in Xinjiang. Just prior to his arrival in October he finally announced that the province's financial system would continue as before.⁴² By then, however, the Ili rebellion had already begun in the far northwestern districts.

The uncertain political situation in the summer of 1944 had already led to general economic decline in the region. The British consul in Urumqi,

Turrall, kept a record of the gradual increase in the prices of staple products and noted the growing scarcity of important items like flour and rice in the summer of 1944. In July of that year, prices had risen 23 percent over June. In August, prices zoomed to over 106 percent in comparison to July.⁴³ When Sheng's departure was finally announced at the end of August, prices leveled off, but doubtless the unstable situation added to tension in the region.

Another economic factor affecting Xinjiang in the summer of 1944 was the fact that the border with the USSR had been closed in 1942. American Consul Ward, in Urumqi, noted that this alone would have been cause enough for the rebellion since the majority of the business enterprises in the Ili area were still oriented to the USSR, the major market for Xinjiang raw materials and the source of manufactured goods not made locally.⁴⁴ The central government in Chongqing was powerless to reopen the border without Soviet agreement—and the economic hardship the closed border entailed for local businessmen and Kazak traders would certainly have offered economic incentive to establish a local government that could then open trade with the USSR.

The closing of the border certainly figured in complaints against the Chinese. Specific economic difficulties were enumerated in a pamphlet distributed in the provincial capital in the summer of 1945. According to point nine of this listing of grievances, the friendly trading relations between the people of East Turkestan (Xinjiang) and the USSR had been disrupted by the Chinese administration. As the pamphlet detailed:

This cessation of trade worked great hardship in our lives, checked the growth of peasant holdings in the villages, and brought to a standstill the trading in the bazaars; for each family the daily livelihood became difficult. In every locality those who were starving, who were without clothing, who could not find employment, and whose condition was altogether piteous, became more and more numerous. Big merchants became small; the small became bankrupt; the bankrupts became beggars...the number of people who have met this kind of misfortune mounts up higher every day. In the market there are no buyers for cattle, for the various kinds of wool, skins or grains, or for the other products of the small village holdings, nor for the production of the cattle raisers. *The powerful Sovsintorg, a large purchaser, went out and away from East Turkestan as a consequence of the inside-out policies of Sheng Tupan* [Sheng Shicai].⁴⁵

On top of the economic disruption of the cessation of Sino-Soviet trade during these years, the pamphlet detailed further economic ills caused by Chinese authorities: “The Chinese authorities also forcibly take all kinds of taxes and exactions, for which reason no one can spend for his own needs or as he likes in a carefree way.”

In another such pamphlet, the government of Ali Han Töre also mentions another Chinese economic abuse, that of *danzhai mailiang*—the practice of making certain merchants responsible for supplying a fixed amount of goods to the local garrison, at prices fixed by the garrison itself.⁴⁶ The American consul reported that these prices were often “ruinously low.” Such abuses certainly constituted economic reasons for rebellion, just as cessation of Soviet trade did.

Another economic factor often cited by existing sources is the requisition order for horses issued by General Sheng, officially to aid the Nationalist army in its anti-Japanese war effort.⁴⁷ Such an order was published in the *Xinjiang Daily* in Urumqi on March 16, 1944. According to this order, each *qu* or district in Xinjiang was to contribute a specific number of horses, which altogether amounted to some 10,000, in lieu of Xinjiang being required to send men to fight at the front. The period of collection was to be from March 16 to the end of May 1944. Specific instructions were published in the article as to the size and type of horse that would be acceptable, and on its care and feeding while awaiting delivery to the government. The order stated that if a district did not have sufficient horses, then it could donate Xn \$700 in lieu of each horse; this money would then be used to buy horses from those districts that were primary horsebreeding areas, in particular the Kazak areas in the north of the province and the Ili valley.

Actually, there is good reason to suppose that this order was simply one of Sheng’s many ploys to raise funds for his government or his own use. For instance, according to reports in the *Xinjiang Daily* between March and July 1944, a total of Xn \$1,655,860 was contributed (enough to “buy” 2,365 horses at the price of Xn \$700 quoted in the original order)—but only 282 horses. By far the largest cash contributions came from settled, non-horse breeding areas like Kashgar and Turfan.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the cost of a horse on the open market in Xinjiang at this time was about Xn \$350.⁴⁹ If the

Nationalist government had actually intended to pay Xn \$700 for a horse, it would certainly have been unprecedented beneficence on its part. For this reason, it was generally assumed that the order was made on Sheng's own initiative and that its goal was not horses but rather the collection of yet more money from the population of the major cities of the region.⁵⁰

When Sheng finally left Xinjiang, the quotas were unfilled and no further action on this "requisition" was taken. Thus, while this order may be considered part of Sheng's oppressive policies and therefore a contributing cause of the rebellion, it was not the immediate nor principal cause of the formation of the East Turkestan Republic. Rather, the primary economic causes were the unstable economic situation in the summer of 1944, the threat of a changeover to the Nationalists' inflation-ridden currency, and, most importantly, the cessation of trade with the region's foremost trading partner, the Soviet Union.

Chinese-Moslem Relations

Exacerbated by the excesses of the Sheng regime, Chinese-Moslem relations had deteriorated in the period of 1940–1944 for several reasons. One cause was certainly the rule of warlord Sheng, who made extensive use of his secret police and the military to impose his rule on the province. Both these organizations were predominantly Han Chinese, which further emphasized the colonialist character of Chinese rule in Xinjiang.

The Chinese military were, in particular, a source of constant antagonism between Moslems and Chinese. U.S. Consul Robert Ward graphically described the negative impact as well as the general appearance and behavior of the Chinese military in Xinjiang:

The individual soldiers are nearly all of them boys in their teens or early twenties, who have had practically no training, are without education, have seen nothing of the war, and have existed for years on the starvation rations left to them after their officers have appropriated for personal uses most or all of the money intended to clothe and feed the soldiers themselves. The uniforms which these troops wear are of the cheapest and dirtiest cotton; their shoes are often of straw; their ideas of discipline would have shamed a Carthaginian in the first of the Punic Wars. The result has been that the natives of areas in which these troops have been garrisoned have suffered from every form of depredation and abuse that hungry, ill-clad, undisciplined troops contemptuous of their commanders could put upon an alien people.... Wherever these troops have been stationed, respect for China and the Chinese has reached a new low among the general population. This is not, however, the worst of the story. When the places that these soldiers garrison is attacked, as often as not—according to both Chinese and native reports—many of them literally throw down their guns and run.⁵¹

Another important element in exacerbating poor Chinese-Moslem relations was the Xinjiang prison system. Ward attributed much local antipathy to this system, perfected under Sheng Shicai. He wrote:

In [the prisons] the Chinese governance of Sinkiang [Xinjiang] had hit upon a means by which it was able to manufacture whitehot opponents of Chinese rule in wholesale lots. The formula was simple: arrest every outstanding individual, every personality suspected of more than ordinary force or resource, herd them all into prison, and subject them to the most vicious torture. The beauty of this system was

its universality: everyone of these people had friends, supporters, admirers, devotees, not to speak of loyal wives, brothers, and other relatives. The hatred was only the deeper because it was forced to subsist in darkness and silence.⁵²

Furthermore, in Xinjiang rumor played an important part in stirring local fears of massive Han Chinese immigration into the region. Such rumors may have originated with the highest level of Chinese government. According to American sources, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, during a trip to Gansu in 1942, reportedly stressed the need to repopulate western Gansu with immigrants from China proper. Chinese officials generally agreed that this would be necessary to provide an economic base for future Chinese military control in the Northwest.⁵³

In 1943 a *Daily Bulletin* given to the U.S. Embassy announced that Xinjiang could accommodate at least one million refugees, and that some thirty million dollars had already been appropriated for homesteading and land reclamation projects in the Northwest. The source for this information, Mr. Liang Hanzhao, added that the province of Xinjiang would be desirable also because it was relatively unaffected by rising commodity prices affecting other areas of China.⁵⁴

The general resettlement program for the Northwest was also said to include the policy of “converting nomads to semi-pastoral semi-agricultural economy.”⁵⁵ In fact, by April 27, 1944, seven thousand refugees had arrived and settled in the area around Hami.⁵⁶ While this did not constitute an immediate threat to the Ili area, it was no doubt seen as a precursor of future settlement of Han Chinese in the region.

By 1944, Han Chinese-Moslem relations had been deeply affected by the immediate history of ethnic strife under Sheng Shicai, and by the behavior of the Chinese military stationed in the province and the economic burden their presence imposed. Sheng’s secret police and his prison system helped foster resistance to Chinese rule among the local Moslems, and rumor of a possible influx of new Han Chinese settlers to the region served to deepen the existing animosities between Moslems and the ruling Chinese.

The USSR and the Ili Rebellion

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the Ili rebellion would not have been possible without the acquiescence of the USSR. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated, the USSR was undoubtedly the source of arms used by the East Turkestan armies to fight the Chinese.

Certainly there can be no question of Soviet disinterest in Xinjiang affairs. The region bordered the sensitive Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union, and disturbances in the Xinjiang area could possibly infect the Soviet's own Central Asian minorities. In addition to political geography, however, there were further reasons for Soviet interest in Xinjiang. Ideologically, the Soviet policy toward national liberation movements was to encourage those that were part of the international revolution of the world's peoples who, like the USSR, were fighting what they viewed as the twin evils of imperialism and colonialism. To follow its own ideological precepts, the USSR could not easily refuse its blessing to long-oppressed, long-suffering groups on its own borders, who were requesting no more than that the Soviet Union refrain from opposing them or aiding the Chinese against them. Soviet disenchantment with Chinese border policy and with Sheng in particular also served to influence the USSR to give its tacit consent to the rebellion.

Also, as mentioned previously, the Ili region was a particularly wealthy area, rich in natural resources and in potential for supplying much needed raw materials to the USSR. An independent sector in this strategic area could not have been greeted with displeasure in Moscow, especially given the unstable situation in China proper, where Chiang seemed first warm and then cool to Soviet advice. Soviet ability to assure itself of Ili products, free of interruption or interference by the Chinese government, doubtless also had its appeal.

Regardless of how attractive the idea of a local rebellion in Xinjiang may have been to the Moscow authorities, such a rebellion did not serve Soviet interests internationally. During this period, the USSR was counseling the Chinese government to pursue a united front and join with the Communist Chinese in concerted efforts against the Japanese. As Stalin did not expect the Communist Party in China to be able to dominate Chinese politics for a

long time to come, he also urged acceptance of a coalition government of Guomindang and the Communist Party—a policy that the Soviets believed would serve the greater interests of proletarian revolution. If the Soviets became openly involved in supporting a rebel group in the Northwest, obviously this would damage their position with Chiang Kai-shek's government. The only possible involvement, if indeed there was to be any, would have to be most covert. In a remote area like Xinjiang, a covert operation to aid the local population to rise in rebellion was certainly feasible.

This does not, however, mean that the Soviets were the principal cause of the Ili rebellion. Evidence of direct Soviet involvement in the rebellion remains circumstantial, and anti-Chinese activity and independence movements already existed in Xinjiang by 1944. Convinced of Soviet instigation of the rebellion, however, the Chinese based their policies in Xinjiang on the premise that the disturbances in Ili were a result of Soviet intrigue. As the Chinese view of the Soviet role is fundamental to an understanding of Chinese policy in Xinjiang, the Chinese account of the causes of the rebellion must be taken into consideration.

Today's Nationalist view of the rebellion is clear and concise: namely, that "On November 7, 1944, the USSR took steps to create the Ining [Yining] government."⁵⁷ Pro-Nationalist authors today contend that the entire episode was simply due to Soviet strategy, the aim of which was to separate Xinjiang from the Republic of China.⁵⁸ The rebellion in the three districts is seen as an extension of the long struggle between China and Russia for control of Chinese Central Asia. In the Chinese view, the Soviet Union was guilty of manipulating the local Turki peoples, causing them to rebel in the mistaken idea that the USSR would allow them to be independent.

From the very first days of the rebellion, Nationalist reports on the events in Ili indicate an eagerness on the part of the military leaders involved to place total blame on the USSR, an eagerness reflected in the Nationalist officials in Urumqi who, before fully verifying initial incorrect accounts, announced that this was an incident caused by the Soviet Union, in the pattern of the earlier March 1944 border incidents. In relating the news of the rebellion as he heard it from local government sources in Urumqi,

British Consul Turrall reported that blame had already been ascribed to the Soviets, long before there was any hard evidence. He wrote that the Chinese based their accusation primarily on rumor and on two pieces of evidence: a Soviet residence certificate found on a dead body, and the fact that the incident began on November 7, the anniversary of the Russian Revolution.⁵⁹ Further evidence cited later by the Chinese included the claim that the rebels had many high-quality weapons, and that Soviet advisers were present with the rebel forces. The means of identifying these advisers as Soviet was not given.

Chongqing accepted such “proof,” but it is interesting to note that despite the belief in Soviet complicity in—or open instigation of—the rebellion, no official complaint was lodged, then or later, with the Soviets. The situation was actually unclear in the three districts during the 1944–45 period, but subsequent chapters will demonstrate that the forces of rebellion were predominantly Turkic Moslems who were supported by the local population, and that, as a result of the Ili rebellion, a Moslem—not socialist or communist—state was founded in the Ili valley.

CHAPTER 4

The Establishment of the East Turkestan Republic

Prior to the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic in the Ili valley, a series of incidents in the northern Xinjiang area foreshadowed the violence that was to erupt in 1944. In 1943, as Sheng Shicai's rule became increasingly oppressive and unpredictable, and as the control imposed on the region by his police and military forces tightened, rumors of impending trouble reached the American consul in Urumqi, who informed the U.S. secretary of state:

It is reported vaguely that there exists political uneasiness among the Xinjiang population, and it is stated somewhat more particularly that a sort of guerrilla warfare has been in progress in the Altai region between the local population and the political authorities for over a year.¹

During 1943 and 1944 incidents increased in both number and intensity, and by July 1944 Kazak attacks on Chinese police posts and small garrisons were endemic. Referred to as "bandit raids" by the Chinese, such attacks were directed at both Chinese military and police and, in at least one case, the Xinjiang Provincial Government itself: in early July Uighurs at Jimunai on the Sino-Soviet border took all the cattle and sheep belonging to the provincial government and drove them across the Soviet border.²

Before the disturbances of September 1944, which marked the opening of hostilities between local Moslem forces and the Nationalist Chinese, resistance groups had begun distributing leaflets that called on the region's non-Han Chinese nationalities to rise against their oppressors and begin a Moslem revolution in Xinjiang.³ Despite the warnings thus given to the Nationalist troops in the Ili valley and elsewhere, the local commander of the Yining garrison was singularly unprepared for the fighting to come.

The Ili Rebellion

On September 11, 1944, the day General Sheng was boarding a plane for Chongqing and his new post in the central government, General Du Defu in Yining found it necessary to send soldiers to quell disturbances in Gongha County, some fifty miles east, along the Ili River.⁴ A company of ninety men from the Public Security Cavalry, 4th Regiment, under the command of Vice-Regimental Commander Xi arrived in the county on the 16th, but because the “rioters,” as they were called in subsequent Chinese reports, numbered over two hundred, the company was unable effectively to control the area.⁵

On September 23, after further incidents of rioting occurred in the same area and as the troops sent were still reporting their inability to handle the situation, General Du wired Urumqi Military Headquarters to ask for reinforcements before sending additional troops into Gongha County.⁶ Support was not forthcoming, however, as the government in Urumqi was in some disorder after Sheng’s departure. Doubtless encouraged by this lack of response from the provincial capital, the disturbances grew in intensity throughout the month of September.

Rumors of the increasing antigovernment movement in the Ili area reached Urumqi in October. The British consul, Turrall, reported that the Ili valley situation was “obscure,” but that serious trouble was apparently brewing in the Upper and Lower Bortala valleys, as well as in the counties of Qinghe and Gongha.⁷

As a result, the provincial government sent Commissioner of Civil Affairs Deng Xianghai to Yining in October to investigate the situation. On his arrival, the local police chief, Gao Yi, assured him that there was no need for any government alarm over the Ili area since all was peaceful and quiet. Deng personally visited the market areas, where he found the atmosphere calm. He reported to the government that the Ili situation seemed quite normal.⁸

As rumors of rebellion circulated through the province that autumn, the first real battle against the Chinese had already been fought. On October 8, 1944, a force variously reported as being from six hundred to a thousand men strong stormed Nilka, the county seat of Gongha County, some seventy

miles east of Yining. Soldiers at the garrison there were at first overwhelmed by the attack, but, rallied by the garrison commander, General Li, they managed to fight for several days before being forced out of the town on October 12, withdrawing to the nearby village of Machaer on the road to Yining. The rebels thus gained control of their first county seat and obtained their first major victory over Chinese Nationalist forces.

According to the Xinjiang Provincial Government's statistics, the population of Gongha County in 1946 was as follows:⁹

Han Chinese	593
Hui	336
Uighur	2,164
Taranchi	3,638
Kazak	30,693
Mongol	4,188
White Russian	491
Others	1,073
Total	43,176

As the vast majority, 70 percent, were Kazak, these figures add credence to the belief that the motive force for the rebellion came from the Kazaks who were angry over Sheng's heavy-handed policies. According to one Kazak account, resistance to the Chinese actually dated from June 1944 when the Kazaks themselves had finally killed a "particularly bad Chinese soldier" and thus touched off a series of revenge killings.¹⁰

General Du urged the Xinjiang military commander and acting governor, Zhu Shaoliang, to send reinforcements to Yining, but arrangements to strengthen the western garrisons were not completed for some weeks, by which time the movement against the Chinese had spread. In government reports, the many incidents in September and October were still described as "bandit" raids, and possibly the Urumqi military dismissed reports from Yining on more bandit activity as merely being further small-scale disturbances.¹¹ Presumably if Zhu had had a clearer idea of the situation, he would have chosen a different course of action. As it was, the significance of the Ili disturbances was slow to penetrate, and the inaction of the provincial government had disastrous results for the Nationalist troops in the Ili valley.

Having successfully established their control over Nilka, the anti-Chinese forces' next target was the city of Yining. As the largest town and center of the Ili valley, Yining had been an important trading and cultural center for years. At the time of the rebellion in 1944, its population was around 149,000, the 92,000 Uighurs far outnumbering the 15,000 Han Chinese. The city was also home for 22,900 Kazak, 7,700 Hui, and 4,500 White Russians.¹²

According to military sources, Sheng had chosen to fortify Yining in the 1930s, moving several battalions to the city over the years when he was in power. At the time of the rebellion, there were three battalions permanently stationed there. These were the 1st and 2d battalions of the 19th Regiment, and the 3d Battalion of the 21st Regiment. In addition, there was a unit of replacement troops (reserves), but these were neither fully trained nor fully armed. The city was also the base for a small air force unit with trainee pilots who used vintage aircraft for training purposes. At the nearby towns of Suiding, Huocheng, and Chaosu were additional troops, so that the total of Nationalist troops in the Ili area was around ten thousand, of whom some eight thousand were in Yining itself.

Despite the seeming strength of the garrison at the time, soldiers in Yining suffered from poor morale and had only outmoded and inadequate equipment. In September 1944 when General Du had first been sent to the area, he had noted the deficiencies and had requested the Urumqi government to upgrade the arms and equipment. But that was when the change in government was taking place, and no immediate action was taken. On October 9, General Du himself flew to Urumqi to ask for assistance and also, most probably, to appraise the changes then being made in the region's government and military.¹³ General Zao Erling was subsequently sent to take charge of the Yining garrison while Du remained in Urumqi, and it was Zao who was in charge when the attack on Yining finally came.

Accounts of the initial attack vary, but most agree that it began on the morning of November 7, 1944, and that the attackers numbered only four or five hundred men, the majority of whom were Uighur, Kazak, and White Russian. According to an eyewitness report relayed to British Consul Turrall in Urumqi by Chinese sources, the signal for the attack came from the

Soviet Consulate, as did the first machine-gun fire of the battles, being aimed at the Nationalist Air Force Headquarters some sixty meters down the street.¹⁴ No other account, however, includes such explicit details of the first few hours of fighting, nor does any so directly implicate the USSR, casting doubt on this official version.

During the first three days of fighting, the attacking force managed to isolate the Nationalist troops in three main strongholds of the city: the military barracks at Airambek east of the city; the Guiwang Temple near the airport; and the air force training field. The attackers thus felt the town sufficiently secure to declare the establishment of the Provisional Government of the East Turkestan Republic. The new government was led by the region's most prestigious religious leader and Islamic scholar, Ali Han Töre, who announced the founding of the republic on November 12, 1944. The fact that the government was so quickly organized, even before all Nationalist troops had been forced out of the city, points to considerable preparation beforehand by the nationalistic core of Turkic leaders. Certainly, the new government committee must have had the acquiescence if not the total support of the local population. Given the successes the revolutionary forces were to enjoy in the coming months, it appears most likely that the population did, in fact, support the new republic with considerable enthusiasm.

The objectives of the new ETR government were clearly stated in an emotional tract issued in the name of Ali Han Töre and stamped with the seal of the East Turkestan Government:

The Turkestan Islam Government is organized: praise be to Allah for his manifold blessings! Allah be praised! The aid of Allah has given us the heroism to overthrow the government of the oppressor Chinese. But even if we have set ourselves free, can it be pleasing in the sight of our God if we only stand and watch while you, our brethren in religion...still bear the bloody grievance of subjection to the black politics of the oppressor Government of the savage Chinese? Certainly our God would not be satisfied. We will not throw down our arms until we have made you free from the five bloody fingers of the Chinese oppressors' power, nor until the very roots of the Chinese oppressors' government have dried and died away from the face of the earth of East Turkestan, which we have inherited as our native land from our fathers and our grandfathers.¹⁵

In another handbill circulated in the region in 1944–1945, a political platform of fourteen points was outlined, including the following (summarized) objectives (for the full text of these nationalistic demands, see [appendix E](#)):

1. End Chinese rule.
2. Establish equality for all nationalities.
3. Organize a national¹⁶ political alliance representing all people in East Turkestan in numbers proportionate to their population.
4. Place local government in local hands.
5. Promote free cultural development in all groups and the use of local languages.
6. Reestablish locally manned military units.
7. Abolish Sheng Shicai's prison system.
8. Free all those arrested under Sheng.
9. Establish friendly relations with the USSR and resume trade, especially for cattle, wool, skins and grains.
10. Reduce taxation.
11. Establish religious freedom.
12. Oppose immigration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang.
13. Increase the amount of irrigated land.
14. End all forced labor.¹⁷

No mention is made in these tracts of a desire for autonomy within China. On the contrary, the rousing, emotional language in each case appears to invite specifically Moslem support for a Moslem government, free of all Chinese rule. Certainly, as the fighting continued during the winter of 1944–45 and into the summer, Moslem zeal for eliminating all Han Chinese from the soil of Xinjiang seemed clear to Chinese residents of the three districts.

The Chinese Military Response

The immediate response of the beleaguered Ili garrison was to ask for relief from the Urumqi and other military units nearby. On November 9, General Zao in Yining wired Urumqi asking for reinforcements, and he included in his report the information that the Soviet Consulate was the base of the whole operation. Orders for reinforcements were sent out on November 15, when the garrison at Jinghe was ordered to send troops of the 7th Division and the new 45th Division under General Li Tiejun to assist General Zao. By the time General Li began the 175-mile journey to Yining, resistance in the region had spread. He would be forced back to Jinghe without ever reaching his destination.¹⁸

In Urumqi, the garrison commander, Zhu Shaoliang, ordered General Du to fly back to his post in Yining to take over from General Zao and to report directly to him on the situation. Accordingly, Du returned to Yining on November 22 by air and wired his report to headquarters on the same day. The situation of the troops in Yining had become desperate, with heavy casualties suffered. At the Guiwang Temple only some one hundred defenders were left, according to Du's report.¹⁹ The next day, November 23, Du requested further support, asking specifically that the 3d Battalion of the 19th Regiment at Jinghe be sent to assist them. This unit was so ordered, but, like General Li's forces, it was not able to fight its way through the Moslem forces near Ili to relieve Yining.

Despite heavy losses and increasing scarcity of food, the Nationalist troops held onto their positions. In late December, as the siege of the three strongholds continued, Zhu himself flew over Yining, but his plane was unable to land due to heavy ground fire. A drop of much needed supplies was made, but judging from Du's continued requests for aid it appears that these supplies did not reach their intended target.

On Christmas Day, the town of Huiyuan, near Yining, fell to the Turki forces, followed on January 3, 1945, by the fall of the important town of Suiding, west of Yining on the road leading to Jinghe (located three hundred miles west of Urumqi). In Yining itself, fighting continued until January 28, 1945, when General Jiang, in command of the Nationalist forces in the Guiwang Temple, was killed in an offensive by the Ili forces.

With this major defeat, the Urumqi command finally gave the order for the Nationalist troops to withdraw to Jinghe on January 29.²⁰ Remnants of the Nationalist army were attacked as they attempted to leave the city, and many were killed in the fighting that followed. Of the nearly four thousand men who had been defending the airfield, only eight hundred remained alive, and most of these were killed as they evacuated their positions.²¹ Despite the strength of the garrison, the entire Yining area was lost to the forces of the East Turkestan Republic in the first three months of fighting.

Despite the bitter cold of the winter of 1945, with temperatures as low as -35°F , fighting continued.²² In February the Chinese suffered a major defeat. Some nine hundred Chinese troops had been holding the pass at Xinertai, but on February 17 a force of three thousand insurgents took this fortified position, followed in rapid succession by victories over the Chinese forces at Sungshukou and Santai.²³ On February 20 it was learned that two to three thousand Chinese troops sent out from Jinghe to bolster the Xinertai garrison had been annihilated by the Turkestani forces. By the end of February, the major garrison town of Jinghe, which had become the Chinese headquarters for fighting the local insurgents, was under siege.

While the fighting continued, the central and provincial governments both prepared to react politically to the situation, which was rapidly damaging Chinese prestige in the region and causing considerable concern in Chongqing.

The Chinese Political Response

On February 5, 1945, General Li Tiejun telegraphed an official report on the situation to the central government, explaining in as full detail as was then available. The “rioters,” he noted, had declared the establishment of an “East Turkestan Republic” based in Yining. Altogether the new government controlled more than ten counties with a total population of over 500,000, half of whom were Kazak.

General Li stated that the entire incident had begun in the town of Alma Ata, in the Kazakstan Republic of the USSR. He gave no source for this information. He also stated that regular army troops trained by the Kazakstan government had been involved in the fighting, and that the weapons used by the rebel forces pointed directly to Soviet involvement since they were primarily Russian and German models. He gave as further proof of Soviet involvement the fact that the tactics used by the rebels were clearly Soviet in origin since they were typical Communist tactics.²⁴

In addition to the report submitted to the government by General Li, a further report was sent by General Hou Sheng, commander of the 29th Corps in Xinjiang. His summary for the government on the reasons for the disastrous Nationalist losses in the Ili area attributed blame to Sheng Shicai. According to Hou, Sheng had known of plans for the rebellion and that it would receive support from the USSR. Hou also condemned Gao Yi, the Yining Police Chief, for misleading Deng Xianghai during his visit to Yining and declared that Gao had not informed the government of the coming rebellion out of friendship and loyalty to Sheng—who would be blamed for the uprising.²⁵

The central government received another account of the Ili rising from the new Governor Wu. On March 17, 1945, he made his official report, roundly condemning local county chiefs in the three districts who fled their posts during the fighting, showing their cowardice. He concurred with General Li that the basic force behind the Ili rebellion was the USSR, and he cautioned the central government that Xinjiang lacked the military strength to retake the Yining garrison area.²⁶

The picture of the rebellion thus being conveyed to the provincial and central governments by participants and observers was that of a Soviet-led,

Soviet-inspired movement of insurgency involving well-armed, well-led troops, with Soviet training and perhaps with Soviet officers. Nonetheless, the Chongqing government did not lodge an official protest with the Soviet Union during the initial months of the campaign, despite the fact that the three districts were being quickly overrun and some thirty thousand Chinese troops had been killed in the fighting.

The general public was not informed of the defeats suffered on this far northwestern front. In Urumqi rumor flowed in and out, increased by the lack of official news reports and further heightening the anxiety felt among the local population. As if oblivious to the Ili situation, the *Xinjiang Daily* remained silent on the topic. It did, however, continue to run stories on the great family of the Chinese people, emphasizing that all the peoples of China were brothers through blood and bone, all being the children of the great emperor Huang Di.²⁷

The concepts presented in such articles were viewed with concern by the U.S. representative in Urumqi, Robert Ward, who pointed out in an official report that Chinese policy in Xinjiang seemed to be based on several assumptions: mainly the belief that Xinjiang people were part of the original Chinese race; the assertion that Xinjiang had been a part of China for two thousand years (which, Ward notes, “has never been and is not now true in a racial, linguistic, or cultural sense”); and the contention that the “natives” were meek, never revolting against their government unless instigated to do so from the outside.²⁸ All three points being untenable on the basis of Xinjiang’s history, Ward contended that unless the Chinese adopted immediate, radical changes in attitude and administration in Xinjiang, future revolts were inevitable.

Ward, of course, was not alone in his observations, and some members of the Nationalist Government also seriously questioned the basis of Chinese policy in Xinjiang. While some may have accepted without question the story of Soviet manipulation and intrigue in Xinjiang, alternative views were also being presented. Liu Zeying, commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Urumqi, believed that, contrary to the picture being presented by militarists, the USSR did not desire outright absorption of Xinjiang but wanted, for its own security, to see a friendly regime installed in the province. Having experienced Sheng’s turnabout and the resulting

instability, Liu felt that the only answer to Xinjiang's troubles was to implement the many reforms long needed in the region.²⁹

As Chongqing sought an answer to the Yining situation, the provincial government in Xinjiang sought to use political countermeasures in a belated attempt to win support among some factions of the local population. It ordered the release of some of the many political prisoners still held in Urumqi and appointed several of them to government posts. On January 12, 1945, the newly released Kazak leader Alen Wang³⁰ was appointed vice-administrative superintendent of the Altai District. Another former prisoner was the Mongol Prince Manjukjab, who was appointed to the same post in Yenki. These men were sent on "pacification" missions to the minorities of the northern Altai areas. Alen Wang personally—but unsuccessfully—visited Osman Batur, the Kazak leader initially allied to the Ili movement, in an attempt to persuade him to side with the central government against the new insurgency movement.³¹

During the same month, the governor also announced the new "Frontier Areas Administration Official Examination Order" passed by the central government, which required that all government employees study the history of the region to which they were sent and learn at least one of the local native languages of their area. As a result, "Turki" language classes were held every evening at Urumqi's Civil Affairs Department offices.³²

In April 1945, it was rumored in Urumqi that Governor Wu had offered his resignation. Behind this rumor was the fact that General Zhu Shaolian disapproved of Wu's handling of the Ili affair. In addition, the two were known to differ over the best solution to the province's long-standing problems.³³ Wu was also having difficulty dealing with the growing political tension, caused partly by the growing strength of the antigovernment forces in the three districts and partly by the increasing number of Nationalist troops in Urumqi where their demands on the local economy had earned them the epithet "human-faced locusts."³⁴

If Wu did indeed tender his resignation it was not accepted, for he continued as governor for nearly one more year. In a conciliatory gesture toward the people of Xinjiang, he announced that the Xinjiang government would make some Xn \$4 million available for "spring plowing" loans. Altogether, a total of Xn \$60 million was projected in financial assistance

for the rest of 1945 for the development of the province. The government was also able to resume supplying electricity to the capital, Urumqi, in June, using equipment from what was formerly an aircraft parts factory. This temporarily, at least, boosted morale in the city.³⁵

Further, in June 1945 the names of the new representatives of the province to the Provisional Advisory Assembly to be held in Chongqing were announced. Out of a total of 42 named, only 16 were Chinese, indicating a new awareness of the need for increased national minority participation in government. The provincial government also announced the release of some 235 men from prison in Urumqi—a short-lived victory for the local people, however, as the provincial government almost immediately arrested new suspects as “Communist spies,” a label that could result in harsh treatment as well as an indefinite stay in the local jail.³⁶

At the national level, the government had decided it would seek an international settlement of the problem in the Ili valley. It was rumored that the rebellion would be brought up at the forthcoming international conference of the Soviet Union and the United States in San Francisco that summer. It followed that military activity be confined to a holding action. Certainly, no move against the rebel districts was made, despite the fact that the Chinese military presence continued to increase. By April 1945 over 100,000 Nationalist troops were in the province, but they remained in their fortifications, taking no offensive action against the Ili forces.

Prior to the San Francisco talks, the Chinese government did make an approach to the Soviet Union. In June 1945, the Chinese quietly contacted the Soviets through the Soviet consul in Urumqi, asking for Soviet good offices to aid in the settlement of the Ili question. The consul deferred to Moscow, however, and said that the matter should be left to Molotov and T. V. Soong to discuss during the talks then being planned for the two in Moscow.³⁷

The Fighting Continues

With both Zhu Shaoliang and Chiang Kai-shek convinced that the only solution to the problem in Xinjiang was through international channels, the Nationalist forces in Xinjiang sat and waited behind their fortifications, suffering record-breaking cold weather.³⁸ Doubtless encouraged by this failure of the Nationalists to react, the rebel forces continued to expand the area of their control unchecked. By the end of February 1945, they had arrived at the garrison town of Jinghe, from which reinforcements had unsuccessfully tried to reach Yining some weeks earlier. An important frontier post, Jinghe was then manned by some fifteen thousand Nationalist troops, including units that had been forced to retreat from the Ili valley as well as fresh units sent from Urumqi. Because the town was well fortified, the Ili forces chose to bypass it, attacking outposts to the east of it first, and thereby hoping to cut the town off from any possible outside support. By mid-July, Ili forces had successfully cut the main road connecting the town of Tacheng some two hundred miles north of Yining, and the town of Wusu, a major point on the Jinghe-Urumqi road. By the end of July, most of Tacheng District, including the district capital of Tacheng itself, was in rebel hands.³⁹

In August, the rebel troops, now proclaiming themselves to be the army of the East Turkestan Republic, took Hefeng County (some one hundred miles east of Emin), forcing the Nationalist troops in the area to withdraw south toward the town of Wusu. Also in August, Kazak troops of the ETR under Osman Batur entered the district capital of Ashan, effectively controlling the city and outlying districts by mid-September.⁴⁰

With these victories under their belt, the ETR forces now converged on the town of Jinghe. By September, the town was cut off and surrounded by ETR forces, and an all-out attack on the town was launched on September 3. On September 7, after only four days of fighting, the city fell.

That same week, other ETR units were preparing for an attack on Wusu, another important garrison town on the Jinghe-Urumqi road. Chinese claims that Soviet planes were involved in the initial attack on Wusu, which began on September 5, remain unconfirmed. It should be remembered, however, that there were planes available to the ETR forces, since they had taken the

airfield of the Nationalist air force in Yining early in the fighting. If they had pilots among their own nationalities, it would have been possible for aircraft that was not Soviet in origin to be involved in the Wusu fighting.

On September 6, the Nationalist forces in Wusu were in full retreat toward the Manas River, itself a scant seventy miles from the provincial capital. As news of the latest defeat reached Urumqi, hundreds of refugees began pouring out of that city on the road to Hami and toward the relative safety of the next province. Wives of high government officials were evacuated by air, and it appeared that the Nationalists were about to abandon the province. At this point, the cost of a place on an ordinary bus out of Urumqi rose to between Xn \$50,000 and Xn \$90,000; the permit to leave cost an additional Xn \$10,000.⁴¹

International Resolution

While the ETR forces forged their way almost unopposed toward the provincial capital during the summer of 1945, the central government continued in its belief that only an international solution was feasible in Xinjiang. As a result of Soong's summer talks with Molotov, a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Soviets and the Chinese was signed on August 14, 1945. In the "Exchange of Notes" appended to this document, the Soviets specifically disclaimed an interest in Xinjiang and recognized the region as clearly within Chinese territory.⁴² The actual situation in Xinjiang worsened during August, however, and in early September it reached crisis proportions when the ETR forces reached the Manas River.

On September 7, 1945, Chiang Kai-shek informed U.S. Ambassador Hurley of the gravity of the situation and was advised to take up the matter through diplomatic channels. Accordingly, Chiang summoned the Soviet ambassador the same day and lodged an official protest over the attacks on the towns of Wusu, Jinghe, and Puli, the latter being a small town in the Pamirs in the far south of Xinjiang, which reportedly had been bombed on August 22, 1945.⁴³ Having thus begun the official Chinese protest, he next summoned General Zhang Zhizhong on September 8, charging him with the task of flying to Urumqi to assess the situation and to report back to him immediately.⁴⁴

Before departing for Urumqi, Zhang first sought the advice of the Nationalists' Xinjiang representatives then living in the capital, namely, Mesut Sabri, Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra, and Isa Yusuf Alptekin. Mesut Sabri was originally from Yining but had been educated in Istanbul, Turkey, as a medical doctor. Upon his return to Xinjiang, he had been involved in local education as well as running his own medical practice there. He ran foul of Sheng Shicai, however, and was forced to flee. He made his way to Chongqing where, during World War II, he became a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang. Supported by the CC Clique, he also became a member of the National Political Council.

Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra was a native of Hetian (Khotan), where his father had been the emir—a local prince or ruler. He had been involved in the short-lived East Turkestan Republic of 1933, but when the republic

dissolved he, too, made his way out of the province and ended up in Chongqing, where he was made a member of the National Assembly, representing Xinjiang. Along with Isa Yusuf Alptekin, he founded a publishing house in Chongqing and wrote and edited magazines dedicated to Xinjiang, including *Altai*, *Tianshan*, and *Voice of Turkestan*. Both he and Isa were known as ardent nationalists, appealing for autonomy for Xinjiang and demanding that the central government recognize Xinjiang's Turkic Moslems as one of China's major nationalities, equal to the Mongols and Tibetans.

Unlike the other two, Isa Yusuf Alptekin had been educated in China—in Beijing and Nanjing. As early as 1932 he had approached the Chinese government on behalf of his native Xinjiang asking for change in the government's policies toward that region and warning of Russian incursions in the province.

These three exiles had explicit suggestions for General Zhang when he visited them to seek their advice. Among these was the request that the government follow the program of autonomy for minority areas envisaged by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and implement this policy in Xinjiang. They asked that the central government ensure that the Turki language be used as the medium of instruction in Xinjiang schools, and that personal freedoms such as freedom of speech, association, and publication be guaranteed, and further, that religious freedom for all be assured. According to Mehmet's memoirs, he, Isa, and Mesut were invited by General Zhang to return to Xinjiang to help in resolving the Yining situation. Given permission to return to Xinjiang, the three men finally arrived back in their home province in October 1945.⁴⁵

Armed with this advice, General Zhang was prepared to fly to the Northwest. From the beginning of his involvement with Xinjiang, Zhang Zhizhong showed an ability to grasp principles that had eluded other Chinese officials in Chongqing—namely, that immediate consideration would have to be given to the case for reform, and that respect for national minority wishes in various cultural areas would be a prerequisite for the success of any future Nationalist policies in Xinjiang.

The sensitivity with which he approached the problems in Xinjiang reflected to a great extent Zhang's background. He graduated from the

Baoding Military Academy and studied in Germany before beginning his military career in China, where he was first a divisional commander and then commander of the Fifth Army. In 1937–1939, he was chairman of Hunan province, but with the intensification of the war in China he was made head of the Political Training Board of the National Military Council. In such a post, Zhang had no personal military power base, but he did have access to Chiang Kai-shek. Trusted by Chiang, Zhang had been involved in delicate negotiations between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party prior to the “Yining Affair.” With a reputation for honesty, forthrightness, and congeniality, he was an excellent choice as a mediator, his appointment to Xinjiang reflecting both the seriousness with which the central government viewed the Xinjiang problem and the degree of trust Zhang enjoyed with Chiang Kai-shek. As will be seen in succeeding pages, Zhang used considerable tact and patience in dealing with the representatives of the three districts, earning him praise from observers and participants. In the end, however, even his patience was exhausted.

On September 13, 1945, General Zhang arrived in Urumqi. On September 14 and 15 he made calls on the Soviet representative, Acting Consul F. G. Evesoff. No record is available of what was said during these meetings, but it was widely believed at the time that he suggested strongly to the Soviets that unless there was a halt to hostilities the Chinese would make the affair an international incident.

Regardless of what was said, it is known that Zhang departed from Urumqi on September 16, and the next day in Chongqing, the Soviet ambassador informed the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the USSR would be pleased to use Soviet good offices to mediate in ending the Xinjiang dispute. At the same time, he also informed the Chinese that, in what British Consul Turrall called an “amazing coincidence,” the Soviets had just received a direct request for Soviet assistance in mediating the dispute from the representatives of the three districts. These representatives also wished the Soviets to relay to the Chinese the message that the people of the three districts “had no desire to separate from China, that they desired autonomy for the districts where the rebel regimes had been set up and that the reason for the revolt had been past oppression.”⁴⁶

And so, according to the information available at present, the Chinese and the government of the three districts arranged an informal ceasefire in the region, with a temporary ceasefire line being drawn at the Manas River.

When the fighting stopped so abruptly and so near to the important prize of the provincial capital, Urumqi, the immediate interpretation in some quarters was that the Soviet Union had simply decided that it had gained a sufficiently large base for future operations and could therefore afford to halt the advance, keeping the richest districts of Xinjiang under its control. Chinese who blamed the Soviets for the entire affair shared this belief and saw in the “amazing coincidence” of a near simultaneous Ili request for Soviet mediation and Soviet offers of good offices to end the affair proof of Soviet complicity in the Ili rebellion.⁴⁷

It is difficult, however, to accept this as a total explanation, for the fighting force of the ETR was known to include many devout Moslems, anti-Soviet in their political leanings and intent on establishing a Moslem state, led by their own distinguished Moslem leader, Ali Han Töre. It was for Ali Han that the Kazaks, for instance, fought; to picture them fighting under the leadership of a known Soviet Communist is inconsistent both with the situation that existed in 1944 and with later developments. But, if we accept that the USSR did not exercise military control over the ETR at this early stage, how can the events of mid-September 1945 be explained? Why did the army of the ETR choose to stop on the virtual doorstep of Urumqi, the capture of which would have given them such an imposing psychological as well as military victory? The answers to these questions are suggested in the following discussion on the peace negotiations and are clarified in succeeding chapters which more clearly demonstrate the objectives of the ETR leadership, the aspirations of the region’s Turkic majority, and the role of the Soviet Union in Xinjiang during this period.

The Peace Negotiations: Phase I

On October 12, 1945, three men appeared on horseback on the west bank of the Manas River, the temporary ceasefire line of the Nationalist and ETR forces. After making their crossing, they were met and escorted to Urumqi by junior government officials the same day. All three wore the smart green military uniform of the ETR army, complete with the Moslem emblems of the crescent moon and star in gold. They identified themselves as Rahim Jan Selimoğlu, Ahmet Jan Kasimi, and Ebulhayir Töre, representatives of the ETR and members of its governing council, a body of seventeen members.

Rahim was a Uighur Turk from the Ili area in his forties. He was the son-in-law of Mesut Sabri, who, as previously mentioned, was also about to arrive in the provincial capital.⁴⁸

Ahmet Jan Kasimi was also a native of the Ili valley and was thirty years old in 1945. In his short career in Xinjiang politics, he had already been imprisoned in Urumqi by Sheng Shicai for a number of years and had risen to his position as minister of foreign affairs in the ETR by virtue of this badge of honor as well as by his very considerable natural ability.⁴⁹ Like many young men of his generation, Ahmet had been educated in Soviet Central Asia, and as a result he was fluent not only in his native Turki and Chinese but also in Russian. In the negotiations and in the coalition government that resulted, Ahmet played a key role although Rahim Jan was technically the leader of the three-man delegation.

The last member of the delegation was Ebulhayir Töre. He, too, was a member of the council of the ETR but, unlike the other two, held no ministerial post.⁵⁰

As the principal Chinese negotiator, Zhang Zhizhong, had not yet arrived, the three Ili delegates made their first call on the Soviet representative, Acting Consul F. G. Evesoff, on October 13, 1945. It was Evesoff who in turn presented the Ili delegates to the Chinese special commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wu Zhixiong (Chaucer H. Wu), who was then stationed in Urumqi. It was arranged that the three Ili delegates would meet with General Zhang as soon as possible after the latter's arrival, slated for October 14.

Unfortunately, the talks met a serious setback before they even began. The three Ili delegates presented themselves as the representatives of the East Turkestan Republic and wished to present their credentials as such to General Zhang at the first meeting. Zhang was informed of this intention before the first meeting and made clear to Consul Evesoff that he could not meet with the delegates formally on that basis, since this would be tantamount to recognizing the ETR as a foreign government. Zhang later wrote that he informed the Ili delegation that, as they themselves had already stated through the USSR's ambassador in Chongqing that they did not desire independence from China but only autonomous status within the Chinese state, it was not realistic to present themselves as anything but the representatives of a group of Chinese citizens who wished to discuss their grievances with a representative of their own country's government—the central government of China.⁵¹

Zhang's stipulation put the Ili men in a quandary. They declared that as their instructions had been to represent the new ETR government, they could not accept Zhang's position without specific instructions from their own government. They would have to return to Yining for further consultations.

Despite the fact that the question of credentials remained unresolved, meetings between the two sides did take place informally, with General Zhang and the Ili delegates both present. Zhang Dajun describes these meetings as purely "courtesy affairs." However, they were not entirely a matter of courtesy. At one such meeting, Zhang addressed the delegates at length on the subject of the government's policy toward the Northwest and toward Xinjiang in particular. He explained that the recent Anti-Japanese War had made it impossible for the government to carry out its policies in Xinjiang. The government was concerned with the welfare of the people of the province, however, and with the war successfully concluded, it wished to turn its attention toward reconstruction in China. It would soon be assisting the people of Xinjiang to build a modern province, on a democratic basis, as provided by the "Three Principles of the People."⁵²

In the course of these "informal talks," Zhang also presented a program of twelve points as the basis for a peace agreement with the people of the three districts. Based in large part on the recommendations of the three

Xinjiang representatives who had been in Chongqing as advisers to the government, the twelve points were as follows:

1. The government would assist the people of Xinjiang in political, economic, and cultural development, according them treatment equal to that of all Chinese citizens.

2. Freedom of religious belief and education would be guaranteed by the government.

3. Each national minority's culture, customs, habits, and written and spoken language would be respected.

4. The government would protect the rights of the person, property, movement, residence, publication, and public meeting.

5. The government would put into practice a system of local autonomy in the following way:

- a. Within three months of the restoration of peace, elections would be held at the village level, and within six months, elections would be held at the county level for the County Council, which would then put into practice the people's government.

- b. After county-level elections, laws would be passed according to the will of the local people.

- c. Six months after establishment of the County Council, elections would be held for the post of county head; two would be elected, and one of these would be chosen by the government to serve as county head.

- d. A vice-county head would be appointed by the government.

- e. The government would use local people to as great an extent as possible when filling local government posts.

6. The government would give serious consideration to the reduction of farm and excise tax, would prohibit apportionment, assist in the expansion of agriculture and industry, and raise the people's standard of living.

7. There would be universal education at all levels, and the government would expand social education and work to raise the cultural level. Elementary schools would use the language of each local national minority and would include the study of their own literature.

8. All military activity in the three districts would stop within one month, and all illegal organizations would be disbanded.

9. All organizations that participated in the movement would be disbanded, and all members would return to their original homes and their original jobs.

10. All who participated in the war would be guaranteed the right to live peacefully after the end of hostilities.

11. Those under arrest would have their cases investigated.

12. Participants in the illegal organizations who returned to their original homes and work would be separately investigated, and those who could serve the nation would be employed by the government.⁵³

These were the twelve points the Ili delegates took with them when they returned to Yining on October 22 for further consultations with the government of the ETR.

The delegates returned to Urumqi November 12. There was no official announcement on the question of credentials. British Consul Turrall commented, however, that the delegates now “understood the situation.”⁵⁴ The use of the appellation “East Turkestan Republic” was, officially at least, dropped. In the Chinese paper *Xinjiang Daily* the three men from Ili were referred to simply as the Ili delegates.

The Ili men brought with them counterproposals. These consisted of eleven points which were presented to the Chinese representatives in the original Turki in which they had been written. These points were as follows:

1. Under a system of advanced autonomy in Xinjiang, local people would hold government posts, and within two months elections would be held for all government posts.

2. There would be total religious freedom within the province.

3. The language of the Moslems would be used for all official and social affairs.

4. Elementary schools, middle and secondary schools, and the university would all use the Moslem language, and national minority education would be expanded.

5. There would be total artistic and cultural freedom.

6. The rights of publication, association, and written and spoken speech would all be guaranteed.

7. Tax would be determined only according to each person's actual property and livelihood.

8. Free trade with other countries would be assured.

9. A national minority army would be organized in each district, armed and trained by the government.

10. Special Moslem representatives would be included in the government as recognition of the Moslem majority in the region.

11. Within three days of the signing of this agreement, all freedom fighters would be released from prison.⁵⁵

Negotiations began using the original twelve points proposed by Zhang and the new eleven proposals of the Ili group. Initially the thorniest issues of elections and reorganization of the military were skipped over. Instead, discussions began on cultural affairs, and agreement in this area was reached with relative ease. The use of Turkic language and freedom of cultural development were to be guaranteed, and the use of Turki in elementary schools was agreed upon in the initial discussion. Both parties accepted assurances of personal freedom and of freedom of speech, publication, and religious belief.

These areas of agreement still left the larger issues unresolved. As the days passed, many observers were doubtful that there would be any positive outcome to the talks. U.S. officials in China, for example, noted that any dissolution of the negotiations would be blamed on the "central government's failure to understand clearly Xinjiang's position and, by persistent effort, especially in Guomintang circles, to force handling of the problem on the basis that Xinjiang is 'no different from any other province.'"⁵⁶

It was also strongly rumored in Urumqi that the highest elected post the Generalissimo himself would allow in Xinjiang was at the district level, and there was a fear among many officials in the local government—and among foreign observers—that Chiang's intransigence on this point alone would destroy the ceasefire and the peace negotiations.⁵⁷

There is some basis for this judgment, but the results of the talks show that it was not wholly warranted. Via the not inconsiderable talents of General Zhang and his negotiation team, a compromise was reached on the

issue of elections. Zhang proposed that the province be ruled by a twenty-five-member council, on which all ministry heads would also serve. The Chinese, it was proposed, would appoint fifteen members of this council, and these appointees would include the heads of three ministries. As many as six or seven of the remaining posts would be reserved for local people, chosen from among local Chinese or natives acceptable to the local Guomindang. This offer, Zhang contended, was as much as could be expected in the way of a compromise on elections, and he was not, he claimed, empowered to go any further in subsequent negotiations.⁵⁸

The two sides also came to an understanding about the question of electing the head of the provincial government. It was decided that this issue would be left until after the National Assembly had met and adopted a new constitution, which would—or would not—accord power of election of the provincial head to the people of the respective provinces.

Finally, on the question of military reorganization, it was agreed by both sides that some type of reorganization was necessary, but the details of how this was to be done were left for later discussions.

With the new eleven-point compromise proposal in hand, the Ili delegates returned again to Yining, this time in a Soviet plane. The Chinese representatives in Urumqi were expecting them to return forthwith, but the days dragged on without sign until December 25 when they finally reappeared in Urumqi to continue the negotiations. When they returned, they brought new demands for the Chinese government. Despite the fact that Zhang had thought agreement had basically been reached on the necessary reforms, the Ili government now wished to add two further points. First, it demanded that the numerous troops brought into Xinjiang to quell disturbances be withdrawn. Second, it demanded that all Chinese special service organizations (e.g., the hated secret police who were predominantly Han Chinese) be disbanded and withdrawn from the province.⁵⁹

Anxious to secure a basic agreement by the end of the year, Zhang urged that these new questions be set aside and that discussion be limited to the original eleven points presented by the Ili group at the previous meeting. The Ili delegates conceded this, and finally, on January 3, 1946, announcement was made that the Ili Affair had been peacefully resolved. The announcement seemed premature, however, primarily because of the

question of annexes to the agreement. The first annex dealt with the distribution of posts within the new government, and on this point both sides were in agreement. However, there was also a second annex, dealing with the reorganization of the military, and this annex was not accepted by the Ili delegates. Debate over its provisions was to rage for another six months. Both sides saw this annex as crucial to the existence of the ETR separatist movement. The central government wanted nothing less than the total disbanding of the ETR forces. The ETR wished to maintain their own armed forces within the three districts under the leadership of their own Moslem commanders, and, in addition, they proposed to share military control over the remaining seven districts of Xinjiang. The Ili government also made the further demand that new recruits to the provincial military forces be native Moslems and not Han Chinese. With these vital areas of disagreement still outstanding, the announcement of the restoration of peace seemed premature indeed.

Toward the end of 1945, Chiang Kai-shek urgently requested the presence of Zhang Zhizhong in Chongqing to aid in the Guomindang-Chinese Communist negotiations which were then intermittently progressing. The somewhat premature announcement of peace in Xinjiang was partly a result of this request. Unfortunately, this was to have repercussions in Xinjiang. Once Zhang had gone, negotiations, which were supposed to continue on the second annex, stalled and then collapsed.

The Peace Negotiations: Phase II

With Zhang's departure from Urumqi in early January 1946, the provincial government, still headed by Governor Wu, established a committee to begin planning for the organization and the financial basis of the new government that was to be formed as soon as final agreement on the second annex was reached. The announcement of the formation of this committee came on January 9, three days after Zhang's departure. On the following day, the Ili delegates returned to their home base to report in person on the final agreement and the state of the discussions on the second annex. According to the terms of the agreement, hostilities were to cease within ten days of the agreement's being signed, and elections were to take place within three months. However, as the agreement was incomplete, no immediate plans were made for the holding of elections, and the ceasefire line remained at the Manas River, with troops of the ETR and the Nationalists facing each other in uneasy silence.

The work of continuing the negotiations was left in the hands of Zhang's colleagues, Peng Zhaoxian, Liu Mengchun, and Wang Cengshan, all of whom had been involved in the negotiations and were familiar with the course of discussions, which had by this point occupied some thirty separate formal and informal sessions.⁶⁰

It was soon clear, however, that the Ili government did not wish to deal with Peng, Zhang's successor. It informed the Chinese that it would wait for Zhang to return himself, before continuing any discussions. On February 28, as Zhang had not returned, the ETR's council sent a telegram to the Chinese government via the Soviet consul in Yining to ask when General Zhang would be returning to resume talks.⁶¹ They implied that unless Zhang himself returned there was a chance that the entire proposal for peace would be abandoned.

Yielding to this pressure to ensure peace in Xinjiang, the central government decided in March to place Zhang at the head of the government in Xinjiang, as he appeared to have gained the trust of the factions within that troubled region. Accordingly, on March 29, the Chongqing government announced his appointment as provincial chairman.⁶² This promotion made Zhang a more authoritative figure, for he also was concurrently commander

of the Northwest Field Army, responsible for the three provinces of Gansu, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. On March 29, he left Chongqing for Urumqi, stopping first at his military headquarters in Lanzhou before arriving in Xinjiang's capital on April 4.

Zhang's return was earnestly awaited because the intervening period of administration under old-style administrator Wu had shown all the traditional features of Chinese exploitation in border regions. Wu had become an unpopular figure not only because of his reputation for avariciousness, but also because of his failure to release political prisoners as promised before he had even arrived in the province. Corruption had also attained new heights under his administration, and rumor strongly contended that Wu would leave Xinjiang considerably wealthier than when he arrived.⁶³

Whatever the state of his personal fortune when he left, Wu did make some attempts to ameliorate past maladministration. He had tackled head-on the difficult matter of relations between soldiers and local population. On January 28, it was announced that the soldiers of the 8th Army Corps in Xinjiang, stationed mainly in Urumqi, had to obey strictly the government's orders and to act in such a way as to alleviate the hardship their presence was causing in the city.⁶⁴ The impact of this order may have been limited—complaints about the military continued throughout this period—but the government did demonstrate its awareness of the problem. Likewise, Wu himself filed a personal report on the need for financial reform in the province in January 1946, emphasizing the need to prevent inflation and to cut the number of government employees to reduce strain on the provincial budget.⁶⁵

During the same month, public mention of the building of a railway in Xinjiang was first made. On January 26, the local newspaper announced that a committee had been organized in Urumqi to petition the government to build a rail link with Lanzhou in neighboring Gansu province, and donations from local citizens in support of this measure were solicited. There was as yet no suggestion that donations were going to be compulsory as they had often been under Sheng. Nevertheless, no further mention was made of this committee in the media or government reports, and it appears

that the proposal lay on the table to await the inauguration of the new government sometime that year.

Despite some positive governmental action under the governorship of Wu Zhongxin, few among the local population regretted his departure. Zhang's own popularity in Xinjiang, in great contrast, was obvious from the warm reception accorded him upon his return to Urumqi. At the airport to meet him were representatives of the Ili government as well as local officials and representatives of all the foreign governments stationed in Urumqi. Within a week of his return, Zhang convened the first meeting of his government. Their first task was to secure agreement on the crucial military annex to the peace agreement, and the first indications were auspicious.

In an atmosphere of optimism, Zhang declared that the main objective of the new government would be to implement the government's new policy of autonomy in Xinjiang. He emphasized the military importance of the region to the whole country and praised Urumqi as a political and economic center for the new developments that would now begin to take place in the region. Urumqi, he said, would become modernized in order to serve as an example for development throughout the region. He asked for the support of the local population of all nationalities so that together they could look forward to a future of peace and unity, under the guidance of the "Three Principles of the People."⁶⁶ Problems with the second annex on military dispositions persisted, however. Despite talks with the Ili delegates, no progress was announced. Privately, Zhang certainly must have had reservations about the chances for agreement on the annex. In early May it was announced that he was unwell and that meetings to discuss the final form of the annex would be delayed.⁶⁷ Then, on May 8, evidently recovered from his bout of illness, Zhang delivered a speech in which he clearly expressed his concern about the delay on the second annex. He pointed out that while the government had made many concessions to the demands of the Ili delegates, a conclusion had not yet been reached. This, he stated, made his heart uneasy, as he sincerely wished to conclude the peace agreement. After six months of patient work, he hoped that the delegates would now accept the government's generous offers in order to secure peace.⁶⁸

These offers he proceeded to develop in greater detail than ever before, producing a package covering religious, political, economic, and social

affairs. The proposals were quite sweeping: the promise of autonomy would be fulfilled; the rule of law would be enjoyed; all people's religious beliefs would be respected; corrupt officials would be punished; Sino-Soviet relations would be improved. Economically, the government would undertake to improve transportation, communication, and environmental sanitation. It would also encourage the expansion of farming, irrigation projects, and animal husbandry, as well as mining and industry. In short, the government wished to help Xinjiang modernize and advance with the rest of China during the new period of reconstruction. This speech was not only an appeal to the population of Urumqi, it was also an appeal to the Ili government to take part in the forthcoming discussions with a view to matching the concessions made by the central government—concessions which, in Zhang's opinion, were considerable.

Formal negotiations began again on May 15. The Ili delegates used their strength to widen the area of discussion. While the second annex was ostensibly the main topic, the Ili delegates wanted government concessions in other areas. The central government had proposed Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra as vice-chairman of the province. However, the Ili faction distrusted all three of the former Xinjiang representatives, now back from their prolonged stay in Chongqing, despite their collective reputation for nationalism. The Ili group instead proposed Ahmet Jan Kasimi, one of the Ili delegates, as vice-chairman, and this, in the end, was agreed. The other vice-chairmanship was given to Burhan Shahidi, the Tatar who had served in previous Xinjiang governments but who was not considered to be either pro-Ili or pro-Guomindang by the parties concerned.⁶⁹

Nine days after the final negotiations began, on May 24, the six articles of the second annex on military reorganization were initialed. These six, which had taken so long to agree upon but which nonetheless were soon to cause more disagreement, were as follows:

1. The Ili forces in the three districts to be organized into six regiments, three cavalry and three infantry. The total number of men under arms to be eleven to twelve thousand. Two cavalry regiments and one infantry regiment to be part of the Nationalist Army in Xinjiang.

2. A Moslem nominated by the Yining representatives to command all six of the above regiments and be responsible to the Xinjiang garrison

commander for the three Nationalist units and to the Xinjiang Peace Preservation Corps [hereafter PPC] Commander for the other three. The same Moslem commander to be the vice-commander of the Xinjiang PPC and to maintain a headquarters.

3. The above six regiments to remain in the three districts and have sole responsibility for the maintenance of peace in those districts. Central government frontier defense troops to undertake defense of the national frontiers, following methods and distribution of troops identical to those prevailing prior to the Ili incident.

4. The Asku and Kashgar units of the PPC to be reorganized, use native recruits, and be organized in consultation with the Moslem commander.

5. The supply, equipment, and treatment of the six regiments above to be on a par with the top national army and PPC respectively. The three PPC to be supplied from the PPC headquarters in Xinjiang province.

6. The reorganization of the six regiments to be the responsibility of the Moslem commander. The garrisons of the troops in the three districts to be reported to and approved by the provincial authorities, and their numbers and equipment to be reported to the provincial government.⁷⁰

The formal signing of the second annex took place on June 6, 1946.⁷¹ Zhang celebrated the momentous day by seeking the approval of the central government for a clutch of new economic policies. Particularly important were price stabilization measures. Inflation had continued to rise throughout the winter of 1946, and Zhang now asked the government to assist in implementing several new measures.

To help control the price of goods being brought into Xinjiang from China proper, he asked that one hundred new trucks be added to those of the Public Highway Bureau of Xinjiang, and that a supply of gasoline and spare parts be ensured to guarantee the steady supply of goods into Xinjiang. To fuel these vehicles, he requested that the government boost the production at the Yumen oil fields and that the road between Lanzhou and Urumqi be maintained by the Northwest Highway Bureau. Further, he asked that the number and frequency of flights and other forms of transport in and out of the region be increased in order to stabilize prices. Finally, he petitioned the government to remit all taxes for Xinjiang for the following year to alleviate hardship, which events of the past year and a half had generated.⁷²

Chairman Zhang next tackled the problem of political prisoners—a matter for which he did not need central government approval. He publicly ordered all local officials concerned immediately to inform him of the number and location of all such prisoners with an aim to expediting their release.⁷³ Such a list was drawn up naming 253 persons being held in Urumqi and 135 held elsewhere. Although their release was not immediate, Zhang managed to arrange a general amnesty for all such prisoners by June 20, when friends and relatives gathered at Urumqi’s main prison to greet their relatives upon their release.⁷⁴ Upon release, each person was given Xn \$2,000 to aid them in resettlement.

Also in early June, the local paper carried a special announcement concerning 131 individuals accused of Communist sympathies (among whom were 22 children). These people were to be freed and provided with transport to Yanan, according to the paper, and by the end of the month they did, in fact, leave the province.⁷⁵

Zhang also proceeded to announce a new slogan for Xinjiang: *yenwu xiuwen*. Literally, this phrase meant “cease military activity and promote civil affairs.” The time for fighting, the *Xinjiang Daily* editorial ran, had ended, and the time to promote culture had come. The local newspaper began to feature many hopeful articles in the following weeks as Urumqi prepared to host the inaugural ceremonies of the new government.⁷⁶

On June 20, 1946, the names of the new members of the Xinjiang Provincial Government were announced. Zhang’s appointment as chairman was confirmed, and the new heads of the various bureaus and departments were duly listed in the local newspaper (see [chapter 5](#)).

In a red-letter edition on July 1, 1946, the *Xinjiang Daily* printed a message from Chairman Zhang to the people of Xinjiang in which he specifically thanked the Soviet consul general in Urumqi for his assistance during the difficult negotiations of the peace settlement. He praised the hard work of both negotiating teams and spoke of the hopes of all Xinjiang people for future peace. Any opposition to national unity (the phrase used to encompass unity between national groups in China) or any attempt to destroy such unity would not be tolerated, he declared. A new world had come into being in Xinjiang, and all the province’s four million people must work to promote unity and peace.⁷⁷

During the inaugural ceremony on July 1, 1946, each new official was called upon to swear his allegiance to the new government. Each one swore “to follow the leadership of the central government, to protect the peace in Xinjiang, to support the unity of the Chinese state, realize democratic government, strengthen the unity of the nationalities, severely punish corruption, and prohibit opium and gambling.”⁷⁸ The accepted basis for the government was to be Sun’s Three Principles of the People, and all new members of the government, including the Ili appointees, duly swore to all that was required.

While most of the new officials from the three districts were in attendance, it is noteworthy that several were not. Moreover, several of those missing never arrived in Urumqi to assume their new posts at all. Ali Han Töre, president of the ETR, and Osman Batur, Kazak leader in the Altai, were both ministers without portfolio in the new provincial government, but neither arrived to assume his post. Nor did the new Kazak minister of health, Delilhan Sukurbayoglu, who remained in Ashan, leaving the deputy head, Ma Shuqi, in charge.

Following Chairman Zhang’s inaugural speech and the swearing in of new officials, several other speeches were made. The speech of the new vice-chairman, Ahmet Jan Kasimi, in particular was well received, and his talk helped launch his reputation in Urumqi as an accomplished and charismatic speaker. His words, printed in the *Xinjiang Daily* in a special black-bordered box, called upon the new officials to work hard for the establishment of democratic government in Xinjiang and full implementation of local autonomy in the province.⁷⁹

To both foreign and local residents, it must indeed have seemed that a new phase in Xinjiang’s troubled history was about to begin. A difficult compromise had been reached, and in the struggle to achieve it, both sides appeared to have given evidence of their good will and their intention to find a workable solution that would bring peace to the region. The national government of China had agreed to radical shifts in its position on minority affairs, accepting that the local population would have to be given a much larger degree of control, and that abusive and corrupt policies would have to end. These were significant concessions.

Furthermore, in the process the government had become sharply aware of the volatile situation in the Northwest, where, spurred by Soviet agitation or not, the local population had become sufficiently enraged against the Han Chinese to rise in revolt. At the very least, the urgent need for reform was at last recognized in Chongqing, and, in the person of Chairman Zhang, it appeared that there was now a chance for the Chinese to continue to hold the region of Xinjiang as an integral part of the state.

CHAPTER 5

Xinjiang's 1946 Coalition Government

From the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1911 to the establishment of the present People's Republic, coalition governments formed and dissolved in China according to the fortunes of war. These coalitions were temporary alliances, born of the desire of military and political factions for power, coupled with the inability of any one group to establish itself as the sole ruling power. Within these coalitions—which existed at both local and national levels—members sought to maximize their own positions. In typical coalition fashion, these temporary arrangements dissolved when membership no longer served the members' best interests or when one faction was able finally to dominate the others.¹

During the 1940s, China's central government was itself a coalition of Guomindang factions, smaller political parties, and a procession of provincial warlords, allied to the Nationalists in order to legitimize their own positions. As the central government's hold was tenuous in many areas of China, it was forced to accept regional power sharing in which Nationalist appointees worked alongside local warlords or military factions to give the impression of a continued, if limited, central government role in these areas. It was into this pattern of coalition governments that the Nationalists placed the Xinjiang Coalition Government in 1946.

The polyglot organization in Xinjiang called for in the peace agreement of January 1946 was very much a coalition in the above sense, as none of the factions participating in it were satisfied with their new positions. The Nationalists, unable to secure the territory militarily, feared further Ili expansionism in Xinjiang, and this fear, coupled with the Chinese assumption that the USSR was directly involved, served as the impetus for Nationalist acceptance of the compromise government. However, a further reason was that, while a limited role in government would have to be given to representatives of the local population, as called for in the peace

agreement, the actual administrative control of Xinjiang clearly was to remain in Chinese hands by means of Han Chinese domination of the new ruling council and other key posts at the provincial and lower levels of government.

In addition, by imposing a peaceful hiatus on the region, the terms of the agreement gave the central government the opportunity to increase its military strength in the region and to extend its own base of political support among the anti-Soviet groups of Xinjiang.

The major goal of the new government was, officially at least, the implementation of the peace agreement and the new Government Political Program (hereafter GPP) adopted during the first few weeks of coalition rule. While neither the Nationalists nor the Ili faction wished to be seen as deviating from the pursuit of popular democratic rule called for in the agreement, as in any compromise situation both nonetheless sought to mitigate implementation of those aspects of the agreement that they saw as a possible threat to their own position. The shifting and maneuvering for advantage within the government, typical of coalitions, was the undercurrent that flowed through Xinjiang political affairs between 1946 and 1947.

The focus of this chapter is the Xinjiang coalition, partnership in which was a cornerstone of Nationalist policy in the Northwest. Chinese continued to dominate at all levels of government administration in the province. As a result of this domination, the major problems of local government, which were endemic elsewhere in China, also plagued the new government: entrenched Chinese bureaucratism, corruption, poor relations between undisciplined, underpaid Nationalist troops and the local non-Chinese population, military intervention in government policy, and various financial problems. These difficulties escalated after July 1946 despite the stated commitment of the new government to correct past abuses and to implement fully the peace agreement and the GPP. This chapter also demonstrates the ramifications of the central government's belief that Xinjiang's problems were the result of Soviet intrigue and manipulation in the area.

Although government representatives had visited the region and agreed with Chairman Zhang that local grievances were in large part to blame for tension in the area, and that these required immediate government attention,

the Nationalist government continued a wait-and-see policy with regard to Xinjiang, predicated on the assumption that when the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw from the province, the region's difficulties would then be solved.

As the government's major concern in Xinjiang was to hold the region as an integral part of China, the only action it directly encouraged, through financial assistance to the province, was an increase in the central government's troops, which served to exacerbate poor Chinese-national minority relations. Although the Chinese had agreed to concessions when they signed the peace agreement, they took little initiative in implementing those concessions that threatened to curtail Nationalist power and influence in the region.

Further, efforts at establishing trust between Zhang and the Turkic people were damaged in the autumn of 1946 with the disclosure made in one of Zhang's major speeches that he had been involved in talks with Osman Batur, who initially had been an ally of the Ili group but who changed sides sometime in 1946. It was rumored that Osman was fighting against the Ili government with Nationalist military support. The fact that Zhang had met with Osman aroused suspicions of Chinese insincerity and did little to alleviate fears among local nationalists that the central government had no intention of allowing a Turki-run government to operate in Xinjiang. The possibility of the government's inducing Osman to fight the Ili faction also implied a reversion to traditional Chinese border policy of "using the barbarian to fight the barbarian." By conducting negotiations with the Kazaks in the rumor-riddled and politically sensitive atmosphere of 1946–1947, the Chinese ran the danger of undermining the fragile peace in the region. Unrest and dissatisfaction grew among both the Han and other nationalities in Xinjiang in 1946–1947. The problems referred to above, and the coalition's attempts to deal with them, were the factors that led, in turn, to the dissolution of the coalition in 1947.

Xinjiang's New Government: The Council

According to the terms of the peace agreement between the central government and the Ili group, the new coalition government inaugurated on July 1, 1946, was to include ten central government appointees and fifteen members drawn from the ten districts of Xinjiang, who would form the twenty-five-man ruling council of the province. This ten/fifteen division gave the impression of local national minority domination of the highest governmental organ in the region, but closer examination of the actual individuals who held these twenty-five posts shows that in what were undoubtedly tense negotiations over each of the twenty-five positions, the Chinese had managed to secure at least seventeen reliable votes on the council. The list of members' names and their political affiliation ([table 5](#)) only partially clarifies this point. To understand the division of power it is necessary to look more closely at the individuals concerned.

The eight Chinese members appointed by the Nationalists formed a cohesive core group under the leadership of General Zhang Zhizhong and included Secretary-General Liu Mengchun, Finance Minister Lu Yuwen, Vice-Minister of Education Cai Zengxian, Vice-Minister of Reconstruction Gu Jianji, Minister of Administration Wang Cengshan, Minister without Portfolio Guan Zeliang, and Urumqi Mayor Chu Wu.

Table 5
Xinjiang Provincial Government Council, 1946

Title	Name (Nationality)	Political affiliation
Chairman	Zhang Zhizhong (Han)	Guomindang
Vice	Burhan Shahidi (Tatar)	Provincial appointee
Vice	Ahmet Jan Kasimi (Uighur)	Ili
Secretary-general	Liu Mengchun (Han)	Guomindang
Vice	Abdul Kerim Abbas (Uighur)	Ili
Vice	Salis (Kazak)	Provincial appointee
Minister of administration	Jelaleddin Wang Cengshan (Hui)	Guomindang
Vice	Rahim Jan Selimoğlu (Uighur)	Ili
Minister of finance	Lu Yuwen (Han)	Guomindang
Vice	Ma Tingxian (Hui)	Provincial appointee

Title	Name (Nationality)	Political affiliation
Minister of education	Seyfettin Azizi (Uighur)	Ili
Vice	Cai Zhongxian (Han)	Guomindang
Minister of reconstruction	Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra (Uighur)	Provincial appointee
Vice	Gu Jianji (Han)	Guomindang
Minister of social affairs	Zhao Qianfeng (Manchu)	Guomindang
Vice	Ardeni (Mongol)	Provincial appointee
Minister of health	Delilhan Sugurbayog̃lu (Kazak)	Ili
Vice	Ma Shuqi ^a (Hui)	Provincial appointee
Mayor of Urumqi	Chu Wu (Han)	Guomindang
Ministers without portfolio	Isa Yusuf Alptekin (Uighur)	Provincial appointee
	Guan Zeliang (Han)	Guomindang
	Abdul Kerim Resit (Uighur)	Provincial appointee
	Zhang Dihua (Manchu)	Provincial appointee
	Osman Batur (Kazak)	Ili
	Ali Han Töre, Hoja (Uighur)	Ili
	Izhak Han Mura, Haji (Kirghiz)	Ili

Source: Zhang Dajun, *Xinjiang's Seventy Years of Turbulence* (Taibei, 1980), 12:6880–81.

^a Ma was not on the twenty-five-man council.

The Chinese side had proposed Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra as one of the two vice-chairmen to work with Zhang. Since the Ili group considered Mehmet to be too pro-Chinese, they refused to sanction this but accepted him as minister of the Reconstruction Bureau, which still made him a member of the twenty-five-man council.² Isa Yusuf Alptekin, another former member of the national government, was also appointed to the council as a minister without portfolio.

Both these men were known to be Turki nationalists, hoping for a greater degree of autonomous government for Xinjiang; however, both also saw union with China as the best course of action open to Xinjiang for the immediate future and were therefore committed to a Chinese role in the province. As Isa said to an American in Urumqi in 1947, “I believe the Chinese side, for all its, faults, is better than the Russian and I will continue to work for autonomy under Chinese rule.”³

Of the fifteen posts allotted to representatives of Xinjiang’s ten districts, seven were given to local national minorities who were in general

agreement with the sentiments of Isa Yusuf Alptekin. While some of them hoped for eventual independence, they, too, feared Soviet power and preferred alliance with the weaker Republic of China. These men included Second Vice-Chairman Burhan Shahidi (a former member of Sheng's government); First Vice-Secretary-General Salis (a Kazak ally of Alibeg Hakim and Osman Batur who later acted as a go-between for the Nationalist government and these Kazak leaders); two Sinicized Manchus, Minister Without Portfolio Zhong Tihua and Minister of Social Affairs Zhao Qianfeng; Vice-Minister of Finance Ma Tingxian (Hui); Vice-Minister of Social Affairs Ardeni (Mongol); and Minister Without Portfolio Abdul Kerim Resit. These seven, plus the central government's ten appointees, gave the Chinese effective control of the new government's highest organ.

The other eight posts were filled by appointments that represented the three ETR districts. These eight held concurrent posts in the provincial government, but those with portfolios were shadowed by a Han Chinese or pro-Chinese counterpart. Ahmet Jan Kasimi, the Ili member holding the highest provincial government rank, shared the position of vice-chairman with Burhan. The second highest post of secretary-general had two vice-secretaries, one of whom was the Ili appointee Abdul Kerim Abbas. Other Ili appointees were Rahim Jan as vice-minister of administration under Wang Cengshan; Seyfettin as minister of education, working with Cai Zengxian as vice-minister; and Delilhan, minister of health, paired with Ma Shuqi as vice-minister. A further three Ili representatives were made ministers without portfolio: Ali Han Töre, Osman Batur, and Izhak Han Mura Haji.

As stated previously, several Ili appointees never took up their posts in Urumqi. Alibeg and Osman were already in the process of splitting with their ETR allies. Unwilling to work within the new coalition, both these Kazak leaders elected to remain in their northern strongholds. Izhak Han remained at his post in the three districts' military organization. No replacements were appointed to the council.

In addition, Ali Han Töre, president of the ETR, disappeared in August 1946 in circumstances that still remain unclear. As no one seemed sure whether he would return or not, his place on the Provincial Council also remained empty. This increased the Nationalist majority to seventeen in comparison to the Ili four. But, although the Nationalists were thus in a

position to dominate the council, the record of its meetings indicates the efforts of Zhang to secure unanimous votes even on controversial propositions. For instance, when a motion was proposed in August 1946 to reduce the number of government personnel—of whom the vast majority were then Han Chinese—it was unanimously passed.⁴ This was no accident. Zhang righteously and rightfully pointed out in 1947 that he and other Chinese members of the council had bent over backward to ensure that the decisions of the new government were reached unanimously. He declared that the need to compromise on many issues had been recognized by the Chinese government from the beginning, and at no time had they used their power on the council to force an affirmative vote on an unpopular issue.⁵

This seeming unanimity was partly a function of the conciliatory policy then being pursued by Zhang in his capacity as chairman. But it was as much due to the fact that the provincial government lacked both the power and the financial backing to act on many of its own resolutions. It was the central government that had ultimate authority over decisions on national defense, so that provincial resolutions in such matters were only advisory. And, provincial decisions relied heavily on central government subsidies. Provincial programs for education expansion and public health work, for instance, required approval from the Nanjing authorities, and this gave the central government ultimate control over most areas of development in the region.

A further means of maintaining Chinese predominance in the province was by the appointment of Chinese and pro-Chinese officials at provincial, district, and county levels. By early 1947, county officials were appointed by elected county assemblies, but other posts throughout the province were filled by appointees. There was pressure for the chairmanship of the Provincial Council to be made elective, but the response continued to be that this must wait for a national-level decision at the coming National Assembly.

Xinjiang's Inspectors-General

Another institution available to the central government was the system of inspectors-general which existed at provincial, district, and county levels. As these appointed officials had great supervisory powers, it is worth looking at them in greater detail.

At the provincial level, the inspector-general reported directly to the central government and was thus the head of an independent hierarchy within the province. At all levels, the post of inspector-general was parallel to that of county, district, and provincial chairmen and was usually filled by a highly educated, locally respected appointee whose duties included serving as watchdog over the workings of the civil government, with special responsibility for checking on civil administration, financial affairs, reconstruction, and education.⁶ In Xinjiang, the inspector-general at the provincial level was also to serve as an adviser on the election process, an especially important role in light of the fact that these were Xinjiang's first elections.

Xinjiang's first inspector-general was Mesut Sabri, a member of the Guomindang as well as an associate of the CC Clique, one of the most important political factions within the Guomindang. By securing this appointment for one of their associates, the CC Clique strengthened their position in the province—a position already strong by virtue of the fact that they counted several members of the twenty-five-man governing council among their followers. These included Liu Mengchun (secretary-general), Wang Cengshan (minister of administration), Zhao Qianfeng (minister of social affairs), and Gu Jianji (vice-minister of reconstruction).⁷ This clique had earned a reputation for being an arch-conservative force in government, quick to use force or brutality to ensure a predominant position for itself. The clout exercised by this clique was probably a main reason why Mesut and his fellow-travelers in Xinjiang politics, Isa Yusuf and Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra, were allowed to return to the region in 1945.

Between May and September 1946, inspectors-general at the district and county level were appointed in the seven districts under Chinese control. At the district level, four of the appointees were Han Chinese, two were Uighurs, and one was a Sinicized Kazak. Of the thirty-nine county-level

inspectors, twenty-nine were Han Chinese, a fact of importance to the local citizens. Names and nationalities are given in [table 6](#) for the district-level posts, with a summary of the county appointments by nationality. With Han Chinese dominance in this post, a potentially important means of maintaining closer central control in the region was kept firmly in Chinese hands.

In early 1947, the provincial government increased the power of the inspectors-general, the reason being that government organization was still in need of development in the vast territory of Xinjiang. District-level inspectors-general were charged with carrying out the peace agreement and the GPP as their principal duty. The inspectors were also given the specific power to formulate and promulgate local laws. These laws were not to interfere with the people's rights to personal freedom and were to be reported to the government, but the power that this right of law-making represented was, on paper at least, formidable.

Chinese Dominance in Local Police Units

Another important institution that remained under Chinese control, at least in the provincial capital, was the local police. As mentioned previously, in the last years of Sheng Shicai's rule, both the ordinary police and special secret police units had aided the Tupan in carrying out a reign of terror. By 1944, the police were both hated and feared in Urumqi. As the police were predominantly Han Chinese, the antipathy took on racial overtones.

Table 6
Appointed Inspectors-General, 1946

District	Inspector (Nationality)	Date of appointment	County-level inspectors
Urumqi	Hatije (Kazak)	July 4, 1946	12 counties: 10 Han; 2 national minorities
Kashgar	Abdul Kerim Han Masim (Uighur)	June 30, 1946	8 counties (5 reporting): 4 Han; 1 unclear
Aksu	Abdul Isazu Mesut (Uighur)	August 27, 1946	9 counties (6 reporting): 4 Han; 2 national minorities
Hetian (Khotan)	Hao Dengpang (Han)	May 31, 1946	6 counties (4 reporting): 4 Han
Yenki	Zuo Shuping (Han)	September 20, 1946	7 counties, 1 bureau (7 reporting): 4 Han, 3 national minorities
Hami	Li Liangxing (Han)	May 11, 1946	3 counties, 1 bureau (3 reporting): 3 Han
Yarkand	Chou Fanggan (Han)	No date given	5 counties (2 reporting): 2 national minorities

Source: Zhang Dajun, *Seventy Years*, 12:7032–38.

No official statistics are available on the ethnic composition of the police after the 1946 coalition government came into being, but according to an article written by Provincial Vice-Chairman Ahmet Jan Kasimi, 81 percent

of the police officers and 89 percent of the lower ranks in Urumqi were Han Chinese.⁸ The chief of the Provincial Police was Liu Handong, also Han Chinese. Quite naturally, the Turki element in the new government sought to have the number of police of various nationalities made proportionate to the overall numbers of nationalities in the province, but, despite this becoming a specific policy objective of the new government, Han police remained overwhelmingly dominant in 1947.

The New Coalition Government and Passage of the Government Political Program

The new government got off to an inauspicious start. On July 11 it held its first meeting, and that very evening Moslem mobs attacked the houses of Han Chinese who were married to Moslem women. The result was a full-scale riot in the provincial capital. The mob abducted the Moslem wives, and in some cases the unfortunate women were forced to marry old Moslem men. Some Chinese were killed in the fighting that night, although no number of casualties was given in subsequent press reports. An 11 P.M. curfew was immediately imposed in Urumqi in an effort to restore order and forestall revenge attacks. The new government then ordered an investigation into the incident; the results, as in other cases, were never officially released.⁹

One direct result of this incident was an increase in the unease felt by Han Chinese in the capital; they feared that under the current conciliatory policy they were not adequately protected, and that such incidents might become commonplace should the government fail to take decisive action. As no action was taken against any Moslems after this incident, it remained as one of the unavenged grievances that undoubtedly contributed to the violence of the following February.

Nevertheless, meetings of the new government proceeded, and after a series of initial sessions the government council officially adopted the Government Political Program on July 18, 1946.¹⁰ This lengthy document together with the peace agreement itself were intended to form the basis of law in Xinjiang and to serve as a guide for the administration of the new government. It attempted to cover all important aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the region. It was also a plan of action for the future economic development of the area, and one that required considerable central government assistance to make implementation feasible.

It was not only wide-ranging and broad in scope, but also democratic in tone. Indeed, it began with the major statement that power was to be exercised by the people. Its ambitious nature, however, was also its shortcoming. In covering a wide range of objectives for the new

government, it promised the people a democratic “paradise,” in the words of Vice-Chairman Ahmet,¹¹ but as noted by the American observer Barnett, it promised a great deal without reference to the means by which its promises would be fulfilled.¹² Its economic provisions were so broad that to realize even a small portion of the stated goals would have required capital investment far beyond what was available to Xinjiang at the time or in the near future. And, as the new government had witnessed on its first day of official operation, the personal freedoms guaranteed in the GPP would have to be suspended at times simply to keep the peace, even in the provincial capital.

The first section of the GPP was a guarantee of the people’s legal rights as called for originally in the peace agreement. It also repeated the assurance that Chinese and Turki languages would be used on an equal basis. The second point, however, tempered any concession to local legal custom by out-lawing the use of corporal punishment under customary or religious law; furthermore, it provided that in the case of conflict between the civil law code and local religious law, the central government would be called upon to resolve the dispute. An additional departure from religious law was called for in the third point, which included legal equality for women and protection of their legal rights.

In the first section the government also reserved the right to train all newly elected officials, a clause that potentially enabled the government to assess not only the new officials’ abilities but also their political stance.

Section B of the GPP was devoted to the guarantee of equality and respect for all nationalities in the province, again repeating the terms of the peace agreement. Added to this was the declaration that stirring up bad feeling or destroying national unity would not be permitted, although no provision suggests ways to prevent incidents of either kind, nor is punishment for those guilty of such activity mentioned.

The next section, C, concerning “Foreign Relations,” dealt exclusively with the “friendly relations” between the USSR and China and called for economic cooperation as well as cultural and artistic exchanges with the USSR’s Central Asian republics. Clearly included as a sign of Soviet support for the new government, it could be seen to benefit both the Ili and the central government factions. For Ili, it meant central government

acknowledgment of the USSR's importance to Xinjiang and the necessity of reopening trade, which had been interrupted since before the beginning of the rebellion.¹³ To the Chinese, this section reaffirmed Soviet recognition of Xinjiang as an integral part of China—an affirmation just recently secured by the Chongqing government with the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on August 14, 1945.

The most ambitious section of the GPP was Section D, on economic development. Plans were outlined in nineteen provisions that called for creating an industrial and agricultural base in Xinjiang. However well-intentioned the proposals, the carrying out of point 13 alone would have taken more funds and technological skill than were then available in the entire province: it called for establishment of basic industries in cement, electricity, steel, and the production of machine parts. The financial and technological constraints also applied to the other provisions in this section, which recommended the development of communications, public health, culture, and education, all of which required considerable financial investment.

The means by which these programs would be financed was discussed in Section E. In addition to revenue from local taxes, point 5 called for the continuation of central subsidies to Xinjiang. As the coalition had little left in the treasury by August 1946, and by the end of 1946 was some six billion dollars in debt, central funds were vital. This financial dependence was expected to continue. Of the fifty-billion-dollar budget proposed for fiscal year 1947, only twenty-two billion was expected as income from local taxes.¹⁴

Because considerable sums would have to come from the central government, and as tax regulations in general were decided by the national, not provincial, government, the provision on taxes in the GPP included few details. It did stipulate, however, that collection of taxes in the province must not “damage the people’s livelihood.”

On the sensitive issue of locally issued currency, point 3 simply stated that the currency of Xinjiang would be united with that of the rest of the nation, but that this would be done only after further appropriate discussion and research. While this treatment avoided a potentially divisive discussion,

it also left an important economic question unresolved, contributing to a sense of financial insecurity in the province.

Point 6 of the finance section called for reduction in provincial government expenditures and in the number of government employees. Regulations dealing with this point were later passed to ensure a greater number of representatives of national minorities in local government.

An important financial matter that was not touched upon in the GPP and later was to cause difficulties was the uniting of the currency of the three districts with that of the rest of Xinjiang. According to U.S. sources, the provincial government had agreed to exchange, for Xinjiang dollars, the large amount of money printed by the Ili government to finance its military action in 1944–1945.¹⁵ This was in addition to “relief” funds issued to the city government of Yining by the provincial government in the summer of 1946 of some Xn \$40 million.¹⁶ As both relief money and funds for buying the Ili currency affected the province’s financial situation, they were important omissions. Their exclusion was presumably to avoid open disagreement or stalemate among the new coalition’s members at this early stage.

According to Zhang’s statement on the GPP, printed in the local Urumqi paper on July 20, 1946, every word in the GPP had been carefully considered and then passed by the council. The resulting document, he said, was unanimously supported by all government members.¹⁷ Avoiding the more contentious issues in the area of finance was certainly one way to ensure this unanimity.

The search for unanimity doubtless accounts for the program’s generality, for its ambitious optimism, and for its failure to discuss the question of implementation. While the GPP did provide a wide-ranging set of goals befitting a modernizing and democratic government, the ways and means of its implementation were uncertain. One major limitation was that the funding was subject to central government approval. For this and other reasons the coalition soon found itself struggling to realize even a small part of the program’s ambitious provisions.

The implementation of the peace agreement and the GPP was one of many problems facing the coalition. These difficulties are discussed in the

following sections. A good example of the complexity of the problems was the experience of trying to implement the provisions for elections.

Elections

In addition to the reorganization of the government and the selection of the council, the peace agreement called for elections at the county level within three months. Each County Assembly was to be elected first. These were to elect the assembly chairman and vice-chairman. One of the first tasks of these assemblies was to choose the county magistrate and his assistant, as well as a county secretary-general. The names of all those chosen were to be reported to the provincial government.

After an initial delay in which the Provincial Council was set up and the method of election decided, the regulations for the coming elections were finally announced on September 1, 1946, following the decision of the council on August 27, at its eighth session.¹⁸ Two of the most important provisions covering the elections were for universal suffrage for both men and women and the use of the secret ballot.

The qualifications for county assemblymen included in the published election regulations were very general, allowing nonlocal residents to run for posts that were supposed to represent the particular interests of the county. The eight qualifications simply stated that candidates could be of any nationality, of any religion, and residents of any county; they could be male or female but had to support the Republic of China, be literate in one language, support the peace agreement and the GPP, and, finally, be over twenty-five and under forty-five years of age.¹⁹

One of the most important functions of the County Assembly was to be the election of a representative to the Provincial Assembly. The Provincial Assembly, attended by indirectly elected representatives, would therefore supposedly reflect the various nationalities in the region in proportion to population. All of the elective offices were to be held for two-year terms. Representatives could not be reelected, and they were not paid.

The first step in the election process was the appointment of Election Supervisory Committees at the district and county levels. At the district level, the committees were headed by Han Chinese or by national minorities fluent in Chinese and with previous experience in government. The ethnic composition of the district and county committees is given in [tables 7](#) and [8](#). Although national minority members dominated at both levels, the

committees included many individuals who had traditionally allied themselves to the Chinese as well at least one Han Chinese on most committees.

The supervisory work of the committees began in September. The actual county elections themselves were spread over a three-month period due to problems of organization, logistics, and, in several cases, violent encounters between election personnel and local nationalities distrustful of any representative of the government in Urumqi.

Criticism of the election procedures was quick to surface. People in the Ili area objected to the need to submit a name list to the provincial government as a prerequisite to holding the formal elections. The *Revolutionary East Turkestan Daily* editorialized: “We are certainly not opposed to the elections! On the contrary, we ardently welcome them, but we want to be able to elect our supporters, without a name list to limit us.”²⁰

Table 7
District-Level Election Supervisory Committees

District	Chairman (Nationality)	Han members	National minority members
Urumqi	Burhan Shahidi (Tatar)	3	4
Yining	Liu Mengchun (Han)	–	5
Kashgar	Abdul Kerim Erbana (Uighur)	1	4
Aksu	Unclear	–	5
Tacheng	Zhen Luhua (Sibo)	2	5
Ashan	Janimhan (Kazak)	–	5
Hetian (Khotan)	Liu Xiaohan (Han)	1	3
Yenki	Ardeni (Mongol)	1	4
Hami	Liu (unclear) (Han)	1	3
Yarkand	Liu Qingxiu (Han)	2	22
Total		11	60

Source: Xinjiang Daily, September 17, 1946, p. 3.

Table 8

County-Level Election Supervisory Committees

District	Number of counties reported	Han members	National minority members	District total
Urumqi	10 of 12	23	25	48
Yining	1 of 11	0	5	5
Kashgar	5 of 9	3	22	25
Aksu	5 of 10	1	23	24
Hetian (Khotan)	2 of 7	1	9	10
Yenki	4 of 8	2	13	15
Hami	2 of 2	2	8	10
Yarkand	4 of 4	0	20	20
Total	33 of 63	32	125	157

Source: Xinjiang Daily, November 2, 1946, p. 3.

In addition to such criticism, several violent incidents occurred in the process of organizing the elections. The most serious of these allegedly occurred in southern Xinjiang. On an unspecified date, a serious incident occurred in the city of Kuche. Turki allegations, later supported by Ahmet Jan Kasimi, were that Chinese troops surrounded the field in which elections were being held and twice opened fire with rifles and machine guns. As a result, four people were killed and seven or eight wounded. The incident was quoted to British Consul Graham as the supreme example of Chinese interference in the elections and was presented as conclusive proof of the necessity of removing the Chinese from Xinjiang. Chinese leaders, when asked about the allegations, refused either to confirm or to deny them, leading to speculation that there may well have been some truth to the charges.

Another serious incident occurred in the north on October 16, 1946, when the Emin County election committee chairman, Tuyuze, and his assistant were shot and killed. Later press coverage of the incident revealed that the same area had been the site of earlier killings. Some thirty Han Chinese refugees who were returning to Xinjiang from refuge in the USSR had also reportedly died in the same locale in the late summer.²¹

The government appointed a committee to investigate, but no results were ever announced publicly. One explanation of what happened was that the election committee was known to be pro-Chinese, and when it reached the Emin area an Altai group, who were presumably Kazak, had demanded that it be searched for weapons. When the chairman refused, he and his assistant were killed in the ensuing fight.²²

Election supervisors sent by Urumqi to other areas also encountered difficulties. In November, the supervisors in Yenki requested that they be allowed to return to the capital because they were unable to complete their work due to “poor communication” in the area. They asked that the government appoint a new supervisory staff as they wished to be relieved of their duties.²³

Tacheng District was also the site of trouble. The committee sent there also requested permission to return, since in their area not even a draft list of county representatives had been drawn up, and it was by then already December.²⁴ Prior to their request, Salis, the Kazak who was serving as assistant secretary-general in the provincial government, made a personal visit to check on the election process there. In November, local authorities had had to put him into protective custody for a period of time.²⁵ Officials who had accompanied him were not molested, however.

During the winter of 1946–1947, Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra visited the southern part of Xinjiang and subsequently reported that the military had not permitted elections in one district, and that five other duly elected magistrates had been prevented from assuming their offices by Han Chinese civil and military officials who were aided by “reactionary” Moslems. At Hetian (Khotan) he reported that the Chinese military had killed civilians.

As a result of such problems, elections were never completed in some areas of the province. The incomplete results, given in [table 9](#), show that ethnic minorities were elected at a ratio of 3:1 at the county level.

[Table 9](#)

Xinjiang Province 1946 Election Results

District	Number counties reported	County Assemblymen		County Chair and Magistrate		County Representative to Province			
		Han	Vice- Chair Min.	Han	Min.	Han	Min.	Han	Min.
Urumqi	12 of 12	59	87	14	10	8	4	7	5
Yining	10 of 11	0	140	0	20	0	10	0	10
Kashgar	0 of 9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Aksu	3 of 10	1	12	1	5	–	–	–	–
Tacheng	6 of 6	0	30	0	12	0	6	0	6
Ashan	0 of 7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Khotan	0 of 7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Yenki	4 of 8	0	38	–	6	1	3	–	3
Hami	3 of 3	8	17	–	3	1	2	2	1
Yarkand	1 of 4	–	–	–	2	–	1	0	1
Total	39 of 77	68	324	15	58	10	26	9	26

Source: Xinjiang Daily, November 21, December 17 and 18, 1946, p. 3.

Notes: Elections were reportedly held in Kashgar and Khotan, but no results are available. Zhang Dajun contends that no elections were ever held in the district of Ashan due to the interference of Osman Batur. No election results for that district were reported in the press. See Zhang Dajun, *Seventy Years*, 12:7170–71, on election problems.

It is difficult to draw conclusions as to how representative of the local population those elected were. Certainly, some were part of the local nobility, traditionally allied to the Chinese. The county heads in Urumqi and Hami districts, for example, were “native” but were known to be pro-Chinese, and most were of noble birth.²⁶

Voting, which was supposed to be by secret ballot, had been done in some districts at public meetings, votes being cast by show of hands. This offered the opportunity for Chinese to ensure the election of pro-Chinese officials in the seven districts, according to one observer.²⁷ Moreover, in southern Xinjiang, provincial Vice-Chairman Ahmet and Minister of Reconstruction Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra accused local military and police units of having interfered in the elections by beatings, breaking up of

meetings, and imprisoning teachers and students. At the same time, however, Ahmet agreed that the holding of elections was one positive result of the coalition government. He wrote that there had been “serious struggle” at the time of the elections, but the people had chosen those they wanted as leaders.²⁸

Other members of the government also expressed satisfaction with the elections. In an interview, Wang Cengshan, minister of administration, said he was proud that “backward” Xinjiang was the first place in China where popular self-government was developing.²⁹

Considering the uniqueness of the situation and the newness of the government at this point, the elections appeared to have gone off quite well. Not only did they result in the appearance of some new faces in official posts, but they also served to raise the general political consciousness of the region’s population, since publicity on the elections and their objectives reached even remote areas of Xinjiang. The elections also served to familiarize many Moslems with the new Turki leaders in the provincial government, as the Ili representatives Seyfettin and Ahmet, in particular, made numerous public appearances during the months of election.

Zhang Zhizhong's Administration:

Major Problems, Attempted Solutions

Head of the Coalition Provincial Government from July 1946 to May 1947, Zhang Zhizhong needed diplomatic skills as he sought to lead the coalition in a way acceptable to both the central government and local factions. An astute diplomat and keen observer, Zhang clearly identified the areas of greatest tension and potential disagreement in the province and spoke convincingly to the central government of the need for immediate reform. Some members of the central government were by no means in agreement on the necessity for a prolonged conciliatory policy in the Northwest, and Zhang's presence undoubtedly served as a brake on them and on certain ambitious militarists in Nanjing and Xinjiang who did not share his views on the need for greater participation in government by the national minorities.

In Xinjiang itself, Zhang had the further difficult task of soothing often ruffled relations between the Han and local Moslems. Pursuing the policy "unity of nationalities," Zhang was not always successful in the realm of national minority relations, but his efforts did earn him a personal reputation in the region for forthrightness and sincerity.³⁰

In addition to acting as conciliator, Zhang had to deal with other major political and administrative problems. The eight areas of concern he identified demonstrate the enormity of the problems confronting not only the government but also the lives of the people of the province. These problems were finances, unemployment, corruption, military discipline, appointment of delegates to the National Assembly, Ashan members of the government, implementation of the peace agreement and the GPP, and the question of the "East Turkestan Republic."³¹ All of these problems represented major threats to the continuation of the fragile coalition. In the background was always Zhang's attempt to establish "unity of nationalities." It will be helpful to look first at Zhang's visit to the Ili valley in August 1946, as well as his efforts to ease tension between Han and Moslems in the capital city.

The Ili Visit

In the initial, hopeful atmosphere that permeated the capital during the first few months of coalition rule, Zhang made repeated calls for unity within the new provincial government and for the support of all nationalities for its policies. He was joined in this call by various local Moslem leaders, including members of the Ili faction, who spoke publicly of the need for united support for this newest attempt to bring real “people’s government” to Xinjiang.

As indicated previously, however, there were obstacles to such unity inherent in the coalition system itself. Distrust, fear of eventual military domination by the other factions, and general unrest caused by the economic situation and political reorganization were problems particularly resistant to solution. Further, the three Ili districts remained cut off from the rest of the province, with transport and communication remaining at a standstill during the second half of 1946.

In an effort to demonstrate to the people of the province that unity was possible, the government announced plans to resume normal traffic to Yining from Urumqi. First, the partially destroyed bridge over the Manas River had to be repaired; then road construction on the main route to Yining was to begin.³²

Plans were also made in July 1946 for a series of visits to the Ili valley by various officials. Although Zhang himself was personally anxious to demonstrate renewal of open communications with the three districts, he was not the first member of the new government to visit the region. Rather, the first to make the journey was Mesut Sabri, the new inspector-general of the province, who was given permission to visit his home town of Yining; he left the capital on July 23, the purpose of his visit ostensibly being to visit his son, who, like his father, was a medical doctor.³³ It is probable that Mesut also went to prepare the way for Zhang’s visit, to assure the provincial authorities that Zhang would be civilly if not cordially welcomed. He was also doubtless collecting information for the provincial government, assessing the situation and its possible future implications for the Chinese during his stay, which, in the end, was extended to several months.

In Urumqi, Mesut's visit was not accorded a great deal of publicity; nor were the visits to Ili in August by the Soviet consul general stationed in Urumqi. When Zhang finally visited Yining himself, however, a series of reports in the *Xinjiang Daily* gave details of the visit, and pictures of his arrival at Yining's Airambek Airport were later published in the *Tianshan Pictorial*.³⁴

Accompanied by provincial Secretary-General Liu Mengchun and a party of twenty, including central government representatives and newspaper reporters, Zhang left Urumqi on August 28, flying in the Sino-Soviet airline's plane that had previously carried the Ili delegates to the peace negotiations. Among those greeting him at the airport in Yining were local government representatives and Soviet Consul-General Tubashenyev. After what was described by the press as a "rousing welcome," Zhang went into the city and later attended several meetings. The first of these, at 7 P.M., was with Tubashenyev and Yining's most important military leaders. Later he met with other local city officials and county heads who had gathered in the city to meet him.³⁵

There is no available official record of these private meetings, but on September 2, Zhang addressed a crowd in Yining's West Park, details of which were reported in the *Xinjiang Daily*. Zhang again appealed for unity, asking for the support of all the people in carrying out the terms of the peace agreement and the GPP.³⁶ He reiterated the four aims of the new government as being continued friendship between China and the Soviet Union, preservation of the unity of the nation, realization of democracy, and strengthening the solidarity of various races in Xinjiang. He was careful to point out, too, that he and Ahmet Jan Kasimi had worked together "like brothers" to forge a new government. He also emphasized the need for continued close Sino-Soviet friendship, cultural exchanges, and trade—especially with the peoples of Soviet Central Asia.³⁷

On September 3, he inspected the two towns of Xinertai and Xuexuesi where, according to news reports, he was warmly welcomed. On the 4th he returned to Urumqi carrying with him pledges of support for the new government from the Ili people.³⁸

In the eyes of some local Moslems, the implications of Zhang's visit were that the Chinese-dominated provincial government would now reassert itself

in the three districts; the July declaration that the road would be opened had caused much concern—so much so that Ahmet was called upon to soothe such fears. In a September 1946 speech in Yining to the Uzbek Summer Club, he said:

It is clear from your questions that you are uneasy because we have opened the road, and demobilized our troops while on the other side there is an ever greater number of troops, defenses are not demolished, old officials remain at their posts, Chinese families are migrating to Urumqi, and so on; and you fear that they have deceived us and may start an offensive. In my opinion, you have no grounds for such conclusions. You can live in peace since we, your representatives, are members of the provincial government.³⁹

Although the speech is critical in tone, Ahmet was at least clear in offering his personal opinion that the opening of the road should not constitute a threat. Reaction to his remarks in Yining may have been temporarily positive, but traffic on the route between the three districts and the rest of Xinjiang remained restricted until early 1947, and even at that time the traffic was primarily one-way and consisted of White Russians anxious to escape the three districts (see [chapter 7](#)). In fact, because of distrust—and because of fears of Chinese resurgence in the three districts—full communications and free travel with the Ili area were never restored, despite Zhang's efforts in Yining in September 1946.

Another visitor also reached Yining that fall. Walter Graham, the British consul stationed in Urumqi, had applied to visit the area. After an initial refusal by Chinese authorities, he was given permission in early September to take the overland route to Yining. Leaving the capital on September 3, he drove via the town of Manas, which remained the unofficial border between the three districts and the rest of Xinjiang. He arrived in Yining later than anticipated, on the evening of the 13th, because of mechanical difficulties with his vehicle. During his week-long visit, Graham had an opportunity to wander through the town, noting that life seemed quiet and ordinary, with markets busy as usual. He saw no sign of overt Soviet occupation in the city, and a number of Chinese appeared on the streets, dispelling claims that all Chinese in the area had been killed the previous winter.⁴⁰

Graham's opinion that the Soviets were involved in some way in the Ili rebellion remained unchanged, but he could not establish one way or the other the presence of Soviet Russians in the government, or of Soviet troops outside the Ili valley.

The visits mentioned above were certainly part of Zhang's efforts to show the people of Xinjiang—and of China proper—that “unity” had indeed returned to Xinjiang. These officially sanctioned visits, however, did not represent a resumption of “normal” traffic to the area by any means, and the fiction of normalized relations was obvious to nearly all observers by the end of the year.

The Call for “Unity of Nationalities”

During the new government’s initial six months in power, Zhang and other members of his new government spoke publicly of the need for unity and cooperation. Assurances were offered in turn to Han Chinese, to local Moslems, and to residents of the Ili area in an attempt to foster a spirit of unity among all local inhabitants.

In July, four major contributions to this theme were made, all of which referred repeatedly to the need for unity and cooperation among nationalities. On July 16, Vice-Chairman Burhan spoke for two hours to the Uighur Literary Society in Urumqi. Addressing an audience of some one thousand people, he appealed to local Uighurs to support their new government and extolled the virtues of the GPP, which, if fully implemented, would bring a new life to the troubled region.⁴¹ Two days later, when Xinjiang’s new chief of staff, General Song Xilian, took up his post, he echoed Burhan’s call.⁴²

Less than a week later, another speech was delivered to the Urumqi City Council by Moslem representative Niyaz Haji. Niyaz was the name of a leading princely family in Xinjiang, members of which had been involved in the 1933 East Turkestan Republic; a plea from a member of this family for national unity was probably expected to attract greater support from the local Moslem population.⁴³

The day after the Niyaz speech appeared in the local press, Urumqi Garrison Commander Chen Defa, Mayor Chu Wu, and Police Chief Liu Handong, jointly signed an article in the *Xinjiang Daily* that blamed current problems on “past errors” in Xinjiang’s history and on general contradictions in society.⁴⁴ As in the speeches, the three asked for the support of the general population and for unity among all of Xinjiang’s nationalities. But they also referred to a “small minority” who had taken “mistaken actions,” and they declared that in the future such acts were to be prohibited. They named specifically the formation of gangs, causing chaos, and destroying others’ freedom or legal rights as prohibited acts.

In August 1946, no less a personage than Yu Youren, president of the Control Yuan, was quoted in two articles in the *Xinjiang Daily* on the same theme,⁴⁵ and in the same month another important speech by Zhang

Zhizhong was published. Aimed mainly at the Han Chinese, Zhang's speech admonished the local Chinese for their criticism of his policies. He told them that "To give way is not to surrender; patience is not shameful."⁴⁶ He made a plea that sounded rather like a Chinese version of the White Man's Burden, declaring that the Han must remember their role as "older brother" to their "younger brothers" in Xinjiang.⁴⁷

The call for unity was not confined to official channels in Urumqi. In Yining, too, the cause of unity was expounded and publicized. The speech that Zhang made in Yining on September 2 was reported locally, as was the speech by Vice-Chairman Ahmet Jan Kasimi, which had received the audience's enthusiastic applause. Especially long applause had greeted his description of the armed struggle of Ili valley residents "for the rights of our people." In veiled references to anticoalition forces in the region, Ahmet declared that "traitors in our midst" should be ousted, and that all people should rally to support the new government. He stated that the Ili area had rebelled only to secure its lawful rights guaranteed under the Chinese constitution—and because "the seventeenth-century conditions" in Xinjiang were no longer tolerable. In the new era opening to the people of the region, he asked for support and unity, echoing the rhetoric of the Chinese members of government, albeit spiced with references to the accomplishments of the Turkic people in forcing the government to implement revolutionary changes in the province.⁴⁸

As attention turned to the election process in September and October 1946, fewer speeches calling for unity were made, but from late October through November, government personalities continued to address the same theme.⁴⁹ The provincial daily frequently editorialized on this topic, and periodically speeches by well-known minority personalities were featured.⁵⁰ It is noteworthy, however, that pleas for unity now accompanied articles on disorder or on new government regulations aimed at maintaining law and order in the capital. The November 11 report in the *Xinjiang Daily* on the Emin murders carried such a plea, as did a November 19 article on guarantees for the free movement of people within the province.⁵¹

By December, when it was clear that the elections would not be completed for some time and that disturbances caused by anticoalition forces were intensifying rather than decreasing, such references all but

stopped in the local press. The wording of government directives took on a harsher tone, declaring that the law would be obeyed and that any persons acting illegally could expect severe punishment. Government hopes of promoting some kind of unity within the province to support the new government did not die, but in the winter of 1946–1947 the harder line of men like Song Xilian was finding a larger and larger audience, not only among disaffected Han but also among those local Turks who feared a resurgence of Soviet power and influence in Xinjiang due to Zhang's conciliatory line.

While preoccupation with a theme is not necessarily an indication of sincerity or even of dedication to such an ideal, in this instance Zhang and other members of the new coalition government knew the necessity of “unity” for the continuation of their still fragile coalition. Without a strong measure of unity—meaning popular, unified support for the new government and its policies—the people of the region faced further bloodshed and would inevitably fall even further behind in economic development. Politically, all factions in Xinjiang stood to gain, in the short run at least, from the arrangement that offered a much needed period of stability for the region. Thus the “unity” called for by Chinese and local leaders was more than a political slogan. Ahmet had stated that the rights his people were determined to secure were those now guaranteed in the peace agreement and the GPP, tacitly agreeing that Xinjiang was part of China. The implication was that, for the time being at least, the area of Xinjiang was Chinese, and through political unity the population would secure basic human rights called for in the Chinese constitution.

During the initial months of the coalition government, the collective membership appears to have been sincere in its belief that the coalition was, in the short term at least, a workable alternative to past forms of government in the region. In November 1946 foreign observers remarked on the evident good will and sincerity apparent among Moslem and non-Moslem members of the government who were to attend the National Assembly in Nanjing in December 1946.⁵² Nonetheless, it was also clear that different factions had quite different expectations for the implementation of the agreement. The Chinese, having yielded for the first time to such wide-ranging reforms in a minority area, expected good will and cooperation from the new minority

members of the provincial government. But it became clear that reforms would not take place overnight, and national minority expectations of rapid change were quickly disappointed. For instance, it was expected that Chinese officials would be replaced with local Moslems in many government posts and in the police, but change in these areas was slow to come, and proportional representation never reached the level envisaged by the Moslem members of government. As Zhang was well aware, even if he had been able to find qualified local people to replace Han Chinese officials, he would be left with a large number of unemployed Han, further exacerbating poor relations between local Chinese and Moslems. Even the provisions for education in local languages were difficult to fulfill, given the limited number of qualified local people to fill positions in educational institutions.

Calls for unity could not mask the enormity of the problems of implementation of the peace agreement and the GPP. High expectations coupled with the reality of Xinjiang's poor economic situation and lack of educated, qualified native personnel to step into government posts were inevitable causes of friction in both government and society as a whole. Furthermore, the local non-Han population was well aware of the extent of the loss of face the concessions by the Chinese entailed; buoyed by a new spirit of victory over traditional foes, a new sense of Turkic power made itself felt in Xinjiang in the summer and autumn of 1946.

A New Sense of “Turkic Power”

In what for many Turks was a heady atmosphere of new political opportunity, the first few months of the coalition also saw the emergence of a new Turkic sense of power within their traditional homeland. Excited over what was perceived as a victory over the Chinese, local Turks set out to make resident Han Chinese aware of their minority status in the region. Beginning with the anti-Chinese riots on the first day of the new government’s official business, small outbursts of anti-Han sentiment exploded periodically during the first months of coalition government. The unavenged murders of the first day of coalition rule were still in the minds of Han Chinese when, on July 29, a Chinese airline official, Jin Xuedong, was murdered.⁵³ When two Turkic suspects in the murder were finally arrested on October 21, a mob gathered at the prison demanding their release. After the crowd guaranteed to produce the two later for trial, they were set free on bail.⁵⁴

Outside the capital itself, Han Chinese were also suffering from the new Turkic sense of power. Early August saw anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet riots in Kashgar, where police were called out to disperse rioters. Later that month in Turfan, south of the provincial capital, disturbances occurred that were calmed only after a personal visit from Vice-Chairman Burhan.⁵⁵

Such events, coupled with Zhang’s policy of compromise and conciliation toward national minorities, caused increasing concern among Chinese in the capital and elsewhere. Han Chinese saw their dominant role in Xinjiang affairs being threatened and began pressing the Chinese members of the government to look after their interests in the region.

Han Chinese Unrest

As the early months passed and the incidents involving Han Chinese and local Moslems increased rather than diminished, Han resistance to Zhang's conciliatory policies built and gradually came to focus on two issues: the plan for redistribution of jobs in the government to include progressively more national minorities in government employment; and the loss of authority by Han Chinese and by China itself through constant concessions to national minority demands.

With regard to the first issue, the coalition government had acted quickly to include more national minorities in government. In only a month, 30 percent of Han in provincial-level posts had reportedly been replaced, as had 40 percent of Han officials at the district and county levels.⁵⁶ Many of the displaced officials were probably assigned other duties, but Zhang was aware of what he called unemployment among the Han, a problem he discussed at length in his October speech.

In addition to the Chinese officials displaced by national minorities, Han refugees from the three districts also crowded into Urumqi. Between August and December 1946, some thirteen thousand refugees arrived in the provincial capital.⁵⁷ Considerable financial aid was given to these people, but their presence added to tensions in the city.⁵⁸

Late in August the provincial government issued a six-point directive to those Han Chinese who remained in their posts. All government and military officials in the area were required to dedicate themselves to the government policy of reconciliation. Certain long-standing abuses against the people were to end. For example, military discipline was to be improved in an effort to curtail some of the most serious abuses, such as the confiscation of property and supplies from local merchants without payment. Punishment for any such abuses was to be severe, according to the directive.⁵⁹

Further important measures dealing with government employees were announced in a directive on November 25.⁶⁰ This time the intention was to ensure proportionate national minority representation in local government. The policy was to take effect on January 1, 1947. The most important aspect of this directive was that it called for a fixed ratio of Han to national

minorities in government of 50:50 within six months and a ratio of 70:30, the new minority being the Han, thereafter. All nationalities would be included in this ratio system, but Han technicians and other specialists were excluded. The Chinese authorities thus preserved the option of bringing in numerous Han “experts” under this clause. This directive was also an attempt to improve the quality of government officials. A test would be given to existing officials to weed out those who were incapable; the latter would be replaced by locally born people. Training for all officials from county level down would be compulsory, and after training the officials could be sent elsewhere in China to work if no positions were available in Xinjiang itself.

There is no record of the number of Han who lost their government posts as a result of the new system. The intended ratio of 70:30 was never realized, however, mainly because a relatively small number of qualified local Moslems existed at the time. All the same, the threat implicit in the new regulations upset resentful local Han who were suddenly faced with reverse discrimination after years of domination.

The loss of Chinese prestige in Xinjiang was a second source of Han unrest. Many Chinese attributed the numerous incidents of Turki-Han confrontation throughout the region to Zhang’s “soft policy” toward the local population. Although as long as Zhang was in the region most Chinese officials professed support for him and his line, as soon as he left on a visit to the national capital, demonstrations exploded in Urumqi, illustrating the extent of Han resentment against continued concessions to minorities.

The chief spokesman for the anticonciliatory faction within Xinjiang was General Song Xilian. Only a month after the new government was organized, he confided to the British consul in Kashgar that although any “unlawful interference” by Chinese with the native population would be severely punished, the government was not prepared to go beyond the concessions already given to the people of Xinjiang and would “rigorously suppress any further disorder or sedition.”⁶¹ It was while Song was the ranking official in Xinjiang and during Zhang’s absence that the February 1947 riots occurred in Urumqi. Song was finally transferred from the region in 1948, reportedly because of his hard-line views.⁶²

Zhang Zhizhong's Assessment of Xinjiang's Problems

In addition to dealing with Han and Turkic discontent, Zhang Zhizhong had to face other problems in the region. In late October 1948, he addressed a special meeting in Urumqi attended by over a thousand representatives of Xinjiang's nationalities. His speech concerned eight major problem areas facing Xinjiang, which he identified as finances, unemployment, military discipline, representation at the upcoming National Assembly, the Ashan members of government, implementation of the peace agreement, and the question of the East Turkestan Republic.⁶³ As these eight problems represented the major challenges to the coalition as well as to the continuation of the Chinese role in Xinjiang, it is worth dealing with the speech in some detail. First, Zhang's comments on each point are briefly summarized, followed by an attempt to place them in perspective and to clarify the issues involved.

Finance: Provincial Issuance of Money

After noting that the rising prices in the region were affecting everyone's lives, Zhang told his audience that they were partly responsible for their own plight due to their unreasonable opposition to the issuance of more provincial currency, especially in new large denominations of Xn \$200 and Xn \$500 bills. As a result of local objections, the proposed Xn \$500 bill would not be printed, but the Xn \$200 bill would have to be issued. He asked the people how, if no money was printed, the government would pay its many bills. He reminded them that one reason there was little money in the provincial treasury was that taxes for half of 1946 had been remitted by the central government at his request.

Zhang also sought to reply to local objections to the government's shipment of 500,000 ounces of gold and 50,000 ounces of silver back to Nanjing as a "reserve" for the Xinjiang dollar. This reserve, said Zhang, was necessary if trade was to continue between Xinjiang, which had its own independent currency, and the rest of China. Without it, he asked, how could the government exchange Cn \$5 for Xn \$1? Furthermore, he stated, the entire provincial budget was being subsidized by the central government, and the total value of financial support far exceeded the value of the gold and silver that had been sent to the capital.

With the resurgence of Nationalist presence in 1944, inflation had become a major problem in the region, with prices steadily climbing. Examples of the increasing price of staples are seen in [table 10](#). By 1948 the government fixed prices in an effort at stabilization.

Although there were certainly local objections to printing more Xinjiang dollars, in the view of the general population a more difficult problem was the fixed rate of exchange enforced by the central government, a parity of Cn \$5 to Xn \$1. The Nationalists officially maintained this rate until 1949, despite the incredible inflation being experienced in China proper. As the Nationalist currency decreased in value, it took more and more Xinjiang dollars to buy goods imported from China.

One serious consequence was felt by the military, who were supposed to be supplied by local traders and herdsman. As these transactions involved payment in Cn\$, local food suppliers increasingly resisted selling their

produce to the army. Sometimes this caused shortages of supplies in the garrisons; as a result, local Turki merchants were forced to sell at a loss to the military, leading to further ill will and deteriorating Han-Turki relations in garrison towns. Furthermore, the effects of sending increasing numbers of Chinese troops to the region were to heighten inflation and also to frighten the local population into believing that there would soon be food shortages in Xinjiang. The local people considered the two phenomena— inflation and military presence—to be closely related.⁶⁴ Zhang did not mention either the relationship between these factors or the people’s fears of food shortages. Nor did he relate the need to print more of the Xinjiang currency to the military presence. As the local population believed that this additional issue of provincial currency would benefit the Chinese more than the Turki, they naturally objected to increased money production.

Table 10
Food Price Inflation, 1946–1948

	Flour price per jin, in Cn\$
April 1945	1,000
October 1946	24,000
November 1946	38,000
January 1947	50–55,000
December 1948	120,000
	Wheat price per charack (20 lb), in Xn\$
July 1947	3,000
September 1947	6,000
November 1947	8,000
January 1948	16,000
April 1948	40,000
November 1948	Almost impossible to buy

Source: IOR L/P&S/12/2405 file 12, 62, Graham, Urumqi, December 4, 1946, and January 4, 1947.

One group that did benefit from the financial situation was the merchants who were selling Xinjiang native products to China proper. As they paid

only Cn \$5 for Xn \$1 of goods, their profits increased with inflation.⁶⁵

Zhang also neglected to mention the sensitive issue of the Xinjiang Native Products Co. This organization had been set up by Sheng Shicai as a quasi-government trading company handling local products such as wool, skins, and animal hair and also running a number of government-owned factories. It had become the monopoly of the government officials who ran it basically for their own and Sheng's benefit. As a result, Zhang dissolved the company, but winding up its affairs took several months. It was replaced by the Chi Ye Trading Company in the autumn of 1946, but as this "new" entity was run by virtually the same officials who had run its predecessor, it suffered from the same problems and was criticized by local Moslems as being too exploitative.⁶⁶ This company was in turn replaced by a new Native Products Trading Company, with Zhang on the board of directors. This was no guarantee of correct management, however, and by 1948 this company, too, was involved in a corruption scandal.⁶⁷

Zhang did mention heavy central government subsidies to the province, which were in fact sizable. Nearly half of this money, however, went to support the local military and police establishments. According to the provincial budget for 1945, the two largest items of expenditure were the security police, which received Xn \$657 million, and the provision of "public foodstuffs" (meaning subsidized imports of food for government employees and the military), which consumed Xn \$1,102 million. Together these two items accounted for 47 percent of the Xn \$3.7 billion provincial budget in 1945.⁶⁸ In the circumstance, it is not surprising that the local people felt they derived little benefit from the central government's financial support to the province.

Unemployment

According to Zhang's speech, there was unemployment among all of Xinjiang's nationalities. He stated that this was an area in which the government intended to help. Initial steps included the previously mentioned plan to divide government jobs among Han and other national minorities, gradually reaching a ratio of 70:30 in favor of local nationalities. As the GPP was implemented, Zhang assured his audience, more and more opportunities would become available within the region so that no talented person would be without a job. There would be, he claimed, opportunity for all to help with the development of the "new" Xinjiang.

As it was primarily Han Chinese who were being threatened with unemployment due to the new proposed ratio system, Zhang's comments in this section were aimed chiefly at them. Not only was he trying to reassure Han in government posts that they would have a future in the province; he was also addressing the Han refugees who had entered the capital in search of security and government support.

Together, both groups of Han were pressing Zhang to look after their interests, and his conciliatory approach was bringing criticism from bureaucrats afraid of losing lucrative government posts and from Han Chinese hoping for government jobs or government assistance to compensate for their losses in the period of rebellion. Zhang was attempting to reply to the aggrieved Han without backing down from promises to introduce the proportionate employment of all nationalities in government. But Han unrest continued to build in the provincial capital, so that by the time the January 1, 1947, deadline for the first changes had passed, the employment issue had been added to the Chinese list of grievances and contributed to the rioting that took place in February 1947 (see [chapter 6](#)).

Corruption

Zhang reminded his audience that he had asked for and received central government authority to use martial law to deal with corruption as, in his opinion, the local civil courts were unable to handle the work load of cases. He urged the public to report all cases of corruption to the government, which would act to put an end to all government and military corruption in the region. He mentioned some of the cases with which the government had summarily dealt; all involved Han Chinese, and in all cases the officials had been executed for their crimes.

Corruption had been an intrinsic part of the operation of government in the region, bribery being the fastest and simplest way of ensuring action or, depending on the case, inaction from government officials. Since his appointment as chairman of the province in April 1946, Zhang had been seriously working on the problem of corruption. Although he did not mention his spring crusade against it in his speech, Zhang had moved against a major cause of corruption in the region in May and June 1946. In June and July he had opium and other drugs burned publicly in front of government offices, and strict regulations were passed against all government officials who continued to use the drug.⁶⁹ As drug traffic had been a part of the corrupt practices of many government officials, Zhang's attack on the trade as well as on its addicts was a public demonstration of his intention to fight corruption seriously.

In July 1946, Zhang had indeed requested permission to use martial law. In his original request, he stated that corruption in Xinjiang occurred at high and low levels of government, and that the majority of the offenders were Han Chinese. This situation, he wrote, touched off conflict between the nationalities. The thousands of cases that he knew existed had, in his opinion, to be dealt with immediately. As the local judicial system was slow and many officials under investigation continued to work at their posts, public confidence in the government was being undermined. Therefore, he asked for and was granted permission to use martial law.⁷⁰

Despite what certainly seemed to be sincere efforts by Zhang to stamp out corruption, it remained a major problem. It was so much a part of business and government that it defied any real solution. A good example of

this is seen in the way military supplies were purchased for local military garrisons. The local magistrate (*xiangbao zhang* or *xiangzhang*) was in theory supposed to handle the purchasing of supplies, as a go-between for the military and local merchants. However, he reportedly often was able to pocket the money given him for the supplies, telling the military later that the goods had been lost, stolen, or just “disappeared.” As Zhang himself knew, the opportunity to make money in this and other ways was so great that the local magistrate usually paid Xn \$20,000–30,000 for the privilege of holding the post, knowing that he would recover his costs in two or three months.⁷¹

Another form of corruption related to this abuse of power occurred when the garrisons ran short of food and new supplies were not forthcoming. Soldiers would go personally to demand goods from local merchants, telling them that payment would be made later, or in installments, but such payments rarely materialized.

In December 1946, the provincial government issued specific orders to end such abuses. The military was officially prohibited from purchasing goods directly from merchants. Instead, all goods were to be purchased through proper channels, and underpaying and buying on credit were both prohibited.⁷² The government hoped that such measures would also end the increasingly frequent attacks on military supply lines within the province, a phenomenon that increased with colder winter weather and higher food prices.⁷³ However, neither Zhang’s assault on corruption nor the new laws on military purchasing ended abuses; both problems remained a nagging thorn in the government’s side.

Han Chinese were not the only ones involved in corrupt practices. Many local “begs”—nobility tracing hereditary titles back many centuries—had long been used to representing the Chinese and were accustomed to collecting local taxes and otherwise administering local government, all of which offered opportunities to collect money for themselves. For instance, in Kashgar, when food was purchased for the local garrison, four times the quantity was forcibly purchased at one-tenth the market price. The extra three-fourths was set aside for the local beg and the military authority concerned; although a certain amount of graft was expected, this was “a margin of profit considered excessive by local producers.”⁷⁴

County-level corruption included the common practice of destroying tax records so that the county tax collector could collect tax twice or more in the same district. The county head and other officials expected big birthday celebrations, and the county head often considered money set aside for the county budget as being for his personal use.⁷⁵ Ticket sellers and officials who issued government travel permits continued to collect extra fees, and stories about rapacious Chinese officials circulated throughout the seven districts still under Nationalist control.⁷⁶

While stories of bribery and corruption could not be proven, many local people in Xinjiang believed them to be true, and, by association, all Chinese in government were tainted. Zhang himself, however, maintained his reputation as a reformer. Even after he was transferred from the province, both minority members of his government and the general population considered him to have been an honest official.

It should be kept in mind that abuses associated with corruption were long standing, and a degree of “squeeze” was expected—and accepted—by the local population. Complaints against corrupt officials did not, for instance, figure prominently in demands for government reform. Given the rate of pay accorded to most officials, squeeze was perhaps a necessary supplement to low wages. When the corruption involved the military—a Han Chinese institution—it took on racial overtones, however, with the aggrieved party adding this abuse of power to the existing sins of the “infidel” army.

Military Discipline

Zhang stated that many people had complained to him about the problem of military discipline, and therefore he was well aware that the soldiers of the Nationalist army had on occasion harassed the local people. He asked people to remember, however, that the army was trying to keep peace in a large area, and that their task was extremely difficult. When cases of abuse were officially reported, he promised that action would be taken. He mentioned specifically one case of a Han commander who had killed a Uighur soldier; this commander, he said, had been tried, convicted, and executed. This demonstrated that the government would not tolerate such breeches of military discipline.

Complaints against the military included not only corruption, indiscriminate confiscation of supplies, and other forms of harassment of local people, but, more seriously, accusations that in many areas the local military commanders, not the duly elected officials, often represented the ultimate authority. Vice-Chairman Ahmet noted in April 1947 that people did not obey some local Moslem county heads but rather followed the instructions of the Chinese county garrison commanders.⁷⁷ This military interference in civilian government was most apparent outside of the provincial capital. Always deferred to because they held ultimate power within local districts, the garrison commanders were seen by many people as a threat to the new “democratic” rule in Xinjiang, as was the increase in Chinese troop strength, especially in southern Xinjiang.⁷⁸

It will be recalled that local people opposed the military presence because of its impact on prices and availability of goods. When Zhang visited the south of the province in the spring of 1947, he was besieged with demands that Chinese troops be withdrawn—for economic as well as political reasons.⁷⁹ Although the provincial government declared that the number of troops had been reduced, the number had actually increased in some areas, particularly in the south, where the government anticipated further trouble.⁸⁰

Problems concerning military discipline continued to escalate, despite government attempts to impose control over garrison commanders and

individual soldiers. This contributed to the pressures on the coalition government and was a principal cause of tension in the area.

Xinjiang Representatives to the National Assembly

In his speech, Zhang began by asserting that the representatives to the National Assembly were not supposed to represent the views of individuals or groups, but rather were to represent the ideas of all peoples and all nationalities in the province. According to him, thousands of names had been proposed, and under Ahmet Jan Kasimi's direction the final list of representatives had been drawn up and approved by the provincial government. Those chosen represented all nationalities, not only their own, and since most of them were government officials, Zhang called them "the logical representatives" of Xinjiang. Opposing them was opposing the government.

As for the challenges made against some of those chosen, Zhang said that it was no longer a question of whether so and so should be a representative, but rather a question of the provincial government's authority. He ended his comments on this question by saying that he did not want anyone to bring up this matter again—an admonition to both Han and national minority critics.

The provincial government's final choices had pleased few, and Zhang sought to defend the appointed delegates. Those delegates were Ahmet Jan Kasimi (Uighur, provincial vice-chairman); Isa Yusuf Alptekin (Uighur, minister without portfolio); Abdul Kerim Abbas (Uighur, deputy secretary-general); Zhao Qianfeng (Manchu, minister of social affairs); Wu Maier (Uighur); Hatije [Hatewan] (Kazak, inspector-general for Urumqi District); Zhang Fengjiu (Han); Madame Bek (probably Uighur); Ma Guoyi (Hui); Mu Qinga (Sibo from Ining); Nasir, Uighur (deputy mayor of Urumqi); and Hamid Sultan, Kazak. The vocational representatives to the National Assembly were Abdul Kerim Maksun (Uighur businessman from Yining); Karim Haji (Uighur); Dr. Artughrul Sabriog~lu (Mai Huanxin) (Uighur from Yining); Ziya (Kazak, deputy chief of police, Urumqi); Ameenah Hanim, Uighur (wife of Mehmet Emin Bug~ra); and Mesut Ahong (Uighur religious leader from Turfan).⁸¹ Of these delegates, three represented the Ili faction, including the provincial vice-chairman, Ahmet Jan Kasimi. Isa Yusuf Alptekin represented the outspoken Turkic nationalists who favored

cooperation with the Chinese as an alternative to the increase of Soviet influence in the Northwest.

Prior to the departure of the delegates for Nanjing, delegate Hatije was interviewed, and the Xinjiang press quoted her as saying, “We absolutely support national unity.”⁸² In a story released after the delegates’ departure, Isa was also quoted, saying that “Autonomy is not independence.”⁸³ The local Xinjiang papers also gave publicity to the departure of the delegates on November 11, 1946; according to press reports, the group included wives of the delegates and some unofficial members such as Mesut Sabri, the region’s inspector-general. They were later joined by Chairman Zhang, who went to discuss the general Xinjiang situation and also to participate in the Guomindang-Chinese Communist Party talks to be held early in 1947.

Han Chinese objected that the delegates chosen included too many national minority members and were led by an Ili faction member, Ahmet Jan Kasimi. Turki objections included the fact that several of the delegates were known to be pro-Chinese and their views, it was felt, did not represent the overall majority of the province.

If it was the Chinese-dominated Provincial Council’s intention to pack the delegation with ciphers, this was only a partial success. In early December, Ahmet and Isa attended a session on the draft constitution that included national minority delegates from Xinjiang, Xigang (then a part of Tibet), and the Miao areas of the Southwest. All of these minority groups were demanding autonomy for their respective nationalities and sought to have the new constitution guarantee this autonomy.

Both Ahmet and Isa spoke to the session on behalf of Xinjiang’s Turki majority, and both put forward the demand for autonomy expressed in the original peace negotiations with Zhang Zhizhong. Particularly outspoken was Isa, who “in a stirring speech...declared that unless and until the present government policy toward racial minorities in Xinjiang is radically changed, blood feuds between them and the Chinese will continue.” He further stated that the Xinjiang people were not agitating for secession or independence, but for freedom, equality, and autonomy, adding that “Xinjiang natives will not be satisfied with half and lukewarm measures.”⁸⁴ Isa called on the Nationalist government to follow Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s original proposals with regard to the self-determination of Chinese national

minorities, and to amend the constitution to assure the border areas of this right.

These outspoken remarks and demands for autonomy were not reported locally in Xinjiang. In fact, little mention was made of the delegates after the publicity that had accompanied their departure, except a notice of their return in January 1947. One reason for this must have been the speeches of Ahmet and Isa, but also important was the fact that Ahmet, in particular, returned “lukewarm” on Nanjing and was privately pessimistic about the possibility that the central government would listen to the demands for autonomy emanating from the border regions.⁸⁵

The Ashan Members of Government

As to the problem of the Ashan members of government, Zhang said he had been asked why he thought it necessary to meet with men from Ashan (specifically with Osman Batur, the Kazak leader of the Altai region), what had been discussed with them, and what the results of the discussions were. He indicated that he had invited “Mr. Osman” because he was a provincial government official and held the post of Ashan vice-chairman and inspector-general. There was, Zhang claimed, no way he could not welcome him to Urumqi for talks.

Further, Zhang told his audience that he had met with Osman once before, on which occasion Vice-Chairman Burhan was also present. At that time he had told Osman that Ashan would be included as part of the three districts during government discussions. If Osman wished this to change, then Zhang would bring this up with the two vice-chairmen and abide by their decision. Declaring his attitude toward Osman to be “straightforward,” he denied that Osman’s people were being bribed or used as mercenaries. He knew that his meeting with Osman had upset many people, but he believed his attitude to be correct in the circumstances.

The unspoken problem here was that the Altai area remained tense, primarily due to the activities of Osman and Ali Beg Hakim against the Ili group, which they had formerly supported. Varying reports put the date of Osman’s break from Ili sometime in the summer of 1946; Osman himself reportedly said it was in April 1946.⁸⁶ Whatever the exact date, the Ili coalition was split by the time of Zhang’s speech, and already the Nationalists had moved quickly to take advantage of the situation.

Rumors quickly grew that the Chinese military was arming Osman and encouraging him to oppose the Ili faction militarily. Zhang did not specifically mention this charge. But the fact that he himself had met with Osman’s representatives on two different occasions was now no longer rumor. The Nationalists were playing both sides: On the one hand, they were involved in the coalition and publicly espoused the concepts of “unity” and peace. On the other hand, the provincial chairman himself admitted that contact had been established with Osman’s Kazaks. In a region like Xinjiang where rumor preceded public acknowledgment of fact, and where

replies to delicate questions were cautiously advanced, Zhang's answers regarding Osman's meetings with him would hardly have assuaged fears of Nationalist intentions to dominate the region through whatever means available.

Implementation of the Peace Treaty

The seventh problem was the implementation of the peace agreement, especially the accusation that the government was dragging its heels. Zhang used this opportunity to reiterate the government's efforts to implement the treaty fully. Government noncompliance was just a slogan, he insisted, and he pointed to the various aspects of the agreement that had already been carried out: the elections were in progress; there was freedom of speech, assembly, and publication; and the new government itself, as called for in the treaty, was in operation. He admitted some shortcomings but pointed out that implementation was the mutual responsibility of Ahmet and himself. If he had not fulfilled the treaty, then neither had Ahmet, as both were jointly responsible.

Although some aspects of the agreement had of course been carried out, as Zhang outlined, the powerlessness of the new coalition to make any immediate or dramatic changes in the region was apparent in the first few months of its existence. The three districts remained cut off from the rest of Xinjiang, for neither side had followed the military arrangements called for in the peace agreement. Elections had been completed in some districts, but the validity of the results was questioned, and there was still no elected Provincial Assembly as called for in the agreement. Distrust—the everpresent flaw in coalitions—kept both sides from unilaterally deciding to fulfill the terms of the peace agreement, and as rumors of Nationalist military aid to Osman grew and Osman's opposition to Ili became an established fact, the distrust deepened. This distrust, which all factions within the government felt, also helped to keep alive the idea of an independent Xinjiang. This was the final point that Zhang chose to discuss.

The Question of the East Turkestan Republic

On the question of the ETR's existence, Zhang pointed out that in Xinjiang there was a mistaken idea that was "anti-homeland, anti-Han and anti-Three Principles of the People."⁸⁷ This idea was that "East Turkestan" could be the name of a country whereas in reality it was only a geographic term and could not be the basis of an independent state. Even Ahmet had agreed with this, Zhang said, referring to an August speech by the former. How was it possible, he asked, that provincial government representatives were asking for independence for Xinjiang? This was an issue that could not be discussed until Xinjiang had established true freedom and equality and had built up its society economically, socially, and politically. He again put forward the idea that the Han Chinese were elder brothers to the people of Xinjiang. How, he asked, could an elder brother push his inexperienced younger brother out to face the world when he was not ready?

Zhang ended his comments by saying that there were three roads open to the people of Xinjiang. The first road was union with the Republic of China and local autonomy. The second was total independence, and the third was union with the USSR. As for the latter, he quickly pointed out that the USSR had already claimed to be disinterested in China's internal affairs and would not be willing to accept Xinjiang. As to total independence, the region was not yet ready, and, while it might one day be capable of independence, this was "absolutely" not possible in the immediate future.

Zhang's lengthy rebuttal of the independent East Turkestan thesis emphasizes the vitality of the independence movement in Xinjiang at the time. Growing numbers of Turkic intellectuals and masses of young Turki people had become committed to the idea of eventual independence for their homelands. Continuing abuses by Chinese officials and the Nationalist army served to strengthen these feelings; despite the new government's good intentions, no great reduction in tension had occurred, and incidents of violence between national minorities and Han Chinese continued.

Two other factors were strengthening Turki nationalist sentiment in the region: one was the existence of the Ili government, which continued to exclude Chinese from the three districts; the other was the opportunity for Turki members of the new government—both Ili and independent

nationalist factions—to reach larger audiences with their message of nationalism.

Because the Ili government at first represented another manifestation of the Turkic dream of independence, many local groups rallied to the movement. In the seven districts outside its control, it was considered to be a locally run, locally inspired government. Many Moslems, initially at least, looked to Ili as a model for the future independence of the whole of Xinjiang.

An important factor in Ili's prestige was the influence of Ali Han Töre, the respected Moslem leader who served as the ETR's first president. His leadership was especially important in bringing the Kazaks into the movement, according to recent Kazak sources.⁸⁸ Through such personalities, the various Turkic groups were united in a nationalist effort at creating the basis for a Turkic Moslem state in the region. As long as the territorial integrity of the three districts was maintained, it continued to claim supporters from the other seven districts.

A further factor contributing to the increase in Turki nationalism throughout the province at this time was the expanding influence of the Turki members of the coalition. As previously mentioned, Ahmet Jan Kasimi emerged as a popular and charismatic speaker, receiving a warm reception whenever he addressed mainly Turkic audiences. According to various observers, from the time of his first public speech in Urumqi—during the inaugural ceremonies for the new government—his reception from the assembled crowds was far warmer and more enthusiastic than that accorded to anyone else, including Chairman Zhang himself.⁸⁹

Another active Ili appointee in the coalition was Seyfettin Azizi [Saifudin], who in the autumn of 1946 traveled to the south of the province in his capacity as an election supervisor. In the southern city of Kashgar at the same time were Burhan Shahidi, the second provincial vice-chairman, and Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra, the independent Turki nationalist. Officially, all three were in the south on government business since Seyfettin was to oversee the elections in Kashgar, Burhan in Yarkand, and Mehmet in Hetian (Khotan).

But first the three men spent some five weeks in Kashgar, during which time they held public meetings and made “boldly nationalistic” speeches.⁹⁰

The three also traveled to other cities. At the same time, the British consul in Kashgar noted the walls of many of these towns sprouting new posters bearing “popular nationalist slogans.”⁹¹

Although the Turki members of the coalition were of different factions, they agreed in their desire for a “free democratic Xinjiang” and for eventual independence from China. This nationalistic message was being carried to a greater number of Turkic people than before, with the prestige of the newly won concessions to bolster its credibility.

Neither the peace agreement nor Turki participation in the provincial government had resulted in a lessening of tensions in the region, and, as Zhang was well aware, dreams of a greater East Turkestan including all of Xinjiang province continued. It was to counter such dreams that he added his remarks on the “three roads” to his speech. The irony of a Han Chinese, heir to an imperialist and bloody past in Xinjiang, warning the Turki people of the dangers of the USSR, however obliquely, would not have been lost on some members of the audience, and many of his listeners may have found this tactic just another ploy to avoid the greater question of Turki demands for control in their own homeland.

Zhang also used this opportunity to assure the local people that they would have government support, including financial aid, to help in the development of their region. But, as much as Xinjiang needed financial assistance, the local people also knew that greater government assistance could well mean greater central government interference in the administration of the region and more Chinese “experts” to develop the local economy. Since the goal of the Turki nationalist movement was less, not more, central control, these assurances were more appealing to Han than to Turkic ears.

As many observers noted toward the end of 1946, Chairman Zhang had genuinely attempted to understand the complex situation in Xinjiang and to correct the worst political and economic abuses in the region. Although the military provisions of the peace agreement had not been implemented, there was still hope that the Chinese would gradually, under Zhang’s conciliatory policies, improve the situation in Xinjiang.

The main purposes of Zhang’s October speech were to calm Han Chinese fears about the changes in the Xinjiang government, and at the same time to

reassure the Turkic population that the new coalition understood the region's special needs and was doing its best to deal with them. The defensive tone he was forced to take, however, demonstrates that after only three months of coalition rule, things were not going well.

The important problem was that the peace agreement had not been fully implemented. By the end of 1946, each side had begun publicly to blame the other for noncompliance with the agreement.⁹² On the Ili side, they had yet to supply military information to the provincial government regarding the numbers and disposition of soldiers, and they continued to exclude Chinese from the three districts.⁹³ The central government, for its part, had been increasing the number of Nationalist troops in the region, giving the impression that an assault on the Ili region was being considered. Furthermore, as the Ili faction knew by October, Osman had turned against his former Ili allies. In his speech, Zhang let it be known publicly that he had met with Osman more than once. The implications of this were enormous as it pointed directly to secret Chinese-Kazak negotiations. The trust that Zhang and other Chinese leaders in the coalition had worked to establish was seriously threatened by this admission.

As the central government was also doubtless aware, full implementation of the peace agreement would have encouraged local nationalism to an even greater extent and therefore, from the Chinese viewpoint, implementation of the agreement was not in their best interests. Further, the Chinese side had accepted the agreement in the first instance thinking that they were dealing strictly with the USSR.⁹⁴ Having signed the agreement, the government had fully expected an end to minor agitation. When tension continued in the area, the government continued to blame the USSR and became even more entrenched in its view that greater freedoms in the region would only lead to further undermining of the Chinese position in the province.

CHAPTER 6

The Xinjiang Coalition, January to July 1947

By early 1947, the weaknesses inherent in a coalition became more and more apparent in the Xinjiang Provincial Coalition Government. The mutual, murmured accusations of nonimplementation grew louder after the return of the region's delegates from the Nanjing National Assembly. The impassioned speeches of Isa and Ahmet left little doubt that border area peoples would resist government attempts to reestablish traditional Chinese military rule in the borderlands, and that a measure of local participation in the provincial government would be the minimum requirement of the increasingly nationalistic minority groups. Yet no assurances of equal or proportionate minority roles in local government were forthcoming at the Assembly, and a certain degree of disillusionment accompanied the Ili representatives, in particular, upon their return.

With General Zhang Zhizhong absent from Xinjiang for the first few months of 1947, the Chinese militarists gained considerable ground in the region vis-à-vis what may be termed Zhang's conciliation faction. Led by General Song Xilian, a hard-line military man, the militarist faction in Xinjiang was supported by many of the Han Chinese in the region who were, as noted, worried over the "soft" approach of Chairman Zhang.

Although the militarists continued to participate in the coalition government, at the same time they encouraged such anti-Soviet and anti-Ili forces as Osman's Kazaks and continued their attempts to expand the influence of pro-Chinese factions, thus ensuring that local national minorities remained divided.

This chapter examines the militarist attempt to strengthen the Han Chinese position in Xinjiang during Zhang's absence from the region, and Zhang's attempts upon his return to restore unity to the provincial government. The major political events discussed include new economic measures, the February riots in Urumqi and their effects, Zhang's tour of the

southern area of the province, and his replacement by Mesut Sabri in May 1947.

In early summer of 1947, Xinjiang was also the site of the “Beidashan Affair”—a border incident touched off by Osman Batur involving China, the MPR, and the USSR. Although its significance was blown out of proportion by the Nationalists, the “affair” did confirm Nationalist Chinese support of Osman, thus substantiating Ili accusations of Chinese military activity against the three districts. Discussion of the incident is thus included in this chapter as further evidence of the influence of the military line in Xinjiang politics during the last months of the coalition.

The Coalition Cracks

The year 1947 began quietly in Xinjiang. In mid-January the Xinjiang delegates of the National Assembly returned to Urumqi, but they maintained a very low profile, making no immediate comment on their experiences in the capital and, evidently, awaiting the return of Zhang, who had remained in Nanjing for consultations.¹

Although Zhang and other members of the coalition had been away, the provincial government, under the leadership of Acting Chairman Rahim Jan Sabri, had continued to work on the region's financial problems. On January 12, 1947, they announced the new tax rates for the province, some of which were substantially decreased from the previous year. For instance, the business tax was reduced from 3 percent to 1.5 percent; the tax on livestock was reduced from 6 percent to 2 percent. The salt tax, however, a mainstay of the central government's revenues, was increased from one to three dollars per jin; and the sensitive issue of tax on agricultural land was left to be settled at a future date.²

Another important economic measure was announced in February: flour was rationed for the first time. To ensure adequate supplies of this staple, the provincial government committee on prices announced that merchants were obliged to sell flour to poor and needy persons at the original base price (not given in the report); all purchasers were also required to use ration cards, and merchants were told that if the person was not a former customer they were not allowed to sell him any flour (to stop profiteers from buying up flour at the original price).³ This announcement also revealed that there were only enough flour supplies in the provincial capital to last until the end of March, a fact that doubtless contributed to fears about the future.

A more important source of tension, in some quarters, was the increasing speculation over whether or not Chairman Zhang would return to Xinjiang. It was probably to calm such fears that an interview with Zhang, still in Nanjing, was published in the *Xinjiang Daily* in mid-January. When asked why he remained in Nanjing, Zhang replied that he was there to try to solve Xinjiang's financial problems by securing much needed central government financial aid; specifically, he was asking for 200 million dollars for construction and development in the northwestern province. Upon being

asked when he would return to Xinjiang, he told the reporter that he did not know the exact date, but that he would return after he finished official business and after making a visit to the graves of his ancestors.⁴

Despite what seemed to be an assurance of Zhang's return in the report of this interview, rumors said that his outspoken opposition to central government policy in Xinjiang during his stay in Nanjing made his removal inevitable.⁵

Although outwardly the provincial capital remained calm in January, posters and handbills criticizing the provincial government began appearing that month in Urumqi. One such handbill, entitled "Struggle for the Motherland," urged the Turki people to oust the "Chinese oppressor" who "came two hundred years ago to enslave us, making our land a colony and dishonoring our holy religion."⁶ The flurry of leaflets caused Acting Chairman Rahim Jan and Secretary General Liu to issue a joint statement in the *Xinjiang Daily*. They declared that these handbills were written to create disturbances, to break down the unity of the various nationalities in Xinjiang, and to bring down the provincial government itself.⁷

In February 1947 a committee was set up to discuss implementation of the peace agreement, for it was from this sole issue that tensions now appeared to derive. The committee included four representatives of the Ili faction and four representatives of the central government. Chairing the meetings was General Song Xilian. His presence on the committee demonstrated both his official status as commander in the region and his attempt in Zhang's absence to inaugurate a more hard-line approach to problems in Xinjiang.

At the time this committee was formed, the position of the Nationalists was that nonimplementation was solely the result of delay tactics of the Ili faction. In the Nationalist view, the major instances of Ili noncompliance were that no election lists had ever been prepared in the three districts (with the result that no elections were held there), and normal communications between the three Ili districts and the other seven had not been restored. When the Nationalists had begun reconstructing the bridge on the Manas that had been destroyed during the fighting of 1945, Ili forces had stopped them, and subsequent winter floods had made it impossible to carry on work.⁸

Little progress had been made on the issue of uniting the Ili currency, issued during 1945–1946, with that of the rest of Xinjiang. The Chinese government had agreed to redeem the currency, but, according to Nationalist sources, the Ili government kept changing the amount of money it claimed to have issued; it had grown from an initial amount of 200 million to 300 million and, most recently, to 430 million. This made adjustments “very difficult.”⁹

Disagreement also continued over the implementation of the military provisions of the agreement. No Nationalist troops had been allowed to enter the three districts to patrol the Sino-Soviet border, as required in Article 3 of the Second Annex to the peace agreement.¹⁰ The Chinese had not forced the issue by amassing troops at the Manas River for entrance into the three districts. The lightly patrolled ceasefire line between Ili and the rest of Xinjiang attests to the fact that the Chinese intended to enter only after assurances had been given.¹¹ As the Chinese privately held the Soviet Union responsible for the situation, presumably such assurances would have had to come from the USSR as well as from the Ili representatives in the provincial government before Nationalist troops entered the three districts.

The Chinese claimed that the Ili group had not reorganized their troops as required by the agreement, nor had they reported the numbers and locations of their troops as stipulated. The Ili forces also continued to wear the green ETR uniform and its Moslem insignia.¹²

In reply to these accusations, the commander of the ETR military forces, Izhak Han Mura, had at first reported that he had, in fact, complied with the order to reorganize in November 1946, but that compilation of a list of troops and their deployment had been delayed due to his own almost constant travel. Furthermore, he said that the constant increase in the numbers of new recruits made it difficult for him to give final figures.¹³

Another reason for difficulty in reorganization of the Ili military was given in February 1947. This was that the provincial government had not yet carried out the reorganization of the Public Security Forces (Baoan Dui) in Aksu and Kashgar. Until such reorganization was carried out, the Ili forces would continue to remain segregated from the Nationalist army. At the same time, they accused the Nationalists of showing bad faith and violating the spirit of the agreement by building up their military strength in

Xinjiang. In fact, General Song confided to Graham in Urumqi that at this point Nationalist troop strength was ninety thousand, and supplies were being satisfactorily built up. He said he could fight “Kulja” (the Ili government) if “outsiders” did not interfere.¹⁴

The Nationalists’ reply to the Ili position was simply that they were awaiting the Ili reorganization before making their own changes in the Aksu and Kashgar areas, leaving the question of military unification stalemated.

The committee thus had plenty to discuss, but it was overtaken by events. Within days of its first meeting, serious rioting broke out in Urumqi. This involved both Han and national minorities, and the provincial government was at once drawn in.

The troubles began just prior to the formation of the committee. A memorial service was held in Urumqi in memory of the Han Chinese who had been killed on February 16 of the previous year in Tacheng. Some four hundred Chinese relatives of those killed gathered to honor their dead at a public ceremony attended by over a thousand people.¹⁵ Within days, a “liberty mass meeting” was held at the Uighur Club in Urumqi, at which the first of what would be several petitions to the government was drawn up.¹⁶ This petition was presented to the provincial government on February 21.

The 21st was a Friday, the day of worship for Moslems. This particular Friday, a crowd of over five hundred Turkis gathered after services to parade through Urumqi streets to the government offices to present their petition demanding full implementation of the peace agreement. Many local people had come to believe that if the agreement were enforced, the region could be assured of peace, and thus the main concern of this first petition was for full, immediate implementation of the agreement.

The crowd was unruly as it marched, and some members shouted menacingly. At one point, some even sought to storm the Central Bank¹⁷ but by 6:00 P.M. the majority were in front of the government headquarters demanding action on 55 separate points in the petition. Ahmet addressed the petitioners and invited them to return the following day to discuss the points of the petition; acceding to Ahmet’s request, the crowd dispersed.

In addition to asking for full and immediate implementation of the peace agreement, the first petition also listed the following demands: withdrawal of Nationalist government troops from Xinjiang; establishment of a local

people's militia in Aksu and Kashgar; an end to army interference in government and oppression of the people; implementation of the 70:30 ratio of hiring in government; new elections in areas where "oppression" had occurred; elimination of the present tax bureau and all secret police activity; and the removal of Hatije [Hatewan] and Salis, both Kazak, from their government posts.¹⁸ According to one source, a further demand was for the punishment of Osman Batur, a point which is not included in the Chinese sources.¹⁹

On February 22, the crowds reappeared to hear Ahmet's reply to the petition and, according to at least one source, to present a further seventeen points for government attention. These included the deposition of Hami's Yolbars Khan (the Uighur "Prince" of Hami) and the provincial minister of finance, Janimhan.²⁰ Exchanges occurred between Ahmet and the crowd, and Ahmet, again asking the crowd for more time to prepare his replies, requested that the people return once again on the following day. The crowd did so, and the February 23 meeting passed without incident.

On that same day, the *Xinjiang Daily* ran an editorial also asking the government to implement fully the peace agreement. It also took the opportunity to remind local people of how much the government had already done for them, and it pointedly claimed that in the three districts the people were still not being assured their basic freedoms. It asked the government, therefore, to be sure to implement the peace agreement in all ten of the region's districts.²¹

On February 24, Urumqi's Chinese population organized a counter-demonstration, which also included Hui and Kazak supporters.²² In the now emotionally charged atmosphere, central government troops were posted throughout the town, and guards were placed on all consulates. During this demonstration, some five thousand people paraded in the streets in support of the central government and its policies, finally presenting a thirteen-point petition to the government which included demands that it oppose all those trying to oppose peace; that it control Uighur demonstrations; that the GPP be supported so that all national minorities would be given equal treatment; and, in reply to demands for the removal of Salis and others, that Ahmet resign. In particular, Kazaks in the procession voiced their support of Salis,

Hatije, and Osman, saying that if the government did not support them, then the Urumqi Kazaks themselves would look after them in the future.²³

To deal with the situation, an emergency meeting of the provincial government was called on the 24th to discuss its next move. As the day drew to a close, the tension in the capital grew in the absence of a firm government response to the situation.

On the evening of that same day, some “rotten apples,” to use the title given them by the local paper, dressed in Urumqi city police uniforms, pushed their way into local Turki homes on the pretext of looking for gambling dens, frightening and threatening the residents as they did so.²⁴ To make matters worse, after a night of disturbances, on the 25th, a further demonstration organized by the “Urumqi City Peace and Unity of the Masses Organization” took place, with Han Chinese as the majority, joined by pro-Chinese Uighur, Kazak, and Hui. Initially numbering six to seven hundred, this group made its way toward the government offices shouting slogans of unity and drawing additional supporters so that some one thousand people reportedly gathered at the government gates.²⁵

Both provincial vice-chairmen, Ahmet and Burhan, came out to address the crowd. During these exchanges, a shot rang out,²⁶ setting off a riot in which eight people were killed.²⁷ The Urumqi garrison commander was called upon to restore order, and the following day martial law was declared in the capital.²⁸

Taking advantage of the opportunity presented by martial law, on the night of February 26, General Song Xilian ordered all neighborhood leaders (*baojia zhang*) to inspect local households within the city. From then until martial law was lifted in March there was a series of searches by police and military, ostensibly for the safety of the public and to seize any unlawfully held arms.²⁹ Sure of his ability to impose military control on the capital, Song’s “inspections” demonstrated his hard-line approach to Xinjiang’s problems and reflected the Chinese militarist’s traditional solution in border areas—the use of military strength to intimidate the local population.

The activities of both the military and the Urumqi police had already been criticized publicly, by both Moslems and the Chinese-run, conservative *Xinjiang Daily*. On February 25, the government had announced via the news media that all police must carry identification and

should be accompanied by the local neighborhood chief and possess a valid warrant when searching a private house.³⁰ The implication was that local people had already complained about arbitrary arrests and searches. The inclusion of detailed directions on what an individual should do if illegally searched would indicate that this was not an uncommon occurrence.

With the imposition of martial law, these rights, so recently detailed in the press, were set aside. The house-to-house searches that took place under martial law between February 26 and March 5 were later to become a cause célèbre, referred to in the press of the three districts as further proof of Chinese oppression.

As Zhang Dajun, a former military intelligence officer in Xinjiang, points out in his discussion of the powers of the military under martial law, the army had the right to inspect both private property and individuals for arms and ammunition; it also had the right to detain any suspect or to confiscate any unlawful items.³¹ A full list of military powers under martial law was given in the *Xinjiang Daily* on March 2, and repeated on the 3d, 4th, and 5th.

With the military in control, the city returned to an uneasy calm. Business resumed as soldiers remained in evidence on the streets. The Chinese in particular seemed confident enough of the military's ability to control events for the Xinjiang provincial Guomindang to hold its scheduled assembly in Urumqi on March 4, under the chairmanship of Chen Xihao, a Guomindang member of the CC Clique.³²

On March 5, it was announced that martial law would be lifted the following day. The local press appealed to the people of the capital to remain calm and law abiding. It appeared that the crisis had passed and that the city was returning to normal. That night, however, the local military units and the Urumqi City Police, most of whom were Han Chinese, used the last opportunity they would have under martial law for a house-to-house search of the Turki areas of the city.³³ Under martial law regulations, police and military were both required to present identification upon entrance to any house, and they were also required to give receipts for any items they took away. As had occurred before during such searches, however, there were many incidents of arbitrary seizure and of Han who entered Turki

homes and, in the later words of Vice-Chairman Ahmet, harassed the local Turki population.³⁴

Ahmet himself was later to refer to the February and March incidents with great anger, even calling them a turning point in Xinjiang affairs. Yet there was no immediate aftermath in Urumqi; no further violent incidents occurred. This was partly because of tight military control in the city, but also because many of the minority factions were waiting to see what moves the government would make next and, especially, what would be the reaction of Chairman Zhang.

Zhang reacted immediately. He left Nanjing, arriving in Lanzhou on March 8, where he was delayed by bad weather until March 16, when he finally flew to Urumqi. He immediately summoned General Song and Secretary General Liu Mengchun and violently upbraided both for their handling of what was now being termed the “2–25 Affair.”³⁵ He then met with Ahmet, Burhan, and other minority leaders and ordered a complete investigation into the deaths.³⁶ A full provincial government meeting was arranged for March 20, and at the same time, Zhang also announced that he intended to convene the Provincial Assembly on May 5, 1947.

While the above measures made it appear that Zhang was once again in control of the province, his position in both the province itself and the central government’s eyes had deteriorated in the first months of 1947. In Nanjing, he had been unable to secure the funds that he saw as vital for Xinjiang’s continued existence as part of the Chinese state.³⁷ This failure was, no doubt, in part due to the displeasure of Chiang Kai-shek and other central militarist leaders with Zhang’s criticism of Guomindang policy in the Northwest and elsewhere in China.

Furthermore, General Song had established himself as a major power during Zhang’s absence, by virtue of his control of the military and the support of the local Han Chinese population. Zhang had no authority to remove him, and his continuation in command did little to restore local Moslem confidence in Zhang’s ability to control the hard-line Chinese militarist element in the province.

Zhang attempted to undo some of the damage to Han–national minority relations from the February incidents, but his effectiveness was now limited, for the riots had served to polarize the anti- and pro-Chinese factions. For

all his conciliatory words and gestures, Zhang was viewed with less respect and confidence than before. His speeches after his return from Nanjing reflect the real decline in his status in Xinjiang as well as his own realization of this fact. Increasingly, his public addresses became impatient with local opinion, where before they had always tried to show a certain objectivity and respect for the Moslem nationalities.

In the ten days between his return to Urumqi and the issuance of the first major government statement on the “2–25 Affair,” Zhang met privately with minority and Han Chinese leaders to work out some kind of accommodation. In a March 22 conversation with American Consul John Hall Paxton, Zhang said that a settlement had been reached “in principle,” and that with good will on both sides there would be no further such incidents.³⁸

Signed by eighteen members of the Provincial Council, the first public statement on the “2–25 Affair” appeared in the local paper on March 26, 1947.³⁹ The announcement sought both to address the 2–25 incident and to set it in the context of the progress made during the previous half year. It declared that neither the government nor the army was responsible for the incident, and that none of the surrounding events had been the government’s doing. (It was suspected that the CC Clique had been at least partly responsible. Many people believed that it had been a plot by both military leaders and Guomindang leaders such as Chen to cause trouble in the region—and possibly to weaken Zhang’s reputation and prestige in the area during his absence. The government directly denied these allegations.)

Further, with regard to the Nationalist army, the statement reminded the petitioners who were demanding the removal of Nationalist troops that the military forces were in Xinjiang as part of the nation’s national defense system, and that, therefore, the people should not regard them with hostility. On the other hand, other passages showed that Zhang’s anger over the military’s handling of the affair had not dissipated. The statement added that the military, for its part, was not to interfere with the freedom granted to the people in the peace agreement and GPP, and that any unreasonable action by the military would be quickly and severely dealt with.⁴⁰

The following day, the paper published new measures designed to ensure public order. Although martial law was not to be reimposed, special orders

were promulgated to end terrorism in the province. Among the new measures was corporal punishment for any person “breaking the peace” by assassination, rape, violent threats to life, causing chaos among or quarrels between national minorities, or encroaching on peoples’ private property or personal liberties.⁴¹

While these measures could be read as protecting the local people from further harassment by the military or police, the vagueness of the wording about breaking the peace (after all, political speeches by almost any faction could be said to cause chaos if the provision were liberally interpreted) gave the predominantly Han police more power than ever before if they chose to exercise it. Basically, this series of new measures and several of the government statements that were to follow indicate that although Zhang was trying once again to achieve compromise in the coalition government—and thereby to give the impression that the provincial government was again united—the police and the Chinese-dominated military had secured considerably more power as a result of the 2–25 incident.

In support of Zhang’s efforts at compromise, in the April 4 edition of the *Xinjiang Daily* an excerpt from *Youth Monthly* was included that emphasized that only a small minority—“rotten apples”—were involved in such incidents as had occurred in the capital. These bad elements used the excuse that the GPP and the peace agreement had not yet been fully implemented to cause trouble. The article urged that, rather than listening to such troublemakers, people should work together to overcome the region’s problems.⁴²

In the closest thing yet to an apology over the February riots and the March searches, the same article referred to these incidents as illegal acts much regretted by the government. But increasingly, the *Xinjiang Daily* and other publications were openly accusing a small minority, which they said was responsible for all the troubles that had plagued the capital. Dominated by conservative Guomindang officials, the *Xinjiang Daily* was adding to the political divisions in the region by its thinly veiled accusation that the Ili faction was responsible for the uneasy situation. To say the least, the newspaper turned a blind eye to other troubles. For instance, it must have known that unrest in the Ashan district was, in great part, due to the Chinese arming of Osman Batur’s Kazaks. Nonetheless, the *Xinjiang Daily*

continued to blame Ili for these disturbances (see the later discussion in this chapter on Ashan during these months). As will be seen, the news media became part of the “divide and rule” tactics being employed by the Chinese militarist faction in Xinjiang.

Further evidence of the increasing influence of the militaristic Chinese views in government were the new regulations on travel announced in Xinjiang that spring. On April 10, it was required that any person doing business with China proper had to show proof of membership in a business association; a travel pass issued by the local police chief would be required of businessmen intending to travel; and officials and businessmen, as well as their families, had to have the business association to which they belonged stamp or seal a formal letter of identification, which must also indicate the individual’s destination.⁴³ That these limitations directly contravened the liberty guaranteed in the peace agreement indicates that the new regulations were primarily the work of the police, who issued them; they may even have done so without consulting the government. Certainly, the city government of Urumqi was concerned about protecting what it called personal liberty, as well as about the increasing crime rate in the capital, and meetings to discuss both of these matters were held in mid-April. The Han Chinese may have welcomed the new police regulations and the new emphasis on law and order, but the minorities increasingly viewed such police action as contrary to the spirit of both the peace agreement and the GPP.

By allowing greater powers to accrue to the police—which, it must be remembered, was virtually a Han organization—and by not implementing the 70:30 ratio for hiring Moslems in government jobs, suspicions and tension among the non-Han grew. Despite Zhang’s return, and despite the renewed conciliatory tone of the government announcements, day-to-day interaction between Han and national minorities involved lower-level Han officials who had little use for conciliation and compromise.⁴⁴

At this point even the chairman himself began to falter. In mid-April, Zhang decided to make a long-delayed inspection mission to the south of the region. Accompanied by Mesut Sabri, Ahmet Jan Kasimi, Wang Cengshan, and Isa Yusuf Alptekin as well as other officials, Zhang headed south on April 16.

Demands began at the first stop. Zhang, speaking to a large meeting of local people in Aksu, mentioned the progress made in the region under the coalition government. The local people responded by complaining that there was not one single representative of southern Xinjiang on the Provincial Council, although the majority of the region's population lived south of the Tianshan. They also put forward a set of local demands: strict prohibition of intermarriage between Han and Moslem; serious punishment for those (e.g., members of the Han Chinese police or the military) who broke the peace or robbed others; establishment of more hospitals; and provision of science education in the schools. These last demands were mentioned in the first *Xinjiang Daily* report of the incident, but the composition of the Provincial Council was a sensitive matter and was not mentioned until later.⁴⁵

The party next went to Kashgar, where a public meeting was held on April 22 at which the crowd put forward demands similar to those made in the February petitions in Urumqi. These demands were not reported in the *Xinjiang Daily*, but other sources say that they included demands for an end to military interference in people's freedom and an end to military arrests; prohibition against new settlers entering Xinjiang; a change in the name of the province to East Turkestan; an end to taxation, especially the land tax;⁴⁶ prohibition of Turki-Han marriage; and the immediate punishment of all individual soldiers who mistreated the people.⁴⁷ This criticism evidently unsettled Zhang, who held no further public meetings until May 5 when he told a group of mostly government officials that the government was not planning to send any immigrants to Xinjiang and asked again for their support and assistance in solving Xinjiang's many problems.⁴⁸

Unsatisfied with the lack of government response to their demands, crowds gathered again on May 6 in Kashgar to ask more questions of the provincial chairman and to put forward even more demands. The situation grew tense as the crowds stood waiting, and Zhang had to call for Ahmet to come out and address them. At the same time he called for the local garrison commander, fearing that another 2-25 incident might occur. Ahmet's address calmed the assembly, however, which dissipated before any violence occurred.⁴⁹ This dangerous situation was not reported in the provincial news media.

Shaken and angered by his experience in Kashgar, Zhang flew back to the capital on May 8. Within days he called for a special three-day meeting of high government officials in Urumqi. In a speech to the assembled officials, he took a much harder line than ever before, complaining that despite great efforts and many concessions on the part of the government, nonetheless, many people continued to hold “mistaken” ideas.

Zhang’s speech indicates that his perception of the political situation in Xinjiang had undergone radical revision. It made clear the irreconcilability of the Chinese government’s intentions and the wishes of substantial numbers of the local population. For the first time, Zhang openly acknowledged the refractoriness of the Ili faction. He accused it of taking its revolution underground and fomenting antigovernment activity. He blamed Ahmet personally for participating in such activity.

Zhang also referred to what he called contradictions in Xinjiang society (translated as “inconsistencies” in the English version of this speech in the journal *Pacific Affairs*), the most important of which he called “contradictions in political leadership.” He admitted that in the past the region had been ruled by Chinese, who only comprised 5 percent of the total population, and he accepted that this was the policy of an imperialist nation toward its colony. He contended, however, that this old attitude was in the process of being superseded, and that progress was being held up by the Ili faction, which would not reach agreement on many important issues. Zhang went as far as to say that the Ili faction was even taking a different road.⁵⁰

Zhang contrasted the Ili faction’s “obscure” views with the clarity of the government’s role and policies. In addition to carrying out elections as promised and making every effort at compromise, the government had made several proposals to improve the life of the people of the province, but these proposals had all been rejected by either the Ili faction or other local groups. He specified five such instances: establishment of a National Tianshan University, to replace the lower-level Xinjiang College; unification of currency in all ten districts and with China proper; a railroad to speed industrial development and communication; new elections for “special commissioners” (a proposal directly opposed by Ahmet, he noted); and

reorganization of the military (which had been delayed because the three districts continued to “go their own path”).⁵¹

These complaints were further evidence of the change in Zhang, for these government proposals were all aimed ultimately at regaining control of the entire province. As such, they were elements in the struggle for political control, a struggle which increasingly intensified during the spring of 1947, narrowing down to one between the Nationalist Han Chinese and their traditional minority supporters, on the one hand, and an ever-widening segment of nationalistic Turkis whose ultimate goal was eventual independence for Xinjiang, on the other. Zhang knew very well what the objections were to virtually every one of the proposals. For example, objection to elevating Xinjiang College to university status was based on the fact that, as a national institution, it would be another progovernment institution dominated by Han Chinese, and therefore undesirable on that basis alone. Currency unification, as previously discussed, was vehemently opposed because the inflation-ridden Nationalist currency promised no benefits to the local economy and, furthermore, was another tie to the rest of China. The railroad was objected to on similar grounds, plus the fact that it would open the region to more Han settlers. As to the objection to the elections, Ahmet probably feared another Han-dominated and Han-run election. Delaying them indefinitely—or at least until after a Provincial Assembly had been convened—was to the advantage of the minority factions as it gave more time for the propagation of the basic tenets of Turki nationalism in the region, and thus a wider base of support in any election.

As to the military organization, deep distrust continued among military leaders on both sides. General Song was certainly involved in negotiations with Osman Batur and other Kazaks, and he was even supplying them in return for their allegiance. Continued stalemate on the military organization clause was inevitable while the Chinese military were convinced that the Soviet Union remained the dominant force behind the Ili faction, allowing the Ili members of government to take what many Chinese considered an arrogant, uncooperative stance.

Xinjiang's "Newspaper War"

With Zhang Zhizhong's denunciation of the Ili group, the factions in government polarized. The intensification of distrust between the factions had developed apace in the preceding few weeks, illustrated in the "newspaper war" that occurred in the spring of 1947. In the course of it, Zhang's interpretation of events in Xinjiang was supported, up to a point, since the "war" revealed the efforts of Ahmet Jan Kasimi to establish himself as spokesman for all the people of the province, and not merely for the Ili faction alone.

As mentioned previously, the *Xinjiang Daily* was dominated by conservative elements of the Guomindang. It was a part of Guomindang machinery for the dissemination of the government and party line, and while its editorials had initially fully supported the coalition, beginning in 1947 these editorials repeatedly referred to the responsibility of a "small minority" of "bad elements" for the tension and violence in the provincial capital and elsewhere in the region. By spring, it was clear that what was meant by this "small minority" was, in fact, the Ili faction.

The first newspaper to challenge the official line of the *Xinjiang Daily* was the Yining paper, *Minzhu bao* (Democratic daily), published in Yining in five languages, including Chinese. Initially this paper tried to appeal for calm and continued cooperation. As late as April, it carried articles by Han Chinese living in the three districts who called for patience and toleration in solving Xinjiang's problems. One such article even claimed that the February and March incidents were the work of mobsters and did not represent the majority of Han Chinese.⁵² Rather than offering more accusations against the Chinese or the government, it appeared to express hopes in the three districts that there would still be a peaceful settlement of the problems in Xinjiang.

In May, however, articles by Ahmet Jan Kasimi, the provincial vice-chairman, began appearing in the *Minzhu bao* under the general title "Who Is Unwilling for Peace?" This series covered a number of topics in detail, most of which were presented as examples of how the Chinese showed their insincerity in Xinjiang—for example, how they continued to dominate the

police forces, how they were supporting Osman, and how corruption continued to operate throughout the province.⁵³

Such articles also began appearing in Urumqi's *Xinjiang gezeti*, in Turki. This paper was supposed to be the local-language equivalent of the *Xinjiang Daily*, but by the spring of 1947 it was pursuing a quite different editorial line from the Chinese version. On May 12, the *Xinjiang Daily* published a letter, purportedly from a Uighur reader, denouncing the *Xinjiang gezeti* for having a bad influence on society because of its policy of "continually printing only lies."⁵⁴

In comparison to succeeding letters, this first one, with its direct accusation against the *Gezeti*, was tame. A second letter, published in the *Xinjiang Daily* and signed by a Kazak named Tosun, reported that the people in the three districts were oppressed by their government to such an extent that many were now fleeing; the Ili area was said to be like all Xinjiang had been under Sheng Shicai.⁵⁵

The following day, the editor of the *Xinjiang Daily* identified the Ili group as being the reactionary force opposed to peace in Xinjiang. The three districts, he proclaimed, were opposed to Sino-Soviet friendship and to national unity and were destroying the unity between nationalities by use of such slogans as "Our fatherland, East Turkestan."⁵⁶

At first, both the *Minzhu bao* and the *Xinjiang Daily* used similar techniques. Each featured letters by members of the "opposite" nationality, for example, Uighur letters (in Chinese) in the Chinese paper, and Chinese letters (in Turki) in the Turki papers. As the battle grew more heated, however, this particular ploy was dropped by both sides.

It appears that the Ili faction used the *Minzhu bao* because its views were not getting adequate coverage in the Chinese press in Urumqi. Initially, the faction made its observations in a calm and reasonable way; for instance, a May 1 article called only for the peace agreement to be put into practice; it urged the people all to work hard for peace and not to believe rumors. As the Chinese press in Urumqi intensified its criticism of the Ili faction, however, the tone of the *Minzhu bao* hardened. On May 19 it accused the Chinese of directly contravening the peace agreement by aiding Osman Batur to fight against the three districts. It also asked for the dismissal of three Kazak leaders in the provincial government—Salis, Hatije, and

Janimhan—as well as other members of the government who were said to be in direct radio contact with Osman.⁵⁷ Accusations like this were not printed in Urumqi's Chinese-language press; the Ili representatives in government were probably right in their assumption that the Chinese media would never fully convey their views to the general public.

At this time, important new elements entered the political situation. It became known that Zhang Zhizhong was to be removed from his post as chairman of the province, and that Mesut Sabri would replace him. This further fueled the “newspaper war,” which continued during the summer of 1947, by this time giving expression to a direct confrontation of the Chinese authorities with the Ili faction.

The “newspaper war” of spring and summer 1947 demonstrated that the Ili group had lost none of its nationalistic fervor. Their participation in the provincial coalition had not lessened their commitment to a Moslem-dominated local government for Xinjiang, and, in fact, the increasingly nationalistic articles appearing in the Ili press during this period point to an intensification of local nationalism in that region.

This verbal war also served to refine the Ili faction's political stance, which was expanded upon and expounded in numerous articles that not only denounced Han Chinese policies in Moslem “Turkestan” but also called for Moslem control over the entire region's domestic affairs. As author of much of the most outspoken criticism, Ahmet Jan's personal reputation as a spokesman for the region's Moslem population grew; the provincewide exposure he received during the period of the “war” also brought him to the forefront of the Moslem-Chinese confrontation, which escalated rapidly with the appointment of Mesut as provincial chairman in May 1947.

The Chinese response to the fervent nationalism expounded in the Turki press of the three districts was to maintain the view of Xinjiang as an integral part of China. Evidence was supplied almost daily to the Chinese authorities by the active local press of the need for Chinese recognition of local political aspirations. But the government continued in its belief that, first, Xinjiang was and would be treated as an ordinary Chinese province, and, second, once a settlement with the Soviet Union had been reached, the difficulties in Xinjiang would simply disappear.

Zhang's Removal

The central government had never intended to appoint General Zhang to a term of any length in Xinjiang. He had originally been sent to the region as a negotiator, a trusted representative of President Chiang, who expected Zhang to visit the region, to reach an accord with the local “rebels,” and, having restored peace and assured continued Chinese sovereignty in the province, to return to the nation’s capital and his role in the ongoing negotiations between the Guomindang and the CCP.

The decision to remove Zhang was made prior to his return to Xinjiang in March 1947; Zhang himself was probably aware of his impending transfer. He hinted at such a change in a speech he made in Urumqi on March 31 when he declared that he would not be Xinjiang’s chairman forever.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, his removal took the province by surprise.⁵⁹ On May 19, 1947, the Executive Yuan in Nanjing announced that Mesut Sabri, a Uighur from the Ili area and a long-standing member of the Guomindang, would replace Zhang. The news was officially announced in the *Xinjiang Daily* on May 21.

Speculation on the reasons for Zhang’s removal varied. Some contemporary observers felt that perhaps he had been too soft in his approach to Xinjiang’s problems to satisfy the central government. While his evident sincerity and his belief in the need for reform in Xinjiang had earned him the respect of local Moslems, his outspoken criticism of Chinese politics in the Northwest had not endeared him to the central government.

Zhang himself, however, offered a different view. On the day of the announcement in Urumqi, an article by Zhang was published in the *Xinjiang Daily*. In the course of this lengthy article, he appealed to the people of Xinjiang to work together to overcome contradictions in the region’s complex society. He referred to the opposition that was already building to Mesut’s appointment. Why, he asked, would anyone want to oppose Mesut? “I have good relations with both Mesut and Ahmet, and this is a good thing.... Why should we oppose Mesut? How could I oppose one and support the other? We three are all good!”⁶⁰ In other words, Zhang was urging the local population to accept another Chinese government

appointment to the post of regional chairman, his major argument being that this new appointee would govern in much the same way as he himself would have in the future.

Opposition to the new appointment began almost as soon as it was announced. Zhang's May 21 speech noted this but did not in any way indicate the sources or the extent. In fact, the same day as this speech appeared, handbills also appeared on Urumqi streets attacking Mesut and the central government. Other leaflets attacked Ahmet and the Ili faction. The rift in Moslem-Chinese relations expanded almost overnight into a gaping abyss.

Sources of opposition to Mesut certainly included the Ili faction. But local Turki nationalists also opposed Mesut, as did some of the higher-ranking Chinese officials who felt that the change had come at a bad time. The reasons for opposing Mesut, who, according to one source, had "high repute for integrity and justice,"⁶¹ varied, but the primary reason among local Moslems was that he was considered to be the tool of the Guomindang, and, more specifically, the CC Clique, which had nurtured him during his long career in Chinese government and which had been responsible for placing him in high government posts. That he commanded respect among older, wealthy Uighur merchants may have been true,⁶² but Mesut had been away from the province for too long to have major political support among the wider population. As chairman of the province, he would be responsible to the Chinese who appointed him, and who would be backing him with Han Chinese Nationalist troops. In the view of all but the Han faction in government, this meant that Chinese interests would be placed before those of the local population while Mesut was in office.

The official reason for Mesut's appointment was given in a second article by Zhang Zhizhong, published in the *Xinjiang Daily* the day following the announcement. He wrote that the central government wanted the Xinjiang government to be headed by a local individual, and that the appointment of Mesut had been made out of respect for the Turki people of Xinjiang. Given Mesut's reputation for honesty and his wide experience in government, he was, in Zhang's view, an ideal choice for chairman.⁶³

Unfortunately, it was precisely his experience in Chinese government, and his many years away from his own people, that were the main causes of

concern among the Turki nationalists in Xinjiang. Furthermore, as pointed out in several quarters (none of them Chinese), Mesut was already in poor health at age sixty. The Ili faction was worried that Mesut, “frail and tired,”⁶⁴ would be easily manipulated by the local Chinese militarists, becoming no more than a figurehead. With power delegated to the generals, and increasing reliance on the military to solve Xinjiang’s internal problems, the prospects for democratic government in Xinjiang would be bleak.

Although Mesut was an experienced administrator and probably sincere in wanting to aid his home region’s development toward democracy and economic self-sufficiency, his appointment constituted another attempt by the central government to control the region more closely through military power and political manipulation.⁶⁵ In deciding to make the announcement of Mesut’s appointment before the Provincial Assembly was convened, the central government was hoping that Mesut would be given a vote of confidence by that body, furthering Nationalist Chinese efforts at asserting Guomintang influence in Xinjiang and uniting the various minorities behind a native-born, Guomintang-trained head of government. Instead, the appointment set off new waves of opposition toward Chinese policy among the various non-Chinese factions in the region and led directly to an open split in the government coalition.

Disorder in the Xinjiang Provincial Assembly

Representatives to Xinjiang's first Provincial Assembly had been elected during the autumn elections of 1946. No assembly had been called, however—the official reason being that the elections in some districts were incomplete. In March 1947, Zhang nonetheless decided to convene the first Provincial Assembly, possibly in part to conciliate the local population in the aftermath of the 2–25 Affair. By May, when Zhang returned from Kashgar, he could hardly have been very optimistic over the possible effects of the forthcoming meeting. The announcement had already been made, however, and preparations for it continued. The arrival of some delegates was delayed by travel difficulties, but by mid-May most had reached Urumqi.⁶⁶

From the very beginning there were problems. Arguments erupted immediately over the number of delegates for some districts, and even over the identities and qualifications of some of those who arrived.⁶⁷ According to later reports, one of the main problems was that the Ili and Tacheng districts, which were entitled to fourteen and six representatives respectively, had sent eighteen and eight instead. Furthermore, five of those sent by Tacheng were not on the original list of those elected. The Ili District also sent an extra two representatives, on behalf of the Sibo, Solon, and Manchu populations of Ili, which was quite outside the original regulations. The Kashgar District was entitled to send twenty elected representatives and had done so, but seven of these had names differing from those on the original list of elected delegates submitted, and these men's identities were questioned by the delegates from other districts.⁶⁸

Another problem was that the Ili District representatives had decided they wanted the matter of electing government, army, and police officers brought up at the Assembly—a matter that the Chinese felt was inappropriate for discussion at the first Provincial Assembly.⁶⁹

In an attempt to overcome these problems, Zhang, upon his return from Kashgar on May 8, invited all parties concerned to discussions, but no headway was made and the opening of the Assembly was delayed. In the midst of these events, the appointment of Mesut Sabri was announced, adding yet another point of contention to an already tense situation.

Possibly in the hopes that a quick inauguration, coupled with the opening of a new “democratic” assembly, would defuse the gathering political crisis, Mesut was sworn in on May 28, 1947, and on the same day the Provincial Assembly was declared formally open.⁷⁰

An account of what transpired at the first Xinjiang Provincial Assembly is difficult to piece together from existing sources. Given the chaotic state of Chinese parliamentary proceedings at the national level,⁷¹ it was hardly to be expected that the Provincial Assembly would be run any more successfully. According to the Hami delegate, Mr. Abdul Erturk, at the first session the proceedings were immediately bogged down over all the unresolved issues. Argument concerned not only matters of representation, but also the issue of Mesut’s appointment, the reorganization of the military, and even whether the Assembly had the right to debate such matters as the implementation of the peace agreement and the GPP.⁷² The arguments were so chaotic that no formal sessions took place, the proceedings remaining informal for the duration of the entire assembly.

Whatever the status of the meetings, the Yining newspapers reported that on June 4, the Provincial Assembly met and a major resolution was passed whereby sixty-two out of ninety delegates voted against Mesut’s chairmanship—whether they were empowered to do so or not being quite beyond the question.⁷³ It seemed that all the dissension in the province was projected into and given new form by the proceedings of the Assembly.

During the month of June, the dissension outside the Assembly itself by no means diminished. Local newspapers, in published articles and in letters to the editor, contributed to the growing unrest. The Yining publications were solid in proclaiming that the three districts’ struggle had been justified and their attitude toward the peace agreement correct.

In Urumqi, law and order declined to such a point that the police chief had to be given special powers against “untrue rumors” and antigovernment propaganda, and to deal with quarrels among the nationalities, illegal deprivation of liberty, and the issuing of inflammatory leaflets and posters.⁷⁴ In short, it began to appear that Xinjiang’s political problems were intractable.

The Beidashan Incident

At the same time as the central authorities were showing a certain disregard for local susceptibilities in Xinjiang, an incident occurred on the Sino-Mongolian border that showed clearly the Chinese government's view that the solutions to the province's problems lay either in the international sphere or in the realm of standard pacificatory measures. To understand this it is necessary to look first at the sequence of events unraveling in northern and northeastern Xinjiang early in 1947.

Osman Batur, an important leader of the Kerei Kazaks, had originally allied himself with the ETR, but as early as the summer of 1946 he was in contact with the Chinese government, from which he hoped to receive arms in order to continue what he called his fight against communism.

Given the legend and myth that now surround Osman, it is difficult to establish his true motives in shifting allegiance from the ETR to the Guomindang—whether it was Soviet interference in the ETR, as he claimed, or the fact that he may simply have been an independent agent, involved in the Altai fighting for whatever advantage it would bring him and his followers. What is known is that Osman was one of several Kazak leaders who in 1946–47 began activities against the ETR in the three districts, and who received military and other aid from the Nationalist Chinese.

Chinese sources claim that Osman wrote to General Song Xilian in July 1946 offering to join the Nationalists in fighting communism. Upon hearing of his appointment as a “government official” on August 15, 1946, he was overcome with emotion and from that time on was committed to the Nationalist cause.⁷⁵

There is no indication that Nationalist military aid was given to Osman at this time, nor did he undertake any military action against Ili. He remained in the Altai District capital of Chenghua until November 1946.⁷⁶

In July 1946 another important Kazak leader, Ali Beg Hakim, had sent his representative to Urumqi to see Janimhan and Salis, the two Kazak members of the newly formed coalition government. The representative told the Nationalist government that Ali Beg Hakim and his people would resist Ili and cooperate with the Nationalists. As part of his resistance movement

against Ili, Ali Beg wrote literature for distribution among Altai Kazaks and elsewhere in Xinjiang, and he may have been the source of handbills that appeared in Urumqi in the winter of 1946–47.⁷⁷

After leaving Chenghua in November 1946, Osman's forces took part in at least one battle with the Ili forces on March 27, 1947,⁷⁸ and again on April 7, 1947, after which they withdrew from Gexiubao (Kurte) to Beidashan on the border between Xinjiang and Mongolia.⁷⁹

Complaints against Osman by the local people quickly surfaced. Burhan, the second vice-chairman of the province at the time, was sent on an inspection mission to the Altai in April 1947, accompanied by an Ili faction representative, Rahim Jan. At a meeting with people's representatives in the Altai on April 4, 1947, Osman was accused of stealing sheep and other animals, and demands were made for his arrest and punishment. Burhan reported on Osman directly to Chairman Zhang, but no action was taken, because no one could go against General Song.⁸⁰

Osman was joined at Beidashan by more Kazaks, so that by June and July he was leading some 1,200 families. Osman had not been able to bring adequate supplies with him, and it was reported that the Chinese were supplying him with sheep and flour.⁸¹

In May, the Mongolian government reported that a division of three hundred Han and Kazak troops had illegally entered Mongolian territory at Baytak Bogda, the Turki name for Beidashan, and had arrested and taken away some Mongol soldiers.⁸² The border in this area has been called "unclear."⁸³ Nonetheless, there were border posts in the area held by the Nationalists on one side and Mongols on the other, so that, although the actual border line itself was unclear, the soldiers in the area were aware of the approximate extent—if not the exact perimeter—of their own territory.

When Osman withdrew into this area from central Altai, he was camping on lands that traditionally had been summer grazing pastures used by both Kazaks from Xinjiang and Mongols from the MPR.⁸⁴ Osman's camp (according to most of the accounts cited below) was near that of Nationalist border guards stationed in the Beidashan area.

When the Xinjiang provincial government did not reply to Mongol demands⁸⁵ that the arrested soldiers be returned (it was, after all, a time of crisis for the coalition, due to Mesut's appointment), the Mongolians issued

an ultimatum. After forty-eight hours had expired, they sent four planes on June 5 to bomb the Chinese border guard's post at Beidashan. Bombing continued on June 6, 7, and 8; two Chinese were reportedly killed in the raids.⁸⁶

In explaining the attack on the border post, the Chinese held that the incident initially began as an attack on Osman, who had angered the Soviet Union and its MPR ally by rejecting the ETR and choosing to fight against it. Some Turki sources support this, as they record that Osman had been approached by representatives of both the USSR and the ETR during the winter of 1946–47. Osman, having twice rebuffed overtures from the Soviets, then became the object of attacks by Colonel Leskin, a Soviet-trained officer serving with the ETR army. According to Kazak accounts, Leskin had followed Osman from Altai to Beidashan, where he finally orchestrated the attack that led to the incident.⁸⁷

First reactions to the border clashes were guarded. The U.S. consul noted the delay in the Chinese announcement of the border violation. It was on June 11, 1947, that the Chinese Information Office first told foreign correspondents of the incidents, and they then simply said that Soviet planes had bombed Beidashan. They declined to give further details.⁸⁸

Indeed, the Chinese themselves at first seemed unsure of the actual location of Beidashan. One government report placed it 117 miles northeast of the town of Qitai, putting it right on the Sino-Mongolian border, but another report said the Mongolians had penetrated two hundred miles into Xinjiang to attack Beidashan.⁸⁹

On June 10, the Chinese lodged an official protest with both the Soviet Union and the MPR government, demanding immediate withdrawal of Mongolian troops from Chinese territory. The protest declared that Beidashan was garrisoned by loyal Han and Kazak troops, and that Soviet action had been aimed at intimidating the Kazaks into becoming pro-Soviet.⁹⁰

The official Mongolian statement, issued on June 15, declared that on June 5 Chinese troops had entered the MPR and proceeded 15 kilometers to Baytak Bogda (Beidashan), where they camped and then assaulted Mongolian border guards. In reply, the MPR troops had driven the Chinese out—after the Chinese had refused a Mongolian officer's request for them

to leave peacefully. Attacked with the aid of planes of the MPR air force, the Chinese had been driven back across the border, which was at no time crossed by the Mongolians. No mention of any Kazaks is made in the MPR report.⁹¹ Thereafter the incident petered out into an exchange of mutual accusations of border infringement by both the Chinese and the Mongols.

Regardless of what actually happened at Beidashan that June, the incident clearly established, first, that Chinese authorities were in direct contact with Osman and were supplying him with food and other materials. They were thus aiding a group that was in direct conflict with the Ili forces while at the same time participating with those same forces in the coalition government, which aimed at peace and stability in Xinjiang.

Second, the incident showed the basic conviction of the Chinese government that its problems in Xinjiang lay with the government of the USSR, and the government's willingness to capitalize on any incident that might attract international support to the Nationalist cause in its differences with the USSR and the MPR. It had the additional advantage of drawing attention away from the increasingly chaotic economic and political situation in China proper.⁹²

Once again, the Chinese interpretation of Xinjiang's troubles officially placed the blame on Soviet intrigue, the Chinese version of the Beidashan incident reflecting a basic political stand. Even before the Chinese themselves had been able to verify the details of the "attack"—or even to establish where the incident took place—the Chinese government had blamed the USSR and its MPR ally. Once the incident had been milked of all propaganda value, it was dropped from the news.⁹³

The Final Collapse of the Coalition

While the Beidashan incident was the temporary focus of attention outside Xinjiang, the people of the provincial capital—who read nothing about any such incident in their local papers—remained in a state of uneasy anticipation, unsure of what new developments Mesut’s appointment would precipitate.

As noted previously, the police, under Police Chief Liu Handong, had been given new powers to keep order in the capital early in June. As the month progressed, the accusations from the Ili group against Han domination of and discrimination in the police grew. Mohammed Tashen, Urumqi’s Third District police chief and one of the few local Moslems to hold such a high post, described the major problems that confronted non-Han serving in the police. Unlike their Han Chinese counterparts, Turki policemen were not issued weapons; orders issued by Moslem superiors were not obeyed by lower-ranking Han; some police business was kept secret from Turki officers; and even routine matters were sometimes restricted to Han Chinese ears.⁹⁴

Later in the month, these accusations were repeated, but there was now added to the list of grievances the denunciation of the secret police. According to the seventeen Moslem policemen who wrote to the *Minzhu bao* in Yining, the secret police remained active in the provincial capital and elsewhere. These policemen also complained of the interference of the army in police matters. The military was said to be the real power in the region, and to dominate matters that were properly the sole concern of the police.⁹⁵

Accusations of continued military interference in the government appeared in succeeding issues of the Yining papers. Despite the elections, wrote Ahmet Jan Kasimi, the real power at the county level remained the county company commander, who was invariably Han Chinese.⁹⁶ Since this was the case, he queried, what was the point of having elections?

In a move to limit the impact of such articles, no Turki-language papers from Urumqi were allowed to circulate in the area south of the Tianshan. Ili papers, according to Deputy Secretary General Abbas, were destroyed at the Manas River (the unofficial boundary between the three districts and the remaining seven) and the carriers imprisoned.⁹⁷

The issue of Han domination through the military and police was an important one. Since these two institutions remained primarily Han, they were a constant and obvious reminder of the Chinese position in Xinjiang. Relations among the nationalities took a turn for the worse.

On June 30, 1947, some 1,500 people gathered at the Uighur Literary Club in Urumqi to watch a Russian film.⁹⁸ Suddenly, there was the sound of a gunshot, and armed men appeared at the club's windows. Han Chinese entered the hall, shouting that they were looking for a certain official of the club. When he could not be found, they reportedly beat up the club's musicians before leaving.⁹⁹ Observers placed blame for this, and other minor incidents during the month of June, on the CC Clique's intriguing, but local Moslems considered all Han Chinese to be responsible for such events.

The general feeling of unrest, fed by rumored stories of such events, erupted into open revolt by early July. Serious riots, described in detail in the next chapter, occurred in the towns of Turfan, Shanshan, Toksun, and Bai. All of these were quickly suppressed by the Nationalist military.¹⁰⁰ Although Kashgar saw no open violence, the military there deemed it prudent to impose a curfew and to arrest potential agitators. The number arrested was variously estimated as between seventy and three hundred.¹⁰¹

Unlike the seven districts under Chinese military control, the government in Yining could boast of general law and order. The local government officials declared their intention to adhere to the terms of the peace agreement, and in the local papers they urged the Chinese to do the same. On July 1, an important mass meeting was held in Yining's West Park, reportedly attended by some twenty thousand people. It was addressed by five local government officials, among others.¹⁰² The meeting resulted in a joint declaration signed by leaders of religious and business organizations in the three districts and by each national minority cultural association in Yining, including that of the Han Chinese. The declaration stated that the people of the three districts had worked sincerely for peace, but that the "reactionaries" had not been sincere. As instances of this lack of good faith, the declaration mentioned the February riots, the appointment of Mesut, the continuation of the policy to print more money to offset Xinjiang's debt,¹⁰³ and the increasing taxation and inflation in the province. The declaration

then put forth seven demands: immediate implementation of the peace agreement and the GPP; Mesut's removal and also the removal of Janimhan, Salis, Hatije, and others; establishment of a truly democratic government in Xinjiang; an end to rumors; an end to the practice of printing more money; the government to stop terrorism; and, finally, the improvement of Sino-Soviet trade.¹⁰⁴

Failure to implement the peace agreement was a constant theme in these articles. If only the peace agreement were implemented, then the entire province would have peace. Blame for nonimplementation was placed squarely on the reactionaries in the provincial government who opposed Zhang's policy of conciliation and on the militarists in the province, led by General Song Xilian.

Zhang himself retorted in the *Xinjiang Daily* that the Ili area itself was the real reason that the peace agreement had not been implemented, an accusation later rebutted in an open letter to Chairman Zhang in the *Minzhu bao*, which went on to declare that there was no true democracy in Xinjiang, since the government and judiciary remained under Chinese military influence. If the central government did not intend to pay any attention to the Provincial Assembly, why bother even to convene one, since it obviously was powerless.¹⁰⁵

The author of the letter, religious leader Osman Damullah, further claimed that it was Ili that had reorganized, and thus implemented the peace agreement as required; yet the government had not carried out its part of the agreement with a similar reorganization. He asked that a special panel be set up to investigate the entire question of nonimplementation. Finally, he concluded with a plea to Zhang to carry out the terms of the peace agreement since it was his responsibility, as the representative of the people. In addition to carrying Osman Damullah's name, the letter bore the signatures of sixty other Ili residents.

The accusations and counteraccusations became heated during June and July; after violence finally erupted in towns near the provincial capital in early July, the new government under Mesut decided it was necessary to adjourn the Provincial Assembly, and an announcement to that effect was made on July 9.¹⁰⁶ A standing committee was organized to arrange for another session of the Assembly, at an unspecified date in the future.

Having no further official business in the capital, delegates left Urumqi after the announcement. Some chose to go to Ili for a visit, as a result of an open invitation extended to them by Ahmet and other members of the Ili faction. Almost immediately, delegates from Urumqi who had not taken up the invitation wrote to Ahmet, demanding an explanation for the action of delegates who had chosen to visit Ili. Ahmet's reply was simply that Ili was not "a foreign country," and that the delegates, being free to travel anywhere in the province, were now most welcome to visit Ili. He denied that any had been coerced to make the journey.¹⁰⁷

On July 29, 1947, some Ili representatives who had remained in Urumqi decided there was nothing more to gain by staying on in the capital and returned to Yining. Ahmet himself chose to remain for some days longer, but by August the coalition was in complete disarray. As he did not wish to work with the new chairman, Ahmet finally left the capital in August, bringing to end the period of coalition government in Xinjiang.

Although the coalition had ostensibly dissolved in a stalemate over Mesut's appointment, the principal reasons for its dissolution lay elsewhere. During the first months of the coalition, the personal prestige and character of Zhang Zhizhong had been instrumental in making it work. His departure from Xinjiang in January 1947, however, had left the militarists with a free hand. Despite Zhang's return to the region soon after the February riots, his position in Xinjiang was no longer the same. By then, the military dominated Xinjiang's political and governmental affairs through the garrison commanders, and General Song, more certain than ever that concessions were no longer of any value, had increased his own influence at the expense of Zhang's. Rumors of Zhang's probable removal as chairman did nothing to help the latter's prestige among the Turki people or his credibility among the Han Chinese in the province.

Zhang's trip to the south, which was supposed to boost public support for the government, had nearly the opposite effect. When near riots occurred in Kashgar, Zhang was forced to call on the Nationalist Army for protection and to preserve public law and order. Angry and defensive, he returned to the capital and took a much firmer line with the national minorities in his government.

Not only had Zhang's ability to influence or partially control the military decreased, but also his own confidence in his ability to influence events was shaken. If at this point he had received full endorsement of his policies from the central government, this might have renewed his confidence and prestige, so that his opposition to the militarist line would have been effective. But Zhang had already made his views on Xinjiang quite clear to the government: he believed that a degree of autonomy was the only feasible policy for the government to pursue in Xinjiang at the time, and he fully supported the idea of more national minority participation in government.¹⁰⁸ This was not in line with the view then held by the highest echelon of the Guomindang and the Nationalist government. No endorsement of Zhang and his policies was forthcoming. With Zhang's removal, a basic ingredient of any coalition disappeared: the will to govern in a spirit of compromise and concession vanished from the ruling faction in Xinjiang's government.

An equally important factor in the collapse of the coalition was the role of the military. The handling of the incidents during the winter of 1946–1947 was not forgotten by either the Han or the Turki population. To the Chinese, such occurrences were proof of the need for greater, not less, military control and fed their desire to see stronger Chinese military control in Xinjiang. To the local Turki population, the increasing military role simply supported suspicions that the Chinese would never allow home-rule in the region.

Rumors of Nationalist aid to Osman Batur—another policy favored by the military—indicated to many Moslems that their urge to mistrust Chinese intentions in Xinjiang was correct. By directly supplying the Ili faction's enemy, the Nationalist government undermined its own position and affirmed the continuation of its “divide and rule” policy in this border region.

Mesut's appointment was in some ways the proverbial straw and no more. His appointment was a symbolic gesture, but it was heavy-handed as it demonstrated that a local individual might be appointed to a leadership post in Xinjiang but would have to fit the proper mold and be a loyal Guomindang supporter, sharing Nanjing's political goal of maintaining Xinjiang as an intrinsic part of China for the foreseeable future. Being thus

a symbol of continued Chinese domination, Mesut was totally unacceptable to a people who, by 1947, were fully embarked on the journey toward a collective national consciousness.

CHAPTER 7

Xinjiang After the Collapse of the Coalition, 1947–1949

After the coalition disintegrated in the summer of 1947, Chinese militarists dominated Nationalist policy in Xinjiang. Under the direction of General Song, covert military action against the three districts began through the Nationalist's Kazak allies led by Osman Batur. At the same time, Zhang Zhizhong pursued the possibility of another diplomatic settlement with the estranged Ili delegates through an exchange of letters which began in September 1947. Although Zhang was no longer chairman of the province, he was still commander of the Northwest Military Region and continued to take an active interest in Xinjiang, attempting to use his influence with the Ili faction to bring it back into the coalition. As long as military action continued, however, there was no possibility of his being successful, as the letters from Ili, sent in reply to Zhang, indicate.

The political paradox of these two divergent courses typifies the ad hoc nature of the policies to which the Nanjing government was reduced by the late 1940s in the border areas. Desperate to maintain control over as much of China's traditional territory as possible, the central government fell back upon the only courses available.

Neither route led to conclusive results. The Ili government maintained independent control of the three districts throughout the remaining years of the Republican period, while Nationalist rule in the rest of the province became increasingly reliant on Chinese military garrisons to maintain Chinese supremacy. Kept at full strength, the military continued to antagonize the local population, fanning racial animosity and exacerbating inflation in the region.

This chapter discusses three major areas of political development in the last period of Nationalist involvement in Xinjiang, between 1947 and 1949. First, there were the attempts to reform the coalition. The Soviet Union

sought to mediate by bringing the Ili group and the Chinese to the negotiating table. When these efforts failed, Zhang Zhizhong entered into an exchange of letters with the Ili government, which also ultimately ended in failure.

The second area of interest is the course of events in the Ashan district, where anti-Ili Kazaks under Osman tried to regain control of what they considered to be their homelands, and to continue their avowed fight against “Communist intervention” in Xinjiang’s affairs.

Finally, a comparison is made of the two parallel administrations that developed in the region between 1947 and 1949—that of the Ili government in the three districts, and that of the Chinese government in the remaining seven.

The Soviet Attempt at Mediation

In March 1947, the Soviet Union once again involved itself openly in local Xinjiang politics. Following the February and March incidents in Urumqi, the Soviet consul there notified Liu Zeying, special commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Xinjiang, that the USSR was very concerned over recent events, particularly the police and military searches of private residences, arbitrary arrests, and confiscation of property and literature.¹ In the Soviet view, these actions contravened the peace agreement. The consul formally requested the Chinese government to look into the situation.²

On March 24, 1947, the Soviets sent a second protest to Commissioner Liu, asking that the Chinese fully implement the peace agreement which the Soviets had worked so hard to bring about in 1946.³

In the summer of 1947, as the situation in Urumqi deteriorated, the Soviets once again contacted the Chinese government through their consul at Urumqi. A Soviet memorandum of August 11, 1947, strongly criticized the appointment of Mesut, saying it was unacceptable to the local people, and condemned police and military attitudes toward Moslems as being contrary to the spirit of the peace agreement.⁴

The Soviets' last attempt to influence the course of events in Xinjiang through official channels came in November 1947 when the Soviet consul again wrote to the Chinese government. The communication was addressed to Zhang, however, and not to the new provincial chairman, who was, in the Soviet view, the cause of such trouble in the region. Specifically, the Soviets complained that Zhang himself seemed to be trying to protect police who were responsible for the deaths of some two thousand people in the Turfan area alone, where riots caused by Mesut's appointment had brought immediate, vengeful retaliation from the Han-dominated police force. As for their own role, the Soviets emphasized that they only wished to bring peace to the region; they expressed the fear that with the Chinese military constantly interfering and stirring up bad feelings, and with constant harassment of the population by both the police and the military, a return to peace was becoming impossible.⁵

These formal attempts by the Soviets to bring about a change in Chinese policy received no formal response, but informally they provoked

indignation. Liu considered them to be unwarranted interference in China's domestic affairs. This view is shared by Chinese authors Sun Fukun and Zhang Dajun—both of whom assert that it was the Chinese who were at this time trying to preserve peace while the Ili forces secretly plotted to destroy all prospect of peace for the region.⁶ In the circumstances, the effect of Soviet efforts at mediation made local Chinese officials in Xinjiang more intransigent.

Exchange of Notes Between the Ili Faction and Zhang Zhizhong

While the Soviets were thus making their opinions known, sporadic communication was established between the Ili government and Zhang Zhizhong. As the Ili faction did not accept Mesut's appointment, they were willing only to communicate with Zhang, whose return to the chairmanship they continued to favor.

After the last Ili delegates had returned to Ili in August 1947, Zhang wrote to the Ili group to defend Nationalist policy in Xinjiang and to accuse the Ili faction of having caused the dissolution of the coalition. He charged that the Ili faction had refused to adhere to the terms of the peace agreement because they had not implemented its military provisions; that they had refused to normalize relations between the three Ili districts and the rest of Xinjiang; that they had been instrumental in the massacre of Chinese in 1946 during the elections and in the February 1947 demonstrations; and that they continued secret efforts to expand their political influence and control into the remaining seven districts of the province.⁷

Zhang's outline of the alleged violations of the peace agreement by the Ili side was hardly conciliatory in tone. Similar points were made in Zhang's September report to the central government,⁸ indicating that Zhang's intentions in the letter to Ili may have been to defend his own role. Clearly, he attempted to place responsibility for reopening talks on the Ili group.

The Ili reply, dated October 16, 1947, and delivered to the Chinese via the Soviet consul in Yining, offered a succinct rebuttal of Zhang's letter. First, it listed six major Chinese violations of the Peace Agreement:⁹

1. The Chinese had not fulfilled their promise to reduce the number of central government troops in the province but, on the contrary, had increased the numbers from 20,000–25,000 in 1944 to 90,000 in 1947.¹⁰

2. No Peace Preservation Corps had been formed in Kashgar or Aksu.

3. Turki troops were not being treated the same as the Nationalist troops, as stipulated in the agreement; the Turki forces had received neither food nor ammunition.

4. The commander of the central government troops in Xinjiang incited and aided Osman Batur to attack the Altai area; and despite Osman's illegal

actions, he and his supporters in the provincial government continued to hold their posts.

5. The Chinese army, the police, and the San Min Zhu Yi Youth Corps interfered with elected officials, and arrests, beatings, imprisonments, and other oppressions carried out against the people on a large scale had become common.

6. Promises to abolish the secret police and to reorganize the local police so that the majority were Turki had not been fulfilled.

The letter also stated that obstruction to communications with the three districts was primarily from the Chinese side. For their part, the Ili party did concede that they refused to allow non-Turki-speaking officials to serve in the postal, telegraph, and customs service in the three districts. This was because Chinese officials sent from Nanjing and Shanghai not only could not speak local dialects but also demanded “squeeze.”

In reply to Zhang’s accusations of Ili-initiated incidents of violence, public demonstrations, and murder, the Ili party cited “large-scale massacres in Mustag, Turfan, Manas, Urumqi, and other places” perpetrated by the Chinese. They further accused the Chinese of following a policy of dividing the people of the region by disregarding local views on the appointment of Mesut and other government officials, and by stirring up enmity between races through “antagonistic and provocative posters.”

Finally, they offered four conditions that would have to be met before the Ili group would return to the negotiating table. These were: (1) End the oppression and torture of progressive elements in Xinjiang; (2) free all Moslem prisoners in jail and punish those who jailed them; (3) remove Mesut as chairman; (4) immediately implement the June 1946 peace agreement.¹¹

Zhang did not reply until December 9, 1947. He refuted the Ili charges and claimed that Nationalist troops in the region had been reduced in number. He further claimed that the Chinese were not aiding Osman. In addition to this defense of government policy in Xinjiang, he set up five conditions for the resumption of talks, namely, that Ili eliminate any irregularities in its territory; that the Chinese flag be flown and the Chinese language be used; that Ili’s military preparations and mobilization be ended; that the “East Turkestan Movement” and anti-Chinese propaganda end; and

that communications with the rest of the province be restored.¹² Plainly, neither side would give way.

In his letter, Zhang certainly exceeded the bounds of credibility. The number of Nationalist troops had, in fact, increased. The general public believed the Chinese to be aiding Osman and, as of 1947, the Kazak leader Ali Beg Hakim, to enable them to fight the Ili government; such aid was in fact admitted in official circles.¹³

Zhang's claims and demands had little impact on the Ili faction, which took ten weeks to reply and then, on February 17, 1948, restated the Ili position, repeating the main points made in the first letter. They again accused General Song of aiding Osman and demanded that Osman be handed over to the Ashan government for trial. They also protested the arrests of progressive elements throughout the province and especially in Urumqi, Hami, and the Nanjiang area (southern Xinjiang) where, the note said, the people were simply reacting against police brutality and oppression. Ili denied any connection with the revolts in Turfan, Shanshan, and Toksun which had broken out the preceding summer. Finally, they demanded that Mesut be removed so that the peace agreement could, at last, be implemented as intended.¹⁴

After conferring with colleagues at Lanzhou, the former chairman replied to the Ili letter on April 1, 1948, curtly asking why the Ili group had not replied to the five conditions set out in his December note. If the Ili forces were serious about entering into discussions and were ready to fulfill these requirements, Zhang wrote, then they should reply directly in order to show their good intentions.¹⁵

It was not until a long summer had passed that the Ili government wrote once again to Zhang Zhizhong. Unlike previous letters, this one did not come through Soviet channels. And, unlike the others, the note was reportedly conciliatory in tone.¹⁶

Although this letter offered some hope of an end to the stalemate between the Ili faction and the Chinese, no further letters were to be exchanged. By this time, the situation in Xinjiang was being influenced by events in China proper, where the Nationalist military position was quickly deteriorating. This forced the Chinese authorities to make conciliatory moves in Xinjiang, but the Ili government made no further reply.

The net result of the Zhang-Ili exchanges was to confirm each side in its original position and demonstrate that Zhang himself had moved into the militarist camp. The polarization of Han Chinese and Ili nationalists appeared complete.

The Kazak Card

A major stumbling block to Ili-Nationalist Chinese relations continued to be Chinese aid to Osman Batur. The interrelations of these Kazaks and the Chinese are not only highly relevant to the course of events in 1947–1949, but also an inherently interesting part of developments during these years.

In June 1947, Osman and his forces had figured prominently in the “Beidashan Incident,” but by the end of that month, the border clashes had ended. Osman remained with the Chinese Nationalist troops in the Beidashan area, but in September he and his men were moving north toward Ashan district.

According to Zhang Dajun, a former Chinese military intelligence officer who is well informed on Osman’s movements at this time, Osman attacked the little town of Fuyun on September 10. Osman claimed that he successfully fought off troops led by a Soviet commander, Stalinov, on September 13, and proceeded on the 16th to Chenghua, the capital of Ashan district, with forces from the Ili area under General Delilhan fleeing before him.¹⁷

In reporting this fighting to the U.S. consul, General Song noted that the Kazaks’ main motivation to go back north was to join their families who had been unable to accompany the fighting force when it moved south.¹⁸ An American official at Beidashan observed, however, that some 250 families had arrived with Osman and more of his followers soon joined him, eventually totaling 1,200 yurts.¹⁹

Song also claimed that Osman’s forces were not under his direct control, and that Osman and his men were acting without his and the Nationalist government’s approval.²⁰ In November 1948, however, U.S. intelligence indicated that the provincial headquarters of the military had finally stopped its supply of arms to the Kazaks.²¹ Thus there is little doubt that the autumn 1947 foray of Osman and company into the Ashan district was done with the knowledge and support of General Song and the central government.

That September, Osman regained control of Chenghua, the capital of Ashan district. His victory, however, was short-lived. According to Osman, who was in radio contact with the Chinese at the time, in October some one hundred trucks carrying two thousand troops and supported by six tanks

entered Xinjiang at Jimunai, a town on the Sino-Soviet border. These troops proceeded to Chenghua, via Burqun.²² By early November, Osman and his forces were being driven out of the Chenghua area. According to eyewitnesses—who, it must be pointed out, were brought to the U.S. Consulate to give their stories by anti-Ili members of the provincial government—the Soviet Red Army had assisted in the drive against Osman. One witness accused Depshaytov, the acting Soviet consul in Chenghua at the time, of being involved in this particular operation, which had been headed in the field by General Bolinov (a member of the ETR government) and Colonel “Madjoroff.”²³ Osman did not succeed again in taking any part of Ashan. He retreated to the Tianshan Mountains where he sheltered until leaving for Barkol in 1949.

Because of his long involvement in anti-Chinese, anti-government activities in Xinjiang, Osman’s reputation has grown somewhat out of proportion to the influence he actually had among Xinjiang Kazaks during this period. Other leaders actually commanded much larger followings. In 1947, for instance, Ali Beg Hakim led some 20,000 people,²⁴ in comparison with Osman’s following of 1,200 yurts or 5,000–7,000 people. Further, out of an estimated total Kazak population in Xinjiang of 450,000, 210,000 lived in the Ili district alone in 1944.²⁵ It seems the majority of Xinjiang’s Kazaks did not choose to oppose the ETR actively.

One reason behind support of the bulk of the three districts’ population for the ETR was that their government was a benevolent one. Life on a daily basis in the Ili area was more comfortable and a good deal more secure than in the other seven districts, which remained under Chinese control.

Xinjiang's Two Parallel Administrations

Despite the year of coalition rule in 1946–1947, the three Ili-led districts were not integrated into the province until 1950–1951. In effect, two administrations existed in Xinjiang throughout the period 1944–1950.

The East Turkestan Republic

From its founding on November 12, 1944, until the entrance of the PLA into the three districts sometime in 1950, the ETR government maintained itself as an independent Moslem state. Covering roughly 20 percent of the province, the ETR included some of the region's most valuable natural resources within its borders (see [chapter 2](#)). The ETR was home to 16–20 percent of the province's population.²⁶ The ethnic breakdown within the three districts was estimated as being 53 percent Kazak, 23 percent Uighur, and 24 percent smaller nationalities, including Mongols, White Russians, Manchus, Uzbeks, and Tatars.²⁷

As noted in [chapter 2](#), the three westernmost districts of Xinjiang had been the object of foreign interest in the previous century, with the result that these three particular districts had been ruled by special military commanders prior to their incorporation into the province as ordinary districts under Governor Yang. From the 1920s onward, the three had been part of the usual Chinese provincial system. As the largest administrative units under the provincial government, the districts in turn were broken down into counties (*xian*). In the urban areas, the old Chinese *baojia* system continued to operate, with one neighborhood leader responsible for the behavior of ten families. These traditional forms of Chinese government organization were retained by the ETR.

Like the Xinjiang Provincial Government of 1946, the ETR was also a type of coalition. Its members were representative of all nationalities resident in the three districts, except for the Chinese. Among these men were also varying political views, as will be discussed below. At the top of the ETR governmental hierarchy was a governing council of seventeen members, led by the chairman (called the “president” in Turki sources) and two vice-chairmen. Of the ten ministry heads, only four served on the council (see [table 11](#)).

In addition to this council, the government included an advisory council of seven religious leaders. The exact functions of this council were not stated, but its presence attests to the respect paid to Islam by the new government.

The majority of leaders in the ETR were Uighur-Turks who, despite differences in education and in degree of admiration for the USSR, gave their allegiance to the ETR's first chairman, Ali Han Töre, and his idea of an independent East Turkestan. Ali Han's involvement in the organization and establishment of the ETR drew both Uighurs and Kazaks into the new movement. According to most Turkic sources, Ali's prestige as a religious scholar and leader and his well-known stance as a Turki nationalist were fundamental to the movement in the early stages.²⁸

With Ali Han's disappearance in August 1946—an incident not yet adequately accounted for²⁹—his first vice-chairman, Asim Bey, another revered religious leader from a princely family of the Ili valley, became the head of government.³⁰ Assisting him was the Turkish-educated, anti-Soviet Anwar Musa Bey.³¹ These two remained at the head of the ETR until its union with the PRC in 1950. When Ahmet Jan Kasimi returned to Ili in August 1947, however, he assumed a leading position in government affairs in the three districts. It was Ahmet who carried on correspondence with Zhang Zhizhong on behalf of the ETR, for instance. Such duties would also have been part of his portfolio as minister of foreign affairs, the post he assumed upon his return to Yining in 1947. But his eminence derived also from his intimate knowledge of the Chinese, his travels to the cities of China proper, and his close working relationship with Zhang, established during his months in Urumqi.

Other members of the ETR government reflected the varying opinions and policies of the people of the three districts at this time. Some clearly favored a period of autonomy under Chinese rule while preparing for the region's eventual independence. Others were undoubtedly pro-Soviet, seeing in the USSR a modernizing state that could benefit the people of Xinjiang. But whatever the political views of individual leaders may have been, all were aware of the need to maintain good relations with the USSR, on one hand, and to maintain the ETR as a Moslem state, on the other, in order to ensure popular support for the movement. The top government posts therefore remained in the hands of well-known religious leaders such as Asim Bey and Anwar Musa Bey, chairman and vice-chairman respectively from 1947 to 1950.³²

Table 11

The Government of the East Turkestan Republic

Chairman Ali Han Töre, Uzbek^{*}
Vice-chairman Bolinov, White Russian
Vice-chairman Asim Bey Hoja, Uighur
Secretary General Mahsum

Members of the Governing Council

Aşim Bey Hoja, Uighur
Abdul Buti, Uighur
AN Halife, Uighur
Abdullah Ebu Maksum, Uighur
Kerim Haji
Bolinov, White Russian
Mansur
Ahmet Jan Kasimi, Uighur
Izhak Han Mura Haji, Kirghiz
Rahim Jan Selimoglu, Uighur
Salih Jan Bey
Juma Ahong
Anwar Musa Bey, Uighur
Fujia
Ebulhayir Töre,
Uighur Moskoloff
White Russian Huseyin Teyji

Ministry heads

Internal Affairs: Moskolov, White Russian
Finance: Anwar Musa Bey, Uighur
Law: Muhammed Jan
Foreign Affairs: Ahmet Jan Kasimi, Uighur
Education: Seyfettin (Saifudin), Uighur
Vice-minister: Hamdi
Agriculture: Ali Jan Bey
Religious Affairs: Salih Jan Bey
Information (propaganda): Minaigen Hoja
Banking: Gansip Hoja
Health: Muhettin Kanat, M.D., Uighur

Military Affairs

Commander of the ETR forces: Bolinov, White Russian

Vice-commander of the ETR forces: Izhak Han Mura Haji, ** Kirghiz

Chief of staff: Latif Jan Kanat, Uighur

Religious Affairs Council

Temur (Tiennai) Ahong

Lukman Ahong

Kansup Ahong

Sasar Ahong

Ma Sandaren Ma Liangpao

Special posts

Yining Police Chief: Yebi Jan

Yining District Special Commissioner: Asim Taj

Vice-commissioner: Abdullah Han

Commissioner of Military Law: Aini

Source: Zhang Dajun, *An Account of Forty Years Turmoil in Xinjiang* (Taipei, 1954), p. 82; also from information supplied by former Ili residents.

* The nationality of these officials is given where known.

** By 1947 Izhak Han was the military commander for all ETR forces.

The Soviet Role in the ETR

Some mention must be made of the interesting question of Soviet advisers and military personnel in the three districts during the period of ETR control. The picture presented by Turkic sources is of particular interest since they offer what seems a highly plausible account of the general course of events and of the Soviet role.

These sources say that the original organizers of the ETR had received assurances from the Soviet Union that it would not interfere in Ili affairs but would support Ili's fight for self-determination and for the establishment of a democratic government in Xinjiang. However, once the ETR was established and arms had been purchased from the USSR, the latter insisted on sending advisers into the area. Not only were military advisers sent, but also advisers arrived to aid in government administration. In other words, it is asserted that the Soviets sought to extend their influence in the three districts by building a pro-Soviet, or at least Soviet-oriented, government organization in the three districts.

Civilian advisers who are reported to have arrived from the USSR to aid the ETR in carrying out its operations allegedly included the following individuals: Muhsin (USSR Turk), counselor to Ali Han Töre; Gorki Mihalovic (Russian), finance adviser; Cafer Kari (USSR Turk), religious adviser; Abdullayoff (USSR Turk), education adviser; Ali (unidentified), interior affairs; and Vladimir Istepanovic (Russian), overall political adviser.³³

Chinese military intelligence had its own list of Soviet military advisers and commanders in the ETR military: Izhak Han Mura Haji, commander, ETR forces; Hasanlokov, military adviser; Zolun Tahir, vice-commander; Delilhan, vice-commander; Mevlanov, chief military adviser; and Bolinov, commander, Ili people's militia.³⁴

Part of the difficulty in ascertaining who was and was not a "Soviet" adviser—in either the military or in the government—is due to the presence of many locally born Russians and White Russian émigrés who were involved in both the ETR's government and military establishments. Such individuals and their families had relations with the USSR that were, by necessity, pragmatic. When in early 1946 the USSR decreed that it would

extend the deadline (to July 1946) for readmission to Soviet citizenship for any citizens of the former Russian empire or persons who lost their citizenship and were living in Xinjiang,³⁵ many White Russians took advantage of the offer. According to the British Consulate in Urumqi, two-thirds of the White Russian community there and an estimated 90 percent of the White Russians in the Ili area accepted Soviet papers.³⁶

Undoubtedly the motivation for the Whites was fear of Soviet reprisal if and when the Soviet Union again achieved a position of dominance in Xinjiang. Moreover, although many people took out Soviet papers, at the same time those who had Chinese citizenship retained it as well. However, by spring of 1947, most White Russians from the Ili region had sold their farms and businesses and were making the long journey to the Chinese coast or Hong Kong and the chance of emigration to safer climes.³⁷ Whatever compelled Xinjiang's Russians to take out Soviet papers, it does not appear to have been admiration for Communism or for the Soviet Union in general.

The holding of Soviet papers thus cannot be taken automatically to indicate pro-Soviet or pro-Communist political beliefs. The same may be said for a Soviet education, with regard to which several factors should be kept in mind.

First, for a Xinjiang Turkic language speaker, the choices of schooling, especially at the secondary level and beyond, were extremely limited. Other than the local Xinjiang College, described by observer Barnett as "rather a joke,"³⁸ the province offered no education beyond middle school. Virtually the only relatively nearby place offering higher education using the Turkic language as the medium of instruction and boasting comparatively modern methods was the Soviet Union. It is therefore hardly surprising to find that many able young men were sent into Soviet Central Asian republics to get an education. Under Sheng's rule, in particular, a sizable number were sent, with the object that when they returned they would be the vanguard of a modernizing, pro-Soviet elite in the region.

While education abroad does sometimes foster a love of the host country, its people, and its policies, this does not occur automatically and consistently in every case. In the final analysis, neither the "facts" of a

Soviet education or of Soviet citizenship offer adequate basis to label any particular individual in the ETR government a Soviet agent.

The individual who is usually so labeled is Ahmet Jan Kasimi, vice-chairman of the coalition provincial government and the ETR's minister of foreign affairs.³⁹ This accusation is based on the biographical information that Ahmet was Soviet educated, spoke Russian fluently, and had even taught school in the USSR—all of which information is correct. Ahmet was not, however, involved in any of the planning of the Ili rebellion. He was in prison in Urumqi from 1937 to 1944.⁴⁰ His political views expressed in both speeches and later writings are those of a Turki nationalist, intent on establishing a democratic, Moslem-majority government in Xinjiang. Lacking any more substantial evidence of his connection to the USSR as an agent, the only safe statement to be made about Ahmet's political beliefs is that he was able to speak forcefully, eloquently, and with evident sincerity for the Turki people; as to any other motivation behind his words, this must await more than purely circumstantial proof.⁴¹

Accusations in Chinese sources of Soviet connections also focus on four individuals in the ETR military. These four are General Izhak Han, General Bolinov, Colonel Leskin, and Colonel Mevlanov. Information on all of these individuals is fragmentary, but the following summaries of the available information shed a little light on just who they were.

The first man, Izhak Han (also spelled Izhart, Ishakjan), was forty-one at the time of the Ili rebellion; originally from Kashgar, he was of Kirghiz nationality.⁴² Like Ahmet, he was Soviet educated. While American sources state that he was originally sent into Xinjiang by the USSR to aid Sheng Shicai,⁴³ it is equally plausible that he returned to his own homeland to aid in the struggle against the Chinese for his own nationalistic reasons. The available evidence does not confirm either view.

More important in the Ili hierarchy was the White Russian General Bolinov. The fact that he was one of two vice-chairmen may reflect the key role that White Russians had among the fighting force of the ETR. Like other members of the ETR government, he, too, had been in prison under Sheng Shicai. Upon his release, he reportedly went to the USSR in 1940, remaining until 1944. Chinese sources claim that it was during this period

that he was trained by the Soviets to play an important role in the Ili rebellion.⁴⁴

Similar accusations of Soviet connections are made about Colonel Leskin, another Ili-born White Russian. Various reports to be an engineer and expert in motor transport,⁴⁵ Leskin was only involved with military operations, not with the civil government. Like Bolinov, he is an example of the contribution made by the White Russians to the ETR cause.

The fourth name, Mevlanov, is the one for which there is the least information. The fact that so little about him is recorded might indicate that, unlike the other three men, he was not locally born, and that he may actually have been a Soviet adviser, as suggested by Turki sources.⁴⁶

The existing evidence is insufficient to substantiate the accusation of "Soviet agent" against any of these individuals. However, it is clear in the cases of the Xinjiang-born leaders that they were not perceived as anything but Turki nationalists by their friends and fellow nationalists in the ETR.

Aside from the difficult question of individual motivation there is the larger issue of whether there were Soviet military units involved in the establishment of the ETR and in maintaining the independent status of the three districts. The Nationalist Chinese sources and many of the Turki sources already cited claim repeatedly that Soviet troops fought alongside the ETR military, and that at various times Soviet troops crossed the border to assist the ETR against the Chinese.⁴⁷

The two most neutral sources of information for this study disagree on this important and sensitive point. During Graham's visit to Yining in September 1946, he saw no Soviet troops at any time during the course of his motor journey from Urumqi to Yining; nor did he see Soviet troops in Yining, the capital of the ETR. His reports were corroborated by the independent American traveler and author, Barbara Stephens, who visited the Ili area in 1947 and reported no active Soviet influence in the ETR.⁴⁸

In contrast to this, a U.S. representative reported seeing small numbers of Soviet personnel in the Ili area during his visit to the region, and being told by Yining residents that some five hundred Soviet troops had left the city before his arrival.⁴⁹

In view of this conflict in opinions, it is difficult to resolve the question on the basis of the information now available. It must be pointed out,

however, that the question of identification of an individual as either a Soviet Central Asian or a Xinjiang Turki would be a difficult matter simply from observation alone, since the two are racially indistinguishable. Moreover, the ETR forces wore a Soviet-style uniform, further complicating the identification of troops as being from either the USSR or the ETR. If this confusion was intended, it was successful. There is little alternative but to treat all reported sightings of “Soviet” troops in the ETR with caution.

While clear identification of Soviet military units in Xinjiang remains problematical, another question of equal importance can now be answered with some certainty. This is the matter of whether the border between the ETR and the USSR was open during this period.

The Status of the ETR-USSR Border

On the question of the status of the ETR-USSR border during the existence of the ETR, again the two principal neutral sources disagree. The information presented here, however, based on British, Turkic, Russian, and Chinese sources, indicates that close commercial ties between the Ili area and the USSR resumed, and that in all likelihood this trade included the transfer of strategic materials.

There is no question of the strong economic ties that had previously existed between the three districts and the USSR. The Soviet Union was the natural trading partner of the region, absorbing vast quantities of local animals and animal products and making life in the Ili valley, in particular, profitable and comfortable for those trading with the USSR in the 1930s.

Further, the USSR offered the fastest and most convenient overland link to the outside world for Xinjiang residents. From 1930 onward, the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Turk-Siberian Railway made the trip to Beijing via the USSR the easiest and fastest land route to China and, in the opposite direction, to Europe.⁵⁰

By the end of the 1930s, Ili area trade with the USSR had made Yining dependent on the Soviet Union for various commodities.⁵¹ Unfortunately, there are no specific figures for Ili-USSR trade, but according to local residents the USSR was both the major market for the three districts' raw materials and the major supplier of manufactured goods to Yining, Chinese goods often being of poorer quality and prohibitively expensive due to transportation costs.⁵²

Whether cessation of this trade would have constituted extreme economic hardship⁵³ is difficult to assess without more data, but certainly having this market interfered with by the Chinese authorities would have displeased Ili merchants and brought about a severe shortage of manufactured goods for local consumers.

U.S. Consul Ward was convinced that the border between the USSR and the ETR had been deliberately closed by the Soviet Union in 1943 when Sheng Shicai had turned away from his Soviet ally. This border closure, Ward believed, had led to such economic difficulties in the three districts that open rebellion ensued in 1944. By keeping the border closed, tension in

the province would continue to rise, creating a more favorable climate for future Soviet action in Xinjiang—either in the course of Soviet involvement in the Ili region itself or in the event of future negotiations between the USSR and the Chinese government over economic concessions in Xinjiang or elsewhere.⁵⁴ As proof of the continued closed status of the border, American reports stated that the goods famine in Ili was more severe than in Urumqi, and that many commodities were more expensive in Ili than in the provincial capital.⁵⁵

This information is directly contradicted by British sources and local residents. Graham reported, after his September 1946 visit to the Ili valley, that staples like meat and lard (the latter not used by Moslems, of course) were half the price charged in Urumqi. Flour, which sold at Xn \$200 a pound in Urumqi, sold for only Xn \$45 a pound in Yining.⁵⁶ As Yining had the province's only flour mill, one would expect flour prices to be much lower there than in Urumqi, and such indeed was the case. British information is corroborated by former Ili residents who say that life in the three districts between 1946 and 1949 continued to be "normal."⁵⁷ Russian trade goods also continued to reach Urumqi during this period to replenish merchants' shelves, indicating that some commercial trade continued with China via the three districts.⁵⁸

Turkish, Chinese, and even Soviet authors corroborate the continuation of commercial trade, and most agree with the British reports that the ETR also received its arms from the USSR.⁵⁹ While Soviet sources make no mention of the fact that the USSR was the source of arms for the ETR, British reports state that the ETR purchased its weapons from the USSR, paying for them in flour and live animals.⁶⁰ Arthur Sabriog~lu, son of Mesut Sabri, confided to an American consular official that the Ili government received supplies from the Soviets on a barter basis in exchange for cotton, wheat, and hides, adding that it could get more if necessary.⁶¹ By 1948, rumors throughout the province claimed that the war materials used by the ETR were bought from the USSR using ordinary commercial agreements that called for payment in local goods.⁶² In the face of agreement among such disparate sources, it seems certain that the border was open, that trade resumed, and that the USSR was the ETR's supplier of war materials.

Since the USSR was the supplier, it seems highly possible that Soviet advisers accompanied the military equipment and that, in addition, civilian advisers were also assigned to the ETR government as suggested by some sources.

The ETR Government's Policies

The earliest statement of the aims of the “Three Districts Revolution” were first made public in the “Kulja Declaration.” Issued at the fourth meeting of the ETR government on January 5, 1945, it included nine articles. The first stated explicitly that the goal of the movement was to destroy forever Chinese despotism in the territory of the East Turkestan Republic.⁶³ The list of political goals and a basic political program were outlined in one of the nationalistic pamphlets distributed in the provincial capital in the summer of 1945, and included the call not only for an end to Chinese rule in Turkestan, but also total local control over the military and all cultural affairs.⁶⁴

Although the call to oust the Chinese from Turkestan supplied the initial impetus to the rebellion, by the time the peace negotiations began in September 1945, the political realities of the situation had asserted themselves. In order to exist, the ETR had to come to terms with both its powerful neighbors, the Chinese and the USSR. It did this through the signing of the January 1946 Peace Agreement and participation in the Provincial Coalition Government. Formally, at least, this ended the secession of the three districts from the Chinese state.

By 1947, however, it was apparent that the ETR continued its de facto existence, administering the three districts without reference to the provincial government in Urumqi. After the summer of 1947, it was the sole author of policy for the area under its control. The three districts were, indeed, in General Zhang's words, “going their own road.”⁶⁵

In the following sections, six aspects of the program and policies pursued in the ETR are examined. These are the Islamic nature of the government, the military, economic affairs, agriculture and industry, social welfare, and political organizations.

The Islamic Nature of the ETR Government

Islam provided the basis for unity within the ETR, where over three-fourths of the population were Moslems. As many of the pamphlets and circulars already cited indicate, the desire to secure freedom of worship and official recognition for the status of Islam was one motivation behind the formation of the ETR, and the establishment of religious freedom was a basic tenet of the ETR government. During the peace negotiations, the Ili delegates had been intent on securing complete religious freedom, which was ultimately listed as one of the eleven points in the final peace agreement. Clearly, any government that sought to establish itself on the basis of popular support in Xinjiang would have to include protection of religious freedom and, in particular, respect for the Islamic religion.

The fundamental importance of Islam in the ETR is seen in both the leadership and the governmental organization. First, the two leaders of the ETR, Ali Han Töre and Asim Bey Hoja, were both Islamic scholars, known throughout the three districts for their scholarship and their dedication to Islam. Second, the majority of members in the new government were also Moslems and included several men who carried the title of Hoja (teacher), Haji (pilgrim), or Ahong (religious leader).⁶⁶

In terms of government organization, the importance of Islam is seen in the formation of the Religious Council. On this council were five Ahongs and two Chinese Moslems. Although the actual function of this council remains unclear, the respect being shown to Islam through its creation is obvious.

Further, the ETR included a special Ministry of Religious Affairs. The minister, Salih Jan Bey, was one of only four ministers who also served on the seventeen-man council.

The importance of Islam can also be seen in the symbols of government: the flag of the new republic incorporated the Moslem crescent and star. The people of the area demonstrated their solidarity with the Islamic-led government by wearing badges bearing the same Islamic symbol,⁶⁷ and gold and silver badges bearing the star and crescent were given as tokens of honor and friendship among the various allies of the ETR, especially in the first year.⁶⁸

The Military

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the ETR army was, for most of its existence, led by the Moslem commander Izhak Han Mura Haji, who was also on the ETR Council. Assisting him were vice-commanders Bolinov and Leskin, both of whom were ethnic Russians, probably trained in Russian-style military methods and organization. In addition to these men, there were also Soviet advisers present with the military, although the extent of their control after 1945 was probably limited since the USSR's position by September 1945 was to discourage further military action by the ETR.

Military tactics adopted by the leaders of the army included guerrilla-type attacks on Chinese units, the avoidance of large garrison towns like Qingho in favor of smaller, easier targets, and the practice of cutting off supply and reinforcement routes. It is not surprising, therefore, to read in one Chinese source that "Communist" tactics were used during the Ili rebellion.⁶⁹ These tactics, however, were also traditionally favored by the Kazak groups who initially formed the bulk of the ETR fighting force, and they were the tactics best suited to the situation in Xinjiang. They proved to be extremely effective as well, for Chinese resistance fell away before the ETR onslaught in 1944–1945.

In terms of military organization, the ETR army appears to have followed Soviet forms. However, the ETR placed considerable reliance on its Kazak cavalry units: six out of the ten known regiments were Kazak groups, and these retained their own forms of internal organization.

Discipline among the ETR forces was apparently good. Soldiers observed in the three districts were said to be well behaved,⁷⁰ and soldiers of the ETR in the provincial capital serving as bodyguards to the Ili members of government were also of good conduct.⁷¹ The contrast in behavior between the ETR and Chinese troops was yet another source of positive propaganda for the ETR government.

Soviet influence can most clearly be seen in the ETR uniforms and equipment. The soldiers of at least some units sported a Soviet-style uniform, with the buttons clearly marked "VTR"—the Cyrillic initials for ETR.⁷² Equipment used by the ETR varied. It included Chinese weapons captured from the garrisons overrun by the ETR in 1944–1945 as well as

Russian- and German-made guns bought from the USSR by the Turkestan government. Other sources mention the presence of machine gun and mortar companies.⁷³ For transport, the ETR had horses and Russian-made trucks, as well as the airplanes that had been captured at the Yining airfield, although there is no evidence that these planes were ever used to fight the Chinese.

Neither the uniforms nor the equipment used by the ETR prove Soviet instigation of the rebellion, but they do demonstrate the extent of Soviet material aid to the ETR during its crucial first year.

Estimates of the ETR's total military forces have varied. Up to forty thousand men may have been involved at the height of the fighting within the three districts in 1944–1945.⁷⁴ After the coalition government was formed, the ETR continued to maintain some ten to twelve thousand troops in the three districts,⁷⁵ facing some ninety thousand Nationalist Chinese troops in the other seven districts.

The odds would seem to have been much in favor of the Chinese, but in the circumstances this was not actually the case. First, the Chinese had to maintain a large number of troops in the southern part of the province, which, they feared, could erupt into open revolt, following the Ili example. A sizable number also were retained in the provincial capital, so that the number of troops that could have been mustered for an attack on the Ili region was strictly limited. Furthermore, the Chinese belief that the Soviet Union remained behind the ETR led the Chinese to maintain a strictly defensive stance, using only proxy troops like those of Osman Batur to engage in open conflict with the Ili area.

Second, the Ili forces enjoyed several advantages. They knew the terrain well and enjoyed the advantage of mobility, as many of its units were fully mounted. The Ili men were also high in morale and committed to a cause that combined powerful nationalistic and religious feelings. In contrast, the Chinese troops suffered from chronic low morale: they were rarely paid, and many, having been brought from China proper, were unaccustomed to the extremes of the Xinjiang climate and the local food.

Well-disciplined, highly motivated, and generally supported by the local population, the ETR standing force of ten to twelve thousand men would

have been an adequate army after 1946. Additional units of Soviet troops appear to have been unnecessary, in the circumstances.

Economic Affairs

Financial affairs were the province of Minister of Finance Anwar Musa Bey and Minister for Banking Management Gansip Haji. In recognition of the importance of finance, Minister Anwar Bey was also a member of the council, a distinction not shared by the minister for banking. There was no special ministry for trade and commerce, so presumably these matters were also handled by these two ministries.

The Ili region was a particularly wealthy area, a source of great mineral wealth, particularly gold. From 1945, the government controlled the Altai gold mines, which would have afforded it a considerable national reserve. The government printed its own money,⁷⁶ which was doubtless backed by the gold from its own mines, but it also allowed the free circulation of the Russian ruble and the provincial currency. In fact, the amount of provincial currency in the three districts was considerable. U.S. Consul Ward in Urumqi had been informed by Mr. Lo Zhimai, manager of the Xinjiang Commercial Bank, that just prior to the Ili incident he had sent Xn \$7,000,000 “in new notes” to their branch bank in Yining.⁷⁷

Table 12

Comparison of Price Increases in Yining and Urumqi, 1941–1947 (All prices in Xinjiang dollars)

Year	Flour per 100 jin		Sheep per jin	
	Yining	Urumqi	Yining	Urumqi
1941	180	–	20–30	–
1942	200	–	20–30	–
1943	240	–	80	–
1944	250	–	110	–
1945	2,400	–	190	–
1946				
Oct.	3,500	20,000*	180	800
Nov.	–	24.000	–	–
Dec.	–	43.000	–	–
1947				
Jan.	3,000	50,000	350	–

Year	Flour per 100 jin		Sheep per jin	
	Yining	Urumqi	Yining	Urumqi
1948				
May	–	–	–	40,000
Dec.	–	12,000,000	–	–

Sources: Yining figures are from Chen Li, *An Account of the Yining Incident* (Taipei, 1977), pp. 11–12. Urumqi figures are from Zhang Dajun, *Seventy Years*, 12:7079, and from PRO F15627 and PRO F3236, citing Graham’s September 24, 1946, report. Figures for 1948 for Urumqi are taken from *Xinjiang Daily*, May 15, 1948, p. 3, and December 13, 1948, p. 3.

* This price was 20,000 per 100 pounds.

Further, the ETR also for a time enjoyed a financial subsidy from the provincial government. After the signing of the peace agreement, the three districts were once again counted as an ordinary part of the region; as such, they were entitled to district budgets provided by the provincial government. This subsidy was given to the governments of the three districts until July 1947 when the Mesut government voted to stop funds to the three until they conformed to provincial laws and regulations.⁷⁸

With regard to taxation, firsthand sources declare that the ETR levied no tax on the inhabitants. This, they have explained, was because taxation is contrary to Islamic law.⁷⁹ If so, government income derived from the printing of its own money, from the takeover of the local mining industry, and from the provincial government itself between 1945 and 1947.

As previously stated, the ETR suffered little from the effects of inflation, prices in the area remaining stable and much below those of the other seven districts. According to Soviet sources, prices were five to twelve times lower in Yining than in Urumqi.⁸⁰ This is confirmed (unintentionally) by a Chinese source, which, in seeking to record inflation’s course in Ili, demonstrates that the Soviet statement is basically accurate.

The prices listed in [table 12](#) indicate inflation’s influence, as would be expected in an area affected by military disturbances and interruption of usual trade. But the rate of inflation as revealed in these figures appears small in comparison with the inflation then being suffered by Urumqi residents and elsewhere in the seven districts. This comparison of prices, based on Chen Li’s figures for Yining and on figures from Chinese and

British sources for Urumqi, supports the Soviet statement on inflation in the three districts.

Banking in the ETR was carried on by local banks, which also handled the agricultural loans made by the ETR government to farmers throughout the three districts.⁸¹ Yining also had a branch of the Soviet State Bank, “Gosbank,” to facilitate trade and financial relations between the ETR and the USSR.⁸²

Local residents attest to the normalcy of life during the period in question. Importantly, there was no economic panic, as was the case elsewhere in Xinjiang in 1948–49. Generally, the economic situation in the three districts was an excellent source of propaganda for the new government. A popular view of the Ili position is given in the following description:

The most effective propaganda for the rebels was, however, the picture of their economic position as it was gradually coming to be viewed by the “man in the street” in Tihwa [Urumqi]. In this city, for instance, 100 catties of flour cost Xn \$5,000 (or Cn \$25,000); in Ining [Yining] so it was said in Tihwa, the same amount of much superior Ining flour could be bought for Xn \$1,000 (Cn \$5,000). Other types of food were rumored to be equally cheap; trade was brisk, work was easy to procure, and people who were hungry could always, if it were necessary, live on the numerous wild berries and fruits of the oasis, which they could also sell on the local markets. The insurrectionist “government” was a popular one, and a *modus operandi* was asserted to have been set up under which exports to and imports from the neighboring Alma Ata District of the Kazak SSR were possible.⁸³

With regard to the development of trade, according to a Soviet source, one of the first acts of the new government in Yining had been to resume trade relations with the USSR.⁸⁴ Undoubtedly, as discussed earlier in this chapter, trade was carried on with the USSR during this period, although the exact extent and nature of it remain unknown. In Yining in 1946 it was possible to buy white Soviet sugar for Xn \$700 a kilo; in comparison, Urumqi’s population paid Xn \$1,600 a pound for “dirty yellow sugar.” Many other Soviet goods unavailable in Urumqi were plentiful in Yining, attesting to the continuation of commercial trade between the three districts and the USSR.⁸⁵

A certain amount of trade also continued with the seven districts of Xinjiang. Small amounts of flour arrived in the provincial capital from Yining, mostly for use by government officials. The few visitors to the Ili region between 1944 and 1949 also noted the movement of trucks carrying animal skins and some Russian-made luxury goods. According to former Urumqi residents, Russian textiles continued to reach Urumqi via Yining during the 1946–1947 period, as did a limited amount of Russian manufactured goods.⁸⁶

Agriculture and Industry

The ETR government sought to promote development in both agriculture and industry. Contrary to what may have been expected in some quarters under a government with Soviet advisers, the government did not carry out any Sovietization or collectivization;⁸⁷ indeed, confiscated property, seized by the Chinese during Sheng Shicai's rule, was returned to individual owners by the ETR.⁸⁸

To aid agricultural development, the government reportedly gave government loans and seed to farmers.⁸⁹ It also encouraged land reclamation and irrigation projects. Soviet author Mingulov asserts that the area under cultivation rose from 251,000 hectares in 1941 to 375,000 hectares in 1948; and that the grain harvest rose from 212,000 tons to 295,000 tons in the same period.⁹⁰

Various industrial enterprises continued to operate throughout the period. Yining's tannery, flour mill, and brewery operated normally. The city had electricity and telephone service for at least parts of the day.⁹¹ Reportedly under the direction of Soviet engineers, the gold mines of the northern Altai also continued to produce.⁹² Reports of mining operations continuing at the important tungsten mines at Fuwen and Wenquan also exist.⁹³ As there was no local means of refining or processing any of this raw ore, it all had to continue to find a market in the USSR, which had been the consumer of such natural resources prior to the Ili rebellion. Coal mining doubtless continued in the region as well, as it was an easily available fuel and necessary as a source of heating in the bitterly cold winters.

Social Welfare

Government-supported schools operated at all levels up through secondary, with classes taught in the various local national languages.⁹⁴ According to one source, classes were able to resume normally by September 1, 1945.⁹⁵ The ETR government also encouraged a literacy drive,⁹⁶ thus adopting one of the characteristic progressive policies for the period.

For much of 1946–1949, the three districts boasted newspapers in five languages—Turkish, Russian, Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese.⁹⁷ While the quality of the news in these may not have been of international standard, the main Yining paper, *Azad Sharki Turkestan*, did receive TASS reports.⁹⁸

Two hospitals served the people of the Ili area, and Soviet sources write that a medical school, dispensaries, and maternity homes were established under the ETR. In the area of public health, “the incidence of typhus was arrested.”⁹⁹ Homes for the old and the homeless were reportedly established, and aid to families of military personnel was given.¹⁰⁰ Although some former Ili residents expressed opposition to what they considered to be Soviet interference in the districts, this interference certainly did not cause any deterioration in their standard of living, and it appears that life in the ETR was probably a good deal more comfortable than life in the rest of Xinjiang.

Political Organizations

The main Turki political organization in the three districts was the Yashlar Tashkilati, variously translated in English-language sources as the Young Turki Party, the East Turkestan Youth Party, or the Turki Youth Party. This organization was also active throughout the province on behalf of the ETR. At the height of its strength, it claimed a membership of some 300,000 throughout Xinjiang. This was a highly nationalistic organization, definitely in favor of establishing an independent Turki homeland in Xinjiang. The rules of organization comprised fifty-four articles which were presented to the government in Urumqi in an attempt to get the proposed organization registered. It is noteworthy that this request was never formally dealt with. Evidently the nationalistic character of the group was too strong for the provincial officials, who, however, could hardly say so when the party was already operating in a large way in Ili.¹⁰¹

This organization saw the Ili rebellion as much more than a rebellion against unjust rule; it viewed the accomplishment of the ETR as nothing less than a revolution, referring to the uprising as the “November Revolution” in the party’s articles filed in Urumqi. It sought to democratize Turki youth, to consolidate the gains of the revolution, and to continue to work for the total withdrawal of Han Chinese from East Turkestan.¹⁰² It represented a political challenge to the Guomindang, which itself had only been operating in Xinjiang since 1943. As an indigenous Turki movement it threatened to undermine the entire base of Guomindang activity within Xinjiang.

In the summer of 1948, the Yashlar Tashkilati was superseded by a larger organization, the name of which is evocative of the 1940s’ atmosphere—the Union for the Defense of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang, referred to in this work as the Democratic Union. The mission of this organization was, to quote from its own statement, published in Yining on August 1, 1948: “To advance freedom and peace among the people, to carry out the Peace Pact [peace agreement] concluded on June 6, 1946, to investigate and punish the adventurers who violated the Peace Pact, and to coordinate the work of all those who work for the public good and love peace.”¹⁰³

The original members of this organization, representatives of religious circles, cultural associations, and youth groups, also put forward twelve demands which amounted to a basic political program, incorporating the rights promised to Xinjiang's people in the peace agreement and the GPP.

Although this organization was nationalistic, its aims signaled a substantial shift in attitude on the part of the leadership of the three districts. While calling for the implementation of the peace agreement (now a constant theme in all Yining's official statements), it also declared that it would fully assist and support the central government "in all its truly progressive undertakings."¹⁰⁴ The Democratic Union may thus have been a partial response of the Ili leadership to the quiet overtures being made by the Guomindang in the summer of 1948¹⁰⁵—a response that was cautious recognition of both the changing fortunes of the Nationalist Army in China proper and the need for the three districts to come to terms with the Chinese. Its broader base also was designed to appeal to a wider spectrum of Xinjiang's Moslem population, and thereby to bring the ETR greater popular support.

This was also in harmony with the mediating influence of Soviet advisers in the ETR government. The Soviets were involved at this time in trade negotiations with the Chinese concerning mineral rights in Xinjiang as well as the continuation of the Sino-Soviet Airline Agreement, which was due to be renewed.¹⁰⁶ During these negotiations, it would have been in Soviet interests to encourage the development of a less openly nationalistic organization to replace the Yashlar Tashkilati. Whether with Soviet blessings or not, the overwhelmingly nationalistic and religious Yashlar Tashkilati was submerged in this newer organization based on a wider vision of democracy and on a call for all races—including Chinese—to work together in building a new Xinjiang.

In the six areas of government activity described above, the ETR apparently enjoyed considerable success. Its Islamic character appears in the choice of leadership, in the structure of government, and in the symbols of government, which were all clearly in the Moslem tradition.

In its military organization, the ETR army was successful on several counts. It had secured its main, immediate object of forcing the Chinese out of the three districts and preventing a Chinese counteroffensive. It

successfully rallied support from among the local population as it swept toward the provincial capital. Further, during the years of coalition rule and until its dissolution in 1950, there were no complaints recorded against the ETR military for poor discipline or conduct—completely in contrast with the Chinese forces. Despite Soviet influence, the credit for their military success accrues to the rebels themselves.

Financially, the region contained enough natural wealth to form the basis of an independent economy and to pay for all needed imports. In comparison with the other seven districts, the ETR successfully controlled inflation, keeping it to a level that made it among the lowest in China at the time.

In trade, the ETR achieved a major goal of local Turks in reopening commercial relations with the USSR, thereby ending any hardship caused by cessation of trade. In agriculture and industry, there was some development, although the exact extent remains unclear. In the area of social welfare, especially in education, there was some advance.

In terms of political organizations and activity, a slight mellowing of the ETR's political stand—probably a result of Soviet influence—can be seen in the formation of the Democratic Union in Yining in 1948. It should be noted, however, that although this union professed itself willing to work with the Chinese central government, it also reiterated the ETR's determination to carry out the peace agreement and to punish those who had violated it. Since Zhang Zhizhong had already reaffirmed the Chinese government position that the Ili government was at fault for not implementing the peace agreement, the stalemate on this issue continued.

In these six areas, the ETR could rightly take pride in achievements that improved the lives of its citizens and gained the new government a positive reputation among much of the Moslem population of Xinjiang. Between the autumn of 1945, when fighting between ETR forces and the Chinese ceased, and the spring of 1950, when the area was joined to the People's Republic of China, the far northwestern districts of Xinjiang maintained an independent government that, by most accounts, offered its Moslem inhabitants a benevolent rule, free of the corruption, inflation, and political unrest that characterized life in the remainder of Xinjiang province.

There is no doubt about the presence of Soviet advisers in the ETR. However, while such advisers evidently counseled the government and the

military on many aspects of policy and organization, policy implementation does not indicate exaggerated Soviet influence in the three districts. What is clearly indicated is that with respect to external policy, Soviet advisers were most likely a conservative force, advising restraint in ETR dealings with the Chinese. Manifestly, it was in the Soviet interest to continue to act as a conservative force as it had done in September 1945 when it counseled negotiation rather than armed conflict with the Chinese. Later, it was also in their interest to encourage the development of the less nationalistic Democratic Union and to urge the leaders of the ETR to use political education to expand the influence of the ETR while awaiting both further Chinese concessions and greater popular support for the ETR objectives in the more populous southern half of the province. With the backing of the powerful Soviet Union, the leadership of the ETR found itself at an advantage in dealings with the Chinese, so that, despite their “riding the tiger,” they were able to bring to an end the influence of the Nationalist government in the three districts. This was indeed the goal.

The written statements of the leaders of the ETR evince a sincere desire for democratic local control over provincial affairs and for both government reform and modernization. Under the leadership of Ali Han and Asim Beg Hoja, the ETR was a symbol of the Turkic dream of an independent Islamic state that might one day cover the whole of Xinjiang and unite its Turkic people under one democratic government. Whether or not the leaders and the ETR itself came under the domination of Soviet advisers in the later period of its existence, the ETR nonetheless represented the political aspirations of an increasing number of Turkic people in Xinjiang. As such a symbol, its existence fueled the growth of Turki nationalism elsewhere in the province and undoubtedly contributed to the difficulties the Chinese experienced in maintaining control in the other seven districts. As will be seen in the following pages, many of these difficulties stemmed from a continuation of past Chinese policy and political abuses which, coupled with a deteriorating economic situation, led to continued unrest and disturbances between 1947 and 1949.

The Mesut and Burhan Administrations: 1947–1949

Dr. Mesut Baykozu Sabrioglu¹⁰⁷ was sworn in as the first native-born chairman of Xinjiang province on May 28, 1947. From the first days of his chairmanship, the administration was marked by bitter opposition to his appointment, led by the Ili faction and its supporters both in Urumqi itself and in other districts throughout the province. This opposition was met by military force. For example, the July 1947 riots in the Turfan area were put down with considerable bloodshed. This crackdown, carried out by the predominantly Han Chinese military and police, served to provoke further opposition and exacerbated existing tensions so that use of the military became the only means to maintain law and order during the months of Mesut's administration.

Mesut's appointment was intended to reconcile national minorities to central government control in Xinjiang, but the effect was virtually the opposite: law and order deteriorated; corruption flourished as never before; inflation soared; and splits developed among the national minority members of the new government in the face of Mesut's inability to solve any of the region's major problems or to forestall ever greater Han domination in the government in Urumqi and, through the still fully deployed Nationalist Army, throughout the province.

Mesut had a reputation in the nation's capital as a "leading advocate of Turki autonomy."¹⁰⁸ In the course of his administration, his cultural policies indicated this. However, the government he led was dominated by Han Chinese, many of whom had long served in Xinjiang and who therefore had established themselves in positions of considerable power. Added to this existing hierarchy of Han Chinese, new Chinese appointees were sent out by the central government to bolster the overall Han role in Xinjiang's government and to tie the region's government organization more closely to that of China proper.

It is clear that Mesut became a figurehead for his predominantly Han administration. General Song Xilian (who remained as the commander of the Chinese Nationalist troops in Xinjiang), Liu Mengchun, and the Guomindang party head, Chen Xihao, increased their influence and power within the highest echelons of government, their names dominating in

newspaper accounts of provincial news and of meetings of the Provincial Government Council. The central government also increased its own direct influence under the Mesut administration through its own appointees, who regularly attended the meetings of the Provincial Government Council. Inevitably this Han domination led to the new government attempting to fit Xinjiang into the mold of an ordinary Chinese province, closely bound to the central government.

With the increase of Han domination in the provincial government, the military's power and prestige grew. Policies favored by the military—including the ruthless and immediate suppression of any opposition to the government in the seven districts—were pursued more openly.

Under Mesut, the GPP and the peace agreement were dead letters. Without an adequate financial base, few programs called for in the GPP could be implemented. The Ili faction continued to regard the peace agreement as the proper basis for peace; but neither the ETR government nor any other faction thought there was much hope for its full implementation. By the summer of 1947 an atmosphere of acute mistrust precluded either side's moving any closer to fulfilling their part of the agreement.

This section examines the new Han-dominated provincial government under the titular leadership of the ailing Mesut, and the policies pursued by his government. It also notes the major problems of his administration—maintenance of law and order, deterioration of the local economy, an increasing inflation rate, corruption, and, in the last months, scandals that rocked the government and led in part to Mesut's replacement by Burhan Shahidi in January 1949.

The New Mesut Government

During Mesut's administration, there were several important changes made in the provincial government, both in personnel and in overall governmental organization. These changes are particularly interesting because they demonstrate the realization by the central government of the need for at least token national minority participation in local government. At the same time, these changes also show the general consensus in Nanjing that Xinjiang must be more closely bound to the central government through whatever means available. These means included, first, concentrating key provincial government posts in experienced and trusted Chinese hands and, second, continuing to station large numbers of Nationalist Chinese troops in the region.

Local Moslems who had served in high posts in Zhang's government were retained under Mesut. These included the Ili members of government who, despite their refusal to serve under the new chairman and their return to Ili in the summer of 1947, technically remained in their posts. (See [table 13](#), which includes the absent Ili members of government.)

The five new national minority members of government demonstrate unspoken central government criteria for such office holders. First, the new appointees were locally born, educated individuals who were devout Moslems if not Moslem religious leaders; second, they were known to the local Moslem community and were, at least formerly, of high standing. In response to demands from people in southern Xinjiang for representation for the South in the highest levels of provincial government, at least one individual was chosen on the basis of geography. Finally, and most importantly, the new appointees all had long-standing associations with the Guomindang and the Chinese authorities.

Finding individuals to satisfy all or most of these criteria reduced the field of candidates considerably. The central government ultimately had little choice but to select men who were known as Turki nationalists but who nonetheless satisfied most Chinese requirements. The first such appointee was a new vice-chairman, named at the end of July 1947. He was Abdul Kerim Han Maksum, a Uighur from Kashgar, a city which had not been represented at the provincial level of government previously. Abdul

was a businessman and former Chinese-appointed district officer, so, like Mesut, he had appropriate experience working with Chinese officialdom.

Second, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Mesut's colleague from Chongqing days, was appointed the new secretary general, replacing the powerful Liu Mengchun. The third Turki nationalist with a long-standing connection with the central government, Mehmet Emin Bugra, was appointed to the provincial government as minister of reconstruction. The other key ministerial posts of administration, finance, health, and education already in national minority hands were unchanged and continued to be under the direction of Jelaleddin Wang Cengshan, Janimhan, Delilhan, and Seyfettin respectively.¹⁰⁹

In early August 1947, an eighty-year-old Moslem religious leader, Ma Liangjun, a Hui from Urumqi, was appointed to the post of controlling inspector, the highest provincial post in the Control Yuan.¹¹⁰ This appointment appears to have been made as a gesture of good will toward local Moslems. Ma did not attend government meetings and was rarely mentioned in the press after the initial announcement of his appointment.

Table 13

Mesut Sabri's Administration

Chairman—Mesut Sabri, Uighur

Vice-chairman (Sr.)—Ahmet Jan Kasimi, Uighur

* Vice-chairman (Jr.)—Abdul Kerim Han Maksun, Uighur

* Secretary General—Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Uighur

Vice—Abdul Kerim Abbas, Uighur

Vice—Salis, Kazak

Minister of Administration—Jelaleddin Wang Cengshan, Hui

Vice—Rahim Jan Sabri, Uighur

Minister of Finance—Janimhan Tilevbayoglu, Kazak

* Vice—Bai Wenyu

Minister of Education—Seyfettin Azizi, Uighur

* Vice—Chen Fangbo, Han Chinese

* Minister of Reconstruction—Mehmet Emin Bugra, Uighur

Vice—Gu Jianji, Han Chinese

* Minister of Social Affairs—Liu Xiaoli, Han Chinese

Vice—Ardeni, Mongol

Minister of Health—Delilhan Sugurbayog~lu, Kazak

Vice—Ma Shuqi, Hui

Ministers without Portfolio

Liu Yongyang, Han Chinese

Guan Zeliang, Han Chinese

Abdul Kerim Resit, Uighur

Zhong Tihua, Han Chinese

Osman Batur, Kazak

Ali Han Töre, Uighur

Izhak Han Mura, Kirghiz

* Minister of Information—Liu Mengchun, Han Chinese

* Comptroller—Gui Xixi, Han Chinese

** Special Central Government Representatives to Xinjiang*

Liu Zeying, Han Chinese, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jia Shanju, Han Chinese, representing the Control Yuan

Head of Xinjiang Province Guomindang—Chen Xihao, Han Chinese

Commander, Xinjiang Garrison Command Headquarters—Song Xilian

Vice-commander—Tang Bigang

Commander, South Xinjiang Garrison—Zhao Xihuang

* Inspector-General, Xinjiang Province—Ma Liangjun

Mayor of Urumqi—Chu Wu

Chief of Police, Urumqi—Liu Handong

* A new government appointee and/or a new post in the provincial government.

The new national minority appointees were an important part of government policy designed to show Chinese awareness of Moslem demands for greater local participation in government. However, while minorities were placed in highly visible government posts, at the same time the provincial government was made broader based and more comprehensive in its organization by the addition of new government posts, nearly all of which were firmly in Chinese hands.

The only Han Chinese appointed to an existing ministerial post was Liu Xiaoli, who became the new minister of social affairs, replacing the Manchu, Zhao Qienfeng. In the position of vice-minister there were two changes: the new vice-minister of finance was Bai Wenyu, Han Chinese,

replacing a Hui, and in education the new vice-minister was Chen Fanbo, a Han Chinese who was replacing another. One new Chinese minister without portfolio was added to the existing list, Mr. Liu Yongyang, who took an active part in the new government's day-to-day business.

Of greater consequence were the new government organizations added in the early months of Mesut's administration. A new Government Information Office (Xuanchuan Weiyuan Hui) was established in September 1947, with former Secretary General Liu Mengchun as chairman. This brought the influential Liu back onto the Provincial Council, where he was to remain until 1949. The provincial government also added the office of the comptroller, the head of which was new Han Chinese appointee Guo Xixi. And during the winter the government created a third new entity, the new Xinjiang Construction Commission.

The first of these, the Government Information Office, was set up in part to investigate rumors and public accusations. Brief reports emanating from this body occasionally appeared in the press, mainly in connection with the riots that occurred during the summer of 1947 and other incidents of antigovernment activity. Members of this committee were drawn from among government employees, many of whom, like the chairman, Liu, had served in the previous administration.¹¹¹

The second new post, that of comptroller, was necessitated by two factors. First, Janimhan, the Kazak who had replaced the coalition government's first finance minister (Lu Yuwen) in August 1946, was illiterate in Chinese, a handicap that understandably led to problems within that ministry.¹¹² Rather than remove this popular Kazak leader, a new Chinese comptroller was appointed—a prerequisite for improved financial policy. Second, in 1947 the economic situation was already experiencing difficulties as a result of the division of the province and the economic deterioration in China proper. It was no doubt felt that an individual more experienced in financial affairs was required if any control over the local economy was to be exerted. The new comptroller, like the new head of the Information Office, Liu Mengchun, regularly attended meetings of the provincial government.

The third new organization was the Xinjiang Construction Commission, whose members were drawn from those people holding other government

posts or previous government employees. At the December 1, 1947, meeting of this group, some 160 people gathered to hear the chairman, Mesut, and the garrison commander, Song, speak on the need for unity among all Xinjiang's nationalities in order to ensure the rapid development of the whole province.¹¹³ The chairman of this new group was Chen Fangbo, who also served as Seyfettin's vice-minister of education. Reports on the functions of this group tend to be primarily rhetorical, repeating the call for unity and other political slogans. No concrete plan of action was announced, other than to petition the central government for increased economic aid to the Northwest.

Another group that had previously existed but was reorganized under Mesut's administration was the Commodity Prices Control Commission (referred to hereafter as the Price Commission). By early 1948, in response to the deteriorating economic situation, this body began to meet regularly. The principal members were Secretary General Isa and nine Han Chinese drawn from the police and the government.¹¹⁴ The chairman of this group also was the still-powerful Liu Mengchun; under his direction the Price Commission attempted to exert some control over what increasingly became a chaotic economic situation. Its work reports are referred to in detail in the following pages.

All of these new bodies were dominated by Han Chinese. No pretense of proportionate representation of minorities—or even of token Turki presence—was made in any of these ministries or commissions; all of them remained Han-dominated groups throughout the Mesut administration.

By broadening the structure of the provincial government, the central authorities gave wider scope for Han participation in government posts at the top of the scale in Xinjiang. The presence of more traditionalist administrators in the provincial government generally and on the Provincial Council in particular served to increase Han authority in the government.

In addition to the important changes mentioned above, the central government decided to send its own representatives to participate in the day-to-day governing of the region. Two special appointees were sent to Xinjiang in the summer of 1947. Liu Zeying (who had served in Xinjiang previously) represented the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Jia Shanchen, also Han Chinese, represented the Control Yuan. Both men had the title of

“special commissioner,” and both attended virtually every meeting of the Mesut government, their names receiving special mention in the regular newspaper accounts of the provincial government sessions.

Further, the Guomindang itself was now directly represented at government sessions by the local provincial head of the Guomindang, Chen Xihao. The military also sent a direct representative to attend these meetings in the person of Vice-Commander of the Garrison Command Tang Bigang. Finally, the mayor of Urumqi, Chu Wu, a central government appointee, was also in regular attendance

The expansion of membership by those mentioned above, plus the new ministers, vice-ministers, and “special commissioners” of the central government, meant that Han Chinese dominated the provincial government. Further, the Ili faction did not return, and its continued absence left only the China-leaning Turki nationalists to oppose the more traditional and militaristic moves of the new provincial government. This Han domination led to disaffection even in some of Mesut’s staunchest supporters, who ultimately deserted him because of his inability to bring democratic and representative government to the region.

Elections for District Inspectors-General

Another facet of central government policy at this time was to continue the pretense of democratically elected government. Autumn 1947 saw another flurry of election activity in the province. This time, the post of district inspector-general was to be filled by election rather than appointment.

In charge of these elections was the minister of administration, Wang Cengshan, who traveled throughout the seven districts during September–October 1947 supervising election activities. Only partial results of these elections were published. According to Wang's subsequent reports, there were difficulties in the election process in some areas due to communication and transportation problems, so possibly some of these elections were never completed. The available results are given in [table 14](#).

The net result of the elections that were completed was to put pro-Guomintang men and women into these posts. Hatije and Yolbars were both considered totally within the Guomintang pocket; in the one instance where a Moslem Hoja was elected, his two assistants were both Han Chinese. In Yenki, the victory of a Han Chinese was surprising, as this was a virtually 100 percent Moslem city; the election of two Uighurs as his assistants was less so.

There is a clear pattern in the available election results of apparent concern for achieving an ethnically balanced slate of officials. In almost every instance either a Han Chinese was combined with two Moslem assistants or vice versa. This may indicate Chinese concern over local susceptibilities, but it gives a certain artificiality to the election results that tends to support Ili charges of untoward Chinese interference in local elections. At best, the most that can be said for the elections is that they were held and therefore show some awareness on the part of the government for the need for a democratic-type structure in local government. However, the results point out clearly that Han dominance was the goal of the central government.

[Table 14](#)

Partial Election Results: District Inspectors-General, 1947

District	Post	Person
Yenki	Inspector-General	Zuo Shuping, Han *
	Assistants	Nadir Jan, Uighur Halit Rasid, Uighur
Aksu	Inspector-General	Sayit Mehmet Hoja, Uighur
	Assistants	(Unclear), Han (Unclear), Han
Hami	Inspector-General	Yolbars Khan, Uighur
	Assistants	Chen Shouping (Unclear),? Han Ali Beg, Uighur
Urumqi	Inspector-General	Hatije Kadvan Hanim,
	Assistants	[Hatewan] Kazak * Dun (unclear), Han Lee (unclear), Han

Kashgar Election committees were only organized in October. No election results announced.

Sources: Information on the Yenki and Aksu elections is from *Xinjiang Daily*, October 5, 1947; Hami and Urumqi elections from *Xinjiang Daily*, December 3, 1947, p. 1; Kashgar notice from *Xinjiang Daily*, December 17, 1947, p. 3.

* Chinese-appointed incumbent.

Xinjiang's New Delegates to the National Assembly

The force of Turki nationalism had grown in Xinjiang by 1948, the year of the second National Assembly in China. Despite government attempts to ensure that pro-China and pro-Guomindang individuals were given government posts, pro-autonomy Turki nationalists sprang up in the most unexpected places. The most important instance of this phenomenon was among the delegates chosen to attend the 1948 Assembly. The fifty-five delegates included thirty-six Uighurs and only nine Han Chinese, with the remainder drawn from among the region's other smaller national minorities; alternates included twenty-nine Uighurs and sixteen Han (table 15). Of the one hundred chosen, fifty-three were serving government officials, and nineteen were former government employees. Of the others, some represented the Guomindang while others were school and education officials, representatives of various cultural associations, and journalists.

In addition to these official delegates, there were also representatives from various professions. Among these were representatives of the Kazak allies of the Nationalist Chinese, including Osman Batur's son Serziman as well as the pro-Chinese Kazak leaders Hamza Ucar Comusbayoglu, Koksegan Karipoglu, and Delilhan Jan Altay.¹¹⁵

Table 15

Xinjiang's 1948 Delegates to the National Assembly (percentages do not equal 100 due to rounding)

Nationality	Number	%	Alternates	%
Uighur	36	65	29	52
Han	9	16	16	29
Kazak	1	1	1	1
Hui	4	7	5	9
Tajik	1	1	1	1
Kirghiz	2	3	2	3
Mongol	1	1	1	1
Uzbek	1	1	0	0
Total	55	95	55	96

Source: Xinjiang Daily, April 12–23, 1948, p. 3.

Despite what was probably careful vetting of these representatives, the views expressed by some of the delegates at the National Assembly were critical of Chinese action in Xinjiang. The predominant view among them was that Xinjiang people did not want separation from China, but they did want a return to the liberalization begun under General Zhang Zhizhong. According to one delegate, Xinjiang had progressed more in two years under Zhang than in the past ten.¹¹⁶ Indeed, the chief delegate, Ibrahim Mittin, declared in an interview that Zhang's policy of patience and understanding was the main reason for Xinjiang's loyalty to China.¹¹⁷ Although this delegation was less outspoken than the 1946 delegation led by Ahmet Jan Kasimi, they nonetheless echoed demands for democratic liberalization made by the previous representatives.

The Increased Military Role

In addition to strengthening Han Chinese dominance through the expansion of the provincial government, Mesut's administration also saw a distinct strengthening of the Han-dominated police and military. Although Zhang Zhizhong contended in his letters to Ili that the Chinese military presence in Xinjiang had been reduced since Sheng's time, the number of Nationalist troops remained at around ninety thousand in the province during this period.¹¹⁸ The military abuses referred to previously expanded and continued under Mesut, and by 1948 the revitalized arrogance of the Chinese in their dealings with the local population caused some observers to despair of the future prospects of the region if it remained under Chinese control. Shipton, British consul in Kashgar in 1948, reported that elected officials were not given opportunity to exercise power, which continued to emanate from local Chinese military garrisons to the exclusion of local officials. He lamented that the Chinese were "failing tragically to make use of a rare opportunity to establish peace and contentment."¹¹⁹ The role of local military commanders had become dominant in most garrison towns, and, with more hard-line men in positions of power in Urumqi, the military was able to increase even further its influence under Mesut.

The military was given opportunity to display its newly extended military power in July 1947 when the army was called upon to quell anti-Mesut riots in Turfan and neighboring counties. The severity of the military action in this instance caused a reaction even among the Turki nationalists in the Mesut government.¹²⁰ Secretary General Isa Yusuf Alptekin became an outspoken critic of the Mesut administration as a result, and the assertions of the Ili faction that Mesut would be dominated by the Chinese appeared already to have come true.

Under Mesut there was a clear reversion to the traditional Chinese means of maintaining order—the use of military force. This was done at the cost of further disaffecting local Moslems as well as members of Mesut's own government. Ironically, it was under the first native-led administration that the military again emerged as the predominant power in Xinjiang.

Major Problems of the Mesut Administration

One of the immediate problems for the new chairman and his government was the reestablishment of law and order, which had seriously deteriorated from the first announcement of Mesut's appointment in May 1947. To counter increasing unrest, the Urumqi police chief, Liu, proclaimed on June 10 that under special powers given him by the central government in their recent proclamation on "Temporary Measures to Safeguard Public Order," he was empowered to arrest anyone creating rumors or plotting disturbances. Liu particularly condemned the pamphlets that were being circulated in Urumqi denouncing members of the provincial government. This inflammatory type of writing was not to be tolerated, and the persons involved faced arrest and punishment "without forgiveness."¹²¹

The above proclamation was not only an instance of increasing police powers. The new orders were also an example of the province's being required to conform to national standards. Despite the difficult and unusual situation faced by the Chinese in the region, the central government was determined to treat Xinjiang as an ordinary Chinese province.

In view of the increasing tension in the provincial capital, another proclamation was issued in Urumqi on July 20 to preserve peace in the capital. The police announced new, harsher penalties for anyone "disturbing the peace." This now included anyone participating in a riot, or anyone who had knowledge of a riot and did not act to stop it. New regulations gave citizens the right of arrest and the obligation to inform the government of any suspicious activity. They also outlawed distribution of reactionary propaganda, the spreading of rumors, and the use of terrorist methods.¹²² In Kashgar the local government went so far as to declare that capital punishment awaited anyone revolting against the government.¹²³

Proclamations were of no use, however; despite the breadth of the new powers, in several counties near Urumqi serious rioting began in July. In Toksun on July 10 rioters attacked a police station. This was followed in Turfan with an attack on the Chinese military garrison on July 13. The disturbances soon spread through nearby towns in Toksun and Yenki counties. In its report on these riots, the Xinjiang Garrison Command emphasized a connection between the "rioters" and the ETR, saying that the

participants carried East Turkestan flags. It named Turfan County Magistrate Abdul Rahman and Uighur Association leader Naman Han as leaders of the riots, which were not quelled until the end of July.¹²⁴

After Chairman Mesut made a personal visit to the riot-torn areas some months later, he reported that fifty-one local people had died, eighty-seven “rioters” had been killed, and thirty-six had been arrested. There had been considerable damage to local homes and crops, and many animals, mainly horses, had been killed. An unknown number of people had fled the area, including the leaders of the three counties in question; their flight appeared to confirm, to Mesut and others, their guilt in planning the disturbances.¹²⁵

This immediate and vengeful military crackdown in July 1947 was difficult for the Turki nationalists in the new government. Mesut, a reform-minded individual who was much concerned with aiding his native land, could not curtail Chinese military action in July or in later incidents. An indication of the pressure this placed on him and the other Turki nationalists in his government appeared in an interview between U.S. and British representatives in Urumqi and Isa, Mesut’s secretary general and old friend. In mid-November 1947, Isa arranged to meet with both men to discuss the “oppression of Xinjiang natives.” According to Isa, the main instances of this oppression were the imprisoning of innocent Turks and the use of force and intimidation so that only pro-Chinese were elected to government posts. He also expressed anger that no effort had been made to end intermarriage between Han men and Moslem women, and he added that the name “Xinjiang” was abhorrent to the local people as a symbol of Han domination, and that the name “Turkestan” was the only acceptable title for the Turks’ homeland.¹²⁶

Isa also made two proposals to the British and U.S. consuls that reflect the extent of his disenchantment with the Chinese at this point. He asked first that the USSR be prevented from taking over Xinjiang, a fear perhaps made more real by recent Nationalist Chinese losses on the battlefields in China proper. Second, he requested that the consuls ask their governments to persuade the Chinese to give the native people “real self-government and facilities for development and to stop oppressing them.”

Isa also declared that the majority of Xinjiang people “would be willing to sacrifice their life and possessions for a fair measure of self-government

and freedom.” He clearly believed that the government under Mesut did not represent any improvement for the lot of the local population; if anything, it was a step backward, away from the self-government promised by the Chinese in the new constitution. Rather than leading the region toward democracy and majority Moslem rule, the province was more than ever being dominated by the Han Chinese, and reform was now at a total standstill. Isa’s appeal to foreign governments to aid in curtailing Chinese abuses and persuading them to allow true self-government is certainly a measure of both Isa’s concern for his native land and his disillusion, at this early date, with the new administration.

Intermarriage was a perennial problem in Xinjiang. In southern Xinjiang, some attempt was made to deal with the chronic difficulty it caused. In September 1947, Kashgar Military Headquarters announced that soldiers who were not Moslem were not to marry Moslem women.¹²⁷ In a further conciliatory move, local commander General Zhao Xihuang attended ceremonies to celebrate the birth of Mohammed and made a speech urging his men to respect all people. He also admonished his men to respect and obey their superiors, whether they were Han or Turki.¹²⁸

The question of intermarriage remained explosive, however. As Shipton pointed out, with ninety thousand soldiers and almost no Chinese women available, it was expecting rather much that these men remain celibate for periods that reached, in some cases, more than ten years.¹²⁹ Nonetheless, few cases of violence were actually reported in the press. In October or November 1948, a Han Chinese was murdered in Urumqi for marrying a Moslem girl.¹³⁰ As such cases generated discussion in the press, it would appear that actual murder as a solution to end such marriages was rare in the provincial capital at least, since this one incident was the only one given such publicity in the Urumqi papers.

Cultural Policies

While law and order policy was basically a matter for the Chinese police and military units, policy with regard to cultural development was entrusted as far as possible to supporters of Mesut, Isa, and Mehmet's brand of Turki nationalism. According to Isa's memoirs, one of the first moves of the new administration was to remove all Russians and all leftists from government posts, replacing them with democratically oriented Moslems wherever possible. For example, Isa notes that the Uighur version of the *Xinjiang Daily* had been in "reactionary hands" but was now returned to the hands of the former editor, Polat Turfani Bey. Polat was advised to use the term "Turkestan" to refer to Xinjiang, so that for the first time in history, according to Isa, the proper name of the region was publicly used.¹³¹

In schools, lessons in Turki history were introduced. In publications, people were encouraged to print new magazines and papers and to write about Turki history, culture, and language to educate the local people in their own cultural tradition. Further, Mesut encouraged the establishment of libraries. Teachers from all schools were invited to Urumqi so that Mesut and other Turki nationalists could lecture them on Turki history and the need for unity among the Turks. They emphasized the commonality of all Xinjiang Moslem Turks, playing down the divisions caused by variance in life-style.¹³² According to Isa's record, these activities incurred Chinese wrath. He writes in particular of the impact of this cultural activity on General Song Xilian, who, with Isa, attended a conference in Urumqi in the winter of 1947. At this conference, Isa heard Song say: "At first, we did not notice. Now, it is understood that this nationalism is more dangerous than the leftist group (the Russian). For instance, the leftists do not belong to a religion or a nation. All they want is to take power. But the nationalists are taking over on all fronts (i.e., literature, language, history) from the very roots; they are trying to poison the people."¹³³ In the circumstances that pertained in Xinjiang in 1947–1948, Mesut could only work in cultural spheres and, in a limited way, in political organization; but even these efforts led to negative reaction on the part of Chinese leaders.

Political Struggle

The deadlock between the Ili faction and the Chinese continued under Mesut, but political struggle intensified in Xinjiang between the Guomindang and the Turki nationalist organizations. Given the strength of the Chinese military, and the clear evidence of its willingness and ability quickly to crush any armed resistance to the new provincial government, anti-Chinese sentiment found its major outlet in Turki political organizations.

As noted in an editorial in *the Xinjiang Daily*, the Guomindang had only been organized in Xinjiang since 1942, and the “Three Principles of the People Youth Corps,” under the leadership of Isa, was only organized in 1946. Neither organization had long experience or extensive membership in the region, but in 1947 the Guomindang attempted to increase its influence and that of its youth branch. Guomindang Provincial Party Chairman Chen Xihao became more visible; his name became more prominent in the local Chinese press, and he regularly attended all meetings of the provincial government in 1947–48, a change from Zhang Zhizhong’s administration.

At a well-publicized meeting in Urumqi during September 1947, the Guomindang and its youth branch called on the young of Xinjiang to support and aid society, to unite all national minorities, to aid in construction of a new society, and to support national defense. As the *Xinjiang Daily* observed, however, few people really understood the meaning of the “Three Principles of the People”—they knew only of the slogans, not the work, of the Guomindang.¹³⁴

Despite Guomindang efforts, its membership and that of its youth branch were never large in Xinjiang; although local people did join other quasi-governmental organizations (such as the cultural groups that originally formed under Sheng Shicai and emerged as a base for Turki nationalism in the 1940s), interest in the Guomindang remained low. The reasons for this were partly local distrust of what was basically a Han Chinese organization, despite the presence of Isa and other representatives of national minorities. But also the Guomindang had a major competitor in the thriving Yashlar Tashkilati of the ETR.

In contrast to the relatively recently founded Guomindang, there was a history of Turki nationalistic organizations in Xinjiang, dating from the time of Sheng's rule. The Yashlar Tashkilati was only the latest expression of this phenomenon. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this organization had applied for registration as a political organization; despite the lack of official recognition, which was never forthcoming, the party grew throughout the province. According to Chinese military intelligence, the financial basis for this expansion was provided by monies given to the three districts as part of their share of provincial funds, as called for in the peace agreement.¹³⁵

This and other nationalistic Turki organizations were viewed as a serious threat in Urumqi. To counter their growing influence, the Guomindang began a drive to gather members for its youth organization, but the Turki organizations were clearly of greater attraction. For example, General Song expressed his growing concern over the agitation for government reform of a "small number" of youth in the autumn of 1947 and also mentioned that some local youths had chosen to leave for the ETR, making clear the powerful lure of the independent region. Song implied in his speech that these young people had left because they were involved in illegal activity in Urumqi—specifically by interfering in people's democratic rights and forcing them to join their organization.¹³⁶ But it is clear from Song's expression of concern that by autumn of 1947, the political struggle between the Turki nationalists and the Guomindang over Xinjiang's younger generation was deepening, and clearly the struggle was going against the Han Chinese.

The Economy: June 1947–December 1948

As elsewhere in China, the deteriorating economic situation strongly influenced implementation, and local acceptance, of government policy. A major handicap in dealing with provincial finances had been the minister of finance, Janimhan, who was eminently unqualified for his position. It was necessary for the government to appoint a qualified assistant, which they did in the person of the new vice-minister, Bai Wenyu, and a comptroller, Xinjiang's first. With provincial financial matters being handled by these two individuals, the minister himself increasingly devoted his attentions to the Xinjiang Native Products Company. Although Janimhan did attend governmental meetings regularly, the province's budget for 1948 was presented to the government (and probably prepared) by Vice-Minister Bai.¹³⁷

In the autumn of 1947 the major economic problems facing the government were the thriving black market and the shortage of grain due to problems of transportation and hoarding in the grain-producing south. With regard to the first problem, the Urumqi Mayor Chu Wu cautioned the government against prohibiting the black market. Any such action, he declared, would lead to the total disappearance of many goods from the local market;¹³⁸ his advice was followed, thus enabling the affluent of Urumqi, mainly Chinese officials, to continue to buy such luxury items as Russian sugar and cloth and Chinese tea.

The government was also much concerned with continuing the rice supply to Urumqi. In October 1947 it allotted 500 million dollars to buy rice in order to ensure an adequate supply for the capital during the coming winter.¹³⁹ Further, Janimhan proposed that the use of grain for making wine be strictly prohibited to help ensure adequate grain supplies. Mesut concurred, urging Xinjiang people to support the government in this measure.¹⁴⁰

Despite such measures, by December 1947 inflation had increased. An editorial in the *Xinjiang Daily* noted that everyone in the province now suffered from the increase in prices: within only one month, November 1947, prices had doubled. Hardest hit were low-level government employees and teachers who continued to receive preinflation salaries. The

local paper called upon the government to ensure adequate livelihoods for such individuals.¹⁴¹

As prices doubled, hoarding became a major problem. The government passed new regulations to prevent hoarding from totally disrupting the availability of food supplies in January 1948. According to the new directive, each household would be allowed to retain a certain amount of supplies on a monthly basis. Anyone holding supplies in excess of government-established limits would have to sell the excess to the government at 80 percent of its market value. Police were given the right to inspect houses to carry out this order.¹⁴²

Further, the government decided that it was necessary to limit the charge for transport of grain from the south; it announced that the price of transport would now be fixed and declared that with transport problems overcome, there would be an adequate supply of grain for everyone. They admitted that there were shortages of many goods in the capital and in many other areas of Xinjiang, but this was blamed on shopkeepers who refused to sell goods due to general unrest.¹⁴³

There were other factors, however, in the refusal of many shopkeepers to sell their goods. For instance, in early 1948 the government prohibited transporting, buying, or selling gold.¹⁴⁴ This was an attempt not only to control prices but also to limit the use of Soviet gold coins, a popular currency throughout the province. The new regulation did not have the desired effect of stabilization but increased reluctance to accept Nationalist currency. In the spring of 1948, troops stationed in Kashgar received six months' worth of back pay, further driving up prices in the south and increasing local resistance to accepting Nationalist currency.¹⁴⁵

The currency exchange rate was another factor in the refusal by locals to sell their goods. Despite the terrible inflation rate being experienced in China proper, rendering the fabi a currency of dubious value, the exchange rate between Xinjiang dollars and the fabi had remained at Xn \$1 to Cn \$5. As a result, remittances between Xinjiang and the rest of China came to a standstill in early 1948.¹⁴⁶ Despite repeated requests for a resumption of remittances from local merchants, trade with the rest of China ground to a halt, except for the black market, which continued to thrive.

In April prices temporarily stabilized, but by this time the price of staples had soared, as indicated in the case of wheat, whose price per charak (20 pounds) rose from Xn \$3,000 in July 1947 to \$8,000 in November, \$16,000 in January 1948, and as high as \$40,000 in April.¹⁴⁷

In public, the government increasingly followed the line that a major cause of the region's economic problems lay in the people's hearts: their own fears were causing many of the province's difficulties, announced Price Commission Chairman Liu. He urged people not to believe rumors and to be assured that government economic support, in the form of spring plowing loans and coal subsidies, would soon help to resolve the situation.¹⁴⁸

In August 1948 the central government announced that the entire country would change over to the gold yuan note. The new exchange rate for the Xinjiang dollar was set at Xn \$3,000 to two gold yuan.¹⁴⁹ At this announcement, the availability of goods immediately dropped, and the local economic situation suffered yet another setback. By October, the provincial government found it necessary to ration available food supplies in the capital. According to new regulations, each person was entitled to buy a total of thirty jin of flour or six sheng of rice a month.¹⁵⁰ Supplies of tea, sugar, and cloth were to be sent into the province from neighboring Gansu to offset shortages.¹⁵¹

Although the government attempted to reassure people that the shortages were not critical,¹⁵² unrest over price controls and rationing grew. As a result, by November the government yielded to public pressure to lift price controls on many items, but the rationing of grain, coal, and meat continued as the economy declined. By December, the price of flour reached an astronomical Xn \$12,000,000 per one hundred jin, and the government decreed that it would begin to handle the sale of flour itself to ensure availability of supplies at this new price.¹⁵³

By the end of 1948, any remaining confidence in Mesut and the Chinese Nationalists had ebbed. Mesut's removal in December 1948 was probably an attempt to place responsibility for the area's economic woes on his shoulders. Certainly, in the ever shifting circumstances that pertained in China, Mesut was hardly accountable for the region's economic difficulties,

but as he was chairman during the period of the worst economic decline the region had ever known, his removal was a political necessity.

Corruption and Internal Dissent

Accusations of blatant corruption continued to surface throughout Mesut's administration. Corruption associated with military purchasing, a persistent problem discussed in previous chapters, expanded in scope as hoarding and refusal to sell intensified.

Under Mesut, accusations of corruption were made against officials at the highest level. Both General Song Xilian and Liu Mengchun were publicly accused of getting rich off the purchase of military supplies. One Uighur newspaper in the capital labeled this type of corruption an obvious example of army oppression.¹⁵⁴ Denials of such activity did not stem the flow of rumor, which found enough basis in reality to warrant belief among many of the local people.

Instances of corruption on a lesser scale were commonplace. For instance, the British consul noted that poorly paid customs officials were using the stiff penalty for opium smuggling to their advantage. If a traveler did not pay the necessary bribe to border officials, opium was likely to be planted on the unsuspecting traveler—and the penalty for such smuggling was death.¹⁵⁵ As a result, few neglected to pay the necessary bribe.

Both Turki and Chinese government officials were engaged in various corrupt practices that increased in scope under Mesut's administration. In the summer of 1948, Shipton, in Kashgar, noted that in Xinjiang "where honesty has never existed, dishonesty is hardly a vice," corruption had reached new heights. The Turki officials were as guilty as the Chinese, but it was the Chinese whom the Moslem population invariably blamed. In the opinion of the British consul, the Chinese had been offered a "golden opportunity" in Xinjiang in 1947 to reestablish Chinese control, but, through a resurgence in the incidence of corruption, they had lost their chance by 1948.¹⁵⁶

Not only corruption, but also open political dissension hit the Mesut government. Isa's outspoken criticism of the Mesut administration was initially reserved for foreign ears. As the year 1948 progressed, however, the split between him and Mesut became open knowledge. According to British reports, the two men gave subordinates conflicting orders. Antagonism in government, says the report, "has produced so many

interpretations of government policy and legislation that it is a wonder to many how the everyday administration of the province continues.”¹⁵⁷

In October 1948 a major corruption scandal broke. This time it involved Minister of Finance Janimhan. He was accused of selling property belonging to the Xinjiang Native Products Company to his friends and relatives, who then sold the goods to members of other nationalities at great financial benefit to themselves.¹⁵⁸ Mesut was reportedly angry over this incident in particular, but the damage was firmly associated with him, personally, despite the fact that Janimhan had been appointed by the coalition government of Zhang Zhizhong and not by Mesut.

With the corruption and splits among national minority members of his government public knowledge, and with accusations of corrupt practices being leveled at top officials in Xinjiang, the Mesut administration was discredited and without direction by the end of 1948. Mesut’s replacement was openly discussed in the region, and Burhan Shahidi, the great survivor of Xinjiang politics, was tipped as the next head of government.

As Mesut struggled through the increasingly difficult months of his administration, there were signs that the ever weakening Nationalist government was contemplating further concessions in Xinjiang. During the year there were several indications of central government willingness to meet Ili demands. In January 1948, the central government announced plans for compensation to victims of Sheng Shicai’s policy of confiscating the property of anyone imprisoned by his regime.¹⁵⁹ That spring, contentious General Song Xilian, the hard-line militarist who dominated much of government policy under Mesut, suffered a broken arm and was sent to China proper to recuperate.¹⁶⁰ He never returned, and his removal was seen in some quarters as a peace overture to the Ili faction.¹⁶¹

Mesut’s presence as chairman was a more important obstacle to the resumption of Ili-Chinese relations. Rumors circulated that if Mesut could be removed, then possibly the Ili members of government would return and participate once again in a new provincial government. These developments, coupled with the deteriorating economy and the scandals within the Mesut government, made his removal a necessity by the end of 1948.

The Break-up of the Mesut Administration

Mesut's government certainly had begun under dark clouds. He inherited both the problems of the coalition and the even graver difficulties of the Nationalist Chinese predicament, which was nearing the end of its tortuous route to Taiwan. Economic difficulties, military interference, and corruption were three facets of government in Xinjiang that were beyond any attempt at local solution, since they were inextricably bound to central government policies. But even in those areas of administration more amenable to local reform or solution—such as local education, cultural development, Han-Moslem relations, and local unity among nationalities—Mesut's government accomplished little. The region neither moved closer to unity with China proper, the major goal of Chinese policy, nor moved toward unity among nationalities within the province itself. Xinjiang's cultural and political divisions remained, and Mesut ultimately succumbed to the overwhelming problems that had existed from the outset of his administration.

The Burhan Administration: January 10–September 25, 1949

Burhan Shahidi, Tatar, was born in Russia on October 3, 1894; his family was originally from Xinjiang, and it was to Xinjiang that they returned when Burhan was still a young man.¹⁶² Being from a wealthy merchant family, Burhan had the opportunity to study in Europe; he attended the University of Berlin, graduating with a degree in economics. When he returned to Xinjiang, he served under successive Chinese governments in the province, surviving them all to become the last Nationalist appointed governor in the Northwest.

Burhan had been away from Xinjiang during much of Mesut's term of office. He had left on September 29, 1947, to serve in Nanjing as a member of the party's Presidium.¹⁶³ In May 1948, as Burhan himself has written, he wished to return to Xinjiang to visit his mother who was ill. He arrived back in Xinjiang in June 1948, having stopped first to visit Zhang Zhizhong in Lanzhou.

Burhan was not particularly welcomed by the chairman, who did not offer him a government post. Instead, he became the head of Xinjiang College, a post he held until his appointment as chairman in January 1949.

Article 113 (2) of the Chinese Constitution calls for the election of provincial governors, but Burhan was nonetheless appointed by the central government as a replacement for the discredited and ill Mesut. Burhan was thus the second national minority personality to be made head of government in Xinjiang. Assisting him as vice-chairman was Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra; Liu Mengchun once again became secretary general. Both Isa and Mesut were recalled to Nanjing.

The former finance minister, Janimhan, initially remained a part of Burhan's government. In May, however, he quietly moved away from Urumqi. Although Burhan sent Vice-Minister Bai to bring him back, Janimhan refused to return, thus ending his career as the province's first Kazak minister of finance.¹⁶⁴ Other Nationalist officers in the government also began to leave in the summer of 1949, moving first to the southern city of Kashgar. Many then went on to make the difficult journey over the Himalayas into neighboring Pakistan and India. From there, most eventually moved to Taiwan.¹⁶⁵

Financial Affairs

As Burhan rightly points out in his memoirs, the economic situation he inherited from Mesut was totally chaotic. Shops had closed in the provincial capital, and available goods could only be had at astronomical prices. A box of matches, for example, sold for one million fabi. In consultation with Zhang Zhizhong, Burhan decided that Xinjiang must return to using its own currency as it had done before. The use of the gold certificate was suspended in Xinjiang, and Burhan reported sending back to Nanjing planes specifically dispatched to Xinjiang with millions in now virtually valueless gold yuan notes.¹⁶⁶ By the summer of 1949, the local Xinjiang currency had stabilized so that trade on a modest scale was able to resume. In August, however, officials and traders fleeing Lanzhou arrived in Xinjiang, bringing with them vast amounts of gold yuan. Burhan himself privately supported a movement among local traders to refuse these gold certificates, use of which spurred panic buying in Urumqi during that month. According to Burhan, the movement to refuse to use the Nationalist currency spread, with local people using the Xinjiang currency or Russian coins in preference to the now totally discredited Nationalist yuan.

Local Political Developments

During the months of Burhan's administration, underground Turki nationalist organizations proliferated while existing groups such as the Xinjiang Democratic Union expanded their influence. Among the many new organizations was the Pioneer Association, which asked for and received financial assistance from Burhan personally. Pioneer and other groups were busy printing and circulating Turki nationalist literature of all kinds during 1949; altogether, Burhan notes some thirty kinds of handouts that were prepared by these Nationalistic groups.¹⁶⁷

In addition to giving financial aid, Burhan appointed various members of such groups to government posts. In particular, he appointed one underground leader as the new police chief for Urumqi, and he made another nationalist leader, Usur Musa, his assistant. A leader of another organization, Democratic Youth, was made head of the Government Personnel Office.¹⁶⁸

Despite tension generated by the existence of such organizations, Urumqi was relatively quiet in the summer of 1949. One incident did occur at a movie theater in June, resulting in the death of a young Chinese student.¹⁶⁹ Although there was outrage in the press over this incident, it did not trigger further incidents or reprisals.

Sino-Soviet Trade Negotiations Under Burhan

In 1949, Xinjiang once again became the focus of international attention, not for Kazaks or currency problems but because it had become a factor in ongoing Sino-Soviet trade negotiations. The USSR's interest was, in fact, both economic and political.

The Soviet interest in the natural wealth of Xinjiang had become clear during the years of Sheng's rule in the region, when the latter made a private arrangement for Soviet exploitation of various natural resources in exchange for Soviet loans and military assistance.

In the period after World War II, Soviet need for Xinjiang's raw materials had grown. The U.S. government estimated that between 1945 and 1950 the Soviet supplies of important foods and consumer items would be substantially below requirements; shortages were predicted especially in wool, cotton, leather, and meat, all items that Xinjiang had previously traded to the USSR for manufactured goods.¹⁷⁰

Further, Soviet interest in Xinjiang's mineral wealth was of long duration, and Xinjiang's known deposits of gold, coal, uranium, molybdenum, and tungsten ore had reportedly been exploited in secret by the USSR for some years.

Politically, the Soviet Union could not afford to be a disinterested neighbor. Anti-Soviet sentiment in Xinjiang could easily affect the USSR's own restive Moslem nationalities, and it could even offer a base for anti-Soviet resistance movements. At the very least, the Soviet Union would want to see a friendly regime in control of the immediate border districts; the ETR, dependent on the USSR for arms and for future economic assistance, had in many ways been the ideal buffer, as long as its leaders maintained a pro-Soviet stance. It was, nonetheless, very much in Soviet interests to continue some kind of dialogue with the Nationalist Chinese, as they remained a military power in Xinjiang.

During the period 1944–1949, the USSR had kept the Chinese government in doubt of its intentions, first vowing to follow a policy of non-intervention in Xinjiang (in the August 14, 1945, treaty with China), but then in 1946–1947 becoming openly critical of Chinese policy in the region to a point of officially protesting Chinese action in their own province.

The Chinese, on the other hand, openly vowed their friendship for the Soviet Union, incorporating calls for close relations into political speeches at every opportunity. At the same time, the Chinese privately held the USSR responsible for the Ili affair, the Beidashan incident, and the general unrest throughout Xinjiang.

Despite the well-established distrust between the two powers, economic talks concerning Xinjiang's development had continued sporadically since 1944. There were constant rumors of ever-increasing demands from the Soviets for more and more concessions in Xinjiang, but no concrete results of economic discussions emerged.

In 1949, a new surge of rumors began, predicting that a November 1944 draft economic agreement between the USSR and China was now to be revived. This agreement was said to include Sino-Soviet co-exploitation of all mineral resources in Xinjiang, freedom of trade between Xinjiang merchants and the USSR, and the free access—without customs duty or inspection—of the Soviet Union's traders to the Xinjiang market. Rumor of such an agreement was so strong that it provoked Isa once again to approach the Americans, asking that the United States block this trade accord, as it would virtually hand over Xinjiang “as chattel” to the USSR.¹⁷¹

In June 1949, the existing Sino-Soviet air agreement was extended for five years, and no further announcements of plans for mineral or other natural resource exploitation were forthcoming. Mehmet wrote later that an order reached the negotiators in Urumqi on July 10, 1949, that told them to suspend all discussions.¹⁷² Time had run out; the Nationalists were no longer in any position to make decisions about the economic future of the Northwest.

Denouement

In August 1949, Burhan received a telegram from General Zhang Zhizhong in Beijing, a new ally of the Communist government. In this telegram, Zhang suggested to Burhan that he invite delegates from the three districts to come to Urumqi for talks. Burhan did so, and subsequently a meeting was arranged between a representative of the Xinjiang Provincial Government, Chen Fangbo, and delegates from Ili. During the brief discussions held on the banks of the Manas River, which remained the unofficial border between the ETR and the rest of the province, the two sides agreed that neither would use force against the other, and that peace should prevail at the border dividing the two administrative areas of Xinjiang.¹⁷³

Burhan was also in touch with Ahmet Jan Kasimi, who wrote on August 16, just prior to his departure from Yining for Alma Ata in the Soviet Union, from where he and several other members of the ETR government were to fly to Beijing. On August 28, Burhan writes that he was privately informed by the USSR consul general in Urumqi that the plane from Alma Ata had crashed, killing all on board.¹⁷⁴ The dead included Ahmet Jan, Abbas, Delilhan, Izhak Han, and a Chinese official, Lo Zu. No public announcement was made of these deaths until some months later.¹⁷⁵ According to Burhan, the Soviet consul general cautioned him not to make any public announcement as it could possibly cause a disturbance. He further advised that Seyfettin had already been despatched to Beijing to represent the three districts in talks with the new Chinese government.

Speculation on the cause of the deaths of the ETR leaders has continued ever since the crash was announced.¹⁷⁶ Whatever the true story, it is clear that this incident removed the most effective and most charismatic leaders of the ETR from any post-Liberation discussions on the future of the Turki homelands.

According to Burhan's memoirs, on September 19, 1949, he personally telegraphed Mao Zedong about the determination of the people of Xinjiang to sever all connection with the "reactionary" Guomindang.¹⁷⁷ Four days later he received a reply from Mao, asking that the PLA be assisted when it entered the region. Official telegrams followed on September 25 from

Burhan and the Xinjiang garrison commander, Tao Zhiyue, to Beijing, officially severing ties with the Nationalist Chinese and declaring the allegiance of the Xinjiang people to the new government in Beijing.¹⁷⁸

Representatives of the PLA began their march into Xinjiang on October 12, 1949, entering Urumqi eight days later.¹⁷⁹ In the months that followed, the PLA consolidated control over the entire region, including the three districts. Xinjiang, China's northwesternmost province of mountains and deserts, and proud Turki people, once again came under Chinese control.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

The Ili rebellion of 1944 and the resultant East Turkestan Republic directly challenged Chinese sovereignty not only in the three districts themselves, but throughout all of Xinjiang province. Therefore, the immediate goal of the central government was to restore Chinese authority in Xinjiang, and to reintegrate the province into the Chinese state. From the first days of the rebellion, however, the Chinese response to this challenge was complicated by both international and domestic factors that limited the government's choice of alternatives in dealing with the "Xinjiang question."

Because of the region's location on international borders with the USSR, British India and Pakistan, Afghanistan, and, after 1945, the Mongolian People's Republic, it was politically and militarily sensitive. It was significant not only to the Chinese government, which considered the region an integral part of the Chinese state, but also to international powers whose interests in Asia were part of greater stratagems involving the future of Asia. Chinese efforts to restore Xinjiang to the fold were, therefore, of concern to powerful outside interests.

At the same time, the central government was sensitive to the fact that Xinjiang had never been under its control, and the region had nearly been lost to China. In the years leading up to and following the Chinese Revolution, the region had repeatedly been the object of foreign encroachment. Lands long claimed by the Chinese were incorporated into the Soviet Union, and territory on the border with India was a matter of continuing international dispute. The Chinese fear of further encroachment in light of their own lack of control in this remote and rugged land was certainly not without foundation.

In addition to the international complexity of the situation, the Chinese government had inherited a region that by 1944 had become increasingly hostile to Chinese rule. Assassination, rebellion, and repeated confrontation

between Chinese and local Moslems marked the twentieth-century history of Xinjiang under Chinese warlord rule, and the ROC inherited this bloody legacy. Despite the fact that the Nationalist government had never controlled Xinjiang, to the local population the new Guomindang government of 1944 simply represented a continuation of the oppressive Chinese rule imposed on the province by Sheng Shicai and his predecessors. The central government was thus heir to problems and attitudes that were largely not of its own making.

The Ili rebellion occurred at a time when the central government was singularly ill-prepared to respond militarily. The long war of resistance against the Japanese had already decimated Chinese troops, and many army units were both demoralized and overextended. A military solution to the problem in Ili was not an immediate possibility.

A further factor limiting Chinese policy alternatives was the Chinese government's interpretation of the genesis of the rebellion itself. From the beginning, the Chinese government believed the USSR was responsible for the instigation and support of the independence movement in Ili. When the gravity of the situation became clear to the government early in 1945, its response was based on the assumption that in this instance China was not facing a local Moslem rebellion, but the Soviets in the guise of Moslem Turki rebels. As has been seen, from the very first reports on the situation, Chinese military leaders constantly referred to the USSR as a source of both men and war materials, ultimately blaming the entire affair on the Soviet Union. The success of the central government's appeal in September 1945 for Soviet good offices in ending the fighting confirmed the Chinese in their belief that the USSR was in fact behind the formation of the ETR. Chinese militarists as well as most members of the central government came to accept this view without question.

Certainly this interpretation of events was not without basis in recent history in China's border lands. The Chinese knew the Soviet Union was deeply involved in the independence movement in Mongolia; in 1944 the area known as Tanna Tuva, west of Mongolia and directly to the north of Xinjiang, had been quietly incorporated into the USSR. In light of these events, it was not unreasonable for the Chinese government to assume Soviet involvement in Xinjiang's Ili rebellion.

As the preceding chapters relate, the USSR did, in fact, play a role in the rebellion. There is little doubt that the ETR government purchased military supplies from the USSR in 1944–1945. Further, as would be consistent with Soviet policy, Soviet military and civilian advisers probably accompanied these military supplies.

Material presented here does not, however, suggest Soviet instigation of the rebellion. As demonstrated above, historic and economic factors, coupled with the new, capable, nationalistic leadership that formed in the Ili region, account for the rebellion itself, and for the widespread popular support accorded the ETR movement in 1944–1945 by the people of the three districts. The Chinese central government nonetheless became firmly dedicated to the theory of Soviet instigation, and policy moves with regard to Xinjiang during this period were deeply affected as a result.

Given the major limitations and complications outlined above, the first option the Chinese chose to exercise was the use of international diplomacy to seek a settlement of the rebellion. As Chiang Kai-shek assumed the Soviet Union to be directing events, an approach was first made to the Soviet government, which chose to defer discussion of this question until the summer of 1945. By then, under the influence of his allies, Chiang found himself forced to make important concessions to the USSR. But at the same time, Chiang was able to use the opportunity thus presented to secure concessions of his own. One of these was to ask for Soviet assurance of non-intervention in Xinjiang, which was given as part of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. With its signing, Chiang believed that an international solution to the Xinjiang problem had been found.

The unrest in Xinjiang and the general dissatisfaction with Chinese governance among the local population was not, however, something that could be resolved so simply. Fundamental problems remained in Xinjiang. Throughout the period of Nationalist rule in the region, Chinese-Moslem relations deteriorated, despite the avowed Chinese policy of “unity of nationalities.” Military interference in government at all levels grew concomitantly with the ever-increasing number of Nationalist Chinese troops, making implementation of any real government reform impossible. Further, the economy during this period deteriorated steadily, reaching what was probably its lowest ebb in history by 1948–1949. At the same time, the ETR continued to exist as a *de facto* government, serving to fan

increasingly defiant Turki nationalism throughout the region. Thus, while international mediation had secured a ceasefire for the Chinese and had brought control of seven of the region's ten districts back to the central government, the problems within the province itself remained daunting. Nationalist attempts to deal with these pressing concerns were largely a failure.

Nationalist Failure in Xinjiang

In part, this failure was influenced by external factors beyond Chinese control. But a large measure of the Nationalist failure in Xinjiang in the 1940s stemmed from two important sources, both within Nationalist power to change: Chinese insistence on Xinjiang conforming to national-level policies and behaving like an “ordinary” Chinese province, and continual military interference in civil government and in the local politics of the region.

Chinese insistence on Xinjiang’s conformity to national policies was part of an overall Chinese policy aimed at making Xinjiang an integral part of the Chinese state. After all, if the region did not follow central government directives or conform to national policy, it could take a path leading away from union with China, as Zhang had accused the ETR of doing. Thus, beginning in 1944 and continuing through the decade, Xinjiang’s provincial government was required to follow patterns established in other provinces, despite the obvious cultural, religious, and socioeconomic differences that divided it from China proper.

For example, under the coalition, the Xinjiang government did include national minority representatives at the provincial level, as stipulated in the peace agreement and its supplements. As this study demonstrates, however, the provincial government of Xinjiang remained firmly in the hands of Chinese-appointed bureaucrats, as did provincial governments elsewhere in China. The resolution passed by the coalition in 1946 calling for a 70:30 ratio of national minorities to Han Chinese in the government was never implemented. Chinese domination continued at most levels of government, despite the elections of 1946. As we have seen, after 1947, Chinese representation in the direct rule of the provincial government increased, with central government appointees joining the ranks of local officials.

Nationally promulgated measures that called for tougher action by the police and military to maintain order in China were also carried out in Xinjiang, especially as law and order deteriorated in the region after Mesut’s appointment. By national decree, the already powerful police were strengthened in Xinjiang, thereby encouraging the militarist line among Han Chinese who believed only tight control could bring stability to the

region. While a predominantly Chinese police force would have been acceptable in China proper, in Xinjiang such a force was increasingly viewed as a tool of Chinese domination, and police action against the Turks was bound to take on racial and religious overtones. The February and March 1947 incidents in Urumqi are dramatic illustration of how the police were drawn into direct confrontation with the local Turks, as a result of which the incidents took on wider dimensions, adding fuel to ethnic rivalries.

Other unfortunate aspects of “ordinary” Chinese-style provincial government also asserted themselves in Xinjiang as Guomindang influence and control expanded. The nationwide pattern of corruption among government and military officials continued unchecked in Xinjiang, with abuses of privilege a common occurrence. The nation’s economic woes also began to affect Xinjiang, which, prior to the period of coalition government, had maintained a separate and relatively strong economy. The rise of inflation in the late 1940s was yet another offshoot of being an “ordinary” province.

By forcing Xinjiang to conform to the central government’s concept of what a province should be, the Guomindang lost its opportunity for reform in Xinjiang. Instead of a new era of reformed government, as promised in the peace agreement and the GPP, the Guomindang brought to Xinjiang many of the evils then plaguing provinces under Nationalist control throughout China.

A second major failing of the Guomindang with regard to Xinjiang was the continuation and growth of military interference in civilian government and local politics. Such interference was common elsewhere in China, but as Nationalist military strength in Xinjiang had not been great prior to the 1940s, there was an opportunity for the provincial government in Xinjiang to remain predominantly in the hands of civilians when Governor Wu was appointed in 1944. As Nationalist troop strength grew, however, military interference grew apace.

From 1944 onward, the power of the military commanders in small and large towns steadily strengthened, prompting Vice-Chairman Ahmet to comment that elections were useless since the local commanders held all local authority. As the number of troops grew, so grew the attendant economic abuses and corruption. As abuses multiplied, demands increased

for the removal of the troops, and the Chinese military thus became a focus of Turki resentment. The increasingly angry opposition to the military was undoubtedly an important factor in the expansion of Turki nationalism in the region, particularly in the south where the Nationalist troop presence was deemed especially oppressive.

At the provincial level, a major impetus behind military interference was General Song Xilian. As a military man, he clearly believed that military dominance was the only means to secure Chinese control of Xinjiang. His influence on local politics was first demonstrated in his handling of the February riots in Urumqi, when his iron-fisted response to the demonstrations gravely affected the reputation of the coalition and undid much of General Zhang's efforts at building good relations with leaders of the local Turkic communities the previous year. Song's use of force to put down the anti-Mesut demonstrations in July 1947 was a further indicator of his belief in the efficacy of the military answer to Xinjiang's problems.

More important than these overt signs, however, was Song's covert involvement with the Kazak leader Osman Batur and his followers. Beginning in 1946, Song was in contact with Osman through pro-Guomindang Kazak members of the provincial government; newspaper stories as well as Song's comments to foreign consular officials—and later Turkish language accounts of Osman's career—point to a close connection between the head of the Nationalist Chinese forces in Xinjiang and this Kazak leader. Certainly Song was aware of Osman's plan to enter and attack ETR-controlled districts in the autumn of 1947. In doing so, Song was directly undermining the provincial government and working against policy advocated by Zhang—a policy of unity, conciliation, and compromise. While Zhang worked for peace, Song was actively sowing discord.

Both the Chinese insistence on Xinjiang's conformity with national policy and the increased interference of the military in the region's government were major reasons for Nationalist Chinese failure to deal effectively with the region's peoples. Both these factors were also potent sources of discontent with Chinese dominance in the region and so contributed to the growth of Turki nationalism. By offering the local population a common foe to unite against, the Chinese gave the forces of Turki nationalism perhaps its greatest impetus: By not carrying out reforms

as promised and by allowing military interference in civil matters, the Chinese directly fed the forces of nationalistic rebellion, which, by the 1940s, had penetrated even the more remote corners of this vast borderland.

The Growth of Turki Nationalism

Xinjiang in the 1940s was a geographically remote and isolated area, separated by great distances from the major centers of world civilization. As a result, its population was relatively unsophisticated, with illiteracy widespread and the level of education even in urban areas relatively low. However, Xinjiang was not by any means a political and cultural vacuum, and the Ili rebellion did not occur in total isolation from outside influences. In the region's towns and cities, an educated elite was aware of the many changes taking place in the wider world beyond the oases and deserts of Xinjiang. Although the immediate impact of the Russian and Chinese revolutions had been limited, Pan-Turkic and Pan-Turanian ideals had infiltrated the region in the 1920s and found support among the region's religious and cultural elite.

Another influence that made itself felt in Xinjiang was the modernizing, secular government of Turkey. Sons of wealthy families like that of Mesut Sabri were sent to Istanbul or Ankara for an education. Upon their return, the respect generally accorded such returned scholars was considerable, and their influence was often far greater than their relatively small numbers might indicate. Further contacts between the Middle East and Xinjiang were made by the Kazak and Uighur Turks who made the long and often difficult journey to Mecca on "haj" and returned to Xinjiang via Turkey. Such men brought back to their native land new notions formed in the relatively modern atmosphere of the Middle East.

From the time of the Russian Revolution onward, Xinjiang's people were also aware of the modernizing efforts of the Soviet government in the Central Asian Republics contiguous to Xinjiang. New ideas regarding the role of government and of alternatives to the Chinese system were introduced to northwestern China by traders and by students who were sent to school in the Soviet Union and returned imbued with the desire to see changes in their native towns and cities.

While such ideas of reform and change in the region were initially the province of a small educated elite, the idea of resistance to the Han Chinese was not. Relatively unsophisticated groups of uneducated but determined men were part of the underground resistance movement in Xinjiang from

the time of the first governor of the Republican period, Yang Cengxin. Such movements were often based solely on shared antipathy toward the Chinese, but other elements were also present. The force of Islam, which separated local Moslems from Chinese, was an important bond among such groups, as was the shared Turkic language and culture of the majority of the indigenous population. The dream of an independent Turkestan—a dream which can be traced back to the days of Yakub Beg and earlier—was also an important element in some of the resistance movements.

In 1933, anti-Chinese sentiment and the dream of the Turkic state resulted in the abortive attempt to form the first East Turkestan government. Although this disunited and faction-torn government was crushed by Sheng Shicai with Soviet assistance, former members of its government remained in Xinjiang and continued to give life to the idea of an independent Turkic state. This idea gained a wider audience in the thirties, and despite the collapse of the first East Turkestan Republic, the concept it embodied remained.

Under Sheng, widespread resentment of his increasingly oppressive rule aroused greater antipathy toward the Chinese in general and gave further impetus to the desire for an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang. Toward the end of Sheng's rule, nationalistic Turki handbills began to appear in both the provincial capital and the three districts, revealing that the anti-Chinese movement now incorporated an appeal to all Moslems to unite in support of freedom and the establishment of an independent Moslem state.

Although such tracts—examples of which appear in appendices E and F—do not reveal a sophisticated political platform, their appeal was clearly based on the fundamentals of nationalism: shared culture and language, shared religious belief, shared economic concerns, and a clearly defined territorial base, the province of Xinjiang. These shared elements, all components of modern nationalism, made it possible for the ETR movement to mobilize widespread popular support in the three districts and eventually among the greater population of the province.

The ETR itself was in great part a manifestation of the growth of Turki nationalism in Xinjiang. Available information indicates that the ETR's leaders were nationalistic Moslems who sought to bring majority Moslem rule to "Turkestan"—an envisaged Islamic state that would ultimately encompass all of Xinjiang. The ETR was also an indication that such a

government could, in fact, exist and successfully govern an Islamic Xinjiang.

Under the Moslem leadership of the ETR, the new government could boast of major successes in its dealings with both the USSR and the Chinese. From the Soviets, the ETR had secured military supplies to enable the rebellion to succeed and had then reestablished the important commercial links with the Soviet Union. In dealings with the Chinese, the leaders of the ETR had gleaned major successes in forcing the government to enter into an agreement with them to institute democratic government based on popular elections throughout Xinjiang.

Further, elections had actually been held in Xinjiang for the first time, a major result of the peace agreement. During the course of the elections, as we have seen, the representatives of the ETR were able to travel throughout the province, bringing their nationalistic message to even the remoter corners of the region. The ETR's political organization, the Yashlar Tashkilati, was able to grow and expand its activities throughout the province. And, as the newspaper war of 1947 demonstrated, the spirit of the rebellion had not been diminished by Ili participation in the coalition government. When Chinese military power grew in 1947, it only served to intensify defiance among Turks throughout the region, and by the time of Zhang's visit to Kashgar, a new militant spirit was evident even in the southern part of the province, which had not participated in the Ili rebellion.

Thus the fruits of the "Three Districts Revolution" were many, and among them was a heightened sense of Turki nationalism that increasingly made itself felt throughout the province. Chinese control in the seven districts was constantly challenged during this period of growing national consciousness, so that the Chinese-dominated provincial government came to rely almost solely on local military garrisons as the basis of its continued control in the region.

In 1944 the nationalism long nascent in Xinjiang province found expression in the Ili rebellion and in the formation of the ETR. During the peace process of 1945–1946 and under the new coalition government that formed as a result, Xinjiang's Moslem population was involved in political processes on a provincewide basis so that a new sense of Turki strength emerged, combining elements of Islam and Turkic culture with the more modern political concepts of representative government and political rights.

Nationalism in Xinjiang had thus grown to become, in the words of U.S. Consul Robert Ward, “quite a vital thing” in Xinjiang in the 1940s. The Nationalist Chinese failure to deal effectively with this newly awakened nationalism or, indeed, to recognize the nature of this challenge to the central government authority in itself constituted a major threat to Chinese sovereignty in Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949.

APPENDIX A

The Peace Agreement of January 2, 1946

This is a translation of the eleven-point peace agreement signed on January 2, 1946, by representatives of the three districts comprising the East Turkestan Republic and representatives of the Chinese central government.

The Representatives of the Central Government and the Representatives of the three disturbed districts agree to the following provisions as a means of peacefully resolving the armed conflict:

1. The government hereby gives the people of Xinjiang the right to vote so that trustworthy local individuals may be elected to serve as government officials. To put this power into practice, the following measures will apply:

Within three months of this resolution, the people of each county will elect county assemblymen and establish a County Assembly; the County Assembly will elect the county magistrate (*xianzhang*). The vice-county magistrate and other county-level government officials will be appointed by the county magistrate.

During the period prior to the holding of elections, within the three disturbed districts and counties the present officials will continue in office.

The district government supervisory officials shall be recommended for appointment by the local people, and the names of such officials shall be submitted to the provincial government for approval.

Special government officials and other staff will be hired by specialists.

After the formation of the County Assemblies, each Assembly will elect representatives to the Provincial Assembly so that a Provincial Assembly may be convened. Representing the will of people, they will oversee and assist the provincial government.

Prior to the promulgation of the constitution and before the elections are held, the organization of the provincial government will be according to the provisions stipulated in Article 9 of this agreement.

2. The government will punish discrimination on the basis of religion, and gives the people complete freedom of religious belief.

3. For state organizations' and private organizations' documents, individuals are authorized to use their native written language.

4. Elementary and middle schools will use the language of the local nationality, but in middle schools, Chinese language will be a required course. At the university level, Chinese or Moslem language(s) will be used, according to the course needs.

5. The government resolves that nationalities' cultures and arts will expand freely.

6. The government resolves that there will be freedom of publication, assembly, and speech.

7. The government will prescribe tax rates in accordance with the people's real productivity and (earning) power.

8. The government gives businessmen freedom in domestic and foreign trade; however, foreign trade must be in accord with the government's commercial treaties with foreign states.

9. The central government agrees to the expansion of the Xinjiang Provincial Government to include a council of twenty-five persons. Of these twenty-five people, ten will be appointed by the Central Government directly, and the remaining fifteen will be chosen from among those recommended by the peoples of each district.

Among the ten individuals directly appointed by the central government will be the provincial chairman, the secretary general, the minister of civil affairs, the minister of finance, the head of the bureau of social welfare, the vice-minister of education, the vice-minister of reconstruction, assistant head of the bureau of public health, and two ministers without portfolio.

Among the fifteen individuals recommended for appointment by the people of the various districts will be two provincial vice-chairmen, two assistant secretaries general, the minister of education, the minister of reconstruction, the head of the public health bureau, the vice-minister of civil affairs, the vice-minister of finance, the assistant head of the social welfare bureau, and five ministers without portfolio.

Refer to supplement number 1.

10. Permit the organization of people's militia (*minzu jundui*). Replacement troops will be assigned in accordance with the principle of

using Moslem soldiers; the people's militia will include troops involved in the recent incident and will be reorganized according to National Army organization. The numbers and the placement of these troops will be discussed and will follow the terms set out in the second supplement to this agreement.

In the training and orders for these military units, the language of the Uighurs and Kazaks will be used.

The officers of these units will be preserved as in their original form, but at specific times will receive military officers' training and further education.

These military units will be assisted and instructed by training officials sent by the government.

Xinjiang's central government military units will not be stationed in the same places as the people's militia; moreover, they will establish special friendly relations and will not act in a spirit of mutual hostility.

Refer to supplement number 2.

11. Prisoners detained during the course of the incident will be released by both sides within ten days of passage of this agreement; no record will be kept of those arrested and there will be no discrimination against them.

Signed by: Zhang Zhizhong, representing the central government; Rahim Jan Mura Haji, Ebulhayir Töre, and Ahmet Jan Kasimi, representing the people. Dated: January 2, 1946.

Supplement 1

1. Of the fifteen posts to be filled by recommendations from the people, six will come from the three districts (ETR).

2. These six posts will include the following:

One vice-chairman of the province

One vice-secretary general

Minister of education or of reconstruction

Vice-minister of civil affairs

Head of the public health bureau or assistant head of the bureau of social welfare

One minister without portfolio

3. The remaining nine posts will be given to appointees from the other seven districts of the province and will include one vice-chairman of the province; others will hold posts not in the above list, at the level of assistant heads of bureaus, vice-secretary general, vice-ministers, and ministers without portfolio.

Signed on January 2, 1946.

Supplement 2

1. The Ili forces in the three districts will be reorganized into six regiments, three cavalry and three infantry. The total number of men under arms will be from 11,000 to 12,000. Two cavalry regiments and one infantry regiment will be part of the Nationalist Chinese Army in Xinjiang.

2. A Moslem nominated by the Ili delegates will command all six of the above regiments and will be responsible to the Xinjiang garrison commander for the three Nationalist Army units and to the Xinjiang Peace Preservation Corps (hereafter PPC), commander for the other three. The same Moslem commander will be the vice-commander of the Xinjiang PPC and will maintain his own headquarters.

3. The six above regiments will remain in the three districts and will have sole responsibility for the maintenance of peace in those districts. Central government frontier defense troops will undertake defense of the national frontiers, following methods and distribution of troops identical to that prevailing prior to the Ili incident.

4. The Aksu and Kashgar units of the PPC will be reorganized and will use native recruits; they will be organized in consultation with the Moslem commander.

5. The supply, equipment, and treatment of the six regiments above will be on a par with the top National Army and PPC respectively. The three PPC will be supplied from the PPC headquarters in Xinjiang province.

6. The reorganization of the six regiments will be the responsibility of the Moslem commander. The garrisons of the troops in the three districts are to be reported to, and approved by, the provincial authorities, and their numbers and equipment to be reported to the provincial government.

Signed on June 6, 1946.

Sources: Zhang Dajun, *Seventy Years of Turbulence in Xinjiang* (Taipei, 1980), 12:6847–50. Supplements pp. 6850–51, 6875–76. Originals held in the National History Institute Archives, Taipei, Taiwan.

APPENDIX B

Government Political Program

This is a translation of the “Government Political Program” (GPP), which was passed by the Xinjiang Provincial Government at its second meeting on July 15, 1946.

A. Political Section

1. The people will exercise political power.
2. The law will protect and guard the following freedoms: thought, written expression, publishing, meeting, association, residence, movement, person, and property. Arrest or detention of people by illegal institutions will not be tolerated, and corporal punishment by religious law will not be permitted.
3. Under government administration, women’s equality is guaranteed, as are their economic, legal, educational, and social rights.
4. In the event of conflict between civil law and religious law, in each case, the central government will be asked to resolve the dispute. In carrying out the law, locally trained individuals will be used as far as possible.
5. Local elections will be based on universal suffrage and the secret ballot; election manipulation or bribery are absolutely prohibited.
6. Within three months of the government reorganization, elections will be held for representative bodies below county level, for officials in the self-governing *baojia* system and for the post of county head, according to the election regulations to be stipulated by the provincial government.
7. Representative bodies of each level of government shall have the right to supervise and assist the government officials at their respective levels.
8. Government officials of each administrative level shall be chosen from among talented individuals of each nationality; every county head and all

self-governing officials will be sent for training at the provincial or district level at regular intervals.

9. In government and legal matters, Chinese and the Moslem language (Huiwen) will be used equally, with individuals free to use their native tongue.

10. Corruption and acts against the welfare of the people are prohibited.

11. Gambling, hashish, and opium are all forbidden.

B. Nationalities Section

1. In government, economy, law, and education all nationalities are equal.

2. Mutual respect and consideration are to be observed and unity among all nationalities promoted.

3. Use and expand national minority languages, literature, arts, and other areas of cultural endeavor.

4. Religious beliefs of each national minority will be respected.

5. Stirring up ill feeling, damaging the unity of nationalities, and endangering mutual respect between nationalities will not be permitted.

6. Any person who violates national minority customs, religious belief, and so on, especially among the smaller minority groups, will be severely punished.

C. Foreign Relations Section

1. Expand Sino-Soviet friendly relations.

2. Promote Sino-Soviet economic cooperation.

3. Expand Sino-Soviet artistic and cultural relations.

4. Expand each nation's trade, friendship, and academic relations.

5. Strive to improve relations among all Moslem nations (including the Soviet Central Asian Republics) on the basis of commonly shared religious belief and culture.

D. Economic Section

1. Protect the rights of the peasant and the right to lease land; oppose the concentration of land in a few hands in order to reach the goal of “fields to the tiller.”

2. Promote labor laws, reform labor regulations, and protect women workers.

3. Solve the unemployment problem.

4. Increase the standard of living of the peasant and nomad peoples.

5. Prohibit high interest rates and usury, and cut all exorbitant rent.

6. Aid the region’s agricultural development, and stress the importance of irrigation construction projects; plan for future development.

7. Expand the amount of arable land, improve the peasants’ agricultural skills, and the agricultural system; prevent locusts and disasters.

8. Increase the production of cotton, hemp, and other agricultural products.

9. Encourage afforestation.

10. Expand and encourage cattle breeding.

11. Assist in establishing the local manufacture of leather and wool products and articles for daily use.

12. Encourage cottage industries, especially for the production of silk, woven cloth, and special regional products.

13. Plan for the establishment of basic industries in the province, e.g., cement, electricity, steel, and machine parts.

14. Develop the mining industry.

15. Insure absolute freedom for all internal trade. Except for the inspection of goods, the government will not interfere, and will not levy any unreasonable tax on goods. Government and public officials may not engage in any commercial enterprise.

16. In accordance with the treaties of the central government, foreign trade will be conducted freely.

17. Promote cooperative efforts in the areas of manufacturing, consumption, and transportation.

18. Make use of the central and provincial money system to facilitate loans to agricultural and animal husbandry enterprises.

19. Except for government enterprises, allow no kind of monopoly.

E. Government Finance Section

1. Expand the economy, raise production, and become financially self-sufficient.
2. In collecting tax, adhere to central government instructions and avoid damaging the people's livelihood or the principle of expanding the economy.
3. Unite the currency within a specified period of time by stopping the issuance of provincial notes. All currencies will be redeemed at existing rates.
4. Reorganize the Xinjiang Commercial Bank into a provincial bank and, according to the terms of the law, allow individuals (renmin) to operate banks for agricultural, animal husbandry, or industrial enterprises.
5. Before the province becomes self-sufficient, the province may apply to the central government to continue financial assistance, according to the needs of each enterprise.
6. The provincial government will reduce expenditure and reduce the number of officials.
7. Prohibit all types of illegal apportionment of funds and irregular taxation practices.

F. Communications Section

1. Develop communications within the province to enhance economic and cultural development.
2. Request the central government to extend the Lunghai Railroad line into the province, and plan a network of provincial railroad links.
3. Ask the central government to build a system of standard roads quickly and construct state highways.
4. Expand and promote airline facilities and plan for a provincial airline system.
5. Expand the use of river transport.
6. Complete the development of postal, telegraphic, and broadcasting networks.

7. Train large numbers of managerial personnel in communication technology.

G. Education

1. Promote the concept of the state, national consciousness, and good order among the nation's citizens.

2. Implement compulsory education, universalizing it within a specified period of time.

3. Train advanced personnel for provincial development by establishing a provincial university in Tihua (Urumqi), as well as schools of agriculture, animal husbandry, commercial and business studies, communications, and teacher training.

4. According to provincial needs, establish junior colleges and vocational schools to train mid- and basic-level personnel.

5. Regulate and improve mid-level and other schools within individual districts within a specified period of time.

6. Establish teacher training institutes to cultivate youths of all nationalities; improve teaching materials and establish schools for short-term teacher training; at regular periods convene meetings for primary school teachers and give regular training courses.

7. Universally establish national schools, middle, primary schools, and preschools (kindergartens).

8. Promote adult education and end illiteracy within a specified period of time.

9. In all primary and middle schools, students will be educated in their own native languages; in middle schools, Chinese (*guowen*) will be used in all compulsory classes. At the university level, according to the needs of the subject, Chinese (*guowen*) or the Moslem language (*Huiwen*) will be used equally for instruction.

10. All private schools must follow proper standards and be managed by qualified personnel.

11. Within a specified period of time, establish institutions for mass education, libraries, public physical education grounds, etc., in order to promote social education.

12. For certain periods of time, students may choose local education or education abroad.

H. Culture Section

1. Guarantee freedom of cultural studies and scientific research.
2. Develop all nationalities' cultures, and promote local literature, music, dance, and painting as well as all of the arts.
3. Promote this province's culture and the culture of the hinterlands, and the interflow between the nationalities' cultures.
4. Establish guidelines for publication and promote the publication in each nationalities' own written language of dictionaries, thesaurus, grammar, teaching materials, and works on all natural sciences, and social sciences, as well as literary works by famous authors.
5. Each district will establish a museum to display artifacts in order to encourage understanding and promote research.
6. Establish centers for the arts of each nationality and for the teaching of music and dance.
7. Expand the news services and the local film industry.

I. Public Health Section

1. Strengthen measures for physical education and raise the standard of the citizens' physical health, paying special attention to the raising of children.
2. Strictly emphasize public health, strengthen preventative medicine to prevent epidemics and infectious diseases.
3. Thoroughly implement (measures for) a system of public hospitals, completely establishing medical care at all levels.
4. Complete the creation of medical facilities and equipment.
5. Rapidly develop the number of medical personnel.
6. Train midwives and establish midwifery centers.
7. Establish public sanatoriums and recuperative centers, and develop local hot springs.
8. Encourage private individuals to build local hospitals throughout the province.
9. Prohibit early marriage.
10. Set standards for practitioners of traditional medicine.

Source: Xinjiang Daily, July 20, 1946. Also published in Zhang Dajun, Seventy Years of Turbulence in Xinjiang (Taipei, 1980), 12:6958–61.

APPENDIX C

Chinese Transliteration of Turkic Names

For centuries, the history of Central Asia has been recorded by Chinese scholars, so that today, Chinese language materials on Central Asia exceed all others in both quantity and quality. A major problem in using Chinese sources, however, has been the difficulty of identifying individuals and groups referred to, because of unsystematic transliteration of “foreign” names into Chinese. Use of different characters for the same name and attempts to sinicize the names of foreign individuals are but two such inconsistencies.

This problem has persisted into present-day materials on Central Asia. In my research on Xinjiang’s modern history and politics, I have been able to complement Chinese-language sources with materials in other languages, but in many ways Western language sources complicate the problems by adding misleading forms of romanization, often based on originally incorrect Chinese sources. Thus the original problem of transliterating foreign names into Chinese continues to make the identification of important individuals in Xinjiang’s modern history difficult.

To clarify just who is who in Xinjiang during the period under the discussion, the following is a short discussion of traditional Turkic names and titles, followed by an explanation of common forms of Chinese transliteration and a glossary cross-referencing modern Turkish forms of Xinjiang names to their common English variations, and their commonest Chinese form.

Turkic Names and Titles

Traditionally, the Turkic people of both Turkey and Xinjiang used only personal names, such as Ali, Muhammed, or Ahmet. This emphasis on personal names is preserved in Turkey today, where the usual mode of verbal address is to use someone's personal name followed by "Bey" meaning "Mister." Thus, Ahmet Selimog~lu would be addressed as Ahmet Bey, rather than as Selimog~lu Bey, and so on.

In June 1934, Ataturk decreed that all Turks must take a surname. As a result, modern Turkish names include both a personal and family name. The family name is often just the name of a common object or a reference to the profession of the individual, according to the whim of the village registrar in charge of carrying out the new law. Some Turks chose to follow a patronymic system dating back before the decree, in which "og~lu," meaning "son of," was appended to the father's name. Mesut son of Selim, for instance, would become Mesut Selimog~lu.

In Xinjiang, the use of oglu was occasionally followed by a few of the educated Uighur and Kazak Turks. This was especially true for those who had been to Turkey or Mecca on pilgrimage, and who thus imported the new system into Chinese territory. Most Xinjiang names, however, reflect the interesting admixture of cultures in the region, including elements of Turkish, Russian, and Chinese naming practices. For instance, in the Ili area close to the Russian border, russification of names sometimes occurred, with "ov" or "off" appended to what would otherwise be a common Turkish name. Selim, for example, would become Selimov, and so on. Such russification sometimes reflected a connection with the Soviet Union through trade or business contacts; it could also indicate that a member of the family received higher education in Soviet Central Asian schools, a common occurrence since higher education in Chinese Xinjiang was extremely limited.

Most commonly, a person was identified by his town or village or by his profession. As there were many Ahmets, Muhammeds, and Alis, specific titles or town of birth or other identifying words would be used to distinguish one Ahmet from another. But just as often a single name stood

alone, adding to the difficulties of identification when such persons were referred to in Chinese records without further explanation.

Common Turkish names for males used in Xinjiang include Mehmet, Izhak, Yusuf, Kasim, and Abbas. Turkic names indigenous to Xinjiang and not common in Turkey include Tokti, Zahrel, Adel, and Talip. The most common titles added to names in both Turkey and Xinjiang are “Bey” meaning “Mister”; “Hoja” meaning “teacher”; and “Haji” meaning one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Such titles follow the whole name of the person, except in spoken address.

In Xinjiang, the use of these titles is the same as in Turkey, but the sound of “Bey” or “Bay” becomes “Bek.” Chinese transliteration of the term recognizes this by using characters with a “k” sound, as indicated in table 14. In addition to varying from the Turkish “Bey” in sound, the term also carries greater social and political significance in Xinjiang than in Turkey. The title “Bek” or “Beg” became part of the official titles conferred on local Turki officials by the Qing government (see listing in [chapter 3](#)). Turki Begs often wielded considerable power in Xinjiang, and thus the title carried much prestige and power even in the twentieth century.

As will be seen below, Chinese transliteration practices tend to merge all these Turkic titles with individuals’ names.

Problems in Chinese Transliteration of Turkic Names

In Xinjiang studies, the main transliteration problems are the use of different Chinese characters to represent the same name or title; the use of characters whose sound seems remote from the sound intended; the merging of titles with names; and the addition of final characters to russify a name or the limitation of a long and complex name to only two or three characters to sinicize it.

There are various examples of the first problem, that of using different Chinese characters for the same name or title. The common Turkish name “Ali” has been written “Ali” (阿力) and “Ali” (阿里); as the sound of both forms is virtually the same, it is possible that this was first done to distinguish two different people. In another case, however, the characters “Hali” (哈力) have been used to indicate a man named Ali Beg Hakim or, in Chinese transliteration “Halibaike.” The appearance of this “H” as the initial sound led various Western observers to call the man variously Halibek, Halibank, or even Kalibank, none of which bear much resemblance to the man’s actual name.

This last example also demonstrates the problem of the use of differing Chinese characters for the same title. Historically, “Beg” was written “Boke” (伯克); however, in modern sources it is sometimes written “Bayi” (巴衣), which is closer to the Turkish form “Bey.” But, for the name of Ali Beg Hakim, another form, “Baiké” (拜克), is used, which evidently led several authors to treat the title as a part of his name.

Ali Beg Hakim did not help clarify matters himself: like other men in positions of leadership, he changed his name with a change in his social status. Originally, he was Ali Beg Rahimbegoglu, or Mr. Ali son of Mr. Rahim. His original name was thus a mixture of modern Turkish naming practices and local titles. His new name, using Hakim or “judge,” suited his new status as leader of a larger group of Kazaks. (See the account in Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, p. 85.) Hakim was part of the title of the highest Chinese rank conferred on Xinjiang’s Turkic officials.

Occasionally a Chinese author chooses to use a character that seems somewhat remote from the sound intended. An important example of this is the name Rahimjan Selimoglu Hoja. In Chinese sources he appears as “Laiximujiang” (賴希木江). Once the reader knows to whom this name refers, the problem is solved, as this form appears consistently. However, it is only through context that an association can be made between this name and the individual concerned.

The third problem, that of merging titles with names, is sometimes a function of local naming practices, as seen in the case of Ali Beg Hakim. But it also stems from the Chinese misunderstanding of names and titles in the Turkic languages. The name of the military commander of the Ili forces is a good case in point. In modern Turkish he is Izhak Han Mura Haji, “Haji” being the title given to someone who has been to Mecca on pilgrimage. In Chinese, his name appears as “Yisihakejiang Munahajiyefu.” Here “Haji” is treated as the last part of his name, which has also been russified by the addition of the suffix “yefu,” equivalent to the Russian “ov.” This brings us to the last problem in dealing with Chinese transliteration of Turkic names—the russification or sinicization of Xinjiang Turkic names and titles.

As so much of Xinjiang’s modern history involves conflict and confrontation with the USSR, Chinese sources often take the view that tension in the Northwest was invariably a result of Soviet manipulation in the region. One way of proving this has been to russify local names in Chinese sources. This can be seen in the works of Zhang Dajun, Sun Fukun, and other pro-Guomindang authors cited in this work. It is possible that in some cases, these individuals may have russified their names themselves as a result of prolonged contact with, or education in, the Soviet Union. But former residents of the Ili area do not usually use the russified forms in referring to the same individuals whose names are russified by the Chinese, indicating that such usage is a political rather than cultural consideration.

One important example of this practice is in the name of the president of the East Turkestan Republic. In modern Turkish his name is Ali Han TOre Hoja, the last word being the title of “teacher.” As in the case of Izhak Han Mura Haji, this man’s title of Hoja has been russified in Chinese-language sources, leading some Western-language sources to use the name “Ali Khan

Ture Hojaeff.” As Ali Han was decidedly anti-Soviet as well as anti-Communist, it is unlikely that he himself ever chose to russify his name.

In a few cases, lengthy Turkic names have been made to conform to the Chinese traditional name form consisting of a one-character surname and one or two characters for the personal name. Examples are Burhan Shadidi, or “Bao Erhan” (包爾漢) in Chinese, and Seyfettin Azizi, who is “Sai Fuding” (賽福鼎) (The final “i” in this name—and others, like Kasimi—is a Xinjiang variation on traditional Turkish names. This final “i” does not appear in Turkish names today.)

In an attempt to lessen confusion over some of the Turkic names that has resulted from Chinese transliteration, the following glossary of names offers a list of important names from Xinjiang’s modern history in modern Turkish form, followed by common English variations, the Chinese characters used to represent the name, and the pinyin form of the characters. It is hoped that future research on Xinjiang’s modern political and historical affairs will be less confusing as a result of this partial guide, which forms a basis for understanding “Who’s Who” in Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949.

Turkish Alphabet Pronunciation Guide

There is only one way to pronounce a given letter in the Turkish alphabet and, as the following guide indicates, most of the letters are pronounced as in English.

a	as in <u>o</u> ther, <u>co</u> me	ü	as in <u>pu</u> t
b	as in <u>b</u> uy, <u>bo</u> y	ü	as in the French <u>tü</u> , <u>su</u> r
c*	as in <u>j</u> elly, <u>Jo</u> e	v	as in <u>awa</u> y
d	as in <u>d</u> oll	y	as in <u>ye</u> ar
e	as in <u>re</u> d	z	as in <u>ze</u> ro
f	as in <u>f</u> ine, <u>fo</u> ul		
ğ†	as in <u>g</u> ood	*c	as in <u>Ch</u> urch
h	as in <u>h</u> elp	†ğ	as in <u>w</u> eigh; that is, usually silent
i	as in <u>thi</u> s, <u>wan</u> ted		
i	as in <u>thi</u> n, <u>pi</u> n		
j	as in <u>plea</u> sure		
k	as in <u>k</u> ite		
l	as in <u>l</u> ow		
m	as in <u>m</u> ine		
n	as in <u>n</u> o		
o	as in <u>po</u> et		
ö	as in the French <u>Deu</u> x		
p	as in <u>pi</u> e		
r	as in <u>re</u> d		
s	as in <u>se</u> e		
ş	as in <u>sh</u> ort		
t	as in <u>tr</u> uth		

Appendix Table 1

Turkic Titles, Turkic Names, and Chinese Transliteration

Turkic Titles

Modern Turkish	Chinese Characters	Chinese Pinyin	English Variations	Meaning
Batir	巴图鲁	Batuer	Batur	hero, brave
Bay	巴衣	Bayi	Beg	Mr.
Bey	伯克	Boke	Bek	

Jan	拜克 江	Baike Jiang	Jan	a person; the name “John”
Haji	哈吉 阿吉	Haji	Haj Haji	pilgrim judge
Hakim	哈斯木	Hachimu	Hakim	learned man or sage
Han	汗	Han	Khan	sovereign or king
Hoja	和加	Hejia	Hodja Khodja	teacher

Turkic Names and Chinese Transliteration

Modern Turkish	Common English Variations	Chinese Characters	Chinese Pinyin
Abdulkerim Abbas	Abbas, Abbasoff	阿巴索夫	Abasufu
Abdulkerim Han Mansur	Abdul Kerim, Makhsun	阿不都 克夏木汗 买合蘇木	Abudou Kelimujiang Maihesumu
Ahmet Jan Kasimi	Achmedjan Kasimov Ahkmed Jan Kasim	阿合夏提汉	Ahemaitijiang
Ali Beg Hakim Ali Han Töre Hoja	Kalibank, Halibek, Hakimbek Ali Han Toere, Ali Khan Ture Sakhir Hojaeff	哈力拜克 艾力汗	Halibaiké Ailihan Tiaore
Ashim Beg Haji	Hakim Beg-haji	阿 然 艾肯木 拜克和加	Aishenmu Baikhejia
Burhan Shahidi Janimhan Tilev- Bayoglu Haji	Burhan Bao Erhan Janimhan	包 爾 漢 夏尼木汗	Bao Erhan Jianimuhan
Delilhan Jan Altay	Delilhan	達里力汗	Dalilihan
Delilhan Sugurbayoglu	Delilhan,	達里力汗	Dalilihan
Ebulhayir Töre	Talilhan Sukurbayeff Mr Abdul	蘇瓦爾巴也夫 阿不都哈爾	Sukeerbayefu Abudouhayier Ture
HatijeKadvan Hanim	Hatewan Kali Wang	哈 堤 萬	Hadewan
Huseyin Teyci ¹	Hussein, Husain	胡 賽 音	Husaiyin

Isa Yusuf Alptekin	Aisa Aisabek	艾沙伯克	Aisha Boke
Izhak Han Mura Haji	Izhart Jan Muna, Hojaeff, Izaakbeg, Ishakjan Monhakiyev	伊斯哈克汉 穆那哈吉 之父	Yichihakejiang Muna Hajiyefu
Mesut Baykozu Sabriog~lu	Masud Sabri, Mahksud	马斯武境	Maisiwude
Muhammed Jan Mehmet Emin Bug~ra	Mohammed Jan Mohammed Imin, Mohammed I- Min	穆罕默德汉 穆罕默德伊敏	Muhanmodejiang Muhanmode Yimin
Niyaz Hoja Osman Batir	Khoja Neyaze, Khodja Niaze Osman Batur or Bator	尼牙孜和加 高斯曼巴图鲁	Niyasun Hejia Wusiman Batuer
Rahimjan Selimog~lu Hoja	Rachim Khan Hoja, Rahmjan Sabri Hodjaeff	赖希木汗	Laiximujiang
Sabut Damullah Salis Ermekog~lu	Sabit Mullah, Sabit Damolla Salis	沙比提大毛拉 萨力士	Shabiti Damaola Salishi
Seyfettin Azizi	Saifudin, Seyfullaev, Saipidin, Seypidin	赛福甫	Saifuding
Shalif Han Yolbars Zolun Tahir	Shalif Khan Yolbars Khan, General Yol Bars Tsunengtayev	沙里福汗 尧乐博士 祖农塔依夫	Shalifuhan Yaoleboshi Tzunongtayefu

1 “Teyci” is a Kazak title for a leader of a sub-tribe group of 1000–3000 yurts.

APPENDIX D

List of Interviews

I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of all the following individuals who assisted in furthering my understanding of the complex political and ethnic situation in Xinjiang during the 1940s. While I deeply appreciate their help, I also wish to state clearly that the interpretation placed on the information they shared with me is mine alone, and the conclusions I reach are not necessarily shared by any of the individuals listed here.

I also wish to thank Dr. Tang Yi for his assistance in acting as translator (Turkish to English), for Dr. Kanat, Mr. Erturk, and Mr. Tosun. The other interviews were conducted in Chinese or English by myself.

Name and nationality

Prof. Frank Bessac, American
Mr. Delilhan Jan Altay, Kazak
Mr. Zhang Dajun, Han Chinese
Mr. Anthony A. Deng, Han Chinese-Russian
Mr. Abdullah Emirog~lu, Uighur
Mr. Abdullah Erturk, Uighur
Mr. Walter Graham, British
Dr. Abdul Kerim Kanat, Uighur
Mr. Arbunsain Kunggur, Sibo
Mr. Ma Shuqi, Hui
Mr. Ibrahim Mansur, Hui
Mr. Na Syluh, Manchu
Mr. Vincent Shui, Han Chinese
Mr. Arslan Tosun, Kazak
Ms. Makbule Wang Shuli, Hui
Dr. A. Muhammed Wang, Hui
Haji Yaqub Yolbars, Uighur

APPENDIX E

“Why Are We Fighting?” (Early Rebel Pamphlet)

Note: This pamphlet is reproduced here as in the original translation made for the U.S. Consulate in Urumqi, notes included.

Our fathers and our father’s fathers called the place where we are living “East Turkestan.”

From ancient time there have lived in this place Uighurs, Taranchis, Kazaks, Uzbeks, and Tatars; at the present time also it is the place of their habitation.

In this territory there are counted to be four million people; more than three million of them are of these nations (that we have named); for that reason the area—Turkestan—was called the hearth of the Turkish nations. Our nearest blood relations are Kazaks, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, and Tatars. In the Soviet Union each of these races has organized its own Government and its members are living free and joyful lives. Let us listen to the white bearded old men among us while they tell us, as they alone can, what was the beginning of the history of our East Turkestan nations, and how it began.

Who are we? Who and where are our near and far relations? Where are the burial grounds—so dear to us—of our beloved and renowned ancestors?

In answer to these questions, any man who seeks the truth and whose heart is right cannot fail to say that the root of our nation and soul is not in China, but in Central Asia, in Kazakstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, and Tatarstan. Our native place is East Turkestan; we are the eastern branch and part of that race—bound to us by blood relationship—the other parts of which lie within the Soviet Union; we are the part that is fighting.

Two hundred years ago from Astrakhan and the borders of the Caspian Sea there came to our East Turkestan several Kalmuk families and from that time forward they lived among us as friends and without friction. Thus we

see that their roots also were not in China but sprang from the Russian Kalmuks. If they are asked they themselves will confirm this.

The (White) Russians now resident in East Turkestan can also make the same statement about themselves [i.e., that they came not from China but from Russia].

Of the fourteen nations living in East Turkestan, the ten nations accounted the most numerous have had no national, racial, or cultural relationship nor any community of blood with the Chinese, nor did any ever exist.

But through the sands of the desert from remote China there came Chinese to our East Turkestan. With the help of sabres and whips and taking advantage of our love of peace, the whiteness of our hearts, and our trustfulness, they took into their hands the control of the whole government; they exacted from us heavy taxes and many kinds of contributions; they oppressed us until we had no more rights than animals. And they were at that time the least enlightened people in the world; they could not give to us brighter lives, they could not increase our knowledge or culture, they could not improve the ordinary living conditions of the people; instead they robbed us of light, held us in slavery, kept us illiterate and plunged us in darkness. From that time forward our territory was called “West China” or “Sinkiang” and it was forbidden to pronounce the name “East Turkestan” which the land had borne for years without end throughout history.

Our fathers and grandfathers were for hundreds of years oppressed by the savage Chinese. To understand the nature of that oppression, we need only regard the way in which our people are being oppressed by the Chinese at the present time.

Many times in the past our people have been unable further to endure this oppression; their patience exhausted, they have turned on their savage oppressors and fought with great heroism. These battles are known to history. The beloved names of our heroic grandfathers who died in these struggles should serve us as banners calling us forward to do battle against the Chinese who enslave us!

In the years 26 and 27¹ the savage policies of Sheng Tupan began to be put in operation, at the same time that fascism started.

In the same way that fascism counts as its enemies all people who love peace and freedom, thus did Sheng Tupan and the savage Chinese who surrounded him count us, the native people of East Turkestan, as their enemies and as an inferior race. They oppressed us with every kind of cruelty. In 26 and 27 and the subsequent years Sheng Tupan arrested Ha Jeeneeyas, Sherif Jan,² and over four thousand others of the vanguard, of those who were most liked, of those who knew the most, of those who were most clever, of those who were outstanding for leadership. Can we forget them?

After he had arrested them, Sheng Tupan put them in torture cells, beat them until their bones were broken, strangled them and poisoned them, until they were dead. Their crime in the eyes of the Tupan was that he accounted them our representatives, who sought for our people freedom and good fortune.

Very few of these men who were arrested at that time are still alive. Those few are in dark prisons waiting for the coming of death to end their tortures at the hands of the Tupan's executioners. Their condition is so pitiful that their best friends would not know them if they saw them, and their mothers, wives, or children would go mad at the sight of them.

These helpless, unfortunate people are Uighurs, Taranchis, Kazaks, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, and Tatars. But they are more than representatives of the races to which we belong: they are our fathers, our elder brothers, our younger brothers and our relatives.

Hail, people! Let all men know well:

That these helpless, unfortunate people in the prisons of Sheng Tupan, drawing their last breaths of life before dying, turn upon us the eyes of their souls and in their moaning say to us: "For the suffering which we have endured at the hands of the savage Chinese, you must avenge us. We are pouring forth our blood and yielding up our souls for our people: for this also you must avenge us."

At the present time, in our territory of East Turkestan, all of the ruling power is in the hands of the Chinese alone. We are a people who have lost all human rights. It should be known by every man of knowledge that when the rule is in the hands of the Chinese, there is no equality and no justice.

Only when the throats of the Chinese fascist oppressors have been cut and they have bled to death will we come again into the life of light.

Chinese administrators plan to move from far-away China a million Chinese and Chinese bandits³ into our territory. Some of them, in the guise of soldiers and of refugees, have already come to Tihwa [Urumqi]; they are being dispersed among the several districts and hsien [*xian*]. It is the aim of the Chinese to drive us out thereafter from our native Turkestan and to remove us by force to the east. This thing which the Chinese seek to do to us is for us the same thing as the most horrible death: everyone should understand this. Our bones will rot unburied on either side of the long road across the Chinese steppe to far away China; Chinese and Chinese bandits will live in our houses, take over our goods, enjoy our riches, be masters in our stead; by force they will go into our wives and our daughters. Because of our fear and our docility and our trustfulness they will mock us with contemptuous laughter.

The progressive, forward looking people among us, who give thought to our future welfare and fortune, have in every place organized illegal groups in order to fight against the savage Chinese, because the Chinese are dragging us toward a bottomless well, into which they mean to fling us.

Our fighters for the people's freedom will unite our forces in friendship and under right leadership to rise against the Chinese in order to destroy their savage mastery and power; therefore there have been formed in every locality the illegal "National Freedom Groups."

Our aim in forming the "National Freedom Groups" is to free our people from enslavement to the savage Chinese and thereafter to make it so that these people, who have been oppressed by the Chinese, strangled by them, crushed down by them, may arise again as national races in possession of freedom, equality before the law, wealth, culture, and a fortunate life.

Our National Freedom Groups and all the members of every group have taken an oath in the name of the One God, before the souls of our heroic grandfathers and in the presence of all the people, to achieve, through enthusiasm and heroism, by legal and illegal means, by words and by force of arms, by night and by day and without resting the objectives set forth below.

1. We are fighting to do away with Chinese rule in all our East Turkestan [Sinkiang] and to destroy for all times the roots of Chinese tyranny in our territory.

East Turkestan belongs to the real masters of the territory, the Uighurs, the Taranchis, the Kazaks, the Kirghiz, the Tatars, the Uzbeks, together with all those who live among them in peace and friendship and who alike suffer Chinese oppression, such as the Mongols and other non-Chinese nations. There is no place in East Turkestan for Chinese colonial government or Chinese colonists.

2. The National Freedom Groups and all of their members are fighting to establish in East Turkestan a real equality of rights between all races one with the other.

3. We are fighting for the organization of a National Political Alliance, that is, a Congress composed of elected representatives of the people living in East Turkestan; the representatives comprising this National Political Alliance should be elected in numbers proportionate to the total numbers of their respective races. We should ourselves be the real masters of this National Political Alliance and not the Chinese. Thereafter the Chinese will have no way to deride and ill treat us: we will make our own lives and our own happiness according to our own desires and not according to those of the Chinese.

From among the elected representatives to the National Political Alliance we will select the most intelligent, the most just, and those who most love the people, and with them we will organize our own new government.

4. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting in the interests of the people of all races except the Chinese so that in the future the district, town, village and small village administrations and organizations will be composed of trusted, energetic, capable, just members elected according to the popular will by the locally resident people themselves.

5. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting for the cultural development of every racial nation [in Sinkiang] and for the establishment of lower and middle schools in their respective languages for the children of every nation, these schools to be supported by the government.

6. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to reestablish the separate national contingents of troops, such as those comprised respectively by Uighurs, Kazaks, Mongols, and members of other national races, which were disbanded by Sheng Tupan because of his fear that they might oppose his political policies.

7. Sheng Tupan, running wild, took all military and civil rule into his own hands; throughout the entire East Turkestan all rule became military; in the cities martial law was declared, and as soon as it became evening all movement in the streets was absolutely forbidden; it was impossible to leave the city without permission. After nightfall you were prevented not only from visiting your friends, but you could not go to see your closest relatives on the most urgent business, because the moment you stepped out of your door, a Chinese would seize you and begin: "Where are you going?" "For what reason?" "What have you said?" and [he would ask you] many other questions. Each person was obliged to spy on everyone else and inform the police. At the present time East Turkestan [Sinkiang] has become one vast prison; the nations are captives in it and the Chinese are the executioners. The Chinese themselves account the situation to be one of happiness and a fortunate life for the natives!

The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to overthrow the prison system set up by the oppressor, Sheng Tupan; to wrest the military and civil powers from the rule of one man, and to free unoffending people from captivity.

8. The National Freedom Groups and their members are fighting to give freedom to such among the number of those natives who (because of their interest in the welfare of the people) were arrested and imprisoned by Sheng Tupan as may yet be still alive and still suffering from Chinese oppression; these persons are the most trusted of our people, possess naturally the most authority, are the foremost among us and the most dear to us.

9. There previously existed friendly trading relations between the people of East Turkestan [Sinkiang] and the Soviet Government; this relationship was disrupted by the Chinese administration; this cessation of trade worked great hardship in our lives, checked the growth of peasant holdings in the villages, and brought to a standstill the trading in the bazaars; for each family the daily livelihood became difficult. In every locality those who were starving, who were without clothing, who could not find employment,

and whose condition was altogether piteous, became more and more numerous. Big merchants became small; the small became bankrupt; the bankrupt became beggars. For skilled workers also there are no jobs because there is no one who needs to employ them. As a result they too have fallen into dire poverty. The number of people who have met this kind of misfortune mounts up higher every day. In the market there are no buyers for cattle, for the various kinds of wool, skins, or grains, or for the other products of the small village holdings, nor for the production of the cattle raisers. The powerful Sovsintorg, a large purchaser, went out and away from East Turkestan [Sinkiang] as a consequence of the inside-out political policies of Sheng Tupan. The prices of the food supplies and other products of the village holdings and of cattle and sheep husbandry are too cheap: the husbandman cannot buy any of the things he needs for his family's livelihood with the money he realizes from the sale of his products. From this money the Chinese authorities also forcibly take all kinds of taxes and exactions, for which reason no one can spend for his own needs or as he likes in a carefree way the money he receives. The life of the peasant, of the cattle and sheep herder, of the whole generality of the population, thus becomes progressively more difficult day by day. The people of East Turkestan [Sinkiang] are like an orphaned child, without father or mother or anyone to heed its cries. The savage Chinese have torn the child from the mother that bore it (the Soviet Government) and seek to give it to a foster mother (the Three People's Principles) for the latter to trample it under foot. For the people of East Turkestan the severance of their mutually friendly relations with the Soviet Union and their subjection to the discipline of the Three People's Principles by the savage Chinese is the same thing as death by torture.

The National Freedom Groups must fight to free all people from the claws of death by hunger, to establish anew strong and truly sincere relations of friendship with our great, freedom-loving friend and neighbor, the Soviet Union, and to develop wide and full trading relations between all our trading men and the Sovsintorg. We are fighting to do away with the fixed market prices set by the Chinese by proclamation and to destroy the other systems of regulations harmful to the people.

10. The National Freedom Groups must fight to procure the abatement and lightening of the unbearable load of taxes and exactions imposed upon

the people by the Chinese. We demand of the Chinese that they decrease the endless and growing number of police and soldiers.

11. The National Freedom Groups must fight to secure freedom of religion and will oppose all restraints placed upon religious practices.⁴

12. The National Freedom Groups must offer strong and merciless opposition to the policy of moving Chinese and Chinese bandits into our East Turkestan and of driving us, the people of the place, by force from our native soil to the East.

Even if the Chinese, with false and sweet words, attempt to receive us, we will not move anywhere at all from our own soil, nor shall the Chinese enter into our land, because we know very well that for us these things would be the same as death.

13. The National Freedom Groups must fight to procure the increase and expansion of irrigated lands, rivers, and (artificial) waterways and must direct the attention of our new government to such useful projects and assist (in their realization).

14. The National Freedom Groups must oppose all of the many kinds of heavy and difficult forced labor imposed on the native peoples by the Chinese (such as the digging of completely useless trenches and so forth) because these things are of no benefit to the people and are necessary to no one.

The oppression of the savage Chinese has turned into Fascist rapacity; for this it is not possible to sit with quiet and patience, only watching. Everyone must know that the time has come when he must choose one of two lives: to live a really happy life in freedom, or to be crushed in slavery beneath the boot of the savage Chinese.

The National Freedom Groups and their members give to all people this warning: if because of our fear we improvidently let this moment pass, the Chinese will bring into our land millions of Chinese bandits and they will be settled among us. Then we shall be strangled, robbed of all our belongings, and humiliated; then we shall be powerless to liberate ourselves from the claws of the Chinese Facsists.

The National Freedom Groups clearly understand this situation and we have sworn an oath not to permit a single moment to pass unused from this time forward, but rather to start now to fight against the rule of the savage

Chinese oppressors, for the sake of a bright life for the people, their freedom, their fortune, and their well-being.

We call upon every man who takes thought for the happiness of his own family and of his people, upon all men of learning, of justice and of courage, upon our heroes and all our youth, upon our brave soldiers, each and everyone of them, not to let a single moment pass, but to stand in our ranks as one of us to resist with us the oppressor Chinese. There is no single person who could possibly doubt that the help of the One God is on our side and His kindness is with us.

Brothers! Each of us must rise with heroic bravery against the Chinese! Time does not wait. Our lives and our happiness are for this moment in our own hands: if we are afraid we will lose them both.

Enroll yourself as a member of the National Freedom Groups! Organize in every separate place a local National Freedom Group! Let all people arise and resist the savage Chinese! The time of our triumph will certainly come!

The National Freedom Group

Source: U.S. Dept. of State, Office of Strategic Services File XL 32642. "Rebel Objectives in Sinkiang," September 25, 1945, enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 23, from the American Consulate in Urumqi.

Notes

1. Of the Chinese Republic, i.e., 1937 and 1938.
2. The leader of the Altai Kazaks, who knew well the Chinese and Russian languages, and was a handsome, gracious man of gigantic physique, famed for his stature and his physical courage. He has become a legend.
3. *Hung hu tzu*, by which the Chinese mean simply "bandit" and the Turkish mean "Chinese bandit."
4. Here the propagandist doubtless refers, among other constraining regulations, to those which in effect forbid the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca, which used to be made by many Sinkiang Muslims.

APPENDIX F

“Struggle for the Motherland” (Later Rebel Pamphlet)

This pamphlet appears here as in the original translation made for the U.S. Consulate in Urumqi.

Originally Eastern Turkestan, our Motherland, was the real territory of the Turkish Race. We consist of seven million people. This land is our birthright left by our brave ancestors and it is our duty and responsibility to guard this heritage. The Chinese oppressors and usurpers came to this land two hundred years ago, like savages and bandits, seizing our territory, enslaving us, making our land a colony and dishonoring our holy religion. In brief, we became like men who have eyes but are blind, ears but are deaf, tongues but are dumb, and legs but are lame. Such treachery and barbarous treatment. How can they be endured? Ponder over these things. Which of them can be gainsaid? If you are not a spy or a quisling; if you are born of your mother; if the blood from your umbilical cord wet this soil; if your father owns you as his legitimate son then you cannot deny the truth of what has just been said!

You must not forget how our country flourished of old under the leadership of such heroes of our race as Sultan Sokushbora Khan, Harum Khan, Abdul Raschid Khan, Mohamet Khan, Sudduk Khan, and Osman Khan. During the times of these great men we were masters of our territory and maintained the luster of our culture equal to any others. Within the last two hundred years we have lost our birth-right and live like animals under the cruel sway of the Chinese who are filthy and barbarous.

Why did the Ili uprising occur? It was because we have the right to rise up against oppression for the sake of our liberty, the happiness and prosperity of our sons, and the renaissance of our religion. We also believe that Allah has said to us, “I shall punish all oppressors.” We also are fully

convinced that the power of the masses is the power of Allah. In this faith we fought and over-throwing the treacherous Chinese sovereignty in the three districts¹ established a free Muslim Eastern Turkestan State. At the same time we raised the flag that was handed down from our forefathers.

Ho, fellow countrymen, Men of the Faith and members of the same blood. Fear not. Strengthen your hearts and courage and consciences.

After an abundance of bloodshed we won a compromise peace which consisted of eleven articles of agreement. In order to preserve this agreement in full, the people must be willing to sacrifice everything.

The crafty foxes, with their swinish snouts, seeking to obtain what is not theirs, the shameless and oppressive Chinese, using these eleven articles as a blind, are seeking again to trap us in their net. The cunning Chinese serve us with a wooden plate (which can be used once only and then must be thrown away). “May Allah protect us from falling once more into the Chinese hands.” If we do so again the people know how they will be treated. People, you must remember the past. The land is ours and the invaders have no claim to it.

Now, the military heads of these oppressors at Urumchi are trying to prolong their already exhausted life.² Their aim is to reestablish their old barbarous methods. Together with them are a few running dogs, conscienceless fools and sycophants, playing a quisling role with the Chinese. The eleven articles of the agreement will not allow the oppressors any road to regain their former suzerainty if its terms are fulfilled.

Ho, shameless beasts and devils. You must know that you are already caught in Hell. We, people of the same blood, must not let you quislings dance to Chinese music.

The present is an era of democracy, justice, and liberty—no longer of absolute dictatorship. This is no more a time for slumber but a brightening period of the Twentieth Century.³ We must struggle unceasingly with our belts still tightened.

Let these oppressors depart quickly from our Eastern Turkestan.

Let these spies, traitors and puppets also leave at once.

Let these running dogs of the Chinese and their coterie get out also.

Long live free Eastern Turkestan.

Long live our Muslim Republican Government.

Long live the great, the heroic warriors.

Long live the crescent calling for our thirty days of holy fast.

Long live the star calling for our five daily prayers.

Away with, away with, away with these oppressors, these spies, these pro-Chinese. If you do not depart there is no room for you here above the ground.

The Bubbling Spring

Source: U.S. Department of State, Division of Chinese Affairs, "Signs of Unrest in Tihwa," American Consul J. Hall Paxton to the Secretary of State, Urumqi, January 13, 1947, enclosure no. 2.

Notes

1. The three northwest districts: Altai, Chuguchek, and Kuldja.
2. This is said to refer to a recent speech of General Song's in which he urged that the Chinese hold their ground and cease yielding.
3. Strange but apparently true, a strongly Moslem declaration using the Christian chronology.

NOTES

CHAPTER 2

1. June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions* (London, 1976), p. 33–38.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 18–22.
3. Sun Yat-sen, *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary* (Taipei, 1953), p. 181.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Sun Yat-sen, *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* (Taipei, 1953), p. 265.
7. Sechin Jagchid, “The Failure of a Self-determination Movement: The Inner Mongolian Case,” in *Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers*, ed. McCagg and Silver (New York, 1979). According to this source (pp. 235–36), the use of *zhongzu* was vehemently denounced by various national minority representatives.
8. *The China Yearbook* (Shanghai, 1934), p. 466.
9. Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny* (Taipei, 1953), p. 6.
10. Dr. Sun himself had evidently at one time envisaged a type of federal organization for China. Members of Sun's Revive China Society founded in 1895 reportedly were asked to swear an oath that called for an end to Manchu rule and the establishment of a federal republic in China. See Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (Oxford, 1983), p. 457.
11. Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950), p. 115.
12. Chiang Kai-shek, *Selected Speeches and Messages: 1937–1945* (Taipei, 1953), p. 265.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 266. The possibility of greater autonomy for Mongolia and Tibet had been included in the platform of the Sixth National Guomintang Congress of May 18, 1945, but other frontier areas were to be assisted in economic and cultural development instead, with no mention of possible autonomy. See Milton J. T. Shieh, *The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894–1969* (New York, 1970).
14. Chiang Kai-shek, *Selected Speeches*, p. 266.
15. Frank Bessac, “Revolution and Government in Inner Mongolia 1945–1950,” *Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science Arts and Letters* (Michigan, 1965), p. 422.
16. “Border Districts Delegates Demand Autonomy for Racial Minorities,” English Language Service of the Central News Agency, December 3, 1946, cited in IOR L/P&S/12/2360, “Chinese Turkestan Internal Situation.”
17. W. Y. Tsao, *The Constitutional Structure of Modern China* (Melbourne, 1947), pp. 291–92.

18. Ibid., pp. 286–87.
19. This office is discussed in Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, p. 53.
20. Tsao Wen-yen, ed., *The Chinese Year Book 1944–45* (Shanghai, 1946), p. 271.
21. On Sheng’s removal see [chapter 3](#). On Lung Yun’s removal, see the account in J. C. S. Hall, *The Yunnan Provincial Faction 1927–1937* (Canberra, 1976).
22. See C. C. Ku, “Economic Development of China’s Northwest,” *China Quarterly* (Shanghai) 4 (1938–39): 294.
23. *China Handbook 1937–43* (New York, 1943), p. 403.
24. *China Handbook 1937–45* (New York, 1947), p. 341.
25. Tsao, ed., *The Chinese Year Book 1944–45*, p. 787.

CHAPTER 3

1. C. C. Ku, “Economic Development of China’s Northwest,” *China Quarterly* (Shanghai) 4 (1938–39): 264. No figures are available for the amount of gold being taken out of the Altai gold mines, but some fifty thousand workers were said to work in the gold mines there. Shipments of gold by plane from Lanzhou to the Chinese coast were “considerable.” This gold, according to Ku, was “mostly mining royalty by high officials” and valued at one-twentieth of the total Altai output.
2. Interview with Walter Graham, Uckfield, England, August 1984.
3. Xinjiang’s bituminous coal reserves were estimated at 31,980 million tons, or the third largest reserves in China in 1946. Oil reserves were estimated at 120 million metric tons, or 58 percent of China’s total reserves; iron, 42,888,000 metric tons, and tungsten ore, 8,600 metric tons were also considered important reserves. *China Handbook 1937–45* (New York, 1947), p. 391.
4. U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C., Office of Strategic Services (OSS), “Developments of the Week in China: Chungking Challenges Russian Influence in Sinkiang,” Research and Analysis Report no. 340, August 25, 1942, p. 1.
5. Ho Ku-jen, *Issues and Studies* 4 (1968): 25.
6. U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C., Office of Intelligence Research, “Recent Events in Sinkiang,” no. 4461, June 11, 1947, p. 9, citing Chinese military sources. Wolfram ore yields tungsten, which is used in tungsten steel and in electrical filaments.
7. Herman, *An Historical Atlas of China* (Chicago, 1966), p. 60.
8. The importance of molybdenum was recognized by the Chinese government, but Xinjiang’s deposits were apparently unknown; no mention of the existence of this mineral in Xinjiang is made in the *China Handbook 1937–45*.
9. OSS, “Russo-Chinese Relations and Potential Soviet Contributions to China’s Postwar Economic development,” R & A Report no. 3331, August 31, 1945, p. 13.
10. Ibid.

11. See Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia* (Bloomington, 1963); Jack Dabbs, *History of the Discovery and Exploration of Chinese Turkestan* (Netherlands, 1963); Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia* (London, 1966); and June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions* (London, 1976).

12. Lawrence Franklin, "The Chinese Response to British and Russian Encroachment in Northwest China," Ph.D. dissertation, St. John's University, 1978.

13. People from the Ili area, in particular, identify only three separate groups in Xinjiang: Moslems, non-Moslems (e.g., Manchus, Mongols), and Han Chinese. Interview with Anthony Alexievitch Deng, Taibei, Taiwan, November 1984.

14. Various Turkic groups lived in Central Asia during this period and intermarried. Turkic peoples included the Besmil, the Qarluq, and the Turkic peoples of the Karakanik, Ghaznavid, and succeeding Turkic empires, many of which were formed through alliances of Turkic groups more powerful than the Uighur.

15. Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950), pp. 15–16.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 45–69.

17. For a detailed account see Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy 1871–1881* (London, 1965).

18. H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagestrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, trans. A. Beltchenko (Beijing, 1910), p. 440.

19. Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, pp. 52–64.

20. See description in *ibid.*, pp. 66–67.

21. Interview with Abdullah Erturk, Taibei, Taiwan, November 1982. Also see Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, pp. 66–67.

22. M. Kutlukoff, "The Democratic Movement of the People of South Xinjiang (Kashgaria) 1945–47," *Scientific Works and Information, Book I*, Academy of Science, Uzbek SSR, Department of Social Sciences (Tashkent, 1960), p. 111, citing "Xinjiang Gazeti," May 3, 1951; Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 67.

23. Kazak resistance under Sheng is recorded in Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri* (Istanbul, 1961), pp. 63–67. Other Sheng tactics included kidnapping, false invitations for peace talks, and promises to release prisoners in exchange for the disarming of the Kazaks.

24. Interview with Arslan Tosun, Taibei, Taiwan, October 1981. According to Mr. Tosun, the group of Kazaks of which he was a member was promised that the head of their revered leader, Zuka Haji, would be returned to them for proper burial if they would end their resistance to Sheng's government. They promised to do so, and under their leader Sultan Sherif they moved to the Barkol area where they hoped to live peacefully; however, due to continued government harrassment they moved into neighboring Qinghai in July 1937. They returned to Xinjiang sometime in 1948.

25. India Office Records (IOR), London, L/P&S/12/2359, no. 12 24 (4), "Special Survey of Intelligence on Xinjiang 1943."

26. *China Handbook* (Taibei, 1951), p. 365.

27. IOR L/P&S/12/2405, no. 12, File 62, “Chinese Turkestan,” Turrall, Urumqi, June 2, 1944.

28. See Allen Whiting, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot* (Michigan, 1958).

29. As late as the 1940s, the term “Turki” was being used by both explorers who visited the region and representatives of foreign governments stationed in Xinjiang.

30. IOR L/P&S/12/2359, no. 12 24 (4), letter no. 602/H/6/S-PT, Gillett, Urumqi, March 1, 1944. He in turn cites a Soviet grammar of Uighur published in 1939 as the source of his information.

31. Ibid.

32. See Aitchison K. Wu, “The Fourteen Peoples of Chinese Turkestan,” *Journal of the West China Border Research Society* 15, series A (1944): 88–93.

33. An example can be seen in Mehmet Emin Bug̃ra, “Xinjiang Compatriots Are Turkish,” *Altai* 1, 1 (April 25, 1945): 8–10.

34. Today Manchus continue to use their own language in Xinjiang. In Taipei, a Manchu Association fosters continued interest in Manchu language and culture among a small but enthusiastic group of Manchus from Xinjiang as well as from the northeast of China.

35. Interviews with Arbunsain Kunggur, Taipei, Taiwan, 1984–1985. Mr. Kunggur is a Sibos originally from the Ili valley.

36. Urumqi’s population was 69,275; Han accounted for 38,557, or 55 percent. If the city’s 15,978 Chinese Moslems or Hui are added, Chinese speakers accounted for 78 percent of the city’s population in 1946. Based on figures given by She Lingyun in *Tianshan yuegan*, Oct. 15, 1947: 9–21.

37. Ibid.

38. Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 140.

39. Zhang Dajun, *Forty Years of Turbulence in Xinjiang* (Hong Kong, 1956), p. 175;

O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: The Great Game* (London, 1971), p. 175.

40. N. N. Mingulov, “The National Liberation Movement in Xinjiang as Part of the Chinese Revolution, 1944–49,” *Central Asian Review* 11 (1963): 184; *Tianshan huabao* (June 1947): 1, citing Zhang Zhizhong. Uncorroborated information from the youngest son of Sabit Damullah (an official in the government of the first East Turkestan Republic) states that the initial meetings of this committee took place at his father’s house in Yining in the year prior to the rebellion. Interview with Dr. Abdul Kasim Kanat, Taipei, Taiwan, January 1982.

41. See Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, p. 63.

42. Zhang Dajun, *Xinjiang’s Seventy Years of Turbulence* (Taipei, 1980), 11:6147.

43. IOR L/P&S/12/2405, no. 12, File 62, Turrall, Urumqi, September 6, 1944. He added that the general cost of living for a laborer was up 86 percent in August 1944

over the preceding month, mainly the result of the cost of food.

44. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, no. 12, File 64, G. A. Wallinger, Nanjing, December 3, 1946.

45. OSS, File XL 32642, "Rebel Objectives in Sinkiang," September 25, 1945, enclosure no. 1, pp. 6–7.

46. *Ibid.*, citing enclosure no. 2, p. 1.

47. See George Moseley, *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou* (Harvard, 1966); Jack Chen, *The Sinkiang Story* (London, 1977), p. 210; Burhan, *Fifty Years in Xinjiang* (Beijing, 1983), p. 276.

48. Kashgar's quota had been to supply 1,500 horses, but it "donated" a total of Xn \$1,050,000 and 70 horses. *Xinjiang Daily*, June 30, 1944, p. 3. Turfan contributed Xn \$113,400 and no horses. *Xinjiang Daily*, June 25, 1944, p. 3.

49. Chen, *The Sinkiang Story*, p. 209.

50. Also, getting horses away from the Kazaks would have been a major challenge!

51. OSS, File XL 32642, "Rebel Objectives in Sinkiang," September 25, 1945, p. 9.

52. *Ibid.* Among those held in Sheng's prisons were Ahmet Jan Kasimi (1937–1944) and Burhan Shahidi (1938–1944). See Burhan, *Fifty Years*, pp. 269–81.

53. This report also indicated that as local oases in the area between Lanzhou and Urumqi did not produce any surplus foodstuffs, the passage of troops into this area would constitute "economic disruption and suffering." OSS, File 36225, no. 1176, "Movement of National Government Troops into Sinkiang," Chongqing, May 12, 1943, citing U.S. Consul Clubb, Urumqi, April 22, 1943.

54. OSS, File 35656, no. 1076, "Subject: Transmitting Report Contained in China Information Committee Daily Bulletin on Sinkiang Province," Chongqing, April 14, 1943, citing *Daily Bulletin*, no. 613 (undated).

55. IOR L/P&S/12/2359, no. 12 24 (4), "Confidential Report on Sino-Soviet Relations Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia Frontier Incidents," Turrall, Urumqi, April 7, 1944.

56. *Ibid.*, April 27, 1944.

57. *China Handbook* (Taipei, 1951), p. 359.

58. See especially the works of Zhang Dajun and Sun Fukun.

59. IOR L/P&S/12/2405, no. 12, File 62, Turrall, Urumqi, December 1, 1944.

CHAPTER 4

1. U.S. State Department, Document 45492, citing report of U.S. Consul O. Edmund Clubb, entitled "Sinkiang-USSR Relations," Urumqi, July 3, 1943, p. 3.

2. *Ibid.*

3. One leaflet is cited in Zhang Dajun, *Xinjiang's Seventy Years of Turbulence* (Taipei, 1980), 11:6259, which in turn cites the Xinjiang Provincial Public Security Department, Ili District, Gongha County Bandit Suppression Report, no. 1, 1944.

4. Ibid.
5. According to the account by Jack Chen the unit was ambushed and wiped out, but this is not supported by Chinese sources. See Jack Chen, *The Sinkiang Story* (London, 1977), p. 209.
6. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 11:6267.
7. IOR L/P&S/12/2405, Turrall, Urumqi, November 2, 1944.
8. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 11:6267. Zhang implies that Deng was purposely misled during his visit by Yining officials still loyal to Sheng who were trying to assure that Sheng would not be blamed for the coming troubles.
9. Xinjiang Provincial Government, "Population Statistics for 1946," Urumqi, July 5, 1946, held at the Bureau of Investigation, Xindian, Taipei, Taiwan.
10. Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri* (Istanbul, 1961), p. 79.
11. The term "bandit" is still used by Chinese speakers both to denote a bandit in the usual English sense of the word and to identify antigovernment groups.
12. Xinjiang Provincial Government, "Population Statistics for 1946."
13. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 11:6260.
14. IOR L/P&S/2405, no. 12, File 62, Turrall, Urumqi, December 1, 1944.
15. OSS XL 32642, "Rebel Objectives in Sinkiang," report by American Consul Robert Ward, Urumqi, September 25, 1945, enclosure 2, p. 3.
16. "National" here refers to the area of Chinese Turkestan—Xinjiang.
17. OSS XL 32642, "Rebel Objectives in Sinkiang," enclosure 1, pp. 4–8.
18. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 11:6271.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 11:6276. A U.S. source gives different dates. According to the U.S. consul in Urumqi, Suiding fell on December 30. General Xie reached Yining about January 18, 1945, with five thousand troops and engaged the "insurgents" for a five-day period that ended with the defeat of the Chinese. Xie retreated with remnants of the defenders of the airfield on January 31. OSS File 117975, no. 7, citing "Ining Uprising: The Fall of the Defense Area; the Insurgent Government," U.S. Consul Ward, Urumqi, February 7, 1945.
21. Various sources agree on this fact, but there are no official figures available on casualties at Yining.
22. OSS File 117975, no. 7, "Ining Uprising," p. 2.
23. OSS File 137188, no. 9, "Xinjiang Revolt: Its Progress from the First Week in February to the Middle of May; Rumored Efforts to Seek a Settlement," U.S. Consul Ward, Urumqi, May 25, 1945.
24. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 11:6277.
25. Ibid., 11:6278–79.
26. "Xinjiang: The Ili Affair," Document no. 100/113.5/1, March 17, 1945, National History Institute, Xindian, Taipei.

27. Zhao Xiguang, "Toward a Correct Understanding of the Northwest," *Xinjiang Daily*, January 21, 1945.

28. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1945* (Washington, D.C., 1969), 7:991, citing Ward's report of January 15, 1945.

29. *Ibid.*, 7:994. Also see references to the fact that T. V. Soong disagreed with the Soviet instigation theory, p. 1004.

30. His name also appears as Ailun Chun Wang, or Prince Wang. He was the reportedly henpecked husband of Hatije Kadvan Hanim [Hatewan], later the first female Kazak to hold the post of inspector general for Urumqi, and the first female to hold such a high-ranking post in Xinjiang.

31. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 11:6349–50.

32. IOR L/P&S/12/2405, Turrall, Urumqi, February 5, 1945. Also in *Xinjiang Daily*, January 12, 1945, p. 3.

33. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 11:6349–50.

34. Mesut Sabri, "Concerning Politics in the Northwest," *Altai* [Chinese-language magazine], Chongqing, April 25, 1945.

35. IOR L/P&S/12/2405, no. 12, File 62, Turrall, Urumqi, July 7, 1945.

36. *Ibid.*

37. *FRUS*, 1945, 7:1002

38. Even if Zhu Shaoliang had decided to launch an offensive, it seems highly probable that despite greater numbers of Nationalist troops they may well have been more than matched by local forces. According to eyewitness accounts, the Nationalist troops were ill-prepared for conditions in Xinjiang, lacking adequate clothing and complaining bitterly about the unsuitable food. Interviews with Arbusain Kunggur and Ibrahim Mansur, Taibei, Taiwan.

39. White Russian commander Bolinov is credited with leading the attacks on Tacheng and Emin. See Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 11:6336.

40. Amaç Karahoca, *Dog̃u Turkistan* (Istanbul, 1961), p. 440.

41. *FRUS*, 1945, 7:1020.

42. The note from Molotov to Wang Shijie, China's new minister of foreign affairs who replaced T. V. Soong before the treaty was signed, stated that with regard to recent developments in Xinjiang, the Soviet Union "has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China." *The Chinese Yearbook 1944–45*, p. 513.

43. Sun Fukun, *A Record of the Soviet Union's Aggression and Exploitation in Xinjiang* (Hong Kong, 1952), p. 9.

44. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6803.

45. Mehmet Emin Bugra, *Dog̃u Turkistan* (Istanbul, 1952), p. 58.

46. IOR L/P&S/12/2405, no. 12, File 62, Turrall, Urumqi, October 3, 1945.

47. Zhu Shaoliang and Luo Jialun (special commissioner for Xinjiang, under the Control Yuan) blamed the Soviet Union for inspiring and aiding the Ili forces. See

FRUS, 1945, 7:992, 1001–1002.

48. Although the two men were related, this marriage had caused a split in the family. There was no indication of any specific sympathy between the two and no record that they met, although both were in Urumqi at the same time.

49. There is an interesting story concerning Ahmet's rise to power in the ETR, which is recorded in more than one source. In the years just prior to the Ili rebellion Ahmet was in prison in Urumqi. Released after the rebellion began, he made his way back to Yining and offered his services to the new government. He was asked to help out in the kitchen, his first contribution to the three districts revolution thus being as cook. When it was discovered that he could read Russian, he was called upon to translate information from that language into Turki. From this rather humble beginning he rose to the post of minister of foreign affairs by autumn of 1945. See Burhan Shahidi, *Fifty Years*, p. 293.

50. Ebulhayir has remained a shadowy figure. Following his participation in the peace negotiations, and after the coalition government took over in July 1946, little is heard of him.

51. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6808, citing Zhang Zhizhong's report to the central government of March 1947. See also OSS XL 48391, citing "Negotiations Between Chang Chih-chung in Tihwa [Urumqi]," Ward, Urumqi, January 29, 1946, p. 2.

52. *Ibid.*

53. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6810–14.

54. IOR L/P&S/12/2405, Turrall, Urumqi, November 1, 1945.

55. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6822–24.

56. *FRUS*, 1945, 7:1024.

57. *Ibid.*, 7:1023. Also, Zhang Dajun writes that the government had determined that no advanced autonomy would be given to Xinjiang, and that absolutely no election of provincial-level officials would be allowed. See Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6825.

58. *Ibid.*

59. OSS File XL CID 48391, "Negotiations between Chang Chih-chung and the Delegates of the Ining Regime," January 28, 1946, p. 4. Zhang Dajun writes that the delegates also demanded that the whole provincial police force be Moslem, that the central government assist in the organization of people's militias, and that all soldiers brought into Xinjiang to quell the rebellion be removed. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6842.

60. *Ibid.*, 12:6847.

61. *Ibid.*, 12:6861.

62. *Ibid.*, 12:6865.

63. On previous appointments in border areas, he had gained a reputation for enriching himself at the local people's expense—especially in Tibet and Inner Mongolia. See Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, pp. 85–86. Rumors said he left with Xn \$20 million in gold. A popular story claimed that "He arrived with a bedding roll and small

suitcase and left with 600 kilos of luggage and 9 lorry loads of goods.” Two of his aides were said to have collected over Xn \$4 million in bribes for passports and export visas—the passport fee under Sheng being a mere Xn \$150,000 but under Wu in 1946 Xn \$2 million. These stories were all collected by the British consul and recorded in IRO L/P&S/12/2402, Ext. Document 7595, 1946.

64. *Xinjiang Daily*, January 28, 1946, p. 3.

65. Wu Zhongxin, “Xinjiang Province Monetary Question,” Doc. no. 02.2/10, January 1946, National History Institute, Xindian, Taipei.

66. *Xinjiang Daily*, April 26, 1946, p. 3.

67. *Ibid.*, May 4, 1946, p. 3.

68. *Ibid.*, May 8, 1946, p. 3.

69. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6874.

70. The text of the second annex or supplementary agreement is in *FRUS*, 1946, 10:1208; also in the original Chinese in Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6875–76.

71. *Xinjiang Daily*, June 7, 1946, p. 3.

72. *Ibid.*, June 6, 1946, p. 3. The central government had already decided that no 1945–46 land taxes would be collected in the provinces occupied by Japan during the war. In 1946 it was declared that all provinces would receive this exemption, and Zhang was therefore probably certain his request would be granted. On the tax remission, see Lloyd E. Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction* (Stanford, 1984), p. 73.

73. *Xiangjiang Daily*, June 6, 1946, p. 3.

74. *Ibid.*, June 21, 1946, p. 3.

75. *Ibid.*, June 8, 1946, p. 3.

76. *Ibid.*

77. *Ibid.*, July 1, 1946, p. 3.

78. *Ibid.*, July 2, 1946, p. 3.

79. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 5

1. On Guomindang involvement in coalitions, see Paul Sih, *Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War 1937–1945* (Hicksville, N.Y., 1977). On warlords and provincial factions see J. C. S. Hall, *The Yunnan Provincial Faction: 1927–1937* (Canberra, 1976); M. R. Hunsberger, “Ma Pu-fang in Chinghai Province: 1931–49” (Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1978); Robert A. Kapp, *Szechuan and the Chinese Republic 1911–1938* (Yale, 1973); and A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (London, 1963).

2. Ili opposition to Emin’s appointment is noted in Zhang Dajun, *Seventy Years*, 12:6874.

3. Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 273.

4. *Xinjiang Daily*, August 15, 1946, p. 3. See also reports in the *Xinjiang Daily* on meetings of the Provincial Council between July and December 1946, which record unanimous decisions on virtually all issues, contentious or otherwise.
5. Zhang Zhizhong's May 13, 1947, speech was published in the *Xinjiang Daily*, August 14, 1947; also translated in *Pacific Affairs* 20,1-4 (December 1947): 422-29.
6. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6847.
7. Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 91.
8. Ahmet Jan Kasimi, "Who Is Unwilling for Peace," *Minzhu bao* (Yining) June 18, 1947, p. 4.
9. IOR L/P&S/12/2405, no. 12, File 62, Graham, Urumqi, August 3, 1946.
10. *Xinjiang Daily*, July 19, 1946, p. 3. A complete translation of this document appears in appendix B.
11. *Xinjiang Daily*, August 4, 1946, p. 3.
12. Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 250.
13. See especially Chairman Zhang's remarks in his October 26, 1946, speech printed in *Xinjiang Daily*, November 25, 1946, p. 2.
14. *FRUS*, 1946, p. 1219.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 1216, citing Robert Ward, Urumqi, November 20, 1946.
16. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, July 29, 1946.
17. *Xinjiang Daily*, July 20, 1946, p. 3.
18. *Ibid.*, September 1, 1946, p. 3.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7148, citing the *East Turkestan Revolutionary News*, September 16, 1946.
21. *Xinjiang Daily*, November 11, 1946, p. 3, and November 21, 1946, p. 3.
22. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, January 1, 1947. Another source says that the election committee was actually investigating the refugee murders when the chairman and his assistant were killed. See *FRUS*, 1946, p. 1217, citing American Consul Robert Ward, Urumqi, November 30, 1946. This seems unlikely as the committee was in sensitive Kazak territory and therefore in a precarious enough position without attempting such an investigation. PRO FO5030, Graham, Urumqi, February 27, 1947. Another reference to this incident places it in February 1947. See OSS, R & A Report no. 4461, "Recent Events in Sinkiang," July 11, 1947, p. 5.
23. *Xinjiang Daily*, December 14, 1946, p. 3.
24. *Ibid.*, December 17, 1946, p. 3.
25. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, December 8, 1946.
26. *Ibid.*, January 18, 1947.
27. *Ibid.* The use of the show-of-hands method may have been necessary in some districts due to high illiteracy.
28. Ahmet Jan Kasimi, "On the People's Joint Declaration," *Minzhu bao* (Yining), July 3, 1947, p. 2; Mehmet's views are in OSS, R & A Report no. 4461, p. 5.

29. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, November 21, 1946.
30. In particular, the U.S. and British consuls in Urumqi saw Zhang's role as pivotal, and their reports to their respective governments praise Zhang's efforts during 1946 and 1947. See IRO L/P&S/12/2360, 2384, 2350, 2361 for British comments on Zhang; *FRUS*, 1946 and 1947, vols. 10 and 7 respectively.
31. *Xinjiang Daily*, November 25, 1946, p. 2. Also portions of this speech appear in Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6900–16.
32. *Ibid.*, July 24, 1946, p. 3.
33. Mesut's son, Dr. Arthur Sabri (Artughrul Sabriog'lu), was trained in medicine at Western China Union University in Chengdu and had worked for UNRRA before returning to Yining. OIR Report 4451, June 30, 1947.
34. *Tian shan hua bao* 1 (January 1947). Zhang's visit is recorded in *Xinjiang Daily*, August 29, September 1, 4, and 5, 1946. Other comments are to be found in the British consular reports for this period as previously cited.
35. *Xinjiang Daily*, September 1, 1946, p. 3.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*, September 4, 1946, p. 3.
38. *Ibid.*
39. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, citing *Revolutionary East Turkestan* (Yining), September 15, 1946.
40. IOR L/P&S/12/2402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.
41. *Xinjiang Daily*, July 17, 1946, p. 3.
42. *Ibid.*, July 18, 1946, p. 3.
43. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1946, p. 3.
44. *Xinjiang Daily*, July 27, 1946, p. 3.
45. *Ibid.*, August 5 and 31, 1946, p. 3
46. *Ibid.*, August 26, 1946, p. 1.
47. *Xinjiang Daily*, September 7, 1946, p. 4.
48. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, no. 12, File 24, Graham, Urumqi, October 2, 1946, citing *Revolutionary East Turkestan* September 15 and 16, 1946.
49. *Xinjiang Daily*, November 25, 1946, p. 3.
50. For instance, in early November the paper featured remarks by the inspector-general for Urumqi District, Hatije [Hatewan], who spoke "wholeheartedly" in support of unity and urged her Xinjiang compatriots to do the same. *Ibid.*, November 3, 1946, p. 3.
51. *Ibid.*, November 11, and 19, 1946, p. 3.
52. *FRUS*, 1946, p. 1217.
53. No immediate report appeared in the local press on this incident, but references were later made to it in *Xinjiang Daily*, November 22, 1946, p. 3. Other details are from Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7067, who writes that Jin was murdered for "dabbling" with a Uighur girl.

54. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, November 1, 1946.
55. Ibid.; IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Etherington-Smith, Kashgar, August 24, 1946.
56. *Xinjiang Daily*, August 25, 1946, p. 3.
57. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, January 5, 1947.
58. A refugee association was established in Urumqi for displaced Han Chinese, each of whom received Xn \$2,500 in aid from the government through this association. On this association and the tension created in the capital by the presence of the refugees, see especially Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7049–50.
59. *Xinjiang Daily*, August 27, 1946, p. 3.
60. Ibid., November 25, 1946, p. 3.
61. IOR L/P&S/12/2384, no.12/24/(2), Coll. 12/24, Etherington-Smith, Kashgar, August 9, 1946.
62. According to Zhang Dajun, Song cursed Zhang Zhizhong as “little man, big ideas” and felt the only way to solve the region’s difficulties was to put down all “mobsters” in Ili and Urumqi by military force. See Zhang Dajun, *Sishi nian dongluan Xinjiang* (Hong Kong, 1956), pp. 223, 227.
63. All the summaries in this chapter are based on the text of Chairman Zhang’s speech that appeared in the *Xinjiang Daily*, November 25, 1946. While this speech is quoted extensively by Zhang Dajun, the order of the items is slightly changed, as he initially omits discussion of the sixth point concerning Guomindang contact with Kazak leader Osman Batur. See Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6900–16.
64. In January 1946, Governor Wu Zhongxin had submitted a report on inflation in the region and on the currency question, advising that the province switch to the Nationalist currency within two years. He noted that military spending in Xinjiang, as elsewhere, had an inflationary impact, and therefore he recommended that salaries for troops stationed there not be increased. Further, he felt a small number of soldiers with good equipment and transport would be as effective and less difficult to support and supply. That this and other advice to the central government was disregarded shows that other considerations prevailed in Nanjing. Wu’s report, “Xinjiang Provincial Monetary Question,” January 1946, Document 02.2/10, National History Archives, Xindian, Taipei.
65. The same conclusion is reached by Allen Whiting, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot* (East Lansing, Michigan, 1958), p. 100.
66. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, September 1946.
67. See [chapter 7](#) for further details on the scandal this caused for Chairman Mesut Sabri.
68. Xinjiang Provincial Government Year 34 (1945) Expenditures, Document 2–10.02 4/65, National History Archives, Xindian, Taipei.
69. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7041. Forty thousand ounces of opium alone were reportedly burned on June 3, 1946.

70. "Sinkiang Province Corruption Cases Under Martial Law," Document 02./49, National History Archives, Xindian, Taipei (telegram).
71. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7045.
72. *Xinjiang Daily*, December 17, 1946, p. 3.
73. Such attacks are referred to in *Xinjiang Daily*, December 13, 1946, p. 3.
74. IOR L/P&S/12/2361, Coll. 12/24, Etherington-Smith, Kashgar, June 21, 1948.
75. Zhang Dajun mentions all these types of corruption. See Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7045–46. These and other kinds are also referred to in Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, p. 86.
76. First-hand experience of corruption was reported by American Consul Robert Ward. See *FRUS*, 1945, p. 1020.
77. *Minzhu bao* (Yining), June 29, 1947, p. 4, which contains an article by Ahmet Jan Kasimi dated April 28, 1947, entitled "Who Is Unwilling for Peace?"
78. IOR L/P&S/12/2350, Graham, Urumqi, January 18, 1947.
79. *Ibid.*, Coll. 12/20A, Shipton, Kashgar, May 1, 1947.
80. Increases in Nationalist army strength are noted in the IOR files on a monthly basis between July and December 1946.
81. *Xinjiang Daily*, November 15, 1946, p. 3, lists the delegates but not their nationalities or government positions, which are based on information from other sources.
82. *Xinjiang Daily*, November 3, 1946, p. 3.
83. *Ibid.*, December 5, 1946, p. 3.
84. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Stevenson, Nanjing, December 6, 1946, citing English Language Service of the Central News Agency of December 3, 1946.
85. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, May 24, 1947.
86. See Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 276.
87. *Xinjiang Daily*, November 25, 1946, p. 3.
88. The Kazak writer Halife Altay identifies Ali Han Töre and Osman Batur as having the same aims—the independence of the entire region. See his *Anayurttan Anadoluya* (Istanbul, 1977), p. 441. Another Kazak points out that this was the reason why Ali Han disappeared in August 1946. See Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, p. 102.
89. See frequent comment to this effect in Zhang, *Seventy Years*, and IOR files, especially Graham's reports for July 1946 to March 1947.
90. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Shipton, Kashgar, January 1, 1947.
91. *Ibid.*
92. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, November 15, 1946.
93. *Ibid.* Ili Commander Izhak Han Mura's reason was that he had actually reorganized his units, but the list and other information were not ready as he had been traveling so much and because so many new recruits had joined his forces.
94. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6847, noting that after thirty meetings agreement had been reached, but that it was really the USSR they were dealing with and really the

USSR that had finally agreed.

CHAPTER 6

1. Stories on the returning delegates appeared in the *Xinjiang Daily* on January 14, 15, 17, 1947, and included the information that Ahmet Jan Kasimi had met with Chiang Kai-shek, who then presented the Xinjiang delegation with a flag. None of the Ili faction delegates—nor the outspoken Isa—is quoted in these stories.

2. *Xinjiang Daily*, January 12, 1947, p. 1.

3. *Ibid.*, February, 5, 1947, p. 2. Furthermore, the right to buy flour and rice at controlled prices had been withdrawn from all employees who were not Chinese citizens. Any person holding Soviet papers was therefore ineligible to buy flour at the controlled price of Xn \$470 per jin, as opposed to the open-market price at this time of Xn \$50,000 a jin. PRO F3236, no. 2, Graham, Urumqi, January 6, 1947.

4. *Xinjiang Daily*, January 13, 1947, p. 4.

5. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 548, citing U.S. Ambassador Stuart, January 30, 1947.

6. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, no. 18, Graham, Urumqi, January 31, 1947, citing a handbill entitled “Struggle for the Motherland.” Ali Beg Hakim was responsible for much of this handout literature, according to Kazak sources. See Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, pp. 105, 108.

7. *Xinjiang Daily*, January 9, 1947, p. 3.

8. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, November 15, 1946.

9. *Ibid.*

10. U.S. Department of State, Report no. 4461, July 11, 1947.

11. Reports from visitors to the Ili area in September 1946 and January 1947 attest to the presence of only a few border guards on either side. IOR L/P&S/12/2350, letter no. 737-H/5/L-47, Shipton, Kashgar, May 1, 1947. Also see PRO F05061, no. 28, Graham, Urumqi, February 22, 1947.

12. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, November 15, 1946.

13. *Ibid.*

14. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, February 18, 1947.

15. *Xinjiang Daily*, February 17, 1947, p. 3.

16. The date of this first “liberty mass meeting” was February 19, according to Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 251; the date of February 20 is given by Zhang Dajun, *Seventy Years*, 12:7326. Zhang writes that the meeting was mainly a youth meeting at which slogans like “Strike down the Han,” “Drive out Zhang (Zhizhong),” and “Corrupt Han running dogs” were shouted. He states that Uighur youth were seeking revenge for a Uighur who had been killed by a Han on the highway—but this is not corroborated by any other source. Zhang’s dates are not always accurate. For instance, he says Ahmet returned to Urumqi at the start of the

riots on February 21; actually Ahmet had been in Urumqi since January 14, according to the *Xinjiang Daily* of that date; also Ahmet was interviewed in January, in Urumqi, by the British consul. See IOR L/P&S/12/2360, January 1947 despatches; also PRO F5030, Graham, Urumqi, January 28, 1947.

17. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, February 27, 1947.

18. These points are cited in both Barnett and Zhang Dajun. See Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 251, and Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7326.

19. Zhang does not mention Osman, but Barnett does (p. 251).

20. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7328.

21. *Xinjiang Daily*, February 23, 1947, p. 3.

22. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, February 27, 1947. According to Burhan Shahidi's memoirs, some three thousand Hui demonstrated on the 24th, in support of the government and against the three districts. Burhan writes that this demonstration was really simply arranged by General Song Xilian, who was taking advantage of Zhang's continued absence. See Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 307.

23. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7329.

24. *Xinjiang Daily*, February 25, 1947, p. 3.

25. Both Zhang Dajun and Burhan Shahidi give the figure of 10,000 for this mass demonstration. See Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7329, and Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 308.

26. Zhang's uncorroborated account of how the first shot was fired is as follows. Ahmet talked with the demonstrators until noon, around which time an old person tried to get into Burhan's car. The chauffeur broke a window of the car in trying to stop him and then hit the old man. When an angry crowd gathered, an official drew a handgun to ward them off. He accidentally fired, killing a Han Chinese and two other people. Zhang Dajun, *Seventy Years*, 12:7330. A similar story about a government driver getting involved in a quarrel and then shooting someone in anger appeared in *Xinjiang Daily*, February 26, 1947, p. 3.

27. The number killed and wounded varies from source to source. *Xinjiang Daily*, February 26, 1947, claims that five were killed and three badly wounded. Barnett, in *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (p. 251), writes that four Chinese and four Uighur were killed. The British consul, Walter Graham, did not witness the demonstration but heard later that four Turki and two Chinese were killed. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, February 27, 1947.

28. A letter from a Han Chinese, printed in the Yining paper *Minzhu bao* on April 22, 1947, p. 4, states that half of the crowd present on the day of the demonstration were soldiers. When Ahmet came out, the cries of "Kill him" came from the soldiers, not the crowd, which did not take up the cry. The letter implies that the entire incident was actually arranged: Moslems and Kazaks had been ordered to go first; on the 25th Han were told to go, and student groups were to follow on the 26th, with businessmen on the 27th. It was all a matter of government manipulation according to this letter, which, tantalizing as it is, is uncorroborated by any other sources. Burhan's own

memoirs add little to existing accounts, except that he and the other officials were forced to take refuge in the government buildings, emerging only in the evening when Ahmet went to address the Uighur Literary Club in Urumqi, where he succeeded in calming down the assembled members. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, pp. 309–10.

29. *Xinjiang Daily*, March 6, 1947, p. 3.

30. *Ibid.*, February 25, 1947, p. 3.

31. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7331.

32. *Xinjiang Daily*, March 1, 1947, p. 3.

33. *Ibid.*, March 5, 1947, p. 3.

34. Ahmet Jan Kasimi, “Who Is Unwilling for Peace?” *Minzhu bao* (Yining), May 24, 1947.

35. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7337.

36. No report was ever published. References were made in the local press about the “unfortunate accident” that sparked the riots and government regret over the affair, but no further explanation was offered, nor was blame ever ascribed to any one individual.

37. Zhang’s lack of success in securing government funds is noted in *FRUS*, 1947, p. 548; the report is dated January 30, 1947.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 551.

39. The members signing the announcement were eight Han Chinese, including Zhang, and ten national minority councillors, including Ili faction leader Ahmet Jan Kasimi, Abbas, and Rahim, as well as the Turki nationalists Isa and Mehmet Emin Bugra. See *Xinjiang Daily*, March 26, 1947, p. 3.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*, March 27, 1947, p. 3.

42. *Ibid.*, April 5, 1947, p. 3.

43. *Ibid.*, April 10, 1947, p. 3.

44. Many officials remained from the days of Sheng Shicai. See comments in Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 256, who notes that local police forces and courts retained most of the same officials who had worked under Sheng.

45. *Xinjiang Daily*, April 27, 1947, p. 3, and May 13, 1947, p. 3.

46. Zhang had announced that the government would repeal the taxes for June–December 1946. *Ibid.*, April 11, 1947, p. 3.

47. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7376.

48. Zhang’s May 5 speech to the Kashgar representatives was published in the *Xinjiang Daily* of May 21, 1947, pp. 2–3.

49. IOR L/P&S/12/2350, Coll. 12/20A, Shipton, Kashgar, June 1, 1947. According to Shipton, only Ahmet’s intervention prevented a full-scale riot.

50. A partial English translation appears in *Pacific Affairs* 20, 1–4 (December 1947). A Chinese version, which appears to be complete, appeared in the August 14, 1947, issue of *Xinjiang Daily*. Parts of the speech—or possibly the original, as it is a

good deal longer than the *Xinjiang Daily* version—appear in Zhang Zhizong’s report to the central government, dated September 11, 1947, cited in Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7383–7406.

51. In the longest version of the speech, cited in Zhang Dajun, Ahmet is also directly blamed for delays in the investigation into the murders at Emin in 1946. See Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7395.

52. *Minzhu bao* (Yining), April 22, 1947, p. 4.

53. *Ibid.*, April 22, 1947, p. 4.

54. *Xinjiang Daily*, May 12, 1947, p. 3.

55. *Ibid.*, May 16, 1947, p. 3.

56. *Ibid.*, May 17, 1947, p. 3.

57. *Minzhu bao*, May 19, 1947.

58. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7366.

59. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 554, citing U.S. Consul Paxton’s report of May 24, 1947, which notes that General Song told Paxton on May 13 that Zhang would be replaced that month.

60. Zhang Zhizhong, “Everyone Wants to Eliminate Contradictions in Society,” *Xinjiang Daily*, May 21, 1947, p. 3.

61. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 557, citing Ambassador Stuart.

62. Lattimore asserts that Mesut had the support of wealthy Uighur classes. See Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 97.

63. *Xinjiang Daily*, May 22, 1947, p. 3.

64. IOR L/P&S/12/2350, Coll. 12/20A, Shipton, Kashgar, August 2, 1947.

65. Mesut’s appointment was certainly greeted with approval by General Song Xilian. A report by American Consul Paxton states that “Liu [Zeying] feels appointment perhaps somewhat premature but General Song is much pleased.” *FRUS*, 1947, p. 557, citing Paxton’s report of June 1, 1947.

66. *Xinjiang Daily*, July 21, 1947, p. 3.

67. According to the Hami delegate to the Assembly, Mr. Abdul Erturk, argument centered on thirteen delegates—four from Kashgar, five from Ili, three from Tacheng, and one from Altai. The accusation was that these men were not the real delegates but replacements for men who were ill or had died. It was actually admitted that that was the case, so the other delegates wanted these “imposters” denied seats. Abdul Erturk interview, January 1982, Taipei, Taiwan.

68. *Xinjiang Daily*, July 21, 1947, p. 3.

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Ibid.*, May 29, 1947, p. 3. According to an article published in Taiwan, the Xinjiang Provincial Assembly convened on June 22 and elected as chairman Sahid Ahong, a religious leader from Aksu, and as vice-chairman, Ma Liangjun, another religious leader. See the interesting but uncorroborated account in Li Yutang, “Yizhang

xuanju fengbao: Shaole boshi sanshiwau,” *Zhongwai zazhi* (Beyond China magazine) (June 1968): 98.

71. See the account in K. W. Rea, ed., *The Forgotten Ambassador: The Reports of J. L. Stuart, 1946–49* (Colorado, 1981), pp. 40, 191.

72. Abdul Erturk interview.

73. *Minzhu bao* (Yining), June 29, 1947, p. 3.

74. *Xinjiang Daily*, June 10, 1947, p. 3.

75. The title he was given was *guanshi*, meaning simply government official. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7306. According to Zhang, Osman made five points in his letter to the Chinese military: He would uphold the Three Principles of the People in the Ashan district; protect lives of all the people; strike and drive out any Mongols in the Beidashan area; and defend the country; finally, he requested that the government supply him with ammunition. As a source for this information, Zhang cites “Xinjiang Garrison Command Classified Information on Ili Military Developments, Report No. 91,” July 20, 1946. Zhang also cites a letter from Osman to Chairman Zhang in a similar military report dated July 25, 1946, no. 95, in which Osman claims that he and his people were cheated into joining the Ili forces and asks that the government extend its protection to him and his people. See Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7306–7307.

76. Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, p. 102.

77. Ibid. U.S. sources (which refer to Ali Beg Hakim as “Halibek”) say he became pro-Chinese in early 1947. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 580.

78. Ibid. No specific date is given.

79. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 568.

80. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 316. As a member of the CCP and representative of the government that had Osman executed in 1951, it could be expected that Burhan would include criticism of Osman in his memoirs. However, as noted previously, there were many regular complaints about the man and his followers whenever they shifted their center of operations.

81. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 568. This information is the result of the personal visit of a U.S. consular official to the Beidashan area in June 1947.

82. The number of soldiers taken varies from source to source. Zhang Dajun says two. See Zhang Dajun, *Sishi nian dongluan Xinjiang* (Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanse, 1956), p. 219. An American source says eight. See *FRUS*, 1947, p. 557.

83. Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 101.

84. Ibid., p. 100. Curiously, Lattimore makes little comment on the Beidashan affair, saying only that the whole business (which he does not describe) was sensationalized by the press.

85. Song said that he had, in fact, sent an order to release the Mongol prisoners, but it had not arrived in time. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 557.

86. Ibid., p. 557.

87. See especially Halife Altay, *Anayurttan Anadolu'ya* (Ankara: Modern Matbaa, 1981), p. 448. Jack Chen claims that Osman was attacked by Izhak Han, who had driven him to Beidashan. Jack Chen, *Sinkiang Story* (London: Collier Macmillan, 1977), p. 261.

88. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 559.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 565.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 561.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 566, citing a Xinhua news agency report of June 17, 1947, in turn citing TASS, which broadcast an announcement on Beidashan made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the MPR, June 15, 1947.

92. American Foreign Service officer John Melby wrote in his diary in June 1947 on the “Mongol invasion of Sinkiang”: “The Ministry of Information admitted to me that the hoopla is designed to help force a loan from us and to distract attention from the disasters in Manchuria which are real disasters. The gentleman in question did not even smile when he said it.” John Melby, *The Mandate of Heaven* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 210.

93. Most sources on Xinjiang during this period mention the Beidashan affair, but the Soviet authors Mingulov and Kutlukov do not. Lattimore makes little mention of it. The *Xinjiang Daily* is silent on the entire episode.

94. *Minzhu bao* (Yining), June 18, 1947, p. 4.

95. *Ibid.*, June 24, 1947, p. 4.

96. *Ibid.*, June 29, 1947.

97. *FRUS*, 1947, pp. 570–71.

98. Cultural clubs like this one existed for each nationality and were often the focus of political work.

99. *Minzhu bao* (Yining), July 7, 1947.

100. See detailed discussion in the next chapter. Also, see comment in Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 252; and in British Consul Shipton's reports, IOR L/P&S/12/2361, Coll. 12/24.

101. IOR L/P&S/12/2361, Coll. 12/24, letter no. 29/H/5/L-48, Shipton, Kashgar, April 5, 1948. Shipton adds that later some fifty of these were sentenced to two years in prison, forty-five were released, and six were reportedly executed.

102. *Minzhu bao* (Yining), July 3, 1947.

103. *Ibid.* In a special report on the Xinjiang budget, dated May 1947, the central government decided that Xinjiang would have to continue to print its own money to offset the provincial deficit of 6.9 billion dollars, as the central government was unable to subsidize the region. In light of this, Guomintang claims of government's massive support for Xinjiang are clearly incorrect. See Document 2–10.02 4/65, National History Archives, Xindian, Taibei, Taiwan.

104. *Minzhu bao* (Yining), July 3, 1947.

105. *Xinjiang Daily*, June 10, 1947, p. 3.

106. Ibid., July 10, 1947, p. 3.

107. Ibid., July 8, 1947, p.3.

108. Zhang's disagreement with the prevailing Nationalist view is indicated in several sources, but see especially *FRUS*, 1947, pp. 554 and 572, which notes that the Americans had heard that Zhang was recommending the granting of full autonomy to Xinjiang by the central government.

CHAPTER 7

1. Turkic sources make the same accusation, but add torture of local Moslems, e.g., the nailing of hands to boards, burning, and mock hanging. According to one source, many Turki prisoners went mad as result of such treatment. See Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, pp. 130–32.

2. Sun Fukun, *A Record of Soviet Union's Aggression in Sinkiang* (Hong Kong, 1952), p. 25.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 26; Soviet sources, which include the authoritative Kutlukov, do not mention the peace feelers put out by the Soviet Consul during this time.

6. See Sun Fukun, *Soviet Union's Aggression; Zhang Dajun, Seventy Years*, vol. 12.

7. These are given in Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 253, and Zhang Dajun (1956), p. 223.

8. This speech was delivered September 11, 1947; published in Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7384.

9. PRO F0371/69624, doc. no. 61770. The Ili letter to Zhang was published in the Yining newspaper *Wake Up* and was translated by the British Consulate, Urumqi. It is submitted by "The Members of the Provincial Government Who Signed the 1946 Agreement" and signed by Ahmet Jan Kasimi and Rahim Jan Sabri Haji (spelled Ahmed Kasyme and Rahim Jan Sabir Haji respectively in the original translation).

10. The Ili group said there were 20,000–25,000 Nationalist forces in 1944. However, Chinese sources say that in 1944 there were 50,000 Chinese Nationalist troops in the province. See Zhang Dajun, *Seventy Years*, 12:6163. By 1947, the number of troops was 90,000 according to Song Xilian. See IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, February 18, 1947.

11. PRO F0371/69642, doc. no. 61770.

12. Cited in Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 254. See also PRO FO 1778, citing an extract from Central News Agency, January 14, 1948, giving Zhang's reply to the "Ining Tribe's" letter of October 16, 1947.

13. General Song told the U.S. consul in Urumqi that the Nationalists had aided Osman but, he claimed, no Chinese troops were with Osman and that, actually, the

Chinese disapproved of Osman's action in the Altai. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 573. Song later said he knew that Ali Beg Hakim (spelled Halibek in the report) was attacking Ili forces around the town of Wusu but again claimed it was "against Chinese advice." *Ibid.*, p. 580.

14. *Ibid.*, 1948, p. 732.

15. *Ibid.*

16. This last note may have been collected by Foreign Affairs Special Commissioner Liu Zeying, whose plane stopped in Yining en route from Alma Ata to Urumqi at about this time. See *ibid.*, p. 751. For comment on the note itself—the exact content of which remains unknown—see *ibid.*, p. 749.

17. Zhang Dajun (1956), p. 226. Also in *Xinjiang Daily*, October 15, 1947, p. 3.

18. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 572, in a report dated September 23, 1947.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 568, in a report dated July 2, 1947. This firsthand information was collected by U.S. consular official Douglas Mackiernan.

20. *Ibid.*, 1948, p. 751.

21. *Ibid.* Liu Mengchun also declared publicly that not one Chinese soldier was with Osman, and that the Chinese were not preparing to enter the Altai region. *Xinjiang Daily*, October 5, 1947, p.3.

22. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 573.

23. "Madjoroff" may have been Mevlanov, an adviser to the ETR government, said to be a Soviet citizen and agent.

24. *FRUS*, 1947, p. 580. The allegiance of Ali Beg Hakim remains unclear. He certainly appears to have received representatives from both the Ili and Chinese factions.

25. Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 267.

26. According to the Shanghai *Xinwen bao*, the population of the three districts in 1946 was 650,000. Using the figure of 4,015,350 for the total provincial population, this comes to 16 percent. Cited in PRO F0371 75800, file no. 11126, F.2042, British Embassy, Nanjing, January 25, 1949.

27. Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 267.

28. Turkic sources differ on many points of interpretation as well as on details in their accounts of the ETR. However, virtually all attest to Ali Han Töre's repute as a scholar, religious leader, nationalist, and anti-Soviet force in the three districts. See Mehmet Emin Bugra, *Dog̃u Turkistan*, pp. 56–57; Karahoca, *Dogu Turkistan*, p. 22; Isa Yusuf Alptekin, *Dogu Turkistan Davasi*, p. 181; Hassan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, pp. 80 and 111, citing Kazaks who said they fought for Ali and that they recognized no difference between Uighur and Kazak, saying "We are all Turkestan's Turkish people."

29. Turkish sources claim that Ali Han Töre Beg was kidnapped by the Russians in August 1946 because of his opposition to the peace agreement. Such views are shared by Hasan Oraltay in *Kazak Turkleri*, p. 101; Isa Yusuf Alptekin, *Dog̃u Turkistan Davasi*, p. 186; and Amaç Karahoca, *Dog̃u Turkistan*, p. 22. However, another theory

is that Ali Han Töre, at this time aged sixty-two, voluntarily went to the USSR for medical treatment, leaving his government in the hands of an equally nationalistic Moslem, Asim Bey. This theory is supported by Graham who, during his visit to the Ili area, was told that the peace agreement came “as a great disappointment to many people in Kulja [Yining]... who had established an independent republic and had no wish to return to Chinese control.” He continues, “Alihan Ture, the Uzbek who led the revolt, is said to have wept at the conclusion of the agreement... and on the score of ill health ... has disappeared none knows whither.” PRO F15550/324/10, Graham, Urumqi, October, 26, 1946.

30. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 282; OSS, OIR no. 4451, June 30, 1947, p. 6.

31. In September 1946 during Graham’s visit, Anwar was the “deputy administrative supervisor” under “Hakim Beg Hoja” (Aşim Beg Hoja). Anwar reportedly spoke very good Russian, unlike Aşim, who spoke no Russian but had “fair Chinese.” PRO F15627, October 1946.

32. Muhettin and Latif Kanat, sons of Sabit Damullah, who served as the premier of the earlier ETR, were among the Moslem nationalists hoping for an independent Moslem state in Xinjiang. Both men served in the ETR government—Muhettin as minister of health and Latif as chief of staff. Dr. Abdul Kasim Kanat, interview, February 12, 1981, Taipei, Taiwan.

33. Mehmet Emin Bugra, p. 57. This list of names is not corroborated by any other source, and Mehmet does not indicate his source of information.

34. Zhang Dajun, *Sishi nian dongluan Xinjiang*, p. 94, and *Seventy Years*, 12:6897. Jack Chen writes that a man known as “Hassonov” was Izhak’s deputy commander; he identifies “Polinov” as a White Russian cavalry commander and Zolun Tahair, Uighur, as deputy commander. Chen, *The Sinkiang Story*, pp. 228–231.

35. IOR L/P&S/12/2362, no. 12(5), File 24. Doc. ext. 2064, March 11, 1946, citing *Journal of Supreme Soviet of the USSR*, March 3, 1946.

36. *Ibid.*, Ext. Doc. no. 8195/6, September 24, 1946.

37. *Ibid.* Much of this file concerns White Russians, on whom the British consul was particularly well informed since he spoke Russian and counted among his friends in Urumqi many members of the White Russian community.

38. Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 260.

39. Not only Chinese sources like Zhang make this accusation; Turki sources also accuse Ahmet of being an agent. However, Soviet citizenship and education can be interpreted either way. One informant declared that the possession of Soviet papers proved that one individual was pro-Soviet, and later used the fact of a Soviet education to show that another individual knew the Soviets too well ever to trust them. Abdul Kerim Kanat interview.

40. IOR report no. 4451, June 30, 1947, based on Chinese sources. It also states that Ahmet was born in Tashkent and graduated from the Soviet Technical College there, information which is corroborated by Burhan and Zhang Dajun.

41. The problem of establishing the truth about Ahmet's political views is exemplified in a reference to Ahmet contained in a British Embassy report. When Ahmet attended the National Assembly in Nanjing in December 1946, he had a meeting with the Turkish ambassador, Tugay, who commented after first meeting him and others from Xinjiang that they were fundamentally anti-Soviet and "Ce sont des Tures, vraiment." After later meetings, however, Tugay described Ahmet as "a very dangerous man and a pro-Stalinist." This was because Ahmet based his case for Xinjiang autonomy on religious rather than political grounds, which Tugay took to be the Soviet party line. For the first report mentioning this exchange see PRO FO F507, no. 1674 (116/101/46) citing the British Embassy report of G. V. Kitson, Nanjing, December 30, 1946. The second report is from PRO F2112, Gillett, Kashgar, January 23, 1947.

42. Zhang (1956), p. 290.

43. *FRUS*, 1946, p. 553.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Zhang Dajun writes that he was an engineer. Zhang (1956), p. 281; Jack Chen suggests he was an expert in motor transport. Chen, *The Sinkiang Story*, p. 229.

46. Mehmet Emin Bugra, *Dogru Turkistan*, p. 57.

47. See Zhang Dajun, *Seventy Years*, 11:6355–56, for the Chinese view. See Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, p. 79, and Mehmet Emin Bugra, *Dogru Turkistan*, pp. 57–58, for the Turkic view.

48. IOR L/P&S/12/2402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946; IOR L/P&S/12/2350, Coll. 12, Shipton, Kashgar, and PRO F5061, no. 28, Graham, Urumqi, February 22, 1947. Shipton considered Ms. Stephens to be biased against the Nationalist Chinese; he cited her pro-CCP views in order to criticize her abilities of observation. This is in contrast with the opinion of Walter Graham, who remembered her as observant and generally well-informed. Unfortunately, she died in an airplane crash en route from Urumqi to Beijing and never filed her stories with *Life* and *Time*, or with the French news agency for which she worked. The report of her death is noted in John Melby, *Mandate of Heaven* (London, 1969), p. 229.

49. OIR report no. 4461, dated July 11, 1947, p. 10.

50. For an interesting account of this trip, see Aitchen Wu's *Turkistan Tumult* (Hong Kong, 1984).

51. One man, Ibrahim Mansur, remembered the loss of manufactured matches, all of which were imported from the USSR. When shipments were cut in the winter of 1944–1945, people had to light fires with flints. This was, however, the only shortage that figured in his memories. Ibrahim Mansur interview, Taipei, November 1984.

52. *Ibid.* See also the figures for Soviet exports to Xinjiang from 1942 to 1949 given in [table 2](#).

53. See "rebel" leaflets, appendices E and F, which claim that the closed border did bring economic hardship to local residents.

54. OSS file XI, 32642, containing the report of Robert Ward, Urumqi, September 25, 1945, p. 4.
55. IOR L/P&S/12/2360, Graham, Urumqi, March 12, 1946, which recounts Graham's interview with Robert Ward.
56. IOR L/P&S/12/2402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.
57. From interviews with former Ili residents.
58. From interviews with former Ili residents and also British Consul Graham.
59. For the Turkish view, see Hasan Oraltay and Mehmet Emin Bugra. Burhan Shahidi states that the ETR received extensive Soviet aid. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 282. Kutlukov writes that trade was resumed immediately with the ETR to alleviate hardship in the Ili area. Kutlukov, *The National Liberation Movement in Xinjiang 1944–49 as a Part of the Chinese People's Revolution* (Tashkent, 1958), pp. 261–69. He makes no mention of the sale of any arms or war materials as aid to the ETR.
60. IOR L/P&S/12/2402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.
61. Melby, *Mandate of Heaven*, p. 102. Melby also writes that the younger Dr. Sabri clearly identified with the Yining government as he continually referred to them using “we.”
62. IOR L/P&S/12/2408, Shipton, Kashgar, June 21, 1948.
63. Kutlukov, *National Liberation Movement*, p. 258.
64. See earlier discussion in [chapter 4](#) and the full list of demands in appendix E.
65. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7403.
66. See [appendix C](#) for discussion of Turkic names and titles.
67. Graham said that such badges were so common that “the absence of a medal is something of a distinction.” Even the driver of a truck he passed on his way to Yining in 1946 had two of them pinned to his dungarees. PRO F15627, Graham, Urumqi, October 18, 1946.
68. Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, p. 101. Drawings of seven types of badges, plus the ETR flag, can be found in Chen, *A Record of the Ining Affair* (Taipei, 1977), p. 25.
69. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6277.
70. PRO FO 5061, Graham, Urumqi, February 27, 1947, citing Ms. Barbara Stephens.
71. PRO FO 371/63336, Graham, Urumqi, December 4, 1946.
72. IOR L/P&S/12/2402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.
73. *FRUS*, 1945, p. 992, and Chen, *The Sinkiang Story*, p. 228. Chen also writes that the ETR had weapons of Japanese, British, German, and American makes, and that the ETR had anti-aircraft guns, but his information is not corroborated by any other sources.
74. Lattimore gives the figure of 40,000. Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 87. Chen gives the number of 30,000. Chen, *The Sinkiang Story*, p. 236. In 1947, General Song estimated ETR strength as “over 69,000”; *FRUS*, 1947, p. 571.

75. According to Chinese military intelligence, these units were as follows: Regiment of Mixed Nationalities, 3,000; Kazak Guerrilla Regiment, 800; First Infantry Regiment (mixed), 1,600; Second Infantry Regiment (mixed), 1,500; Third Infantry Regiment and Fourth Cavalry Regiment, 1,000; Hui Fifth Regiment, 500; Kazak Sixth Regiment, 700; Kazak Seventh Regiment, 500; Mongol Eighth Regiment, 500; Mixed Nationality Ninth Regiment, 500; Hui Tenth Regiment, 700; Independent Sibo Mounted Regiment, 200; total, 11,500. Zhang Dajun (1956), pp. 179–80.

76. This money was of such poor quality that it “will soon all have disintegrated entirely,” PRO doc. F 15550, Graham, Urumqi, October 25, 1946.

77. OSS File 137188, no. 9, “Xinjiang Revolt: Its Progress from the First Week in February to the Middle of May: Rumored Efforts to Seek a Settlement,” U.S. Consul Robert Ward, Urumqi, February 7, 1945.

78. *Xinjiang Daily*, July 27, 1947, p. 3.

79. Mansur and Kanat interviews.

80. Kutlukov, *National Liberation Movement*, p. 261.

81. *Ibid.*

82. PRO F15627, Graham, Urumqi, October 28, 1946.

83. OSS File 137188, no. 9, citing U.S. Consul Robert Ward, Urumqi, May 25, 1945, pp. 7–8.

84. Kutlukov, *National Liberation Movement*, p. 261.

85. PRO F15627, October 28, 1946, citing Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.

86. *Ibid.*

87. Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 269.

88. Kutlukov, *National Liberation Movement*, p. 260, citing *Azad Sharki Turkestan* (Free East Turkestan), December 5, 1944.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 260, citing *Azad Sharki Turkestan*, April 19, 1945, July 16, 1945, and August 28, 1945. The same information is cited in N. N. Mingulov, “The Uprising in Northwestern Xinjiang, 1944–45,” *CAR* 11, 2 (1963): 186–89.

90. Mingulov, “Uprising,” p. 189. He cites no source.

91. IOR L/P&S/12/2402, Graham, Urumqi, September 24, 1946.

92. Osman personally claimed to have opposed Russian exploitation of the Altai mines. He recounts challenging a group of Russians, demanding that they show him an authorization by Ali Han Töre himself, or he would drive them out. Hasan Oraltay, *Kazak Turkleri*, p. 102.

93. American observer Barnett wrote of persistent rumors that the Russians continued to mine in the Altai, as per an agreement with the ETR. Not only gold was taken, but also the tungsten mines at Fuwen and Wenquan were said to operate for the benefit of the USSR. Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 270.

94. Mingulov, “Uprising,” p. 186. This was corroborated in an interview with Dr. Kanat, who was a high school student in Yining between 1945 and 1949.

95. Dr. Abdul Kerim Kanat interview.

96. Mingulov, "Uprising," p. 186.
97. PRO London, F15627.
98. Ibid.
99. Mingulov, "Uprising," p. 189.
100. Kutlukov, *National Liberation Movement*, p. 260.
101. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7061. The head of this organization was a man named Sayerdula (Seyfullaev), not Seyfettin and not Ahmet Jan Kasimi as is erroneously stated in various sources.
102. PRO F3116. Originally this information was in *Qian jin bao*, August 1, 1948, published in Yining. It was reproduced in *Dagong bao*, (Shanghai) November 29, 1948, in an article entitled "New Developments in Xinjiang as Revealed in a Local Document," by Lin Yen.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. See discussion later in this chapter.
106. See discussion on the aviation agreement later in the chapter.
107. This is the formal Turkish name of the chairman. He is more commonly referred to as Mesut Sabri, or Mesut, in keeping with Turkish forms of address. See [appendix C](#) for further discussion of this point.
108. Melby, *Mandate of Heaven*, p. 102.
109. Seyfettin is listed as among those attending a meeting of the provincial government on September 18, 1947. *Xinjiang Daily*, September 22, 1947, p. 3.
110. Ibid., August 11, 1947. The title of this post in Chinese is "Jiancha Shi." Ma Liangjun was one of the men released by Governor Wu in 1945 along with the Kazak leader Ailin Wang. See Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:6175. Another source claims that Ma was elected vice-chairman of the Provincial Assembly in June 1947, on the recommendation of no less a personage than Yang Deliang, then commander of military forces at Kashgar. Yang, a Chinese Moslem, reportedly made a special trip to Urumqi to endorse Ma in a speech delivered after religious services in an Urumqi mosque. See Li Yutang, "Yizhang xuanju fengbo: Shaoleboshi (sanshiwu)," *Zhongwai zazhi* (Taipei) (June 1986): 98.
111. *Xinjiang Daily*, September 16, 1947, p. 3.
112. Some reports claim Janimhan was totally illiterate, but as he did have a medresse education, it seems more probable that he was at least semiliterate.
113. *Xinjiang Daily*, December 2, 1947, p. 3.
114. Ibid., April 21, 1948, p. 3.
115. Halife *Altay*, *Anayurttan Anadoluya* (Istanbul, 1977), p. 448.
116. IRO L/P&S/12/2361, Coll. 12/24, June–December 1948. From an undated article in the consular files by Gary Wang entitled "Sinkiang, Back Door to China, Is the Land of Opportunity for the Young."

117. Ibrahim Mittin, a Kazak, was also elected to the National Assembly Presidium. IRO L/P&S/12/2361.
118. PRO F5061, no. 28, Graham, Urumqi, February 22, 1947.
119. IRO L/P&S/12/2361, Coll. 12/24, Letter no. 47-H/5/L-48, Shipton, Kashgar, June 21, 1948.
120. See details on the July riots in the following section.
121. *Xinjiang Daily*, June 10, 1947, p. 3.
122. *Ibid.*, July 20, 1947, p. 3.
123. IOR L/P&S/12/2350, Coll.12/20A, Shipton, Kashgar, July 30, 1947, citing *Khalq Ishtiki*, a Uighur-language daily in Kashgar.
124. *Xinjiang Daily*, July 24, 1947, p. 4.
125. *Ibid.*, November 17, 1947, p. 3. However, according to Burhan Shahidi, over three thousand were killed and many fled the three counties, seeking refuge in the Ili-controlled three districts. See Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 322.
126. When the two representatives asked Isa for documentation of oppression and abuse by the Chinese, Isa replied that people were afraid to come forward or to sign anything for fear of reprisal. See IOR L/P&S/12/2361, Coll. 12/24, Shipton, Kashgar, November 19, 1947.
127. *Ibid.*, letter no. 29/H/5/L-48, Kashgar, April 5, 1948.
128. *Ibid.*
129. *Ibid.*
130. *Xinjiang Daily*, December 5 and 27, 1947.
131. Isa Yusuf Alptekin, *Dog̃u Turkistan Davasi*, pp. 197–98. There could have been very few Russians in the government; presumably, he means people with USSR papers.
132. *Ibid.*
133. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
134. *Xinjiang Daily*, September 17, 1947, p. 3.
135. Zhang, *Seventy Years*, 12:7058.
136. *Xinjiang Daily*, September 17, 1947, p. 3. The further development and activity of Turki nationalist organizations is discussed later in this chapter.
137. The budget was presented by Bai and approved in October. *Xinjiang Daily*, October 19, 1947, p. 3.
138. *Ibid.*, October 14, 1947, p. 3.
139. *Ibid.*
140. *Xinjiang Daily*, October 14, 1947, p. 3.
141. *Ibid.*, December 5, 1947, p. 2. This was a common problem throughout China. Poorly paid officials were often reduced to corruption just to stay alive. See Chou Shun-hsin, *The Chinese Inflation 1937–49* (New York, 1963), p. 244.
142. *Xinjiang Daily*, January 4, 1948, p. 1.
143. *Ibid.*, March 17, 1948.

144. Ibid., January 18, 1948, p. 1.
145. IOR L/P&S/12/2361, Coll. 12/24, Shipton, Kashgar, April 5, 1948.
146. *Xinjiang Daily*, March 17, 1948, p. 3.
147. IOR L/P&S/2361, Coll. 12/24, Shipton, Kashgar, April 5, 1948.
148. *Xinjiang Daily*, April 21, 1948. See also Mesut's promises of special aid to drought-stricken areas (ibid., April 27, 1948, p. 3) and wheat loans of 5,000 million to be allotted throughout the seven districts according to local need (ibid., April 29, 1948, p.3).
149. IOR L/P&S/12/2361.
150. *Xinjiang Daily*, October 23 and 29, 1948, p. 3.
151. Ibid., October 24, 1948, p. 3.
152. Ibid., October 30, p. 1, editorial.
153. Ibid., December 13, 1948, p. 3.
154. Ibid., October 30, 1948, p. 4, citing accusations in *Shuguang ribao* (Urumqi), September 29, 1948.
155. IOR L/P&S/12/2361, Shipton, Kashgar, April 5, 1948.
156. IOR/L/P&S/12/2361, Coll. 12/24, letter no. 47-H/5/L-48, Shipton, Kashgar, June 21, 1948.
157. IOR L/P&S/12/2408, no. 889 (46/10/1040/48), despatch no. 106, Fox-Holmes, Urumqi, October 8, 1948.
158. Ibid.
159. Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 98
160. IOR L/P&S/12/2361, Shipton, Kashgar, April 5, 1948.
161. See the account in H. Boorman, ed., *Biographic Dictionary of Republican China* (London, 1970), 3:3. In his memoirs, Burhan writes that Zhang Zhizhong had realized that Song's presence was an obstacle to normalization of Ili-Urumqi relations and had asked Chiang Kai-shek to recall him. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 322.
162. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 1.
163. Ibid., p. 320. Burhan writes that he had left Xinjiang at the suggestion of Zhang Zhizhong, who advised him that since Mesut was unacceptable, he would be eventually replaced; if Burhan distanced himself from the Mesut government, he could then be called at the appropriate time to serve as the next chairman.
164. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 349.
165. Some published sources mention this exodus in the summer and autumn of 1949, but this information was more graphically conveyed to the author during interviews with members of these officials' families who now live in Taiwan and the Middle East.
166. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 344.
167. Ibid., p.346.
168. Ibid. In Chinese, the police chiefs name is given as Niufuti.
169. *Xinjiang Daily*, June 15, 1949, p. 3.

170. OSS R&A, no. 3331, "Russo-Chinese Relations and Potential Soviet Contribution to China's Postwar Economic Development," Washington, D.C., August 31, 1945, p. 29.

171. *FRUS*, 1949, pp. 1044,1049.

172. Mehmet Emin Bugra, *Dogu Turkistan*, pp. 63–64.

173. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 358.

174. *Ibid.* However, Burhan's message to the new government in Beijing, written in September 1949, also included a request that Ili members of the provincial government return to Urumqi to aid in the coming change in government, a curious request in light of the claim in his memoirs that he already knew of the men's demise in August 1949.

175. *Ibid.* Burhan writes (p. 372) that he made the announcement at a public meeting in Urumqi on November 1, 1949. The date of the crash is given as August 27, 1949. A year later, the *Xinjiang Daily* (August 28, 1949, p. 1) reported memorial services for the fallen heroes, with Ahmet's photograph prominently displayed. A memorial service was held earlier in Yining, attended by 300,000 people. Possibly this was when the announcement of these deaths was made in the three districts. *Ibid.*, April 21, 1950, p. 1.

176. The Burhan account is partly corroborated by that of Mehmet Emin Bugra, who heard in September 1949 that the Ili leaders had gone to Alma Ata and from there had departed for Beijing. No further news was heard of the men, but some months later four burned corpses were brought to Ili and buried there. Mehmet Emin Bugra, *Dogu Turkistan*, pp. 66–67. A recent version of the fate of the Ili leaders claims that there was no airplane crash at all. Rather, according to the former deputy chairman of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous District, the leaders were all arrested upon their arrival in Beijing, and Ahmet Jan Kasimi died in prison there in 1962. See Roostam Sadri, "The Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan: A Commemorative Review," *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 5,2 (July 1984): 313.

177. Burhan, *Fifty Years*, p. 359.

178. *Ibid.* Also *Survey of China Mainland Press*, no. 775, October 29, 1965, p. 30.

179. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, no. 775, October 29, 1965, p. 30. Peng Dehuai reported, however, that the PLA entered Hami on November 12, 1949. It is possible that he is referring to the main body of PLA troops and that the troops that entered Urumqi in October were an advance party that was met, according to Burhan, by himself on October 20, 1949. For the Peng account see his article, "Report on the Work Situation in the Northwest," *Xinhua yuebao* (Beijing) 204 (February 15, 1950): 873–76. For Burhan's account, see Burhan's memoirs, which include a photograph of him greeting PLA troops, dated October 20, 1949.

GLOSSARY

Hanyu pinyin	Chinese characters	Wade-Giles system	English and/or alternatives
Aertai	阿爾泰	Ah-erh-t'ai	Altai
Akesu	阿克蘇	Ah-k'o-su	Aksu
Aqimu Boke	阿齊木伯克	Ah-ch'i-mu Po-k'o	Hakim Beg
Ashan	阿山	Ah-shan	
Bai Wenyu	白文昱	Pai Wen-yü	
Baoan Dui	保安隊	Pao-an Tui	
baojia	保甲	pao-chia	
baojia zhang	保甲長	pao-chia chang	
Beidashan	北塔山	Pei-ta-shan	Baytag Bogdo
Bole	博樂	Po-le	Polo

Bolinov	波里諾夫	Po-li-nuo-fu	Polinoff
Buergen	布爾根	Pu-erh-ken	Burqun
Buerxin	布爾新	Pu-erh-hsin	
Cai Zengxian	蔡泉賢	Ts'ai Tseng-hsien	
Chaosu	昭蘇	Chao-su	
Chen Fangbo	陳方伯	Ch'en Fang-po	
Chen Xihao	陳希豪	Ch'en Hsi-hao	
Chenghua	承化	Ch'eng-hua	Sharsumbey, Ashan
danzhai mailiang	担差買糧	tan-chai-mai-liang	compulsory sale of supplies to military
Deng Xianghai	鄧翔海	Teng Hsiang-hai	
Dihua (Urumqi)	迪化	Ti-hua	Tihwa
Du Defu	杜德孚	Tu Te-fu	
Emin	額敏	O-min	
fabi	法幣	fa-pi	Nationalist Chinese currency
Fuhai	福海	Fu-hai	
Fuyun	富蘊	Fu-yün	
Gao Yi	高偉	Kao I	
Gezanaqi Boke	噶雜納齊伯克	Ke-tsan-na-ch'i Po-k'o	Katsonatchi Beg
Gongha	鞏哈	Kung-ha	Kungha, Nilka
Gu Jianji	顧謙吉	Ku Chien-chi	

Guan Zeliang	管澤良	Kuan Tse-liang	
Gui Xixi	魏錫熙	Kuei Hsi-hsi	
Guomintang	國民黨	Kuomintang	
Hami	哈密	Ha-mi	Komul
Hazi Boke	哈孜伯克	Ha-tzu Po-k'o	Hazi Beg
Hefeng	和豐	Ho-feng	
Hetian	和闐	Ho-t'ien	Khotan
Hou Sheng	侯聲	Ho Sheng	
Huijiao	回教	Hui-chiao	Islam
Huiyuan	惠遠	Hwei-yuan	
Huocheng	霍城	Huo-ch'eng	
Jia Shanju	賈賧巨	Chia Shan-chu	
Jiancha shi	監察使	Chien-ch'a shih	Controlling inspector
Jimunai	吉木乃	Chi-mu-nai	
jin	斤	chin	unit of measure
Jin Shuren	金樹仁	Chin Shu-jen	
Jin Xuedong	金學勤	Chin Hsueh-tong	
Jinghe	精河	Ching-ho	
Keshen	喀什	K'o-shen	Kashgar
Kuche	庫車	K'u-che	Kucha
Kuerle	庫爾勒	K'u-erh-le	Korla
Li Tiejun	李鐵軍	Li Tieh-chün	

Liu Handong	劉漢東	Liu Han-tung	
Liu Mengchun	劉孟純	Liu Meng-ch'un	
Liu Qingxiu	劉經秀	Liu Ch'ing-hsiu	
Liu Xiaohan	劉效漢	Liu Hsiao-han	
Liu Xiaoli	劉效黎	Liu Hsiao-li	
Liu Yongyang	劉永祥	Liu Yung-yang	
Liu Zeying	劉澤榮	Liu Tse-ying	
Lu Yuwen	盧郁文	Lu Yu-wen	
Luo Zhi	囉誌	Lo Chih	
Ma Bufang	馬步芳	Ma Pu-fang	
Ma Guoyi	馬國義	Ma Kuo-i	
Ma Liangjun	馬良駿	Ma Liang-chün	
Ma Shuqi	馬恕基	Ma Shu-ch'i	
Ma Tingxian	馬廷襄	Ma T'ing-hsien	
Ma Zhongying	馬仲漢	Ma Chong-ying	
Machaer	麻札爾	Ma-cha-er	Mazar
Maigaiti	麥蓋提	Mai-kai-t'i	Merket
Manasi	瑪納斯	Ma-na-ssu	Manas
Milabu Boke	密喇布伯克	Mi-la-pu Po-k'o	Mirabu Beg
minzu	民族	min-tzu	
minzu jundui	民族軍隊	min-tzu chün-tui	people's militia
Peng Dehuai	彭德懷	P'eng Te-huai	

Peng Zhaoxian	彭昭賢	P'eng Chao-hsien	
Qingbaishe	青白社	Ch'ing-pai she	CC Clique
Qinghe	青河	Ch'ing-ho	
Qingzhensi	清真寺	Ch'ing-chen-ssu	mosque
Qitai	奇台	Ch'i-t'ai	Kitai
Qu Wu	屈武	Ch'ü Wu	
Santai	三台	San-t'ai	
Shache	莎車	Sha-ch'e	
Shang Boke	商伯克	Shang Po-k'o	Shang Beg
sheng	升	sheng	unit of measure
sheng	省	sheng	province
shengcan yiyuan	省參議員	sheng-ts'an i-yuan	Provincial Assembly representative
Sheng Shicai	盛世才	Sheng Shih-ts'ai	
Shufu	疏附	Shu-fu	Kashgar
Song Xilian	宋希濂	Sung Hsi-lien	
Songshukou	松樹口	Sung-shu-k'ou	
Suiding	綏定	Sui-ting	
Tacheng	塔城	Ta-cheng	Tarbagatai, Savan, or Chugachak
Tang Bigang	堂必剛	T'ang Pi-kang	
Tao Zhiyue	陶峙岳	Tao Chih-yueh	

Tianshan	天山	T'ien-shan	
Toukesun	托克遜	T'ou-ke-sun	Toksun
Tuwufan	吐魯番	Tu-wu-fan	Turfan, Turpan
Ulumuqi	烏魯木齊	Wu-lu-mu-ch'i	Urumqi
Wang Cengshan	王曾善	Wang Ts'eng-shan	
Wenquan	溫泉	Wen-ch'üan	
Wu Zhongxin	吳忠信	Wu Chung-hsin	
Wusu	烏蘇	Wu-su	
xian	縣	hsien	county
xiancan yihui	縣參議會	hsien-ts'an-i-hui	County Assembly
xianzhang	縣長	hsien-chang	County magistrate
Xinertai	新二台	Hsin-erh-t'ai	
Xingzheng ducha chuan yuan	行政督察專員	Hsing-cheng tu-ch'a ch'uanyuan	Inspector- general (or district officer)
Xinjiang	新疆	Hsin-kiang	Sinkiang
Xuanchuan Wei-yuan Hui	宣傳委員會	Hsuan-ch'uan Wei-yuan Hui	Government Information Office
Xuerxuesi	斯爾學斯	Hsu-erh-hsueh-ssu	
Yang Cengxin	楊增新	Yang Tseng-hsin	
Yanqi	焉耆	Yen-chi	Yenki
Yanwu xiuwen	偃武修文	Yen-wu hsiu-wen	Cease conflict; promote culture
Yili	伊犁	I-li	Ili

Yingjisha	英吉沙	Ying-chi-sha	Yangi Hissar
Yining	伊寧	I-ning	Ining, Kuldja
Yishenhan Boke	伊什罕伯克	I-shen-han Po-k'o	Yishenshan Beg
Yiyizhiyi	以夷制夷	I-i-chih-i	Use the barbarian to fight the barbarian
Yu Youren	于右任	Yü Yu-jen	
Yumen	玉門	Yü-men	
Zao Erling	曹日靈	Tsao Erh-ling	
Zhang Fengjiu	張鳳九	Chang Feng-chiu	
Zhang Zhizhong	張治中	Chang Chih-chung	
Zhao Qianfeng	趙劍峯	Chao Chien-feng	
Zhong Tihua	鍾棣華	Chong T'i-hua	
zhongzu	種族	chung-tzu	race; tribe
Zhu Shaoliang	朱紹良	Chu Shao-liang	
Zuo Chuping	左曙萍	Tso Chu-p'ing	
Zuo Zongtang	左宗棠	Tso Tsung-tang	

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