

A large, diverse crowd of people is arranged in a circular formation, viewed from an elevated perspective. The crowd is composed of many individuals wearing various colored clothing, creating a vibrant, multi-colored ring. The center of the circle is a plain white space where the book's title and authors' names are printed.

POPULIST DISCOURSE

Critical Approaches to
Contemporary Politics

Edited by

**Encarnación Hidalgo-Tenorio,
Miguel-Ángel Benítez-Castro
and Francesca De Cesare**

POPULIST DISCOURSE

Populist Discourse brings together experts from both linguistics and political science to analyse the language of populist leaders and the media's representation of populism in different temporal, geographical and ideological contexts, including Nazi Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Austria, Greece, the UK, the US and South America. With 17 contributions split into four sections, *Populist Discourse* covers a variety of approaches such as corpus-based discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis and political perspectives, making it a timely dissection for students and researchers working in linguistics, political science and communication.

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INTRODUCTION

Unravelling populist discourse

*Encarnación Hidalgo-Tenorio, Miguel-Ángel Benítez-Castro
and Francesca De Cesare*

Populism, a difficult concept to define

To understand the communicative and discursive nature of populism, it is necessary to take into account the many perspectives from which it has been examined so far. Almost half a century ago, Ionescu and Gellner (1969, p. 3) addressed many of the questions that nowadays still remain largely unanswered. They wondered whether populism was a recurrent frame of mind, an anti-phenomenon, or a subcategory of nationalism, socialism or peasantism.

Political scientists themselves struggle to provide an accurate definition of a term characterised by its ambiguity. According to Laclau (2005, p. 11), this has no referential unity because it is attributed to a social logic whose effects can be perceived in a great variety of examples; in his view, “populism is simply a way of building the political”.

Certainly, the recent unprecedented increase in populist phenomena on a global scale has compounded its definition and classification even more. In this regard, Taggart (2000, p. 1) reports on the highly slippery nature of this word because of the many different contexts where it has been used over time; for instance, Canovan (1981) includes under the same umbrella term American populism, Russian Narodniki, European agrarian movements and Argentina’s Peronism. Put more simply, Deiwiks (2009, p. 1) concludes that it is a contested and problematic concept that, in everyday political struggle, is used to offend adversaries and, in the field of science, turns out to be an annoying formula.

Notwithstanding the usual difficulty, or reluctance, to give a precise meaning to populism, Gidron and Bonikowski (2013) make a key contribution to the field by identifying three angles from which to better define its boundaries: the first one regards populism as a strategy; the second one, as an ideology; and the third one qualifies it as a discursive style. These three research strands highlight three

of its basic components. We agree that, if taken separately, they provide solutions to a very complex issue only from a single dimension, leaving aside the other dimensions that may happen to be caused by the selected dimension (Anselmi, 2017, p. 56).

Populism is a strategy

In his description of Latin American politics, Weyland (2011, p. 14) uses the label “political strategy” to capture the essence of populism. In his words, this “emerges when a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganised followers”.

From this perspective, it is the socio-structural side of populism that has analytical priority (i.e. social and economic crises, social mobilisation, changes in society, and the geopolitical framework), laying emphasis on the disadvantaged classes’ reaction when claiming their own rights. In this case, polarisation becomes the driving force behind a call to gain greater sovereignty (Jansen, 2011).

Populism is an ideology

Mudde’s (2004) paper on the functioning of current European right-wing parties identifies populism with an ideology deeply rooted in the social and political opposition between the elite (with all its negative implications) and the people (endowed with an array of positive features). This standpoint echoes Van Dijk’s (2003, pp. 27–28) analysis highlighting the polarisation characteristic of populist dynamics (i.e. in-group vs. out-group mentality).

Drawing on this position, most subsequent research considers populism to be a “thin-centred” ideology (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Stanley, 2008; Rovira and Kaltwasser, 2012). According to Aslanidis (2015), though, the weakness of this paradigm lies in the vagueness of the definition of such a category and in the difficulties of its methodological application, precisely because a subtle ideology can be combined with other ideological elements. Certainly, this approach has contributed significantly to the growth of populism studies. Nevertheless, there are many reasons why it is perhaps more appropriate to describe populism as a discourse practice.

Populism is a discursive style

Compared to Mudde’s (2004) conclusion as to the markedly bipolar nature of populism, Kazin’s (1998) analysis of American populism stresses that this is not an ideology but a language, as it has a lot more in common with how contents are expressed than with the contents themselves. However, this is not the only author who argues that populism is a discursive style or communicative reality. The majority of studies supporting this perspective are inspired by Laclau (2005),

who examines social phenomena from the linguistic and mass psychology dimensions. As such, populism is a rhetorical system used to revert the people's subjection to the oligarchy, whichever this may be; thus, the identity of anti-system people-structures is construed communicatively. In line with this theory, populism is reported to simplify the political space by separating the "People" from the "Others" (Barros, 2005; Panizza, 2005; Groppo, 2009). The Essex School, on the other hand, is devoted to the rhetorical analysis of the expressive structures of populism, producing either more content-oriented (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Hawkins, 2010) or quantitative-oriented research (Armony and Armony, 2005; Reungoat, 2010; Pauwels, 2011). Moffitt and Tormey (2014), among others, start from the communicative dimension to encompass the concrete actions of political actors and their forms of organisation.

From the above, we can deduce that communication does play a very significant role in the rise of populism. This is the main idea around which the edited volume by Aalberg *et al.* (2017) revolves. Following Canovan (1999), populist political communication is said to comprise the following: (1) the use of very simple, democratic language; (2) the constant reference to the people; (3) the adjustment to the media logics; (4) the identification of a shared enemy; and (5) a charismatic, redemptive figure embodying provocation and antagonism. Furthermore, the most frequent topics reported in populist discourse are terrorism, immigration or the loss of benefits due to the economic crisis. As a rule, the negativity underlying this type of language helps to reinforce the construction of an "us" versus "them" world (Mudde, 2007; Aalberg *et al.*, 2017). As far as right-wing parties are concerned, this means the otherisation of various minorities regarded as dangerous for the majority; left-wing parties, on the other hand, construe the State and the powerful (i.e. the so-called "Establishment") as the caste that needs to be fought against. Nevertheless, the gradual though substantial shift of political communication, including the spectacularisation of politics and political personalisation, makes us wonder whether there is any difference between a *populist* discursive style and a *popular* discursive style. In actual fact, most parties nowadays function and communicate along increasingly similar lines. That is why it perhaps may make little sense to use this category if all politicians can be defined in this way.

Populism as a global phenomenon

Recursively in history, bare emotions such as social anger and malaise, moral satiety, distrust of the elite and the Establishment, fear and hatred of difference, disgust at corruption, despair at joblessness and homelessness, as well as a willingness to revolt and an urgent need for border control, to name but a few, have all, to varying degrees, materialised in the creation of a rather emotionally charged discourse (De la Torre, 1997; Van Leeuwen, 2009; Garlinska, 2017). Underpinning this very discourse is people's political disaffection (Betz, 1994) as a result of the allegedly poor performance of political experts (Moghalu, 2017).

Scholarly research as well as the (wo)man in the street alike use the same label to name this contemporary sociological hurricane, which to some seems to be the “curse of our age” (Karina Robinson in an interview by Ellen Conberg in 2016). But populism is nothing new (Kazin, 1995; Norris, 2016); it is neither a wave nor a fashion trend ready for consumption that will never come back again. As it happens, it was, has been, is and will be around whenever the above-mentioned circumstances are met (Canovan, 1999; Moffitt, 2016). A cursory diachronic glance at the twentieth century proves the truth and validity of this statement.

As Dalio *et al.* (2017) argue, quite before and shortly after the 1930s, it is possible to observe populism, or populist policies and populist leaders, in many countries around the globe. Here we will mention some of the most prominent ones. It is the case of US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who was elected by the dispossessed in the hope of changing the old ways of doing politics. Louisiana governor Huey Long tried to end inequality and the power of big companies until his mandate came to an end in 1935. In his popular radio show, Father Charles Coughlin made extremely radical speeches that showed he was a classical anti-capitalist whose concern for the poor came to fuel his sympathies for fascist leaders in Europe. Another example is Oswald Mosley, a British MP who supported jobs programmes with the purpose of lowering unemployment rates; his early radicalisation encouraged his foundation of the British Union of Fascists. Likewise, the dictatorships of Mussolini, Hitler and Franco could be read in rather the same populist light.

Although it is true that populism is not comparable to fascism (Finchelstein, 2017), the birth of fascism can be explained on similar grounds to the ones that justify the rise of populism, that is, (1) a severe financial crisis widening the gap between social classes; (2) a generalised atmosphere of frustration and panic among the weakest sections of society; and (3) the lack of a strong government capable of handling domestic unrest and economic chaos. Moreover, the success of these regimes can be attributed to some of the key features that characterise populism as well, namely, (1) the priority of the people, or “majoritarianism” (Aydın-Düzgüt and Fuat Keyman, 2017, p. 3); (2) the priority of social justice; and (3) the priority of the own over the alien. After WWII, other remarkably outstanding populist figures were Argentina’s President Juan Domingo Perón, French politician Pierre Poujade, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Robert Muldoon or Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez.

From 2010 onwards, through the press, TV and social media, we have grown accustomed to hearing and reading almost on a daily basis about the decisions and actions taken by Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Viktor Orban in Hungary, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Sarah Palin or Donald Trump in the US, Nigel Farage in the UK, Narendra Modi in India, Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, Beppe Grillo in Italy, Pablo Iglesias in Spain, Alexis Tsipras in Greece or Rodrigo

Duterte in the Philippines (Gherghina, Mişcoiu and Soare, 2013; Schulz, 2016). All of these leaders are also well known for their populist agenda and flaming rhetoric (McCoy, 2017). The latter is one of the aspects this edited volume will pay particular attention to.

Types of populism

In the last decade or so, lengthy and heated discussions and debates on the term itself, or its derivatives, and the perils and dangers of the (“thin”) ideology behind it (Mudde, 2004, p. 544; Hartleb, 2013, p. 1) have been rife all over the world. Despite its expansion globally (Aydin-Düzgüt and Keyman, 2017), populism is not a homogeneous entity (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014), and the roots and strategies of each of its actualisations are not the same either. Although this old-new phenomenon is partially, or poorly, understood (Taggart, 2000), there is an overall tendency for oversimplification in various fields, especially the mass media and the big, old parties; these reinforce a Manichaeian view of populism and its leaders, perhaps out of dread of its potential for disruption of the well-established social order.

In De la Torre (1997), the reader is provided with an excellent description of the breeding ground for populism during periods of economic turmoil. Over the last decades, democratic institutions seem to have weakened; as a consequence, mediated representation has undergone a harsh crisis (Decker, 2003). In this context, the people are discursively construed as a “collective actor” (Laclau, 2005, p. 202), and the (self-)proclaimed leader, quite often an outsider, maintains that they are its genuine mouthpiece. In so doing, they tend to promote outright confrontation with one antagonist, the public enemy number one, whose lack of purity contrasts sharply with the purity of the community (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). The latter often results in a generally uncontested feeling of moral superiority among citizens (Lee, 2006; Müller, 2016a) and their blind adherence to the sense of being always right. To this list, it is necessary to add some other basic ingredients: the reliance on new media technologies (Moffitt, 2016); the expansion of anti-globalisation (Ranieri, 2016) and direct democracy (Puhle, 1987; Haskell, 2001); and, finally, a style of politics based on simplicity, demagogic persuasion (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014) and restricting public debate over issues concerned with liberal democracy (Müller, 2016b).

To better understand what populism is, we will use a very vivid metaphor, the so-called “Cinderella complex” to which Allcock (1971, p. 385) refers in an influential paper of unquestionable validity. According to this author:

[t]here exists a shoe – the word ‘populism’ – for which somewhere exists a foot. There are all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering about with the shoe; and somewhere ... there awaits a limb called pure populism.

Although we are not shoe-makers, we will try to spot which foot is which, and which size and brand are the most appropriate ones for each. The most frequent divide is that between left-wing populism and right-wing populism (Mudde, 2007), or radical populism and populist authoritarianism (Norris, 2016). Jagers and Walgrave (2007) prefer speaking, instead, about complete populism, excluding populism, anti-elitist populism and empty populism. Canovan (1981) reports that there are also agrarian and political populisms. A fourth classification is that of Puhle (1987), who states that First World populism is distinctively different from Third World populism. On the whole, all these subcategories share something in common; they are all variously conceived of, once and at the same time, as a spectre (Albertazzi and McConnell, 2007), a challenge (Akkerman, 2003), a threat to global consensus (Gilly, 2005; Decker, 2003; Lawson, 2017), and a collection of naive solutions (Crick, 2005; Schulz, 2016), which, as Ferguson (2016, p. 20) puts it, are “jam today”. Despite the similarities highlighted above, these variants of populism clearly differ in many other respects, as shown in the remainder of this section. Next, we concentrate on those most commonly discussed in the literature, alongside the characteristics that set them poles apart.

Left-wing populism is defined in terms of wealth distribution and anti-capitalism (Puhle, 1987, p. 93), and hence, relies on straightforward opposition to the interests of banks and big corporations (Dalio *et al.* 2017, p. 11). It may start from above (Puhle, 1987, p. 96), especially in former colonised countries, or through participatory democracy (Hartleb, 2013), as best illustrated by the Spanish 15-M, an anti-austerity citizen protest movement that gathered thousands of *indignados* (i.e. outraged) in many cities from May to December 2011. One of the key strategies employed by adherents to this kind of populism is to exploit and heighten people’s concern with social asymmetry, climate change or scarcity of natural resources (Aydın-Düzgüt and Fuat Keyman, 2017, p. 4), with the intention of promoting a more altruistic view of all social and economic issues. It is more typical in Latin America, Africa and Asia, where they aim to empower marginal sections of society (De la Torre, 2005).

In contrast, right-wing populism features more frequently in the so-called West (De la Torre, 2005), and is often associated with post-truth politics (Speed and Mannion, 2017), which, curiously, results from personal beliefs and the appearance of truth taking priority over objective data in the information and social-media era. This type of populism usually favours isolationism, or “nativism” (Aydın-Düzgüt and Fuat Keyman, 2017, p. 3), and, as a side effect, all prejudices possible such as elitism, racism and xenophobia (Dalio *et al.* 2017, p. 14). Additionally, it is grassroots- and common-person-based (Puhle 1987, p. 90), and seems to support, or be supported by, anti-intellectualism (Hartleb, 2013). In order to defend the hegemonic status quo, right-wing populists tend to draw upon people’s fear of the loss of traditional values, and of an increase in migration flows and unemployment rates (Aydın-Düzgüt and Fuat Keyman, 2017, p. 4).

The aims and contents of this edited volume

Populism is much more than discourse, but it is mainly through discourse that it is enacted. Such an important sociological phenomenon can be articulated through various modes and channels like the deceptively simple election campaign speeches and adverts voters have become used to. Simultaneously, the media can take various sides in their portrayal of anti-Establishment politics, assessing its pros and cons with a view to influencing a broad section of the population, steering it towards one position or another. As it stands, populism has become an unstoppable wave informing policy-making in towns, cities and countries. Accordingly, politicians have come to phagocytise the language of the man and the woman in the street, whilst people echo and reproduce populist themes, slogans and rhetoric, and the press successfully shape public opinion.

The chapters collected here are an example of scholarly research reflecting a comprehensive understanding of key aspects intimately connected with the focus of this book. Some analyse the portrayal of populism in the press as a reaction to the financial crisis hitting especially the West; others are about the many ways of making populism mainstream. These contributions pay special attention to how populist leaders, in their self-imposed capacity as guardians of the truth, resort to different communication strategies to spread their own agendas. In their rallies, during TV interviews and on Twitter, right-wing populists indoctrinate their aggrieved fellow countrymen and countrywomen into anti-welfarism, anti-immigration and racial intolerance. Conversely, left-wing populists endorse egalitarianism, wealth redistribution and social justice. Interestingly, both represent two divergent modalities of anti-systemism and protectionism. This book is a multidisciplinary effort aimed to address all these issues rigorously.

As mentioned above, the complex and multifarious nature of populism makes it a notoriously slippery phenomenon to examine and define. To achieve a clearer understanding of its underpinnings, we need to delve deeper into instances of allegedly populist language and discourse in a wide range of contexts. In so doing, more evidence will become available to help us to disentangle populist from non-populist discourse, which, in turn, would enable us to better distinguish between those discursive features that are specific to populist styles and those that were perhaps originally populist but are now beginning to seep through all kinds of political communication. Our aim with this edited volume is to offer a thorough and wide-ranging analysis of so-called populist communication styles worldwide from three naturally interconnected, broad methodological approaches to the study of discourse: (1) content and framing analysis (e.g. Entman, 2003); (2) corpus-assisted discourse analysis (e.g. Baker and Levon, 2015); and (3) rhetoric, and metaphor and critical discourse analysis (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Fairclough, 1995). These three sections comprise 17 contributions in total, spanning the political contexts of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, the US, Venezuela and Bolivia.

The first section consists of five chapters whose common thread is the main tenets of communication theory and two well-known political science methods (content and framing analysis). Arroyas Langa and Fernández Ilundain test their hypothesis as to the relation of populist discourse to the politics of authenticity, through the analysis of the persuasive strategies the spokeswoman of Podemos resorted to during the parliamentary no-confidence motion against the then Spanish Prime Minister in June 2017. De Blasio and Sorice turn to the rise of technopopulist parties in Italy to analyse how the growing use of technology and digital democracy have led to a discourse reflecting the development of depoliticisation processes. As is evident, the press does not remain immune to the anti-politics approach advocated by neo-populist parties; this is demonstrated by Ibáñez Rosales, who analyses how Podemos drummed up support and successfully rose to public attention through its leaders' politician/journalist communication strategies and their mediated representation in the Spanish mainstream print media. Do Espírito Santo and Figueiras also draw on the influence of the media, but instead of focusing on how populist leaders' messages and language inescapably affect the media's take on political events, they address this issue from the standpoint of neo-populist leaders who frame their messages to fit as much as possible with media logics. They observe the Portuguese neo-populist presidential candidates' self-presentation strategies in their electoral programmes and how they are portrayed by television media coverage of the election campaign. Moving from a focus on self- and mediated representation in campaign programmes, TV and press coverage, in the last chapter in this section, García-Marín and Luengo delve into microblogging and examine a corpus of the tweets posted in 2017 by Spanish, Venezuelan and Bolivian populist politicians and parties in order to categorise the frames present in each case to describe otherisation.

The second section includes six chapters where quantitative and semi-automated analyses of corpus data prevail. Corpus-assisted discourse analysis thus lies at the core of this section. Ruiz-Sánchez and Alcántara-Plá examine how the "us vs. them" polarisation is construed in a corpus of tweets produced by Spain's main parties and candidates during the 2015 and 2016 General Elections. Breeze draws on automated semantic tagging, keyword analysis and subsequent qualitative coding to explore the differences between populist and non-populist political styles through a corpus of articles produced by the press offices of the Labour and UKIP parties in the UK in the early months of 2017. Bartley, by contrast, focuses on the potential populist features of Labour's discourse by studying key sections from the 2017 Labour manifesto through manual tagging of all the verbs used therein on the basis of a modified version of Halliday's TRANSITIVITY system. Finally, Pérez-Paredes, Nisco and Russo, although still within the realm of populist discourse, move the emphasis away from political communication as produced by specific parties. Whereas Pérez-Paredes deals with the representation of Austria's Freedom Party by the British right-wing press, Nisco and Russo discuss two topics that often form part of the populist

agenda: disability and climate change. More precisely, using keyword analysis, word sketches and collocational analysis, Pérez-Paredes is able to show that these newspapers' use of Austrian politics aimed to legitimise a populist vertical discourse against the elites, personified by the EU, foreigners and immigrants. Nisco focuses on tabloid newspapers to explore the consistently negative light in which disability was portrayed in the British press in 2016–17, which reflects populist views ingrained in certain sections of society. Russo, in turn, uses corpus analysis to look at the fear-driven discourse of climate change, as evidenced in a longitudinal corpus of Anglophone online news reports and opinion editorials from 1996 to 2017.

The six contributions in the third section draw on methods and theories inspired by rhetoric, and metaphor and critical discourse analysis. Whilst quantitative findings are provided in some of them, the analytical approach followed is, in general, more qualitative than in the chapters from the previous section. Two of them are largely centred on the Spanish context; the remaining contributions in this section revolve around Greece, the UK, the US and Germany. Keating and Soria identify and categorise the metaphorical utterances whereby Nigel Farage (UKIP) and Pablo Iglesias (Podemos) dichotomise reality in a series of speeches given in the European Parliament; their initial quantitative identification of the keywords in each sub-corpus (e.g. *people*, *against*) is followed by a more in-depth analysis of the novel metaphors associated with those words. Holgado-Sáez and La Rubia-Prado go back in time to Nazism to show how the aesthetic-related discursive strategies underpinning the populist discourse of National Socialism (as reflected in Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and in a range of laws) contributed to legitimising the horrific violence towards, and annihilation of, millions of people. McCallum-Bayliss turns to American politics to uncover the conceptual metaphors apparent in Donald J. Trump's political speeches from late 2015 to early 2017; her analysis reveals that all the specific metaphors in the corpus are instantiations of a more general metaphor, i.e. DONALD TRUMP IS A CONQUEROR. Kaniklidou analyses a corpus from *I Avgi*, a newspaper linked to Syriza, to explore the discursive construction of austerity by Greek left-wing populism through frames and metaphor analysis. Sánchez García concentrates on the two leaders of Podemos, but in a context where the polarisation between both (radical communism vs. moderate socialism) was most evident, i.e. during the heated campaign for the party's presidency back in March 2017; the author's analysis of the rhetorical resources, argumentative fallacies and non-verbal language in their speeches and statements reveals marked differences between their communicative styles. The last contribution in this section, by Forceville and van de Laar, differs from the others in its reliance on visual and multimodal metaphors, and in the change of emphasis from the metaphors revealed in populist leaders' discourses to people's metaphorical conceptualisation of those leaders; in this chapter, the authors try to uncover the metaphorical patterns that most typically occur in political cartoons involving the extreme right-wing Dutch politician Geert Wilders.

We are confident this volume will be of interest to students and researchers in linguistics, discourse analysis, politics and communication studies, as it provides a detailed account of what might be (or not) populist discourse in specific contexts (rather than in broad general terms) thanks to the fruitful and valuable combination of methodologies and theoretical frameworks.

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PART I

Populism, politics and communication



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1

THE POLITICS OF AUTHENTICITY IN POPULIST DISCOURSE

Rhetorical analysis of a parliamentary
speech by Podemos

Enrique Arroyas Langa and Victoria Fernández Ilundain

Introduction

An ideology, a strategy, a style. Three different ways to understand a political phenomenon which has gained such momentum in recent years that it is beginning to look like an epidemic: populism (Archibugi and Cellini, 2017). We are facing an extraordinarily powerful metaphor of irrational substance and with an enormous destructive power due to its perverse nature; it uses a victim, i.e. the democratic system, which is devoured by its own weakness. If populism is contagious, it is because in times of crisis democracy has lost its ability to hope for anything, and citizens are especially vulnerable to other government options (Huber and Saskia, 2017). Whatever it is, from the conviction that populism is not a passing movement, we believe that finding out its theoretical foundations will help to revitalize the opposing alternative: a democracy based on liberal principles. This chapter's intention is to try to contribute to that purpose.

According to our hypothesis, contrary to what other theories propose, populism is not only a discursive style, or a strategy, but an ideology based on a conception of politics as an irreconcilable conflict placing legitimacy in 'the people' as an instance that precedes and prevails over the normative agreements reached in the institutions. In the context of an economic and political crisis such as that currently experienced by representative democracies, confrontation intensifies in such a way that, from the populist approach, political adversaries come to be considered not only opponents but enemies to be expelled from the debate. In this sense, populism, under the guise of a supposed mission to save democracy from the clutches of an institutional system that has distorted and corrupted it, is, in fact, its greatest enemy (Mudde and Rovira, 2017).

This chapter delves into these ideological aspects of populism with a reflection on its anti-liberal foundations and with an analysis of its rhetorical component.

In the first place, we clarify that populist discourse is caused by a conception of politics based on conflict as a source of legitimacy from the Marxist tradition. The latter considers liberal parliamentarism as a falsification of politics and bets on social reconfiguration, whose engine of change would be the confrontation between two antagonistic instances: the people and the power elite.

With a speech of authentication of politics that serves to denounce the falsification of institutional representativeness, populism opts for a direct-action policy: street mobilization and media strategies. At this point, the inauthenticity of institutional policy is justified, from the populist perspective, with the degradation of its representativeness and the distortion of the very concept of representation, which is understood as mere theatrical staging in the entertainment society.

Secondly, we investigate the reasons that explain the emotional character of populist discourse in a postmodern culture, which has promoted an aestheticization of politics where sentiment dominates public debate. We will see how this characteristic of the populist style helps to understand its success in a context of weakness of the democratic system materialized in the deterioration of rational public debate, the weakening of institutions and the consequent climate of citizen distrust in traditional politics. In this way, we will see how populism has a series of components in which we can appreciate the relationship of the politics of authenticity with the discourse of emotions, and a conflictivist view of politics.

Finally, the theoretical framework of this chapter will be completed with the rhetorical analysis of a political discourse that is representative of Spanish populism: the speech by the spokeswoman of Podemos in the parliamentary no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, held in June 2017. The framework of persuasive resources encompassed in the Aristotelian *inventio* will be analysed, with the aim of following the tracks of the populist politics of authenticity.

The populist alternative to representative democracy

The rise of new populisms takes place in a context of political crisis that must be understood in a broad sense and in a specific context: a time of transformations at all levels, of confusion over the new challenges of the turn of the century, and of the decline of representative democracy. Since the 1990s, proposals for democratic renewal have proliferated to combat citizen disaffection, considered as one of the clearest symptoms of this political crisis. Associated especially with the work of Pettit (1999) or Dagger (1997), civic republicans consider that individual freedom depends on citizens' civic engagement in public life (Dahlgren, 2006; Talisse, 2005; Ovejero, 2008; Villaverde Rico, 2008).

While republicanism and deliberative democracy criticize some parameters of representative democracy without leaving the paradigm of liberalism, populism has been inserted in the intellectual tradition that has fought liberalism's foundations since the origins of modern democracy. Populism is a political theory that arises as a reaction to the bankruptcy of the rationality of public space, both as

a construction of institutional spaces of legitimacy and as a critical instance of those same institutions. Therefore, it is when the failure of the liberal narrative becomes more evident that populism finds its opportunity as an alternative in a world that seems to have lost its trust in reason as a source of social order. When the liberal system is called into question, the door opens up to alternative proposals. In its different forms of understanding the political configuration of society is where the defining characteristic of populism lies; in times of crisis, that is where we must look for the reasons for its success in current societies.

For populism, as opposed to the liberal view, the sustenance of a political community is not the normative pact that is established between its members, but the affective bonds that acquire form and meaning through the construction of 'the people' as legitimating politics. It is worth highlighting that the populist 'the people' is not a natural pre-existing reality, as in the case of nationalism, but a political reality that is yet to be constructed. In its aspiration to 'the people's' hegemony, built politically through conflict, the fracture of the social body between friends and enemies is assumed to be inevitable.

From this first premise, we need to situate the populist narrative in the political and moral framework of modernity, in order to understand its importance as an interpretive alternative to the current crisis of democracy. Populism is not presented as a reaction to modernity, but as "a response to the own problematic dimensions that modernity contains and to the inevitable social crisis that it generates under its present form of neoliberal globalization" (Villacañas, 2017, p. 38). That is to say, it is upon the failure of modernity that populism builds its discourse.

In this sense, although it is part of the critical tradition of Marxism, populist theory proposes an interpretation that overcomes the historical stagnation of communist political action, allowing it to distance itself from its totalitarian manifestations and move within the limits of democracy. Its formal acceptance of democracy to demand an 'authentic democracy' from within is probably one of the reasons for the fascination it arouses: the paradoxical fact that, being an enemy of liberal democracy, it presents itself as a model of regeneration of democracy.

Populism assumes the Marxist denunciation of the failure of the liberal illusion of a vertebrate society in the enlightened emancipation of individuals. It also considers that the political construction of 'the people' as a hegemonic agent demands mass political action. In its origins, therefore, populism shares with Marxism the critique of liberalism as an illusion but distances itself in the choice of the agent of change, which will no longer be class struggle. The multiplicity and heterogeneity of modern society requires a new interpretation and, from the populist strategy, a greater persuasive effort for the construction of a homogeneous community as a requirement of democracy. In this aspect, we find the second difference with respect to liberalism; liberalism starts from the acceptance of plurality as the foundation of democracy, whereas populism holds that democracy is reached in a process that tends to dilute the differences towards a project of 'the people' (Mudde, 2010).

Hence, its rhetoric is fundamentally oriented to the invention of a community, ‘the people’, which manifests itself as a hegemonic majority. The tension (natural and logical in democracies) between political representation, popular sovereignty and the heterogeneity of society is resolved by populism sacrificing the plurality of the social body for the sake of a group identity “as an agglutinative and unifying mechanism, something that can only be achieved by excluding the other” (Vallespín and Martínez-Bascuñán, 2017, p. 268).

But, how is homogeneity built to conquer hegemony in a plural society? What is it that can unite people in a context of competing interests? How can something common be found in a diverse social reality? Populist discourse will be nourished by the feeling of grievance of broad layers of the population that consider themselves victims of an institutional system that is perceived as responsible for the crisis.

The authenticity policy

Populism takes for granted the failure of the liberal model, which has plunged Western societies into an organic crisis; the entire institutional framework has collapsed. The foundations of the system are questioned, and a new order is created where an ethical-political community represented by a hegemonic people replaces the traditional structures of democracy. The starting point of this new order is a new theory of representation opposed to liberal pluralism expressed institutionally in an open debate (Mair, 2015, 2009; Taggart, 2002; Vallespín and Martínez-Bascuñán, 2017).

Representation in populism is assumed by the people, constituted through the exclusion of a part of the social body identified in a fractured society between the elite and the excluded. The new sovereignty is configured ideologically with a sense of politics as a conflict whose discursive expression is reflected in the antagonism between friends and enemies.

Exclusion is, therefore, at the very foundation of the populist ideology. The people referred to by populism is, in fact, only a part of the people. The transformation process of that part into a hegemonic whole that can exercise sovereignty can only be done through the exclusion of that part of society that is considered the enemy. The construction of ‘the people’ as a permanent majority that removes from power that minority that has kidnapped popular sovereignty will be discursive; only through an authentic policy, which is a direct expression of the people, the demands of the outraged can be satisfied. This is the idea that underlies the popular protest 15M slogan in Spain: “Real Democracy Now”. Exclusion becomes indispensable for the configuration of ‘the people’ as hegemonic in a conflict that aspires to the annihilation of institutions, and that feeds on a persuasive idea: the politics of authenticity. We will now explore the relationship between politics as a conflict and the idea of authenticity to understand the danger of populism and the reasons for its success.

Both are related because the very idea of authentication implies a sense of politics as an irresolvable conflict through dialogue since the original impulse

of the populist strategy is none other than to unmask the institutional farce that has falsified real politics. Faced with the ‘contractualist’ model of politics (Rawls, 1993), populism has its roots in the ‘conflictivist’ line (Schmitt, 1991), which considers democracy as a system determined to falsify politics by deactivating confrontation and struggle, with illusory formal rites that hide the imposition of the interests of powerful elites. From this line of thought, in a society fractured into irreducible antagonisms, only force will resolve conflicts. And the legitimacy of force lies in the fact that it is a reaction to an earlier evil: the falsification of democracy under the formal mantle of institutions. Direct action becomes the authentic policy and the most effective instrument to dislodge the elites from power. This model, which in Marxism acquires the persuasive force of a defence of ‘good’ (the exploited classes’ right to equality), assumes higher levels of sophistication in postmodernity. According to Pardo (2016, pp. 97–98), populism will assume the vision of power of authors like Foucault (2001), for whom, even in a democracy, the mechanisms of power are always mechanisms of coercion.

In this way, the liberal anchoring point of liberties and rights is inverted. Populism stands on the sidelines of politics to rely on the intellectual sublimation of the revolutionary creed, and the creation of a general conscience about the malaise the crisis has brought and that becomes an extraordinary instrument of persuasion for mobilization. Populism takes on that aura of authenticity with which the falsification of a democratic state of law is denounced, “the fallacious myth that, while having naive believers accompanying its parliamentary rites, suspends confrontation and, therefore, falsifies and neutralizes the authentic politics, which is always confrontation and struggle” (Pardo, 2016, pp. 147–148).

This falsification of democracy is also genuine. It is not a distortion that can be redirected. The normative social contract on which democracy is based would be the origin of the inauthenticity of its political model, since sovereignty cannot be based on a normative pact, such as a constitution, but on a political decision, the political configuration of ‘the people’. While democracy is situated in the ideal of the social pact that enshrines the law as the supreme good, populism places legitimacy in a decision that is imposed by the sovereign people’s will. In other words, while liberalism bases power on the law to resolve conflicts, populism refuses to accept any rule. In order to explain it, Pardo (2016, p. 169) uses the simile of the “Carl Schmitt virus”:

Given that concealment of the sovereign decision that legal normativism has consummated in the democratic State of law, only by taking things to the extreme and considering the exceptional situation, can that decision or will that was intended to be concealed be exposed; and only thus can the policy awaken from its dogmatic (normativist) dream and recover its lost authenticity, the contact with its foundation of seriousness, which has nothing to do with a normative foundation.

There are no ‘people’ before the pact, say the liberals. There is no legitimate pact before ‘the people’, replies populism. Overflowing the margins of the parliamentary arena, conflict is the horizon providing authenticity to politics. In this way, populism is configured as a counter-democracy that calls into question the institutional political order and, on behalf of a supposed authentic people, acts from the margins, as the “shadow of liberal democracy” (Vallespín and Martínez-Bascuñán, 2017, p. 45), that is, as an intimate enemy of democracy (Todorov, 2012).

The emotional rhetoric of populism

In challenging the foundations of the rational and plural debate of liberalism, the alternative of populist reason is inclined towards a policy connected with emotional discourse. Conflict returns authenticity to politics while the appeal to emotions gives symbolic content to populist demands in the postmodern context of the aestheticization of politics and institutional decline. Postmodern populism maintains the legacy of its predecessor by designing a discourse that promotes the construction of a ‘people’ that excludes the elites and unites their victims emotionally, through speeches full of empty signifiers and imprecise, simple and emotional terms, capable of provoking citizens’ mobilization and fostering the homogeneity of the masses.

For the construction of its basic messages that “behind the institutions is not the nation, but the caste” and that “outside are the people” (Villacañas, 2015, p. 67), populist discourse uses an emotional and Manichean language to support society’s division into two independent and opposite spheres. ‘The people’ functions as a synecdoche of the nation; moreover, it is configured as an indeterminate concept to which it is possible to link an infinite diversity of individual feelings or “a blank sheet on which to project one’s own illusions” (Arias Maldonado, 2014, p. 24) as shown, for instance, in Obama’s “Yes, we can” slogan during his first campaign.

That linguistic vagueness gives meaning to populist discourse, adapted to the diverse nature of society, and made up of empty signifiers that, like the term ‘people’, will be able to attract demands of all kinds to themselves. Through this dialectical mechanism, populism constructs the unifying, effective and simple discourse it needs to convince electors: a speech tapping into people’s emotions, with a power to unite citizens in their defencelessness against the corrupt elite. Nussbaum (2014, p. 3330) reminds us that the weakness of the individual is one of the most powerful feelings for their connection with other individuals, which leads us to appreciate the enormous power acquired by political movements that stir up such feelings in particularly delicate times such as economic and social crises. From the populist perspective, it is useless to direct the discourse to reason because it is not the one that makes decisions. If the rational argument is incomprehensible to the masses, who are supposed to be politically illiterate (Villacañas, 2015, p. 46), it will be a waste of time to build intellectual

stories, also because “our brain blocks the rational information that could incline us to change our opinion because we prefer emotional or moral convictions” (Gutiérrez-Rubí, 2009, p. 54). Therefore, populists should make an effort to address their speeches to affect an emotion.

Emotion thus dominates political communication, especially the populist one. Dalrymple (2016, pp. 74–75, and 109) notices that, when sentimentality becomes a mass phenomenon, it requires everyone to experience it:

The person who refuses to release their emotions on the grounds that the sentiment does not deserve public display is automatically placed outside the virtuous circle, and becomes practically an enemy of the people.... If you are looking for the public’s sympathy, you should cry in public; Grief is like justice, not only should you feel it, but you have to show that you feel it.

The populist is a master in the handling of emotional language. The speech addressed to the affections acquires all its persuasive force in its sentimental exhibition and dramatization (Arias Maldonado, 2016, p. 137). Politicians have become media stars, and their ability to connect with the public depends on their personal communication skills. The new policy is the politics of entertainment for a society that exhibits itself through social networks and is more interested in politicians’ personal space than in their role in politics.

Connecting with emotions requires mastering the language and knowing the audiences deeply because only this knowledge guarantees the emotional connection with the public and the mobilization of collective wills towards the objectives that are sought. They should be good leaders capable of articulating discourses around particular emotions, connecting their proposals with the deepest feelings of the audience. The populist orator has traditionally demonstrated their ability to make emotions an effective instrument of communication and to inject into the masses the distrust that allows social division. A mistrust that, consistent with their ‘conflictivist’ view of politics, explains that, within the broad spectrum of emotions, populist discourse resorts not only to positive feelings of solidarity among the victims of the crisis, but also to emotions such as anger, indignation or fear, which have a great power to mobilize the crowds (Moffit, 2015).

Reviewing the reflections on populism and emotion by Gutiérrez-Rubí (2009) and Nussbaum (2014), we can conclude that the populist is adept at transmitting emotions, a skill that entails risks such as the breaking of coexistence by the exaltation of passions:

Even the most extroverted claims, from 15M to Beppe Grillo, passing through Podemos and the American Tea Party, are inclined toward irrationalism, whose most characteristic feature would be the search for a scapegoat: bankers, politicians, the rich, governments. And the result is a

labyrinth of passions that looks very little like the public sphere claimed by the enlightened for our representative democracies.

(Arias Maldonado, 2014)

The crowd's identification with the leader is decisive when establishing a solid emotional rapport. If the leader shares the traits of those they represent, as explained by Laclau (2016, pp. 73–74), this identification will allow a whole process that leads first to affection and then to the development of all populist logic. The leader must be a pure receiver of affections, so they will be fully qualified to conquer the masses through emotional resources.

Populism as a rhetorical metaphor

In the search for emotional impact, metaphor plays a decisive role, as it is a rhetorical figure that allows the populist to refer to reality in understandable terms, and offer easy, attractive, emotional and effective ideas to activate the conflicting vision of social reality. Laclau (2016) has addressed the issue by presenting interesting conclusions that relate rhetoric and metaphor to populism's social process of construction. Engaged in defending the origin of populism as a response to the needs of a society damaged by the corruption of power, and dispossessed of its sovereignty, Laclau defends his theories against those who disqualify them as a mere rhetoric, arguing that, since we are talking about rhetoric, when a literal term is replaced by another figurative term, rhetoric is at the root of political construction, and in a special way in that of populism. In fact, in populism, the literal term which would have to be society as a whole (in our case, the indeterminate social part opposed to the elites), is replaced by a figurative term, 'the people'.

For the sake of further precision, Laclau (2016, p. 96) explains the process through catachresis, a more accurate figure that perhaps fits better with the idea explained above, since it allows us to allude to a reality for which there is no literal expression. According to Laclau (2002), the term 'people', in the context of populism, is a catachresis because there is nothing literal to back it up; understood as a stable concept, it does not exist. We have seen previously how a part of the citizens is grouped solely by virtue of their having a common enemy, but deep down that group is mutable and constitutes a vague idea that is not enough to support the term 'people'.

Everything in populism is a trope. 'The people', as we have seen, is a synecdoche. Arias Maldonado (2016, p. 133) maintains that populism is constructed and directed towards "a united whole that reality [...] does not confirm". Populism knows perfectly well that the concept of the people has no literal support and knows that it is variable, undefined and built at the convenience of those who promote it; it is a figure of thought with enormous emotional power, with the quality of adapting to new realities as circumstances demand, and with the power to create an intense feeling of belonging. We could affirm that the concept of

the people promoted by populism is the great metaphor of affections. Everyone wants to be part of the people and that is the great success of populism.

Arias Maldonado (2016, p. 82) refers to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson to remind us that “the language we share is saturated with metaphors that correspond to the human conceptual system, which means that [...] the way we talk about things is based on the understanding of an aspect of them in the terms of another”. In fact, Lakoff and Johnson (2003, pp. 159–160) explain that “metaphors are conceptual in nature. They are among our principal vehicles for understanding. And they play a central role in the construction of social and political reality”. This would justify the masses accepting concepts such as people, caste or plot to refer to abstract and open realities in which, therefore, almost everything fits, and whose original depths are much more complex than their metaphorical counterparts.

The appeal to emotions and the displacement of ideas in favour of feelings are not exclusive to populist discourse, nor is the conception of politics as conflict. A political discourse can be demagogic, simplifying and emotional, but not populist. Polarization is key to populism, as based on affective appeals to distrust in reason’s capacity to give meaning, fuelled by the incapacity of dialectics to overcome conflicts.

Methodology

As a complement to the theoretical analysis, we will now analyse the speech by Irene Montero (2017), the spokeswoman for Podemos in the Spanish Parliament, during the first debate session held on 13 June 2017 on the no-confidence vote presented by her party against the then Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy.

The method of analysis combines elements of discourse analysis, rhetoric and argumentation theory (Arroyas and Berná, 2015), and has proved to be useful in previous research (Arroyas and Pérez, 2016).

With this interdisciplinary perspective, we try to uncover ideological meaning, an approach that we consider adequate for a type of discourse with an evident persuasive intention. Nuclear aspects related to the values and argumentative resources used will be analysed.

Results

Themes and theses

The main theme of the text is the vote of no-confidence proposed by Podemos against Rajoy’s government; this, in turn, provides the pretext for the interpretation the party makes of the political situation of Spain and from which other sub-themes are derived: the discredit of the Popular Party (PP), corruption as a major problem of Spanish politics, falsification of democracy, and Podemos as an alternative on the people’s behalf.

The thesis defended in the speech is as follows: the PP is delegitimized to govern because it has become a “criminal organization”. It acts through a web of corruption affecting the legislative and judicial powers. This has caused the destruction of all democratic institutions – in other words, the falsification of democracy – by creating a criminal plot that also reaches parties, companies, the financial system, the police and even the media. “You have turned corruption into a form of government” is repeated in the speech with different variations. The PP has become the enemy of the people. Given this emergency situation, Podemos represents the challenge to the corrupt elites. Faced with this institutional framework, the solution must come from mobilization; in actual fact, the people rise in the streets to expel the PP from power and bring a true democracy to Spain, channelled by Podemos as the party of the ‘people’.

The speech combines expository (as in (1)), interpretative (as in (2)), expressive (as in (3)) and appellative (as in (4)) elements oriented ultimately towards mobilization; although it largely adopts an interpretative modality with a political assessment from a specific ideological perspective, this interpretation responds to emotional motivations:

- (1) One hundred and eighty-three years ago the cigar makers of this country organized the first labour movements of women in Spain.
- (2) Spain was a room full of smoke and officers.
- (3) What a shame, ladies and gentlemen!
- (4) Honestly I tell you, if you do not resign out of respect for Spain, do it out of self-respect.

Values and ideology

Underlying the ideological axis on which the discourse is constructed (the corrupt elite vs. the people; the true democrats vs. the false ones; the real patriots and the traitors who only think about getting rich, etc.) is a way of understanding politics as an irreconcilable conflict between us and them before a historical challenge that demands mobilization for change. This interpretation implies discredit of the democratic and institutional channels by identifying the opponent not only as an adversary with ideas that can be disagreed on; but also as someone who, based on lies, usurps power to enrich themselves (“Spain is tired of being robbed”), distorts the Constitution (the PP “has ruined the rule of law”) and, therefore, must be “cast from power”.

This argument appeals to generally accepted moral principles and resorts to emotions to attract the audience’s sympathy: hope in the face of resignation, old versus new, elites in front of ordinary people. There are also values associated with the Manichean division between them and us; whilst Podemos stands for the struggle for human rights, feminism and public services, the PP is identified

with the heirs of the dictatorship, the “financial vultures”, inequality (as in (5)), decadence (as in (6)), fear (as in (7)) and lack of solidarity (as in (8)).

- (5) We women are excluded from decision-making despite being the ones who have borne more than anyone the weight of the crisis. Your economic, political and social project is a deeply macho model.
- (6) You want to normalize an obsolete territorial model.
- (7) You want to deliver the final years of our lives to the vulture funds and speculators.
- (8) More and more people in this country know that you have left them with nothing.

Ethos

The most important persuasive resources for the configuration of ethos are of a narrative nature, such as the construction of antagonistic characters; and of a linguistic nature, such as the use of colloquial terms and exclamations (“What a shame, ladies and gentlemen”), and a lexicon that alludes to confronting semantic fields.

The image the speaker intends to project is based on identification with one of the two parties in conflict (us) as a form of empathy to encourage popular mobilization against the corrupt plot (them). People (fellow citizens) are quoted with terms such as neighbours, simple people, those below, the poor and even Spaniards; the enemy, by contrast, is presented as the elite, the bunker, the men in suits, the rich, etc. Each of these characters always appears associated with a lexicon alluding to positive or negative values, depending on the case: lie, theft, the old, the false, struggle, hope, work, unity, solidarity, fraternity and resignation in the face of dignity.

The personal references with which each block is identified have clear ideological resonances: Rosa Parks, Campoamor, Celaya, Machado, Angela Davis, on the one hand, while the enemy appears linked to characters such as The Godfather, Franco, The Sopranos, JP Morgan, S. Adelson or Trump. The speech also highlights the symbolism of the scenarios linked to each group; while the party in office appears to be associated with places related to crime (tax havens, accused benches) and wealth (Bernabeu box, golf courses, cocktails, country houses), the opposite side, Podemos, stands for the street, public squares or workplaces.

The results of the analysis support the usual scale of values of populist discourse based on the exaltation of an anti-elitist and anti-institutional ideal: “People showed that they are not afraid of filling squares and streets.” Although it was a vote of distrust where the alternatives to the government should be put forward, no solution was presented. On the contrary, only vague ideas and appeals to emotions such as hope, fraternity or tolerance were pronounced. The speaker showed herself and her party as a paragon of honesty in the face of corruption,

and as one more among the simple people, referring to those who work in “the corner store”, the taxi driver or the plumber, as if she was one of them.

Benevolence as a key feature of the ethos of Montero’s discourse is completed by the idea of the us, “the healthy part of the State”, as the prototypical character of a hero of a collective nature stressed with the constant use of the first person plural: “They do not intimidate us anymore, we are no longer afraid of them”, “The Spain that is coming” or “the people”, a term that is repeated up to 13 times in the speech.

Logos

The resource used by Podemos’ spokeswoman to destroy the image of the party in office is to exhibit a whole web of *pseudo-arguments*, fallacies, ironies and discredit. These *pseudo-arguments* denaturalize the arguments of the rhetorical logos when manipulating reasoning, presenting as facts ideas that are only wishes of the one who exposes them. In this way, she resorts to the distorted pair of argument by analogy to convey the idea that the vote of no-confidence is a first step in the difficult process towards the final eviction of the corrupt government, just as Rosa Park’s action in Alabama was the starting point for the conquest of the rights of Blacks. Like the great characters of history in the fight for the rights of people, Podemos is presented as a party of brave people capable of sacrificing themselves so that millions of others can live in a truly democratic state.

The speech, however, includes real arguments based on facts and data, such as the one that referred to the government’s tax amnesty in which the speaker quotes a paragraph of the sentence that declares it unconstitutional; or the arguments subject to the *principle of authority* to legitimize its attacks on the government, with expressions like “I do not say it, the judges say it” or “Amnesty International has said it and also Reporters Without Borders, not me, ladies and gentlemen”. The *argument by example* is recurrent in this speech full of allusions to specific cases (as in (9)), although it should be noted that these are chosen without regard to whether they are proven facts or not.

- (9) In the middle of 2017 this House received (...) nothing more and nothing less than the Minister of Trade Union Relations, responsible for the slaughter of Vitoria, and came to talk about democracy.

In general, fallacies of a different order predominate, such as *half-truths* (“They put an economic criminal to run the economy of the country”), the speaker knowing that those who appointed the minister could not have foreseen his criminal profile; or *Ad misericordiam*, which appeals to emotions, especially in the paragraphs dedicated to women, including the deputy herself, who even says “we are being killed”, in relation to domestic violence, with the intention of tugging at people’s heartstrings.

Regarding Catalonia's referendum on independence, the speaker argues that, "when deciding, nothing is broken", and concludes: "It is you [the PP] those who have broken Spain and those who have sold it to pieces to the vulture funds", a *non sequitur* that does not follow from the argument. Resources such as *subterfuge* are not very abundant although they can be found in cases like "Spain is a country of countries ... and this is recognized by our own Constitution", when the Constitution only mentions peoples, nationalities and regions. These constitute other ingredients of this formula for emotions.

Pathos

The speaker uses an accessible, simple and direct style, aimed at a mostly young audience, social groups of a medium or low cultural level, working women, victims of gender violence, and pensioners. The speech is constructed using the second-person indicative to address the lordships in the chamber. In so doing, it is much easier to make the speech sound like a conversation between the speaker and the members of the House. Using this resource allows the speaker to achieve two objectives: that the sarcastic messages go directly to their receivers, the lordships; and, secondly, when she speaks to 'the people', to be closer. In addition, the speaker uses common language to facilitate understanding. According to this, she pronounces sentences like: "What is the problem? Yes, we've plundered the public, we've made billions in cuts, so what?".

Numerous emotional arguments reinforce the construction of the narrative plot with the creation of three central characters: the villain, represented by the government; the victim, embodied by the people; and the hero, Podemos, represented on this occasion by its spokeswoman. The figure of the villain evokes the idea of fear, a symbol of a government that has subjected its citizens:

- (10) They need people to fear losing their job, being expelled from their homes, not being able to fill their refrigerator next month, their children not finding work, their grandparents and grandmothers not receiving the pension they deserve ... they fear receiving a blow or a fine if they protest or being fired if they take part in a strike.

She reinforces the idea of subjugation with passages in which she refers to the manipulation of the press and the intimidation of the "brave" ones who still investigate corruption, associating the government with totalitarianism. The references to Francoism seek to pit the citizens against the government and promote an awareness that it is necessary to remove it from power. Phrases such as "Spain was a smoke-filled room full of officers" offers a portrait of Franco's military men, to whom she intends to associate the image of a rancid PP, with the intention of damaging its reputation.

The search for the female audience's sympathy with her arguments is another of the major issues of Montero's speech, which qualifies as a 'feminist' vote of

confidence. That is why she does not hesitate to resort to the *ad misericordiam* fallacy to move the feelings of the public, by using sentences such as “They are killing us women” or “we are excluded from the important decisions”; while “we have assumed more than anyone the weight of the crisis” is heard as a lament of the marginalization of the collective.

Anaphora is the rhetorical resource with the most emotional power in this speech. With the repetition of expressions such as “what a shame” and “Spain on the move”, the speech sends a message with increasing rhythm that tries to arouse two basic emotions: indignation at the government and the urgency of mobilization. Outlining a long list of cases of corruption produces an effect similar to anaphora, and is used to drive the listener, through a hammering *ad nauseam*, until the final sentence: “Corruption has headquarters and it is Génova 13”.¹

Irony and sarcasm, finally, play a prominent role in the emotional dimension of this discourse by its ridiculing of the adversary. We highlight here only one example among many: “Of course, ladies and gentlemen! Because corruption is a phenomenon of nature! Right like the rain or the sun.”

Conclusion

Some of the questions reflected in the theoretical part of the chapter are confirmed in this analysis. With rhetorical resources of an emotional nature, the speech constructs a narrative plot with antagonistic characters: the victim, embodied by the people; the hero, Podemos, who appears as the saviour of a “Spain that is tired of being robbed”; and the villain, represented by a delegitimized government that has falsified democracy.

The explanation of the power plot is crucial in this discourse because it allows the listener to visualize the corrupt structure built by the elites and that involves not only politicians and rulers but all institutions; this serves to encourage ‘the people’ to mobilize in the streets against the system. With argumentative resources aimed at provoking citizens with extreme emotions such as the feeling of grievance and indignation, Podemos’ discourse is adjusted to the conflictive conception of politics that populism fosters when describing a fractured society between the excluded and the elite.

Note

- 1 “Genova 13” is a metonym used to identify the address of the headquarters of the Popular Party in Madrid and, by association, the party itself.

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2

THE RISE OF POPULIST PARTIES IN ITALY

Techno-populism between neo-liberalism and direct democracy

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Introduction

Populism (or different political movements and/or social aggregations that are in many ways situated in the frame of populism) are not new in the Italian political landscape. In 1946, for example, journalist Guglielmo Giannini founded the Fronte dell'Uomo Qualunque (Common Man's Front), a political party that was often labelled "populist" and "anti-political". Among the key points of the party's programme, we can identify the following: (a) a clear and visceral opposition to socialists and communists; (b) an exaltation of individualistic liberalism (a liberalism very close to modern neo-liberal approaches); (c) a struggle for tax reduction; and (d) support for what we could currently label as the "light-weight state" (Setta, 1975; Lomartire, 2008). The Italian Communist Party declared that the Common Man's Front represented a tactical move for the re-establishment of the Fascist Party (Spriano, 1975). Giannini's party, which can be defined as a particular type of right-wing populist aggregation that adopted highly anti-political rhetorical strategies, lasted only a few years despite the strong electoral results obtained in 1946. Giannini himself was a candidate in the general elections of 1953 with the Christian Democrats. The term "qualunquismo" (coming from "uomo qualunque", *qualunque-ism = qualunquismo*),¹ however, is still used in Italian to indicate – in a derogatory way – a cynical position towards politics, a lack of social responsibility and, more generally, an anti-political attitude.²

"Populist" rhetoric was also present in the first era of the Fascist movement, and it is not by chance that Antonio Gramsci (1921) defined the term "fascism" as "the anti-party", overlapping with the "anti-social psychology" of some clusters of Italian people.

In this chapter, we highlight the connections between some "traditional" forms of Italian populism, the emerging trend of techno-populism, a neo-liberal

rhetoric on the light-weight state and depoliticisation processes. Our hypothesis is that there is a correlation between the rise of techno-populism and the development of depoliticisation processes.³

To answer this hypothesis, we have drafted a research project that started in 2017 and is still in progress at the time of writing. Methodologically, this project, which is framed in the process tracing approach (Collier, 2011; De Blasio *et al.* 2017; De Blasio 2018), plans to verify the following:

1. If there is a correlation between the growth of a) keywords related to the sphere of populism and b) of keywords related to the sphere of depoliticisation, and c) positive emphasis on the role of technologies. This correlation is studied through the use of content analysis and has parties' programmes and their policy documents as the object of investigation.
2. The study of the policy documents produced by the main Italian parties concerning the adoption of digital technologies for public administration. This study is carried out through the adoption of frame analysis.
3. The study of the perception of the role of technology and of the forms of digital democracy by the activists of M5S, the Democratic Party and the League. This study is carried out through 60 semi-structured interviews, which be carried out at the end of the mandate of the current Italian Government (therefore not yet implemented: they will constitute a part of future research).

The project has a background in a previous study already published (with other research questions) and is based on a broad time scan (De Blasio and Sorice, 2018). This chapter presents the reflections from the first part (point a) of the research project mentioned above; the results of the research will be published in a special volume at the beginning of 2020 (De Blasio and Sorice, forthcoming).

Do we need a definition?

Populism, in its various and sometimes inevitably contradictory definitions, is often interpreted as a response to the lack of participation that distinguishes liberal representative democracies. This interpretation of the emergence of populism and, with it, the emergence of so-called neo-populist parties is based on an awareness of a crisis of representation (Mair, 2000; Taggart, 2000; Taguieff, 2002; Papadopoulos, 2013; Sorice, 2014).

Another important aspect to consider is the acceleration of the decline in political parties' credibility because of the financial crisis that has affected Europe and the US since 2007, and that has also produced a wave of movement parties that have had meaningful (and sometimes surprising) electoral successes.⁴ The crisis of the neo-liberal approach to economics combined with the crisis of traditional political parties has led to the emergence of two contrasting trends: (a) the growth of far-right populist parties and (b) the emergence of movement parties

(della Porta, 2015; della Porta, Fernández, Kouki and Mosca, 2017).⁵ Far-right populist parties have shown some traditional characteristics of right-wing populism, such as anti-immigrant rhetoric, a sovereignist perspective in international relations and a substantial anti-system approach to politics. Movement parties have emphasised the importance of a “popular sovereignty” that is quite different from sovereignism and an anti-establishment frame that is not unavoidably anti-system. Movement parties are not necessarily “populist”; in some cases, in fact, these parties do not use the distinction between “the people” (us) and the “non-people” (them), but prefer a distinction between the economic elites and the “exploited” people.⁶ Populism can be better understood if we frame it in terms of *hyper-representation* (Mastropaolo, 2000, 2008, 2016; De Blasio and Sorice, 2018). The notion of hyper-representation (usually the leader) correlates with the concept of super-people, not a people made by individuals and/or classes, but a simulacrum of the idealised people that is unitary. For this reason, populism is also fundamentally anti-pluralist, as noted by Müller (2017).

The progressive erosion of long-term identities on which a party’s legitimisation was founded has also thrown into crisis the established forms of political participation. Populism can thus be defined as the opposition between the “true people” (us) and the “non-people” (them), or it can be situated within representative democracy (Urbinati, 2013a, 2013b) of which it constitutes a pathology (Kaltwasser, 2014) or a special ideology (Mudde, 2004; Aslanidis, 2016). Other scholars use more normative definitions (Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000; Stanley, 2008; Anselmi, 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Following an empirical approach, we prefer to use a non-normative approach to populism, which is why we link populism to the crisis of political representation and the emergence of the phenomenon of hyper-representation.

The crisis of representation is based on an agency deficit that is evident in the diminished centrality of political parties; simultaneously, it produces a request for an increasingly less fiduciary and more sanctioning representation. In fact, the trust relationship between the representative and the represented has been replaced by a systematic mistrust. The crisis of representation is partly mitigated by the emergence of forms of surrogate representation.⁷ In this case, the latter constitutes a moment of potential synthesis between the forms of “exit” and the forms of “voice” (Hirschman, 1970).⁸ That is, in addition to social apathy, there are at least two other possibilities for “voice”: the first is represented by the populist appeal to make representative democracy more participatory through a sort of “claim for representation” (Saward, 2010), and the second is highlighted by the most advanced experiences of democratic innovations and civic engagement (De Blasio and Sorice, 2016; Smith, 2009; della Porta, 2013). The populist response to the risk of exit, however, consists in a substantial conceptual overlap between “delegates” and “trustees”; the constant appeal to direct (but not participatory) democracy; and, often, the adoption of plebiscitary (and, sometimes, authoritarian) leadership. There is also a variation of authoritarian leadership (Hall, 1985) that occurs when politicians define themselves as “new”; this




FIGURE 2.1 From the crisis of representation to hyper-representation.

Source: De Blasio and Sorice (2018).

situation is an example of “top-down populism”, or “governmental populism” (Revelli, 2017, p. 26). The process that is briefly described here (see Figure 2.1) is called hyper-representation.⁹ Hyper-representation is strongly connected to the idea of populism as the “hypertrophy of popular sovereignty” (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti, 2017, p. 337).

The process illustrated in Figure 2.1 has accompanied both populists’ appeal against the lack of participation in representative democracy and the emphasis on the role of technology. The development of the emerging forms of *techno-populism* seems to be coherent with the process of *depoliticisation* (Hay, 2007; Jaeger, 2007; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2015; Fawcett, Flinders, Hay and Wood, 2017).

Neo-liberal discourse, emergent populism and depoliticisation

The link between anti-politics, certain tendencies of populism and the process of depoliticisation has been emphasised, in different ways, in several rather recent

publications (Crouch, 2003; Hay, 2007). Flinders and Buller (2006), for example, wrote about the “tactics and tools” used by neo-liberalism to absorb and anaesthetise popular participation as well as the “mechanisms used by politicians to depoliticise issues – including delegation, but also the creation of binding rules and discursive preference shaping” (Fawcett, Flinders, Hay and Wood, 2017, p. 4).

The relationships between the depoliticisation process and the two often converging phenomena of anti-politics and populism constitute an important theoretical starting point to understand emerging populism, as argued by Fawcett *et al.* (2017, p. 4): “Anti-politics overlaps with depoliticisation in referring to public disengagement, manifested in declining public participation in elections and parties as well as acquiescence to dominant paradigms of public policy”. However, the slippery and loaded concept of anti-politics can be connected to insurgent populist politicians whose dominant slogans concern their capacity to replace “exhausted” politics with more “authentic” governing skills,¹⁰ which include, in many cases, minimal governance action (Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013). Figure 2.2 illustrates these processes.




FIGURE 2.2 Depoliticisation as linkage between neo-liberal ideology and some forms of populism.

The neo-liberal approach (at least as it has been configured since the 1980s) finds one of its points of reference in the ideal of the light-weight state, which is more suitable to favouring the market (Crouch, 2003). Simultaneously, anti-political rhetoric (which is not by chance often concentrated against public institutions that are accused of being inefficient) finds fertile ground in the processes of depoliticisation. In this framework, the encounter between neo-liberal approaches to the economy and some tendencies of European populism is activated. The crises of public bureaucracies and representative politics are two structural variables that have legitimated the tendencies towards depoliticisation. However, Flinders and Bullers (2006, p. 299) consider globalisation, neo-liberalism and new public management to be the micro-political-level variables of the depoliticisation process.

In this framework, we can place the emphasis on “governance”, which is described as being more efficient and “participatory” than “government” (Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013; Fasenfest, 2010).¹¹ Governance is a preferential road towards depoliticisation, and, simultaneously, an element of a strong and efficient neo-liberal strategy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2017); even some tools (e.g., online direct democracy) can be considered agents to depoliticise decision-making processes (Urbinati, 2014). Notably, the topic of *direct democracy* is often allegedly used as an antidote to the lack of participation in representative systems: direct democracy constitutes a rhetorical argument that favours the shift from government to governance. However, it is evident that direct democracy (and its online version) is based on an aggregative idea of decision-making (a majoritarian perspective rather than a deliberative one); it is a tool of representative democracy and cannot be in any way confused with participatory/deliberative democracy (Morlino, 2011; della Porta, 2013; Sorice, 2014).

The outcome of depoliticising the decision-making process is twofold. On the one hand, the idea of governance is made possible by technologies, such as in the case of e-government platforms or the efficient results of technocracy (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti, 2017); on the other hand, the emphasis on online direct democracy, or even on collaborative processes, is surely important and interesting but is very often limited to marginal issues. In this scenario, the emergence of “hyper-representative leaders of the people” is an example of the “post-political” (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2015).¹² The theme of “governability” against the background of both neo-liberal rhetoric and the rhetoric used by populist parties in their processes of institutionalisation, constitutes a sort of re-politicisation.¹³

Old and new populism: the emergence of techno-populism

In social and political studies, there are many possibilities and methodological approaches to investigate populism and its several faces. Because of the substantial inefficiency of normative definitions, an empirical approach is a better solution. At the same time, defining the field (populist movements, populist political

parties, populist leaders, etc.) is also important. Regarding populist leadership, for example, a preliminary challenge is to attempt to avoid confusing anti-political rhetoric with populist style. Although anti-political rhetoric (Campus, 2006; Sorice, 2014) is strongly connected to populism, populist style is not necessarily a symptom of populism. Simultaneously, we can also consider anti-political rhetoric as an indicator of populist discursive style.¹⁴

Anti-political rhetoric is not the only kind, however, that can be traced in the communication of populist leaders. Table 2.1 highlights the various indicators present in the populist-style discursive rhetoric. It should be noted, in this regard, that the presence of populist discursive styles adopted by political leaders does not necessarily imply that the relative political party is populist. Table 2.1,

TABLE 2.1 Indicators of populist style.

<i>Indicators of populist style</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>
Anti-political rhetoric	Anti-system, anti-State, anti-parties, anti-intellectuals
Emotionalisation	Sharing emotions or revealing insights (Mazzoleni <i>et al.</i> , 2003; Van Santen and Van Zoonen, 2010)
Informality	Adopting a direct, simple, non-formal and non-institutional style (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014)
Instrumental actualisation	Exploiting specific events in order to support political bias and applying a sort of incorrect inductive reasoning (cherry-picking fallacy) based on current events (Krämer, 2014) -> <i>post-truth tendency?</i>
Intimisation	Recounting his/her own life (Stanyer, 2012)
Negative affect	Appealing to emotions of fear, or using apodictic registers to arouse interest and/or alarm and to mobilise people on the basis of negative feelings (Alvares and Dahlgren, 2016) -> <i>Anger</i>
Simplification	Oversimplifying issues and solutions (Alvares and Dahlgren, 2016; Caiani and Graziano, 2016)
Storytelling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Narrating politics • Meritocracy (as a key to go beyond the “corrupted elites”)
Exaggerations	The frequent recourse to proverbs, stereotypes, clichés and other expression of popular wisdom
Taboo breaker	Breaking taboos and fighting against political correctness (to distinguish oneself from the elite) (Caiani and Graziano, 2016; Krämer, 2014; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014)
Victimhood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Politicians considering people not ready to understand their proposals • Politicians say that there is a conspiracy against them if they cannot reach the goals of their programmes
Vulgarism	Using vulgar language to reach “ordinary people” (Mastropaolo, 2008)

Source: Bracciale and Martella (2017, p. 1314) with integrations and modifications.

in particular, comes from a study on the presence of Italian political leaders on Twitter and shows the articulation of populist style indicators. To the original variables, we have also added the indicator concerning anti-political rhetoric, often adopted even by political leaders with institutional positions.

Table 2.1 shows our partial re-elaboration of the indicators used by Bracciale and Martella (2017, p. 1314) in analysing the relationships between Twitter and Italian political leaders. The importance of the media (and especially digital media) for the study of populism is widely corroborated (Higgins, 2017). As Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008, pp. 200–221) suggest:

The contribution of the media to the establishment of a ‘populist *Zeitgeist*’ in the twenty-first century appears to be threefold (...) the function of politically educating the citizenry (once played by mass parties) is now largely delegated to the national media, which in turn favours those telogenic politicians who speak in slogans and soundbites.

The indicators of populist style can be very useful in evaluating populist strategies without framing all of them in the same definition of “populism”.

Anti-political rhetoric is characterised by the recourse to “newism” against the “old” political actors and the “intermediary bodies” (which are obviously represented by the “non-people”) and by a constant reference to specific keywords. Among these keywords, we must highlight the importance of terms such as *efficiency* and *privatisation*, the concept of *short-termism* (variously defined), the many forms of *newism*, the insurgence of rhetoric concerning *meritocracy* (Littler, 2018) and the centrality of *technology* (De Blasio and Sorice, 2018; Sorice, 2018a). We found these keywords in research presented in De Blasio and Sorice (2018); we found similar outcomes also in this case, where we study the correlation between the growth of keywords related to the sphere of populism and that of keywords related to the sphere of depoliticisation.

In this case, we have used content analysis as a research method to analyse a corpus of parties’ programmes and policy documents.¹⁵ Table 2.2 illustrates the four steps we have taken; this method gives to the researcher the opportunity to use traditional sociological qualitative tools (such as interviews) and more quantitative approaches.

The analysis carried out shows an evident correlation between the presence of positive expressions associated with the use of technologies for participation and the keywords related to the process of depoliticisation. In particular, we have noted the following: the emphasis on “governance”, the exaltation of “new” (the “newism”) and “change”, the emphasis placed on “meritocracy” (and conversely the lack of keywords connected to the idea of equality or redistribution), the connection between ethno-nationalist instances and mistrust in the party system (Figure 2.3). These issues are very similar to those we had found using another type of content analysis (i.e., Evaluation Assertive Analysis, which has a more quantitative approach) in previous research.¹⁶

TABLE 2.2 The four steps of the content analysis as investigation

<i>Research draw</i>	<i>Information building (data)</i>	<i>Elaboration, analysis and interpretation</i>	<i>Dissemination</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulation of cognitive questions • Choice of cases (texts, specific messages, fragments of text, etc.) • Sampling (may not be necessary) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis processing • Categorical variables • Ordinal variables • Cardinal variables (use of a metric scale for each indicator) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cases building (cases for variables) • Definiton of textual profiles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reworking and discussion of results

Source: De Blasio *et al.* (2017, p. 157).




FIGURE 2.3 Prominent key issues and figures in the political discourse of the Five Star Movement and the League.

Figure 2.3 shows the first outcomes of our research, concerning the Five Star Movement and League (formerly North League).

In other studies (De Blasio and Sorice, 2018; De Blasio, 2018; Sorice, 2018) concerning the Italian political scenario, we identified four predominant types of populism (which have some points of convergence with the outcomes of many other studies across Europe): (a) neo-liberal populism; (b) social populism, or

democratic populism, as Laclau (2005) or Anselmi (2017) defined it; (c) national populism (in many cases with some elements of ethnic populism); and (d) techno-populism (Bickerton and Accetti Invernizzi, 2017; Deseriis, 2017). The characteristics we identify in Table 2.3 also had a bearing on the findings presented in Figure 2.2. With the exception of social populism (which is notably absent in the Italian scenario), the other three types of populism are coherent with the depoliticisation of Italian society and with the winning rhetoric of “governability” (which is disseminated even by non-populist parties that sometimes adopt a populist style).

Among the four types of populism, techno-populism represents a major emerging “innovation”. As stated by Müller (2017, p. 96), “technocracy holds that there is only one correct policy solution; populism holds that there is only one authentic will of the people”; in a certain way, both refuse democratic debate and can be interpreted as an outcome of the depoliticisation process. It is also true that some trends of techno-libertarianism have influenced both the positive approach to top-down e-government and the idea of online direct democracy. Accordingly, these trends are another aspect of the post-political era: an effect of depoliticisation and a new form of re-politicisation through technology (see Figure 2.2). Techno-populism stands as a pivotal element in the process of depoliticisation; in fact, techno-populism represents an outcome of a “de facto” convergence path between neo-liberal instances and anti-political rhetoric. At the same time, however, techno-populism constitutes the fulcrum of re-politicisation mechanisms that are often based not only on the primacy of the rhetoric of efficiency and governability, but also on the denial of the practices of egalitarian democracy. An Italian example is represented by the Five Star Movement, whose emphasis on the concept of (online) direct democracy is not accompanied by the same attention to online deliberative and participatory processes (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013; Mosca, 2018).

This is, more generally, evident in the triadic relationships between depoliticisation, techno-populism and the emergence of so-called “platform parties” (Gerbaudo, 2018; Sorice, 2018c). One of the effects of the crisis of the intermediary bodies (which has accompanied the emergence of populist parties) is constituted by the mass party decline. These were parties of people, strongly supported by a structure of cadres and functioning on an organisational mechanism based on a delegation system. The new “platform parties” – made possible by digital technologies and net-based communication styles – have no cadres and are usually based on a stratarchic structure (Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel, 2014). The techno-populist rhetoric (in some cases in the background of the platform parties) usually establishes a strong relationship between the leader (the hyper-representative of the people) and the super-people (the active militants who participate in the party’s life).¹⁷ The concept of super-people is based upon an individualistic conception of participation (see Figure 2.4) and the decision-making process is totally framed in an aggregative idea of democracy (Mosca, 2018).

TABLE 2.3 Four types of populism

	<i>Neo-liberal populism</i>	<i>Social populism (democratic)</i>	<i>National populism (ethnic)</i>	<i>Techno-populism</i>
<i>Basic elements</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Free market • No intervention of the State in economic issues • People as tax-payers • Direct democracy • Techno-libertarianism • Hyper-representation (technical skills possession, technocracy) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Egalitarianism • Anti-capitalism • People as workers and/or “excluded” • Direct democracy as possibility, participatory democracy as practice • Technology as a tool • Diffused representation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ethnic position • Xenophobia • People as (imagined) nation • Religious traditions • Direct democracy • Hyper-representation (authoritarian leadership) • Emotional figures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Egalitarianism through the Internet • People as “social community” • Direct democracy • Techno-libertarianism • Hyper-representation (technical skills possession, anti-elite technocracy)
<i>Key features</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political elites are corrupted • Government is corrupted, politics is non-efficient • Individualism • Meritocracy as ideology • Rule of law vs rule of the people (penal populism) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capitalist elites are corrupted • People as collective entity • Listening to the people • Popular sovereignty • Rule of law 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migrants as enemies • Christian roots • Authoritarianism and national sovereignty (sovereignism) • “Law and order” (penal populism) • Anger 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political elites are corrupted • Government is corrupted, politics is non-efficient • Rule of law • Meritocracy as ideology

Source: De Blasio and Sorice (2018).




FIGURE 2.4 The platform party in the frame of depoliticisation and as an output of techno-populism.

The platform party constitutes an attempt against the representation deficit, but it is also an outcome of the positive storytelling about ICTs as “revolutionary” tools for the improvement of democracy (Boccia Artieri, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2018; 2019). Digital technologies can accentuate or diminish the “oligarchic” dimension of party structures, depending on whether they are used as basic tools for direct democracy or participatory architecture for the online deliberative democracy. In the Italian case, the most meaningful example of platform party, i.e., the Five Star Movement in its original structure,¹⁸ is strongly connected to the techno-populist appeal to online direct democracy; in this way, it represents an outcome of the depoliticisation process. We have also to underline, anyway, that platform parties can also become an organisational form for more participatory political aggregations; they can constitute, in other words, a tool for alternative re-politicisation processes. This latter option, however, was not present – until now – in Italy.

Notes

- 1 See also Giardina, Sabbatucci, Vidotto (1992).
- 2 A similar situation is French *Poujadism*, which was named after the political experience of Pierre Poujade and his “populist” movement (Bouclier 2006; Pigenet and Tartakowski 2012).
- 3 In many Western democracies, depoliticisation processes seem to be followed by some re-politicisation trends (della Porta, 2015; Sorice, 2018). We have partly showed this correlation in De Blasio and Sorice (2018); in the same frame, also Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti (2017).
- 4 The crisis of political parties obviously has many causes; a very important one is represented by the redefinition of the cleavages on which traditional parties founded their own legitimacy and their collective identity. It is no coincidence that “high / low” or “centre / peripheral” fractures are more suitable today for explaining new social conflicts.
- 5 The economic crisis has been aggravated by the fact that it was recognised just as a debt crisis derived from the public debt of peripheral EU countries without understanding all the variables of the problem. European citizens, among others, have been discussing the role of formal democratic institutions and political parties, which are considered to be

too passive towards international institutions, without the power and the abilities to act in an independent and sovereign way.

- 6 For example, the famous slogan “we are the 99%” designates a counter-position, also from a linguistic perspective, between the “majority” of the people against a rich and powerful “minority”.
- 7 Mansbridge (2003) states that the traditional idea of representation as delegation co-exists with three other forms of representation that are pervasively present in democratic systems: (a) anticipatory representation, (b) gyroscopic representation and (c) surrogate representation. The author considers these forms as “cumulative” and “complementary, not oppositional” (ibid: 526). Surrogate representation concerns the interests hidden beyond a specific electoral constituency. It “plays the normatively critical role of providing representation to voters who lose in their own district” (ibid: 523).
- 8 Albert O. Hirschman (1970) proposed a sort of parallel between citizen and consumer: to react to dissatisfaction, Hirschman stated, the citizens can make a renunciation (an “exit”) as the consumers can abandon a brand or a type of product to safeguard their wellbeing or improve their satisfaction. But they can also protest, making their voice heard (“voice”, in fact) with a series of different strategies ranging from more lukewarm forms to explicit and direct forms. The voice involves a certain amount of attachment (loyalty) and as for companies it would be preferable to protest abandonment, so for politics the forms of protest should be considered less dangerous than the exit strategies.
- 9 The emphasis on participation – which is very often reduced to the practices of direct democracy – usually dissipates in the plebiscitary appeal for the legitimisation of the leader (supreme representative of the people) against all other people (the non-people).
- 10 The concept of anti-politics has been defined by scholars and researchers in several ways (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2015; Fawcett, Flinders, Hay and Wood 2017). As for “populism”, it is a loaded term that is very often used (particularly in the media frame) as a denigrating word. Here, we use the concept of anti-politics in a merely instrumental way, similar to Fawcett, Flinders, Hay and Wood (2017): “public disillusionment and disengagement, associated with declining turnout at elections, declining membership of parties and political movements, and public opposition to paradigmatic policy agendas”.
- 11 The shifting from government to governance determines an even smaller weight for citizens, which is often confined to the management of important but subordinate issues, while strategic questions – also because of the loss of centrality of political parties – have firmly landed in the hands of technocracies and of large economic-financial corporations.
- 12 The post-political can be defined as “the reduction of the political to the economic – the creation of a ‘welcoming business environment’, which inspires ‘investor confidence, and provides the economic guarantees deemed necessary for ‘strong and stable markets’. This subordination is not only ideological, but is embodied in concrete institutional forms, including the privatisation of central banks; the imposition of austerity on the instruction of the International Monetary Fund; the subordination of national legislation to the juridical regimes of the World Trade Organization and other multilateral organisations; the translation of corporate agendas into public policy through close formal and informal cooperation with business networks; and the delegation of numerous decision-making powers to non-state or quasi-state institutional forms” (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 9).
- 13 The new political engagement of organised citizens (the active citizenship) and social movements constitutes some different outputs of the re-politicisation process. For the different outputs of re-politicisation, see Sorice (2018b).
- 14 From a theoretical perspective, it comes from the adoption of the “empirical concept” of populism as communication style (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Moffit and Tormey, 2014). About the many definitions of populism, see also Woods (2014)
- 15 “The content analysis as investigation tends to give more space to the interpretive moment ... [it] presents a greater flexibility and ... a vocation, in a certain sense, more ‘qualitative’. This type of analysis also produces data in numerical form, but it supports

and integrates it with a greater interpretative effort. The number has no value in itself, but draws its meaning from the models it suggests and, at the same time, helps to substantiate” (Casetti and Di Chio 1998, p. 208).

- 16 This section of the research is part of a large long-term project, made up of several modules and that will be completed in the course of 2020.
- 17 It happens, usually, through a subscription to the online “participatory” platform of the party (as it happens for the Italian Five-Star Movements and – in a much more deliberative way – for the Spanish party, Podemos). See: Mosca (2018). About Podemos, see also Damiani 2017.
- 18 The Five Star Movement is experiencing a process of internal and organisational transformation. For a historical reconstruction, see Ceri and Veltri (2017).

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3

REWRITING THE NEWS

The amphibious relationship between populist Podemos and print media in Spain

Ismael Ibáñez-Rosales

They held up Chiron as an example of nature, half human and half beast. One without the other was not viable.

Machiavelli – The Prince

Introduction: the journalist/politician hybrid

In the May 2014 European elections, the Spanish political party Podemos (We Can), only registered three months earlier, won five seats and 1.2 million votes. Known as Spain's 15-M Movement or Movement of the Outraged, Podemos had emerged from the turmoil caused by the Spanish economic and political crisis of the previous years with a message of rupture directed against the austerity measures of political elite. That socio-political scenario became a breeding ground for populist discourses where a group of scholars from the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of the Complutense University of Madrid, with strong connections with Venezuelan Chavismo and the Anticapitalist Left, joined forces to found Podemos.

Following the ideas of Laclau (2005) and leaning towards a more critical evaluation of populist characteristics (Taguieff, 2002), Podemos's leaders seek to occupy important spaces that were previously ignored by those parties in the establishment, giving those spaces meaning, voice and the capacity to act politically through discourse (Errejón, 2015). This strategy took advantage of the widespread discontent over the major parties' attitude towards key issues including unemployment, corruption and austerity measures. Led by the party's chief strategist Íñigo Errejón, Podemos's frameworks for action are heavily influenced by Gramsci's (1971) concept of 'hegemony', and its partial appropriation in Laclau and Mouffe (2001). Because the key concept is hegemony, Errejón's argument lies in the need to construct 'the people' as a collective subject. Consequently,

this populist discourse is introduced in an attempt to radicalize existing liberal democracy by drawing a new antagonistic frontier between the people, and the political and economic establishment. ‘Discourse’ turns into a set of binary oppositions that make sense out of certain social facts. In this context, political discourse, López-García (2016, p. 87) explains, “presents itself as a permanent translation of reality, redefining what makes sense”. Translation here means simplification, and socio-political issues are often reduced to slogans and clichés transferred to the public sphere, where they are easily handled and assumed. Podemos soon understood that an effective way to spread their messages was through the media. Moreover, in this new media environment, news headlines are the most adequate means.

Van Dijk (2009, p. 202) states that “As is the case for most public discourse, the news is imbued with ideologies”. Discourses shape representations of reality, construct identities, social relations and arise at a certain historical background leaving traces of the contexts where they are not only produced but also reproduced. Discourse, as a political and ideological tool, can either maintain or change power relations and socio-political insights. The analysis of populist discourse and its diffusion in the press seems to leave “no doubt about the prominent role of the news media in the (re)production of ideologies in society” (Van Dijk, 2009, p. 202). These discursive strategies, simplified and carefully designed to appeal to the general public, follow the classic rhetoric of populism (Kessel, 2014, p. 101) and have been applied through Podemos’s leaders’ frequent appearances in the media. Pablo Iglesias, the initial media figurehead for Podemos, had won certain renown thanks to his numerous appearances on several political debate programmes on TV using a populist style of rhetoric based on the constitution of the people as a political actor. Iglesias stated that political discourse is built around audiovisual products and devices and described it as a battle to define what reality is. He went on to say that, “[P]eople believe that the battle is waged between parties or political groups, but that’s not true. The battle is fought in the media” (Domínguez and Giménez, 2014, p. 15).¹ Thus, populism is understood “as an anti-status quo discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing society between ‘the people’ (as the ‘underdogs’) and its *other*”. (Panizza, 2005, p. 3). While criticizing politicians as belonging to a *privileged caste*, Podemos’s members develop an amphibious identity through affective and emotional bonds, both placing themselves among the people and proclaiming themselves their representatives.

Populist leaders, therefore, become the spokespeople: they arrogate the right to write the ‘discourse of the people’ with the aim of providing journalists with the necessary props to spread their messages. In a way, populist leaders are able to rewrite their own news. It is no coincidence that Pablo Iglesias knew well how to reach his goal since he has done his best to become the epitome of the *politician-journalist* figure. But can this hybrid be an acceptable and long-lasting figure in the public eye? Iglesias himself addresses this question in a section of his book titled *The Fight for Hegemony*: “Antonio Gramsci borrowed a metaphor

from Machiavelli to describe power: power would be like a centaur, half human and half beast” (Iglesias, 2014, p. 47).² Iglesias agrees with Gramsci that the power of the dominant classes is not only exerted through coercive instruments or productive processes but also through control of the educational system, religion and the media. According to Iglesias (2014, p. 49), “the media is the most effective tool to establish and determine what people think”.³ For news outlets, Podemos provided a fertile source of striking headlines so necessary for surviving in the present media environment. Machiavelli’s metaphor illustrates this relationship between Podemos and most Spanish newspapers in the populists’ search for authority and hegemony. This chapter aims to show how Podemos’s symbiosis with the press developed from consent to coercion reflecting this Gramscian dual nature of power. The populists’ problem was to identify the ‘proper’ balance or proportion in the dyadic relation.

For this study, we selected news stories from some Spanish newspapers: *La Razón* (right-leaning, 2 stories), *El Mundo* (centre, 4), *El País* (centre-left, 2), *El Confidencial* (neo-liberal, 1), *La Vanguardia* (Catalonian conservative, 1), *Público* (left-leaning, 3), and *ElDiario.es* (left-leaning, 1). The theoretical and methodological issues involved in the analysis of newspaper headlines arise out of the interest in observing the evolution of Podemos’s relationship with the Spanish press. One of the challenges posed by this study is how to arrive at valid conclusions, given the extensive and varied corpus of newspaper articles. A corpus of headlines facilitates this task and may be more revealing for our qualitative research: “Headlines reach an audience considerably wider than those who read the articles [and] they encapsulate not only the content but the orientation, the perspective that the readers should bring to their understanding of the article” (Develotte and Rechniewski, 2001, p. 2).⁴ The impact of (front cover) headlines is stronger on the reader due to their prominence and the use of a more sensational and direct language. The headlines chosen for this study fall into three different stages in Podemos’s development so far: emergence, consolidation and standstill. They all have controversial messages illustrating Podemos’s relationship with the press from May 2014 until January 2018. In this sense, the concept of mediation describes “how communication has to be grasped as a process of mediating meaning construction” (Hepp and Krotz, 2014, p. 3). It is “a problematic process concerned with the media’s power to shape representations of ‘reality’” (Strömbäck, 2008, p. 230), “a process characterized by the considerable intervention of the media to the extent that it affects and changes the object of mediation including the way political reality is depicted and understood” (Sorensen, 2018, p. 3). As Higgins (2017, p. 2) suggests, it would be useful to think of populism “not as a political doctrine, but as an underlying relational attitude that is manifest in primarily oppositional forms of political rhetoric that can be directed against or in tactical collaboration with media”.

This chapter will focus on the interplay between Podemos and the Spanish print media, dividing this process into three stages which follow the three primary criteria of mediated representation identified by Coleman (2011). These criteria

(i.e. visibility, authenticity and efficacy), related to Podemos's three stages mentioned above, intersect with populist rhetoric. Critical Discourse Analysis is intended to reveal the relationship between language, society, ideology and power;⁵ it is also best suited to deal with small corpora and the reason why the texts concerned were singled out for analysis in the first place was that they were ideological instances which aroused the analyst's attention, and that was precisely the populists' intention.⁶ These issues raise questions such as the following: Can the advance of Podemos be considered an extraordinary phenomenon, or does it stem from their ability to play the roles of politician and journalist interchangeably? Through its amphibious nature, populism exploits the vulnerabilities of journalism but also exposes its own scheme.

Visibility: in league with the media

The requirement of visibility in mediated representation refers to how far representatives can be seen to represent us (Coleman, 2011, p. 47). Podemos's first objective was to transform institutional spaces into effective sites for mediation of their self-representation.

- (1) Podemos triumphs at the ballot box just four months after forming (*Público*, 25 May 2014).⁷

Far from the triumphalism of 'friendly' papers (as in (1)), news stories about Podemos's emergence were treated in a lukewarm way by traditional main newspapers such as *El País* or *El Mundo*.⁸ In spite of the different responses to their partial triumph, Podemos's leaders understood the need to enter into the processes of mediation as new actors who would introduce an element of contestation over political symbols and meaning in online and physical spaces.

- (2) Tomorrow *La Casta* will still be in power (*Público*, 26 May 2014).⁹

Podemos's leaders began to spread their messages so that these would circulate uniformly through all newspapers. This news story was part of Iglesias's speech after the European elections. Iglesias (2014) added that "We were born to throw out the Government of *La Casta* and put an end to corruption". Inheritors of Laclau's post-Marxism and strongly influenced by the populist movements of Chavez and Morales, Podemos's leaders have also constructed their own alternative language to distinguish themselves from the neo-liberal language of the "corrupt elite". As Pablo Iglesias (2014, p. 48) explained:

That's why you should never use the language of your adversary, but you should fight over it. When our adversaries use terms like *la casta*, revolving doors, 'Berlusconisation' of politics, evictions, insecurity, etc., they accept that the debate has moved to a territory which favours us.¹⁰

The Spanish media and most Spaniards soon began to use Podemos's language. This rapid and effective result was the fruit of a political rhetoric based on the new media environment. Alarmism, sensationalism and immediacy have become the key features for a successful media market, features which often blur journalistic standards and the new political rhetoric.

(3) Podemos, in the heart of 'La Casta' (*El País*, 19 July 2014).¹¹

The most evident and immediate success was the term *la casta*. Everyone – from newspaper editors to adolescents – used the word and knew that *la casta* meant the back-and-forth power shifts between the Spanish major parties. This headline from *El País*, a newspaper who has always expressed a critical attitude towards this populist party, demonstrates how effective Podemos's discourse strategies were. 'The heart of *La Casta*' is used here to describe the seat of the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Below in the same news story, Iglesias establishes a separation between what he calls 'the old parties' and 'the new parties' such as Podemos. In an article from *ABC*, on 21 September that year, journalist Iñaki Ezkerra wrote about Podemos's discourse: "Lately, I've been noticing that many of my friends are talking about '*La Casta*'; they have adopted Podemos's discourse although they don't have any intention of voting for that party" (p. 19).¹²

Four months after their irruption in the political arena, even those media outlets that had adopted a highly censorious attitude towards the populists were using their language and unconsciously spreading their discourse. Podemos effectively built its discourse following the theories of George Lakoff. The American linguist (2006, p. 37) explains how both conservatives and liberals use frames (i.e. mental structures that shape the way we view the world) "to dominate public discourse" that is "accepted unconsciously as common sense". As Lakoff (2006, p. 37) points out, the repetition of a word embeds it and creates a frame: "When repeated over and over, the words reinforce deep frames by strengthening neural connections in listeners. Activation links surface frames to deep frames and inhibits opposition frames". By opposing *la casta*, Podemos sides with 'the people', leaving the traditional parties at a rhetorical disadvantage.

(4) When they insult you, yell at you or defame you, just smile, because we will win (*Público*, 15 November 2014).¹³

Público, the outlet which originally showed more affinity for Podemos, highlighted Iglesias's emotional message in his first speech as General Secretary of Podemos. *ABC*, however, focused on the ideology rather than on the sentimentality of Iglesias's words; Jaime González, in an article titled ¿Cómo Poder sin Podemos? ("How can we do it without Podemos?"), described Iglesias's speech in the following terms:

To the cry of "the people united will never be defeated" – a sentence coined by Colombian politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1940 and popularized by

Chilean band Quilapayún years later – Pablo Iglesias and his forward line, Monedero, Errejón and Bescansa, celebrated yesterday their overwhelming victory. (...) Spurred by the audience who cheered on chanting the classic “A por ellos” (Go get ‘em), whose most famous version was used to support the Spanish national football team in the World Cup in South Africa, the members of the winning team paraded on the stage. After this short piece of information, the question is: Can we? Can we set this democracy straight without Podemos, or are we heading towards a new system ruled by the icons of the new populism?

(ABC, 16 November 2014, p. 5)¹⁴

González’s article seems to foreshadow the criticism that major newspapers would express later. Ironically, by depicting Podemos as a real menace, journalists were playing the populist game. They were taking for granted that Podemos had become a viable alternative looming over the new political arena even before the populist party had obtained any representation in national politics. This opposition could only strengthen Iglesias’s emotional and victimizing discourse. As he went on to say in his first speech as elected leader of Podemos, “Podemos is not a political experiment, it is the result of the failure of the oligarchic regime. The people have answered them: of course, we can” (2015a).¹⁵ Podemos had taken its role as the political ‘outsider’ willing to defend the rights of the social majority against those intent on sustaining the status quo.

- (5) Pablo Iglesias promises to put an end to the “regime” of the Transition (*El País*, 16 November 2014).¹⁶

Iglesias’s words were said after being elected as leader of the party during the first People’s Assembly held by Podemos from 15 September to 15 November 2014. Highly organized, and media-savvy, the party started to become aware of the fact that they had become a viable threat to what they called “the 1978 Transition Regime”, or “PPSOE”¹⁷. As Zarzalejos (2016, p. 185) has observed, populism, from either the right or the left, is characterized by two elements – the construction of an enemy and the disparagement of representative democracy:

Building an enemy is necessary in order to drag society into antagonism, and establish an unbridgeable divide between good and bad, virtuous and wicked, and the wicked elites and the oppressed, by exploiting the *caste* and the exploited *people* (...) Instead of the inclusive and integrating concept of the ‘people’ as a group of citizens free and equal before the law, populism imposes a divisive idea of people that fractures society into antagonistic factions doomed to clash: there are ‘the people’ (the oppressed, victims of the crisis) and the ‘non people’, represented by the elites, the caste and the oligarchy.

Having doubled its support in November 2014, Podemos marched steadily towards the peak of its popularity. The rhetoric adopted by its leaders was more powerful and mordant, but also more radical, each day. This was clearly seen both at a formal level through repetition, irony, famous quotations and puns, and at content level, where they resorted to more radical messages against the Spanish democratic system, utopian economic measures, their sympathy and support for Maduro's regime, and ambiguous statements about nationalism and terrorism.

- (6) Podemos calls for change before tens of thousands of “Quixotes” in Puerta de Sol (*El Mundo*, 31 January 2015).¹⁸

One of the major achievements of Podemos's populist strategies is the use of an emotional discourse, knowing that emotions may bring about opinion changes. This sentimental rhetoric aims at attaining the rise of emotionality in the media (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2017). These aspirations could be observed on 31 January 2015, when Podemos held the “March for Change”, one of the party's first outdoor mass rallies. Before 150,000 people filling the Puerta del Sol square, Iglesias said: “These brave and humble people are the DNA of our party. Together we will win the elections and beat the PP”. He told Podemos's followers to “dream and, like that noble madman Don Quixote, take their dreams seriously”. He shouted, “we can dream, we can win” (Iglesias, 2015).¹⁹

These messages not only fulfil the populists' aspirations but also benefit the newspapers' appeal in a complex media environment. The rise of digital media outlets, social networks, blogs and other online sources of information has changed the way information is both produced and consumed. As Sorensen (2018, p. 3) has observed, “[T]he flows of production, circulation, interpretation and recirculation of symbolic content are even more difficult to control with the advent of social media”. In this uncertain world, the success of print media depends on immediacy, which is often the cause for sentimentalism and alarmism, two main ingredients of the populist recipe.²⁰ Consequently, the mediated and the media influence each other's performances. Sorensen (2018, p. 3) goes on to explain that “the fragility of self-representation engendered by new forms of visibility can become a weapon in the hands of populists”. In this sense, Iglesias had achieved that amphibious ability to influence other actors and their mediated personas, including journalists. He had become the epitome of the politician-journalist, a figure with the potential to control the socio-political environment that results from the interplay between populist communication and the media. This ability opens up the possibility to allow ‘outsider’ actors – such as Iglesias – to not only acquire visibility but also to “define the visibility of others, to become organizers of visibility” (Dayan, 2013, p. 143). He interferes in the terrain of journalists as the sole guardian of visibility. However, in conferring visibility upon his adversaries through markedly populist rhetoric, the same fragility of self-representation mentioned above can become a weapon wielded by the media to transform performances of authenticity into acts of deception.

Authenticity: at war with the media

Authenticity, according to Taylor (1992, pp. 15–16), is the moral ideal of staying true to oneself. It is, therefore, necessary to build trust between politicians and the people, a trust that is continuously questioned and negotiated. The mediated relationship between politicians and the public depends to a great extent on the performance of authenticity that is carried out through the processes of mediation. Silverstone (1999, p. 180) adds that “For trust to be relevant, there must be a possibility for others to betray us”. As Coleman puts it:

The debate about authenticity in politics is in reality about the alleged betrayal of the public through misrepresentation. This pervasive problem of authentication concerns citizens’ sense of not being recognized, respected or understood by their representatives.

(2005, p. 194)

The appearance of being authentic becomes more important than the moral ideal itself. As a result, the media are keen to expose backstage moments since they seek to survive in an immediate, commercialized and competitive media environment, whilst they justify and present their motive as their own contribution to the public sphere.

- (7) Pablo Iglesias labels the fact that 500 ETA prisoners are far from their families “a tragic problem” (*El Confidencial*, 22 June 2015).²¹

This was stated by Iglesias in an interview for the *New Left Review* in which he admits that “the adversary plays a role and the terms of the confrontation have been changing. It’s true that the media terrain is much less comfortable for us now” (Iglesias, 2015b). The political space they aspired to occupy had been reduced by several counter-moves, including the rise of Ciudadanos (Citizens), a Spanish centre-right and liberal party founded in Catalonia in 2006. In the same interview, Iglesias reflects on Podemos’s mediated strategy:

We are facing three immediate difficulties. The first is that this shift is relocating us on what we have considered from the beginning to be a losing axis – the traditional left–right axis. We believe that on that basis there is no possibility of change in Spain, and the risk we face now is being relocated precisely on that axis, as opposed to defining a new centrality that, to repeat, has nothing to do with the centre of the political spectrum. The second risk, or challenge, is that within this new landscape Podemos’s plebeian discourse, which is articulated in terms of ‘those below’ against ‘those above’, the oligarchs, may be reinterpreted as the traditional discourse of the far left; as a result, Podemos risks losing its transversal appeal and the possibility of occupying the new centrality. The third challenge,

which is also a potential tool, is that of normalization. We no longer appear as the outsiders; the element of novelty is being diluted. (2015b)

- (8) Podemos unmasked: “Catalonia is a nation” (*La Razón*, 12 September 2015).²²

The strategy of visibility had been a complete success for Podemos. However, the populist party was not able to achieve a satisfactory process of authenticity. In online print media, things could get even worse depending on the political audience of the outlet. *Periodista Digital* displayed sarcasm in its approach to the story: “Errejón wraps himself in the flag of separatism: Catalonia is a nation, but Podemos is not in favour of independentism”. Underlying this statement, Podemos aimed to expose the weakness of the rest of the Spanish left, especially PSOE’s, to emerge as the only authentic representative of the oppressed and as the legitimate voice of the people. Errejón displayed Podemos’s double discourse: on the one hand, he said his party does not want Catalonia out of Spain. On the other, Podemos understands and favours Catalonians’ right to vote and decide on their future without the rest of Spaniards’ consent. Eventually, Podemos’s result in Catalonia’s September 2015 regional elections was a complete disappointment.

Podemos’s populist strategy of exposing the establishment’s false authenticity is fuelled by a climate of general mistrust characterized by a deficit of authenticity in the mediation process. Although a markedly populist rhetoric serves to construct Podemos’s own authenticity, it also narrows the scope of policies offered to voters. The discourses of Podemos’s members seemed at first emblematic manifestations of populist ideology created to challenge mainstream politics; nevertheless, they went beyond the limits and ran into sensitive matters for most Spaniards. January 2015 had been Podemos’s political zenith in terms of support and ‘control’ of the media, understood as a symbiosis beneficial in both directions. At the same time, however, the response to the hegemonic discourse was evolving. Some of Podemos’s leaders have collaborated with Chavism and have defended Otegi²³ whilst they refused to honour ETA victims.²⁴ From May 2015 to May 2016, Podemos was pushed aside by the hegemonic discourse, putting forward Ciudadanos as a moderate alternative to renew the Spanish political class. As soon as Podemos reached the height of its support, they were forced to place themselves on the defensive for the first time.

- (9) Pablo Iglesias attacks a journalist from *El Mundo* at a conference (*El Mundo*, 21 April 2016).²⁵

At a conference given at the Complutense University of Madrid, Iglesias singled out *El Mundo* reporter Álvaro Carvajal: “I have to avoid Álvaro Carvajal, who looks like an epistemologist but who is an *El Mundo* journalist, coming out with a headline for me like ‘Pablo Iglesias, let’s make Spain masturbate with us’”. He would later explain that he was talking about the Freudian aspects

of the relationship between politicians and the media. “The journalists look scared for the first time”, he stated ironically. He later mentioned Carvajal for a second time: “Álvaro Carvajal, or someone who wasn’t Álvaro Carvajal, or Álvaro Carvajal’s internal sources, came to report something that wasn’t true like so many other things that are not true but that get published”. This attitude provoked the journalists covering the event into abandoning the room. Iglesias’s comments and the press walkout were covered in most major daily newspapers and broadcast media on Friday. The fact that he singled out one journalist for public criticism and humiliation was criticized by Spain’s main associations of professional journalists, including the Madrid Press Association, Parliamentary Journalists’ Association (APP) and the Federation of the Spanish Press (FAPE).²⁶

In addition, Podemos started to deal with internal struggles after a poor performance at the polls. A day after coming third in a general election where it had been widely expected to take the second spot, the anti-austerity party decided not to offer any explanations for such a fiasco. The disappointment had opened up an internal dispute. Many of Podemos’s members felt the need to assess whether the campaign had been aimed at reality or had turned its back on it.

(10) Iglesias denies being a populist like Trump (*El Mundo*, 9 October 2016).²⁷

Ciudadanos’s leader Albert Rivera had compared Iglesias to Trump, explaining that populisms, either left-wing or right-wing, aimed at the same policies. Major Spanish newspapers echoed the issue.²⁸ The adjective populist was used as a reproach against Podemos, a term which the leaders and members embraced until both Brexit and Donald Trump’s rise shocked the world. Initially, there was an internal debate about whether Podemos should continue with its populist rhetoric. Then, the party tried to distance itself from right-wing populisms.²⁹ Unlike other European populist parties, Podemos had to adapt itself to Brexit and Trump’s popularity rise. Although the fragility of self-representation had become a weapon in the hands of populists, Podemos was also experiencing a threat to its own claims to authenticity.

Efficacy?

(11) Podemos does not believe in the freedom of the press (*El Mundo*, 07 March 2017).³⁰

El Mundo added: “Populism gags press”. Most major print media outlets headlined the same message that day: “Podemos intimidates and threatens critical journalists, says APM” (*ABC*); “Press harassment by Podemos” (*El País*). Meanwhile, left-wing outlets including *Público* and *El Diario* questioned the Madrid Press Association, ironically asking “Who harasses the press?”, implying that Podemos had not been measured by the same yardstick.

As an act of mediation, the last criterion of representation is efficacy, which measures the experience of how the citizens feel able to “influence representatives to say and do the right things, or punish them if they don’t” (Coleman, 2011, p. 45). In a very short time, Podemos has succeeded in gaining the same media access that established parties enjoy. Its capacity to get its message across in the media has depended mainly on its newsworthiness by employing populist rhetoric and exploiting an outsider role. However, its leaders’ radical positions on controversial issues upset the delicate balance of mediated trust. When the Madrid Press Association accused Podemos’s leaders of intimidating journalists, they lost authenticity and most of their media strategy proved inefficient.

(12) Podemos avoids self-criticism and blames the media for its failure in Catalonia (*La Razón*, 11 January 2018).³¹

During Iglesias’s prolonged absence from the media after the poor results in the Catalanian elections, other members spoke. Pablo Echenique, Podemos’s Secretary of Organization, explained that their poor results were due to external factors. He mentioned specifically the media and the criteria followed when they covered Podemos: “In such a polarized context, it’s extremely hard to get our messages across in the media. It’s not only our fault, but also the journalists’ and other political actors’”.³² Podemos has never concealed its interventionism and mediatisation. But in this society of showbusiness, image and media, any relationship between politicians and the media seems characterized by mutual distrust. Iglesias understood this difficulty and embodied the figure of the journalist-politician. However, such a hybrid demanded an amphibious ability which proved viable in the first stages of visibility, when the journalist and the politician benefited each other. That symbiosis, however, turns problematic when authenticity is disputed, and the increasingly fragile process of self-representation becomes a prime target for both sides.

Conclusion

Politicians need the media to perform effectively. They know that society relies on the media as the source of truth in this brave new world; the media have a “reality-pronouncing” function (Dayan, 2013, p. 146). But why did Podemos, following in the footsteps of UKIP and Trump, discredit the media? The reason may be that populists try to usurp the role of the media: they arrogate the right to write ‘the discourse of the people’, they ‘rewrite the news’. When populists denounce the elite as strategic rhetoricians, they engage in an act of exposure that undermines any politician’s performance of authenticity. The notion of truth is no longer based on empirical and rational evidence. Populists equate truth with authenticity, turning it into a question of morality. Consequently, authenticity is not about being true to oneself, but rather about appearing to be true to oneself, for authenticity is a performed quality (Enli, 2015, p. 109).

This paradoxical quality of authenticity implies that acts of authenticity should never be seen to be performed. On the public stage of politics, there must appear to be no discrepancy between onstage and backstage behaviour (Goffman, 1959, pp. 74–82). Podemos's acts of mediation, as seen in the headlines above, show a contradiction between their backstage political personae and their public performance, revealing traces of inefficacy in their authenticity process. Coleman (2018, p. 117) observes that

Contemporary societies find themselves in a paradoxical situation, characterised by a simultaneous deficit or excess of trust (...) Through performances of populist ventriloquism, leaders and followers find themselves entangled in a web of misplaced trust, each believing that the other is their mirror reflection.

The question is which part of the centaur is reflected, the human or the beast.

Notes

- 1 The original text is not in English. It is my translation.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 See also Bell (1991, p. 189).
- 5 I follow Wodak's framing definition for all CDA approaches in Wodak (2001, p. xxi).
- 6 See Baker (2006).
- 7 The text is not in English. My translation.
- 8 Cf. *El País*: "Podemos becomes the surprise and wins five seats in Strasbourg". *El Mundo*: "Surprising irruption of Podemos whose five seats establish them as the fourth electoral power". Headlines not in English. My translation.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 The original text is not in English. My translation.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 The original text is not in English. My translation.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Iglesias uses this acronym to refer to the two major Spanish political parties, the PP (centre-right) and the PSOE (centre-left).
- 18 Text not in English. My translation.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 See Ferré Pavía (2013) or Rohgalf (2017).
- 21 The original text is not in English. My translation.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Arnaldo Otegi (1958) is a politician from the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain who is the current Secretary General of Basque separatist party Sortu. Before joining politics, he had been convicted of being an ETA member and taking part in several actions including kidnapping.
- 24 See: <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2016/06/23/576afcf4468aeba95b8b4616.html>, https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/06/17/actualidad/1403039351_862188.html, http://www.abc.es/espana/abci-pablo-iglesias-sobre-liberacion-otegi-buena-noticia-201603010936_noticia.html

- 25 The original text is not in English. My translation.
- 26 See: https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/06/21/actualidad/1498063509_248775.html, <http://www.elmundo.es/television/2017/06/20/594980a322601d11638b4665.html>
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 *El País* opened on October 11, 2016: “Pablo Iglesias defends a left-wing populism against Trump’s”. *La Vanguardia* headlined on November 20, 2016: ‘Podemos IS populist’.
- 29 See: <http://blogs.publico.es/pablo-iglesias/1091/trump-y-el-momento-populista/> and http://www.abc.es/espana/abci-iglesias-afirma-momento-abandonar-populismo-cuando-llega-gobernar-201610060851_noticia.html
See also: Iglesias presents Fernández Lira’s book *En Defensa del Populismo* at the Faculty of Philosophy, Complutense University Madrid, 21/04/2016: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MtubLIZgoxQ>
- 30 The original text is not in English. My translation.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 See: <http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2018/01/10/5a561ea122601d6c258b458c.html>. This text is not in English. My translation.

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4

POPULISM AND THE MEDIA FACTOR

A comparative perspective on the Portuguese presidential candidates

Paula do Espírito Santo and Rita Figueiras

Introduction

The decrease of interest in mainstream parties is opening up an opportunity for populist parties to increase their influence in the political landscape. In order to understand the rise of populist leaders' influence, one needs to take into account political, social and economic factors, such as the crisis of the nation-state, xenophobia, fears of globalisation and domestic electoral volatility. At the same time, the number of non-partisan candidates has increased, which seems to be a tendency in several European democracies, Portugal included. In this context, one also needs to consider the media as a fundamental element in the analysis of the emerging of neo-populist phenomena.

Several representative democracies have a non-partisan head-of-state system. This is the case in Portugal and other established democracies, where the President is elected without the formal support of political parties. However, the latter may give electoral and political support to the election campaign message. In many nations, the fundamental political principle is that the President has a key role in balancing the system's functioning, but they must be equidistant from the parties represented in the Parliament and the Government, no matter the party in power.

In Portugal, the presidential election is centred on the person of the President, and political parties play a reduced or even non-existent role in campaigning terms. Since the 1974 Carnation Revolution, all the Portuguese presidents have been elected for two five-year terms each. In this case, they are usually popular because they do not have government functions, and so do not effectively play an influential role in political and financial terms. The main presidential powers involve the high command of the armed forces, the political leadership of the nation, the safeguarding of democracy, and the promulgation and vetoing of Parliament's and the Government's legislative proposals.

After revising what the term *nation* means (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969) and discussing the concept of *populism* (Taggart, 2000, 2004) and its rapid emergence in the West (Canovan, 1981; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017), our contribution addresses the Portuguese case by analysing the strategies of self-representation of neo-populist and anti-establishment presidential candidates, and identifying the fundamental dimensions of their political campaign messages. We aim to address the following research question: what are the main message features of populist presidential candidates in a non-partisan presidential regime? We hypothesise that (1) there is a set of populist features underlying the campaigning messages; (2) these may have different intensity and exposure levels, according to the political background options and the candidates' personal characteristics; (3) at some point during the campaign, a populist side may be identified, when considering both the content and the candidate's performance. These populist traits are associated with different and unusual propaganda strategies that tend to indicate an attempt to gain an advantage over conventional party politics. Our ultimate aim is to identify a populist construction pattern, considering the electoral proposals of presidential candidates, in conjunction with the influence of the media factor.

Populism in democratic systems

We may find several populist leaders' messages from "right-wing parties in Europe, left-wing presidents in Latin America, and the Tea Party movement in the United States" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 2). While in the European context, xenophobia and anti-immigration issues are usual message attributes, in Latin America we find clientelism and economic mismanagement as the most frequent arguments (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 2). Looking at the massive protest movements between 2011 and 2014, States' responses were not as politically productive or effective as demanded and expected (Figueiras and do Espírito Santo, 2016). The arrival of populism in the 21st century is based on a long history. Several examples of populist regimes can be found in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Russia, Brazil and Latin America. Populism is a concept that has a nation-relevance perspective and history (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969). It has opened up new challenges for democracy. One of them is how to deal with demagogic leaders who defend both non-democratic and democratic values and achieve high levels of popularity, even, in some cases, without needing their party's support. Some clear examples of populist leaders are charismatic and ambivalent politicians such as Juan Domingo Perón, Ross Perot, Le Pen, Berlusconi or Chávez (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).

A consideration of Europe's multicultural characteristics, political history and needs reveals a European context more than a European Union. That is the main argument defended by Taggart (2004, p. 269): populism will emerge in many different forms and will appear as a series of fractured instances, based on a common set of elements. In contrast to Canovan (1981), he argues that populism can

have universal features that may be found in a culturally wide spectrum of leaders and nations (Taggart, 2004, p. 270). On the one hand, populism has a wide range of dimensions because it is a culturally dependent concept. On the other, whilst it has been studied in modern history, it has not been a central element in terms of scope and analysis. Other concepts such as propaganda, democracy, totalitarianism, extreme right or extreme left have featured more prominently in academic observations. Therefore, finding the conceptual roots of populism is the same as identifying the missing parts of a complicated puzzle where populism is the main actor.

According to Taggart (2000, p. 1):

Populism has many of the attributes of an ideology, but not all of them.... For different sets of people it veers between having great meaning and fundamental vacuousness.... To be catalysed into a political force it sometimes relies on great leaders and sometimes on great masses. Where it relies on leaders, it requires the most extraordinary individuals to lead the most ordinary of people. Appearing to be revolutionary, [it] draws great support at times of crisis but, in practice, it is invariably reformist and incapable of offering fundamental 'root and branch' reform.

The empirical tendencies observed in the next sections of this chapter will be based upon the set of populist features of Taggart's definition (2004, pp. 273–276):

- (i) Populism is hostile to representative politics.
- (ii) Populists tend to identify themselves with a heartland that represents an idealised conception of the community they serve.
- (iii) Populism lacks core values.
- (iv) Populism is a reaction to a sense of extreme crisis.
- (v) Populism has a self-limiting quality and is politically reluctant.
- (vi) Populism tends to be highly chameleonic.

When considering a series of historical examples, the definition of populism lies mostly in its contextual features and needs, rather than in an operative conceptual meaning. It usually relies on a strong, charismatic, leader who appeals directly to the masses and who has the answers to the social needs derived from real or hypothetically disastrous current or previous economic conjunctures. The media factor is also an important element to consider when analysing populism. Mazzoleni *et al.* (2004, p. 3) define it as "the complex processes that are typical of mass communication and especially of the news media in democratic environments". The contribution of the media factor may vary according to the nature of the political system, and the specific features of social and cultural political contexts. Nevertheless, populist parties, movements and political actors are the product of a combination of environmental and structural elements where the media factor must be included.

Although mediated populism may be a consequence of politically motivated media ownership, it may be mainly for both symbolic and commercial reasons that the media give visibility to populist discourse against the mainstream elites. What we are referring to here as mediated populism is populism as a product of the media's unintended complicity (Mazzoleni, 2008; Esser *et al.*, 2017). Populist discourse is mainly centred on a Manichean and binary discourse of “us” versus “them” to reclaim political institutions on behalf of “the people” in an oppositional, abrasive and sometimes violent language. Populist discourse seems, therefore, to push all the right buttons of newsworthiness, considering that conflict (controversy, polemics and attacks), entertainment (light-hearted stories, human interest or humour), shareability (stories generating shares and comments online) and strong images (sensational, or generating strong support or antagonism) are among the dominant news values of the mainstream media outlets (Harcup and O’Neill, 2017, p. 1482). Hence, when politicians frame messages to fit storytelling techniques inspired by the media logic of simplification, personalisation, polarisation, confrontation and dramatisation, it may be difficult for the media to resist covering populist messages. This is the reason why Mazzoleni (2008, p. 52) states that a media logic is the necessary background for understanding populist political communication, even from parties or politicians that use populist arguments for strategic reasons only. Populism as a particular communication style (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Stanyer *et al.*, 2017) helps politicians to gain visibility, especially in such competitive moments as electoral disputes.

Methodology and objectives

In methodological terms, our research is based on a qualitative approach to content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004), through category construction, followed by indicators and units of analysis (Bardin, 2011). Category analysis, supported by content analysis, draws on Taggart’s (2004) identification of populist features in the political message of the Portuguese presidents.

In empirical terms, this contribution aims, firstly, to identify the populist presidential candidates, considering a 40-year period from 1976 to 2016, with special emphasis on the 2011 and 2016 presidential elections. This first stage is based on the application of content analysis to *slogan* messages (1976–2016) and to political campaign programmes (2011 and 2016). This allowed us to identify the candidates with potentially populist traces.

In a second phase of the analysis, the study draws on the television coverage of the 2011 and 2016 election campaigns, considering the several presidential candidates with the populist traits previously identified. We will explore the interplay between political and media factors, and the role the media play in the construction of populist candidates. This research combines an actor-centred approach (Stanyer *et al.*, 2017) with media analysis, and starts by identifying which candidates are populist. We then analyse which of their communication strategies, tactics and styles attracted media attention. Hence, we explore how they present

themselves through the media and how they are mediated to the electorate. In order to do this, we adapted the framework proposed by Block and Negrine (2017) and considered two main variables: rhetorical style and relationship with the media. Several indicators were related to each variable.

In a competition stage, such as an electoral dispute, populist candidates' rhetorical style positions them as challengers at different levels. First, following political marketing strategies, they take on the role of challengers to the incumbent (indicator: adversarial). Second, as populist politicians, they have an oppositional relation between the good people and the evil others in society (indicator: patriotic). Third, by doing this, populist politicians are also challengers of the norms and values of the mainstream political discourse by adopting a rhetorical style that is oppositional, radical and provocative (indicator: abrasive). This hostility against the status quo echoes the ways in which populist candidates relate to the media. Their controversial traits, attitude and message range from playing the underdog, earning media spaces by adopting a "bullying" style against the establishment, and staging "newsworthy" political events.

As in other Western countries, television continues to be the most important source of information in Portugal (Cardoso *et al.*, 2015; Figueiras, 2017). That is the reason why the second stage of this research analyses every election-related news item concerning the populist candidates identified on the Portuguese primetime national bulletins on free-to-air TV channels (RTP1, SIC, TVI) over the two official campaigning weeks prior to election day (January 9 to January 21, 2011; and January 9 to January 22, 2016).

This second stage of the analysis involved watching all stories related to the candidates with populist traits in the 2011 and 2016 campaigns. We collected a corpus of 388 news items. The corpus was first annotated by both researchers separately; data were checked afterwards by the other researcher, which allowed us to fine-tune the variables and indicators outlined above and to overcome diverse interpretations. In case of doubt, tagging was conducted together by both researchers. All news items were watched several times in order to identify how the candidates' rhetorical style and relationship with the media were portrayed. We focused mainly on the news message – *i.e.*, how news narratives framed candidates' rhetorical style and their relationship with the media. Very often more than one indicator in each TV news item was identified. The values presented in this table must be read as the number of times each variable was identified in all the TV news items analysed.

First stage of the analysis: non-partisan presidents and potentially populist candidates

Non-partisan presidents are those who are not affiliated with a political party. This is a rather neglected concept and dimension in political science that deserves closer inspection. Little research has been conducted and several research strands need further development. One possible explanation is that there are

few non-partisan presidents in democratic countries (not more than a quarter, across the world) (Beuman, 2014). They are rare, however, “in all continents but Europe” (Passarelli, 2017). Portugal is a semi-presidentialist type of regime, and its presidential elections are single-member elections. In this case, the tendency for the growth of non-partisan candidates, whether in presidential or local elections, needs further academic discussion.¹ Even considering this contingency, the first and immediate findings are that independent candidates try to convey the idea that they run separately from parties due to their mistrust of the party system and their leaders.

Our qualitative analysis follows Bardin’s (2013). It is based on the “words” and “issues” as research units and follows a “presence” and “absence” inventory procedure. At this stage, the main corpus of analysis is composed of campaign slogans. This candidate’s profile approach is complemented by the knowledge about the candidate’s known public and political characteristics (see Table 4.1).

TABLE 4.1 Synthesis of the populist traits contained in the programmes and slogans of presidential candidates in 2011 and 2016, based on Taggart’s (2004) representation of populism

Year	Candidates	Categories						
		Non-Partisan	1	2	3	4	5	6
2011	Aníbal Cavaco Silva							
	Defensor Moura	X			x			
	Francisco Lopes							
	José Coelho	X	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Manuel Alegre	X		x				
	Fernando Nobre							
2016	Henrique Neto	X						
	António Sampaio da Nóvoa							
	Cândido Ferreira	X		x				
	Edgar Silva							
	Jorge Sequeira	X		x				
	Marisa Matias					x		
	Maria de Belém Roseira							
	Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa	X						X
	Paulo de Morais	X	x	x		x	x	
Vitorino Silva	X					x	X	

Notes: Bold denotes the candidates who were elected.

1. Hostile to representative politics; 2. Identification with a heartland which represents an idealised conception of the community they serve; 3. Lack of core values; 4. Reaction to a sense of extreme crisis; 5. Self-limiting quality and politically reluctant; 6. Tendency to be highly chameleonic.

In the 1976 and 1980 elections, we had only one non-partisan candidate, the first president to be democratically elected, whilst in 2011 there were three, and in 2016, four.² That was the case of Rebelo de Sousa, who won the 2016 presidential elections. Despite being one of the founding fathers of the PSD (Social Democratic Party), he refused any support from his party and tried to be equidistant from all of them. Rebelo de Sousa was a different kind of candidate who spent one of the smallest budgets (about 157,000 euros) and decided not to have any paid spots or outdoor billboards for his campaign. As a matter of fact, he did not have the need; he was already a renowned political figure, as he had been a TV political commentator for almost 15 years, in programmes with large audiences. Table 4.1 above shows that Rebelo de Sousa was selected for being highly chameleonic (feature 6 above). His strategy was based on a close relationship with the people.

Among the independent candidates who had higher numbers of populist features, there were Coelho (2011), Morais (2016) and Silva (2016) (see Table 4.1). Coelho was a former communist who had run in the Madeira regional elections for several other political parties. He positioned himself as an anti-system, or even ‘out-system’ or ‘pariah’, candidate, due to his lack of knowledge about current politics and his low level of education. The slogan he often used was: “Enough of cream cakes, Coelho to Belém.” The official residence of the President is the *Palácio de Belém*, and the word in Portuguese for a cake, *pastel*, can also mean someone with low energy. Coelho made an analogy with the image of the President then in office, Cavaco Silva, who was criticised for his low profile. This is an example of his hostility towards traditional politics, here personified by Cavaco Silva, one of the oldest politicians in the political system.

Morais is an academic and a researcher known for his studies about corruption in Portugal. His strategy was centred on talking about corruption in Portugal and was also known for being against the traditional party system. One of his slogans was: “Politicians lie every day while the people are thirsty for a justice that never arrives.” As for Silva, a pawnbroker, he has had a political journey similar to that of Coelho.

In the first stage of observation, as shown in Table 4.1, a populist profile materialises in the independent candidates’ profiles, and essential ideas contained in the slogan messages and the campaign programmes. Further studies would be needed in order to see a broader dimension in the spectrum of populist features, considering the complexity and extension of populism as a concept. Candidates who did not have a party machine supporting them adopted an unconventional campaign and approach to people. One could suggest that this seems to be a form of compensation strategy to overcome the difficulties of not having a campaign structure similar to mainstream candidates. Non-partisan candidates seem to be slowly but progressively growing, especially after the 2007 economic crisis (Table 4.2).

In the first stage of the analysis, we considered a corpus composed of the political messages (posters, slogans and programmes) of the non-partisan candidates

TABLE 4.2 Number of presidential candidates and non-partisan candidates, and electoral success

<i>Election year</i>	<i>Number of presidential candidates</i>	<i>Number of non-partisan presidential candidates</i>	<i>Was a non-partisan candidate elected? (yes/no)</i>
1976	4	1	Yes
1980	6	1	Yes
2011	6	3	No
2016	10	6	Yes

in 2011 and 2016. Although more research is needed, the leaders' political messages tend to stress two main profiles and tendencies:³

- (i) The equidistant leader maintains a certain distance from the traditional parties' support, though not challenging the role of the party system; on the contrary, such leaders are candidates of the system (e.g. Rebelo de Sousa in 2016).
- (ii) The antagonistic and challenging leader does not trust, and indeed openly criticises, the democratic system, the party system and political leaders, and this is key to their message (e.g. Coelho in 2011 and Morais in 2016).

We find a ranking of populist traits amongst non-partisan candidates' messages. In some way, they tend to have more populist traits (Taggart, 2004) than the candidates supported by any party. In some presidential elections, the media may turn some candidates into something like the equivalent of pop stars within the system of democratic politics (Schwarzenberg, 1977). This is particularly true in the case of non-partisan and populist candidates.

Second stage of the analysis: mediated populism in the Portuguese 2011 and 2016 presidential elections

Table 3 indicates that media attention is related to candidates' electoral strength/weakness and their position in the polls.⁴ Most research in political communication studies argues that the race frame is one of the dominant frames for reporting electoral campaigns, as it highlights the dispute, the rivalry and the drama associated with the election (Aalberg *et al.*, 2012, p. 164). In addition, polls also indicate voters' favourite candidates. Hence, in order to meet their audience's political interests, media tend to give less visibility to the proposals that are not grabbing people's attention.

As Table 4.3 indicates, Cândido Ferreira appeared in only ten news pieces. At the beginning of his first television debate, this candidate read a statement against what he called biased media coverage of the lesser-known candidates, such as his own, and this was his justification for not participating in the debates. After reading the statement, he left the studio and conducted only a few campaign

TABLE 4.3 Total number of news pieces per candidate with populist traits in 2011 and 2016 presidential elections

	<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Number of news pieces</i>
2011	Defensor Moura	40
	José Coelho	68
	Manuel Alegre	130
2016	Cândido Ferreira	10
	Jorge Sequeira	32
	Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa	119
	Paulo Morais	45
	Vitorino Silva	34

TABLE 4.4 Presence of populist traits in TV news pieces per candidate

<i>Variables and indicators</i>	<i>DM</i>	<i>JC</i>	<i>MA</i>	<i>MRS</i>	<i>PM</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>VS</i>
<i>Candidates</i>							
<i>Rhetorical style</i>							
Adversarial	30	40	100	13	25	6	25
Patriotic	–	22	73	65	7	10	35
Abrasive	–	58	–	–	38	–	5
<i>Relationship with the media</i>							
Underdog	–	38	–	–	12	28	20
Bullying style	–	61	–	–	37	6	12
Staging newsworthy events	–	55	–	32	–	–	26

activities. In turn, Rebelo de Sousa, Defensor Moura and Alegre received much more media attention, but they were not presented to the audience as populist candidates (Table 4.4). The three candidates were not referenced as having a discourse revolving around the moral and causal centrality of the ordinary people together with an anti-establishment or exclusionist discourse. For this reason, these candidates were also excluded from the analysis.

Hence, considering both Tables 4.3 and 4.4, candidates with fewer elements of populism had higher levels of media visibility, whereas candidates with higher scores for populist traits received lower levels of media attention. On top of that, whilst the previous section showed that eight out of the 16 candidates running for President had populist traits, the analysis of the broadcasters' news coverage showed that only four of those candidates were portrayed as such: José Coelho (JC), Jorge Sequeira (JS), Paulo Morais (PM) and Vitorino Silva (VS).

Variable 1: rhetorical style

All the populist presidential candidates revealed an oppositional relationship between the good people and the evil others. In the case of the Portuguese

populist candidates under analysis, these others were defined vertically in an anti-establishment discourse. Candidates constructed elites as immoral, corrupt and self-serving:

- (1) [...] the Portuguese parliament is a den of corruption⁵ (Morais, SIC: January 6, 2016).
- (2) [...] mainstream politicians are part of the problem (Sequeira, TVI: January 10, 2016).
- (3) I want to say to the elites: stop robbing the people (Silva, RTP1: January 11, 2016).
- (4) They (politicians) just know how to rob the poor and honest people (Coelho, TVI: January 8, 2016).

Populist candidates depict elites as untrustworthy, and the people as their victims. They also blame the elites for the economic and social problems common people face. Their rhetorical style is, thus, based on a Manichaeic discourse that assigns a binary moral dimension to political conflicts (Higgins and Smith, 2017).

Political actors can position themselves discursively as members of the people or as being on their side. All the candidates, except for Morais, positioned themselves as members of the in-group of the ordinary people. These references were directly made visible by several sound bites:

- (5) We the people know how hard it is living with economic difficulties. Politicians need to learn from us (Silva, RTP1: January 10, 2016).
- (6) I am a man of the people (Coelho, RTP1: January 17, 2016).

Conversely, the political discourse of Morais puts the focus on “them”. Hence, references to the people were indirect. In his case, it is not always clear who belongs to the people and this intentionally vague reference may be a strategic move (Stanyer *et al.*, 2017) in order to allow multiple interpretations among voters. In turn, his references to the political elites were direct. He attacked the political and economic establishment:

- (7) [...] the Portuguese political class is connected to the big interests and the presidential candidates related to all political parties embody that dependency on the big interests (TVI: January 2, 2016).

Moreover, as a typical populist politician, he portrayed himself as an outsider by assuming an antagonistic position against the elites, rather than any relationship with the people:

- (8) I'm not a politician. My interest in politics is to fight against corruption (TVI: January 2, 2016).

All candidates presented themselves as courageous, although in different ways. Courage was strongly linked to patriotism as the candidates depicted themselves as being the only ones who dared to say the unsayable. Their disdain for elites and experts is expressed via a populist rhetoric that uses provocative, abrasive and straightforward language:

- (9) The people cannot keep being an easy prey of sharks (Silva, SIC: January 2, 2016).

Populist candidates take on the role of spokesperson for the angry people, embodying their frustration and their righteous indignation against the corrupt elites. Anger and indignation fit well with “belligerent broadcasting” (Higgins and Smith, 2017), which also achieves high levels of sharing on social media sites (pivotal platforms for news media to reach their audience).

Variable 2: relations with the media

Populist politicians need media attention and the media need political actors willing to serve the media’s commitment to emotionally driven news. The examples already used demonstrate that the four populist candidates employed “highly emotional, slogan-based, and tabloid-style language” (Mazzoleni *et al.*, 2004, p. 3). They all embodied a bullying style against the establishment, but their relationship with the media was not exactly the same. Morais, for instance, presented himself as a loner in his crusade against the establishment. He adopted an aggressive, slogan-based and tabloid-style language when talking to the media:

- (10) [...] give us [politicians] the meat and keep the bones [people] (SIC: January 2, 2016).
 (11) Portuguese politicians are not just corrupt. They are also tacky (E11: RTP1: January 19, 2016).

Nevertheless, in the streets, his level of interaction was low; he always kept some distance between himself and the people and greeted them formally. In summary, Morais was portrayed as a distant, formal and constrained candidate.

Candidates also adopted an underdog style. In the first television debate, Vitorino da Silva said:

- (12) First of all I need to say that I never dreamt of being able to be in a debate with a rector of a university! (SIC: January 2, 2016).

The underdog status was the main feature of Sequeira’s relations with the media:

- (13) While other candidates are spending 750 thousand euros on their campaign, I’m going to check how much money I have. Look: 5, 15, 25, 45 euros.

These other 20 euros I can't spend on the campaign because this is money for eating and gas. This is all the money I have (RTP1, January 20, 2016).

Conversely, as part of an outsider-based communicative strategy, both Coelho and Silva defied the existing order with an oppositional and abrasive rhetorical style, but they also prepared an entertaining, animated and humorous campaign in line with the contemporary sketches of a satirical culture. They were astute newsmakers and took advantage of their “media-genic” personal qualities, which led them to benefit from some kind of (in)direct complicity with the media.

Coelho designed a campaign based on provocative and sarcastic events that put corruption at the centre of his candidacy. He drove a hearse across the country, which he also used as a stage for enacting his performances. The hearse would also illustrate his political message:

(14) This regime is rotten (RTP1: January 6, 2011).

(15) Our politicians are killing the people and the people must be aware of this (TVI, January 21, 2011).

The funeral car would, thus, embody the death of the democratic regime.

With a lack of human, financial and organisational resources, he scripted campaign events linked to notorious corruption cases in a satirical fashion. For instance, he showed to the camera the letter that he addressed to a Portuguese politician known for enriching himself in a few years and escaping to Cape Verde in order to avoid prison:

(16) I want to ask him to pay a little visit to Portugal in order to help our public finances and also to teach his fellow citizens how one can earn so much money so fast. I'm curious to learn how a regular man can become a multi-millionaire so fast (RTP1: January 7, 2011).

Some days later, Coelho staged another sketch in front of the headquarters of the Portuguese right-wing party. The head of that party was a former minister involved in a corruption scandal related to the purchase of submarines from a German company. In Germany, the people involved in the business were accused of corruption, but in Portugal the case never made it to court. He said to the media:

(17) I'm here looking for a little boy that lives in this palace. I know that he is really fond of submarines, so I brought him this toy [shows a submarine] (TVI: January 13, 2011).

In 2011, the Portuguese government asked for a bailout package and this led to the implementation of an austerity programme in the country. Within this context, the incumbent in the 2011 presidential election said that he knew the difficulties of living with a retirement pension because that was his case.⁶ Coelho

visited the place where the President has his summerhouse, an upper-class neighbourhood guarded by police officers, and he was reported to say:

- (18) I'm worried about the President and I heard that he has a house here and I wanted to see if he lives in a safe neighbourhood and if he has the minimum living conditions (SIC: January 15, 2011).

In contrast, Silva also staged newsworthy events, although more festive ones, closer to the people, and full of puns and double meanings:

- (19) This campaign is a tinosunami [a blending of his nickname Tino and the Asian tsunami in 2004] (TVI: January 17, 2016).

He held his rallies at popular fairs across the country where he sang his campaign anthem and danced with old ladies. He was portrayed as someone who would enjoy embracing and kissing people, laughing with them and telling them jokes. Silva was a professional paver and he had paved the surroundings of some Portuguese monuments, and one of his campaign events included visiting those pavements. In a patriotic rhetorical style, he said several times:

- (20) I helped preserve and rebuild Portugal (SIC: January 14, 2016).

To show the difficulties of the humble people, he staged a picnic at a bus station during rush hour and slept one night near a homeless man:

- (21) (...) these people have a lot to teach our politicians (...). They don't even notice these people, but these people are like us (RTP1: January 19, 2016).

At the end of the campaign, he went to "Portugal dos Pequenitos" (Portugal of the Little Ones), a park with diminutive versions of Portuguese houses and monuments.

Populist communication strategies suit the media logic well and the four candidates benefited the media in various ways. Coelho and Silva staged newsworthy events, and their campaign served the increasing popular demand for entertainment. In turn, the controversial discourse mainly of Morais and Coelho resonated well with the increasing anti-establishment sentiment among the population. In addition, the mainstream media might have also encouraged the adversarial discourse and, even if unintentionally, of those who censured corrupt parties and politicians, which may have been beneficial for all the populist candidates.

Concluding remarks

Looking inside the people's minds and dreams, populist leaders proclaim that they defend the individual's most basic economic and financial interests, stressing

that they can respond efficiently to urgent needs and problems, most of them originating in and not solved by the democratic system and its leaders. In terms of profile and attitudes, populist leaders seem to have an advantage over conventional politicians. Populist leaders are usually close to the people, bringing the anonymous voter into the political arena through mass media exposure, giving them the visibility they never had, and offering them protection, as parents usually do for their children.

“Non-partisan candidates” is an important concept to attend to when studying populism in democratic countries such as Portugal. Non-partisan candidates try to sell the idea that they are above the party system and, consequently, that they do not want and do not need any (indirect) political party support, due mainly to the mistrust of the party system, the failure of the politics of democracy and its leaders’ lack of reliability. In this study, we argue that there is a connection between non-partisan candidates and the existence of populist traits in their messages.

As evidenced above, only four out of the seven candidates with populist traits were portrayed as such by the Portuguese mainstream broadcasters, and their coverage revealed different populist characteristics. Considering populism as a discursive style, the analysis showed a gradational coverage; a candidate may have more populist characteristics or fewer, but the degree of populism highlighted in a given political actor may vary due to the media factor. The media may emphasise certain populist traits in one candidate and ignore other dimensions of populism in that specific candidate, or they can render invisible those same populist dimensions in another candidate. This shows the discretionary power of the media to shape politics according to their own interests.

All four populist candidates were portrayed by the Portuguese broadcasters as anti-establishment leaders who addressed more populist-related themes of anti-elitist discourse and less of popular empowerment. They were also presented as having a markedly non-political “authenticity” of language and performance. These candidates join in the emotive language of the media by emphasising their underdog status and their controversial outsidership. This suggests that adopting a populist agenda may also be a media strategy. In market-oriented journalism, dramatic, polemical and politically incorrect messages and performances feed news media needs. Given that the majority of these candidates are not well known to the general population, a populist strategy is a way of getting media attention and increasing their visibility in the very competitive media electoral coverage.

Notes

- 1 There are 308 city or local councils in Portugal. In local elections, citizens elect representatives for three different government branches: town hall, parish assembly and parish council. In 1976 it became legal for independent citizens to run for parish assemblies, and since 2001, independent or citizens’ movements can run for all local bodies. This kind of candidacy has been growing over time: 2001: an average of

- 1.60 candidacies; 2005: an average of 2.47 candidacies; 2009: an average of 4.07 candidacies; 2013: an average of 6.89 candidacies; 2007: an average of 6.79 candidacies).
- 2 Portugal's elected presidents:
- António Ramalho Eanes (1976–1986);
 - Mário Soares (1986–1996);
 - Jorge Sampaio (1996–2006);
 - Aníbal Cavaco Silva (2006–2016);
 - Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (2016–present).
- 3 Most candidates did not have a 'programme' but a set of 'reasons' to run for President. This is mostly due to the type of semi-presidential regime in Portugal, where the President does not have government responsibilities.
- 4 In the 2011 presidential election, the results were: Aníbal Cavaco Silva (52.95%), Manuel Alegre (19.76%), José Coelho (4.49%), Defensor Moura (1.57%).
Source: <https://www.eleicoes.mai.gov.pt/presidenciais2011/resultados-globais.html> accessed in July 2017.
- 5 All the translations from Portuguese into English were done by the authors.
- 6 See <https://www.publico.pt/2012/04/10/politica/noticia/cavaco-garante-que-nunca-mais-fala-sobre-subsidios-da-pensao-do-banco-de-portugal-1541541/amp>

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5

POPULIST DISCOURSE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The definition of otherness on Twitter in the cases of Spain, Bolivia and Venezuela

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Populism in Spain, Bolivia and Venezuela

Latin American countries have traditionally been considered the perfect environment for populism, especially since the emergence of Argentinian Peronism (Knight, 1998). From the early years of this century, new progressive governments, especially in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela and Argentina, have retaken that tradition and, in some cases, even accentuated it. Moreover, the dialectics created by these parties, quite often in office, also seems to have an impact on the European political arena, with Spain's Podemos, for example, recently claiming its Latin American political heritage. In this chapter, we will analyse the political discourse in the Venezuelan, Bolivian and Spanish cases as highly significant left-wing populist movements in the American and European continents (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Laclau, 2005; Mény and Surel, 2002; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014; Mudde, 2004). Using a combined methodological strategy (machine learning and content analysis), our main goal will be to verify if the social media discourse of these cases projects a clear image of the "other", this being one of the characteristics of populism described in earlier chapters.

The first instance of this style of successful 21st-century left-wing populism in Latin America was Hugo Chávez's accession to the presidency of Venezuela in February 1999 (Hawkins, 2009). This politician was the founder of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV) and occupied its leadership until his death on March 5, 2013. This was, perhaps, the first example of a new type of political language in Latin America, with a will to expand abroad and establish a new style across South America, and other countries across the Atlantic, as well. The term *Bolivarian Revolution* denotes a new system of government that moves away from North American influence through the exaltation of Simón Bolívar (the hero of the independence war against

Spain) and a united South America led by a “strong but compassionate warlord” (McCaughan, 2005, p. 89). The warlord oversees the transformation of the militia into an armed part of the nationalist revolution, using the poor as their support. The notion of *participatory democracy* became the central premise of Hugo Chávez’s government (Manwaring, 2005). In the framework of the Bolivarian Revolution, Chávez created the Bolívar Plan by implementing a strategy to improve the welfare conditions of the poor and integrate Venezuelan troops into the Bolivarian Revolution. A propaganda campaign was launched to achieve participatory democracy and thus strengthen its political position by expanding its base of power. According to Schoen and Rowan (2009, p. 154), Chávez promoted his populist message through social programmes and diverse legislation (even with the involvement of some bishops of the Catholic Church), closing media outlets and amending the laws to demand information from citizens disloyal to the regime. Following Hugo Chávez’s death, another leader inspired by his figure, Nicolás Maduro, replaced him as president of the Republic, adopting many of his predecessor’s policies and even deepening his model of populism.

Other Latin American politicians soon emulated the Venezuelan electoral success in 1999; among them, Evo Morales from Bolivia. He became Bolivia’s president in December 2005, and, to date (June 2018), is still in office. His victory marks the first time an indigenous Bolivian has achieved power and government responsibilities in the country through election, with 25 per cent more of the votes in relation to the second candidate. Evo Morales’ “socialism” is defined in terms of communitarianism,² and his governments have been characterised by nationalisations, especially those aimed at natural resources. As for national identity, his Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) borrows the discourse of the leftist tradition and the movement endorsing ethnic identification. It criticises the modern nation-state as a failed, inherently racist construct of internal colonialism, seeking to build instead a plurinational state based on the autonomy of its indigenous people. In his discourse, the nation is presented as the people, while the oligarchy is presented as anti-national (Petras and Vermeyer, 2009), following the principles of anti-elitism prominent in populist proposals.

As stated previously, the Bolivarian populist language was successful in several Latin American countries, whilst traditionally having difficulties reaching other latitudes. However, perhaps due to the financial crisis in Southern Europe and the emergence of new social movements in countries like Spain, this narrative became more attractive than ever before. Podemos was founded in Spain in January 2014 by Pablo Iglesias, a lecturer in political science from Madrid’s Universidad Complutense. As we have argued elsewhere (Luengo, Marín and Fernández-García, 2016), Iglesias was well known for his appearances on Spanish talk shows and for his close links to the new Bolivarian political elites in Venezuela. The start of this formation can be traced back to the outcome of 15-M, the 2011 political movement whereby camps were established throughout major Spanish cities to express people’s outrage against corruption and the political representation crisis, and in opposition to the austerity measures imposed by the

Troika. Among the adherents of the movement, apart from the intellectuals and celebrities who signed the founding manifesto, there were others like the Anti-Capitalist Left party and part of the Spanish International Trotskyist movement.

In May 2014, Podemos underwent its first political “acid test” and exceeded general expectations, polling 7.98 per cent of the national vote and obtaining five seats in the European Parliament. From then on, Podemos began to increase its presence in the political arena, multiplying its electoral support for the regional elections in Andalusia and coming third with 14.8 per cent of the votes and 15 seats for the regional chamber. In the 2015 local elections, Podemos won the mayoralty of Spain’s largest cities, Madrid and Barcelona (Luengo, García-Marín and Fernández-García, 2016, p. 260). At the national level, the party was able to secure 67 seats (out of 350) in 2016, making it the third-largest party in the main chamber.

Podemos’s potential influence is high (it was the main support of PSOE in 2018 no-confidence motion), as it has thus far taken positions aligned with the sensitivities of the Spanish people (Heinen and Kreutzmann, 2015, p. 13). Their priorities have been observed in some public opinion surveys, such as the Eurobarometer, and include unemployment, health and medical insurance, and the national debt (Heinen and Kreutzmann, 2015, p. 13). The success of this party thus rests on its ability to frame the difficulties Spaniards perceive to be most serious and imperative. The principal political strategy of Podemos relied on the transformation of the traditional axis of electoral competition (left-right). Although, neither the leftist past of some of its leaders nor its controversial support of the Venezuelan government can be hidden, the idea they highlighted and that earned them most public acclaim was the polarisation between the privileged (what they call “the caste”) and the people (Luengo, García-Marín and Fernández-García, 2016, p. 261). This further reproduces the main elements of the populist discourse and the Bolivarian dialectics.

Methodology and objectives

Using as a starting point the three cases mentioned above, this chapter aims to determine whether their discourse focuses on the definition of the “other” as one of the main characteristics of populist narratives. To answer this question, we will analyse the way the main political actors in Venezuela, Bolivia and Spain communicate. Nicolás Maduro, Evo Morales and Pablo Iglesias have a very active and communicative public profile, and employ a myriad of channels to contact their electorate, both traditional (TV appearances, press interviews, etc.) and online; in actual fact, they all have an important presence on social media, especially Podemos in Spain. Therefore, we have decided to analyse their interaction on Twitter. This microblogging social networking service offers a number of advantages for its analysis. On the one hand, Twitter has several APIs (e.g. Twitter Ads API, Twitter Search Tweets API, and Twitter Direct Message API) that allow automated content extraction.³ All the posts are intermediary-free

so that we can dare say that they closely reflect the actors' argument line or narrative. In addition, the information in each tweet is well structured, with fields such as date, origin or text, facilitating their subsequent study. Finally, each actor's posts are followed by hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of people and institutions, as it is a very popular format today. That makes this kind of communication very useful to analyse the discourse of politicians.

We have extracted the tweets from two accounts for each actor (see Table 5.1): the institutional one (@Mindegobierno, @DPresidencia and @Ahorapodemos) and the personal one (@Evoespueblo, @NicolasMaduro and @Pablo_Iglesias), totalling 10,591 tweets. The range of dates selected is March 2017–January 2018, covering the last communications of selected actors at the moment of writing. It is important to note that we have not been able to extract all the tweets because the Twitter API has certain time and quantity limits.⁴ In addition, some actors, especially in Spain and Venezuela, tended to delete their tweets (weekly, usually), which means that a few were not included in the sample. However, the sample is representative. First, because we did not detect an attempt to delete specific tweets (all of them were deleted at the same time); and, second, because the results of the Search API and the normal search results through the Twitter website were identical.

The methodological approach used was that of frame theory (Entman, 1993, 2004). Frames are heuristic mechanisms through which political or media actors try to make sense of reality. Normally, frames have four functions: (1) they define problems; (2) they identify what caused them; (3) they propose solutions; and, finally, (4) they issue moral judgments. For frame analysis, authors use many different techniques, but of special utility is content analysis (Krippendorff and Bogg, 2009). Due to the amount of information obtained here and its nature (tweets had 140 characters, but at the end of 2017 this limit was increased to 280), traditional content analysis can be cumbersome without automated techniques. Therefore, we have performed an automated analysis based on an LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) machine-learning algorithm, which helps to speed up information tagging. According to Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003, p. 993), LDA is a three-level hierarchical Bayesian model where each item of a collection is modelled as a finite mixture over an underlying set of topics. In turn, each topic is modelled as an infinite mixture over an underlying set of topic probabilities. In the context of text modelling, topic probabilities provide an explicit representation of a document (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003, p. 993). In other words, the algorithm will help us to reduce the number of terms, or topics, the actors

TABLE 5.1 Analysed accounts and tweets (n = 10,591 tweets)

<i>Actor</i>	<i>Bolivia</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Venezuela</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>n</i>
Account	@evoespueblo	4376	@NicolasMaduro	128	@Ahorapodemos	1820
	@Mindegobierno	857	@DPresidencia	2290	@Pablo_Iglesias	1018

employ or deal with in their posts. Subsequently, we conducted a content analysis on the terms used in the categories proposed: i.e. the definition of “them” versus “us”, and the presence of an anti-elitist language.

In order to perform the analysis, we used the R language, specifically tidytext (Silge and Robinson, 2016), topicmodels (Hornik and Grün, 2011) and tm libraries (Meyer, Hornik and Feinerer, 2008). In this last library, the data set (the text) was transformed and tokenised by removing any kind of punctuation (as well as the Spanish letter “ñ”), capital letters, numbers, whitespaces, and *stop words*; the remaining words were stemmed.⁵

Venezuela

The Venezuelan Twitter accounts (@NicolasMaduro and @DPresidencia – see Table 5.2) were frequently used during the period under analysis to provide information about the government’s work; nevertheless, they were also employed to spread propaganda and opinion. In this regard, we can separate the messages of the @NicolasMaduro account, where opinion and first-person use feature prominently, from @DPresidencia, more inclined to informational and propagandistic endeavours.

The LDA analysis of the Venezuelan sample can be interpreted as confirming the existence of a communication strategy. By default, the LDA algorithm gives a multitude of possibilities grouping several topics (from one to dozens). It is the decision of researchers to limit the number of topics according to usefulness and clarity (where just a few topics would make them too ample and too many very

TABLE 5.2 LDA analysis of tweets from Venezuela (@NicolasMaduro and @DPresidencia)¹

Priority	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
1	“pdte” (president)	“pdte” (president)	“ahora” (now)	“ahora” (now)
2	“envivo” (live)	“envivo” (live)	“pdte” (president)	“pdte” (president)
3	“esnoticia” (is news)	“esnoticia” (is news)	“esnoticia” (is news)	“esnoticia” (is news)
4	“pueblo” (people)	“herman” (brother)	“presidente” (president)	“hoy” (today)
5	“leer” (read)	“venezuela”	“pueblo” (people)	“presidente” (president)
6	“bolivarian”	“soberan” (sovereignty)	“clase” (class)	“paz” (peace)
7	“venezuela”	“min” (minister)	“nacional” (national)	“pueblo” (people)
8	“hoy” (today)	“pueblo” (people)	“junt” (together)	“patria” (motherland)

¹ There are many references to terms like “envivo” or “esnoticia”. Note that these are usually hashtags or tags that refer to headings to indicate that it is a news story or a live event.

similar to each other). In this case, by reducing the number of topics to four, the sample can be reduced, at least, to four meaningful clusters:⁶ (a) one where the people, the President, Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution prevail; (b) one where concepts such as sovereignty or brotherhood would enter; (c) another including terms such as nation or class; and (d) one where peace and motherland would be included. The LDA analysis shows that the terms used gravitate towards the use of “us” to a much greater extent than in defining “them”, which, in any case, would be made implicitly (although it is mentioned sometimes as the Empire or Imperialism; see Table 5.3).

- (1) As soldiers we will defeat the corrupt and sabotaging bureaucracy (@DPresidencia, 29-11-2017).

In this regard, the Venezuelan case is perhaps the one that most clearly shows the elements of a populist discourse based on binary confrontation. This is due to the use of a strongly biased language focused on the definition and discursive positioning of “us” above “them”. Thus, the term *people* is used regularly in our corpus, along with adjectives like “beloved” or “dear”. There are constant allusions to the “motherland” (*Patria*) and the “revolution”, which are frequently linked to other terms such as “sovereignty” or “working class” (the latter adopts other forms such as the oil worker class, mining class, etc.). Allied countries or governments are called brothers, and any allusion to Russia or Turkey is made in terms of the “Russian people” or “Turkish people”. A permanent and surprising element present in almost all the tweets is hyperbole. Indeed, adjectives like “historic”, “glorious”, “proud” or “extraordinary” are common in the sample. For example, aviators are:

- (2) The Sentinels of air sovereignty, of the glorious Bolivarian National armed Force (@DPresidencia, 27-11-2017).⁷
 (3) The Motherland ID [is] a miraculous tool (@NicolasMaduro, 16-01-2018).

The tweets are always written in the first person (both singular and plural), denoting an eminently personalistic character, perhaps due to the presidential regime and the high visibility of the charismatic leader, another feature of populism.

TABLE 5.3 Most common references to “us” and “them” in tweets from Venezuela

<i>Us</i>	<i>Them</i>
Motherland (<i>Patria</i>)	Empire (<i>El Imperio</i>)
Compatriots (<i>Compatriotas</i>)	Imperialism (<i>Imperialismo</i>)
Bolivarian (<i>Bolivarianos</i>)	Economic war (<i>Guerra económica</i>)
People (<i>Pueblo</i>)	
Together (<i>Juntos</i>)	
Brothers (<i>Hermanos</i>)	
Working class (<i>Clasetrabajadora</i>)	

The leader's communicative style is clearly Manichaeic, as there is a confrontation between the revolution and the Empire (the US), "us" vs. "them". Imperialism is a common term to define the "other", but so is "economic war", meaning an organised effort by the opposition to damage the national economy in order to stir chaos and disorder. This dialectic pervades the entire sample, and almost all the tweets can be explained according to this logic. As such, there are tweets (nearly all of them) about the Government's achievements where hyperbole is evident:

- (4) The [year] 2017 will be marked as the heroic year (@NicolasMaduro, 15-01-2018).

There are other tweets dedicated to international support, countries that are brothers (*pueblos hermanos*), as opposed to non-allied countries, which are labelled as "countries" only (the US, the Empire, etc.). These are always referred to in terms of confrontation:

- (5) We bid farewell to our brothers of the Republic of Turkey, hoping to continue strengthening friendship ties (@NicolasMaduro, 23-01-2018).
 (6) The model of inequality has failed, the empire is in disuse and decay (@DPresidencia, 18-10-2017).

Other tweets are very personal and allude to the president himself and his thoughts:

- (7) I believe infinitely in the popular power, only the organised people save the people! (5-12-2017 @DPresidencia).

Bolivia

The accounts analysed for the Bolivian case (@evoespueblo and @MindeGobierno) were the most productive in the whole corpus. Their primary functions are to spread information and propaganda, with a much smaller dimension of opinion on the part of President Evo Morales. That informative function is evident in a section called "Like Today" (como hoy), where tweets showed anniversaries of political events:

- (8) Like today, in 1731, in the Cochabamba Valley, the rebellion against the Spanish colonial power commanded by Nicolás Flores was born (@evoespueblo, 14-08-2017).

In the Bolivian case, the LDA analysis is more complex than in the previous example, but it still reveals a similar communication strategy. We decided to keep the number of topics to four for the sake of clarity and consistency. However, the

TABLE 5.4 LDA analysis of tweets from Bolivia

Priority	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
1	“ministro” (minister)	“gobierno” (government)	“gobierno” (government)	“pueblo”
2	“carlos”	“carlosromero”	“nuestr” (ours)	“nuestr” (ours)
3	“pueblo”	“ministro” (minister)	“pueblo” (people)	“derech” (right)
4	“contra” (against)	“pueblo”	“pueblo”	“nos” (we)
5	“gobierno” (government)	“mas” (movement towards socialism)	“razon” (reason)	“pueblo” (people)
6	“hemos” (we have)	“ahora” (now)	“herman” (brother)	“eeu” (US)
7	“president”	“unidad” (unity)	“junto” (together)	“chile”
8	“trabajad” (workers)	“president”	“ley” (law)	“entregamos” (we deliver)

first two can be integrated into a single line, intended to show the government’s work and achievements. The third topic clearly focuses on the definition of “us”, where terms like Bolivia, brother, law, people or “us” and “our” (*nosotros, nuestro*) stand out. Hence, this dynamic explains the existence of a fourth group, where terms from the third are mixed with others clearly defining the “them” category, like the US, Chile or right-wing parties.

- (9) The people stand up to resist the policies of discrimination and racism. With the new President of the United States (@evoespueblo, 25-12-2017).

In this way, the two groups are different because the former shows information about “us” and the latter about “them” (see Table 5.5). This reveals a different pattern to the one found in the Venezuelan case, where the definition of the “other” is represented in just a few cases.

- (10) The pretext of the invasion is always the same: democracy, terrorism, drug trafficking (@evoespueblo, 07-08-2017).

However, the Bolivian case also shares many similarities with the Venezuelan subset. Perhaps one of the reasons for this is the two countries’ cultural and ideological proximity. The Bolivian discourse comprises at least three different strategies revolving around anti-imperialism, political achievements and friendly countries (the “brother peoples” or *pueblos hermanos*). The three contain distinctive elements regarding the use of “us” and “them” because they are also articulated according to a confrontation between different ideologies.

The first strategy (or narrative line) is the anti-imperialist one present in many tweets of the corpus. This line focuses on the definition of “us” and “them”, and

TABLE 5.5 Most common references to “us” and “them” in tweets from Bolivia

<i>Us</i>	<i>Them</i>
People (Pueblo)	Neoliberal
Brother (Hermano)	Right (Derecha)
Workers (Obreros)	US (EEUU)
Motherland (Patria)	Empire (Imperio)

two subject matters: the US and the political Right, against the brothers who resist the invading imperialists. In this case, the definition of “us” is internationalist (i.e. the brothers):

- (11) Instead of expelling Cuban brothers who represent their State, expel criminals. The USA cannot be a genocidal cave (@evoespueblo, 09-08-2017).
- (12) To brother Maduro and the Venezuelan Revolutionary people: the anti-imperialist peoples are with you (@evoespueblo, 24-01-2018).

By contrast, the enemy, the “Empire”, is defined as the United States, which is not “a people” but,

- (13) A landfill of corrupt and delinquents who violate human rights, not only in Bolivia but in other countries (@evoespueblo, 06-11-2017).
- (14) Through Saudi Arabia and Israel, the US encourages violent protest against the Iranian government (@evoespueblo 03-01-2018).

As for the national right-wing parties, these are likened to corrupt imperialists,

- (15) The sole aim of the macabre and indolent right, who neither took pity on the Dead or their families, is to damage the Motherland. Always [has] (@evoespueblo 03-12-2016).

The political right is part of the Empire, as happened in the Venezuelan case:

- (16) Let the people judge those who massacred, those who stole the money, privatized our natural resources and surrendered to the Empire. (@evoespueblo 18-10-2016).

Thus, undesirable activities are characterised as imperial doctrine:

- (17) Union independence is an imperial doctrine. Doctrine of intervention for domination, domination for the plundering of our natural resources (@MindeGobierno, 19-08-2017).

The second narrative line is based on the presentation of the government’s achievements. It is similar again to the Venezuelan strategy, but it lacks the constant hyperbole. Unlike the Venezuelan tweets, it is not an excessively personalist line as it tends to focus on what “we” or the “people” (with all possible variations, such as the “original people”, “workers”, or “our peoples”) have achieved. This line has a frequent element of contrast under the entry “Like Today”, used to cite past prominent, and mostly political, events (presented in a clear favourable light for Morales). In these posts, the use of “us” is prevalent, but not the definition of “them”:

(18) Motherland is our soul, the people our family (@EvoesPueblo, 31-07-2016).

Within the definitions of the people, there is a variant that we could call indigenuous, which is the result of the allusion to the native inhabitants of Bolivia:

(19) The seas, a World heritage site. Our ancestral cultures sailed always for peace and unity (@MindeGobierno, 15-08-2017).

A final line, or strategy, with less prevalence would be dedicated to “brothers” like Venezuela, Brazil or Iran. As in the Venezuelan case, the Bolivian posts use siblings to refer to allied or potentially friendly actors (e.g. “Brother Pope”. @MindeGobierno, 18-12-2017). This narrative line is intimately linked to the first one, but it does not contain direct allusions to the “other”, or they are very infrequent indeed.

Spain

The case of Podemos is different from the previous two. This difference is explained by many factors such as Spain’s cultural and geographical distance from

TABLE 5.6 LDA analysis of tweets from Podemos (Spain)

Priority	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
1	“directo” (live)	“pablo”	“españa” (Spain)	“hemos” (we have)
2	“pablo”	“aqui” (here)	“rajoy”	“derecha” (right)
3	“pais” (country)	“podemos” (we can)	“hoy” (today)	“nuestro” (our)
4	“politica” (politics)	“iglesias”	“corrupcion” (corruption)	“pp” (popular party)
5	“españa” (Spain)	“montero”	“nuestro” (our)	“pero” (but)
6	“social”	“podreis” (you could)	“pais” (country)	“proyecto” (project)
7	“iglesias”	“puedes” (you can)	“pp” (popular party)	“españa” (Spain)
8	“dias” (days)	“estamos” (we are)	“trabajo” (work)	“debe” (must)

Latin America, the party's political evolution and context, the social background of its grassroots, the leaders' limited experience, and the absence of national government responsibilities. That is the reason why Podemos' tweets can hardly post messages on reached electoral goals or achieved policies. The functions of their Twitter accounts are also different. Information outweighs propaganda, because the political reality is shown while reflecting the party's viewpoint. The first person is used less often, but when it is, it refers to a collective, not to an individual, even in the personal account of Pablo Iglesias (although we found some examples of personalism).

As in previous cases, the LDA analysis shows a grouping of terms according to their use in the sample. Our analysis also confirms the existence of different communicative strategies. The first two groups address the "us" dimension, although with prominent personal elements in the figures of Pablo Iglesias and Irene Montero (spokesperson for the parliamentary group in the Spanish lower chamber). The second group consists of topics three and four, centred on "them", mainly the Popular Party, identified with concepts such as the Right, Rajoy or corruption.

Although language use differs from the Latin American cases, we interpret that the functions are similar. It is easy to see a distinction between "us" and "them" in their Twitter messages. In Podemos, however, there is more emphasis on "them" and less on "us", which is often implied in the tweets. As shown in Table 5.6 above, "them" refers mainly to the Popular Party, in office at that time (with Mariano Rajoy as president of the party and Prime Minister of Spain). Other similar definitions are the government, Mariano Rajoy or, simply, Rajoy.

In addition to identifying "the other" as the Popular Party, the tweets analysed sometimes referred to "the corrupt", the "media cavern" (*caverna mediática*) or "the IBEX35".⁸ The former involves all the corruption scandals affecting other political parties, not only the PP, but also the Socialist Party (including ironic coinages such as PPSOE, that is PP+PSOE, to point to the two most significant traditional parties).⁹ As regards the latter terms, the media cavern applies to media outlets accused of collusion with the PP and PSOE. As for the IBEX35, it refers to the economic power of large companies ("do not dare to pronounce "Spain" IBEX entrepreneurs who do not pay their taxes here", @ahorapodemos, 20-05-2017). The definition of "the other" by Podemos is

TABLE 5.7 Most common references to "us" and "them" in tweets from Podemos (Spain)

<i>Us</i>	<i>Them</i>
The ordinary people (la gente normal)	The Popular Party (El PP)
The people (La gente)	The Government (El gobierno)
Podemos (We Can)	The corrupt (Los corruptos)
	The media "cavern" (La caverna mediática)
	The biggest companies (El IBEX35)

thus a political business conglomerate characterised by corruption and ideological bicephaly (PP-PSOE). Podemos commonly used terms such as “mafia” or “caste” to name that conglomerate.¹⁰ Standing in opposition to the corrupt “them” would be “us”, the normal people:

(20) We cannot admit that it is only the normal people who must struggle to get out of the crisis (@Pablo_Iglesias, 19-01-2018).

Podemos is then defined as the ordinary people’s party:

(21) In Podemos normal people are in charge, who want a change in our country. That’s why we went back out to the streets in Spring (@ahorapodemos, 17-01-2018).

All subjects are contextualised according to this dialectic of contrast, including the problem with the Catalan independence referendum:

(22) Catalonia will serve to justify corruption and not to debate budgets. The government press will tell you (@Pablo_iglesias, 26-09-2017).

Shared strategies and frames

The three actors used similar language, at least from the standpoint of describing a binary social reality, with a clear distinction between “us” and “them”. Moreover, the use of anti-elitist language is evident in all three instances. Both features reflect clear distinctions of populist political communication. But to what extent do the three populist leaders make use of similar strategies or terms? To answer this question, we have done a simple frequency analysis, whose results can be observed in Table 5.8.

Each one of the actors used different terms, although there are obvious matches. The first of those differences is the balance in the definition of “us” and “them”. As shown in Table 5.8, the Venezuelan tweets make extensive use of “us” (terms like president, Venezuela, government, Bolivarian, etc.), while the “them” dimension does not appear among the 30 most frequently used terms in their tweets. The Bolivian case, however, is different. Among these terms, we can see many concepts about the definition of both “us” (people, Bolivia, brother, government, etc.) and “them” (especially the US, but also Chile or the Right). In the Spanish case, Podemos stands at the other end of the spectrum, where the allusions to “them” (PP, or Popular Party, government, Rajoy, Right) outnumber the use of “us” (Pablo, Podemos, work, etc.).

Another perceived difference is the distribution of term frequencies. Words near the line in Figures 5.1 to 5.3 are used in equal frequencies by the different actors, while words far away from the line are used much more by one actor than another. Words, hashtags, and usernames in this plot are ones they have used at

TABLE 5.8 The top 30 terms in the analysed tweets

	<i>Venezuela</i>			<i>Bolivia</i>			<i>Spain</i>		
	Global freq.	Global %	Global %	Global freq.	Global %	Global %	Global freq.	Global %	Global %
nicolasmadur	971	4.63	Co	3369	5.17	co	2836	7.78	
Pdte	753	3.59	htps	3345	5.13	htps	2830	7.76	
Enviv	303	1.45	puebl	751	1.15	pp	407	1.12	
Venezuel	281	1.34	bolivi	726	1.11	iglesi	233	0.64	
Pueblo	276	1.32	hoy	663	1.02	pabl	233	0.64	
President	244	1.16	ministr	492	0.76	españ	186	0.51	
Hoy	151	0.72	gobiern	407	0.62	hoy	171	0.47	
Leer	143	0.68	herman	371	0.57	mas	169	0.46	
Plan	140	0.67	eeuu	370	0.57	si	166	0.46	
Min	135	0.64	bolivian	282	0.43	polit	160	0.44	
Mil	132	0.63	luch	245	0.38	gobiern	156	0.43	
Patri	132	0.63	Carlosromer	240	0.37	part	143	0.39	
Venezolan	125	0.60	salud	237	0.36	direct	142	0.39	
Nacional	122	0.58	mas	236	0.36	pod	135	0.37	
Bolivarian	119	0.57	chil	235	0.36	rajoy	135	0.37	
Nuev	115	0.55	paz	230	0.35	cataluñ	130	0.36	
Notice	111	0.53	romer	230	0.35	hac	124	0.34	
Gobiern	104	0.50	president	218	0.33	pais	123	0.34	
Paz	102	0.49	entreg	216	0.33	ser	121	0.33	
Pais	100	0.48	mund	211	0.32	derech	118	0.32	
Constituyent	98	0.47	nuev	209	0.32	pued	111	0.30	
Aqu	95	0.45	derech	189	0.29	sol	110	0.30	
Realiz	93	0.44	ahor	182	0.28	trabaj	110	0.30	
Millon	88	0.42	pais	174	0.27	aqui	109	0.30	
Gobern	87	0.42	ser	166	0.25	habl	97	0.27	
Gt	83	0.40	social	163	0.25	iren	83	0.23	
Trabaj	82	0.39	hac	160	0.25	nuev	83	0.23	
Social	76	0.36	carl	154	0.24	monter	82	0.22	
Años	73	0.35	mm	152	0.23	public	82	0.22	
Aprob	72	0.34	trabaj	152	0.23	corrupcion	81	0.22	




FIGURE 5.3 Relationship in the use of terms between Venezuela and Podemos.

least once. The comparisons were made by pairs (Bolivia-Venezuela, Bolivia-Podemos and Venezuela-Podemos). Figures 1 to 3 show how we can establish two groups according to the use of language: one with Venezuela and Bolivia, and another with Podemos in Spain. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that both the Venezuelan and Bolivian tweets have a similar use of key terms such as “state”, “peace”, “revolutionary”, “president” and “people”. It can then be argued that the definition of “us” is similar in both cases. The differences would be found in the terms that move away from the axis (Bolivarian, Bolivia, US, etc.). However, in the case of Podemos (Figures 2 and 3), no key concept appears near the axis, so we can conclude that it is a different study case.

Cultural differences, however, do not hide the use of a strategy or, we might say, a similar frame. The LDA analyses reveal that the groupings of terms in all the cases make a distinction between functions, where the terms used may vary, but not their relationship. Thus, in all the cases there is a convergence of the category “us” with the “people”, defined as a subject with problems, caused by external entities, which can be foreign (Venezuela and Bolivia) or national (Spain and, to some extent, Bolivia). Thus, we have, in the three cases, a definition of the problem and a cause. Moral judgement is also explicit; they are not us, they are corrupt, they are evil. The proposed solution is the government of the people, the motherland or the normal people; that is to say, the PSUV, the MAS or Podemos.

Conclusion

In the introduction to this book, the editors mentioned some of the difficulties found in reaching a consensus regarding the definition of populism (Canovan, 1999, 2004). Indeed, populism is present not only in one sphere of politics; it can be traced to a range of strategies, speeches, and ideologies (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013). Beyond political strategy (which has not been part of this chapter), populist discourse and ideology imply a binary definition of the world, an “us” against “them”, which reproduces the scheme of good against evil.

Does this antagonism mean that there can be a populist frame? Frames have always been difficult to identify and conceptualise, even to the point that they have been characterised as a fragmented paradigm (Entman, 1993). Yet there seems to be agreement on the fact that they fulfil the function of defining political reality. From that point of view, we can say that there can be a populist frame or framing technique (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011; Scheufele, 1999).

Indeed, we believe it has been demonstrated that the three actors analysed apply this frame in almost all their interactions. Each case selected for this study has proved it from a different perspective, which is probably due to the local conditions in each case. The Venezuelan and Spanish cases have shown opposing strategies, focusing more on the “us”, in the former case, or “them” in the latter. We suspect that the degree of control of the political sphere has determined the choice of the discourse strategy. The Bolivian case, however, would show elements of the two models.

We stated previously that another element forming part of the populist discourse strategy is anti-elitism. And, indeed, the three actors also show a variety of tweets that mention it. Again, the differences are visible, given that rhetoric tends to change. For the Venezuelan and Bolivian cases, the US is the main antagonist, leaving the local actors of the opposition as lackeys or serfs. In each case, though, the rhetorical resources change: from the “US” of Bolivian tweets to the “Empire” of Venezuelans. The Spanish case, however, identifies the elite as the government of the PP and large companies in a kind of two-headed entity.

In conclusion, the findings of this chapter point in the same direction highlighted in the Introduction: populism, either as a discursive or political strategy (or even a frame) is a phenomenon of global reach. Rhetoric, themes and actors can change, but adaptation to the local environment is proving to be successful worldwide.

Notes

- 1 We would like to express our gratitude to the reviewers for their comments and suggestions.
- 2 Communitarianism, as a political ideology, opposes liberalism and proposes a return to coexistence in communities rather than individualities (Bell, 1993).
- 3 Application Programming Interface.
- 4 See <https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/search/api-reference/get-search-tweets> for more information on limits of Twitter search API.
- 5 See Meyer *et al.* (2008), to take full advantage of pre-processing possibilities.
- 6 The LDA algorithm does not provide any kind of percentage or frequency rates; it is able to include most tweets into those four categories using some topics.
- 7 In Spanish, “los centinelas de la soberanía aérea de las gloriosas fuerzas armadas nacionales bolivarianas”.
- 8 IBEX35, or IBEX, is the main reference index of the Madrid stock exchange, analogous to the FTSE100 or the Dow Jones.
- 9 “The PP is no longer in the institutions to govern, but to protect itself from corruption” (@ahorapodemos, 27-05-2017).
- 10 The term “caste” was often used by Podemos at the beginning of its foundation. However, since 2016 the party has greatly reduced its use. Nowadays they are trying to include the term “monarchical block” as a less successful substitute for “caste”.

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PART II

A corpus-based discourse analysis of populism



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6

US VS. THEM

Polarization and populist discourses in the online electoral campaign in Spain

Ana Ruiz-Sánchez and Manuel Alcántara-Plá¹

Introduction

Polarization is one of the most frequent strategies in political discourse (Sinclair, 2006). In this chapter, we analyse the use of polarization strategies and populist discourse in the microblogging platform Twitter during a period covering two electoral campaigns in Spain: from December 2015 to June 2016. The second electoral campaign, just six months after the previous one, was brought about by the lack of agreement among the political parties, incapable of forming a government. This research focuses on the ten Twitter accounts of the five leading political parties and their candidates. These are Izquierda Unida-IU/Garzón (left-wing), Podemos/Iglesias (left-wing), Partido Socialista-PSOE/Sánchez (socialist), Ciudadanos-C's/Rivera (centre-right), and Partido Popular-PP/Rajoy (right-wing).

The conceptual relation between polarization and populism appears in Spain coinciding with a change to a new political cycle. Forty years after the death of the dictator Francisco Franco and the arrival of democracy, there is a growing perception that it is necessary to reform the current Constitution and some of the agreements reached during the transition to democracy. Also, the economic crisis, the many corruption scandals uncovered and the increasing separatist tensions brewing in Catalonia went hand in hand with the emergence of new groups with different views on the country's needs and demands. Citizen movements such as 15-M Indignados and the Platform for People Affected by Mortgage Debt were born in this context and became key actors in the political landscape. The so-called emerging political parties, Podemos and C's, also arose during these turbulent times, blaming the other parties for practising old-fashioned politics.

New parties understand that, in order to make possible the political transformations they seek, the country needs a complete cultural change so that new parameters of interpretation of reality, and new relationships based on those

parameters, can be used to reformulate society. In other words, some traditional terms need to be redefined; that is the case of *people*, *democracy*, *right*, *left*, etc. As Errejón and Mouffe (2015, p. 87) explain,

[I]n politics, neither loyalties nor the position in the game are predetermined by any social condition, and they are not fixed. On the contrary, they are constructed discursively by constructions such as the friend/enemy distinction, and are permanently negotiated.²

It is in this context that there seems to be an increased perception of the use of populist strategies, which promote homogenizing and simplistic views of society. In fact, the European Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) recently warned that “Polarisation is increasing in European societies, creating a fertile base for processes of radicalisation through the increase of complaints, the thought ‘us against them’ and incidents that incite to hatred and violence” (RAN, 2017, p. 2).

In the next sections, we explore how the creation of new meanings leading to a polarized and populist discourse employed on Twitter during the aforementioned electoral period.

Twitter as a subject of study

Twitter is currently one among many tools in a complex hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013), but it has now become the most attractive channel for political communication (Štětka *et al.*, 2014), which explains the growing interest in its analysis.

There is already much research on the political discourse on Twitter. In the case of Spain, several studies have concluded that politicians have yet to employ this new medium to optimum effect. They communicate through Twitter in the same way as they have always done through traditional media (Aragón *et al.*, 2013; Zamora and Zurutuza, 2014; Mancera and Pano, 2016), and still do not interact much with their followers (Zugasti and Sabés, 2015; Padilla, 2015; Congosto, 2015).

Scholars are also interested in the question of polarization in the social networks, the main idea being that these media reinforce prior ideologies due to selective exposure to information (Bimber and Davis, 2003; Sunstein, 2001). Regarding Twitter, in an empirical study, Colleoni *et al.* (2014, p. 328) found out that the platform is “conducive to an echo chamber-like scenario where established partisan positions tend to be reinforced”. Therefore, Twitter is presented as an ideal context for polarizing discourses.

Methodology

This study is part of a project where we follow a Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies approach (Baker *et al.*, 2008; Partington *et al.*, 2013), using both discourse analysis and corpus linguistics.³ Regarding the former, we follow an approach

based on both articulation (Howarth, 2005) and frame semantics (Huckin, 2002; Langacker, 1991; Fillmore, 1982). Lexical selection and framing strategies are key elements in these theories. Methods of corpus linguistics help us to find keywords and their collocates.

Our corpus is made up of 116,072 tweets. It was obtained using a script connected to the Twitter API designed for retrieving all the messages posted by any of the ten accounts we had previously chosen. The API gives us the tweets tagged with a JSON standard that includes all the metadata: date, user, number of replies, multimedia elements, etc. The texts were POS-tagged using Freeling (Padró and Stanilovsky, 2012). POS tagging was important in order to have a disambiguated version of the messages. Frequencies and collocations were obtained through Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff *et al.*, 2014).

Whilst all the accounts were used regularly, there are important differences regarding the number of tweets posted during the time period under analysis, as shown in Table 6.1.

First, we have worked on data obtained from the frequencies of this corpus.⁴ Our starting point is to analyse how many times each account mentions the other candidates. Our aim is to see whether there is a strategy of confrontation, which might be used as a way of polarizing discourse. After examining the percentages of messages with mentions throughout the whole corpus, we turn to compare the frequency of these mentions during both official campaigns (December 2015 and June 2016).

We subsequently look at terms – and their most used collocations – corresponding with key concepts of populist discourses (*democracy, citizens, people, majority, civil society, country and Spaniard*), and at how they use the term *populism* itself. In so doing, we seek to recover the semantic frames that are conveyed, assuming a link between the high frequency of certain collocates and their association with a particular semantic framework. As described by the Network Agenda Setting model, the greater the likelihood that two elements are mentioned together, the greater the chance that readers will perceive them as interconnected (Lang, 2000). This connection between frequency and relation has been studied from different angles such as the Cognitive Network Model (Santanen, Briggs and de Vreede, 2000), Lexical priming (Hoey, 2005), and the Associative Network Model of Memory (Anderson, 1983), and is coherent with Corpus Linguistics approaches, where repetitions are always a key factor.

After the frequency analysis, we describe other strategies we have found while studying our corpus.

Results and discussion

Us vs. them in the main corpus

Corpora allow us to identify the political adversaries of every candidate and party since they tell us how many times they mention other participants. We have used

TABLE 6.1 Number of tweets in every account (from October 2015 to June 2016)

<i>Podemos</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>IU</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>PSOE</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>C's</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>PP</i>	<i>n</i>
@Ahorapodemos	26,210	@iunida	20,111	@PSOE	18,350	@CiudadanosCs	19,728	@PPopular	13,361
@Pablo_Iglesias	1,629	@agarzon	3,316	@sanchezcastejon	4,513	@Albert_Rivera	4,586	@marianorajoy	4,299

three corpora: the main corpus from October 2015 to June 2016, and the sub-corpora of the December 2015 and the June 2016 campaigns. We will first look at the main corpus for the number of tweets where the other candidates were mentioned during those nine months, and then we will compare it with the frequencies during the campaigns in order to see differences between the general use of Twitter and that of the official campaigning period.

Mariano Rajoy, Spain's prime minister at that time, is mentioned almost 11,000 times in the main corpus. In other words, supposing he were mentioned only once per tweet,⁵ he appeared in 9.25% of the messages. His own party (29.76%) and himself (49%) mention him the most, but he is also in 4.72% of the tweets of the rest of the corpus. It is interesting to notice that Podemos (1.85%) and Pablo Iglesias (2.15%), his theoretical antagonists, are the ones talking less frequently about him, while the PSOE (11.64%) and Pedro Sánchez (9.84%) show that attacking the then Prime Minister was a key strategy in their campaign. It is not, however, a mutual relation since Sánchez is not mentioned much in the corpus (0.95% of the tweets of the other parties and 0.59% of those of the other candidates). Surprisingly, he features more frequently in PP's than in PSOE's tweets (2.93% vs. 0.1%). In fact, he is the only candidate that seemed to be relevant in PP's messages.

- (1) Of all the candidates, Rajoy is the only one who has experience in government (PP).
- (2) To solve the Catalan conflict Rajoy must stop being the President of the government (PSOE).

Pablo Iglesias was mentioned by his party quite frequently (21.52%), but he was also present in all the other accounts (1.82%). This was especially so for the PSOE (4.27%) and Sánchez (4.81%), but also for Albert Rivera (3.19%). Again we find here the contrast we saw with the PP because neither Iglesias (0.43%) nor Podemos (0.7%) was giving much importance to Sánchez.

- (3) Iglesias wants an exclusive and exclusionary negotiation. Pablo Iglesias says that I should not count on his party if I talk to Rivera (Sánchez).

The case of Albert Rivera is quite different from Iglesias. Rivera is the candidate most frequently cited by his own party (43%), the least mentioned by other parties (0.64%), and the second least mentioned by other candidates (0.7%). The party and candidate that mentions him the most are PP (1.54%) and Iglesias (1.29%). While Rivera competes with the PP for the right-wing votes, he competes with Iglesias for voters looking for a new and young candidate.

- (4) Mr Rivera has to submit his proposals. He must stop telling the PP who has to run the party (PP).
- (5) A permanent commission against corruption. Will Rajoy and Rivera talk about this? (Iglesias)

Although Pedro Sánchez was not frequently referred to, this did not apply to his party, which was in fact the most frequently mentioned one (8.22% in total, 3.6% of other parties' tweets and 2.95% of those of other candidates).

The data show that mentioning other candidates was a common strategy, but not in an all-against-all fashion. Though the elections could be read as a competition between old (PP/PSOE) and new parties (Podemos/C's), it is not what we find in their discourses. What they were conveying was the historical confrontation between the PP and PSOE, and a general attack on Mariano Rajoy, as Prime Minister and candidate, and on Pablo Iglesias, the representative of populism. The latter cannot be read as confirmation of the expected old-against-new strategy since he was also attacked by the other new party and candidate, and Rivera was not that relevant for both traditional parties. The difference between PSOE (0.34%) and PP (1.54%) in references to Rivera was expected since PP and C's are right-wing and centre-right parties and, therefore, in more direct rivalry. Something similar can be said about Iglesias' interest in Rivera since both were the newcomers considered the alternative to the established parties.

Us vs. them during the campaigns

In order to compare the campaigns of December 2015 and June 2016, we will look at the position of the candidates' names in the list of words most often used by each party.

During the 2015 official campaign, C's was focused on the traditional parties: Rajoy (16th), PP (51th), Sánchez (56th) and PSOE (58th). However, Pablo Iglesias became more important for them in the 2016 campaign, ranking 815th in December and 95th in June. Besides, the term *populism*, which C's always used to refer to Podemos, moved from the position 394th to the 62nd (in (6), *stagnation* refers to PP and PSOE, the traditional parties, while *populism* refers to Podemos). By contrast, PSOE went from the 44th to the 156th, losing importance.

- (6) There's no need to choose between stagnation and populism. Next Sunday you can choose a #ChangeForTheBetter (C's).

Podemos chose PP (44th) and Rajoy (64th) as their adversaries in both December and June, adding PSOE to the second campaign (it went from 150th position to 50th). It is interesting to note that, whilst IU and Podemos came to an agreement for the June elections, the federal coordinator for IU, Alberto Garzón, only occupied 109th position, while even Ada Colau, the mayor of Barcelona, was in 56th position.

- (7) The country is more corrupt, it is more indebted and we have worse public services. Rajoy should apologize (Podemos).

The PP mentioned the PSOE (18th) and Sánchez (42nd) the most in December as if the new candidates were not taking part in the election. This changed in June when Sánchez was demoted to 82nd position, while Iglesias moved from 578th to 106th and Rivera from 247th to 199th.

- (8) People are starting to see how Sánchez thinks more about his personal interest than about Spain (PP, December).
- (9) If you don't want Pablo Iglesias to come to office, don't divide moderate voters (PP, June).

The PSOE was the party which gave most importance to their adversary, clearly associated in December with Rajoy (5th) and the PP (13th), with other high-ranking items also related to it: #Rajoyyanocuela (10th, #ItWon'tWashAnymore), *right-wing* (56th), and *Bárceñas* (95th, *Bárceñas* being a member of PP accused of corruption). We find the same strategy in June, but with Iglesias rising in importance from 242nd position to 10th.

- (10) Unemployment, inequality and corruption, that is the outcome left by Rajoy (PSOE).

Keywords

Polarization can be found not only in the attacks between candidates but also in the way they present key democratic concepts. As populism is a particular way of understanding democracy and the relation between government and people, we have researched the frames of terms referring to the people (*citizens, people, majority, civil society, country*, and *Spanish/Spaniard*), the word *democracy*, and the references to *populism* itself.

Ciudadanos (*Citizens*)

We expected a high frequency of *ciudadanos* (citizens) since it is the noun in Spanish for the holders of political rights, including the right to vote. However, the data show a different picture. Its frequency is much lower (511.56 per million) than what we find for *gente* (people) (1,609.63 per million), though the latter has a vague meaning. *Citizens* appears as the subject of verbs such as *want, must, vote* and *have*, and occurs typically in phrases like “the questions of the citizens are ...”, “the interests of the citizens are ...”, “the problems of the citizens are ...”, etc. IU is the party that uses it the least.

Although grammatical gender exists in Spanish and there is a morphological distinction between masculine and feminine, which lately has been vindicated as a way of recognizing the discursive presence of women, we find only 0.1% of cases with *ciudadanas* instead of the morphologically unmarked masculine form (all by the PSOE).

- (11) We want schools to educate citizens, not to create patriots or believers (PSOE).

Gente (*people*)

In contrast with this use of *citizens*, the term *gente* (people) seems more complex and typically used by the emerging parties (Podemos and C's). Podemos is the party that uses it the most, followed by C's and IU. It co-occurs with adjectives such as *normal*, *humble*, *ordinary*, *simple*, *decent*, *young*, *good*, *hard-working*, *wonderful* or *common*, which add a positive evaluation. *Gente* is used as a synonym for *people* in its most positive and populist sense. Podemos argues that “our country is the people”, putting them at the centre of the campaign. New parties consider themselves representatives of the “normal” people, who would be arriving for the first time at the institutions, spaces portrayed as previously closed. It is also a way of describing the candidates (e.g. Albert Rivera is portrayed as a “normal young man surrounded by normal people who will change Spain”). Finally, *gente* is used to highlight the addressees of political action in contrast with the elites (traditional politicians and economic elites).

- (12) We have to work for the people, not to end up in a board of directors (Podemos).

Therefore, the use of *gente* is polarizing, picturing a society split into two distinctive sides: an old one ruled by traditional parties in favour of traditional elites; and another one that might be ruled by the new parties in favour of most of the population. Besides, this term frequently appears in emotionally connoted frameworks with words such as *smile*, *hope*, *protection* and *illusion*. The people are characterized as affected by harmful political actions explicitly related to *hatred*, *contempt* and *the unjust suffering caused by the crisis* (as in (13)). Common verbs are *to face (the problems)*, *to fight*, *to teach (lessons)* and *to live from their work*. On the one hand, people are related to positive emotions; on the other, they are presented as good from a moral perspective and brave enough to survive in hard contexts.

- (13) Politics should not be made out of resentment, but thinking about the people who are suffering the consequences of the crisis (IU).

A particular use of *people* is with possessive pronouns. It has high frequencies in all the accounts, especially in Podemos's, in emotional and combative frameworks:

- (14) Never again a country without its people.
 (15) We need institutions that live up to their people.
 (16) For a government that has a duty only to its people.

Pueblo (*people/nation*)

The noun *pueblo*, which can be translated as both *people* and *nation*, shares its Latin root with *populism*. It has very low frequencies in our corpus (385.39 per million). It is used mostly as a synonym of *population* and tends to co-occur with nationalities: French, Sahrawi, Belgian, Ecuadorian, Venezuelan, Turkish, etc., always associated with news such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

- (17) My affection and my solidarity to the French people. Our heart is in Paris. Nos coeur est à Paris (C's).
- (18) At least 80 casualties in three attacks in Baghdad. We express our condolences to the Iraqi people and our strong condemnation (PP).

Mayoría (*majority*)

With a frequency of 1,083 (466.35 per million), the term *mayoría* is preceded by two different types of modifiers: quantity-related modifiers (*absolute*, *immense*, *wide*, *sufficient* and *large*) and quality-related modifiers (*social*, *parliamentary*, *democratic*, *socialist* and *popular*).

In the left-wing parties, we find a repetitive use of the noun phrase *mayoría social* (social majority) (both in singular and plural), as opposed to *élites*, *parliamentary majority*, *large companies*, *minority* and *privileged elite*. As synonyms, we find *clases populares* (lower classes), *clase trabajadora* (working class), and *pobres* (the poor). PSOE also refers to *social majority* and *political majority* when talking about *agreements*.

- (19) But we will make mistakes in favour of the poor, the social majority (IU).
- (20) The only change we are betting on is the one that places the social majority ahead, not the interests of the elites (Podemos).

Mayoría is used by the PSOE and Sánchez as a subject of the expression *La mayoría quiere cambio* (The majority wants change). The *social majority* usually appears in a frame of abuse: it *suffers*, *has been hit*, *has been convinced* (in the sense of *manipulated*), and *they* (the other parties) *want to blackmail it*. There is a frame of powerlessness when *social majority* appears as patient, theme or beneficiary: it is *defended*, *rescued* and *helped*, or *built* and *created*, and others must *govern for it*. And we find abuse again when looking at the use of *mayoría* in sentences where other parties and the government are to blame: they *do not respect it*, they *despise it*, they *govern behind people's backs*, they *exclude it*, they *blackmail it*, they *damage it*, they *do not listen to it*, they *isolate it*, and they *ignore it*.

Sociedad civil (*civil society*)

As we have seen with *pueblo*, *sociedad civil* (civil society) has a low frequency in the corpus (51.24 per million). It was not an issue in the official campaigns,

although it is a common cluster in Spanish politics because of the various social movements working to improve people's social conditions, through a stronger civil society.

País (*country*)

More interesting is the analysis of the noun *país* (country), with many more occurrences (2,329.18 per million). It is used almost exclusively with the possessive pronoun *nuestro* (our) and in positive frames. When looking at its collocates, we see that they all convey hope and promises of renewal: verbs (*change, transform, recover, regenerate, reform*), nouns (*project, future, agreement*) and adjectives (*new, better, fair, democratic*).

Español (*Spanish/Spaniard*)

As expected, *español* (translated as both 'Spanish' and 'Spaniard') is one of the most frequent nouns in the corpus (2,696 tweets). However, it is barely used by the left-wing parties (IU and Podemos). The following discussion is, therefore, focused on C's, PP, PSOE, and their candidates (Rivera, Rajoy and Sánchez).

In general terms, they do not include themselves among the Spaniards, who are usually referred to in the third person. Many tweets seem to be telling Spaniards what Spaniards think and want. C's and the PP use this formula to explain that Spaniards are tired of some things (such as extremism, polarization, politicking, etc.), and it is also common for them to explain what Spaniards know (C's, the PP and the PSOE), what they see (C's, PSOE), what they expect (C's, PP), what they need (C's, PP, PSOE), what they ask for (C's, Rivera), and even why they are voting (C's, PP, PSOE, Rajoy).

(21) The excitement about change is greater than fear and we are confident this is what Spaniards demand (C's).

(22) Spaniards have voted for centrality and demand stability (Rajoy).

Therefore, we see that Spaniards appear empowered by what they can do (the PSOE, PP and C's), but they are also required by what they should do (C's, Rivera, PSOE, PP).

Especially C's, but also Rivera and the PP, use *Spain* and *Spaniards* as if they stood for or were the same thing, as they identify the country with its inhabitants. The latter are usually referred to quantitatively: *millions of Spaniards* (C's, Rivera and PSOE) and *most Spaniards* (C's, Rajoy, Sánchez, Podemos, PP and PSOE).

The PP and Rajoy are the only ones who talk about the future of Spaniards and their well-being, as well as the efforts they have made. Their interests are also mentioned by C's (in addition to the PP and Rajoy), while the problems Spaniards are facing appear in the accounts of all the parties except for IU.

Populismo (*populism*)

Populism is not a very frequent term in our corpus (223 cases, 96.02 per million words), but it has different frames depending on the Twitter account and the context. Right-wing and centre-right parties (the PP and C's) associate *populism* with the *left-wing parties*, *radical leftists* (Catalan) *nationalists* and Barcelona's mayor, Ada Colau (linked to Podemos). In the case of C's and their candidate, it refers to two frames. On the one hand, Catalonia and its separatist movements (C's is a party with Catalan origins). On the other, it is linked to Venezuela (a country that the media linked to Podemos). The PSOE and their candidate mention *populism* in relation to irresponsible right-wing parties and the UK's withdrawal from the European Union (always referred to as *Brexit*).

- (23) #Brexit in the United Kingdom is the confluence of populism with an irresponsible right (Sánchez).

Other collocates of *populism* evoke a frame of fear and chaos: *disaster* (C's), *dangers* (PP), *adventure* (PP) and the need to *vaccinate against it* (as if it were a pandemic phenomenon) (PSOE), while it is described as surrounding us *in continuous growth* (C's) with *arms* and *tentacles* (C's).

- (24) .@MonederoJC The criminals are your friends Chávez and Maduro. Aznar is right: populism is a threat to democracy, also in Spain (PP, tweet addressed to J. C. Monedero, member of Podemos).
- (25) If you ever fall into the tentacles of populism, remember who they applaud or support (C's).

With such negative framing, it is not surprising to find verbs such as *to stop* and *to defeat* with *populism* as patient when the sender of the tweet is the agent; and others such as *to give rise to* and *to favour*, when other parties are the agents.

- (26) To end corruption, regenerate politics, break immobility and stop populism: #ChangeForTheBetter (C's).

Democracia (*democracy*)

Democracy itself was an important topic in the campaigns (597.69 per million). Its relevance proves that the elections were seen as a key moment for the democratic development of the country.

Frequent adjectives with this noun are *internal*, *real*, *healthy*, *gender-equal*, *Spanish*, *mature*, *clean*, *parliamentary*, *full*, *dignified*, *strong*, *true*, *economic* and *European*. Most of them refer to qualities the candidates promise for the Spanish democracy. Some require further comment. *Internal* is related to the particular context where a new bill for the democratic election of party leaders was being discussed.

The same happens with *real* and *true*, which imply that the current democracy is unreal/fake in a context where new parties present themselves as bringing a necessary regeneration of the political system. *Real democracy* was a slogan created by the Indignados movement and it is used here by the parties closer to it (the left-wing parties IU and Podemos), and C's uses it once in relation with the situation in Venezuela. *Democracia limpia* (clean) and *paritaria* (parity) are used exclusively by PSOE.

- (27) A step forward in internal democracy: IU's leadership will be elected by universal suffrage for all militants (IU).
 (28) We jurists know that we have lived in a formal democracy, not in a real democracy (Podemos).
 (29) I am convinced that, sooner rather than later, we will see a real democracy in Venezuela (C's).

We find similar criticisms of the current situation in the modifiers *healthy*, *mature*, *clean*, *full*, *worthy* and *strong*, which imply a democracy lacking in those features. Finally, regarding *democracia económica* (economic democracy), this is a collocation repeated only by IU as something that must be defended, related to *social justice*.

- (30) We were born as a tool to build a democracy worthy of all (Podemos).
 (31) We need an economic democracy, to give power to public authorities over private interests (IU).

The verbs most commonly used with the noun phrase *democracy* as direct object show three different frames. The most common (48.5%) is a frame of acknowledgement with verbs such as *understand*, *have* and *put into practice*. The second frame is that of threat (36.7%), with verbs such as *defend*, *respect*, *hijack*, *ignore* (only C's), *weaken*, *despise* and *destabilize*. Finally, we find a frame of progress and need for improvement (14.8%), with *reform*, *regenerate*, *advance*, *care for*, *recover*, *strengthen*, *improve*, *clean up*, *bring* and *build*.⁶

Finally, with *democracy* as agent or experiencer, we find *to defeat* (*terrorism*) and *to need* (*transparency*, *plural and independent media*, *representatives risen to the occasion*, and *debates and dialogue*).

Polarizing strategies on Twitter?

After having analysed frequencies and collocates in the corpus, we look at other phenomena that are relevant for our research, although they are not among the highest frequencies.

First, references to a historical tradition (and the lack of this reference) seem relevant in the strategies of polarization. Some hashtags are used in this sense, such as #conlapepapodemus (#WithThePepaWeCan) by Podemos. *La Pepa* is a nickname for the 1812 Spanish constitution. The hashtag was posted on its

anniversary, but its use goes far beyond simple commemoration. The Constitution is framed in a tradition of liberal and progressive politics, helping the members of Podemos to establish themselves as heirs to that tradition. The historical roots of every political discourse was a hot topic in the campaigns because two of the main parties were new and the old parties claimed them not to have any experience. For this reason, Podemos made an effort to show that they had a tradition behind them, from historical progressive turning points such as *La Pepa* to the very recent Indignados movement.

Second, there are clear strategies to convey emotional rather than rational messages. The most frequent ones in the corpus are urgency (to vote) and gratitude (for accompanying the candidate and for voting).

- (32) If you don't want Rajoy in the government, you have to vote for the PSOE (Sánchez).
 (33) Thanks to everyone who joined us in the #Ciudadanas event, World TT! (Rivera).

Besides these, there are other, more creative uses of emotional messages. For example, IU created the hashtag #abuelascongarzón (*#GrandmasWithGarzón*), becoming its 14th most used term. IU is a party with a long tradition that goes back to the Spanish Communist Party. However, this reference to grandmothers is an attempt to fill the generational gap by appealing to citizens' emotions: both IU and Podemos had young candidates (30 and 37 years old respectively). Besides, grandmothers are explicitly linked in the tweets to a past (the civil war and the post-war era) where they had to fight for their civil rights. Strong emotions arise in the frames of family and of a suffering (and unjust) past.

- (34) We send our greatest love to our dearest grandmothers; our great fighters. They are the memory and the example. Eternal grandmothers, thank you. #GrandmasWithGarzón and granddaughters too (IU).

Emotional manipulation strategies are key in political discourse (Etxeberria, 2008). Our corpus shows how parties and candidates use Twitter with this in mind. We have already seen examples of negative frames related to bad emotions (e.g. the terms used with *populism*). Podemos and IU were focused on positive frames. Similar to #GrandmasWithGarzón, Podemos chose the hashtag #conmiabupodemos (*#WithMyGranWeCan*), *abu* being an abbreviation for both *grandmother* and *grandfather*, and the hashtag #Unpáisconsufrikis (*#ACountryWithItsNerds*), *friki* being a very informal way of referring to persons who do not have mainstream tastes. #votagarzonprimo (*#VoteForGarzónCousin*) conveys a frame of emotional proximity and confidence thanks to the informality of this register. It helps the candidate to relate himself to the most underprivileged sectors of society, those where *primo* (*cousin*) is frequently used as a synonym for *friend* or *colleague*.

Third, *transparency* becomes a key term in order to identify the parties with citizens' interests. Both the visibility of the campaign teams and their explicit commitment to transparency are two important innovations in the political discourse produced in these campaigns. Some accounts made it clear that, behind the appearance of spontaneity of the candidates and parties' tweets, there were teams of communication advisers. Mariano Rajoy tagged with his initials (*MR*) those messages in his account that were actually written by him. IU was the party with the most direct strategy for transparency, the hashtag *#lacuevadegarzón* (*#TheCaveOfGarzón*) being the tag chosen by his team as signature, the 13th most frequent word in the account. The advisory team thus constitutes an identified political actor that participates, interacts and generates conversation.

Fourth, the campaigns on Twitter hide one of the most relevant political issues in Spain: the different types of nationalisms operating in the country. Madrid is the only geographical location in our corpus that is not a reference to a campaign event, and there are very few messages in languages other than Spanish, despite Catalan, Basque and Galician being official languages in some regions.

Conclusion

We find paradoxical behaviour in the campaigns on Twitter. While we have seen strategies that might intensify polarization, we have also found others that homogenize discourses. In general, the messages are similar, while controversial topics, which we expected to be the base for differentiation, are overshadowed by more general and incidental ones. Every account conveys the idea that its candidate would be the best option for Spain, but without basing this on specific measures.

The keyword analysis has allowed us to find some typical strategies of polarization and populism. The political landscape is pictured as divided into two sides: on the one hand the elite, frequently identified with the traditional parties, but also with the new *unrealistic* politicians, sometimes compared with the leaders of Venezuela; and on the other, the *people*, who want change and radical improvements in the country. We have seen that this key notion for populism (*pueblo*) is mentioned as *social majority*, *country*, *people* (*gente*), and is preferred over other terms such as *citizens* or *civil society*, which would imply democratic values more directly.

We have also seen that the messages appeal to voters' emotions rather than to concrete proposals. There are many examples of both negative and positive emotional strategies. The former (mostly in the case of the PP and C's) are related to the threat that some choices might mean for the country. Democracy is pictured as fragile and in need of strong defenders. Positive strategies (mostly in the case of IU and Podemos) are related to hope, and this hope seems to have its roots in the past, in a long story of a fight between antidemocratic powers and the normal people (exemplified by the 1812 Constitution, and the grandparents who fought and survived the Spanish civil war and the post-war period).

When looking at the content, we find low frequencies that are really distinctive. IU, for example, emphasizes the idea of taking the (political) fight to the streets. C's gives importance to *Spain* as a reference point, to a need for *regeneration*, and to the idea of *innovation* as a key factor for the future. The PP reiterates the reference to the *years* during which they have governed, as proof of their experience and know-how. The PSOE insists on its *commitment* to the country. With Podemos, a *need for a change* stands out. As we see, they are not strong stances since they do not tell us much about what these parties are going to do differently if they win the elections.

The 140-character restriction, in place on Twitter during the analysed period, might favour the use of emotional messages: tweets must be short and with a direct impact (since they compete with many others). Populist discourse seems to fit into this context, but it also gives a simplified and polarized picture of society. To take an example of simplification, identifying Angela Merkel with Europe in a context of crisis reinforces the framing of Germany's chancellor as the only person responsible for the EU's austerity measures. Regarding polarization, linking democracy to the republic and to the fight of the elderly (*our grandparents*) reinforces the framing of the elections as a fight between two opposing sides (direct heirs of the civil war).

Polarization is based here on populist messages; we have not found interest in real discussions. Other candidates are mentioned in order to discredit them, not to establish a debate or to compare specific measures. Strategies of simplification through binary contrasts and appeals to emotions are not new in politics, but Twitter's design seems to fit them perfectly.

Notes

- 1 The study reported in this chapter is part of the project *Estrategias de encuadre y articulación del discurso político en 140 caracteres*, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (FFI-2014-53958-P). We are grateful to the members of our research group *Wor(l)ds Lab* at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (www.worldslab.eu), especially to Vanessa Amessa for helping us with the translation of the tweets.
- 2 All the examples and text in Spanish have been translated into English.
- 3 See note 1.
- 4 Data can be consulted on the project's website: <http://www.worldslab.eu/marcopolo>
- 5 Though we have found some exceptions, it was the case in most of the messages.
- 6 We wondered whether these frames were the most common ones for democracy in general. We compared these figures with the EsEuTenTen corpus (Kilgarrieff 2013), a large text corpus (1,992 millions of words) created from internet texts in European Spanish. We find similar frames (Table 3), but with different percentages: improvement (47%), threat (27.1%) and acknowledgment (25.8%). Therefore, we can see how the threat frame is intensified during the campaign.

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7

IMAGINING THE PEOPLE IN UKIP AND LABOUR

Ruth Breeze

Introduction

Europe has recently seen a rise in populist movements, as trust in mainstream political parties has been undermined by the financial crisis and by perceptions of widespread corruption. Some discourse-oriented studies have shown how new political movements use charismatic personalities and striking discursive strategies to attract media attention and appeal to particular sectors of the electorate (Wodak and KhosraviNik, 2013). However, so far, relatively little attention has focused on how so-called populist parties try to reset the public agenda by highlighting specific topics, or by promoting a particular evaluative framing of the issues of the day.

Regarding populism, this chapter takes its theoretical starting point from Moffitt's (2016) account of populism as a political style that exploits the classic division between "the people" and "the elite". By applying a logic of equivalence that constructs antagonistic relations in an "us–them" fashion, populists blur the distinction between different social demands and dichotomise the political space to their own ends (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 130). It also builds on the awareness of other salient characteristics of populist movements:

- (i) Their performance and perpetuation of a sense of "crisis" (Moffitt and Tormey, 2013).
- (ii) Their status as the embodiment of "protest" (Taggart, 2000).
- (iii) Their hostility to "organised" or "representative" politics (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).
- (iv) Their reliance on topoi involving fear and danger to simplify complex arguments (Wodak, 2015).
- (v) And, particularly in the case of right-wing populism, their demotic and "low-brow" style (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Ostiguy, 2009).

This conceptual framework will be used to draw out possible interpretations of the differences found in the comparative analysis and to explicate the discursive performances of the parties within a wider context.

In methodological terms, research on populist discourse often runs the risk of circularity; a self-fulfilling prophecy is in operation whereby a party is defined as populist, and then features of its language are identified and proclaimed to be typically populist, without taking into account two important points. First, all political parties sometimes use strong, rhetorical language to engage with their audience. Second, all opposition parties exercise fierce criticism of parties in power, through negative and/or hyperbolic language. For these reasons, a comparative approach is necessary, contrasting the discursive production of parties with different agenda-setting strategies and communicative styles, but with a comparable position in the political system. This comparison should ideally also set out from some objective standpoint, exploiting quantitative methods to detect differences between parties and triangulating this with close qualitative analysis of the more salient contrasts.

With these points in mind, I conducted a systematic study of the news articles published on the websites of the two main UK opposition parties, Labour and UKIP, in the first three months of 2017. Since both parties were in opposition at that time, they were likely both to be extremely critical of the Conservative government and to offer alternative ideas in order to attract public interest. However, UKIP is a newcomer on the political scene, while Labour is one of the two main parties in the UK and held power from 1997 to 2010. UKIP is broadly classified as a right-wing populist party, with high visibility, a deliberately shocking style and an outspoken anti-establishment stance (Bennett, 2019). Labour under Jeremy Corbyn, though also claiming to represent the people, is generally thought to adopt a more mainstream approach to politics, respecting discursive norms and the status quo, and avoiding sensationalism. These two parties thus provide a test case to identify differences between populist and non-populist political discourse.

In this chapter, I start from a quantitative semantic exploration of the differences between the two news sites and then use discourse analysis techniques to scrutinise further some areas relevant to the themes mentioned above.

Material and method

This chapter proposes an approach to the study of political discourse using a mixed-methods approach. The study focuses on the first three months of 2017, which was a particularly interesting period: the country was still in confusion over Brexit; there were two high-profile by-elections in February and a terrorist attack on the Houses of Parliament on 26 March; and Article 50, triggering the UK's exit from the EU, was finally put into operation after several legal challenges on 29 March. Four corpora were created using the official news sites of Labour and UKIP for the first three months of 2017 (see Table 7.1).

TABLE 7.1 Corpus data

<i>Period</i>	<i>1 January–15 February 2017</i>		<i>16 February–31 March 2017</i>	
<i>Party</i>	<i>UKIP 1</i>	<i>Labour 1</i>	<i>UKIP 2</i>	<i>Labour 2</i>
No. tokens	19,395	38,250	17,862	53,651
No. types	4,205	4,369	3,918	6,650
No. semantic tags	334	351	328	381

Two corpora were created for each party in order to provide a rough measure of internal consistency; for example, if both UKIP corpora showed a high frequency of a particular feature, this would suggest that this is not just a temporary phenomenon associated with, say, a single news item. Moreover, this also enabled us to compare the two corpora for each period with each other (UKIP1 with Labour1, for example), which was useful to test for consistency and to identify potential areas of thematic overlap.

To reduce the risk of circularity, I began by adopting an exploratory approach using quantitative semantic analysis in order to identify salient aspects of each party's news sites and to make a comparison between them. Both UKIP and Labour news corpora were uploaded to Wmatrix3 (Rayson, 2008) for semantic tagging; the top content-bearing semantic areas were identified in order to establish what each corpus was about; subsequently, key semantic areas were identified with respect to the other corpus covering the same time period.

Once I had established which semantic areas were most prominent for each party in each period, I conducted a qualitative examination of the co-text of words belonging to areas identified as important. Thus, for example, if "politics" emerged as frequent in UKIP rather than Labour, I looked at the frequencies of the different words belonging to this semantic area and at the concordance lines found, in order to develop a sense of the most typical meanings and connotations of these words in the party discourse. I followed the principles of corpus-assisted discourse analysis (Partington and Marchi, 2015).

Results

In the initial stage of the analysis, I compared the semantic areas that were statistically more frequent in one corpus to the other for the same period. This keyness study revealed a considerable amount of information about the ways in which these corpora differed.

Overview: contrastive semantic analysis

Key semantic areas in each corpus were identified in Wmatrix3 using the other corpus from the same period as reference. This brought out the areas of meaning that were particularly prominent in each party's news site (see Table 7.2).

TABLE 7.2 Key semantic areas identified using the other party's news during the same period as reference corpus

<i>Rank</i>	<i>UKIP 1</i>	<i>UKIP 2</i>	<i>Labour 1</i>	<i>Labour 2</i>
1	Living creatures	Warfare, defence and the army	Government	Work and employment generally
2	Warfare, defence and the army	Sailing, swimming	General actions: making	Health and disease
3	Politics	Substances: liquid	Business generally	Government
4	Sensible	Speech acts	Money and pay	Money and pay
5	Sailing, swimming	Violent, angry	Work and employment generally	Business generally
6	Judgement of appearance: positive	Living creatures	Difficult	Architecture, houses and buildings
7	Easy	Foolish	Failure	General actions: making
8	Flying and aircraft	Politics	Health and disease	Belonging to a group
9	Substances: liquid	In power	Strong obligation and necessity	Cheap
10	Science and technology	Farming and horticulture	Industry	Difficult

Table 7.2 provides an overview of key semantic areas in the two UKIP and two Labour news corpora. In what follows, I shall provide an explanation of the results based on an analysis of the words within each category and their associated co-text.

Key thematic strands

The sword and the ploughshare

The most striking phenomenon observable in Table 7.2 is that UKIP's press site has a powerful obsession with military issues. In fact, the emphasis placed on military matters is even greater than the table suggests at first sight, because the labels are misleading. On closer inspection, it turns out that almost all the items in both "sailing, swimming" and "flying and aircraft" also represent aspects of "warfare, defence and the army", as do many of the items in "science and technology". This means that no fewer than four of the top ten semantic content areas in the UKIP news corpora are related to the armed forces and defence issues. As the following excerpts show, the UKIP site rejoices in clichéd allusions to Britain's past as a military power and contrasts former glories

with the current state of neglect caused by what they represent as government indifference:

- (1) I want a Navy that is restored to ruling the waves, not a laughing stock, where we have no missiles on our destroyers and no paint or planes on our aircraft carriers (UKIP News, 30 March).
- (2) It is clear to me that our Armed Forces are woefully underfunded with rock bottom morale (UKIP News, 30 January).

The UKIP defence spokesman is one of the most active contributors to the news site, and voices the popular sympathy for the army and concern about the state of its equipment, which are recurring themes in the tabloid press, where they are often treated with a full array of discursive manifestations of “banal nationalism” (Billig, 1995, p. 38). On a different note, this theme also arises within the context of the anti-EU discourses that form the mainstay of UKIP’s argumentation, with the spectre of “an EU army” raised:

- (3) The UK and Polish governments have denied this is a move towards an EU military headquarters (UKIP News, 3 March).

Oddly, Table 7.2 also shows that UKIP displays a keen interest in issues related to “living creatures”. This reflects a constant thematic strand relating to domestic animals in the context of farming (“farming and horticulture” also has high keyness in UKIP2; “fishing”, though not in the top ten, is relatively high in UKIP1). The theme of farming is represented emotively, with connotations of an idealised “rural England” to which voters could feel a strong bond of affinity. However, the topics of farming and fishing ultimately often turn out to be related to EU issues:

- (4) Poultry farmers do not receive EU subsidies like other farmers (UKIP News, 1 February).
- (5) The EU realised long ago the quality and value of the fish caught in British waters, and that is why they were so keen to grab control of our fishing grounds (UKIP News, 5 April).

One other notable semantic area with high keyness in UKIP 1 is “judgement of appearance”. The reason for this is interesting in its ideological and psychological implications. The site uses a range of items to exalt the natural beauty of various aspects of the British Isles. One of UKIP’s rhetorical stock-in-trades is its “celebration” of Britishness, which is materialised here in advertising-like references to different aspects of British heritage:

- (6) Bath is one of the most stunning cities in the whole of the UK (UKIP News, 26 January).

- (7) Otherwise many more important and beautiful historical items will leave our shores forever (UKIP News, 20 January).

UKIP spokespeople even make reference to well-known patriotic hymns, tapping the symbolic potential of national identity on a banal level (Billig, 1995), as in the reference to the hymn “Jerusalem” underlined in the following example:

- (8) Bathampton meadows show off everything that is great about the UK’s green and pleasant lands and the establishment elite do not care about covering it all (UKIP News, 26 January).

The semantic range that emerges as peculiarly characteristic of UKIP in quantitative terms thus centres around three main issues: the armed forces, farming and “beautiful Britain”. None of them is central for other political parties; nevertheless, all of them hold an appeal which is more emotional than rational, evoking an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983, pp. 5–6) with shared emotional dispositions, engaged in (or at least, symbolically allied with) traditional pursuits such as farming, a beautiful “heartland” in need of defence (Canovan, 1981; Wodak, 2015, p. 77).

By contrast, the keyness ranking of Labour news shows a more conventional focus on the issues of economy, employment and health, which form the staple of mainstream British political debate. The semantic categories “business generally”, “money and pay”, “work and employment generally”, “industry” and “cheap” all consist of items referring to the economy, employment and wages. The category “health and disease” contains items almost all of which refer in some way to the theme of “health and social care”, and the state of the National Health Service:

- (9) Living standards are being squeezed and working people are being hit hard (Labour News, 5 March).
 (10) The NHS is going through the biggest financial squeeze in its history (Labour News, 3 March).

This basic thematic contrast (the armed forces and farming vs. money, jobs and health) points to a key difference between the two parties’ discourses. UKIP started out as a one-issue party (anti-EU), which broadened its focus somewhat as it gained strength (chiefly to encompass issues related to migration) (Bennett, 2019). The evidence from the present study suggests that UKIP has now broadened its scope rather more to two areas that have rather greater symbolic importance than actual relevance in UK public life, namely farming/fishing and the armed forces. This might be understood as a way of attracting attention by focusing on specific issues rather than dispersing one’s media activity across a range of topics. However, in fact, the actual choice of issues is rather significant in itself; both the armed forces and the agricultural world are topics that have a

high profile in the tabloid press, with an appeal at once emotional and patriotic. These topics also have organic associations with UKIP's defining role as the anti-European party. We can contrast this with Labour's approach; as a mainstream party with a long history of being in government, Labour covers the range of topics about which a party with ambitions to govern would be expected to provide serious ideas and workable proposals.

Government or politics

Interestingly, "government" turns out to be particularly salient in Labour, while UKIP overall has consistently more items tagged as "politics". Labour news abounds with references to the government, MPs, the Prime Minister, other Ministers and other governmental institutions (see Table 7.3).

Labour's references to the government are generally negative, as would be expected from an opposition party, but the style of expression is moderate:

- (11) Businesses and councils need far more support and stability than the Government is currently offering (Labour News, 4 March).
- (12) Women are still bearing the brunt of this Tory Government's failed austerity agenda (Labour News, 9 March).

Although Labour is critical towards the status quo, its target is clearly defined as "the government" (the institution actually responsible for policy), and "Tories", rather than politicians as a class, or the establishment as a whole. Labour news rarely uses the word "politicians", and when it does, it is usually qualified in some way (e.g. "right-wing politicians", "politicians who have an agenda the BBC does not share") or linked with non-evaluative referents (e.g. "ambassadors and politicians across Europe").

By contrast, UKIP tends to refer to MPs as "politicians", usually in combination with verbs that have extremely negative connotations (Labour talks about the "government" having a "failed agenda" or offering insufficient "stability", but UKIP talks about "politicians" who "steal" or "parrot"):

- (13) Fishermen knew in 1972 that their industry had been stolen from them by politicians desperate to get into the EEC club (UKIP News, 16 February).
- (14) Though it's gratifying that politicians and pressure groups are now parroting what we have been saying for a decade (UKIP News, 13 March).

This phenomenon shows a greater tendency in UKIP to follow the populist topos of "politicians versus the people", in which "politicians" are delegitimised; in these examples, politicians are clearly incompetent ("parroting what we have been saying for a decade"), and the people are positioned as their victims ("their industry had been stolen from them"). This feature of UKIP's texts ties in with a recurring theme in populist discourse, in which speakers attempt to discredit

TABLE 7.3 Most frequent lemmas in semantic fields “government” and “politics” (frequency/100)

<i>Semantic area: government</i>		<i>Semantic area: politics</i>					
<i>UKIP 1</i>	<i>UKIP 2</i>	<i>Labour 1</i>	<i>Labour 2</i>	<i>UKIP 1</i>	<i>UKIP 2</i>	<i>Labour 1</i>	<i>Labour 2</i>
Government (0.34)	Government (0.39)	Government (0.92)	Government (0.84)	UKIP (0.72)	UKIP (0.68)	Tory (0.65)	Tory (0.39)
Country (0.19)	Country (0.13)	MP (0.58)	MP (0.28)	Labour (0.15)	Politician (0.14)	Labour (0.25)	Labour (0.33)
MP (0.1)	Citizens (0.1)	Country (0.19)	Country (0.24)	Political (0.09)	Referendum (0.1)	Conservative (0.08)	Referendum (0.05)
Parliament (0.09)	Parliament (0.08)	Prime Minister (0.18)	Prime Minister (0.16)	Tory (0.09)	Political (0.09)	Vote (0.05)	Conservative (0.05)

not one particular party but the entire political establishment.¹ The stance against politicians establishes a “logic of equivalence” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 176), in that it projects the existence of an enemy who can be held responsible for the whole range of unsatisfied social demands. This can be interpreted as an aspect of the particular political logic of populism, which revolves around the claim to represent ‘the people’, who are discursively constructed by pitting ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ as a small but powerful group that frustrates the former’s legitimate demands (Mudde, 2007; De Cleen, 2018). By vilifying politicians as a class, UKIP goes further along the road to envisioning a polarised society in which it can speak out for “the people” against its supposed adversaries (Moffitt, 2016).

Evaluative regime

Some of the most striking differences between UKIP and Labour news are those related to semantic areas that might first appear to be neutral or offer little ideological potential. “Easy”, “sensible” and “foolish” in UKIP, “difficult” and “failure” in Labour. A sixth category, “success”, was added for the sake of balance, and frequencies of these in all four corpora were obtained (Figure 7.1).

Interestingly, Labour news evidently has a trend towards higher scores for the negative elements here, while UKIP has a greater frequency of the value judgements. In what follows, I explain these findings further and discuss how they can be related to what we might term the “evaluative regime” which underpins the discourses used by the two parties.

One striking feature of Figure 7.1 is that UKIP news contains more items related to simplicity, while Labour gives over twice as much prominence to difficulty. The tag for “easy” is particularly common in UKIP1, where many problems are presented as having “simple” solutions:




FIGURE 7.1 “Easy”/“difficult”, “success”/“failure” and “sensible”/“foolish” in UKIP and Labour.

- (15) There is a simple, cost-free solution to the problem of health tourism, and that is to not allow any foreign national into the country (UKIP News, 6 February).

Obviously, the “simple” solutions proposed here are far from simple, but the fact that they are presented as easy, in a way reminiscent of some of Donald Trump’s speeches (Breeze, 2017), fits with UKIP’s political style. Previous characterisations of populist discourse have emphasised its “simplistic” message and style (Taguieff, 1998; Mudde, 2004).

Both UKIP corpora also show considerable reliance on the notion of “sense” as opposed to “foolishness”, two semantic areas almost absent from the Labour corpora. “Common sense” is often used to build arguments against certain types of policy, particularly those coming from the EU, framed as “ridiculous”, “illogical” and “absurd”.

- (16) It is yet another piece of crazy, nonsensical legislation being imposed on the UK, which flies in the face of common sense and penalises the ordinary, law abiding man and woman on the street (UKIP News, 16 January).

Elsewhere the virtue of common sense is celebrated when a conservative politician is praised for his “customary good sense and leadership”, or a company has shown “a welcome dose of common sense”. Perceived opponents are often characterised as having a lack of sense:

- (17) This astonishingly illiberal and illogical measure will mean that newspapers can be made to pay huge legal costs for the sin of telling the truth (UKIP News, 4 January).
- (18) I have opposed HS2 from the start, and this preposterous and distasteful revelation proves why I am right to have done so (UKIP News, 22 March).

The net effect of these judgements is to create the sensation that those in power (other politicians, government, EU) have taken leave of their senses and that the only people still in touch with “common sense” are UKIP and the ordinary people whom it claims to represent. Wodak (2015, p.2) discusses the “arrogance of ignorance” and observes that a common feature across right-wing populists is their recourse to “common sense” language. From a different perspective, Ostiguy’s (2009) analysis of the “high” and “low” in politics has drawn attention to the cultivation of a demotic, folksy, plain-speaking approach by many populist politicians, regardless of their ideological leanings. The “low” style in politics is geared towards making voters believe that a politician is “one of ours”; this is not just a question of style, but links “deeply with a society’s history, existing group differences, identities and resentments” (Ostiguy, 2009, p. 6). Socio-cultural aspects of politicians do not necessarily become politicised, but they may sometimes do so, and “social identities with their many cultural attributes interact

with political identities” (Ostiguy, 2009, p. 9) to create a sense of trust based on an assumption of shared values, interests or understandings. In the case of UKIP, the curious charisma of Farage has been discussed by Wodak (2015, p. 125), who notes that, despite belonging to the social elite, Farage was able to convince ordinary voters that “he speaks my language”. Frequent reference to “common sense”, as opposed to what is “illogical” and “ridiculous”, plays a significant role in framing the news reported on the UKIP site, and in reaffirming the view that a few simple solutions will suffice to solve all our problems.

By contrast, Labour news uses hardly any items tagged as “sensible” or “foolish”, since these parameters are not part of their evaluative system. Instead, Labour news projects a more complex understanding of the world in which black and white give way to shades of grey. In Labour’s worldview, mistakes have been made, parties have “wrong priorities”, the Brexit negotiations are “fiendishly difficult”, the government may make steps “in the right direction”, but also take “shambolic decisions”, and so on. In Ostiguy (2009), the analyses of the UK’s problems offered by Labour are “high”, appealing to a more educated public, and providing more nuanced judgements. The categories of sense/foolishness are rarely used, reserved for characterising specific, accurately defined decisions, and are not generalised to cover broad areas of policy or large groups of people.

On the other hand, Labour does give particular prominence to the discourse of crisis, which accounts for the frequency of the semantic area “difficult”. Labour’s news abounds with references to “the social care crisis”, “the housing crisis”, “the NHS crisis”, as well as the more predictable “financial crisis”. Other items tagged as “difficult” include words such as “turbulent” (“these turbulent times”), “burden” (“the burden of debt”), “problems” (“NHS problems are worse and more widespread”), “struggling” (“schools are struggling to plug the massive budget deficit”), “austerity” (“this government’s distorted austerity agenda”), “hardship” (“extreme hardship, poverty and stress”), and so on. Blame is not specifically apportioned; rather, the situation is accepted as a crisis, and a Labour spokesperson proposes a solution of a technical kind. Named culprits are usually “the present government” or “Tory policy”.

Items about problems and difficulties are also fairly frequent in UKIP news, but with the difference that, for UKIP, blame is attributed to completely different causes; the reader is left in no doubt that the “crisis” is caused by migration, on the one hand, and asymmetry in UK relations with the EU, on the other. By the same token, the people who are suffering from these crises are also envisaged differently; in UKIP news, “hardship”, for example, is borne by members of the armed forces or by “struggling small businesses”, rather than by the population groups which Labour envisages as suffering (e.g. the elderly, the unemployed, etc.).

The literature on populism has often pointed to the tendency to create and perpetuate a sense of crisis as highly characteristic of populist discourse (Moffitt, 2016). Here, it seems that the struggle between these two parties is not about whether Britain is facing a crisis, but about what kind of crisis this

is. Are we looking at the classic problem of austerity caused by (misguided) government policies, or are we looking at a crisis of national identity in which external enemies (migrants and the EU) can be blamed for all the other problems that might arise? While Labour bemoans the “problems” of housing, the economy or the NHS, UKIP ascribes the UK’s difficulties to “the immigration problem”, which is presented as responsible for economic, social and other ills of the country:

- (19) It does not take a genius to understand that if you allow well over a million immigrants, mostly unaccompanied young men, into Europe there will be problems with harassment and attacks on women (UKIP News, 5 January).

Having said that, we can also see from Figure 7.1 that, although “difficult” is relatively frequent in all four corpora, it is found much more often in Labour news, and so it is not fair to say that UKIP’s discourse dwells more on the topos of crisis than Labour does. The difference lies in the nature of the blame attributed in each case, and in the purported availability of “simple” solutions, a feature of UKIP’s discourse to which we shall return below.

Finally, the semantic tag pinpointing elements relating to failure, loss and defeat, is particularly frequent in the two Labour corpora. Interestingly, the phrases “seven years of Tory economic failure”, “Tory abject failure” and “Tory failure” recur with considerable regularity, mantras repeated by different writers across reports. “Failed” and “failing” also correlate strongly with “the prime minister” and “the Tory government”. UKIP’s (fewer) attributions of failure again steer away from issues related to austerity or economic policy, to the topic of migration (“they have totally failed in bringing the numbers down”), and to European failures (to meet spending targets, to control crime, or to protect the environment). As for the positive correlate, the overwhelming majority of instances in the corpus reinforce the negative message conveyed by “failure”, as they mainly occur in sentences with negative polarity (“the UK does not have a proper and effective negotiating team”) or in recommendations for the future (“Government needs to live up to its moral and legal obligation to help people fleeing persecution and war”). In the references to success and failure, then, as in the case of “crisis”, Labour seems to place more emphasis on negative performance in general, while for UKIP this negative discourse is more circumscribed, focusing on two specific causes (migration and the EU), with the result that the problem is presented as “easier” to solve.

Discussion

This chapter uses quantitative semantic analysis to identify differences between the news published on the party websites of Labour and UKIP during the first three months of 2017. Corpus linguistic and discourse analytical techniques are used to gain a deeper understanding of salient areas in each party’s discourses,

and comparisons are made with the existing bibliography on populist versus non-populist (mainstream, bureaucratic or “high-brow”) political discourses.

The analysis presented here shows that the two parties’ news sites differ considerably in terms of thematic content, with Labour news focusing mainly on the staple issues of British politics (economy, health, jobs), while UKIP foregrounds marginal but colourful issues whose importance is more symbolic than real (the armed forces, agriculture, fishing) and celebrates national identity. Interpreted in terms of political content, Labour’s concerns are seriously geared towards addressing issues of the day, while UKIP’s messages seem to be designed to bring topics that are neglected by other parties into the public eye and, thereby, create a new political agenda in which they can achieve prominence. Building on their successes at politicising discontent and influencing public opinion over Brexit and immigration policy, UKIP appears to be widening its sphere of interest to other issues that have some popular appeal and are likely to attract media attention. It is also clear, however, that prominent foci of interest such as agriculture and the army are very often articulated with UKIP’s anti-EU stance, which still provides the overarching narrative that gives consistency to UKIP’s discourses.

Moving on from this to a more detailed analysis of the semantic areas that stand out in each party’s news sites, we examine various lexical areas that are prominent in one or other sites and show how the lines of division open up. The fault lines that appear enable us to identify and analyse a series of contrasts related to the way the parties communicate rather than what they communicate about. These include a preference for discussing “government” rather than “politics” and for referring to “difficulty”, on the one hand, or “simplicity” and “common sense”, on the other.

If we start from Moffitt and Tormey’s (2013) understanding of populism as a “style” or repertoire of performance used to create political relations, we can see how the UKIP “style” contains many of the elements discussed in the recent bibliography on populism. These elements include the dichotomous view of society as “the people” versus “the elite”, the “heartland”, and the primacy of “common sense” and “simplicity” when offering explanations and solutions. In what follows, I shall look briefly at each of these in turn.

The core feature of populism identified by most authors is the vision of society as ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: in Mudde’s (2004, p. 543) words, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’. This is epitomised in UKIP’s discourse, where “politicians” and “the political elite” are positioned antagonistically as an enemy trying to “frustrate the will of the people”. Celebration of the “heartland” (Canovan, 1981; Wodak, 2015) – its natural beauty, its agriculture and fishing, and the armed forces that defend it – plays a role in this, since all of these signifiers are joined together as a loose configuration of symbolic elements that are somehow threatened by the “establishment elite”. These are not exactly the unmet social demands envisaged by Laclau (2005) as giving force to populist movements, but in the British context, they have high symbolic value, drawing on a shared imaginaire which owes

much to nostalgia, as well as to tabloid culture. As Stavrakakis (1999, p. 82) says, “all political projects to reconstitute society as a well-ordered and harmonious ensemble aim at this impossible object which reduces utopia to a fantasmatic screen”; in the case of UKIP, the “state of fullness” envisaged seems to be an imagined pastoral England animated by 1940s patriotism. Moreover, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) indicate, the “chain of equivalences” is forged not through positive features the elements share, but rather in their common opposition to a particular adversary (Borriello, 2019). In some sense, the issues foregrounded by UKIP play on the loss of identity sparked by globalisation, exacerbated by the insecurity resulting from distrust of political institutions, which has largely been ignored in mainstream political discourses in many countries (Weyland, 2001, p. 5). By placing these elements (identity loss, nostalgia, insecurity, longing) together in loose juxtaposition, and in contrast to malignant forces from outside (the EU, migrants) and from within (the liberal establishment), the emergent subject (the British people) and its opponents are brought forth into the public arena to powerful effect.

The theme of “common sense” is another leitmotif in the bibliography on populist discourse (Rosenfeld, 2011). According to Canovan (1999, p. 15), populists rarely attempt “deep thought”, and “their characteristic style is a mixture of homespun common sense and emotional appeals”. This tends to be contrasted with more technocratic or bureaucratic approaches to political communication, which present issues and policies using technical analyses and rational arguments (Moffitt, 2016). This chapter has shown how UKIP exploits the notions of common sense and simplicity in its diagnoses and its solutions, ridiculing and delegitimising its opponents, their actions and explanations, and the proposals they offer. Labour, on the other hand, adopts a more intellectual, analytical approach, giving reasoned explanations as to why it disagrees with particular policies.

One detail in all of this is also worth noting. The violation of political correctness has a particular role in the affective dimension of UKIP news, tying in with what has been observed elsewhere (Arditi, 2007). The overtly non-PC stance is a further way of embodying the “low” or “vernacular” style in politics (Ostiguy, 2009), in which class differences are politicised in an “us” versus “them” scenario. But in the case of political correctness, it is more than this; anti-PC discourses represent both a conscious attack on the “liberal establishment”, which is felt to have sacrificed ordinary people’s interests, and also a deliberate way of attracting media attention and bringing the party to a wider audience. As Greven (2016, p. 6) points out, “right-wing populists receive a lot of free media attention because of the provocative, emotional and simplified nature of their political communication”. Parties like UKIP have evolved marked strategies of provocation to exploit the mechanisms of the media, earning free coverage, and ultimately enhancing the effectiveness of their messages.

Finally, regarding methodology, it remains to be said that quantitative semantic analysis has proven useful, enabling me to approach these discourses in an exploratory spirit, avoiding researcher bias, and thus to provide a solid basis for

qualitative examination. Despite the obvious limitations of the present study in terms of time span and corpus size, the methodology trialled in this chapter offers potential for handling much larger data samples efficiently and accurately.

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Note

- 1 The keyness of the area “in power”, in UKIP2, is due to the frequent use of the term “leader”, particularly “UKIP leader”. However, even though this is used more by UKIP, it is the standard term to refer to heads of British political parties and is also frequently used by Labour to refer to Corbyn.

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8

FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW

A transitivity analysis of Labour's 2017 manifesto as a driving force for promoting a populist Britain

Leanne Bartley

Introduction

There is some speculation as to whether the current Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, is or is not a populist. With articles published in *The Guardian* (cf. Baggini, 2016; Stewart and Elgot, 2016) claiming that “if Jeremy Corbyn is re-elected as Labour leader, it will be a mild-mannered socialist who will have led the most successful populist campaign in Britain in decades” and “his backers believe his populist credentials, seen in a series of rallies throughout the summer [...] could be one of Labour's strongest weapons”, it is clear that the notion of Corbyn as a populist leader is gaining recognition in Britain. To add to these, John Gray, an English political philosopher and retired professor of the London School of Economics and Political Science, argues that “Labour has been modernised [...] Corbyn has brought together some of the most vital forces on the contemporary scene [...] Nothing could be more exotically modern than Corbyn's hybrid populism” (Gray, 2017). Of a similar opinion to Gray (2017) is Chantal Mouffe, a political theorist based at the University of Westminster. In an article originally published in *Le Vent se Lève* and subsequently translated by Liam Farrell for the online blog of the independent, radical publishing house Verso Books, Mouffe (2018) asserts that “Jeremy Corbyn represents the success of left populism”. Contrary to these ideas, however, Maignushca and Dean (forthcoming) insist that to characterise Jeremy Corbyn as a populist would be erroneous on the grounds that the definition of populism would, as a result, be meaningless. Thus, with academics and non-academics alike debating this issue, what comes to the forefront are the different ways in which the term *populism* is conceived of, which, over time and across regions as well as across political spectrums, appears to have acquired different interpretations (cf. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). As Taggart (2000, p. 10) puts it, “the term is used

widely, but often defined narrowly”, resulting in a rather ambivalent concept. In view of this, it is worthwhile now to outline the features often associated with populism more generally (cf. Clark *et al.*, 2008, p. 524; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 9–19), before proceeding to describe right-wing vs. left-wing populism. Acknowledgement of the latter distinction is paramount here, given that Jeremy Corbyn leads a centre-left mainstream party, which is also why he is considered an unlikely populist.

According to Akkerman (2003, p. 148), the term populism was first officially used in connection with the North American People’s party and a Russian political movement, known as the Narodniki, in the 19th century. Those political leaders originally labelled as populist were considered to have radical political ideas (Allcock, 1971, p. 372), strongly supporting, for instance, a rural society whilst demonising an urban one. Nonetheless, by the early 20th century, the term populism had acquired associations with the politics of the people (Canovan, 2002, p. 25), and by the mid-1950s, was mainly discussed in relation to American politics (cf. Shils, 1954) to denote the belief that the common people are not merely equal, but superior to those in authority, thereby undermining authoritative figures, politicians included. Somewhat related is Kornhauser’s (1960, p. 129) argument that populism embodies the relationship between the elite and non-elite and, more specifically, the process of satisfying the needs of the non-elite at the expense of the elite (see also Wodak, 2015, p. 7). This has come to be a widely accepted understanding of populism, i.e. a strong anti-establishment and anti-elitist attitude (cf. Canovan, 2002; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Mudde, 2004) that divides society into ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 8). This divide, however, raises the question of who constitutes each group, which from one political party to another is likely to alter due to their ideological orientation (Otjes and Louwse, 2015, p. 61).

This leads us to the distinction between right and left-wing notions of populism. Whilst both share a connection to anti-elitism and empowering the people (Otjes and Louwse, 2015, p. 62), Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013, pp. 158–166) identified the following differences in a study comparing Latin America (predominantly left-wing populism) with Europe (primarily right-wing populism):

- (i) Left-wing populists are inclusive; right-wing populists are exclusive.
- (ii) Left-wing populists place emphasis on socio-economic issues; right-wing populists centre on issues of ethnic identity.

March (2007, p. 66) seems to coincide with these ideas, asserting that the prime concerns of left-wing populists are equality and rights for the people. Similarly, Huber and Schimpf (2017, p. 148) argue that left-wing populists refer to the people in terms of class and, more specifically, focus on the ordinary (i.e. poor); lastly, March (2007, p. 66) states that “More radical leftists will espouse anti-capitalism” (*ibid.*).

Thus, it may not be so difficult to explain why the current Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, is considered by some to support a left-wing populist philosophy as he arguably exhibits some of the abovementioned features. The question is whether he does this often enough to warrant the label ‘populist’ or, rather, if there are merely signs of a populist ideology in his party’s 2017 manifesto.

The 2017 Labour manifesto, entitled “For the many, not the few”, consists of 12 subsections. Each addresses an issue in British society, such as healthcare or social security. Due to space constraints, this chapter focuses on the *Foreword* and five of the 12 topics (see Methodology). In each subsection, the Labour party reiterates what they make clear in their manifesto slogan, which is to deliver a fairer society for the many (i.e. the common people), not the few (i.e. the elite), as evident in (1):

- (1) Britain is a long-established democracy. But the distribution of ownership of the country’s economy means that decisions about our economy are often made by the narrow elite. More democratic ownership structures would help our economy deliver for the many and lead to a fairer distribution of wealth (Creating an economy that works for all, p. 19).

Similar ideas have been mentioned in other manifestos as well as by other leading politicians worldwide, who have subsequently been labelled as populist. One such example is given in (2) below, taken from a statement by a French politician, Pierre Poujade, whose populist ideas were so widely acknowledged in France at that time that, almost 70 years on, *Poujadism* is now used “to refer to any anti-elite movement” (Dalio *et al.*, 2017, p. 50).

- (2) I must systematically take the side of the small, the downtrodden, the trashed, the ripped-off, the humiliated who live with three times nothing (Dalio *et al.*, 2017, p. 51).

In view of examples (1) and (2), it seems reasonable to envisage that the Labour manifesto, if seen as populist (cf. Gray, 2017; Mouffe, 2018), will recurrently refer to the deprived position of many people in the UK and emphasise that the wealthy continue to prosper whilst Britain is led by an elitist Conservative government. Furthermore, one would expect the manifesto to follow these references with an explanation of how Labour will improve the conditions of the lower economic classes, which, if necessary, will be at the expense of the wealthiest sector of the population. As Block and Negrine (2017, p. 183) remark, populists highlight “the benefits that they and their followers can gain from their relationship”, which is evident in (3):

- (3) Only the top 5 per cent of earners will be asked to contribute more in tax to help fund our public services (Creating an economy that works for all, p. 9).

With all of this in mind, a number of hypotheses are proposed in this chapter. Firstly, a high number of examples are expected to denote positive actions, with the Labour party as the driving force behind these; in contrast, the elites will be the *Catalyst* of negative actions that have led to Britain's demise.¹ In addition, a considerable number of examples describing the deprived situation of many in Britain by comparison to their elite counterpart is anticipated, through the use of relational processes (see the theoretical background section for a description of process categories). Examples of verbal processes to reflect what the common people have to say (i.e. verbal processes) is also envisaged, thus ensuring that their voice is heard; lastly, instances relating the negative thoughts and feelings (i.e. mental processes) of society's disadvantaged could also surface in the discourse. In order to verify these hypotheses, this chapter examines the distribution of TRANSITIVITY patterns in six subsections of the 2017 Labour manifesto. Attention is paid to the process categories and participant roles encountered in order to capture how Labour represent themselves, the common people, and their adversaries (i.e. the elite and their political rivals). The analysis is designed to reveal the extent to which, through their manifesto, Labour do or do not echo a populist philosophy. This will be achieved through reference to the abovementioned features of populism more generally as well as left-wing populism. To this end, the following research questions are put forward:

- (i) Which TRANSITIVITY processes emerge most frequently in the Labour manifesto and what purpose do they serve?
- (ii) Which semantic roles are most commonly encountered in the Labour manifesto and to whom do they refer?

Theoretical background

This chapter addresses a popular area of Systemic Functional Grammar, namely TRANSITIVITY (Halliday, 1971, 1985, 1994; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, 2014; Fawcett, 1987; Neale, 2002), which has been used by (Critical) Discourse Analysts (henceforth, CDA) (see Bartley and Hidalgo-Tenorio, 2015; Fontaine *et al.*, 2013; Matthiessen, 1999, 2013) to explore the ways in which we represent our internal and external experiences. CDA examines the ways in which power and inequality radiate through written and spoken discourse (Fowler, 1991; van Dijk, 2001) and the TRANSITIVITY model, as a subsystem of the experiential metafunction, can provide insights into the ideologies that resound within a text. These insights are acquired through examining three elements that form the basis of the clause, namely processes (i.e. the predicator of a clause), participants (commonly realised as a nominal group or adjective phrase) and circumstances (commonly an adverbial group, nominal group or prepositional phrase). Whilst, to date, scholars have examined TRANSITIVITY patterns in political discourse (cf. Kazemian and Hashemi, 2014; Zhang, 2017), there seems to be a dearth of

studies considering TRANSITIVITY in populist discourse; as such, this chapter will contribute to filling this gap.

To date, two TRANSITIVITY systems have been put forward. The first and more widely used originated with Michael Halliday (1985, 1994) and was later amended by himself and Christian Matthiessen (2004, 2014); the second, referred to as the Cardiff Grammar (henceforth, CG) model, was originally proposed by Robin Fawcett (1987) and more recently modified by Amy Neale (2002). Whilst both models lay the foundations for the systematic and thorough analysis of clause semantics, scholars agree that they both have shortcomings (cf. Bartley, 2018; Fontaine and Gwilliams, 2015; O'Donnell *et al.*, 2009; Simon-Vandenberg *et al.*, 2003). For instance, analysts often struggle to reach a consensus on the TRANSITIVITY annotations for a text due to the difficulty of categorising language so precisely. In light of the issues raised regarding these systems, the analysis in this chapter employs a revised TRANSITIVITY taxonomy (Bartley, 2017) in which aspects of the former models are maintained together with amendments, enabling a more fine-grained TRANSITIVITY analysis of the current dataset.

The revised TRANSITIVITY system also proposes that there are processes, participants and circumstances. Whereas both processes and participants are inherent components, circumstances are classed as peripheral, supplying additional information or meaning. Table 8.1 provides an overview of the process categories and subcategories, whilst Table 8.2 provides a list of the semantic roles.

Given the amendments to the existing TRANSITIVITY networks, a brief description of each process type in the revised system follows. As with Halliday and Matthiessen's (2014, pp. 231–232) material process set, the (inter)action process category distinguishes between transformative and creative subtypes. Additionally, it caters for events/happenings, material action, whereby a physical action is performed (e.g. *draw*), social interaction, whereby a non-verbal social action is performed (e.g. *visit*), and voluntary or involuntary bodily reactions (e.g. *laugh*, *sigh*).

The second process category is labelled as mental and depicts the subcategories listed in Halliday and Matthiessen (2014, p. 257), distinguishing between our *thoughts* (mental cognitive), *emotions* (mental emotive), *desires* (mental desiderative) and *perceptions* (mental perceptive). However, unlike their model, the revised network includes mental processes that can and cannot project, as in (4) and (5) below.

- (4) [...] Labour *recognises* that certain sectors are of strategic significance to the UK (Creating an economy that works for all, p. 14).
- (5) [...] we will *look at* giving the mayor the power (Secure homes for all, p. 62).

Moreover, the distinction between an agentive *Senser* and a non-agentive *Senser*, as outlined in the CG (Neale, 2002, p.168), is also adopted here (See Table 8.2). Thus, the revised model accounts for mental processes that involve agency and those that involve involuntary mental activity.

TABLE 8.1 Process categories and subcategories

<i>Process category</i>	<i>Process subcategory</i>	<i>Example</i>
(Inter)action	Transformative	We will change the culture of the social security systems [...]
	Creative	Labour government will rebuild communities ripped apart [...]
Mental	Cognitive	Labour understands that the creation of wealth is a collective endeavour
	Emotive	[...] our children will not enjoy the same opportunities that we have
	Desiderative	[...] they just want reliable and affordable energy
	Perceptive	I've also heard something far less positive [...]
Relational	Attributive	Too many of us are in low paid and insecure work
	Identifying	Britain is the only major developed economy
Verbal	–	[...] but we will not ask ordinary households to pay more [...]
Non-referent	–	There are many more workers on short hours contracts
Complex	Dual	Labour government will give leaseholders security
	Multi	[...] the law assumes a worker is an employee unless the employer can prove otherwise

The relational process category construes experiences of being, becoming and having, and the distinction between attributive and identifying subcategories (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, pp. 295–297) is maintained given that these two types of clauses are grammatically different. A relational attributive process represents a relationship between two entities, one of which or whom is ascribed an attribute (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, p. 267) and syntactically, these clauses are irreversible. Meanwhile, relational identifying clauses are those that assign one of two entities an identity (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, p. 276), although, unlike the former, are reversible (see Table 8.2 for examples of relational clauses).

The verbal process set resembles Halliday and Matthiessen's (2014, pp. 302–303) model, although as with the mental process category, the revised network comprises verbs that can and cannot project. There are two fundamental reasons for this: (i) the semantics of the verbal group are given due weighting, unlike the Hallidayan model in which a number of verbs denoting verbal behaviour (e.g. *suggest*) are, nevertheless, allocated to a different process category (See Bartley, 2018); and (ii) the potential for a *Target* role to appear in a verbal clause that can no longer project proves a contradiction in terms.

TABLE 8.2 Semantic roles

<i>Process category</i>	<i>Participant roles</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Example</i>
(Inter)action	<i>Catalyst</i>	The semantic role that is responsible for bringing about a change	We will change the culture of the social security systems [...]
	<i>Goal</i>	The semantic role that is impacted upon	We will change the culture of the social security systems [...]
	<i>Beneficiary: Client</i>	The semantic role for whom a service is carried out	Work should provide people with security and fulfilment
	<i>Beneficiary: Recipient</i>	The semantic role to whom goods are given	Only a Labour government can deliver prosperity to every corner of our country .
	<i>Created</i>	The semantic role that comes into existence as a result of the process	We will build Crossrail 2 .
	<i>Scope: Extension</i>	The semantic role that accompanies the process to give it meaning	We will make significant capital investment during our first two years [...]
	<i>Reciprocal</i>	The semantic role that is as equally immersed in the process as another entity	[...] you meet people across the country [...]
Mental	<i>Agentive Senser</i>	The semantic role that carries out an intentional mental activity	We will consider these differences [...]
	<i>Non-agentive Senser</i>	The semantic role that experiences involuntary mental activity	I 've heard something far less positive
	<i>Phenomenon</i>	The semantic role that represents what is thought, felt, desired or perceived	I 've heard something far less positive

Relational	<i>Carrier</i>	The semantic role that is assigned a quality	Jobs are increasingly low skilled and insecure	
	<i>Attribute</i>	The semantic role that represents the quality of the <i>Carrier</i>	Jobs are increasingly low skilled and insecure	
	<i>Attributor</i>	The semantic role that assigns an attribute to the <i>Carrier</i>	We will [...] make the sector more accessible to all	
	<i>Identifier</i>	The semantic role that defines the identity of another entity	Britain is the fifth richest country in the world	
	<i>Identified</i>	The semantic role that is defined by the <i>Identifier</i>	Britain is the fifth richest country in the world	
	<i>Assigner</i>	The semantic role that assigns an identity to the <i>Identified</i>	Labour will make the NHS the preferred provider	
	<i>Possessor</i>	The semantic role that possesses something	Britain has a successful international finance industry	
	<i>Possessed</i>	The semantic role that represents the thing possessed	Britain has a successful international finance industry	
	Verbal	<i>Sayer</i>	The semantic role that is responsible for the exchange of meaning	They say we get choice [...]
		<i>Receiver</i>	The semantic role that represents the entity to whom the exchange is addressed	[...] Unions speak to members [...]
<i>Verbiage</i>		The semantic role that represents the exchange (i.e. what is said)	[...] the Committee on Climate Change says gas in the UK must sharply decline .	
Non-referent	<i>Target</i>	The semantic role that is targeted by the <i>Sayer</i> and, as such, positively (e.g. praise) or negatively (e.g. criticise) evaluated by him/her	Labour will not scapegoat migrants nor blame them for economic failures.	
	<i>Presence</i>	The semantic role that represents what is present	Currently, there is a gap [...]	

The fifth process category, labelled here as *non-referent*, denotes processes which closely resemble the Existential process put forward by Halliday and Matthiessen (2014, pp. 307–310) and make reference to the existence of an entity (see Table 8.2).

Lastly, the complex process group comprises examples in which two or more process types are functioning simultaneously; this can occur when a verb involves a multifaceted meaning, causing an overlap across process types. An example is the verb *prove* (see Table 8.2), which is defined as “to show that something is true by providing facts or information”, giving it the potential to denote material, mental and even verbal activity.

Data and method

The dataset used here comprises the foreword (FWD) and five subsections of the 2017 Labour manifesto, producing a sample of 10,494 words. The subsections include: (i) *Creating an economy that works for all* (CEW); (ii) *A fair deal at work* (FDW); (iii) *Secure homes for all* (SHA); (iv) *Healthcare for all* (HCA); and (v) *A more equal society* (MES²). The manifesto, originally downloaded as a .pdf, was converted into six .txt files, one file for each subsection, and assigned a three-digit code to distinguish the topics on Labour’s agenda. Following compilation of the corpus, the files were fed into the *UAM Corpus Tool 3.3* (O’Donnell, 2016) to address the following objectives:

- (i) To determine the frequency of TRANSITIVITY processes in the 2017 Labour manifesto subsections outlined and show how these results inform whether Labour show signs of a populist ideology.
- (ii) To identify the semantic roles employed in the 2017 Labour manifesto subsections outlined and whether the entities they represent are an indication of a populist stance.

The UAM Corpus tool (O’Donnell, 2016) provides an in-built TRANSITIVITY scheme of Halliday and Matthiessen’s (2014) categories and subcategories, thus enabling an automated tagging of texts. Nonetheless, on this occasion, a personalised TRANSITIVITY scheme was created to incorporate the modifications introduced in the revised TRANSITIVITY system (Bartley, 2017) and, thus, facilitate a more rigorous annotation of the Labour manifesto.

Results and discussion

This section will address the following research questions:

- (i) Which TRANSITIVITY processes emerge in the Labour manifesto and what purpose do they serve?
- (ii) Which semantic roles are encountered in the Labour manifesto and to whom do they refer?

The analysis of the 2017 Labour manifesto subsections saw a number of interesting TRANSITIVITY findings emerge. To begin with, the most frequent process types are outlined in Table 8.3.

The data revealed the (inter)action category as the most frequent process type, followed by the relational set and, thirdly, the mental category. The high number of (inter)action processes, denoting actions, may be explained by the fact that references are commonly made to what the Conservative party have done or, otherwise, failed to do whilst in power, as in (6) and (7). In highlighting these issues, Labour then cite themselves as *Catalysts* of a more positive inter(action) process to explain how, if elected into government, they will improve the general living conditions of “the many” across the UK, as apparent in (6) and (8).

- (6) While the Conservatives *stand back* and allow insecure work to spread, Labour will *act* to guarantee good jobs and businesses (FDW, p. 46).
- (7) [...] a report concluding that the Conservative government *had committed* “grave, systematic violations of the rights of persons with disabilities” [...] (MES, p. 113).
- (8) So let’s *build* a fairer Britain where no one is held back. A country where everybody is able to get on in life [...] (FWD, p. 5).

In example (6), there are two (inter)action processes (i.e. *stand back* and *act*) that place the Conservatives in a position of agency, or rather, lack thereof; that is, they seemingly do nothing. The purpose of this is to emphasise the Conservative government’s lack of disposition to do what was expected of them, and in doing so, Labour are portrayed as the problem solvers. This particular example is evidence of a general populist philosophy on the grounds that, as Block and Negrine (2017, p. 290) outline, populists “present themselves as those with a solution to existing and continuing problems [...] indeed they accuse others of exacerbating the problem”. Example (7) also reflects a more general populist stance in view of the overriding negative message delivered to attack the elite politicians (Canovan, 2002, p. 132), thereby implying a nasty elite that “oppress the good and pure people” (Negrea-Busioc, 2016, p. 40). Lastly, the lexical verb *build* in (8) is classed as an (inter)action process because its action will lead to the creation of something that, at present, does not exist (i.e. a country that caters to the majority). This arguably reveals a populist standpoint because through stating that Labour will build “a fairer Britain where no one is held back” and “everybody is able to get on in life”, they draw attention to how they understand and

TABLE 8.3 Frequency of TRANSITIVITY categories

<i>Process</i>	<i>(Inter)action</i>	<i>Relational</i>	<i>Mental</i>	<i>Verbal</i>	<i>Complex</i>	<i>Non-referent</i>	<i>Totals</i>
Raw Frequency	866	278	171	69	84	11	613
%	58.5	18.8	11.6	4.7	5.7	0.7	100

connect with the people (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). This coincides with Block and Negrine's (2017, p. 179) claim of populism as "a political style of communication [...] to connect with the people". All in all, when (inter)action processes surface, there is a notable tendency for Labour to be the *Catalyst* of positive future actions and for their rivals to be the *Catalyst* of negative past and present actions. In doing this, an Us. vs. Them (Wodak, 2015, p. 28) (i.e. inclusion/exclusion divide) also comes to the forefront of the manifesto.

Relational processes are the second most common category in the dataset and examples reveal that this process is used to refer to the type of country Britain is, as in (9), and to the situation of people who live in Britain at present, as in (10).

- (9) [...] Britain *is* a long-established democracy. But the distribution of ownership of the country's economy means that decisions about our economy are often made by a narrow elite [...] (CEW, p. 19).
- (10) Most working people in Britain today are earning less [...]. Too many of us *are* in low-paid and insecure work. [...] Labour will turn this around. (CEW, p. 8).

Both examples reiterate the idea that Labour persistently challenge the Conservative party, who have seemingly led the country towards a poorer quality of life. It has been suggested that populism often emerges as a result of "wealth and opportunity gaps [...] and people being fed up with government not working effectively" (Dalio *et al.*, 2017, p. 3). Moreover, the reference to socio-economic issues and, more implicitly, the poor, further supports the notion that Labour's discourse is somewhat left-wing populist here. Example (10) takes it a step further by using a relational process to indicate that the current system persecutes the common people, unlike those with a more privileged status in society. Through highlighting these issues, Labour focus on what is wrong with the country and how this results from the mistakes made by the current elitist conservative government; in turn, they can explain how they will make Britain a better place; thus, once again we note an 'us' and a 'them', a tactic commonly employed by populist leaders.

The mental process type proved the third most frequent category. The findings illustrate how the mental cognitive set (73.7%) far outweighs all other mental subtypes. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the mental process category is used almost exclusively to refer to the Labour party's understanding of what the British people need, as in example (11) below.

- (11) [...] this Conservative Government has taken small businesses for granted. Labour is the party of small businesses. We *understand* the challenges our smaller businesses face [...] (CEW, p. 18).

Through the use of mental verbs like *understand* in the above example, Labour successfully remind the public that they, as *Sensers*, are in touch with the people's

ideas regarding how Britain is being run and, thus, what needs to change. Given that populism is not just related to tangible societal issues, but equally to communicating feelings, values and perceptions (Block and Negrine, 2017, p. 181), the identification of mental processes with Labour at the forefront appears to also be revealing of a populist discourse. To add to this, we yet again witness an us vs. them divide when mental processes are used, as evident in (12) below.

- (12) But the distribution of ownership of the country's economy means that *decisions* about our economy are often *made* by a narrow elite [...] (CEW, p. 19).

Our attention now turns to the complex process set, comprising verbs that cannot adequately be assigned to one process category alone. This is because the meaning of the verb reflects an overlap of criteria across different process categories, as evidenced earlier with the verb *prove*. Another example of this is the verb *vote*, defined as “to show which person or part you want by marking a piece of paper” (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online). Thus, both mental desiderative and material action is involved in voting for someone, making it inadequate to choose one process category over another for examples such as (13) below.

- (13) You can choose more of the same: the rich getting richer, more children in poverty [...] Or you can *vote* for the party that has a plan to change all of this: The Labour Party [...] (FWD, p. 4).

Example (13) is relevant to left-wing populism given its explicit reference to poverty and the fact that under a Conservative leader, the rich will continue to get richer, whilst the poor continue to live an impoverished existence. This is also comparable to the “discourse of political fear” (Wodak, 2015, p. 2); that is, although more commonly associated with (far) right-wing political parties who often use particular groups as scapegoats to account for the nation's problems, the Labour manifesto here attempts to incite fear in the public through repeatedly referencing what Britain will endure if they elect a Conservative government. Again, there is a clear ‘us/them’ dichotomy.

The verbal process set is the last category discussed here and most notable is the fact that the *Sayers* are, primarily, Labour (59.3 %), as in (14) and (15).

- (14) A Labour government will *guarantee* no rises in income tax for those earning below £380,000 a year [...] Only the top 5 per cent of earners will *be asked* to contribute more in tax [...] (CEW, p. 9).
 (15) But we will not *ask* ordinary households to pay more (CEW, p. 9).

Some interesting features surface in examples (14) and (15); firstly, when Labour are referred to as *Sayers*, they say what the public wants to hear; strategically, they also omit themselves as *Sayer*, as in (14), when having to ask people for something

undesirable (i.e. more tax contributions). Lastly, example (15) involves pragmatic inference, with Labour indirectly pointing out what the Conservatives have said by using a negated verbal process alongside a reference to themselves as *Sayer*; this aids to reinforce Labour's allegiance with the common people. Thus, the verbal process and participant patterns seem to also reflect a populist ideology, to some extent. In fact, whilst not perhaps conclusively evidencing Jeremy Corbyn as a populist leader, the findings in general seem to support the notion that the Labour manifesto comprises elements frequently encountered in populist or left-wing populist communication.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a TRANSITIVITY analysis of the 2017 Labour manifesto that offers insights into the linguistic patterns employed by the centre-left party and, in turn, determines whether Labour can be considered to adopt a populist stance. The focus was on the process types together with their corresponding semantic roles.

To return to the findings themselves, a number of points merit attention. The most common process was the (inter)action category, a finding that coincides with other studies on TRANSITIVITY in which actions and events are central to discourse (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, p. 215). More specifically, though, when (inter)action processes were employed here, the *Catalyst* role primarily denoted the Labour party in order to indicate the good Labour will do for the many; otherwise, the *Catalysts* were the Conservatives, who have seemingly built an unfair Britain in which the elite prosper whilst the common man perishes.

The second most frequent process was the relational type, used to describe Britain or, otherwise, Britain's current economic and social climate. Although one may argue that this process category is not directly indicative of a populist ideology, it does, nonetheless, indirectly relate as a result of what Martin and Rose (2007) refer to as *discourse semantics*, i.e. the overall message conveyed across a stretch of discourse that, consequently, goes beyond the meaning at clause level. Thus, the relational processes that emerge in the different sections of the manifesto permit Labour to outline the living situation in Britain and, thus, emphasise the common people's poor quality of life at the expense of a Conservative government's concern for the elite.

Mental processes surfaced as the third most frequent category with, more specifically, references to the understanding of the Labour party dominating their discourse. Thus, Labour often cited themselves as *Senser* of a mental cognitive clause. This appeared to be strategic; that is, Labour make it clear that, unlike the Conservatives, they are in touch with the British people, which coincidentally is a strategy commonly used by populist leaders (Block and Negrine, 2017, p. 183).

Lastly, the dataset saw a minimal number of verbal and complex processes surface. Nonetheless, in the same way as the other process categories, these two types also draw attention to the fact that the 2017 Labour manifesto incites political

fear and creates an ‘us’ (the common man) vs. ‘them’ (the elites) divide in Britain (Wodak, 2015, p. 26). This is a powerful tool in political discourse in general, but here it serves to strengthen the claim that Labour show signs of employing populist practices as a means to ‘construct and reconstruct their publics’ (Block and Negrine, 2017, p. 182), as well as idealise themselves whilst demonising their opponent. Labour’s slogan also carries populist connotations (Maiguashca and Dean, forthcoming), enabling them to repeatedly emphasise class division and the fact that, under their rule, the average British citizen will no longer be overlooked whilst the ‘Other’ is unduly rewarded. All that said, before being able to substantiate the claim that Jeremy Corbyn is truly a populist, more research into his written and spoken outputs is first required.

Notes

- 1 See Table 2 for a definition of the different semantic roles.
- 2 From this point forward, the codes will be used to reference the corresponding subsection of the manifesto.

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9

LITTLE OLD UK VOTING BREXIT AND SOME AUSTRIAN FRIENDS

A corpus-driven analysis of the 2016
UK right-wing tabloid discourse

Pascual Pérez-Paredes

So it no longer matters what Hollande or Merkel say any more. It's what the people say that matters. And this revolution is all down to the little old UK voting Brexit. EU could collapse long before Brexit process is finished THE Brexit vote in June was an earth-shattering political event. EU could collapse long before Brexit process is finished.

Stephen Pollard – Daily Express, 2 December 2016

Introduction

The year 2016 was full of shocking events in the old continent. On 22 March, 32 people were killed in attacks at Brussels airport and Maalbeek underground station. On 18 April, over 400 migrants and refugees died in the Mediterranean trying to make it into Italy from Egypt. In Austria, a gunman killed two and wounded 11 people in an open-air concert. On 23 June, the UK voted to leave the EU. Jo Cox, a Labour MP, had been shot dead a few days earlier. On 22 July a gunman killed nine and injured 27 in a shopping mall in Munich. On 4 December, Alexander Van der Bellen, supported by the Green Party, won the Austrian presidential election in a re-run of the second round. He defeated right-wing Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) candidate Norbert Hofer. On 5 December, Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi resigned after losing the constitutional reform referendum.

Different authors (Corbett, 2016; Schmidt, 2017) have researched the political reactions and the media discourse around these events, before and after 2016, in the light of populism. Bonikowski (2016, p. 18) claims that it is difficult to study populism on the European radical right as scholars have used terms such as nationalism, Euroscepticism or the far right interchangeably “when labeling a set of specific parties”. This author suggests that populist discourse has

been successful due to both “a potent mix of populist and ethno-nationalist discourse, and [...] a confluence of contextual factors that makes such anti-elite, anti-foreigner, and anti-minority arguments resonant” (p. 21). Some of the events described in the first paragraph (terrorist attacks, immigration, anti-EU vote) create the backdrop against which radical right-wing narratives emerge in the EU. Bonikowski (2016, p. 21) suggests that such narratives “can be easily exploited by anti-establishment” parties.

Rhetorical strategies have reshaped the political landscape by using new and old media that exploit the anger and the fear of a significant portion of the population in Western societies. Schmidt (2017) has argued that the ideational root causes behind Brexit and Trump’s victory are:

- (i) Neoliberal economic ideas leading to the 21st century financial crisis, and to “the worsening of [middle class people] life chances due to stagnant wages, growing inequality and the increasing difficulty for the young to get a foot on the real estate ladder, or a steady well-paying job” (p. 255).
- (ii) A discourse on culture and identity, in particular against cross-border mobility and immigration (p. 256).
- (iii) A political discourse against the establishment, and “[...] against citizens’ growing sense of loss of control as a result of the removal of more and more decisions from the national to supranational level [...] because of increasing Europeanization in the case of the UK” (p. 258).

The day after the Austrian elections, Julia Ebner wrote in *The Guardian* an article with the following title: “Austria defeated the far-right Norbert Hofer – finally, some hope for Europe”.¹ The author stated the following:

Unlike the Brexit referendum and the US elections, this vote was not just a choice between the status quo and change, or the establishment and the fringes. Mainstream politicians had already been eliminated in the first round, leaving only outsiders in the game: a xenophobic gun enthusiast and a green party-backed professor. It was a runoff between greed and solidarity, hatred and empathy, and, potentially war and peace.

Julia Ebner described the FPÖ as “partly founded by Nazis with a record of anti-semitism and an agenda of anti-Muslim bigotry”. She stated that Hofer sparked an aggressive campaign that fuelled political violence and hate speech, and “increasingly hijacked religion as a populist mobilisation tool”. Wodak (2015) describes right-wing populism as having, among other features, a focus on EU-scepticism, and maintains that UKIP and FPÖ have developed a “broader integrative identity concept related to nativist body politics” (p. 41). Both parties thrived on the idea that the European identity is an invention of the elites, a top-down construction where the community of “us” is an imaginary one. Despite his defeat on 4 December 2016, Hofer was backed by 46% of the voters.

This chapter seeks to understand how the UK right-wing tabloids construed Norbert Hofer during 2016 and the themes that emerged in the articles where he was mentioned. We will adopt a corpus-driven approach (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001; Baker, 2006) where we will seek to expose how “the patterns in [our corpus and the reference corpora] are noted as a way of expressing regularities (and exceptions) in language” (Baker, 2006, p. 16). We will try to answer the following research questions:

- (1) How was Norbert Hofer construed in the UK right-wing tabloid press during 2016?
- (2) How were Norbert Hofer and the FPÖ used in the discussions that appear in the UK right-wing tabloid press?

Thus, we hope to gain a better understanding of how right-wing media, supposedly populist and nationalist, use foreign politics in their discourse and contribute to the debate on the use of rhetorical strategies to promote the right-wing agenda in Europe and beyond.

Methodology

Our research methodology is based on corpus-driven and corpus-based discourse analysis (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001), where keywords and collocations (Baker *et al.*, 2008; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 2013a, 2013b; Pérez-Paredes, Aguado and Sánchez, 2017; Pérez-Paredes, 2018) help us to understand how individuals and processes are discursively constructed. In the following lines, we will discuss how the corpus was collected and the different methods used in order to answer our research questions.

Corpus compilation and clean-up

We selected the UK conservative tabloid papers *Daily Mail*, *Daily Express* and *The Sun*, and searched the Factiva platform² for news articles from 1/1/2016 to 3/12/2016³ where the full name “Norbert Hofer” was mentioned. All information in Factiva is tagged with a classification system allowing users to retrieve exact content from nearly 33,000 global sources, and “eliminate the noise that comes with free text searching”⁴. While this is mostly accurate, corpus linguists and discourse analysts need to refine the results.

The search returned 19 texts (Appendix 2). After examining each, one of the articles was removed as “Norbert Hofer” was not part of the main body of the text but part of a “Read More” section in the middle of the piece. Eighteen news items were retained and cleaned up before carrying out POS tagging and applying corpus analysis methods. The clean-up involved removing unnecessary sections such as metadata, *Read more* sections, formatting code (h2, caption, etc.) and appeals to contribution, generally in the final paragraph. In some of them,

particularly in *The Sun*, it was decided to remove sections that were not concerned with the main news item where Norbert Hofer was alluded. That was the case of the column by Conservative Party supporter and journalist⁵ “Tony Parsons: “Moronic Remain poster is offensive to both black AND white people”, published in *The Sun* on 29 May 2016.⁶ After examining the item, it could be attested that the piece was divided into different sections all written by Conservative Party supporter and journalist Tony Parsons: “Moronic Remain poster is offensive to both black AND white people”, “FACISM-I BLAME ANGELA MERKEL”, “Insane.....Sharon Osbourne”, “HARRY STYLES IS A PLUCKY SOLDIER”, “MONEY-GRABBING WARMONGER’S LOOKING A BIT AGED” and “LUVVIES GO ACTING SUPERIOR” (Upper/lower case as in the original).

All 18 articles comprising the 2016 Hofer UK Tabloid Corpus (HUKT Corpus) were published across 11 different days, most of them in the months of May (four articles) and December 2016 (eight articles). Our corpus was uploaded to Sketch Engine where it was POS-tagged using the English Tree Tagger tagset with Sketch Engine modifications. The HUKT corpus contains 18,564 words and 4,316 types.

Methods

Baker (2006, p. 7) points out that “all methods of research have associated problems which need to be addressed and are also limited in terms of what they can and cannot achieve”. Following Baker (2004, p. 357), we will carry out analyses of multi-word keywords and “supplementary concordance and collocational analyses [which] enable researchers to obtain a more accurate picture of how keywords function in texts”. In this research, we will triangulate results from three different methods that will explore the corpus (as well as other reference corpora). By using a combination of approaches, we aim (1) to provide richer results (2) derived from a variety of research methods that (3) will contribute to discussing our initial research questions from multiple perspectives and, to some extent, (4) reduce researcher’s bias (Baker, 2004; 2006). These methods are keyword analysis, word sketches and collocational analysis. Keyword analyses and word sketches will be mined, that is, the resulting items will be the product of different statistical tests. We will use collocation analysis to examine *Norbert Hofer* and related terms. The difference between corpus-driven and corpus-based methods is that, in the former, the keywords and sketches to examine will emerge from the statistical analyses carried out; the latter have been selected a priori based on our interest in Norbert Hofer’s role in British right-wing tabloids.

Keyword analyses

In cultural studies, keywords are seen as the body of meanings of the practices central to our societies and institutions. In corpus-informed discourse analysis,

however, keywords are mined through statistical analysis. In corpus linguistics, the clustering of lexical items reveals different co-textual environments built upon co-collocation and colligation (Pace-Sigge, 2013; Pérez-Paredes, 2017). These lexico-grammatical environments built on repeated linguistic patterns are “widely shared in a discourse community” (Baker 2011, p. 13), and create the conditions for the identification of lexical items characterising a text or a whole corpus (Pérez-Paredes, 2018). Stubbs (2007, p. 130) highlights that “unique events can be described only against the background of what is normal and expected”. It follows that “what is normal and expected” has to be modelled, and hence the need for a reference corpus that can be contrasted with our focus corpus. Following Baker’s (2004) methodological guidelines, in the following paragraphs we intend to specify how keywords were mined.

Single-word and multi-word extractions were performed using Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff, 2012). Table 9.1 summarises the criteria selected for keyword extraction:

For the single-word keyword extraction, we used the English Web Corpus (enTenTen) as reference corpus. This is a crawled corpus (Kilgarriff, 2012) made up of texts collected from the Internet and part of the TenTen corpus family. The enTenTen English corpora were tagged by TreeTagger using Penn TreeBanktagset with Sketch Engine modifications. The English Web corpus 2015 (enTenTen15) contains 15 billion words. The use of a recent, large reference corpus was deemed more appropriate for the extraction of single words, while for the multi-word keyword extraction, the British National Corpus (BNC) was chosen. Keyness is calculated using *Simple maths*, “a method for identifying keywords of one corpus vs another [...] and identify instantly what is typical in language and what is rare, unusual or emerging usage [...] The statistic [...] for keywords is a variant on word W is so-and-so times more frequent in corpus X than corpus Y ”.⁷ In our analysis, we only considered the top 100 keywords although for the sake of space we report the top 50 in Tables 9.2 and 9.3. Some of the limitations of keyword analysis pointed out by Baker (2004) have been met by exploring the actual concordance lines and, particularly, by triangulating results with other methods (word sketches and collocations). However, we could not measure keyword dispersion as this feature is not offered on Sketch Engine. For the sake of analysis, keywords are grouped semantically.

TABLE 9.1 Criteria used for the extraction of single- and multiple-word keywords

Single word keywords reference corpus	enTenTen15
Multi-words reference corpus	BNC
Attribute for keywords	Lemma
Minimum frequency	3

Word sketches

Sketch Engine (Kilgariff, 2012) developed Word Sketch, a function that offers a “word’s collocates categorised by grammatical relations”.⁸ A word sketch is then a group of collocations displayed according to grammatical relations and sorted either by their frequency or an association score. In the context of this research, logDice is used as association score and overall lexical word frequency in the corpus as the criterion to choose which sketches to examine (Appendix 1).

Collocational analysis

In the context of this research, collocations are understood as “co-occurrence patterns observed in corpus data” (McEnery and Hardie, 2011, p. 123) as calculated by Sketch Engine and which uses the logDice association measure based on the likelihood function within a range of -5/+5 words. The significance cutoff point was established at 6.63 ($p = 0.01$). The words examined with this type of analysis (i.e. *Norbert Hofer*, *Freedom Party*, *Austria* and *Britain*) were selected before carrying out the keyword and the word sketch analyses. Given its prominence in the corpus, *Italy* was included at a later stage.

Results

Single-word keywords

Table 9.2 shows the top 50 single keywords in the HUKT corpus. 36% of them are countries or nationalities (e.g. Italian, Europe, Britain, etc.); 24%, people (Hofer, Grillo, Merkel, etc.); and 14%, politics-related lexical items (Party, Labour, Freedom, Star, etc.)

Titles are unsurprisingly significant (Mr, Ministers, Prime, Mrs, etc.), and while *Brexit* and *Remain* make it into the top 50, *Leave* did not even make it into the top 100. EU (7948.77), Brexit (3076.03), Europe (2366.41), Britain (2650.26) and European (2366.41) are in the top eight of the extracted keywords; in other words, these lemmas are most salient in the corpus under analysis when compared to enTenTen15. What is even more interesting is that, if we used the enTenTen13 as the reference corpus instead of the enTenTen15, the top eight keywords would be *Brexit*, *Renzi*, *Hofer*, *Grillo*, *referendum*, *Norbert*, *Euroscptic* and *Juncker*, which reinforces the relevance of the keywords *EU*, *Europe*, *Britain* and *European*. In short, in 2013/2014 our corpus would have been characterised by a very strong presence of proper nouns such as Renzi or Grillo, whereas in 2015/2016, it is the nations and the political structures that, based on our keyword analysis, seem to dominate the debate in the right-wing press. Additionally, the pronoun *I* stands out as a top three keyword as quoted speech is a trademark of tabloids according to Lefkowitz (2018). In the corpus, *I* represents different speakers, columnists as well as politicians, among whom we find Mr Hofer.

TABLE 9.2 Top 50 keywords extracted from the corpus

Rank	Item	Score	Freq	Rank	Item	Score	Freq
1	EU	7948.77	168	26	Sunday	757.93	16
2	Brexit	3076.03	65	27	Star	757.93	16
3	I	3028.72	64	28	No	757.93	16
4	Italian	2981.41	63	29	May	757.93	16
5	Italy	2886.8	61	30	Five	757.93	16
6	Europe	2792.18	59	31	Trump	710.62	15
7	Britain	2650.26	56	32	Pen	710.62	15
8	European	2366.41	50	33	Le	663.31	14
9	Renzi	1656.79	35	34	Greece	663.31	14
10	Mr	1372.94	29	35	Turkey	616.01	13
11	Party	1231.01	26	36	Movement	616.01	13
12	France	1231.01	26	37	What	568.7	12
13	Hofer	1183.7	25	38	Polish	568.7	12
14	Germany	1136.4	24	39	Marine	568.7	12
15	Austria	1136.4	24	40	Angela	568.7	12
16	Labour	1089.09	23	41	Mrs	521.39	11
17	UK	994.47	21	42	Eurosceptic	521.39	11
18	Minister	994.47	21	43	Dutch	521.39	11
19	Grillo	994.47	21	44	Spain	474.08	10
20	British	947.16	20	45	Saatchi	474.08	10
21	Prime	899.86	19	46	Remain	474.08	10
22	Merkel	899.86	19	47	Poland	474.08	10
23	Freedom	852.55	18	48	PM	474.08	10
24	Brussels	852.55	18	49	Matteo	474.08	10
25	Norbert	805.24	17	50	Juncker	474.08	10

Multi-word keywords

Table 9.3 offers the top 50 multi-word keywords in the HUKT corpus. In the top ten, we find four noun phrases where the word *crisis* is a headword: *migration crisis* (284.85), *migrant crisis* (142.92), *banking crisis* (130.29) and *financial crisis* (119.01). *Eurozone crisis* is top 13 and *next crisis* is top 30.

A second group of keywords is made up of societal problems such as *youth unemployment* (150.33), *banking collapse* (139.3), *rising nationalism* (94.02) or *refugee exodus* (91.59). *Youth unemployment* is consistently mentioned together with the 37.1% rate in the case of Italy and 11.7 % in the case of Austria. In every case, (the number of) migrants in those countries appear in the vicinity:

- (1) With **youth unemployment** at 37.1 per cent and a record 171,000 migrants arriving this year from north Africa, the Italian Establishment is terrified of Five Star (Appendix 2, text id 13).

A third group of keywords has *uncertainty* as a headword in the noun phrase: *real uncertainty* (94.86), *economic uncertainty* (84.39) and *political uncertainty* (79.42).

TABLE 9.3 Top 50 multi-word keywords extracted from the corpus

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Freq</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Freq</i>
1	migration crisis	284.85	6	26	real uncertainty	94.86	2
2	far-right leader	237.54	5	27	rising nationalism	94.02	2
3	european project	223.67	5	28	banking capital	93.19	2
4	youth unemployment	150.53	5	29	speech today	92.38	2
5	constitutional reform	146.2	7	30	next crisis	91.59	2
6	migrant crisis	142.92	3	31	refugee exodus	91.59	2
7	banking collapse	139.3	3	32	top job	91.09	3
8	banking crisis	130.29	3	33	polish community	89.28	2
9	financial crisis	119.01	5	34	political mood	89.28	2
10	presidential election	115.41	7	35	referendum campaign	87.16	2
11	far-right candidate	95.62	2	36	italian economy	87.16	2
12	populist candidate	95.62	2	37	referendum result	84.39	2
13	eurozone crisis	95.62	2	38	economic uncertainty	84.39	2
14	dirty divorce	95.62	2	39	next president	83.07	2
15	popular fury	95.62	2	40	local bank	81.79	2
16	first far-right leader	95.62	2	41	free movement	81.47	4
17	polish leader	95.62	2	42	political uncertainty	79.42	2
18	visa liberalisation	95.62	2	43	recent poll	78.83	2
19	italian referendum	95.62	2	44	political establishment	78.25	2
20	puerile racist trash	95.62	2	45	open-door policy	77.67	2
21	racist trash	95.62	2	46	political class	76.55	2
22	such puerile racist trash	95.62	2	47	damage limitation	74.47	2
23	asian lady	94.86	2	48	fourth term	73.95	2
24	right politician	94.86	2	49	leading light	73.44	2
25	own referendum	94.86	2	50	upper house	61.21	3

Uncertainty in these cases lies in the EU camp, and not in the UK. Economic uncertainty, for example, is created in Europe as a result of the UK leaving the EU:

- (2) Voting Remain is a greater leap into the unknown than freeing ourselves from the EU's **economic uncertainty**. WE may not always like it but one of the intractable realities of the human condition is that nothing ever stays the same (Appendix 2, text id 6).

Similarly, *political uncertainty* rests with the EU, not with the UK:

- (3) What has changed since then is the increasing **political uncertainty** in several European countries, which is likely to further undermine any appetite the EU might have for a fight to the death with Britain (Appendix 2, text id 11).

A fourth group of two keywords expresses Europeans' anger and frustration both at the UK's decision to leave the EU and at migrants in Austria: *dirty divorce* (95.62) and *popular fury* (95.62). The former is allegedly used by the EU press to refer to the consequences of Brexit, while the latter is used to, purportedly, describe Austrians' concern with migrants:

- (4) Thanks largely to **popular fury** at the migration crisis, the country's far-Right Freedom Party is now comfortably the most popular in the land (Appendix 2, text id 2).

Word sketches

In the following lines, we will report how the grammatical relations found in the corpus construct the following most frequent nouns in the corpus: *EU*, *country*, *Brexit* and *Italy*. LogDice scores are provided in brackets.

The EU

While the most significant modifier of EU is *punch-drunk* (11.83), as a modifier, EU presents a more neutral, less evaluative profile: *membership* (12.24), *leader* (10.82), *citizen* (10.80), *country* (10.43) or *state* (10.24) are some of the top nouns modified by *EU*. As an object, apart from *leave* (13.17), we find, among others, *join* (10.54), *plunge* (9.67), *cripple* (9.67) or *shatter* (9.67):

- (5) Voters in Austria and Italy go to the polls and could **plunge** the EU into a political and economic crisis (Appendix 2, text id 17).
- (6) People are turning against Brussels as Italy hits the polls. It may well **cripple** the EU and serve a boost to Brexit. TOMORROW will be another nervous day in the Chancelleries of Europe (Appendix 2, text id 17).

- (7) But Italians are not the only people whose vote on Sunday could **shatter** the EU (Appendix 2, text id 2).

When the EU takes an 's genitive it is in EU's *failings* (12.19) and EU's *stalwart* (12.19) in the context of Italy or in *economic uncertainty* (12.19). The EU appears in coordinated phrases following *Muslims* (11.41), *Ankara* (11.41) and *immigration* (11.00).

Country

The noun *country* is used in the corpus to signify the idea of *otherness*. Using Sketch Engine grammar, we find out that this lemma is preceded by *other* (11.70), *European* (11.36), *Euroseptic* (10.87), *EU* (10.43), *angry* (10.19) or *Mediterranean* (10.19). In *normal* (10.19) *country*, we find an Italian citizen who complains that banks and politicians scheme against citizens' interests, so a normal country is one where all of them would be in prison. The title of the article is "Will QUITaly sink the EU?". In *self-satisfied* (10.19) *countries*, we find a reflection on the resignation of Austrian chancellor Werner Faymann in May 2016 as a symptom of the dangers of the xenophobic far right: "thanks largely to popular fury at the migration crisis, the country's far-Right Freedom Party is now comfortably most popular in the land" (Appendix 2, text id 2). *Country* is also the subject of copular *be* in the following:

- (8) To say the **country** is pessimistic is putting it lightly. With that mood prevailing, Italians watched events in America – and saw a non-politician wrest power from a cynical establishment figure (Appendix 2, text id 13).
- (9) Some economists say the Italian story will be a much bigger version of the Greek crisis, but with one crucial difference – the **country** is too large to be rescued (Appendix 2, text id 18).

Brexit

Modifiers of Brexit include *Poland* (11.99), *UK* (11.54) and *Italian* (9.64). *Brexit* is the subject of *trigger* (11.54), *give* (10.91) and *have* (9.46):

- (10) Brexit has also **triggered** concerns about what will happen to the peace process. Italy Recent polls have revealed that 48 per cent of Italians believe they would be better off out of the EU (Appendix 2, text id 9).
- (11) As Brexit **gives** Europe's far-right leaders cheer, it's now clear punch-drunk EU has over-extended itself (Appendix 2, text id 9).

Brexit modifies *vote* (12.02), *negotiation* (11.41), *talk* (11.24) as well as *bomb* (10.54) and *gloom* (10.35) in "Enough of all this Brexit gloom" (Appendix 2, text id 11).

Collocations

As above, logDice scores are provided in brackets.

Norbert Hofer, the Freedom Party and Austria

Most of the collocates of Norbert Hofer describe his status as *candidate* (12.80) or *presidential* (11.77), as well as his political orientation as member of the *Freedom* (11.83) *Party* and *far-right* (11.54) politician. The *Freedom Party* only collocates with *Hofer* (11.76) or *candidate* (11.22), while *Austria* does not collocate with any lexical word in the corpus.

Britain

Britain, on the other hand, offers quite a rich range of collocates: *leave* (11.73), *if* (10.98), *EU* (10.93), *deal* (10.91), *should* (10.69), *voted* (10.60), *Brexit* (10.40), *Europe* (10.28) or *could* (9.72). In the HUKT corpus, *Britain* is seen as a nation that, after the Brexit vote, has left the EU in shock, although in two concordance lines we can read that (1) Sweden's finance Minister warns that it would be a mistake to *chastise* the UK and (2) the readers of *Le Figaro* thought Brexit was a good idea. Modal verbs *should* and *could* are used to describe different scenarios that present a profound division in terms of different unfolding events between the UK and the EU.

Italy

Italy collocates with *euro* (10.83), *across* (10.70), *likely* (10.35), *referendum* (10.32), *polls* (10.20), *France* (10.15), *may* (10.14) and *could* (9.66). Most of these collocates are used in the context of the 4 December constitutional reform referendum, when 59.12% of the voters rejected the reform. That night, Matteo Renzi announced his resignation as Prime Minister. *Euro* always appears in the corpus as a collocate of *Italy* when discussing the hypothetical referendum the Five Star Movement would hold on Italy's Euro membership. *Likely* is used to hypothesise on the political future of both Renzi and Italy if the voters rejected the constitutional reform, creating thus "a political earthquake comparable to Brexit and the election in America of Donald Trump" (Appendix 2, text id 13). The use of the preposition *across* is statistically significant. It is complemented either by *eurozone* or *Italy*:

- (12) Experts are now fearful that uncertainty provoked by a political crisis in Italy could spark panic **across** the eurozone, and Italy may even end up leaving the euro and returning to the lira (Appendix 2, text id 13).
- (13) So will there be an fresh earthquake right **across** Italy tomorrow night? I expect a No vote (Appendix 2, text id 18).

As we can see in the above two articles published in the *Daily Mail* in early December 2016, *panic* and an *earthquake* are the likely results of a referendum on a constitutional reform. Moreover, *polls* is used to convey the idea that “48 percent of Italians believe they would be better off out of the EU” (Appendix 2, text id 8); that the referendum “may well cripple the EU and serve a boost to Brexit” (Appendix 2, text id 17); and that “Italy go to the polls and could plunge the EU into a political and economic crisis” (Appendix 2, text id 17).

Discussion

Baker (2006, p. 18) points out that “corpus data does not interpret itself, it is up to the researcher to make sense of the patterns of language which are found within a corpus, postulating reasons for their existence or looking for further evidence to support hypotheses”. In this section, we will interpret the results in the previous section by examining how discourse is constructed around the keywords, word sketches and collocations analysed. We will use Abts and Rummens (2007) right-wing populism twofold vertical structure framework to discuss how the media analysed integrate *Norbert Hofer, Austria* and the *Freedom Party* as part of a rhetorical strategy to support the ideological makeup of English nationalism as “opposition to bureaucracy, open borders and migration” (Wellings, 2010, p. 498).

This paper examines how Norbert Hofer is construed in the UK right-wing tabloid press during 2016 and how his party is portrayed in the discussions that appear in this type of press. Our results show that the discourse involving *Norbert Hofer* in British right-wing tabloids during 2016 is restricted to a limited set of keywords and themes that characterise the HUKT corpus. The 18 texts present a marked interest in Brexit and its consequences on international politics, and the negative impact of other political events on the EU. The multi-word keyword analysis is particularly illuminating as it paints a picture where numerous crises sweep away the EU and threaten to end the EU project sooner than later, to the apparent satisfaction of the papers under analysis. This finding corroborates Leconte’s (2015) suggestion that the European project is under attack from different right-wing actors across Europe.

Right-wing populism against the elites

Abts and Rummens (2007, p. 418) maintain that right-wing populism blames the intellectual, economic and political elites for abusing their positions of power and influence, and ignoring the *people*. The keyword analysis has shown that the main focus of interest of the corpus rests with countries, European institutions and Brexit. Leconte (2015, p. 258) describes populism as an anti-establishmentarian discourse that emphasises the *people* against the *elites*. The top three multi-word keywords are unequivocally revealing: *migration crisis*, *far-right leader* and *European project*. While the second is arguably the immediate result of our

inquiry, *migration crisis* and *European project* reveal themselves as relevant themes in our corpus. Let us focus on the latter now.

The European project, that is, the EU, and Brexit are the top two most significant individual keywords in the corpus. *Brexit* is seen as being damaging to *punch-drunk EU* and to the interests of *senior officials*. The enemy in the corpus, according to the logic of identity, is the *EU*, not the Europeans. The EU personifies the role the elites play in populist discourse: “all political forms and offices which institute mediated forms of representative power will be targeted as inimical to the direct rule of the people” (Abts and Rummens, 2007, p. 418). The narrative in the corpus suggests that *Britain* has started an earthquake that will be followed by other countries. In this context, Italy and Austria are instrumental. They are the other European countries that will show how dissatisfied the *people* are with the EU project and the “invented” European identity (Wodak, 2015, p. 41).

The Italian vote against the constitutional reform is seen as a punishment against the establishment, one that will extend *panic* across the *eurozone* and will *cripple* and *plunge* the EU, that is, their remote elites. As a result, Brexit will be *boosted*. Corbett (2016, p. 11) maintains that the populist media depiction of EU policy has “promoted an especially ‘right-wing Euroscepticism’, that is ‘regressive and conservative within the British political culture, [whose] strength lies in its capacity to be populist and appear contemporary and radical (Gifford, 2008, p. 857)”. The radical and populist Eurosceptic elements are found in the HUKT corpus in the way in which the EU is seen as a scapegoat of all major problems (unemployment, migration crisis, economic crisis), and in the neutral treatment, Norbert Hofer and his party are given in the corpus. Our word sketch and multi-word keyword analyses reveal that the Austrian far-right is not explicitly associated with collocates other than neutral descriptors. Unsurprisingly, when it comes to the EU, the right-wing media show no hesitation in blaming the EU or Brussels (Geddes, 2013) for many of the issues outlined in Table 9.3. An exploration of the concordance lines of *European* suggests that this is often used to portray threats to the common people’s values and the logic of identity pursued by populists as opposed to the discourse of constitutional democracies as guarantors of individual freedoms and “constitutive conditions of the democratic process” (Abts and Rummens, 2007, p. 418). The following are some examples of how *European* is consistently associated with some obscure elites and the construction of the EU as a delegitimised idea:

- (14) Brutalised by recession, stricken by austerity and outraged by what they see as the **European** elite’s callous indifference, thousands of Greeks have been driven into the arms of the far Right and extreme Left (Appendix 2, text id 2).
- (15) Is it likely that an EU in such a weak and confused condition will come together with the specific intention of punishing Britain? I don’t believe so. Of course, some **European** politicians – especially in Brussels – like to talk tough (Appendix 2, text id 11).

- (16) This month, Austria's new chancellor, Christian Kern, said that Brexit could mean the "slow goodbye of the **European** idea" unless serious reform is carried out. He claimed that Brexit would trigger "enormous economic upheaval and a shift in the continent's political balance" (Appendix 2, text id 8).
- (17) Plenty of experts think that a rejection of Renzi's reforms will trigger a crisis which could eventually bring down the entire **European** project – the EU, the euro, the Brussels gravy train, Uncle Tom Juncker and all (Appendix 2, text id 18).

Abts and Rummens (2007, p. 419) maintain that political opponents can "no longer appear as legitimate representatives of the popular will", which validates the exclusion and lack of recognition of what is different, in this case, the EU as embodied by the Brussels elites and politicians. The extract below showcases how the Brexit vote is constructed as a reaction to the elites by the "ordinary voters":

- (18) The political establishment here [Germany, France and Italy] has carried on the battle against Brexit by maintaining that the referendum vote was some sort of irrational aberration. It was nothing of the sort: it was a vote by **ordinary voters** who were fed up with being told they had no choice but to go along with the EU elite (Appendix 2, text id 16).

Brexit is constructed as an extraordinary movement full of vigour and enough potential to bring the EU down. This picture is consistent with *Britain's* portrayal as a visionary country that will set trend and will be followed by others:

- (19) The other countries who could follow **Britain** out of the EU after becoming disillusioned with Brussels FAR right political parties across Europe are calling for their own countries to stage referendums on leaving the EU just hours after Brits voted in favour of Brexit yesterday (Appendix 2, text id 8).

Paradoxically, this populist construction of the EU as an elitist project contrasts with Gifford (2008), who states that Euroscepticism, as the hegemonic position within the British political order, is the brainchild of the British political elite.

Right-wing populism against foreigners and immigrants

A significant number of the keywords analysed show that the articles where *Norbert Hofer* was mentioned were concerned with the EU and migration. Corbett (2016, p. 17) thinks that dissatisfaction with the enlargement of the EU and the movement of people "especially from new member states in central Europe opened up tensions in British politics that neither New Labour nor Conservative parties could

address". In this light, Brexit is seen as a direct consequence of these tensions. In our corpus, *political uncertainty* is something EU countries need to deal with, in particular Italy. *Youth unemployment* appears inexorably linked to migration, as if there was a direct, undisputed causal link between the two. Some of the uses of the keyword *European* show how it was used to suggest that the EU can pose threats to the readers of the media analysed. The following example links *European decline* with migrant workers and asylum seekers' sexual assault in Germany:

- (20) The calendar of **European** decline begins not with last month's referendum in Britain or the unrest in Turkey. For the Germans at least it probably started on New Year's Eve in Cologne when hundreds of women were sexually assaulted by migrant workers and asylum seekers. Information was initially withheld by the authorities because they did not want to admit that the state could no longer cope (Appendix 2, text id 9).

However, this never happened according to German police, *The Bild* and *The New York Times*⁹. This incident appears in another article in the corpus (Appendix 1, text id 2). The presence of anti-migrant and anti-asylum seeker discourses in the press is deeply worrying because of their effect on the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will (Wodak, 2015). As with the elites, it seems that a topos of cause was used in the corpus around the ideas of economic crisis and migrants. According to Wodak (2015, p. 53), "if the cause exists then so does the effect. If the cause does not exist, then there is no effect". Such a causal link is implied in our corpus. In all the instances where the top one multi-word keyword *migration crisis* occurs, what we find is not a humanitarian interest in the situation of migrants coming to the EU to improve their life conditions (away from a war in Syria), but a breakdown of the negative effects on countries and citizens in the EU:

- (21) That figure has increased from 35 per cent over the last year, suggesting that Eurosceptic momentum is building due to the country's **migration crisis**, poor economy and unemployment figures (Appendix 2, text id 16).

The extended concordance line refers to *Italy*, one of the unexpected protagonists of our initial search. *Italy* was constructed as one of the EU countries that may eventually follow the UK in leaving the EU. *Italy* and *Austria* provide the backdrop against which the migration crisis unfolds and against which a populist pro-Brexit discourse emerges, possibly suggesting "an idealized conception of a [nation's] imagined past, which has since been weakened or destroyed by enemies of the people" (Corbett, 2016, p. 15), especially by the EU project (Wellings, 2010; Geddes, 2013). Part of that conception remains implicit in the HUKT corpus, as if the invocation of the topos of cause would suffice for the effect of crises and disasters to validate the effects and the consequences of the Brexit vote. In some of the keywords, however, we find a more explicit vindication of Brexit. This is the case of *free movement*:

- (22) Joseph Muscat effectively said there wasn't a cat's chance in Hell of our having access to the single market while restricting **free movement** of labour. Sometimes it seems intransigent Remainers actually want negotiations to founder so that Brexit can be universally recognised as a total disaster (Appendix 2, text id 8).
- (23) Expanding the EU to include additional countries, which is very much Brussels' plan, would exacerbate opposition to the **free movement** of people. Given all this, Remain needs to explain why we wouldn't be better off trying to diversify our economy towards more resilient parts of the world (Appendix 2, text id 9).

Remainers and *Brussels* are used here in similar ways as elites in the previous section as part of the topos of threat (Wodak, 2015); if Remainers continue their fight to repeal Brexit, we are warned, the voices of the people will be unheard and the EU elites will triumph. Freedden (2017, p. 1) states that Brexit has "occasioned the need to reassess the ranges and guises of populism, especially when populist agendas are voiced in part from within the political Establishment of a democratic state". The results of the study reveal a discourse that tries to blame the EU and migrants (Wodak, 2015) for the many challenges and problems the UK and the EU are facing in 2016 and beyond.

Some conclusions

Data-driven methods such as keyword analyses and word sketches were used to surface the themes and the aboutness of our corpus (Scott, 2008). This study has tried to gain further understanding of the role played by Austrian far-right politics in the discourse of right-wing press in the UK during 2016. Using a combination of corpus linguistics research methods and the analytical framework provided by Abts and Rummens (2007), the results of this research provide evidence that Norbert Hofer and the FPÖ were used to articulate the EU on a vertical axis where right-wing tabloids' populist discourse against the EU elites and migrants could be framed. Complementary collocation analyses support the idea that, while far-right leaders in right-wing media are portrayed as neutral stakeholders, their politics and beliefs are used to showcase populist discourse against the EU and migrants. This is an interesting finding that lends support to Wodak's (2015) analysis of right-wing populism as embodying the feelings of fear of the future and the desires for change. In this context, "fear is easily converted into scapegoating and is politically instrumentalized" (Wodak, 2015, p. 186). This study also corroborates that the Brexit vote was a reaction to a narrative about immigration as a danger to UK values and sovereignty:

[...] immigration was central to the debate in the UK. The Leave campaign was relentless in its narratives about the problems of immigration in

Britain, in particular by UKIP, where opposition took on racist overtones as party leaders claimed foreigners were taking jobs and overburdening the social services (despite evidence to the contrary).

(Schmidt, 2017, p. 256)

The UKIP poster suggesting thousands of migrants trying to break into the UK will remain as one of the most dishonourable tricks in the history of social manipulation. One of the contributions of this analysis is to unmask the dangerous discourse of populist media that tries to oversimplify complex issues such as migration and sovereignty and exploits the fear of those who feel their lifestyle threatened. Another is to show how necessary it is to challenge views on populism situating it as an ideology, as they take advantage of “rising immigration, growing ethnic diversity of national populations, changes in cultural mores, persistent social inequality, economic crises, terrorist threats, and ineffective political governance” (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 21). Understanding the rhetorical strategies of right-wing populist discourse is necessary to fight the ideological makeup (Wellings, 2010) covering up the use of foreign politics in UK tabloids in order to legitimise the hatred towards minorities, in particular migrants.

Notes

- 1 URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/05/defeat-austria-far-right-norbert-hofer-hope-europe>
- 2 URL: <https://global-factiva-com.proxy.jbs.cam.ac.uk/>
- 3 The day before the presidential elections in Austria.
- 4 URL: <https://www.dowjones.com/products/factiva/>
- 5 URL: <https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/tony-parsons/1222188/tony-parsons-moronic-remain-poster-is-offensive-to-both-black-and-white-people/>
- 6 URL: <https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/tony-parsons/1222188/tony-parsons-moronic-remain-poster-is-offensive-to-both-black-and-white-people/>
- 7 URL: <https://www.sketchengine.eu/documentation/simple-maths/>
- 8 URL: <https://www.sketchengine.eu/user-guide/user-manual/word-sketch/>
- 9 URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/world/europe/bild-fake-story.html>

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Corpus lemma list (Top 100)

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Lemma</i>	<i>Freq</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Lemma</i>	<i>Freq</i>
1	The	1199	51	Leave	49
2	Be	767	52	Their	48
3	Of	536	53	Party	46
4	To	504	54	All	46
5	A	470	55	About	46
6	In	378	56	Want	45
7	And	376	57	No	45
8	Have	273	58	Now	44
9	That	244	59	Do	43
10	It	183	60	Make	42
11	For	176	61	Leader	40
12	EU	168	62	Than	39
13	On	150	63	There	38
14	As	123	64	People	38
15	Will	119	65	Political	37
16	Not	110	66	One	37
17	By	101	67	Poll	36
18	He	97	68	Crisis	36
19	With	96	69	After	36
20	Would	96	70	Or	36
21	This	95	71	Many	36
22	Vote	95	72	Renzi	35
23	But	85	73	government	35
24	Say	85	74	Come	35
25	They	76	75	Into	34
26	If	76	76	She	34
27	referendum	74	77	Next	33
28	An	73	78	Like	33
29	Country	72	79	Even	33
30	From	72	80	Our	33
31	Brexit	65	81	See	32
32	His	64	82	Also	32
33	I	64	83	Most	31
34	Italian	63	84	Up	30
35	At	63	85	Go	30
36	Italy	61	86	Over	30
37	Year	61	87	So	29
38	We	61	88	When	29
39	Could	60	89	Mr	29
40	Who	60	90	What	28
41	Europe	59	91	Win	28
42	More	57	92	Lead	28
43	Britain	56	93	Call	27
44	Per	54	94	Voter	27
45	Cent	53	95	Just	27
46	Out	52	96	May	26
47	Which	51	97	Party	26
48	European	50	98	Last	26
49	Its	49	99	France	26
50	election	49	100	Hofer	25

Appendix 2

Texts included in the Hofer UK Tabloid 2016 Corpus

<i>id</i>	<i>Paper</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Title</i>
1	<i>Daily Mail</i>	25/04/2016	EU MAKES IT HARDER FOR US TO CONTROL MIGRATION, ADMITS HOME SECRETARY
2	<i>Daily Mail</i>	14/05/2016	THE BIGGEST LIE OF ALL
3	<i>The Sun</i>	23/05/2016	David Cameron fighting back after PM's former guru backed Brexit
4	<i>The Sun</i>	29/05/2016	Tony Parsons: Moronic Remain poster is offensive to both black AND white people
5*	<i>The Sun</i>	30/05/2016	A riddle, wrapped in a mystery, found in a shed: Hitler's code machine discovered in Essex outhouse
6	<i>The Sun</i>	03/06/2016	EU Referendum: Voting Remain is a greater leap into the unknown than freeing ourselves from the EU's economic uncertainty
7	<i>The Sun</i>	24/06/2016	News sites in Europe react in shock as Britain votes to leave the EU, calling Brexit a 'dirty divorce'
8	<i>The Sun</i>	24/06/2016	The other countries who could follow Britain out of the EU after becoming disillusioned with Brussels
9	<i>The Sun</i>	27/07/2016	As Brexit gives Europe's far-right leaders cheer, it's now clear punch-drunk EU has over-extended itself
10	<i>Daily Mail</i>	29/11/2016	POLISH PM: TEACH MY LANGUAGE IN BRITISH SCHOOLS
11	<i>Daily Mail</i>	29/11/2016	ENOUGH OF ALL THIS BREXIT GLOOM! THE EU'S IN TURMOIL – AND WE'VE SOME ACES UP OUR SLEEVES
12	<i>Daily Mail</i>	01/12/2016	NOW MORE GERMANS CALL FOR VOTE ON QUITTING EU
13	<i>Daily Mail</i>	01/12/2016	EUROPE ON A PRECIPICE
14	<i>The Sun</i>	01/12/2016	EUROPE'S MOMENT OF TRUTH Elections, rising nationalism and banking crisis could spark 'cataclysmic' break-up of the EU next year
15	<i>The Sun</i>	02/12/2016	We're all facing job uncertainty, but unlike business bosses, miners handle it with real dignity
16	<i>The Daily Express</i>	02/12/2016	EU could collapse long before Brexit process is finished
17	<i>The Sun</i>	03/12/2016	As Italy hits the polls it may well cripple the EU and serve a boost to Brexit
18	<i>Daily Mail</i>	03/12/2016	WILL QUITALY SINK THE EU?
19	<i>The Sun</i>	03/12/2016	Working class Brits did not ditch the Labour Party ... it ditched them

* This text was excluded from the analyses and the final corpus.

10

DISABILITY IN THE POPULIST PRESS

An investigation of British tabloids

Maria Cristina Nisco

Introduction

The last decades have witnessed some major changes in the way Western societies have approached disabled people, so that disability has become a key policy area and a pivotal equality issue, along the lines of gender, sexual orientation and ethnicity. Great emphasis has been placed on the need for people with disabilities to enjoy the same level of services, equal access to facilities, and employment opportunities while acknowledging that inequality is a matter of dominance and subordination as it involves hierarchies and the (mal)distribution of power.

Disability theory has engaged in a variety of critical and investigative pursuits ranging from the cultural and historical specificity of dominant representations of disabled people and the genealogies of eugenic policies, to images of disabled people in the media and literature, and the intersection between disability and ethnicity and/or queer sexualities (Corker and Shakespeare, 2002; Clare, 2009; Siebers, 2013).

In this context, Michel Foucault's stance on disability acted as a major reference point, especially in what pertains to the discourses, practices, procedures, and policies that create, classify, codify, manage and control the way people are categorised and objectified as physically impaired, handicapped, mentally ill, etc. In particular, Foucault (1982) argued that normative practices of categorisation and classification were the primary means whereby people could be 'systematised' on the basis of the accepted idea of normality. By doing so, power created knowledge and knowledge, in turn, affected power; therefore, medical, juridical and psychiatric classifications led to the emergence of (human) 'kinds' into which people could be sorted (Hacking, 1999; 2002). Foucault (1982) further suggested that the idea of disability is discursively framed as a pathology when medical knowledge determines individual able-bodiedness. To such extent, his

understanding of discourse (Foucault, 1981) is extremely useful since discourse is that which orders how subjects and events are framed and experienced, shaping what is included in, or excluded from, societal hegemonic structures.

Over the last 30 years, a number of theoretical models have been proposed, reflecting important shifts in the way disability is viewed; the two most frequently employed are the medical and the social models (Oliver, 1996). The medical model states that people are disabled by their own impairments, so disability is regarded as a problem in itself. The social model, in contrast, draws on the assumption that society disables people, suggesting that disability is caused by society's inability to accommodate differences. This maintains that barriers are not just physical since prejudice and stereotypes do create constraints disabling people from having equal opportunities within society. In other words, instead of viewing disability as a problem affecting a person and requiring medical treatment, the social model regards disability as a disadvantage stemming from a lack of sustainable conditions in the social environment.¹ On the one hand, the medical understanding of disability commonly resulted in people feeling marginalised, undervalued, frustrated and pressured to fit societal norms; on the other hand, by focusing on the attitudinal obstacles experienced by people with disabilities, the social model enables a vision that does not regard disability in itself as a form of restraint and oppression, and rather shifts the attention towards society's limitations and failures (Valle and Connor, 2018). Having received international attention to counter medical conceptions of disability, the social model has achieved increasing influence at the institutional level; therefore, it lies behind a wide range of initiatives and official documents that will be briefly discussed in the next paragraph.

After overviewing the main institutional developments, the recurrent portrayals of disability in news discourse and the relations between populism and tabloids in the UK, this chapter investigates the discursive patterns framing disability in the British populist press, connoting it positively or negatively. Such analysis appears to be of central importance in the light of the role the media play in shaping societal perceptions, thus affecting public attitudes towards disabled people. The case of the populist press seems particularly interesting considering that disabled people can be ambivalently construed either as a weak group needing protection or as a scapegoat for society's problems. The category they are located into changes accordingly, shifting from 'ordinary (good) people' to 'corrupted (evil) élite'.

The institutional background

Following the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), a number of international treaties and conventions have emphasised the dignity, inherent value, and equal rights that are to be granted to persons with disabilities. Among the most important initiatives aiming at establishing guiding principles for national policies, it is worth mentioning the UN Declaration for the International Year

of Disabled Persons (1981), the UN Decade of Disabled Persons (1983), the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention no. 159 (1983) and the UN Rules on Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (1994). More recently, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007) has defined the duties of states and the rights of persons with disabilities, seeking to overcome the social marginalisation they might experience. The Convention has been the major catalyst in the shift from viewing persons with disabilities as objects of compassion and medical treatment (i.e. a social sub-group mostly defined by their impairments) towards viewing them as full members of society, with equal rights. Signatory states to the Convention have undertaken to adopt all appropriate legislative measures to fight disability discrimination, and to raise social awareness regarding this issue, combating stereotypes and harmful practices. Accordingly, the media were also recommended to portray these persons following the purpose of the Convention.

The UK, in particular, ratified the UN Convention in 2009, taking a further step from the disability discrimination laws developed in the 1990s.² Bringing together various laws broadly covering discrimination, the Equality Act (2010) detailed all forms of discrimination, harassment and victimisation to be prevented. In fact, it protects anyone who has (or has had) a disability and anyone who experiences discrimination because of their association with a disabled person. Most importantly, it has broadened the meaning of ‘disability’, defining it as a “physical or mental impairment that has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities”.³ While, previously, disability discrimination was deemed unlawful exclusively when it happened in relation to work, the Equality Act encompasses all areas, ranging from personal, educational and professional contexts to health care, security and political participation. With over 11 million disabled people (a number that grows each year), the Act is currently the main legislative framework to support the fight against disability discrimination in Great Britain.

However, very often, societal attitudes toward disability lag behind the law. Indeed, whilst the law could formally change the conditions in which attitudes are shaped and reinforced, progress on equality legislation stands in contrast to a potential failure to reshape societal perceptions and practices, with disabled people experiencing conditions of poverty, exclusion from health, education, employment, social services and cultural activities (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2010; Wood and Grant, 2010; Edwards, 2012). Therefore, disabled people seem to be still left behind, treated as second-class citizens.

In line with the requirements of the UN Convention, the UK Office for Disability Issues periodically measures public attitudes towards disabled people and disability with questions included in the British Social Attitudes Surveys.⁴ Overall, data suggest that disabled people tend to be viewed (by three-quarters of respondents) as needing to be cared for most of the time, besides being regarded as less capable and less productive than non-disabled people. While acknowledging that measuring prejudice against disabled people is not a straightforward task – indeed,

people's attitudes comprise a complex mix of presumptions, beliefs, feelings, values, and stereotypes – public attitudes and perceptions appear all the more relevant because they translate into behaviours that turn into barriers to achieving equality.

Framing disability in news discourse

News reports about disability deal with a social group that has been conventionally treated as marginal; as such, the social issue has not received much press attention in the past (Burns and Haller, 2015, p. 264). Even when present, it has been mostly tackled in terms of a medical or welfare problem. In fact, the most recurrent media portrayals of disability have depicted it as an illness or malfunction (following the medical model) or as a social pathology (portraying disabled people as disadvantaged citizens who depend upon the state or society for economic support and are, therefore, a burden for the community) (Clogston, 1990). Also of some relevance was the image of the super-cripple (portrayed as special individuals with superhuman features that allowed them to live a normal life in spite of their disability) (Clogston, 1990). However, as marginal as news on disability could be, the media have always played a pivotal role in how the issue is presented and received. Indeed, the media matter not only for their persuasive ability, but above all for the power relations they establish and endorse, and their shaping of events. As the ILO has also noted, describing “women and men with disabilities with dignity and respect in the media can help promote more inclusive and tolerant societies” (2015, p. 7). Media representations of people with disabilities are thus a key factor in achieving societal inclusion and equal rights.

With a specific reference to the British context, according to the charity Disability Rights UK, the way disabled people are referred to by the Government and the media has a serious effect on their lives. In the report *Press Portrayal of Disabled People. A Rise in Hostility Fuelled by Austerity* (Disability Rights UK, 2012), they surveyed disabled people's views of press coverage on disability, with the aim of examining the rise of hostility towards disabled people and its causes. The report shows how critical the issue has become and the urgent need to address the problem, as evident in some of the following findings:

- Over 70% of respondents could cite negative news reports about disabled people and less than 30% mentioned a positive story.
- 94% stated that the press portrayal of disability issues was unfair.
- 76% believed that negativity was significantly increasing.
- 91% said there was a link between negative press portrayals and rising hostility and hate crime.
- 42% suggested that the Government was responsible for rising press negativity and hostility towards disabled people (Disability Rights UK, 2012, p. 4).

While recognition of both the Government's and the media's responsibilities in fuelling stigma, harassment and hate crime is a key step, the big challenge seems

to be transforming the way disabled people are discursively construed in society. Although Disability Rights UK has repeatedly stressed the importance for the press to ensure positive attitudes towards disabled people, this does not seem to be occurring as often as it should, at present, in the UK. In fact, the above-mentioned findings suggest a rising tide of vilification of disabled people, worsened by frequently inaccurate and misleading reports.

In this respect, the media play a central role in demarcating what is or is not socially relevant, fostering specific representations of disabled people that inevitably affect their lives. By setting the importance of a topic in its amount of coverage, they resonate with cultural norms, framing the issue and setting the agenda. This appears even more relevant considering that previous research has found that a substantial proportion of people acquire core information about disability mainly from specific popular media, namely TV and newspapers (Manning, 2001). As symbolic gatekeepers, the media hold significant social power in ideologically delineating public assumptions, attitudes and moods for a wide audience (Fairclough, 1995).

In 2011, the Glasgow Media Group and the Strathclyde Centre for Disability Research were commissioned to analyse changes in how the British press reported disability and how it impacted on societal attitudes towards people with disabilities (Briant, Philo, Watson, 2011).⁵ They compared and contrasted coverage of disability in five newspapers (*Sun*, *Daily Mirror*, *Express*, *Daily Mail*, *Guardian*) in 2004–05 and 2010–11, and then drew on content analysis and audience reception analysis to consider how the trends identified could affect the lives of disabled people. The investigation found that there had been a significant increase in the reporting of disability in the second period, with progressive politicisation of how it was reported compared to the first period, reflecting the Government's agenda (with some obvious differences in the reporting depending on the newspapers' political stance). There was also a reduction in the number of articles portraying disabled people in sympathetic or disablist terms – such as 'cripple' or terms presenting them as sufferers or victims – and a remarkable increase in the number of reports focusing on disability benefits and fraud in 2010–11. Accordingly, the 'burden' disabled people were alleged to place on the economy became a recurrent theme, with tabloids often blaming disabled people for the recession. A significantly frequent use of pejorative language was detected, in comparison to 2004–05, with terms like 'scrounger', 'cheat' and 'skiver' reinforcing the idea of disabled claimants as undeserving. Interestingly, debates on the political and social context in which disabled people find themselves was almost entirely absent from the tabloids, which limited all explanations of the consequences of the cuts to individual responsibilities and weakened social values.

Populism and tabloids in the UK

Within the UK, the populist press coverage seems to particularly deserve some attention since, according to the Turn2Us report (2012), up until 2011 the British

tabloids showed a trend to report disability in a negative light. The share of stories with negative language was lower in the *Daily Mirror* (with 56% of articles), but it went beyond two-thirds for the other tabloids (with the *Sun* coming up to 78%).⁶ Further investigation conducted at the London School of Economics (LSE) – aiming at assessing the populist content of newspaper opinion articles in five European countries – has also proved that public debates in Great Britain seem to have become increasingly populist over the last decades, so that populism can be actually said to be more widespread than one could previously assume (Rooduijn, 2014).⁷ Not only have populist parties become increasingly electorally successful in Western Europe, but the populist message itself has become more widespread and pervasive in public debates, generating deeply ingrained beliefs in society.

As a matter of fact, the majority of European countries are witnessing a wave of populist ideology and politics (both left- and right-leaning) conceiving society as separated into two distinct groups, the ‘ordinary (good) people’ vs. the ‘corrupt elite’ (Canovan, 2002). Traditionally expressing identities, interests and needs that have been delegitimised by dominant political parties, populism takes into account the demands of ordinary people, identifying with them and intending to speak in their name. The appeal of populism has recently grown because of public resentment, economic malaise and inequalities threatening social balance, causing a generalised sense that governments and the élite ignore public concerns, thus the urge to defend the nation from perceived dangers and evils (see Human Rights Watch, 2017).

In the cauldron of discontent, tabloids’ populist discourse has flourished and gained power by conventionally portraying a series of ‘subjects’ as potential threats to ‘the people’, adopting a more or less exclusionist attitude towards ‘dangerous others’ whether immigrants, LGBTI people or people of different religions. However, disability seems to be a trickier issue in relation to populism because disabled people are usually regarded as a weak group to be protected while often becoming, at the same time, a scapegoat. Consequently, their discursive construal can be rather ambivalent and worthy of attention. If populism seeks to support the interests of ordinary people, to what extent are people with disabilities located within or outside the ‘ordinary people/evil’ dimension when it comes to populist press coverage?

This research question stems from the awareness that tabloids’ identity rests on populist assumptions about their target audience, in that they offer a routine representation of important aspects of the dominant, naturalised version of contemporary Britain that is based on the parameters of what a national readership is willing to recognise as part of its own narratives. Moreover, despite a general falling circulation and their tarnished reputation, tabloids still maintain a striking grip on power in this context. They seem to set the agenda far more effectively than other media outlets.⁸ Indeed, they consciously follow the rhetoric of populist journalism, assumedly identifying with the people against the powerful – overshadowing this internal contradiction which also views

them as major actors among the powerful (Conboy, 2006). Tabloids provide a well-defined sense of identity, a textual locus for a popular national community to belong to. To this extent, can disabled people be said to be part of this discursive community?

The *Dis_UK* corpus

Moving from these assumptions as much as from the linguistic investigation carried out by the Glasgow Media Group and the Strathclyde Centre for Disability Research on the 2004–05 and 2010–11 British press coverage of disability, this chapter aims at examining the news reports on disability in more recent times, namely 2016–17, thus keeping the same time span of the previous study, with a regular interval of six years. This seems particularly relevant at a time when the UK government has signalled new cuts to disability benefits, with widespread debate on whether claimants are ‘deserving’ or ‘non-deserving’. Indeed, early in 2016, the Government reduced support and services for disabled people and further cut benefit payments, which implied a loss of £2,500 a year on average for 500,000 disabled people. It also introduced the so-called ‘fit-to-work’ tests, which are meant to assess whether or not claimants’ medical conditions stop them from being able to work and allow them to be on benefits; such tests caused benefit claimants to wait months before being assessed, besides the obvious rejections and stricter limits. All this seemed to many an unprecedented assault on disabled people’s rights in Britain.

Further on this point, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has condemned Theresa May’s government over disabled people’s declining living standards following cuts to benefits and services. According to a report that was issued in mid-2017, the British government failed to recognise living independently and being included in the community as a human right, while attacking its failure at providing adequate education support for disabled pupils. There was also concern regarding care and treatment policies, which were described as insufficient and inconsistent with the right to life of persons with disabilities as equal and contributing members of society. The UN Committee overtly accused ministers of neglecting disabled people with policies stemming from austerity measures, thus causing what was defined as a ‘human catastrophe’.⁹

Therefore, in the attempt to analyse the main discursive construal of ‘disability’ and disabled people in the British populist press, the *Dis_UK* corpus was built gathering the news reports published over a time-span ranging from January 1, 2016 to June 1, 2017.¹⁰ From the tabloids selected for inclusion (those featuring the highest circulation rates), namely the *Daily Mail*, *Daily Mirror*, *Daily Star*, and *The Sun*, about 3,400 articles were collected searching for ‘disabilit*’ and ‘disabled’. Table 10.1 details the number of news reports and tokens in each newspaper.

TABLE 10.1 Detailed information on the *Dis_UK* corpus

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Daily Mail</i>	<i>Daily Mirror</i>	<i>Daily Star</i>	<i>Sun</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
No. of news reports	662	1,229	236	1,272	3,399
No. of tokens	635,938	629,806	95,686	650,284	2,011,714

To explore the corpus, quantitative and qualitative analyses were integrated, employing quantitative tools such as Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff *et al.*, 2004) together with the software for linguistic analysis AntConc 3.5.7 (Anthony, 2010). This approach has allowed a systematic investigation of the recurrent themes mentioned in relation to disability, and the emerging linguistic and discursive patterns construing the issue. Moreover, examination of such patterns uncovers the extent to which tabloids employ positive or negative vocabulary to connote disability in terms of need, discrimination, human rights, barriers, stigma or, conversely, dishonesty, lack of effort, benefit dependency, fraud, and so on. This appears a pivotal step in having a comprehensive picture of the dominant assumptions about disability conveyed by the populist press to their readerships.

Analysis and findings

The first phase of analysis, employing Sketch Engine, was carried out through word-sketches of two seed words, *disabled* and *disability*,¹¹ and the data emerging from the four newspapers were then compared and contrasted. Figure 10.1 shows the word-sketch of the term *disabled* in the *Daily Star*, which is meant to provide a sample of what a word-sketch looks like.

The resulting collocates of the first seed word were grouped according to their semantic domains, namely the areas of meaning they could be associated to and the lexical relations they held to each other. This categorisation based on clustering techniques can prove very useful to bring together semantically similar elements, identifying texts with common patterns and recurring clusters embedded in the network that is developed around the search term under investigation.

A detailed reading of the lexical items modified by, or co-occurring with, *disabled* suggests a great focus on aspects relating to the semantic domain of age, as evident from collocates like ‘youngster’, ‘child’, ‘boy’, ‘kid’, ‘girl’, ‘schoolgirl’, ‘elderly’, ‘10-year-old’, ‘teen’, ‘14-year-old’, ‘young’. The second domain also appearing to have some significance in the *Daily Star* is sport (‘disabled’ being often employed with ‘athlete’, ‘footballer’, ‘Olympic’), while the third domain relates to illness, with items like ‘mentally’, ‘sick’, and ‘ill’ modifying or co-occurring with *disabled*.

Word-sketches of the same seed word were then retrieved from all the newspapers included in the corpus, and the resulting semantic domains (see Figure 10.2).

disabled (*adjective*) Alternative PoS: noun (14)
 Disability Star freq = 233 (2,435.04 per million)

modifiers of "disabled"		nouns and verbs modified by "disabled"		"disabled" and/or ...		prepositional phrases	
	13 5.58		169 72.53	42	18.03		7
severely	6 13.26	people	36 12.13	sick	5 11.64	"disabled" for ...	4 1.72
mentally	1 11.00	disabled people		other	4 11.24	"disabled" as ...	1 0.43
genuinely	1 10.82	harvey	16 11.24	poor	3 10.97	"disabled" at ...	1 0.43
seriously	1 10.75	her disabled son Harvey		elderly	2 10.54	"disabled" from ...	1 0.43
often	1 10.41	athlete	9 10.52	ill	2 10.51		
really	2 9.64	toilet	7 10.30	low	2 10.51		
too	1 9.44	man	8 10.20	gay	2 10.47		
		youngster	5 9.84	first	2 10.38		
		bay	5 9.83	many	2 10.30		
		child	5 9.77	10-year-old	1 9.57		
		boy	5 9.73	teen	1 9.57		
		person	4 9.43	human	1 9.57		
		boxing	3 9.15	14-year-old	1 9.57		
		serviceman	2 8.56	being	1 9.57		
		gregory	2 8.55	manipulative	1 9.57		
		kid	2 8.55	unfair	1 9.57		
		mother	2 8.54	overnight	1 9.53		
		daughter	2 8.54	female	1 9.53		
		footballer	2 8.54	lesbian	1 9.53		
		actor	2 8.54	olympic	1 9.53		
		son	2 8.52	real	1 9.53		
		driver	2 8.46	only	1 9.53		
		woman	2 8.37	6ft	1 9.50		
		fan	2 8.37	own	1 9.50		
		girl	2 8.31	young	1 9.48		
		comrade	1 7.59				
		schoolgirl	1 7.59				

infinitive objects of "disabled"	
	2 0.86
hold	1 13.00
be	1 8.59

verbs before "disabled"	
	13 5.58
leave	2 11.91
hit	1 11.09
bear	1 11.09
remain	1 10.91
be	8 9.01

subjects of "be disabled"	
	2 0.86
rival	1 13.41
son	1 13.41

FIGURE 10.1 Word-sketch of disabled (*Daily Star*).




FIGURE 10.2 Semantic domains resulting from word-sketches of 'disabled'.

As evident, there is widespread attention given to young disabled people, probably partly due to a seemingly well-established trend revealing young people as more likely to be claiming disability benefits in the UK than in other rich countries, something disclosed by an international study on welfare by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.¹² All the newspapers

(with the exception of the *Daily Mirror*) employ lexical items that overtly connote disabled people in terms of age:

- (1) Disabled girl, 14, reveals plan to end her life after one final dance at her prom (*Sun*, 21/07/16);
- (2) A disabled youngster has spoken for the first time thanks to a computer (*Daily Star*, 25/09/16);
- (3) Tyldesley disabled boy gets out of the wheelchair and crawls (*Daily Mail*, 31/03/17).

A qualitative reading of the concordances of *disabled* also shows that this feature hints at the complex issue of widening gaps between disabled and non-disabled young people, and their constraints and aspirations into adulthood. This potentially draws attention to the social urge to support young people with disabilities in building high aspirations for the future.

The other recurrent feature in the corpus is the portrayal of disabled people in relation to their medical conditions or impairments, something that is explicitly discouraged at the institutional level. Indeed, the Office for Disability Issues maintains that a positive image of disability should be based on the social model rather than the medical model.¹³ In fact, the identification of people by their disabling condition might reinforce discrimination, perpetuating negative beliefs about people with disabilities. Despite this recommendation, the most common depiction in the populist press revolves around a clinical perspective and reduces the person's quality of life to an illness, highlighting all the consequent limitations to a 'normal' life:

- (4) The 13-year-old has Prader-Willi syndrome, a rare and complex genetic condition which causes obsessive overeating. Harvey also suffers from partial blindness, ADHD and autism (*Sun*, 02/03/16).
- (5) Josh, 21, is confined to a wheelchair with muscular dystrophy, a degenerative disease which causes weakness of muscles, causing paralysis (*Daily Mail*, 23/10/16).
- (6) Since his birth Likhon cannot move any of his limbs on his own. He is confined to a wheelchair and has to take his mother's help to meet his daily needs (*Daily Star*, 03/12/16).

Within the *Dis_UK* corpus, the *Daily Mirror* is the only newspaper to construe disabled people drawing on social factors like poverty, social disadvantage and unemployment, something certainly due to its left-leaning orientation:

- (7) Huge numbers of disabled people are wrongly denied Personal Independence Payments (PIP), tribunals are ruling (*Daily Mirror*, 06/04/16).
- (8) Tory promises to halve unemployment gap of disabled workers will be missed, research shows (*Daily Mirror*, 18/05/16).

- (9) Cruel Tory benefit cuts could push disabled people into poverty (*Daily Mirror*, 03/02/17).

Word-sketches of the second seed word, *disability*, were then retrieved from all the newspapers, assuming that an investigation of the linguistic construal of the concept could also offer interesting insights (see Figure 10.3).

More specifically, analysis of *disability* revealed an extremely negative emphasis on fraudulent cases (especially in the *Sun* and the *Daily Star*, but also, to a lesser extent, in the two other papers). In fact, the search term mostly co-occurs with collocates like ‘benefits’, ‘cheat’, ‘scrounger’, ‘fraudulent’, ‘exaggerate’, ‘abuse’. Indeed, the amount of coverage on benefits and their misuse or abuse is quite high and present in all the populist newspapers. Overall, there is a widespread presence within the corpus as far as cases of fraud and moral outrage are concerned (it is worth noting that even if such stories are numerically less significant in the *Daily Mail* and *Daily Mirror*, they are nonetheless present):

- (10) A couple who claimed more than £64,000 in disability benefits were caught red handed lifting heavy baskets at their florist’s shop (*Sun*, 19/04/16).
 (11) A woman claiming disability benefits was caught on camera in a gym class (*Daily Star*, 17/05/16).
 (12) Smooth Criminal! Disability benefits fraudster who swindled over £500,000 by claiming she couldn’t move her arms was caught dancing Michael Jackson song (*Daily Mail*, 03/02/17).

The concordances retrieved feature a negative semantic prosody overtly conveyed by lexical items like ‘pocketed/pocketing’, ‘illegally claimed’, ‘lying’, ‘swindled’, which seem to invariably endorse a range of stereotypical practices and ideas surrounding disability.

The second phase of analysis was carried out by resorting to keyness analysis through the software programme AntConc 3.5.7 (Anthony, 2010). Keyness analysis is meant to describe the quality of some words as having an unusual




FIGURE 10.3 Semantic domains resulting from word-sketches of ‘disability’.

frequency in comparison with a reference corpus. In this case, each newspaper was compared with the three other newspapers, jointly used as a reference corpus, to detect potential differences in their reporting of disability.

Starting, once again, with the *Daily Star* (using the *Daily Mail*, *Daily Mirror*, and *Sun* as a reference corpus), it prioritises a view of disability centred on sports, with a prevalence of lexical items like ‘footballer(s)’, ‘athlete(s)’, ‘medals’, ‘players’, ‘league’, ‘Olympic’, ‘triathlon’, and so on (see Table 10.2).

The list of keywords in the *Sun* features a significant amount of proper names (which were, however, omitted from Table 10.3), referring to an extremely high number of stories reporting how disabled people allegedly spend the money they illegally get from benefits – as signalled by keywords such as ‘holiday(s)’, ‘holidaying’, ‘pocketed’, ‘pocketing’.

Some additional emphasis is also given to the medical conditions linked to disability – as shown by keywords such as ‘carers’, ‘medication’, ‘hospital(s)’, ‘patient(s)’, among others – as well as cases of violence usually against disabled people – with lexical items like ‘murder’, and ‘attacks’, featuring relatively high keyness values. This possibly results from the process through which stories are selected on the basis of their newsworthiness. Indeed, a central criterion pertains to negativity – as the common saying goes ‘if it bleeds, it leads’ – according to which violence is more newsworthy. Violent crimes against disabled people tend to be widely reported because they provide the kind of sensationalism populist newspapers seek.

Keywords in the *Daily Mail* sub-corpus almost exclusively concern medical conditions, cases and treatments – as demonstrated by terms such as ‘patient(s)’, ‘hospitals’, ‘screening’, ‘medical’, ‘clinics’, ‘pills’, ‘rehabilitation’, ‘treatment’, ‘drugs’, ‘assistance’, ‘diagnosis’ – with some additional emphasis on financial aspects and insurance (see Table 10.4).

Unlike the other newspapers, the keywords retrieved from the *Daily Mirror* are mainly centred around austerity measures, poverty, pensions (thus confirming data from previous analysis) – with lexical items like ‘cuts’, ‘support’, ‘tax’,

TABLE 10.2 Keyness analysis (*Daily Star*)

<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>	<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>	<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>
246.986	Club	230.129	footballer	225.472	mike
235.166	Fans	228.694	Medals	224.881	stadium
235.109	Harry	228.480	Tory	224.522	government
234.652	Messi	228.053	Price	223.907	reckon
233.023	Footballers	227.872	players	223.191	scots
231.864	Games	227.591	constable	222.740	traps
231.705	Athletes	227.139	league	222.713	triathlon
230.909	Petition	226.715	olympic	221.596	premier
230.610	Athlete	226.408	leeds	220.831	blind
230.433	Affair	225.711	racing	220.289	dishonestly

TABLE 10.3 Keyness analysis (*Sun*)

<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>	<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>	<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>
367.246	Holiday	277.580	holidaying	257.609	stroke
343.184	Facilities	277.149	families	257.136	abortions
329.177	Holidays	274.361	payment	252.841	Attacks
326.842	Return	273.028	Mum	250.732	Sex
314.642	Cops	270.994	carers	246.921	patients
311.924	Euro	267.523	devastating	245.870	pocketed
297.580	Park	266.495	medication	244.146	Dublin
294.816	Kids	262.894	hospital	240.958	Boobs
289.603	UK	262.047	Pay	239.721	applications
285.274	Pocketing	261.493	Bay	237.045	murder

TABLE 10.4 Keyness analysis (*Daily Mail*)

<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>	<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>	<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>
235.093	patients	141.394	hospitals	130.521	abortions
210.895	Professor	140.202	Cases	128.437	compensation
208.156	Had	138.671	insurance	127.939	drugs
207.433	stroke	138.590	screening	124.715	scientists
156.527	mother	138.014	abortion	124.399	risk
150.167	Brain	135.949	clinics	122.868	medical
147.806	Blood	134.772	women	121.095	inquiry
146.103	Father	134.609	patient	119.847	pills
145.886	parents	134.189	Study	119.261	rehabilitation
143.719	insurers	132.051	midwives	117.103	treatment

TABLE 10.5 Keyness analysis (*Daily Mirror*)

<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>	<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>	<i>Keyness</i>	<i>Keyword</i>
239.893	Cuts	216.374	budget	188.551	workers
230.765	Tories	213.402	families	188.237	economic
227.956	Tory	213.171	government	185.134	poor
227.433	labour	210.694	pensions	184.016	allowance
226.527	support	208.014	needs	180.347	assessments
225.969	disabled	206.549	Work	176.168	accessible
223.800	Tax	203.737	Help	175.725	disability
223.106	austerity	200.901	patients	171.847	wheelchair
222.885	Cruel	195.689	unfairness	169.964	kids
220.719	poverty	193.071	community	169.303	working

‘austerity’, ‘poverty’, ‘budget’, ‘pensions’, ‘work’, ‘workers’, ‘poor’, ‘allowance’, ‘working’ – and, generally speaking, around all the economic and financial aspects relating to disability (see Table 10.5).

Data seem to confirm a more liberal, left-leaning approach, privileging a social understanding of disability issues. In this case, it is also worth noting that *disabled* and *disability* do appear as keywords, their keyness values being quite high (which is not the case in the three other populist newspapers). This provides an indication of both keywords’ importance as content descriptors. The fact that their frequency is unusually high in comparison with a norm – the reference corpus – uncovers relevant information on the meaning relationships existing within each sub-corpus (Scott, 2011).

Conclusion

British tabloids are certainly quick to jump on various populist bandwagons, even when disability is the issue at stake. Compared to the previous, qualitative analysis carried out by the Glasgow Media Group and the Strathclyde Centre for Disability over the time-spans 2004–05 and 2010–11, this 2016–17 study, integrating qualitative and quantitative approaches, shows some important differences and similarities.

While explicitly disablist or sympathetic terms are usually avoided, news reports on disability and disabled people from a recurrent and redundant medical perspective do have the effect of conveying an image that still channels and conveys compassion, to a certain degree, although in a politically correct manner.

Benefit fraud remains a popular topic; in fact, the majority of articles concern benefit claimants’ dishonesty. Populist newspapers seem to adopt what might be termed as a ‘scrounger rhetoric’, revolving around the discursive construal of disabled people as ‘fraudsters/spongers’ and their lack of effort, their being workshy and too lazy to work, which then leads to negative perceptions in the readerships and potential hate crime. The *Daily Mirror* is the only partially discordant voice, bringing to the fore questions of poverty, unemployment and social disadvantage in relation to disability, which is in line with its more liberal views and orientation, paying attention to social issues.

A crucial shift worth highlighting as a specifically defining feature of the *Dis_UK* corpus, and presumably of contemporary Britain, concerns the fact that, whereas populist discourse has always been critical of the so-called ‘old corruption’ (where the enemies were bureaucrats from the elite) currently, members of the ‘ordinary people’, such as disabled people, are the new enemies, with their forms of moral corruption and greed. The financial discourse and the medical discourse seem to be intertwined to construe disabled people as constituting a completely different social class, a ‘benefit’ class, thus providing the dominant narrative to frame and report news on disability.

Interestingly, the only additional topics mentioned in relation to disability within the corpus are medical conditions or treatments and sport. The former

seems to uphold the view of disability as an impairment that can be costly for the non-disabled community, while the latter somehow keeps the narratives of the 'super-cripple' alive, sticking to the (probably most socially acceptable) myth of disabled people as extraordinary people with super qualities. However, there is not a statistically significant number of articles on equally relevant issues relating to disability, for instance, the many attempted suicides by disability benefit claimants (which actually doubled after the introduction of the fit-to-work tests), or the numerous surveys on the fact that the new benefit policy wrongly denies people with disabilities financial support at a higher rate than ever; not to mention the admission by the Department of Work and Pensions that there were cases where sanctions were wrongly applied (something which was actually reported by the British quality press). Similarly, despite the fact that the perspective of human rights has gained strength and the notion of inclusiveness has become central, issues of accessibility and quality of life, as well as denouncements of prejudice, are seldom part of the populist newspapers' reporting. They rarely tackle the question of whether people with disabilities enjoy equal rights or whether society is to be held responsible for overcoming barriers that hinder their autonomous and full living.

Overall, disabled people tend to be polarised in terms of discursive representations, which either hail them as successful athletes given medals at Paralympic competitions, marvelling at the way they managed to surmount huge obstacles, or despise them as undeserving benefits claimants. In doing so, the populist press plays straight into the readership's fears about the benefit system: hordes of people with disabilities living off taxpayers' money. This seems to be a constitutive part of the narrative of scroungers milking the system, with moral disagreement and conflict of interest generally coming to the fore in the reporting.

Therefore, although at the institutional level disability has definitely become an equality issue, the British populist press mostly exploits the concept of 'benefit stigma' to frame the news about disability from the perspective of a non-disabled readership. Such benefit stigma is primarily driven by the perception that claimants are undeserving, which then reinforces demarcations between social groups within British society, and locates disabled people outside the group of 'ordinary people', structuring the community of readers as victims of the 'evil outsiders'. Disabled people thus experience the 'exclusionist side' of populist rhetoric, which, despite its aims of opposing the elitist system advocating for more support for the welfare state (something which would expectedly protect and empower disabled people), locates them, instead, in a category to fight.¹⁴ If immigrants and LGBTI people have generally been the most common scapegoat of (mostly, but not exclusively, right-wing) populism, this case-study shows that disabled people also share such a dubious 'honour'. The internal contradiction present in populist newspapers, ambivalently locating disabled people into a grey area between the 'ordinary people' and 'dangerous others' dimensions, seems thus to deserve constant reflection and critical investigation.

The British populist press coverage of disability issues seems, on the one hand, reflective of the salient and accepted ideas about disability within society, with news stories reproducing the main tropes circulating in that society (Mitchell and Snyder, 2006). On the other hand, as a form of discourse, populist accounts do have a constitutive power working to create the very objects or phenomena they describe (Jones and Harwood, 2009). Thus, tabloids can be said to function as a technology constituting people with disabilities (Foucault, 1984; Titchkosky, 2003). More than simply reflecting societal anxieties and debates, populist coverage assigns people with disabilities particular kinds of personhood (the very status of being a person) and features that, in turn, have negative, disempowering effects. In doing so, while scapegoating disabled people, populist discourse can result in hardening attitudes, experiences of aggression and violence, due to a general rising public resentment. It can further create a witch-hunt demonising disabled people, dividing communities as neighbours become suspicious of each other, moving from hate speech to hate crime, which is a warning sign of a real danger.¹⁵

Notes

- 1 Since 'disabled' can be sometimes regarded as a stigmatising word, another term has gained popularity in functional development and educational contexts: 'special needs'. The types of special needs vary greatly depending on the kind of assistance required by individuals. By employing the formulation 'special needs', the term 'disability' – which is often thought to emphasise a lack or deficit – can be avoided. Some scholars have argued for a social-relational model of disability, conforming to the notion of inclusion (Reindal, 2008).
- 2 The Disability Discrimination Act came into force in 1995 and was implemented over the years.
- 3 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/6> (unless otherwise specified, all websites were last accessed in May 2018).
- 4 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325989/ppdp.pdf.
- 5 https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_214917_en.pdf.
- 6 <https://www.disabilityrightsuk.org/about-us/press-office/press-and-media-2012/press-portrayal-disabled-people-rise-hostility-fuelled>.
- 7 The LSE study notes that, although right-wing parties such as UKIP in the UK, Front National in France and the Freedom Party in the Netherlands – or among the left-wing parties, Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece – differ in many respects, they do all share a populist message. While the definition of populism is a very debatable topic, scholars tend to agree that populism can be best outlined as a political message concerning the antagonistic relationship between the (good) people and the (evil) élite (Rooduijn, 2014). See also: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/populist-arguments-have-become-more-pervasive-in-the-uk-and-other-western-european-countries/>.
- 8 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/world/europe/london-tabloids-brexite.html?_r=0.
- 9 <https://www.disabilitynewsservice.com/uk-faces-un-examination-government-cuts-caused-human-catastrophe/>.
- 10 Articles were downloaded from the online archive LexisNexis <https://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>.

- 11 A word-sketch is a one-page summary of the word's colligational and collocational behaviour showing the word's collocates categorised by grammatical relations.
- 12 According to the report, not only are claimants from rich countries getting younger, but there has been a big shift in the reasons for making a disability benefit claim. In fact, mental health problems have replaced physical causes. http://www.oecd.org/redirect/document/33/0,3343,en_21571361_44315115_46493857_1_1_1_1,00.html.
- 13 https://www.disability.co.uk/sites/default/files/resources/social_model_briefing.pdf.
- 14 Indeed, despite the fact that, unlike right-wing populism, left-wing populism tends to view disabled people as deserving government support, it also maintains that if people commit social fraud, they lose their entitlements to financial help and support. This prevailing media portrayal of disabled people, based on the logic of immoral parasitism, seems to be what both types of populism share and generally highlight.
- 15 According to a survey by *The Independent*, members of the public should not have a role in identifying fraud by being allowed to log their suspicions about those they believe are committing benefit fraud (personal information can be reported through a fraud hotline or online). In fact, almost 90% of the cases were found to have no or little evidence to substantiate the claim. Interestingly, data also show that people tend to overestimate the issue of benefit fraud in the UK. See <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/benefit-fraud-public-tip-offs-legal-action-police-no-evidence-dwp-work-pensions-department-a8144096.html>.

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11

SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE

Populism and climate change in news discourse

Katherine E. Russo

Introduction

Climate change has been one of the most controversial issues in politics in the last 30 years (Carvalho, 2005). Political parties have given different priorities to climate change over time, ranging from the frontline of anthropogenic climate change supporters, such as Al Gore and Kevin Rudd, to the scepticism and active obstructionism of George W. Bush or John Howard. The same binary opposition can be applied to left- and right-wing populism. Left-wing and right-wing populist parties employ similar features of style, form and mediated performance, but, at the content level, the link between right-wing populism and the denial of anthropogenic climate change has been on-going (Wodak, 2015). The right-wing opposition to the theory of anthropogenic climate change has been shared by politicians embodying the classical oppositional *habitus* of populism, such as Pauline Hanson and Nigel Farage, and the governmental *habitus* of politicians such as Donald Trump and Tony Abbott (Laclau, 1996).

Citizens' awareness, attitudes and actions towards climate change are often claimed to be shaped by mediated information (Bell, 1994a; 1994b; Bevitori, 2011; Boycoff and Boycoff, 2004, 2007). News media play an important role in the popularization of science-related matters and risk (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005). Yet, in the case of climate change, newspaper discourse often backgrounds planning and forecasting, and privileges unexpected and dramatic events. Certain events, such as environmental disasters or announcements by prominent scientists or politicians, fulfil news values more than others (Bell, 1991; Fowler, 1991; van Dijk, 1998). Yet, as Bednarek and Caple note (2012, p. 44; 2017, p. 79), news values and newsworthiness should be conceptualized in terms of how events or propositions are construed through discourse. In their opinion, "newsworthiness is not inherent in events but established through language and image" (Bednarek

and Caple, 2012, p. 41). Indeed, the discourse of climate change has changed over time in order to avoid editorial fatigue and satisfy news values (Boycoff and Boycoff, 2007; Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Bevitori, 2011). The past 20 years have been marked by a preference for spectacularization: dramatic weather-related events and crises provide sensational stories which are more entertaining than climate science planning and statistics (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005, pp. 1465–1467). This pattern was picked up by Trump, who in a tweet noted:

In the East, it could be the COLDEST New Year's Eve on record. Perhaps we could use a little bit of that good old Global Warming that our Country, but not other countries, was going to pay TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS to protect against. Bundle up! (28 December 2017).

The populist contract with citizens is arguably secured through a similar investment in scepticism towards climate change science (Wodak, 2015).

Recent research has shed new light on the paradoxical relationship between populist discourse and quality newspaper discourse (Benitez-Castro, De Cesare and Hidalgo-Tenorio, 2017; Rasulo, 2017). On the one hand, populist leaders regard quality newspapers as instruments of the established political elite. On the other, they are one of the factors that have contributed to the circulation of populist discourse. As Glasson (2012, p. 106) notes, while the electoral success of populist parties is often short-lived, their demise does not mark a retreat of their discourses to the fringe of news discourse. News reporters and opinion writers have considerable difficulties in bridging the gap between populist politicians, experts and lay readers in the case of 'contested science' such as climate change.

Based on these premises, this chapter will try to ascertain whether online quality newspapers have intensified their role as a channel for the circulation of right-wing populist climate change denialism. While not aligned with populist parties, quality newspapers may contribute to the spread of the issues, key-words and communication styles of populist leaders. In order to test this hypothesis along with the different dimensions of evaluation of populist discourse in online quality newspapers, a study has been carried out analysing a corpus (the Populist Climate Change Corpus, PCCC) specifically compiled to represent the newspaper coverage of climate change over a period of ten years (1996–2017).

Given that the power of newspaper discourse lies in the repetition of images and language patterns, whose close examination can reveal presuppositions, stereotypes and ideological inferences in discourse (Baker, 2006; Stubbs, 1995, 2001), the chapter draws on Corpus Linguistics, Critical Discourse Analysis and Appraisal Theory in order to ascertain if anthropogenic climate change denialism has been defused by injecting populist themes and prejudices into quality newspaper discourse. In particular, the chapter focuses on the populist 'discourse of the future' and the interrelated aspect of ATTITUDE (Martin and White, 2005) in the appraisal of climate change-related risks by considering the levels

of speculation of populist discourse in newspaper reports, opinion pieces and op-eds through the analysis of epistemic modality, AFFECT and evidentiality.

Method

The investigation focuses on climate change by analysing the resources used to express evaluation in online quality newspapers (Bednarek, 2006; Bednarek and Caple, 2012; Hunston and Thompson, 2000; Martin and White, 2005; Bartley and Benitez-Castro, 2016). Evaluation, as the writer's expression of opinion or subjectivity, may involve different meaning dimensions or parameters linked to the standards, norms and values whereby people evaluate something through language in a given context. Resources to express evaluation include lexical and grammatical means and vary semantically in the way in which they express opinion and positively or negatively evaluate people, events, propositions. According to Martin and White's Appraisal Framework, writers may express attitude or take up a stance oriented to affect, judgement or appreciation, covering the semantic regions traditionally associated with emotions, ethics and aesthetics. Studies on evaluation and The Appraisal Framework are crucial to this study and will be extended to the analysis of affect, epistemic modality and evidentiality.

However, evaluation is a slippery notion for Corpus Linguistics methods because it cannot easily be assigned to a clear-cut set of expressions (Bartley and Benitez-Castro, 2016; Bednarek, 2006, 2008; Mauranen, 2002; Fuoli, forthcoming; Fuoli and Hommerberg, 2015). Evaluation encompasses evaluative items, which may convey evaluative meaning (e.g. *wonderful*, *nice*, *great*). Evaluative items are also often accompanied by hedges (*perhaps*, *sort of*) or intensifiers (*highly*, *extremely*), and connectors (*but*, *nevertheless*). Hence, evaluation involves both discourse structural evaluation and "evaluative items", which are "smaller units which confer evaluative meanings to the entities they refer to or to other linguistic elements in the context they occur in" (Mauranen, 2002, p. 1115). In addition, both semantic prosody and semantic preference are crucial to evaluation (Stubbs, 2001, p. 202).

Due to all these reasons, as Mauranen (2004, p. 209) notes, "[i]dentifying evaluation in corpora is far from straightforward. Corpus methods are best suited for searching items that are identifiable, therefore tracking down evaluative items poses a methodological problem". Moreover, from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis, evaluative items are also an expression of the value system, ideologies and discourses which are constructed in different texts and domains (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 171–173).

Hence, the use of quantitative techniques, such as wordlists and keyword searches, concordance and collocational analysis using specialized corpus software, has been combined with qualitative approaches (Baker 2006; Bevitori, 2011). The Corpus Linguistics quantitative techniques were employed to find out about the statistically significant higher frequency of particular words or clusters in the online quality newspaper sub-corpus of the PCCC in comparison

with the BNC corpus, which was used as a reference corpus. The corpus was analysed through the comparative approach of using each sub-corpus compiled for each year and genre (<NR>, <OE>, <Op-eds>) side-by-side. The analysis was carried out using the UAM CorpusTool for automatic annotation (O'Donnell, 2008) and AntConc, a concordancer developed by Laurence Anthony (2005) to explore the context and collocation of terms. The search was later narrowed from bulk data retrieval to identify discursive strategies. The analysis firstly considered speculations about the future by focusing on epistemic modality in the PCCC. Secondly, it considered context and discourse structural evaluation through qualitative assessments of evidentiality and affect in order to uncover how right-wing populist climate change denialism is appraised in the PCCC (Baker, 2006).

The populist climate change corpus design

The Populist Climate Change Corpus (PCCC) was compiled by including texts from the NewsBank database covering the years 1996–2017. In 1996–1997, the coverage of climate change increased following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on 11 December 1997, while 2017 was chosen as a cut-off date since climate change returned to the centre stage of international politics after Trump withdrew from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris (Table 11.1).

The PCCC includes the News Reports sub-corpus (tagged as <NR>), the Opinion Editorials sub-corpus (tagged as <OE>) and the Op-eds sub-corpus (tagged as <Op-eds>), compiled by searching for the query chain “climate change” in North American, British and Australian quality newspapers, such as *The Age*, *The Australian*, *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *The Times*, *The Sydney Morning Herald* or *The Washington Post*. The query matched 240 texts (500,000 tokens), which were balanced per year, newspaper type and genre (see Table 11.1).

TABLE 11.1 PCCC make-up

<i>Corpus</i>	<i>NR</i>	<i>OE</i>	<i>Op-eds</i>	<i>Total</i>
Quality	80	80	80	240
Tokens	166.000	163.000	169.000	500.000

Speculations about the future

Scientific findings on climate change constitute specialized knowledge that is generally conveyed with caution and uncertainty (Bell 1994a, p. 35; 1994b, p. 270). Nevertheless, reporters need to evaluate scientific findings and often express greater or lesser confidence towards scientific findings and predictions.

TABLE 11.2 Epistemic Modality Realizations regarding climate change and its impacts in the PCCC

<i>Realization</i>	<i>High (certain)</i>	<i>Median (probable)</i>	<i>Low (possible)</i>
Modals and semi-modals	Must (<i>n</i> 50), Will (<i>n</i> 395), Be going to (<i>n</i> 33)	Should (<i>n</i> 91)	May (<i>n</i> 66), can (<i>n</i> 160), could (<i>n</i> 120), might (<i>n</i> 55)
Lexical verbs	Believe (<i>n</i> 33)	Think (<i>n</i> 20), suppose (<i>n</i> 2)	Wonder (<i>n</i> 8), think (<i>n</i> 41)
Modal adjuncts	Certainly (<i>n</i> 11), definitely (<i>n</i> 1), surely (<i>n</i> 7), undoubtedly (<i>n</i> 2)	Probably (<i>n</i> n 7), maybe (<i>n</i> n 2)	Perhaps (<i>n</i> 14), possibly (<i>n</i> 9)
Lexico-modal auxiliaries	Be certain to (<i>n</i> 4), be sure to (<i>n</i> 10)		
Clause with past participle or adjective		Likely (<i>n</i> 46)	Possible (<i>n</i> 25)
Clause with noun	There is certainty (<i>n</i> 2) that	There is likelihood (<i>n</i> 3), probability (<i>n</i> 1)	There is a possibility (<i>n</i> 5), uncertainty (<i>n</i> 5)
Conditional clause	If (<i>n</i> 55)	If (<i>n</i> 33)	If (<i>n</i> 48)
Modal +Adjunct	Must certainly (<i>n</i> 2)	It will probably (<i>n</i> 1)	Might possibly (<i>n</i> 2)

The degree of commitment to the truth of a proposition is termed epistemic modality. Epistemic modality is realized by a range of forms: modal auxiliary verbs, sentence adverbs, subordinators, or modal adjectives and nouns (Bartley and Hidalgo-Tenorio, 2016; Fowler, 1985; Nordström, 2010); its meaning is classified on the basis of the degree of certainty, i.e. certainty, probability and possibility. As a consequence, according to Halliday (1994, p. 358) and Eggins (2004, p. 173), the degree of certainty on the knowledge of a proposition may fall under the following values and grades: high-certain, median-probable and low-possible.

Following this line of enquiry, the analysis of the PCCC firstly considered epistemic modality, or the degree of un/certainty, in the corpus through the manual analysis of the wordlist (12,466 types, 500,000 tokens) and concordances, which uncovered the linguistic realizations and frequency counts illustrated in Table 11.2.

The close analysis of the concordance lines regarding climate change (context horizon 5 L and 5 R) revealed that in realizations expressing predictions about the future *climate change* collocates with a much greater frequency with the modal *will* expressing prediction (*n* 142), and fewer times with *could* (*n* 46), *can* (*n* 30), *going to* (*n* 26), *may* (*n* 4), and *would* (*n* 28). Hence, the analysis of context was




FIGURE 11.1 Epistemic modality in the PCCC.

fundamental since the use of the modal verbs used to predict the future may greatly vary in degree of speculation.

The analysis also revealed a strong polarization (see Figure 11.1) in predictions about the future, which in the corpus occur as apocalyptic visions on behalf of the news reporters and opinion writers, and the downplaying of risk outcomes on behalf of the populist leaders. Moreover, as Neiger (2007, p. 130) notes, in news reporting, predictions are classified according to degrees of speculation related to time span and sources. Hence, the modal *will* was classified according to Neiger's classification of four different levels of speculation in news reporting, and it was found that in 82 cases out of 142 they were related to the highest level of speculation (level 4):

- Level 1: Predictable future, based on measurements, official announcements and known schedules, experience in similar circumstances:
 - (1) The review was written by 31 scientists from 12 countries as part of a scientific assessment for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “[f]or deltas and estuaries, changes in sediment supply and distribution are often causing significant changes in the coastal zone. This reinforces the message that climate change *will* act on coastal systems that are already under stress” (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, <NR>, 19/10/1995).
- Level 2: Informed Assessment, based on the near future, declarations by political insiders and sources which the reporter trusts:
 - (2) Research by the CSIRO on behalf of the round table found that while climate change *will* have a major impact on Australia, its effects *will* be even more devastating in many of the poorest parts of the Asia-Pacific region, where there is now “little room for optimism” (*The Age*, <NR>, 01/06/2009).

- Level 3: Speculative assessment, based on medium and long-term future, political advisors, unreliable sources, future inquiry into alleged wrongdoings and misdemeanours:
 - (3) We have known about the problem at least since 1992, when the leaders of every other big nation on the planet signed a declaration pledging to keep our emissions below the point at which they would lead to “dangerous anthropogenic climate change”. We have selfishly failed to keep that promise. For that future generations *will* curse us, and rightly so (*The Age*, <OE>, 01/01/2011).
- Level 4: Conjectured future, based on medium and long-term future, conjectured uncertain future, worst-case scenarios:
 - (4) Pure fantasy, of course. But with predictions that climate change *will* cause shortages of fresh water, crop failures and more extreme weather, could global warming spark future wars? (*The Age*, <Op-eds>, 18/12/2007).
 - (5) Equatorial lands that are home to hundreds of millions of people *will* become uninhabitable as food and water run out due to climate change, scientists will warn this week (*The Times*, <OE>, 1/4/2007).
 - (6) They predict that many more people *will* seek asylum in Europe as temperatures in their home countries are projected to rise (*The Times*, <NR>, 19/4/2017).
 - (7) Climate change *will* stir ‘unimaginable’ refugee crisis, says the military (*The Guardian*, <NR>, 1/12/2016).
 - (8) If the Loy Yang coal-fired power station is still belching carbon dioxide in 2036, then whether we have an aluminium smelter operating is irrelevant as we *will* be in the midst of catastrophic climate change (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, <NR>, 19/04/2010).

On the other hand, news reporters and opinion writers do give voice to right-wing populist climate change denialism, but largely resort to quotations to distance themselves from such speculations about the future:

- (9) On Radio 4’s Any Questions last October, the Ukip leader attacked Cameron for “this loopy idea that we can cover Britain in ugly disgusting ghastly windmills and that somehow our future energy needs will come from that” (*The Times*, <NR>, 4/3/2013).
- (10) Last month, Helmer used his website to rail against the European Union’s large combustion plant directive, combustion plant directive, which is forcing the closure of many coal-fired power stations, on the grounds that it “will make not a scrap of difference” to global emissions of greenhouse gases (*The Guardian*, <NR>, 8/8/2016).

As examples 4–8 show, endorsed predictions about climate change effects are more often framed in apocalyptic and catastrophic tones regardless of genre. The analysis suggests a correlation between the support for climate change science, speculations about conjectured futures, and discourses of chaos and catastrophe,

which insistently foreground the magnitude and catastrophic impact of climate change hazards. As a matter of fact, in the PCCC, based on the mutual information score, the strong statistical significance of climate change collocates (in comparison with the British National Corpus), such as *unbelievable* (stat. 680.027), *unpredictable* (stat. 521.531), *unimaginable* (stat. 480.027), *catastrophic* (stat. 557.788) and *cataclysmic* (stat. 521.531), suggest that reporters seem to rely on the lay interpretation of chaotic systems as unpredictable. Example 11 shows that the lay interpretation of chaos systems counters scientific assessments of chaotic systems, such as the climate, which are based on forecasting and the ability to foresee the strengths and impacts of dynamic systems.

- (11) We are on the brink of calamitous climate change. This is likely to mean unpredictable rainfall fluctuations, more intense storms, fiercer heat waves, rising sea levels and, by the end of the century, perhaps hundreds of millions or even billions of climate refugees (*The Guardian*, <Op-eds>, 3/10/2010).

As the analysis of examples in level 4 further suggests, when the speculation level is high, apocalyptic visions and chaos may evoke emotions such as fear and anxiety, diverting attention towards external threats.

Affect

As mentioned above, the analysis of epistemic modality revealed the concomitant use of several language resources employed to express emotional attitude. The latter may be utilized in newspapers to construe news values such as negativity, personalization, impact, superlativeness, novelty and expectation (Bednarek, 2008, p. 32). The linguistic realization of affect may take many forms, which comprise the modification of participants (affect as a quality), affective mental and behavioural processes (affect as a process), modal adjuncts (affect as comment), and grammatical metaphors (e.g. nominalizations of qualities and processes) (Martin and White, 2005, p. 42). They may be related to emotional behaviour, such as *restless* and *twitching*, or to the internal labelling of psychological, mental or relational processes, such as *uneasy* or *happy with* (Benítez-Castro and Hidalgo-Tenorio, forthcoming). Martin and White (2005, pp. 49–52) group emotions into three major sets:

- (i) Un/happiness: covering emotions concerned with ‘affairs of the heart’.
- (ii) In/security: covering emotions concerning eco-social well-being.
- (iii) Dis/satisfaction: covering emotions concerned with the pursuit of goals, displeasure, curiosity, respect.

Moreover, lexico-grammatical choices for the expression of emotion must be graded according to the depth of feeling along semantic topologies encompassing both the surge of behaviour and disposition (Martin and White, 2005, p. 50).

TABLE 11.3 Lexico-grammatical choices for the expression of emotion in *Wordlist*

<i>Un/happiness</i>	N	<i>In/security</i>	n	<i>Dis/satisfaction</i>	N
Sad*	50	Fear*	195	Satisf*	25
Desper*	44	Concern*	110	Angr*	20
Depress*	20	Worr*	75	Unsatisf*	20
Gloomy*	20	Surpris*	50	Caution*	5
Miserabl*	8	Commit*	50	Bus*	5
Happ*	10	Secure	25	Pleas*	5
Rejoyc*	5	Startl*	20		
Excite*	5	Stress*	20		
		Anxi*	15		
		Confident*	10		
		Alarm*	10		
		Twitch*	10		
		Reassur*	10		
		Declare*	10		
		Wary	5		
		Uneas*	5		

These major sets were used as an annotation scheme to automatically tag the corpus with the built-in scheme in the UAM CorpusTool (O'Donnell, 2008).

In the corpus, risk communication regarding climate change mainly triggers affects related to *in/security*, with realizations regarding fear and anxiety (Table 11.3).

In the corpus, fear appeals are used differently by social actors and news practitioners and intersect with different discourses. In the case of quotations by populist politicians, they intersect with the populist discourses of antagonism to the elite, taxation, conspiracy, power to the people, money grabbing, etc.:

- (12) Climate sceptics are often conservatives and *fear* the prospect of large-scale government intervention more than the destruction of the human species (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, <NR>, 10/01/2009).

Yet in many cases, fear appeals are attributed to climate change supporters:

- (13) Hanson said “Global warming is all about a power grab by a wealthy elite and their collectivist sycophants using the U.N. as a cover and tool. It is designed to form a crisis to unite people around the world’s threat of global warming, water shortage, famine and pollution. Then when people are in *fear* they don’t question but scream out for something to be done” (*The Age*, <NR>, 25/7/2013).
- (14) Farage savages Barroso on how manufactured global warming *fears* are driving poor people into fuel poverty (*The Guardian*, <OE>, 13/9/2013).

- (15) If people are *concerned* about the environment, laws can be introduced to ensure industry and businesses are adhering to a clean and safe environment, as we have done in the past. If our government forces this diabolical carbon tax, or under the new guise of an Emissions Trading Scheme on Australians, it will be a disgrace and borders on treason (*The Age*, <Op-eds>, 25/7/2013).

Hence, climate change supporters are constructed as people who “worry”:

- (16) Abbott told the think tank which had denied requests from seasoned climate reporters to attend that past climate changes that occurred millions of years ago showed there was nothing to *worry* about now (*The Age*, <Op-eds>, 25/7/2013).
- (17) Labor is *worried* the government will use these comments to back away from the policy, which it says would be capitulating to Mr Abbott and fellow conservative backbenchers (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, 16/10/2010).

In other cases, *affect* is used to represent ‘the scientific community’, or scientists:

- (18) It is one of the few issues where the scientific community is considerably more *anxious* than the lay population. This is a fact highlighted this week by NASA’s top scientist, *Professor James Hansen*, who sent George Bush a *heart-felt* note about the dangers of global warming (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, <NR>, 10/01/2009).

In many cases, opinion writers resort to affects such as fear and anxiety in order to persuade people by highlighting relevance and describing risk outcomes as terrible things that will happen to them if they do not do what the message recommends:

- (19) Disaster is so public. In Victoria after the fires... In the immediate aftermath, the *anguish* is felt and seen by the world. They can expect sleeplessness and flashbacks and heightened *fears* about their own safety and the safety of those they love (*The Age*, <OE>, 26/02/2011).

Evidentiality and populist discourse

Since in news discourse sources are fundamental to evidentiality, the news reporters’ and opinion writers’ stance towards right-wing populist climate change denialism discourse in the PCCC was analysed in terms of the ways in which source material is integrated. Evidentiality may be defined as a linguistic category connected to the source of information. An evidential is also a grammatical form which expresses evidentiality and refers to one’s

incomplete authority over knowledge (Nuyts, 2001). In newspaper discourse, sources may remain unattributed or attributed to a specific or non-specific source. They may be used to provide evidence and facts, to provide objectivity and credibility, or to increase newsworthiness through the quotation of elite speakers (Bednarek, 2006, p. 32). The ways in which they are integrated into news genres may vary and be analysed to reveal the stance towards the source or event.

By analysing reporting verbs, it was found that, in the PCCC corpus, reporters, opinion writers and op-eds gauge the weight given to populist leaders' and experts' predictions, attesting to their alleged degree of precision or reliability (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994). As Figure 11.2 below indicates, they mostly resort to neutral structuring verbs such as *say*, *tell*, *ask*, *enquire*, *reply* and *answer* (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994); yet, the analysis of context shows that boosters and hedges are used to dis-endorse populist discourse (Hyland 2005).

For instance, in the following news report, the reporter employs the neutral reporting expression "said" to refer to Farage; yet, readers are aligned with climate change supporters ("the rest of us") through the overt negative speculative assessment of Clexit (i.e. the withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement) as a *disaster*:

(20) Nigel Farage *says* Donald Trump is "fully within his rights" to withdraw from the Paris agreement. The former Ukip leader *said* the US president had been elected on a promise to withdraw from the accord. *Fortunately*, given the high level of global concern about climate change, Clexit faces a much tougher road to success than Brexit, because a Clexit victory *would* be a disaster for the rest of us (*The Guardian*, <NR>, 8/8/2016).

In the following examples, the external opinion writer uses the neutral structuring verbs 'say' and 'told' to quote the experts' view on Abbott, but recurs to




FIGURE 11.2 Quoting verbs in the PCCC.

social sanction through the use of the hedge *supposedly* and through negative lexis related to veracity (*false*):

- (21) Professor Steve Sherwood, deputy director of the University of New South Wales Climate Change Research Centre, read Abbott's speech and *said* it was the usual mix of *misdirection*, *falsehoods* and *tirades* against brigades who supposedly say this but are never clearly identified (*The Guardian*, <Op-eds>, 10 Oct 2017).
- (22) Professor Mark Howden, director of the ANU Climate Change Institute, *said* Abbot's claim that other factors, such as sunspots cycles or wobbles in the Earth's orbit could be just as important as carbon dioxide, was simply *false* (*The Guardian*, <Op-eds>, 10 Oct 2017).

On the other hand, the reporters and opinion writers tend to endorse experts. In the example below, the reporter explicitly endorses the scientific authority of the Garnaut Report source through adjectives such as *credible*, *sobering*, *workable*, which encourage the reader to accept the prediction that "Australia, says Garnaut, is uniquely vulnerable":

- (23) *The Garnaut report* is the first tool in Abbott's political kit for leading the public debate. It is a *credible* account of the situation, with a *sobering* explanation of the costs of inaction, and a *workable* proposal for a solution. Among developed nations, Australia, says Garnaut, is *uniquely* vulnerable to the damage that climate change *will* wreak (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, <NR>, 05/07/2008).

Similarly, in example 14, *even more significantly* and *widely* function as boosters of the attitude verb *agreed*, which allows the reporter to express his certainty in what he says, and to mark involvement and solidarity with the following report of the estimation of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Moreover, the choice of the reporting verb *estimated* is an endorsement of the scientific credibility of the source:

- (24) *Even more significantly*, it is *widely agreed* that climate change is itself a threat to international peace and security. Earlier this year, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights *estimated* that the combined effects of climate change and other economic, social and political problems could lead to a heightened risk of conflict in 46 countries, particularly in areas prone to the adverse effects of climate change in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America (*The Age*, <NR>, 10/12/2009).

Both reporters and opinion writers employ several devices to indicate their opinion about propositions. Hence, it is important to analyse the evaluation of climate change risk in context.

Conversely, in example 23, the reporter clearly attributes the proposition to the source, i.e. the populist Australian leader Pauline Hanson, but the use of the verb *argued* results in an implicit non-endorsement of the reliability of the source. It implies that the opinion may be contested. Therefore, the reporting verb is used to imply that the statement is based on plausible reasoning rather than certain knowledge:

- (25) Hanson *argued* that Australians were sick of high power bills. She also confirmed to Kochie that One Nation would not support the Coalition's proposed clean energy target (*The Guardian*, <NR> 3/5/2012).

In this manner, reporters and opinion writers employ reporting verbs, hedging and boosters to indicate their decision to withhold complete commitment to right-wing populist climate-change denialism, allowing information to be presented as an opinion rather than as an accredited fact, especially in relation to strong claims about climate change. Hedges also allow reporters and opinion writers to open a discursive space where readers can dispute their interpretations and create a strategic ambiguity within their claims. Claim-making is risky because it can contradict readers' opinion, which means that arguments must accommodate readers' expectations that they will be allowed to participate in a dialogue and their views will be acknowledged in the discourse.

In other cases, boosters are employed to allow the opinion writer to express certainty in what they say, and to mark involvement with the topic and solidarity with their audience. As Hyland (2005, p. 176) notes, boosters function to stress shared information, group membership and engagement with readers. Hence, they help writers to present their report with assurance while effecting interpersonal solidarity as in the following example from an opinion piece, where the boosters *of course* and *in fact* are used to mock Trump:

- (26) Trump is correct on one point: the polar ice caps are at a record level. *Of course*, he probably didn't mean that global sea ice is at record low extent. *In fact*, Arctic sea ice is in such a rapid long-term decline that climate scientists have described it as a death spiral. As climate scientist Michael Mann noted, ice sheets are likewise melting faster than predicted (*The New York Times*, <OE>, 7/11/2016).

Both boosters and hedges represent the reporter's response to readers' potential viewpoints. They balance objective information, subjective evaluation and interpersonal negotiation, and this can be a powerful factor for the gaining of acceptance of experts' opinions. Both strategies emphasize that statements communicate ideas, but also the writer's attitude towards them. Hence, while news reporting follows a well-established tradition, which claims to be 'objective and 'neutral', and which often obscures the subjective role of the author in constructing the text, the analysis found that news reporters often dis-endorse populist

climate change denialism through the use of hedges and boosters (Thomson and White, 2008, p. 3).

Conclusions

The analysis has confirmed the suggestion that, although scholars have reached a high level of consensus on anthropogenic climate change, the scientific perspective on climate science is largely misrepresented in newspaper discourse due to the influence of news values, such as dramatization. The communicative purpose of filling a gap in the knowledge of the audience entails the transformation of specialized knowledge into ‘everyday’ or ‘lay’ knowledge, as well as a recontextualization of scientific discourse (Calsamiglia and van Dijk, 2004, p. 370). Yet, in quality newspapers, reporters and opinion writers often try to endorse climate change science by resorting to the worst-case scenarios, apocalyptic visions and chaos. In order to maximize persuasion and reach a lay audience, communication and news operators background planning and forecasting and privilege chaotic and unexpected events, which have a much higher chance of becoming news. In such cases, the popularization of the complex range of scientific and expert opinions are weaved together in a web which imposes new orders and interpretations upon information.

Indeed, one of the main findings of the present analysis is that the representation of climate change science in newspaper discourse is often characterized by affective labour, foregrounding anxiety, vulnerability and alarm. The present study has found that the lexico-grammatical resources which regulate appraisal are employed in newspaper discourse to explicitly inscribe affects, such as worry and fear, not preventing and prescribing them but intensifying and diffusing them (Martin and White, 2005). Affect is inherent in climate change risk communication as it is characterized by high speculation, which may be arguably defined as an element that increases its news value.

In this setting, right-wing populist climate change denialism discourse is present, but not endorsed in quality newspapers. It has an air of familiarity about it, it is well worn and sedimented. Climate change supporters are often depicted as worriers and fearful individuals, while populist politicians addressing the fears of the lay public in order to deny climate change science have a voice. Appeals to common sense and anti-intellectualism, which are central to the populist construction of scepticism towards anthropogenic climate change, and towards scientists, through the overrepresentation of climate science scandals and hoaxes, are also present (Boycoff and Boycoff, 2004). As in most populist discourse, antagonism is central to right-wing populist climate change denialism (Laclau, 1996, 2005). Right-wing populists blame climate change science for threatening or damaging society economically, through appeals to common sense and a politics of anti-politics that constructs supporters of climate change and environmentalists as the selfish elite (Lockwood, 2018; Fraune and Knodt, 2018). In this antagonistic relation, climate change may be defined as an empty signifier “whose efficiency derives from its affective force and paucity of content”

(Glasson, 2012, p. 109). Climate change science has become a feared scapegoat that is often blamed for damaging the future economy (Wodak, 2015). Indeed the populist contract with citizens is often secured through the investment in affect, which increases the circulation of worry and fear. Climate change supporters are constructed as a threat to the imagined future of a homogenous community residing within a well-protected territory (Russo, 2017, p. 207). Therefore, it is the contention of this study that while speculations about the future and the investment in affect are an inherent feature of climate change risk communication in newspaper discourse, they may provide a fertile ground to understand right-wing populist climate change denialism as they are often used by populist leaders as a trigger of “media spinning, scaring the public, creating solidarity, and diverting attention” (Neiger, 2007, p. 310).

It may be argued that the populist discourse of climate change denial has become mainstream in the politics of contemporary democracies. Yet the analysis of evidentiality found that, while reporters and opinion writers resorted to neutral structuring verbs with greater frequency in regard to populist speculations about the future, both boosters and hedges were employed to represent a neutral or negative evaluation of the populist discourse of climate change denial. Hence, while news reporting follows a well-established tradition, which claims to be objective, and which often obscures the subjective role of journalists in constructing the text, the analysis found that news reporters and opinion writers largely dis-endorse populist sources and evaluate them negatively through lexico-grammatical strategies.

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PART III

Rhetoric, critical discourse analysis and populism



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12

POPULIST METAPHORICAL UTTERANCES¹

John Keating and Belén Soria

Introduction

Populism has been the focus of many recent studies in political science (see Bonikovski and Gidron, 2016), and it has been conceptualised either as a strategy of political mobilisation (Weyland, 2001), an ideology (Mudde, 2004) or a form of political discourse (Bonikovski and Gidron, 2016). The most widely cited definition is given by Mudde (2004, p. 544), who claims that populism is a “thin-centred ideology” that involves a confrontation between the pure people, seen as the legitimate source of sovereignty, and the corrupt elites. However, as Aslanidis (2016) argues, the definition of populism as a thin ideology is vague and difficult to apply:

First, the very notion of thinness is conceptually spurious; second, this position entails significant methodological inconsistencies in the framework of its proponents; and third, its essentialist connotations erect insurmountable obstacles with regard to classification and measurement.

(Aslanidis, 2016, p. 89)

A study of the different approaches to the concept of populism shows that, in spite of disagreements, it is generally agreed that the core idea of populism involves an anti-elite discourse in the name of noble sovereign people. Thus, we will follow Bonikovski and Gidron (2016) in arguing that, although there are several approaches to the notion of populism, a minimal discursive definition is possible and will thus make the case for “the analytical advantages of the most minimal, discursive definition of populism that treats the phenomenon as an attribute of political claims” (Bonikovski and Gidron, 2016, p. 7).

We will use the term “populist claim” to refer to any political claim that promotes or is consistent with a binary worldview confronting the morally superior

people (and the politicians speaking on their behalf) to certain immoral (and, thus, illegitimate) political or economic powers. Following Laclau (2005) and the proponents of frame theory (Snow *et al.*, 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988), Aslanidis (2016) conceives of populism as a discursive frame rather than as an ideology or a strategy. The idea of a frame can be used to describe populist discourse as:

the systematic dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality as problematic because ‘corrupt elites’ have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the ‘noble People’ and maintains that the solution to the problem resides in the righteous political mobilization of the latter in order to regain power.
(Aslanidis, 2016, p. 99)

In our opinion, an account of populism should provide an explanation of how the populist binary worldview is constructed through discourse and, more particularly, through metaphorical discourse. Using Romero and Soria (2016)’s notion of metaphorical *ad hoc* concept construction, we aim to account for the role of novel metaphor in populist discourse. We hypothesise that populist speakers metaphorically present elites from a certain perspective which highlights some of their (negative) aspects and suppresses others (which might be positive). Elites, their attitude towards noble people, their behaviour or their policies, are metaphorically conceptualised as something else. This reconceptualisation allows the speaker to assign certain properties to these entities, their attitudes, etc. which locate them in an unethical position consistent with the populist frame.

In addition, we aim to see if, despite getting their content from the more specific right- or left-wing populist values, there are characteristics of populism common to both. Specifically, we will determine if there are regularities in the metaphorical *ad hoc* conceptualisation of their populist worldviews, regardless of whether they are right-wing or left-wing. As Bonikovski and Gidron (2016, p. 7) say, “[j]ust who the elites are varies across context, as do the boundaries of ‘the people’, but the binary structure of populist claims is largely invariant”. Our interest, then, is not to analyse the particular left-wing or right-wing ideological elements in the utterances of populist speakers but the organisation of their respective ideological elements as part of the populist frame. If this is confirmed, it can be taken as evidence supporting Aslanidis’s view of populism as a discursive frame rather than an ideology.

Our study will focus on debates in the European Parliament (EP). Given that European politicians participate in political debates in different languages, we have decided to focus on utterances in English and Spanish, and we have selected one speaker for each language: Nigel Farage (from UKIP in Britain) and Pablo Iglesias (from Podemos in Spain). They represent right-wing and left-wing populism in contemporary Europe, respectively. We assumed that these two leaders would exhibit populist claims since they are often labelled as ‘populist’, not only in the popular press but in other scholarly research on UKIP (Abedi

and Lundberg, 2009; Bossetta, 2017) and Podemos (Kioupkiolis, 2016; Ramiro and Gomez, 2017). In their political positions, these two choices were ideal for controlling contextual variables as much as possible: both were leaders of their respective parties and associated with them to an unusually high degree. This is an important variable because, although the EP is an international stage, it allows politicians (particularly those from opposition parties at home) to address a domestic audience.

Both the Farage and Iglesias corpora were retrieved from the EP website². The corpus begins with the first plenary debate of the eighth EP (01/07/2014). Though Farage had been elected to the EP before this, the 2014 elections saw Pablo Iglesias elected to the Parliament for the first time, and so this was a natural lower diachronic limit for both corpora. For the Farage corpus, the cut-off date was chosen arbitrarily on the basis of our working deadline for conducting corpus analysis (26/04/2017). For Iglesias, this was dictated by his resignation from the EP to stand in Spanish national elections (27/10/2015).

Only contributions from parliamentary plenary sessions were chosen, to control the variables which different addressees would introduce (i.e., in non-plenary sessions of parliamentary groups). Of these plenary debates, only spoken contributions were included, with written contributions excluded to avoid the variables which distinct modes might introduce. The final dataset consists of a corpus of 22,698 words for Farage and 6,020 words for Iglesias. Using the identification criteria outlined in the next section, we extracted 30 novel metaphorical utterances from Iglesias's corpus and 95 from Farage's. Examples were extracted manually, as our analysis of novel metaphorical utterances precludes computer-assisted tagging. We believe that, although the disparity in corpora sizes, cut-off dates and tagged examples might be of concern in a quantitative study, it is not a problem in a qualitative study such as this one. Speaker's meaning often depends on inference and, as Baker and Levon (2015, p. 232) argue, one of the strengths of qualitative analysis is "its ability to uncover the implicit representations that emerge" which escape a corpus-based quantitative analysis.

The rest of the chapter has the following structure. In the following section, we explain Romero and Soria's pragmatic approach to metaphor and use it to account for how the speaker's meaning is constructed in the interpretation of populist metaphorical utterances. Then, we analyse a selection of metaphors evidenced in Iglesias's and Farage's utterances, where populist oppositions are metaphorically conveyed. In the final section, we summarise our findings.

The role of metaphor in EU populist discourse

Metaphor and political discourse

There are many studies on metaphor. Some focus on the interpretation of metaphorical utterances (Richards, 1936; Black, 1954/5; Grice, 1975; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Indurkha, 1986; Sperber and Wilson, 1986/95; Romero and

Soria, 1997/8, 2007; Gentner and Wolf, 2000; Lepore and Stone, 2015) and some have been applied to the analysis of political discourse (Charteris-Black, 2005; Chilton and Ilyin, 1993; Musolff, 2012). Each of these approaches to metaphor makes their own contribution to the field. Richards' (1936) and Black's (1954/5) seminal works provided us with the mapping approach to metaphor which is generally accepted by conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). In CMT, the interpretation of metaphor is not a two-stage process as in the traditional view of metaphor as particularised conversational implicature (Grice, 1975). Other theorists working on the effects of utterance interpretation (Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004) also oppose metaphorical interpretation in two stages and defend that *ad hoc* concepts³ arise and affect "what is said" (or "explicature" in relevance-theoretic terms). However, they reject the view of metaphor as mapping and argue for the view of metaphor as loosening. By contrast, Romero and Soria (2007, 2014) advocate the view of metaphor as mapping (rather than as loosening), whilst also accepting that the interpretative effects of metaphorical utterances affect what is said rather than implicatures. In our opinion, this is the approach that can be of use to our analysis of novel metaphorical utterances in populist discourse.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has focused on the systematic (or ready-made) metaphorical concepts that can be identified in a corpus. In particular, Charteris-Black (2005) applies it to political discourse and calls it "Critical Metaphor Analysis". However, we agree with Musolff when he says that "cognitive metaphor analysis needs to be complemented by a pragmatic, specifically relevance-oriented approach to be fruitful for CDA" (2012, p. 302).

Thus, drawing on Romero and Soria's (2014, 2016) pragmatic approach to metaphor, we claim that the interpretative effects of novel metaphorical utterances affect "what is said" and can be an essential conceptual part of the claims made by speakers. In their view, metaphorical conceptualisation is contextually determined and they focus on the study of metaphorical interpretation of utterances rather than on the study of what Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 53) call "literal metaphors". In interpreting novel metaphorical utterances, a metaphorical context is constructed. This metaphorical context is a cognitive structure in relation to the topic talked about that is constructed *ad hoc* by the mapping of some relational properties from a source domain. From this metaphorical context, some words acquire a provisional meaning with which they contribute to the propositions intentionally conveyed by the speaker. These propositions are metaphorical and with them, a metaphorically grounded claim can be made.

The construction of the metaphorical context in the interpretation of novel metaphorical utterances often requires a source domain which is also constructed in an *ad hoc* manner. In this way, a very *ad hoc* portrayal of the source domain allows a very rich *ad hoc* and specific metaphorical characterisation of the target. The evidence⁴ provided by the speaker about the *ad hoc* source domain guides the hearer's construction of the mapping as intended. This is consistent with Musolff (2012, p. 305), who claims that, "depending on the context of use, the source

domain content can vary almost indefinitely” and that “the mapping process is the product of discourse”.

This pragmatic approach to metaphor allows us to argue that the interpretation of metaphorical utterances involves cognising the target through a mapping from a semantic domain that serves as a lens with which to focus on certain types of features of the target. Through metaphorical political discourse, speakers can assign prominence to certain aspects of social phenomena, political or economic situations, politicians, etc. In this way, metaphor provides a tool to help construct a certain worldview. Through the *ad hoc* cognitive structure created by the interpretation of metaphorical utterances, hearers entertain this worldview and, even if they disagree, a new conceptualisation becomes a part of the interlocutors’ common ground. If the speaker succeeds in conveying her metaphorically grounded claims and the hearer disagrees, he can negate them but his disagreement does not preclude his entertaining of the metaphorical reconceptualisation in the way intended. Metaphorical conceptualisations can be contested. In this sense, negative metaphorical utterances may be of use in argumentation and, more particularly, in political argumentation. In addition, we suggest that they are useful to populist politicians in their construction of the binary worldview within the populist frame.

Populist metaphorical utterances

Following Romero and Soria’s pragmatic approach, we can analyse populist metaphorical utterances and explain their role in the populist frame. We explain and illustrate this approach using the following utterance by Iglesias:

- (1) [At the EP (16/09/2014), as part of the debate on the state of EU–Russia relations and the issue in Ukraine, Iglesias utters:] And the question we need to pose is if we should assume that European foreign policy is going to be a pawn on a chessboard manipulated by the United States or if we are going to be serious enough to have a foreign policy of our own that does not put Europeans at risk.

To get the meaning intended by the speaker of (1), the hearer must, among other things, align the EU’s role in the world with a pawn on a chessboard and the US with someone dictating to the player how to move that pawn. From this alignment, some *ad hoc* conceptualisation of the game of chess allows a particular description of the EU’s role in the world. As we will see, the metaphorical conceptualisation that results from this process partially substantiates the populist frame.

According to Romero and Soria (1997/8, 2005), the metaphorical mechanism is triggered both by a *contextual abnormality*, produced when using a linguistic expression in an abnormal linguistic or extralinguistic context; and a *conceptual contrast*, produced when identifying one concept as a source domain and another concept

as the target domain. In (1), there is a contextual abnormality since the EU's role in the world is not the kind of thing we can categorise as a pawn on a chessboard according to our ready-made conceptual system. In addition, the concept PAWN ON A CHESSBOARD MOVED BY A CONTROLLED PLAYER is identified as the source domain (from which to describe the topic Iglesias is talking about) and EU'S ROLE IN THE WORLD as the target domain. Both target and source are already complex concepts generated in the particular context. These identification criteria of the metaphorical utterance (1) trigger the metaphorical mechanism which links two different domains, a source domain (D_s) and a target domain (D_t), in order to see the latter as the former. Following Romero and Soria (2016, pp. 161-2), we represent each domain by a set of terms which make up its vocabulary (V) and a set of structural constraints (S) which specify how these terms are related to the information associated with the concept. The link between domains can be specified with a mapping, M , from D_s to D_t . In Table 12.1, we can see the domains involved in (1).

TABLE 12.1 Representation of source and target domains

<i>A PAWN ON A CHESSBOARD MOVED BY A CONTROLLED PLAYER</i>	<i>EU'S ROLE IN THE WORLD</i>
$D_s = \langle V_s, S_s \rangle$	$D_t = \langle V_t, S_t \rangle$
$V_s = \{ \text{'piece', 'pawn', 'king', 'queen', 'chess', 'chessboard', 'move', 'play', 'risk', etc.} \}$	$V_t = \{ \text{'Europe', 'union', 'council', 'manipulate', 'US', 'policy', 'world', etc.} \}$
$S_s =$	$S_t =$
[1 _s] Chess is a zero-sum game played on a chessboard with 16 pieces for each of the two players,	[1 _t] The EU is a political and economic union of 28 member states with a strong role in world relations,
[2 _s] The pieces are one king, one queen, two rooks, two knights, two bishops, and eight pawns,	[2 _t] The EU is one of the largest trade powers in the world,
[3 _s] It is illegal for a player to follow advice from other sources of information (a person, a computer, etc.),	[3 _t] The EU and the US dominate political and military international relations,
[4 _s] Pieces are used to attack and capture the opponent's pieces,	[4 _t] The EU and the US have a good bilateral diplomatic relationship,
[5 _s] Each player tries to immobilise the opponent's king,	[5 _t] There are no border and immigration controls among EU member states,
[6 _s] The pawn is the weakest piece on the board,	[6 _t] The EU provides foreign aid, etc.
[7 _s] Pawns are often risked by the player to capture other opponent's pieces,	
[8 _s] A game can end in a draw, etc.	

Structural constraints in bold contribute to the restructured target domain.

To interpret Iglesias's utterance (1) we must find a structural alignment of consistent one-to-one correspondences between these domains. This alignment (e.g. chessboard \rightarrow world) allows the selection and coherent partial mapping from D_s to D_t . Iglesias's utterance invites us to relevantly align the world with a chessboard and the role of Europe in the world with that of a pawn on a chessboard. On transforming some structural constraints of D_s , we come across other structural constraints only in terms of the target domain. A restructured D_t or metaphorical target domain (D_t^M) results from this mapping, as we can see in Table 12.2.

In utterance interpretation, mappings have two inferential requirements: coherence and relevance. Transfer is allowed from D_s to D_t only if the transformed information of D_s does not make our conception of D_t incoherent. If the union of the transformation of the structural constraints of D_s with part of the information of D_t is consistent, then the structural constraints of D_s have been coherently transformed by means of a partial function into structural constraints of D_t . Furthermore, the mapping is guided by relevance (Romero and Soria, 2014), that is, by the hearer's attempt to maximise the speaker's intended cognitive effects at the least possible effort (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/95). The mapping for (1) generates a metaphorically restructured conception of the EU's ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A PAWN ON A CHESSBOARD MOVED BY A CONTROLLED PLAYER, characterised by the structural constraints of D_t^M in Table 12.2. Several coherent mappings are possible and the one constructed is guided by the search for relevance. Target domain information is downplayed by their alignment with the selected features in the source domain. For example, the conceptualisation of European foreign policy as the weakest piece on the chessboard (coming from [6_s]) downplays the target domain assumption that the EU has a strong role in the world (e.g. [1_t]-[4_t]). When Iglesias presents the US as "manipulating" (rather than simply moving) the pawn on the chessboard, the EU is conceptualised as having a weak role (the EU's foreign policy is a weak piece). Through this metaphorical conceptualisation, Iglesias can raise the question of whether the EU should take a passive role in letting the US make decisions that should legitimately be made by Europeans, assuming that both the EU and the US have a dominant role and

TABLE 12.2 EU'S ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A PAWN ON A CHESSBOARD MOVED BY A CONTROLLED PLAYER

Restructured D_t or D_t^M : EU'S ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A PAWN ON A CHESSBOARD MOVED BY A CONTROLLED PLAYER

- [1_t^M] The EU has a weak role in foreign relations, (new, coming from 6_s and downplaying 1_t-3_t)
 - [2_t^M] The EU is unscrupulously risked by the US in geopolitical conflicts, (new, coming from 7_s)
 - [3_t^M] The EU illegitimately follows advice from the US, (new, coming from 3_s)
-

equal status in international affairs (as we can see in [3_t] and [4_t]). The question is if the European people should assume the EU elites' passive attitude. By this rhetorical question, Iglesias is expressing his attitude of rejection towards the EU's passivity. [1_t^M], [2_t^M] and [3_t^M] can be considered as new information added to D_t from D_s, from [6_s], [7_s] and [3_s] respectively. Some similarities are created in the production and interpretation of novel metaphorical utterances if they contribute to communicating the speaker's intended cognitive effects. Since, in novel metaphorical utterances,⁵ the context of interpretation changes, the meanings associated with the terms metaphorically used change, too. The mapping process ultimately results in a metaphorically restructured target domain which allows the hearer to associate metaphorical *ad hoc* concepts with the vehicles of the metaphor (the terms from the source domain expressed by the speaker in his metaphorical utterance e.g. 'pawn', 'chessboard', 'risk') in the way intended by the speaker. They represent metaphorical provisional meanings which contribute to the proposition intended by Iglesias with utterance (1). The metaphorical context is constructed in the process of utterance interpretation and is guided by the search of the cognitive effects that justify our processing effort (Romero and Soria, 2014). Only the transformations that make the speaker's utterance relevant will be entertained as part of the interpretation process.

With this metaphorical utterance, Iglesias is conceptualising the EU as having no actual role in the important decisions on foreign policy. This role has been usurped by the US and the passive attitude of the EU elites should be diagnosed as problematic as the passive attitude of a chess player that lets another person move the pieces for him. By means of this, the structural constraints [3_t] and [4_t] are downplayed and [3_t^M] is introduced.

This is an example of how metaphor can contribute to the construction of the populist frame. With metaphorical utterance (1), Iglesias contributes to the diagnosis of reality as problematic because control has been illegitimately taken by some abusive power (the US) and this has been facilitated by corrupt elites (the EU). This diagnosis justifies his demand for anti-elitist political mobilisation.

Left-wing and right-wing populist metaphorical utterances in the EP

In this section, we analyse a selection of utterances used by the left-wing populist leader Pablo Iglesias and the right-wing populist leader Nigel Farage to explore if their metaphorical conceptualisations contribute to the construction of their worldviews (regardless of whether they are left-wing or right-wing) within a populist frame. We explore how the metaphorical *ad hoc* concepts that form part of the meaning intentionally conveyed by both leaders contribute to a populist frame that, as Aslanidis (2016, p. 99) says, "diagnoses reality as problematic because 'corrupt elites' have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the 'noble people'".

Pablo Iglesias's populist metaphorical utterances

Iglesias metaphorically substantiates the populist frame in the EP by opposing the democratic legitimacy of noble people to the usurpation of power by corrupt elites. In particular, we find that metaphor has a role in the following populist oppositions:

- (i) European self-government in opposition to US abusive power.
- (ii) National sovereignty of southern and eastern European peoples in opposition to the Troika's abusive austerity policy.
- (iii) Non-European noble people in need of asylum in opposition to EU rights-abusing policy.

Iglesias's utterance (1) exemplifies opposition (i). In Table 12.3 below, we simplify the representation of the mapping needed to interpret (1) and we follow this type of simplified representation for the analysis of the following metaphorical utterances.

Iglesias's populist claim in the EP depends on this metaphorical conceptualisation of the US as usurper of the sovereignty of noble European people.

Opposition (ii) can be exemplified by Iglesias's utterance (2):

- (2) [At the EP (01/07/2014) as part of the sessions on the election of the president of the EP, Iglesias utters:] The expropriation of sovereignty and submission of the government to financial elites threaten the present and the future of Europe. (...) But I suppose you are aware that there is no Europe without its southern peoples, just as there is none without its eastern peoples, also subject to the harsh conditions of the Troika, whose policy threatens to destroy the European project (...). But there is another way, there is an alternative to the policies of impoverishment and the kidnapping of sovereignty. (...) This Parliament must express the democratic legitimacy of the origin that brings us together: the voice of citizens, and not the arrangements between elites.

TABLE 12.3 EU'S ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A PAWN ON A CHESSBOARD

D_s	<i>Relevant mapped features</i>	D_t
A PAWN ON A CHESSBOARD MOVED BY A CONTROLLED PLAYER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The piece with the weakest role in game of chess • Usually put to risk or killed to capture pieces of opponents • It is illegal for a player to follow advice 	EU'S ROLE IN THE WORLD
Restructured D_t: EU'S ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A PAWN ON A CHESSBOARD		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU has a weak role in world relations • The EU is unscrupulously risked by the US in geopolitical conflicts • The EU illegitimately follows advice from the US 		

In (2), EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL ELITES (TROIKA) are metaphorically represented as EXPROPRIATORS or as KIDNAPPERS OF SOVEREIGNTY. Iglesias makes the metaphorically grounded populist claim that the national sovereignty of southern European countries (noble people of Greece, Spain and Italy) has been usurped by the Troika's austerity policies.

An example of opposition (iii) is the metaphorical utterance (3):

- (3) [As part of the conclusions of the European Council (15/10/2015), Iglesias utters:] The refugee crisis is not resolved with police. It is solved with a responsible policy. Stop playing chess with the peoples of the Mediterranean. Work for peace instead of fomenting wars. Help people who are fleeing from horror. Do not keep destroying the dignity of Europe, Mr. Juncker.

In (3), the European authorities (represented by Juncker on this occasion) are presented as a select few putting pieces on a chessboard and encouraging attacks on noble people, refugees, coming from the other side of the Mediterranean Sea (Table 12.4).

The restructured target domain EU AUTHORITIES AS PLAYERS OF CHESS, which is generated *ad hoc* in the interpretation process, provides us with the metaphorical context from which to interpret Iglesias's utterance (3).

Although CHESS is part of the source domain in both utterances (1) and (3), different mappings are triggered and different contents are intentionally communicated by these utterances. This can be taken as evidence that a pragmatic approach to metaphor is needed to account for the metaphorical meaning conveyed by the speaker. Coherence and relevance are inferential requirements for the mappings involved in the interpretation of each utterance. In each case, hearers are able to derive a coherent restructured target domain intended by the speaker whose utterance, as Sperber and Wilson (1986/95, p. 156) argue for all verbal utterances⁶, conveys its presumption of relevance.

TABLE 12.4 EU AUTHORITIES AS PLAYERS OF CHESS

D_s	Relevant mapped features	D_t
PLAYERS OF CHESS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Players of chess set the pieces on a chessboard knowing that many will be sacrificed • Players of chess try to prevent opponents' pieces from moving ahead in their part of the chessboard 	EU AUTHORITIES
Restructured D_t: EU AUTHORITIES AS PLAYERS OF CHESS		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU authorities encourage conflicts knowing that many noble people will be sacrificed or abused in different ways • EU authorities try to prevent refugees from entering EU territory in their attempt to escape from the conflict 		

Another example of opposition (iii) is Iglesias's use of a quotation from a poem by Julio Herrera:

- (4) [At the EP (12/03/2015) as part of the sessions on the Human Rights council in NATO, Iglesias quotes a poem by Julio Herrera:] "I am not a migratory bird / that on a whim left its dwelling / upon the arrival of adverse seasons: / I am a castaway from an unsettled country / that an infamous pirate plunged into the seas of misery".

Iglesias metaphorically describes the refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea as noble people by a mapping from the source domain *CASTAWAY PLUNGED BY AN INFAMOUS PIRATE* rather than from *MIGRATORY BIRD THAT ON A WHIM LEFT ITS DWELLING UPON THE ARRIVAL OF ADVERSE SEASONS*. In this example, there are two metaphorical mappings: one of them is used to make an affirmative assertion, the other to make a negative one.

Taking into account that certain conceptualisations can be "meta-represented by speaker as being someone else's believed reality" (Chilton, 2004, p. 54), we can hypothesise that this is what happens in cases of negative populist metaphorical utterances. For example, we can say that, with the quotation in (4), Iglesias implicitly attributes to the European authorities the metaphorical conceptualisation of *REFUGEE AS MIGRATORY BIRD THAT ON A WHIM LEFT THEIR DWELLING UPON THE ARRIVAL OF ADVERSE SEASONS*. In cases like this, a populist speaker attributes a thought to an elite entity, by meta-representing an elite worldview metaphorically reconceptualised within the populist frame. This metaphorical claim is attributed and contested simultaneously by the populist speaker with a negative metaphorical utterance "I am not a migratory bird". Contestation is reinforced with the affirmative metaphorical utterance "I am a castaway from an unsettled country that an infamous pirate plunged into the seas of misery". Both contribute to the populist frame.

Sometimes, the metaphorical conceptualisation attributed to the elites is rather conventional as in the description of *REFUGEES' ARRIVAL AS A PLAGUE OR AS AN INVASION*, and they are also contested. For example, in (5):

- (5) [23/09/2015 as part of the debate on the conclusions of the European Council, Iglesias utters:] To talk about "plague", to talk about "invasion" (...) is an offense to this House and democracy. Whoever talks about human beings in this way deserves just one label and, even if it is a strong word, I am going to say it: you are trash, (...).

Iglesias protests against these metaphorical conceptualisations. A myriad of other source domains (e.g. *MASTERS GIVING ORDERS TO DOGS WILLING TO COMPLY WITH THEM*) are used by Iglesias to represent EU authorities within the populist frame. Space, however, limits us here.

Nigel Farage's populist metaphorical utterances

Farage substantiates the populist frame via the following populist oppositions:

- (i) The noble people, usually Britain and the British, or Farage himself, in opposition to the elites of the European Union's political institutions.
- (ii) National sovereignty of European member states in opposition to the anti-democratic policies of the EU.

A frequent source domain he uses to describe the EU within the populist frame is ORGANISED RELIGION, as in (6):

- (6) [In a State of the Union debate, (Strasbourg, 14/09/16) Farage utters:] If you were to think of this building as a temple, Mr. Verhofstadt is the high priest, a fanatic. (...) If you stick to the dogma of saying that for reciprocal tariff-free access to the single market we must maintain the free movement of people, then you will inevitably drive us towards no deal.

Several related metaphorical conceptualisations are involved: THE EP BUILDING AS TEMPLE, MEP VERHOFSTADT (a prominent Belgian MEP in favour of further EU integration and leader of the parliamentary group 'Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe'⁷) AS A FANATICAL HIGH-PRIEST, and THE EU'S BREXIT NEGOTIATION TACTICS AS DOGMA. Table 12.5 illustrates some of the mapped features of the second, as a case of opposition (i).

This metaphorical conceptualisation denigrates Verhofstadt, as a fanatic, precluding the possibility that he will negotiate in a rational manner, and downplays the fact that Verhofstadt is also an elected representative in a democratic institution.

As we can see in Table 12.6, utterance (6) also exemplifies opposition (ii) via the populist claim that the EU's Brexit negotiation position is based on blind belief in the EU project, and blind obedience to authority rather than reason and willingness to compromise and democratic principles.

TABLE 12.5 MEP VERHOFSTADT AS FANATICAL HIGH PRIEST

D_s	<i>Relevant mapped features</i>	D_t
A FANATICAL HIGH PRIEST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leads worship in the temple • Is the highest authority in the temple • Will do anything to support his blind and extreme beliefs • Can punish sinners 	MEP VERHOFSTADT

Restructured D_t : MEP VERHOFSTADT AS FANATICAL HIGH PRIEST

- Verhofstadt leads worship for the EU in the European Parliament
- Verhofstadt is the highest authority in the EP
- Verhofstadt will do anything to support his blind and extreme belief in the EU
- Verhofstadt can punish members transgressing divine EU law

Brexit is also metaphorically conceptualised by Farage in the populist frame. A good example is:

- (7) [In negotiations with the UK following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union (Strasbourg, 5/04/17), Farage utters:] President, it may have taken nine months – a pretty full gestation – but be in no doubt that last Wednesday was a great historic day when the United Kingdom announced that we were going to become an independent, self-governing, democratic nation once again, an act that has been cheered by hundreds of millions of people all over the world.

The vehicle of the metaphor, the nine-month gestation, describes the nine-month delay between the Brexit referendum result and the British government's triggering of article 50, thereby starting the legal process of leaving the EU. The structural constraints of the source domain implicitly divide the Brexit process into three stages: conception (the Brexit referendum), pregnancy (the post-referendum process in Britain) (Table 12.7) and birth (the triggering of article 50) (Table 12.8).

Farage had campaigned for Britain to leave the EU for his entire political career and so the metaphorical ad-hoc conceptualisation POST-REFERENDUM

TABLE 12.6 EU'S BREXIT NEGOTIATION TACTICS AS DOGMA

D_s	<i>Relevant mapped features</i>	D_t
DOGMA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy based on blind belief rather than reason • Imposed by authorities in a certain religious cult 	EU'S BREXIT NEGOTIATION TACTICS

Restructured D_t : EU's Brexit negotiation tactics as dogma

- The EU's Brexit negotiation tactics are based on blind belief in the EU project rather than on reason
- The EU's Brexit negotiation tactics are imposed by the authorities in the European cult

TABLE 12.7 POST-REFERENDUM BREXIT PROCESS AS PREGNANCY

D_s	<i>Relevant mapped features</i>	D_t
PREGNANCY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pregnancy is a natural and necessary process • Pregnancy is physically, emotionally and mentally demanding • Giving birth is painful • Birth of a child is a joyful occasion • Parents should be congratulated 	POST-REFERENDUM BREXIT PROCESS

Restructured D_t : POST-REFERENDUM BREXIT PROCESS AS PREGNANCY

- Brexit process was a natural and necessary process
- Brexit process was physically, emotionally and mentally demanding
- Birth of Brexit-Britain was a joyful occasion
- Farage and his followers should be congratulated

TABLE 12.8 BRITAIN UNDER THE BREXIT PROCESS AS NEWBORN CHILD CELEBRATED BY MILLIONS

D_s	Relevant mapped features	D_t
NEWBORN CHILD CELEBRATED BY MILLIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Birth of a relevant child is celebrated by millions of citizens (in a kingdom or religious community) because he/she is important for the future of that social group • The child will grow up to be independent, self-governing 	BRITAIN UNDER THE BREXIT PROCESS
Restructured D_t: BRITAIN UNDER THE BREXIT PROCESS AS NEWBORN CHILD CELEBRATED BY MILLIONS		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brexit-Britain is celebrated by millions around the world because it is important for the future of democracy • Newborn Britain will grow up to be independent, self-governing 		

BREXIT PROCESS AS PREGNANCY conceptualises Farage and his followers as a parent who should be congratulated and positions them in the populist frame as representing the noble people.

Metaphorically, it is not just the birth of any child but the birth of a child whose birth is “cheered by hundreds of millions of people all over the world”, and which signalled that “we were going to become an independent, self-governing, democratic nation once again”. The explicit metaphor BREXIT PROCESS AS PREGNANCY creates the context of interpretation in which the rest of the utterance can also be interpreted metaphorically. Thus, as an extension of the first metaphor, we can construe the highly ad-hoc conceptualisation of BREXIT AS NEWBORN CHILD CELEBRATED BY MILLIONS.

Here, even the target domain BREXIT is highly *ad hoc* as it seems to signify not only the Brexit process but also post-EU Britain. There are only very particular types of births which are celebrated by millions, namely royal births and religious births (i.e. the birth of Jesus), and the two are already analogically associated in quite complex ways (i.e. the birth of Jesus is depicted as the birth of a king, and kings have been seen to rule by divine right). Both the royal and the religious associations would be highly resonant for the British public, particularly Farage’s conservative audience. BREXIT AS CHILD will grow to become an independent, self-governing and democratic nation, a prognostic populist claim presupposing as its diagnosis that Britain, under EU elites, is none of these things.

Another metaphorical utterance using a religious source domain is (8).

- (8) [In a debate over the situation in Hungary (Brussels, 24/04/17), Farage, addressing Victor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, utters:] You are not the leader of a nation, and these people will go on interfering in the lives of Hungarian people, and you will never be forgiven. You are a sinner in their eyes.

Just as with Iglesias's utterances (4) and (5), Farage's metaphorical utterance (8) is used to contest an alleged elite metaphorical thought. This time the metaphorical content is contested ironically rather than by means of negation. Metaphor combines with irony to convey the meaning intended by the populist speaker. The metaphorical conceptualisation involved in this utterance (VICTOR ORBÁN AS SINNER) contributes to Farage's populist opposition (ii), by attributing to the elites the conceptualisation of the democratically elected representatives of the noble people as sinners. Victor Orbán, the rightful representative of noble Hungarian people, is seen as a sinner for disagreeing with the EU's refugee policy, but just "in their [the elite's] eyes". With this expression, Farage is making it clear that this is a metaphorical thought he does not endorse, it is ironical. In the echoic account by Wilson and Sperber (2012, pp. 128–129), irony is defined as "a subtype of attributive use in which the speaker's primary intention is not to provide information about the content of an attributed thought, but to convey her own attitude or reaction to that thought". Following this account, we can identify Farage's utterance as ironical since his primary intention is not to assert that Victor Orbán is not the democratically elected Hungarian leader. Rather, he is conveying his negative attitude or reaction to the alleged fact that Europeans authorities are "interfering in the lives of Hungarian people" and, by doing this, Victor Orbán is being unjustly treated as a sinner (Table 12.9).

Curiously enough, the issue of refugees is used by both right- and left-wing populist speakers in the EP. Whilst in (8), Farage uses the issue to depict EU authorities as the elite usurping the sovereignty of noble people (Hungarians), in (3) and (4), Iglesias uses the issue to depict the EU authorities as the elite attacking noble people (refugees). Though the populist frame is the same in these utterances, it is substantiated differently according to ideological point of view.

Other metaphors used by Farage to position concepts in the populist frame include EP AS BULLY BOYS, EP AS CHILDREN, and GOLDMAN SACHS AS BIG BOYS. These metaphors depict European Parliamentary politics as a playground in which Britain is bullied by the EU (NOBLE PEOPLE abused by ELITES) and the EP is under the influence of GOLDMAN SACHS AS BIG BOYS (undermining the sovereignty of the NOBLE PEOPLE). Farage draws on domains of history (TURKEY'S

TABLE 12.9 VICTOR ORBÁN AS SINNER

D_s	<i>Relevant mapped features</i>	D_t
SINNER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has committed a sin, an immoral act • Can be punished by religious authorities • Can be punished by God 	VICTOR ORBÁN
Restructured D_t: VICTOR ORBÁN AS SINNER		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Victor Orbán committed the immoral act of disagreeing with EU's refugee quota • Victor Orbán can be punished by the authorities in the European cult for transgressing the European refugee policy 		

REFUGEE POLICY AS VIKING INVASION OF BRITAIN), literature (DAVID CAMERON AS OLIVER TWIST) and war (UKIP SUPPORTERS AS PEOPLE'S ARMY), to name just a few, consistently using metaphorical ad-hoc concepts to create worldviews according to the populist frame.

Conclusion

We have argued that novel metaphor is used by both left- and right-wing populist speakers (Iglesias and Farage). A pragmatic account of metaphor is used to explain how the meaning intended by these populist speakers is derived from the interpretation of their novel metaphorical utterances. An analysis of novel metaphorical utterances in populist discourse reveals that *ad hoc* metaphorical conceptualisations are often found in the construction of the anti-elitist worldview that substantiates the populist frame. Regardless of their particular proposals, they diagnose a problematic reality by presenting a partially metaphorical worldview where the established powers are described as usurpers of sovereignty of noble people. This analysis also reveals that sometimes they use metaphorical conceptualisations as attributed thoughts that they contest. Negative and ironical metaphors may have a specific role in these cases. Although we have not made a comprehensive study to test if this is peculiar of populist discourse or even of political discourse more generally, we think it would be a promising topic for future research.

Notes

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- 2 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/home.html>
- 3 The term "*ad hoc* concept" was first used by Barsalou (1983, p. 214), who argued that they are usually not thought of by most people.
- 4 This evidence can be provided by means of linguistic, non-linguistic or multimodal cues. See Forceville (2008) for an explanation of metaphorical meanings conveyed in these different ways).
- 5 As indicated by the reviewers of our paper, some readers might understand that this is not exactly a 100% novel metaphor, given that politics is often described in terms of the game metaphor, in particular chess. Following Lakoff and Johnson's (1980, p. 53) terminology, we can say that creative metaphors can be one of the following three types: unsystematic novel uses of an expression, instances of an unused part of a "literal metaphor", or extensions of the used part of a "literal metaphor". Here, we use the term "novel metaphor" in a general sense to cover the three types of what they call "imaginative (or non-literal) metaphor" (1980, p. 53) without distinguishing the subtypes. For us, metaphorical utterances of any of these types demand a non-literal interpretation and thus are called "novel" (see Romero and Soria, 2005).
- 6 In Sperber and Wilson (1986/95, p. 156) words, "(...) an act of ostensive communication automatically communicates a *presumption of relevance*."
- 7 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/97058/GUY_VERHOFSTADT_home.html

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13

POPULISMUS AND AESTHETICISATION IN NAZI RHETORIC

Christina Holgado-Sáez and Leopoldo La Rubia-Prado

Introduction

The following pages aim to portray to what extent Nazism focused its political programme on linguistic, aesthetic, rhetorical and propaganda aspects as the common thread of the concept of people's Community (*Volksgemeinschaft*), developed by Hitler in *Mein Kampf* (*My Struggle*).

Nazi totalitarianism pursued the expansion of Germanism (myths, language, traditions, etc.). This goal had to be satisfied in the short run. For that purpose, populism became a very effective strategy to hoodwink a Germany that felt humiliated after World War I and by the Versailles Treaty.

The propaganda, the rhetoric, the aestheticisation, the manipulation of language or sports (Olympic Games, 1936), and the appeal to the emotions of a humiliated Germany became part of that populist and short-term strategy of control.

The aesthetic-propaganda of the Nazi programme

Writing about Nazism involves writing about Hitler, the politician, and Hitler, a frustrated and anachronistic artist who lived in a fertile, audacious and transgressive artistic context (Schjeldahl, 2002). Some of the avant-garde movements such as Dadaism rejected beauty, and most of the aesthetic and compositional categories of art used in the last six centuries. Adolf Hitler never became, as he expected, a plastic artist. However, he sold millions of copies of his autobiographical and programmatic political manifesto entitled *Mein Kampf*. Hitler's paintings were not considered as great works of art and, for this reason, he decided to do something audacious: to create the total work of art. He wanted to spread two great ideas or forms of art based on the classics: unity and beauty. If we translate

this into a political and social programme, we are talking about Pan-Germanism and superhumans (that is, beautiful perfect Aryan people).

Thanks to its founder, Nazism showed a very powerful artistic and aesthetic aspect which can be detected in the Nazi praxis. As humans are ontologically symbolic beings, Nazism started by assuming that symbols are important. Therefore, Nazis decided to use the swastika, an ancient Asian religious icon, as the new symbol for a new kingdom on Earth: the Third Reich. This symbol was displayed everywhere.

One of the essential aspects of the Nazi plan for manipulating millions of Germans into going along with their ideals was propaganda, a crucial instrument which was established and advanced by Joseph Goebbels (Bramsted, 1965; Herf, 2005). This contributed to an extraordinary electoral victory of a political party that ended up becoming the only one in the new State. Goebbels had read *Crystallising Public Opinion* by E. Bernays Freud, Freud's nephew, who was also the author of *Propaganda*, a very influential book from which he benefitted the most.¹ Nazi propaganda was characterised by a strong aesthetic and visual quality which covered different fields. Attracting millions of supporters to their cause was not an easy task even if they had already attracted some people's attention by promoting a long-established anti-Semitic and anti-communist discourse. Hating Jews and communists, and making them the scapegoats for their problems, was part of the Nazi strategy. This hate was also directed towards other groups such as homosexuals and gypsies.

Art was a mainstay of the Nazi propaganda. In fact, documentary films directed by prestigious filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl became an extraordinary ally as we will describe later. Moreover, luck was on their side since the appearance of mechanical reproduction technology allowed the masses to gain access to artistic content and information of other nature at the beginning of the 20th century, contributing to spreading Nazi ideals. The aura of a work of art is no longer the unique aesthetic authority. Mechanical reproduction becomes the means to disseminate a visual message loaded with ideological and practical intent.

Apart from visual support, the propaganda activity needed a message: some "good news". This message was a potpourri of different ideas superficially understood and blended and yet politically effective, ideas that ranged from *Völkerpsychologie* (social psychology), and from Herder to Darwin, Spengler, Nietzsche and Heidegger (Evans, 2005; Miller, 2014). The Nazi message was staged with a dramatic and forceful rhetoric; it contained a shallow and populist message that had to take root in people (Ryback, 2010). It is widely recognised that Nazis used art and artists for their own purposes in the same way they used aesthetics and certain aesthetic processes to spread their message visually and effectively. In addition to the historical Post-World War I context, this explains how it took root so easily and quickly in most Germans, resulting in the 1932 electoral victory (Strathausen, 2009).

The Nazi rhetoric, which used the *sublime* rhetoric introduced by Longinus in the 2nd century and further developed by Burke and Kant (Doran, 2015; Tegel, 2006),

is found in the Führer's speeches, full of sweeping gestures and a theatricality that hypnotised the audience attending his mass events.

Nazism associated its idea of the total work of art with the works created by the anti-Semitic composer Richard Wagner (Chamberlain, 1983, pp. 43–44), viewed by the Nazis as the archetypal composer due to his passion for including Norse mythology in his works. He also contributed to saving the romantic aspects of nationalism that were exported as a way of Pan-Germanism.² Wagner's operas represented the total work of art, Adolf Hitler's project; they included painting, scenography, ballet, music, singing and literature.

Clothes were also an important aesthetic aspect to be considered. The Nazi military uniforms, which were designed by Hugo Boss (Villatoro, 2012), were very effective, as well as the distinctive symbols used by the *Schutzstaffel*, Protection Squadron or SS (e.g. skulls, the Iron Crosses, commanders' stylish boots and coats).

Everything in the Nazi proposal showed a basic aesthetic aspect focused on domination, violence and death, which has had a real impact to this day. Since the message is empty, the aesthetic aspect becomes the real message, still surviving in fashion, music, and even in other fields and areas which will be analysed later. When everything is invaded by beauty, we can see a phenomenon which links art (beauty) to society: aestheticisation.

Fundamentals of aestheticisation: Michaud, Welsch and Benjamin

Aestheticisation is an ancient phenomenon conceptualised by Walter Benjamin. This was due to the Dadaist movements, which defended the new idea that beauty was not part of a work of art, as opposed to the previous movements which considered it a key aspect. Beauty, as an adaptation or new reformulation of the law of conservation of energy, was no longer an essential aspect of works of art but an aspect covering everything. This law states that energy is not created or destroyed but just converted or redistributed from one form to another. This would also apply to beauty, which is neither created nor destroyed. It adopts a new form which is not limited to the work of art but affects other human and divine spheres.

This idea is very well described in the first lines of Yves Michaud's book:

It is crazy how beautiful the world is. Beautiful are the packaged products; the brand clothing (...); the bodies, reconstructed, remodelled or rejuvenated by plastic surgery; the made-up faces, treated or lifted; the personalised piercings and tattoos (...). Even corpses are beautiful (...). If it is not yet beautiful, it has to be. Beauty reigns. In any case, it has become imperative: be beautiful or, at least, save us from your ugliness!

(Michaud, 2007, p. 9)

It is true that beauty was back then – and is still – an imperative. Beauty is not in contemporary art museums or galleries but everywhere, like a gas which is continuously expanding. Beauty, which a long time ago was considered the main aesthetic category, can be found in almost everything. In fact, our eyes seem to be covered by a veil which makes us see our world through beauty.

However, if everything surrounding aestheticisation was just a synonym of embellishment or beautification, this subject would have no real significance, except for those who have made beauty their main source to earn their living. Wolfgang Welsch (1996) described the two aestheticisation processes that can be found at different levels: surface aestheticisation and deep-seated aestheticisation.³ Surface aestheticisation refers to the embellishment or softening of reality in an aesthetic way. Aestheticisation is used then to be continuously immersed in experiences:

Every boutique and every café is today designed to be an ‘active experience’. German railway stations are no longer called stations, but rather, following their artistic garniture, call themselves a ‘world of experience with rail connection’. Every day we go from the experience-office to experience-shopping, relax with experience-gastronomy and finally end up at home for some experience-living. Suggestions have even been made that memorials – for example, those to Nazi atrocities – should be staged as an ‘experience-domain’.

(Welsch, 1996, p. 2)

This type of aestheticisation is no longer affecting remote or isolated elements of society but culture itself, as a whole, which expands and reaches deeper levels. In this sense, it has been stated that there is a special type called deep-seated aestheticisation and a “new priority of the aesthetic” (Welsch, 1996, p. 4). All this can be observed in economic and advertising strategies, affecting the basic structures of reality: new materials technologies aestheticise the material reality, the media aestheticise the social reality, and the replacement of moral criteria by the self-styling aestheticises the subjective reality. In this deep sense, ‘aesthetic’ does not refer to beauty but to modellability. An immaterial aestheticisation is then produced and reaches deeper than the material one described since it affects reality and our conception of it as a whole. Welsch (1996, p. 12) also states that there was an epistemological aestheticisation that is rooted within the Enlightenment, which was prior to the aforementioned aestheticisation processes. It is a situation in which knowledge, following Kant (2013), is also affected by categories with a strong aesthetic point of view. A series of processes of this kind would lead to creating a *homo aestheticus*.

Surface and deep-seated aestheticisation processes are based on the concept of “aestheticisation” suggested by Walter Benjamin in his 1936 book *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*. Benjamin (2010, p. 60) pointed out that Nazism rendered politics aesthetic while Communism used to politicise art. However, the Nazis and even Hitler, who maintained close ties with Stalin for a

long time, also ended up politicising art. They used it for their own political interests. Riefenstahl's documentary films such as *Olympia* and *Triumph des Willens* [*Triumph of the Will*] were essential elements of Nazi propaganda. Aesthetics and the emphasis on the aesthetic aspect of human praxis were thus essential within the Nazi political and populist worldview. Hitler was the greatest pioneer of current European populism, from a theoretical point of view, i.e. exclusive and racist. Today's society boasts similar historical conditions: crisis of political representativeness, economic crisis and a situation of immobility (Pinto, 2017).

The Nazi worldview: the Greco-Roman world and paganism as new aesthetic proposals

The political programme of the Nazi party can be found in *Mein Kampf*, where Hitler talks openly about the "race-based state". Racism, purity, etc. would later promote ethnic cleansing and eugenics. These ideas were aestheticised through films. Nazi propaganda used documentary films to shape and spread their message. These films showed Hitler's positive attitude towards ancient Greece and Rome. If we focus on ancient Greece, the film which best reflects Hitler's ideology is *Olympia* by Riefenstahl (1938). Using the Berlin 1936 Olympic Games as an example, this film shows healthy and perfect athletes. The relationship with Rome can be observed in *Triumph des Willens* by Riefenstahl (1935), in which aestheticisation is focused on politics and military actions or, strictly speaking, militarist actions based on the militarist aesthetics of the Roman Empire. All this will contribute to the development of one of the key concepts used in Nazism and its political praxis: *Volksgemeinschaft* [people's Community]. Paganism also played an important role since it provided a romantic and nationalist essence which was reflected in Wagner's operas. The SS commander-in-chief Heinrich Himmler loved this paganism (Lumsden, 2005). After losing his faith, Himmler decided to look for the origins of Germanism by developing a pagan faith which, in 1934, had a pseudo-religious centre at the Castle of Wewelsburg in the district of Paderborn (Lumsden, 2005, p. 237).

Regarding *Triumph des Willens*, we can state that the militarism of the Third Reich was quite clear. This film made Rome its most relevant and elaborated symbol since order, efficacy and beauty are shown as perfect elements to achieve. Roman legions are seen as perfectly trained men who demonstrate an unusual beauty in their perfect geometric formations and through all the paraphernalia of acronyms and symbols such as *SPQR*. Italian Fascism probably made only a small contribution to German Nazism. However, when we read the *Manifesto del Futurismo* (*The Futurist Manifesto*) by Italian Fascist artist Filippo Tommaso Marinetti in 1909, we find several similarities between him and the Nazi obsession with struggling, aggression, destruction and war:

7. Beauty exists only in struggle. There is no masterpiece that has not an aggressive character. [Poetry must be conceived as a violent attack on

unknown forces, to reduce and prostrate them before men.] (...) 9. We want to glorify war – the only cure for the world – militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of [libertarians], the beautiful ideas [worth dying for], and [the] contempt for women. 10. We want to demolish museums and libraries, fight morality, feminism and all opportunist and utilitarian [vileness].

Marinetti (1909), cited by Zander (Marinetti, 2016, p. 138)

Olympia is an exceptional three-hour documentary film which, apart from being used as a document to explain the Berlin 1936 Olympic Games and as a source for Nazi propaganda, shows some relevant artistic and aesthetic values. Regarding its content, it shows how German sports developed in the 1930s. These real images contributed to promoting the superiority and the physical prowess of the Aryan race. This film was released in two parts. The first was conceived of as a prologue showing the remains of the Greek civilisation and the different athletics competitions taking place at the Olympic Stadium where Hitler cheered his team on. The second is a tribute to nature. The human body is extolled: naked athletes are seen while running in the country and enjoying a relaxing sauna. Body worship is observed in this film since it refers to the classical era. Other competitions such as gymnastics, sailing, equestrian sports, shooting, decathlon, etc. are included in this part. Flags are not shown during the gymnastics events and the producer only focuses on the plastic beauty of the human body. The beautiful shots taken during the sailing events proved to be more aesthetic than narrative. These images, etched in our memories, do not have any negative connotations. However, when included in the Nazi narrative showing the athletes and their physical activity, these images are beautiful and effective, to the extent of excluding any other forms of being or living. Race, the image of the athlete as a superman, the classical ideal, the perfect body, virility, health, purity, body worship, etc., became the keystones of the Nazi worldview. The results obtained in the Games of the XI Olympiad satisfied the Führer. Germany had 348 athletes and achieved the leading position in the medal table with 89 medals, followed by the USA, who had 312 athletes and got 56 medals. The Olympics were a success and were used as a facelift for the Regime, although they were also the Olympics in which African-American Jesse Owens won four medals. Hitler's racist vision showed that Germany did very well thanks to all the medals they won but also to all the medals obtained by other countries which they considered part of their Aryan fantasy; a success that reinforced their "programme" (Riefenstahl, 1938). Indeed, the success in the Olympic Games became additional fuel for the Führer's racist convictions.

Hitler's political programme was implicit in *Mein Kampf*, where he explained his ideas, ambitions and his route designed to build a new empire that would last a thousand years:

Realising this, the race-based state must direct its primary educational effort toward training sound and healthy bodies and not just pumping in

knowledge. Development of the intellectual abilities takes second place. The development of character and especially strength of will and determination comes first. Together with this, we must teach the joy that comes from readily accepting responsibility. Scientific education comes last. The race-based Nationalist state must operate from the belief that a man with little academic schooling, but who is physically sound and has a good, solid character, who is filled with determination and strong will is more valuable to the people's Community than a brilliant weakling

(Hitler, 2009, p. 274)

The German political discourse of *Volksgemeinschaft* [People's Community] as a Nazi term

LTI. *The Language of the Third Reich: Notes of a Philologist* was published by Victor Klemperer in 2001 (4th edition).⁴ As a rabbi's son, Klemperer suffered the consequences of racial laws forcing him to leave the position of Chair of French literature at the University of Dresden. Unlike other Jewish intellectuals and relatives, he decided to stay in Germany, where he was subjugated to the harsh restrictions imposed on the Semitic population. He managed to save himself from deportation because he was married to an Aryan woman who did not abandon him. As a result, he had the opportunity to collect abundant material for one of the most important essays on language manipulation in the Third Reich. His work appeared in 1975 and four more editions have been published since then. According to Klemperer, the precise sources of political discourse and the manipulation of the German language were found in *Mein Kampf* (1939). Once the NSDAP (National Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei) reached power, the language of a political party became the language of the entire German society, taking over both the public and private spheres: politics, jurisprudence, economics, art, science, school, sport, family, indeed every social spot susceptible of being manipulated.

The language of Nazism was characterised by its eagerness to move, to take action, hence their use of a number of terms such as *Sturm* (assault), *Sturmabteilungen* (assault sections), *Volkssturm* (people's assault) or *Reitersturm* (cavalry assault). The newspaper which focused on the agitation against the Jews was called *Der Stürmer*. This desire to take action generated new verbs. The use of the prefix of deprivation "ent-" was increased, as evident in *entjuden*, referring to the intention of disposing of the Jews; in *Arisieren*, which means to try to provoke the ruin of merchants as their possessions were passed into Aryan hands; and in *Aufnorden*, which alludes to the reinstatement of the purity of the ancestors' blood. Numerous terms were newly created, others were adopted from certain expressions employed in the specialised language of the Community [*Gemeinschaftssprache*], that is, the language used by a few individuals who provided the Community with a valid linguistic model for everybody (Klemperer, 2001, p. 45).

The language of the Third Reich had been built up from toxic elements carrying harmful substances. As a result, words acted like small doses of arsenic. Initially, the poison does not have an immediate effect, but after a while, the devastating toxic effect begins. In this respect, one of the most pernicious terms of Nazism but with a positive connotation in its creation was *Volk*, which originated from the Latin word *populus* (people). The Nazified version was translated into *Volksgemeinschaft* or “people’s Community”, alluding to the racial and national Community (*völkisch*);⁵ in order to be a citizen of “the community”, (i) one must be born in Germany, (ii) belong to the German race, and (iii) be physically healthy (Hitler, 1939, pp. 438–439).

With regard to points (i) and (ii), Hitler (2009, p. 315) argued in chapter three of *Mein Kampf* (“Citizens and Subjects of the State”) that:

Citizens are all those who possess full civic rights, either by reason of their birth or by an act of naturalisation. Aliens are those who enjoy the same rights in some other State. They are people who have no citizenship in any State and consequently no civil rights anywhere. In most cases nowadays a person acquires civic rights by being born within the frontiers of a State. The race or nationality to which he may belong plays no role whatsoever. The child of a Negro who once lived in one of the German protectorates and now takes up his residence in Germany automatically becomes a ‘German citizen’ in the eyes of the world. In the same way the child of any Jew, Pole, African or Asian may automatically be declared a German citizen.

The antithesis to these theses was stated in the Nürnberg Laws, whereby the Jewish population witnessed the cutback of their social, labour and legal rights. *Volksgemeinschaft* considered people as a whole, with no differences other than those involved in the division of classes. National Socialism lured people into building their power and their leaders.⁶ The members of the party presented themselves as saviours of the lower social classes. They tried to obtain voters’ confidence regardless of the consequences, welfare or progress. The National Socialist political discourse introduced convincing proposals that were designed to be appealing to the German people. However, its manipulative and demagogic component was undeniable. Their hidden interests led to the destruction of defenceless majorities and minorities as well as those who did not belong to the *Volksgemeinschaft* because of their race, sexual orientation, or congenital and hereditary diseases. The political discourse of National Socialism, which always included instances of protest against the “subhuman” or “inferior beings” [*Untermenschen*],⁷ originated from a small extremist movement of the right (petty bourgeoisie) opposed to the democratic parliamentary system of the Republic of Weimar. Its communicative style is characterised by a massive personalisation and emotionalisation of politics, the use of enemy stereotypes in extremely dichotomous and simplified worldviews, and a vertical segregation of “below” [*Untermenschen*] and “above” (the upper middle class, the elites – *die Elite*)⁸ (D’Onofrio, 2012; Geiger, 1930, p. 640).

Regarding (iii), i.e. “being physically healthy”, in chapter three of *Mein Kampf*, we can read:

Not only is no question asked regarding the race to which the new citizen belongs; even the matter of his physical health is not inquired into. His flesh may be corrupted with syphilis; but he will still be welcome in the State as it exists today so long as he may not become a financial burden or a political danger

(Hitler, 2009, p. 316)

This statement referred to temporary illnesses. However, the details of the “financial burden” and the “political danger” were perfectly put into force. The high social cost of maintaining patients with congenital or hereditary diseases led to the drafting of eugenic laws. The political danger was based on the postulates about race and the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Any element that could corrupt the system had to be eliminated. As Müller-Hill (2016, p. 41) points out, the National Socialist ideology argued that inequality among human beings had a biological basis, that is, everything resided in the blood, in the genes.⁹

Jews, gypsies, outcasts or strangers to the Community, and the insane, among others, labelled as *Untermenschen* in the political discourse, were classified as “inferior people”, “second-class citizens” and “disabled persons lacking in any vital values” (Muñoz, 2001, p. 153). Whilst they did belong to the people’s Community, they were claimed to harm racial stability and cause the decline of culture; it was thus necessary to segregate,¹⁰ sterilise and eliminate them. In that line of action, the murder of hundreds of thousands of human beings took place as the consequence of a certain political discourse whose purpose was precisely the annihilation of the *Untermenschen* to avoid a mixture that could corrupt the Community’s health. It included the infection of society with the political idea of the search for a pure Aryan German race (*deutschblütig*). It was a political discourse that harangued the purity of race, the idolatry of blood and physical aesthetics. It became a destructive discourse within the National Socialist thesis that advanced and permeated the German population. As a result, the political regime achieved the desired political success, strengthened its power and began to reveal with crystal clear precision its true purposes in its aspiration to create a pure Aryan German race. An unstoppable legislative machinery was set in motion, giving rise to two excessively disturbing laws with a political discourse based on biological superiority.

The ideology of the community as the official doctrine of the Nazi State: ad hoc legal instruments and a license for barbarism

German blood purity constitutes the first condition to remain part of the people’s Community. The duty to secure the future of the German nation is reflected in the enactment of very rigid racial policies. See below:

- (i) The Law on Prevention of Hereditary Pathological Descendancy (*Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses-GzVeN*, July 14, 1933) legalised the sterilisation of people with alleged hereditary diseases, in addition to allowing the application of that law forcibly (Rickmann, 2002, p. 89). Operation T4 included Down syndromes [*Idiotie wie Mongolismus*] or absences of any limbs [*Fehlen von Gliedmaßen*] (Hermann and Braun, 2010, p. 3).¹¹ This law was based on the logic of Social Darwinism, which aimed at the genetic improvement of a particular society. The Nazis used Social Darwinism as an excuse for eugenics and the euthanasia programmes, as it supported the idea of differences between human beings in terms of superior or substandard genes. This statement is reflected in Herman Lundberg (1921, p. 11, cited in Kellerhof, 2016, p. 73), who stated that “history teaches us that many people with a brilliant cultural development in the past, for instance the Persians, the Greeks or the Romans degenerated and collapsed and, in so doing, gave up their home to people of a worse nature”. In this sense, Hitler (1939, p. 313) expressed his thoughts as follows:

Human history also offers innumerable examples in this order, as it shows with amazing clarity that every mixture of Aryan blood with that of substandard people resulted in the ruin of the superior culture race.

- (ii) The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour (*Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre*, September 15, 1935), prohibiting marriages between Jews and German-blood citizens, in addition to extramarital sexual relations between Jews and German-blood citizens.
- (iii) The Law on the Treatment of “strangers to the community”¹² (*Gesetz über die Behandlung Gemeinschaftsfremder*) had 14 different versions in its bill form. The latest version dates from March 17, 1944. The increasing concern about marginalisation and criminality was legally reflected in coercive and criminal measures. These measures affected the most economically weak sectors of society and, therefore, the ones susceptible to committing crimes. All these measures were based scientifically on theories about “born offenders”, “disabled persons lacking any vital values”, “inferior races” and “second-class citizens” (Muñoz, 2001, p. 153). This population sector was socially burdensome, incorrigible and unrecoverable for a normal social life. They were considered asocial and inveterate offenders, victims of congenital defects or hereditary illnesses who had to be suppressed by means of radical hygienic-social measures based on castration and sterilisation, or physical elimination as carriers of defective genes (Muñoz, 2001, p. 152). Sterilisation served as a means of social hygiene to avoid undesirable descendants (Guerra-García, Ávila-Morales and Acuña-Barrantes, 2015; Proctor, 1990; Bock, 1986). The people’s Community placed a great emphasis on the unwanted inheritance of “madness, vices and danger” (Esteban, 1999, p. 20). With such harmful subject-carriers, it was felt necessary to ensure the order and the safety of the wealthier social classes and the upper bourgeoisie, who remained indifferent to the fate of these social groups. Thus, they were deprived of

all their rights as members of the Community [*Volkgenosse*],¹³ of their right to freedom (and were liable to internment in concentration camps), and, ultimately, of their right to life (through mass executions in gas chambers) (Holgado-Sáez, 2014; Rütter, 2001; Schwartz, 1998; Von Kranach, 2003; Vyszynski, 2000).

Conclusions

The historical perspective – with reference to Nazi Germany and populism as a related strategy to their effective propaganda instrument – has provided much more than a descriptive analysis. Whatever happened during the Nazi years mirrors to a certain extent the current rise of populism in much of Europe, North America (excluding Canada) and part of South America. Nevertheless, the violent atmosphere of the Nazi period has not been reproduced to the same degree in today's society. Aestheticisation was a very powerful instrument for the Nazi propaganda praxis which reached its peak during the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games as a large number of the medals were won by the athletes who were considered Aryan by the Nazis, i.e. Germans, Finns, Swedes and Danes. This was utilised as an alibi in support of the idea of people's Community.

The principles of Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister (Doob, 1950, pp. 419–442; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2012, pp. 32–48) concerning Nazi propaganda are reflected in the propaganda programme of current democratic political parties. These principles are applied in many countries with the intention of captivating and manipulating people's minds, for instance, (i) the principle of simplification and the single enemy by adopting a unique idea: the opponent is transformed into a single enemy (Jews, gypsies, Marxists, right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists); (ii) the principle of the method of contagion, by which some opponents are individualised and gathered into a single enemy (non-patriotic population); (iii) the principle of transposition, i.e. if bad news cannot be denied, other news that can serve as a distraction has to be made up; (iv) the principle of vulgarisation, which sets forth the idea that all propaganda must be popular, with its level adapted to the least intelligent of the individuals to whom it is directed; and (v) the principle of orchestration, by which propaganda should be limited to a small number of ideas and be repeated tirelessly; they have to be presented from different perspectives but with a focus on the same idea. Some of today's politicians (Hugo Chávez, Nicolás Maduro, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, Pablo Iglesias) act from a short-term propaganda perspective to reach their political goals. Currently, political campaigns are short; for this reason, political discourse increasingly appeals to feelings and easy messages. These politicians describe their political opponent as the enemy, just as Goebbels did in his tremendous populist principles. As in the Nazi rhetoric, the concept of identity personifies “difference and exclusion” (Bock and Negrine, 2017, p. 182); identity gains meaning by opposing its connection with “the Other”, i.e. the leader constructs the idea of the people, a collective identity. Regarding the

control of the diverse tools of political communication to disseminate delirious messages, Goebbels effectively took advantage of huge audiences and unashamed speeches, television and press management, accompanied by a belligerent and forthright advertising policy. Concerning the explicit style of rhetoric employed by the populists, the speech implicates a demagogical and rough discourse to connect with the discontented population, i.e. their public.

Notes

- 1 Bernays's book (1927) represents a real mine of information for the Nazi political-propaganda praxis. Note the clarity of his view: "The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of." (Chapter I, Organizing Chaos, p. 9).
- 2 Romanticism emphasises national and folkloric aspects such as mythology, the cult of the Middle Ages, etc.
- 3 Surface aestheticisation refers to (i) aesthetic furnishing of reality, (ii) hedonism as a cultural matrix, and (iii) aestheticisation as an economic strategy. Deep-seated aestheticisation implies (i) changes in the production process – new materials technologies, (ii) reality as constructed through media, (iii) the styling of subject and ways of life – on the way towards the Homo Aestheticus, i.e. the formation of a new role-model, and (iv) aestheticisation as a general trend – in varying forms.
- 4 LTI stands for *Lingua Tertii Imperii*.
- 5 Ingrao (2007, p. 278) defines the term as "that blood community that SD (Sicherheitsdienst) intellectuals wanted to organize as the foundation of the millennial Reich".
- 6 Abel (1965, pp. 150–152) argued that no movement can succeed unless: its adherents are motivated by a persistent, prevalent, and wide-spread discontent with a state of affairs; it sets forth a goal that is novel in its aspirations but based on deeply-rooted sentiments as well; and it has a charismatic leader with an efficiently organised group of devoted followers.
- 7 We agree with Ingrao (2017, p. 280) that the theorisation and elimination of millions of "inferior" race individuals was supported by a shared conviction among members of the generation that grew up in the defeated Germany of World War I and oppressed by the Treaty of Versailles. The beliefs of this generation, modelled after personal experiences of resentment, sought to destroy everything that could threaten their nation.
- 8 Public servants' support went rather unnoticed. However, it is true that their support was given gradually to the Nazi party due to their distrust of the government's deflationist policy and of its belief in the ennoblement of the myth of the authoritarian public service during the imperial period (Burrin, 2012, p. 95). Factors such as job security, a high level of education and social prestige encouraged the higher classes' increasing support.
- 9 According to Lundberg (1921, p. 11, cited in Kellerhoff, 2016, p. 73) and to the original eugenic theories of Günther (1939), who is known to have been an inspiration to Hitler's ideas, "The fundamental principle is to prevent as much as possible that the weak or unfortunate wretches have the possibility of reproducing. Such a decisive task should fall on the best men and women in the country".
- 10 The policy of segregation resulted in the overcrowding of the Jewish population in ghettos in the unhealthiest living conditions. The unpleasant caricature of Jewish existence was exploited for propaganda purposes in the disgusting movie *Der ewige*

- Jude* (1940), where a political discourse of the Nazi elite that claimed that “a relief of that weight and a solution” is evidently exploited (Kershaw, 2013, p. 155).
- 11 Viktor Brack, an officer of the Führer’s Chancellery, was responsible for the “Euthanasia Operation”. More than 70,000 mentally ill people and other people with diverse pathologies were eliminated in Germany between 1939 and 1941. Brack proposed the sterilisation of 3,000 to 4,000 Jews every day (Kershaw, 2013, p. 155; Holgado-Sáez, 2014).
 - 12 *Gemeinschaftsfremde* (strangers to the community) comprised different groups of people – generally socially marginalised individuals, beggars, outcasts, thieves, fraudsters, overtly unsuccessful citizens or sex offenders (homosexuals included) – whose behaviour deviated from the values and principles that guided the “people’s Community”; for more information on Paragraph 175 of the German Penal Code and its specifications, see Eschebach (2016), Grau, (1995, 2004), Holgado-Sáez (2018), Rector (1981), Zinn (2016), Zur Nieden (2016). These groups belonged to the Aryan race, but they could not be made part of the concept of the true member of the German community, due to either some defect or to some hereditary anomaly that turned them into “people of lesser value” (Hirsch, Majer and Meinck, 1984, p. 488; Muñoz, 2002, pp. 4–5).
 - 13 For additional information on deprivation of rights, see Aly and Roth (2000).

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14

DONALD TRUMP IS A CONQUEROR

How the cognitive analysis of Trump's discourse reveals his worldview

Heather McCallum-Bayliss

Introduction

Political leaders are entrusted with the power to shape and make decisions about citizens' lives. Knowing what principles, beliefs and worldview motivate a political actor's decisions and behavior may give us insight into how the candidate will govern. Research shows, however, that citizens generally lack sufficient civic knowledge to make informed decisions about politicians (Zaller, 1992, p. 18). Voters' instincts are also not reliable. Shenkman (2016, p. 39) notes that "[o]ur natural gifts of reading people are largely neutralized when we are reading politicians.... We know them only at a distance".

The chapter attempts to increase civic understanding by proposing a method for identifying the worldview of a political actor. A worldview "is a set of assumptions about physical and social reality that may have powerful effects on cognition and behavior" (Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 3). The approach is based on principles of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (henceforth, CMT) and demonstrates that the analysis of a political actor's language choices provides access to cognitive structures that are the components of the speaker's worldview (Bougher, 2012, 2014; Chilton, 2004; Chilton and Schaffner, 2002; Van Dijk, 2008). The cognitive structures that emerge from the data analysis are the subdomains of an overarching complex cognitive structure (Kövecses, 2010; Morgan, 2008; Musolff, 2006) that is a social role.

The political discourse of US president Donald J. Trump forms the basis of the analysis. It establishes that three core concepts occur in his discourse, which result in the Conceptual Metaphors (CMs):

THE NATION IS A RUIN
THE PEOPLE ARE PAWNS
THE LEADER IS A POTENTATE

The CMs form the subdomains of an overarching conceptual space that corresponds to the social role of a Conqueror. Trump's role is that of a Conqueror.

Trump has also been labeled a populist. Is he a populist? Does his Conqueror role give us insight into his posture as a populist politician? Populism scholars and political scientists have produced various definitions and analytic approaches to populism (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2014; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Simply put, though, populism is a political philosophy that involves “a critique of the establishment and an adulation of the common people” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 5). Although Trump's rhetorical style seems to mimic that of many populists (Block and Negrine, 2017), I suggest that he is not motivated by populist principles. Instead, he uses populist tactics to exploit his supporters and consolidate personal power. After establishing Trump's worldview as a Conqueror, I discuss the impact of his worldview on his populist image.

Theoretical framework

Metaphorical language

Over the last several decades, research in CMT has established that human beings view and organize the world around them in terms of metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) seminal work, *Metaphors We Live By*, proposed that metaphorical language is the centerpiece of the human conceptual system. These authors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1993) argued that metaphors are cognitive structures that allow us to understand abstract concepts in terms of concrete concepts grounded in our physical, cultural and social experiences. The cognitive process of linking a concrete experience to an abstract concept produces the cognitive structure known as a Conceptual Metaphor (CM). LIFE IS A JOURNEY is one such CM. The abstract concept Life is characterized in terms of the concept Journey, which has a set of conceptual entailments: Traveler, Vehicle, Path, Obstacles, Destination. There are various types of CMs. Structural metaphors allow us to shape one concept in terms of another concept (TIME IS MONEY). Orientational metaphors reflect our physical and cultural spatial experiences (Up/Down; Front/Back; In/Out). Many concepts are oriented in a standard way (MORE IS UP/LESS IS DOWN). Ontological metaphors allow us to conceive of experiences in terms of objects, substances and containers, providing ways of circumscribing events, emotions and activities (IDEAS ARE OBJECTS) (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 7–32; Kövecses, 2010, pp. 37–40)

We know that CMs exist because we find manifestations of them in the language we use: “He's on the wrong path”, “Life can be a bumpy road,” “I'm not sure I'm ever going to reach my destination”. These metaphorical utterances – Linguistic Metaphors (henceforth, LMs) – trigger the recognition of the CM LIFE IS A JOURNEY and serve as evidence of its existence. So, the CM reveals how we conceive of the abstract concept. The LMs show how we talk about it (Kövecses, 2002, p. 6)¹.

Further advancements in metaphor research have demonstrated that CMs go beyond isolated mappings of abstract and concrete concepts to form networks of related concepts. Research into hierarchical cascades (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2014; David *et al.*, 2016), abstract complex concepts (Kövecses, 2010) and scenario-based source relations (Kövecses, 2005; Musolff, 2006; Semino, 2008) show that networks of conceptual relations are fundamental to cognitive systems.

Two types of cognitive networks are of interest here. One type recognizes that cognitive subdomains provide conceptual coherence to complex cognitive structures (Musolff, 2006). I propose that social roles qualify as complex cognitive structures that have cognitive subdomains. For example, the social role of the Conqueror has the following socially recognized dimensions: one who takes territory, subjugates the populace and seizes power². These dimensions correspond to three abstract concepts – Nation, People and Leader. Analysis of a speaker's discourse triggers CMs that reveal the speaker's cognitive positioning on each conceptual subdomain. Together, these subdomain CMs define the superordinate, complex conceptual space (Kövecses, 2010; Morgan, 2008; Musolff, 2006) of the Conqueror role, and frame the speaker's belief system and worldview. I will show that subdomain CMs emerge from the data and provide a coherent characterization of Trump's worldview as that of TRUMP IS A CONQUEROR.

Another cognitive network recognizes the systematic contribution that CMs make to the conceptualization of abstract complex concepts (e.g., Government, Society, Career). Although it may appear that the CMs below are independent ways of characterizing the concept Society, the CMs are systematically related to one another. They represent standard features of complex systems – structure, condition, growth and function. Structure refers to the solidity, stability and permanence of the system; condition refers to its current state and health; growth refers to its appropriate development; and function refers to its operation and purpose. Taken together, they conceptualize a full system (Kövecses, 2010, pp. 155–162).

SOCIETY IS A STRUCTURE (structure/stability)

- (1) [...] they were simple mechanical products of a tribal model of society [BNC Corpus].

SOCIETY IS A PERSON (condition)

- (2) Politicians are being blamed for the ills of society [*Collins Cobuild Metaphor Dictionary*; Kövecses, 2010, p. 157].

SOCIETY IS A GARDEN (growth)

- (3) They are fighting deep-rooted social and cultural traditions [*Collins Cobuild Metaphor Dictionary*; Kövecses, 2010, p. 128].

SOCIETY IS A MACHINE (function)

- (4) The machinery of democracy could be created quickly but its spirit was just as important [*Collins Cobuild Metaphor Dictionary*; Kövecses, 2010, p. 159].

One would expect, therefore, that CMs that represent the features of complex systems would emerge from the analysis of abstract complex concepts. Below, I show that Nation is an abstract complex concept that is defined by systematically related CMs that reflect the features of a complex system.

Metaphor and discourse

Conceptual Metaphor research continues to advance the theoretical understanding and definition of CMs (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2014; Kövecses, 2010, 2015). Some would say, however, that research on CMs has been at the expense of the study of LMs in real-world data, calling into question the authenticity of evidence that is said to support CMs (Ahrens, 2006; Breeze, 2011; Semino, 2008, p. 10). In the last decade, however, discourse analysts interested in metaphor have moved beyond isolated LMs as evidence of a CM and analyzed metaphors that occur in real-world discourse (e.g. Charteris-Black, 2011; Chilton, 2004; Semino, 2008; Tenbrink, 2015).

Metaphor analysis is important for understanding political discourse. Political actors establish power by promoting policies and beliefs and imposing them on others (Bougher, 2012; Charteris-Black, 2011; Chilton, 2004; Cienki, 2005; Fairclough, 1985; Hart, 2015; Lakoff, 2004, 2008; Mio, 1997; Musolff, 2006; Semino, 2008). CMs frame how the speaker understands and constructs reality (Koller, 2003), revealing his/her character and behavior (Black, 1962; Kövecses, 2002). CMs also shape how the audience understands and reasons about that reality (Thibodeau and Boroditsky, 2011). The analysis presented here demonstrates that metaphorical language in discourse (LMs) triggers access to cognitive structures (CMs) that form the basis of the speaker's belief system (e.g. Chilton, 2004; Corner, 2000; Van Dijk, 2008).

Cognitive analysis of Trump's political discourse

Method

The methodology for identifying a speaker's worldview began with the selection of texts produced by the speaker. They represent a range of topics, dates, times, venues and media to ensure that the language is not conditioned by a single context (Underhill, 2011). To identify relevant texts, a text analyzer (Mike Scott's WordSmith Tools v7.0) was used to produce frequency lists and concordance lines of the lexical items in the full corpus and by text. These distributions helped to ensure balance in the distribution of concepts across texts. Each text was broken into sentences (or other meaningful units, e.g., phrases) in order to identify LMs. LMs were manually tagged using the process established by the Pragglejaz Group (2007). The meaning of each lexical or phrasal unit is established; concreteness, bodily action, semantic precision are noted; and a more basic meaning is identified, which contrasts with the contextual meaning but can be understood

when compared with the basic meaning. If these steps are satisfied, the lexical unit is considered metaphorical.

LMs were then sorted by Target concepts (e.g., Nation, Leader). The LM Target concepts included semantically related and anaphorically linked items in the discourse. CMs were generated for each concept, e.g., *THE NATION IS A RUIN*. An attempt was made to identify social roles that were defined by the Target concepts in the data. For example, Conqueror has three core concepts, Nation, People and Leader. Taken together, the CMs defined the cognitive framework of the speaker's role and worldview.

Corpus

The corpus, amounting to 282,926 words, was written and oral language produced by Donald Trump in speeches, social media, interviews and debates largely from 2015 into 2017. This period represents different dimensions of Trump's political life from his launch as a Presidential candidate through the Presidential campaign and into the early part of his Presidency. The data sources are listed in Table 14.1 below. They are publicly available; online links are provided.

LMs presented in this chapter are not an exhaustive set. They are meant to be metaphorical uses that trigger the CM. They are presented with enough context to aid in the interpretation of the LM. The data source is in square brackets at the end of each LM example. The initial element refers to the date of the communication followed by a code for the source. A fuller description of the source is provided in the list. An exception to this convention is Twitter references. They are labeled TW followed by the date and time of the Tweet.

Results

The cognitive analysis of Trump's discourse identified LMs that trigger CMs that represent his conception of reality. Three abstract concepts – Nation, People and Leader – are central to his discourse. CMs representing each of these concepts emerge from the LMs in his discourse. I discuss below how each of the CMs emerges from the data and how together they contribute to an overarching CM that defines a social role.

THE NATION IS A RUIN

A central notion in Trump's belief system is the concept of the Nation. The analysis shows that Trump depicts the Nation as a Ruin that only he can rebuild.

The standard Target concept used for a country in metaphor analysis is Nation (Chilton, 2004; Hart, 2015; Lakoff, 1996; Mio, 1997; Musolff, 2016). I intend to advance the understanding of the Nation concept, however, by proposing that Nation is an abstract complex concept that requires analysis as a complex system. As explained above, an abstract complex concept is a multidimensional concept

TABLE 14.1 Data sources

<i>Data Code</i>	<i>Expanded Reference</i>	<i># Words</i>
122316 MSNBC	Comment on MSNBC Morning Joe on 12/23/16 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-distressing-chest-thumping-on-nuclear-weapons/2016/12/23/6a528540-c88b-11e6-bf4b-2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.de92a01a6688	141
012316 IA	Comment at campaign rally in Iowa on 01/23/16 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/01/23/donald-trump-i-could-shoot-somebody-and-still-have-support/?utm_term=.b228849d635c	121
030416 D11	Republican Presidential Primary Debate #11 on 03/04/16 https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/10/politics/repulican-debate-transcript-full-text/index.html	18356
032116 AIPAC	Speech to American Israeli Public Affairs Committee on 03/21/16 http://time.com/4267058/donald-trump-aipac-speech-transcript/	2421
061615 LS	Campaign launch speech on 06/16/15 http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/	5247
072116 RNC	Republican National Convention nomination acceptance speech on 07/21/16 https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974	3769
081616 Law	Speech on law and order on 08/16/16 https://heav.com/news/2016/08/read-full-transcript-donald-trump-transcript-law-and-order-speech-west-bend-wisconsin/	3594
083116 IP	Speech on immigration plan 08/31/16 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcript-trump-immigration-speech.html	6940
092616 D1	Clinton-Trump Debate #1 on 09/26/16 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/26/the-first-trump-clinton-presidential-debate-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.ecd2aad0ac80	14350
100916 D2	Clinton-Trump Debate #2 on 10/09/16 https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/2016-presidential-debate-transcript-229519	13745

011117	newsconf	News Conference on 01/11/17 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-transcript.html	10030
011517	Post	<i>Washington Post</i> interview on 01/15/17 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-vows-insurance-for-everybody-in-obamacare-replacement-plan/2017/01/15/5f2b1e18-db5d-11e6-ad42-f3375f271c9c_story.html?utm_term=.9848c6db32e5	10196
012017	Inaug	Inaugural Address on 01/20/17 https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/full-text-donald-trump-inauguration-speech-transcript-233907	1301
020117	af-amer hist remarks	Remarks at African-American History Month listening session 02/01/17 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/02/01/trumps-black-history-month-listening-session-was-more-of-a-media-complaining-session/?utm_term=.580e48f5d76f	2260
021817	RFL	Rally in Florida on 02/18/17 https://www.vox.com/2017/2/18/14659952/trump-transcript-rally-melbourne-florida	9295
071817	NBC	Comments to NBC News, White House 07/18/17 http://www.msnbc.com/transcripts/mtp-daily/2017-07-18	9199
071917	NYT	<i>New York Times</i> interview on 07/19/17 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/23/us/politics/trump-new-york-times-interview-transcript.html	7630
080217	WV	Campaign rally in West Virginia on 08/03/17 https://www.c-span.org/video/?431931-1/president-trump-holds-rally-west-virginia&live	3887
TW	date time	Tweets from @realDonaldTrump Twitter account plus date and time of Tweet (01/01/15-12/31/17) https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump	160,444
TOTAL		Tokens	282,926

that is conceived of from multiple perspectives. These perspectives are systematically related. So, although it may appear that Nation is conceptualized in four different ways by four independent CMs, each CM represents a different vantage point on the same abstract complex concept. Each contributes to the overall understanding of the larger concept Nation, resulting in THE NATION IS A RUIN.

Structure: *THE NATION IS A STRUCTURE*

Trump conceives of the abstract complex concept Nation as a Structure. His LMs reveal a structure in a broken, ruined state (*unsalvageable; broken system*). It must be rebuilt (*build; rebuild*). He views himself as the architect of the new construct (*need somebody...will make it ... again*). The Nation is in ruins, as the examples below illustrate.

- (5) That's when we become a country that's unsalvageable... [061615 LS].
- (6) Republican party ... choose a nominee from outside our failed and corrupt and broken system [081616 Law].
- (7) [...] we have to build up the wealth of our nation [100916 D2].
- (8) It is time to take care of OUR people, to rebuild OUR NATION... [TW Sep 27, 2017 08:55:05 pm].
- (9) We need somebody [Trump]... that will ... make it [this country] great again. [061615 LS].

Condition: *THE NATION IS A HUMAN BEING*

When Trump discusses the condition of the Nation, he attributes negative human qualities to it (*dying; weaker; must...strengthen*). Even the future is bleak. He longs for a vague past state when the Nation was deemed healthy – *thriving again*. The Nation is a Human Being nearing its end.

- (10) [...] we're dying. We're dying. We need money. We have to do it [061615 LS].
- (11) We as a country are getting weaker [061615 LS].
- (12) The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability.... [TW Dec 22, 2016 12:50:30 PM].
- (13) We are going to be thriving again [100916 D2].

Growth: *THE NATION IS A GARDEN*

Trump views the Nation as a dying and rotting Garden (*no growth; swamp; mired in; dumping ground; mess we're in*).

- (14) We have no growth in this country. There's no growth [100916 D2].

- (15) Get mired in and we can't do anything about it [021817 RFL].
- (16) Drain the Swamp should be changed to Drain the Sewer...! [TW Jul 24, 2017 05:40:28 AM].
- (17) The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else's problems [061615 LS].
- (18) Because look at the mess that we're in. Look at the mess that we're in [092616 D1].

Function: *THE NATION IS A COMPETITOR*

Trump believes that the fundamental function of a Nation is to be a Competitor. To Trump, a Nation functions correctly when its outcomes produce dominance and control, especially on the world stage. Currently, the Nation does not function properly (*don't have victories; we're losing; we lose*). The Nation's only goal should be to win (*outmatch them; America first; win, win, win*). To Trump, the Nation is non-functional.

- (19) We don't have victories anymore [061615 LS].
- (20) That's why we're losing – we're losing – we lose on everything... [092616 D1].
- (21) [arms race]... We will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all [122316 MSNBC].
- (22) From this day forward, it's going to be only America first, America first [012017 Inaug].
- (23) [...] most importantly, we will continue to win, win, win [021817 RFL].

Trump's conceptualization of the abstract complex concept Nation brings together CMs that represent a dilapidated (structure), moribund (condition), stunted (growth) and purposeless (function) system. The integration of these perspectives results in the CM, *THE NATION IS A RUIN* – the remains of a building that has been destroyed³.

THE PEOPLE ARE PAWNS

Trump views the people of the Nation as Pawns. A pawn is the piece in a chess game that has the least value, the most limitations on movement and the fewest resources to directionally advance⁴. It is often sacrificed for a larger advantage.

Trump uses emotion rather than rational argument (McAdams, 2017) to influence the People. His pessimism and claims of economic stagnation and deprivation engage people who feel cut off from American opportunity and have little hope. His negativity causes anxiety, fear and anger. He taps into people's frustrations (*they're ... ripped off*), sense of loss (*take our country back*) and cultural and racial prejudices (*get the right people*). He takes advantage of their feelings

of isolation (*I am your voice*). He exploits their fears by promising to solve their problems (*I am the only one*). Trump will rescue them.

- (24) And they're [the people] tired of being ripped off by everybody in the world [061615 LS].
- (25) We're going to take our country back [083116 IP].
- (26) We will get the right people. An ideological certification ... that those we are admitting to our country share our values and love our people [083116 IP].
- (27) [...] to all Americans, I see you & I hear you. I am your voice [TW Oct 27, 2016 03:27:44 PM].
- (28) [...] I am the only one who will #MAKEAMERICAGREATAGAIN! [TW Feb 19, 2016 03:30:24 PM].

Trump panders to these supporters. He accuses unnamed others (*they*) of cheating them out of what he has promised them (*they...not bring us; cheat you...of future*).

- (29) They [politicians] will not bring us...to the promised land [061615 LS].
- (30) [...] they're trying to cheat you out of the future and the future that you want [080317 WV].

However, it is not the People's needs that drive him. He exploits them for self-aggrandizement. He boasts about crowd sizes (*crowd...broke ... records; massive crowd*), revels in being the leader of a self-defined movement (*it's a movement*), brags about his supporters' devotion to and passion for him (*shoot somebody...not lose votes; never beat the passion*). All this not because he respects his supporters but because he needs to feel adored by them and to have power over them.

- (31) The crowd in Ohio was amazing last night - broke all records [TW Jul 26, 2017 05:49:28 AM].
- (32) Last night in Orlando, Florida, was incredible - massive crowd [TW Dec 17, 2016 08:05:02 AM].
- (33) It's a movement like the world has never seen before. It's a movement that a lot of people didn't expect [011117 newsconf].
- (34) I could ... shoot somebody and I wouldn't lose voters [012316 IA].
- (35) Hillary and the Dems were never going to beat the PASSION of my voters [TW Jan 6, 2017 06:39:35 AM].

Trump splinters the populace, using hate speech to arouse believers and delegitimize non-believers. His repeated insults and defamatory remarks demean his opponents and detractors. Name-calling and personal slurs feed his need to lord over others (*Little Marco; Lying Ted; head down Chuck Schumer; Crooked Hillary's corruption; people ... are stupid ... controlled?*). Trump protests if his

efforts to quash his detractors are met with resistance (... *trying to stop me; last shot at me*).

- (36) You defrauded the people of Florida, Little Marco [Rubio] [030416 D11].
- (37) You're [Cruz] the liar. You're the lying guy up here.... Excuse me. Excuse me. I've given my answer, Lyin' Ted.... [030416 D11].
- (38) The Democrats, lead [sic] by head clown Chuck Schumer, know how bad ObamaCare is.... [TW Jan 5, 2017 7:57:57 AM].
- (39) After decades of lies and scandal, Crooked Hillary's corruption is closing in. #DrainTheSwamp! [TW Nov 2, 2016 3:09:28 PM].
- (40) [...] we have people that are stupid....controlled by special interests [061615 LS].
- (41) I'm not part of the corrupt system. In fact, the corrupt system is trying to stop me.... 081616 Law].
- (42) Intelligence agencies should never have allowed this fake news to "leak" into the public. One last shot at me.... [011117 newsconf].

Trump conceives of the People as game pieces that he can manipulate: THE PEOPLE ARE PAWNS. He courts his supporters because they provide him with adulation and a sense of power. He attacks detractors; they are betrayers. He sows the seeds of social divisiveness to maintain his control and status.

THE LEADER IS A POTENTATE

Trump conceives of the Leader as a Potentate. A Potentate is an autocratic ruler with unlimited power, unconstrained by laws. He demands allegiance and demeans others who hold him accountable. He creates his own truth to justify his actions⁵.

Trump declares his absolute power (*has complete power; FBI reports directly ... to the president [a falsehood]; ready to use the power of the presidency*). His disdain for others' authority is clear (*so-called judge*).

- (43) While all agree the U. S. President has the complete power to pardon.... [TW Jul 22, 2017 06:35:34 AM].
- (44) [...] the F.B.I. started reporting to the Department of Justice. ...But the F.B.I. person really reports directly to the president of the United States.... [071917 NYT].
- (45) Trump warned ... that if the party splinters or slows his agenda, he is ready to use the power of the presidency [011517 Post].
- (46) The opinion of this so-called judge ... is ridiculous and will be overturned! [TW Feb 4, 2017 08:12:02 AM].

He inflates his capabilities to demonstrate his power (*I alone; I am the only one; great leader*). He believes that he is superior to all others (*I took the risk*) and is solely responsible for positive outcomes (*because of me*).

- (47) Nobody knows the system better than me, which is why I alone can fix it [country]. [072116 RNC].
- (48) [...] our country needs a truly great leader, and we need a truly great leader now. We need a leader that wrote “The Art of the Deal” [061615 LS].
- (49) It was a very dangerous time for Israel and frankly for anyone supporting Israel...I took the risk [032116 AIPAC].
- (50) ...@NBCNews [said] ... jobs are coming back... to the U.S., but had nothing to do with TRUMP, is more FAKE NEWS.... Came back because of me! [TW Jan 18, 2017 8:34:09 AM].

Trump demands allegiance from others so that he has free rein to exercise his power: *loyalty is very important; Most Republicans ... loyal; [Congress should] protect their President.*

- (51) Loyalty is very important [TW Oct 12, 2012 03:09:06 PM].
- (52) [...] most Republicans were loyal... [TW Jul 18, 2017 06:53:05 AM].
- (53) It's very sad that Republicans ... do very little to protect their President [TW Jul 23, 2017 03:14:32 PM].

He disparages institutions that serve as a check on his power. The mainstream media are the arch-enemy (*opposition party; part of the corrupt system*). He must control his message in order to maintain his power and image (*without the filter of the fake news*).

- (54) A lot of the media is actually the opposition party.... [020117 af-amer hist remarks].
- (55) They [media] are part of the corrupt system [021817 RFL].
- (56) I also want to speak to you [through Twitter] without the filter of the fake news [021817 RFL].

Trump will not acknowledge failure or weakness, even in the face of counter-evidence. He failed to win the popular vote but declared a win by falsely claiming millions of illegal votes (*I won the popular vote ... people voted illegally*). He failed to pass a bill replacing the healthcare system but blamed the minority party for the failure (*I'm not going to own it...*). Trump blamed biased polling for low approval ratings (*approval rating polls ... are rigged*).

- (57) [...] I won the popular vote if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally [TW Nov 27, 2016 4:30:43 PM].
- (58) We're not going to own it. I'm not going to own it... The Republicans are not going to own it [071817 NBC].
- (59) The same people who did the phony election polls ... are now doing approval rating polls. They are rigged just like before [TW Jan 17, 2017 9:11:56 AM].

In summary, Trump conceives of a Leader as a Potentate. He believes that the Leader has absolute power. He demands reverence and loyalty. He maintains his superiority by verbally attacking those who challenge his authority.

TRUMP IS A CONQUEROR

Research suggested that complex cognitive structures have subdomains (Musolff, 2006). I propose that social roles lend themselves to this type of cognitive structuring. For example, the Conqueror role consists of three socially recognized dimensions: taking territory, subjugating the populace and seizing power. These behaviors are associated with the abstract concepts Nation, People and Leader, which are the cognitive subdomains of the Conqueror role. Trump produces LMs for these Target concepts. The LMs trigger CMs that reveal his cognitive positioning on each subdomain concept. The resulting subdomain CMs satisfy the dimensions of the conceptual space of the Conqueror role and thereby frame Trump's worldview: *TRUMP IS A CONQUEROR*.

The consequence of Trump's Conqueror worldview is noteworthy. His CMs frame a world in which he fractures institutions and divides the populace and world order to ensure that he has absolute power and that nothing can displace him. He manipulates his supporters into believing that his self-defined reality is in their best interest. His language choices, however, reveal that he seeks their devotion, not improvement in their lives.

Conclusion

This study shows that applying the principles of CMT to the analysis of political discourse can define a political actor's belief system. The CMs that emerge from the analysis of Trump's political discourse are the subdomains of an overarching conceptual space that corresponds to the social role of a Conqueror. Trump's role and worldview are those of a Conqueror.

However, Donald Trump has also been labelled a populist (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). Can the cognitive analysis of Trump's discourse confirm or disconfirm this claim? The difficulty with answering this question lies with the broad use of the term *populism* and its application to diverse political contexts and leaders. I will follow the framework proposed by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), who identify consistent features of populism across a wide range of populist regimes.

Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, p. 6) define populism as

a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. [It is positioned] ... within the context of *liberal* democracy.

“The people” are predominantly those who have little political power, who have lower socioeconomic status and who are socially and culturally marginalized. “The elite” are the corrupt power centers – the political, cultural, economic and media institutions. They are the enemy of the people and are said to work against the people’s will. A “thin-ideology” addresses a limited portion of a political agenda. Populist leaders mobilize the majority by railing against a common enemy – “the elite” or establishment. Populist leaders “present themselves as the voice of the people”. They are generally masculine strongmen whose power is independent of established institutions and is without constraint. (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 62–63).

Donald Trump appears to position himself as a populist in his discourse.

- (i) He declares himself *the voice* of the people (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).
- (ii) He criticizes the political establishment (*dying; broken; unsalvageable; no growth*) and condemns its institutions: *so-called judge; fake news* (Block and Negrine, 2017).
- (iii) He denigrates opponents and detractors to delegitimize them: *Crooked Hillary; Lyin’ Ted* (Block and Negrine, 2017).
- (iv) He provokes fear and anxiety in “the people”: the corrupt elites have *cheated them* (Pettigrew, 2017).
- (v) He plays on fears of cultural change, fostering racism, xenophobia, white supremacy: *the right people* (Block and Negrine, 2017).

However, Trump’s discourse also reveals that he is not a true populist. As a Conqueror, the people serve his needs, not the reverse; he uses them to advance and maintain his power.

1. A Conqueror does not need to represent the people and Trump does not. Large, diverse segments of society protest against his administration, unmasking a broad dissatisfaction with his leadership (e.g., women’s marches, gun-control protests, protests against sexual harassment and assault, healthcare protests against Trump and Congress).
2. He mobilizes the masses through entertainment, not civic engagement. His *incredible movement* is about him, not the people.
3. He is a narcissist, convinced of his self-importance and unequaled qualities and abilities. These qualities are not used to enhance the status of the people.
4. Ill-considered actions result in negative outcomes for the people: negative effects on the quality of human life (e.g., air and water quality); tax reform that benefits the rich; trade decisions that result in higher costs; and failed healthcare reform.

I have established through the cognitive analysis of Trump’s discourse that Trump’s worldview is that of a Conqueror, even though his behaviors include populist

tactics. In the world of the Conqueror, the people are not central. The Conqueror himself is the centerpiece. The people are a tool for self-aggrandizement.

Notes

- 1 In this article, Conceptual Metaphors will be written in small capital letters, LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Linguistic Metaphors will be underlined in the data presented. When terms refer to cognitive concepts, they will have an initial capital letter, e.g., Nation. This stands in contrast to reference to an instance, e.g., nation.
- 2 See merriam-webster.com.
- 3 See dictionary.com.
- 4 See merriam-webster.com.
- 5 See merriam-webster.com; en.oxforddictionaries.com; vocabulary.com.

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15

LEFT-WING POPULIST DISCOURSES IN THE GREEK PRESS

Themis Kaniklidou

Introduction

Populism in the European sphere has been for some time now almost exclusively associated with the radical right (Mudde, 2007). At a time when populism and right-wing (neopopulist) movements have often been perceived in the EU as intertwining syndromes following significant successes of right-wing parties, left-wing populism (LWP), with some exceptions (Bolivar, 2018; Stavrakakis, 2017), has escaped scholarly attention. What is more, while populism has been a pervasive phenomenon, efforts to understand it have long remained blind to its communicative functions (Aalberg and de Vreese, 2017). Recently, however, there has been a turn towards attending to the underexplored communication foundations of populist action (Aalberg *et al.*, 2017). This turn is welcome for three reasons: firstly, because the conditions giving rise to and sustaining populist political action cannot be stripped of the communicative impact of populist actors and messages. Secondly, because populism as a discursive style (Hawkins, 2010) can only be analysed as such through a detailed empirical investigation of the linguistic features it bears. Thirdly, because populism-driven social mobilisation is a direct outcome of the communicative force of mesmerising messages cast by populist actors. With this as background, this chapter engages in a discussion of LWP in Greece and seeks to uncover the discursive template rooted in the language of the left-leaning newspaper *I Avgi*.

A variety of seemingly antithetical, yet intimately intertwined, phenomena are found under the rubric of populism, a variety paralleled in the plethora of analytical and methodological approaches to this phenomenon. Scholars have often seen populism as a political style (Moffit, 2016), a political strategy (Weyland, 2001), a thin ideology (Mudde, 2004) or a discursive style (Hawkins, 2010).

This chapter aligns with Mudde's (2004, p. 543) definition of populism as a 'thin' ideology that considers "society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people".

Populist parties manifest themselves in different forms across the left-right spectrum, but they all exhibit core traits that point to "diverse but not disparate" (Woods, 2014, p.11) expressions of populism. Whether left- or right-leaning, they all show a deep dislike of what they call 'elites' and make explicit appeals to the 'people', who are often termed as 'pure' or 'ordinary'. Whereas left-wing populists attack the economic elites, right-wing populism has a wide spectrum of 'others' they construe as enemies (e.g. refugees, immigrants). Furthermore, they all advocate some type of exclusionary practices targeting a group or groups, a practice known as *scapegoating* (Wodak, 2015a, p. 3).

Research on populism started developing with the rise of populist parties across Europe,¹ particularly right-leaning ones such as the far-right movements in Austria, Greece and France, but also with the emergence of what Wodak and Kryzanowski (2017, p. 471) have termed 'Orbanism' and 'Trumpism' to talk about the exclusionary rhetoric of Victor Orban in Hungary and the unexpected success of President Trump in the USA. Populism in Italy has passed through the politics and rhetoric of Berlusconi, while, in the European periphery, Turkey has seen the upsurge of authoritarian populism of mass social mobilisation triggered by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rhetoric.

Extreme right-wing parties seem to circumvent the norms of democratic agendas; with the use of mesmerising messages and exclusionary discourse, where their enemy is a strange and threatening 'Other', they manage to win over a large part of the population. On the other hand, in Europe, LWP has recently started to attract popular attention. The cases of Podemos in Spain, Die Linke in Germany, Syriza in Greece and the Left Front and Communist Party in France prove that populism cannot be limited to the right-wing agenda. LWP has been particularly successful in countries hit by austerity, serving well the left variety of populism to "have an economically inclusive notion of the people as a class" (Ivaldi, Lanzzone and Woods, 2017, p. 356).

Whereas both LW and RW populism are often understood as threats to democracy, at least in principle, as Higgins (2009, p. 131) mentions, populism "is the art of negotiating and implementing policies that appeal to the people". In general, populism thus seems to represent and reflect the *vox populi* and be the response to the stark ignorance of the people's will by the so-called elites. When American historian Comer Vann Woodward summarised American populism between the 1950s and the 1970s, he mentioned that "the study of populism is instructive about the consequences of condescension, *arrogance*, and *ignorance* on the part of elites and intellectuals" (Vann Woodward, 1981, p. 32, emphasis added). Although right-wing parties often seem to have little or nothing in common with left-wing ones, both

are seen as violating or transgressing an established order of how politics is *properly, rationally and professionally* done. Populism emerges *where* it should not *when* it should not; it disrupts a supposed ‘normal’ course of events and can only be seen as a signal of *failure*.

(Stavrakakis, 2017, p. 524, *emphasis added*)

This chapter begins by exploring LWP in Greece and then turns to its discursive elements using examples culled from the left-wing newspaper *I Avgi* from 2014 to 2016. It then discusses why it is important to look at LWP through its communication features and provides some insights into the tools (frames and metaphors) that can be used to link populism as a practice and ideology with the persuasive force it exerts through language. Finally, the last sections of this chapter present findings from the corpus to provide a qualitative understanding of LWP’s communication effects while giving some quantitative insights from manual count of frequencies.

Greece’s left-wing populism

What is the face of Greece’s LWP and how does it appear in the press? In the Greek context, Stavrakakis (2017) has carried out a thorough analysis of populism, helping us better understand the phenomenon, which he defines as “one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary politics and academia” (p. 523). Moreover, Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli and Andreadis (2017) have mapped out populist formations across the left and right spectrum and have identified the different typologies of populism in the various parties and actors.² Others (Mavrogordatos, 1997; Pantazopoulos, 2013) have analysed its role in the Greek historical context. With some notable exceptions (Stavrakakis, 2017; Stavrakakis and Katsabekis, 2014), more attention has been paid to RWP phenomena like the Golden Dawn, and scholarly research has failed to capture the more elusive face of LWP, whose voice has become even more pronounced following the election of the Syriza-led government.

Syriza, or the so-called Coalition of the Radical Left, became a known entity first as the opposition party following its unexpected electoral success in the 2012 elections and then, in 2015, when it won the elections and formed a coalition government with the right-wing populist party, ANEL³. Since 2010, when Greece was hit hard by austerity measures and the Economic Adjustment Programmes, Syriza has developed a strong anti-elite populist rhetoric against austerity and the outcomes of the crisis, against the ‘establishment’, the ‘Troika’ and the ‘creditors’; this seems to have been part of the party’s winning ticket. For years before its rise to power, Syriza represented the ‘underdog’ of the political system which had emerged to “reclaim the sovereignty of the people” (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli and Andreadis, 2017, p. 196). Furthermore, Syriza’s success also rested upon the existence of a charismatic leader, or ‘Greece’s rising star’⁴ whose rhetoric insisted on the need of the people’s will to be represented in an unrepresentative

system. In the next sections, I will illustrate (i) how Syriza's discourse as encapsulated in the newspaper *I Avgi* is indeed populist in nature; and (ii) how particular lexical devices coalesce around the threat that austerity and corrupt elites pose to Greek households and families. To do that, framing and metaphor have been used as analytical tools.

Frames, metaphor and discourse

This chapter intends to uncover the communication features of LWP by looking at the discourse of the left-leaning newspaper *I Avgi*. This study agrees with scholars who argue that there is an interconnection between framing and discourse (Entman, 1997) and between metaphors and discourse (Chilton and Lakoff, 1995; Charteris-Black, 2004, 2005; Hart, 2008). In this section, I discuss the concepts of framing and metaphors as tools to effectively connect cognition and discourse practice (Semino, Demjén and Demmen, 2016).

Metaphors and framing are important in communication and cognition because they express, reflect and reinforce different ways of making sense of our lives. The communicative orientation is supported by framing while metaphors mostly lend themselves to cognitive interpretations. Framing has often been described as a fragmented field of research and as fuzzy territory 'courted' by more than one discipline, including mass communication (Scheufele, 1999) and psychology (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Framing relates to both "internal structures of the mind" and to "devices embedded in political discourse" (Kinder and Sanders, 1990, p. 74). It is a method of analysis with clear links to the communication of messages for two reasons: firstly, because it leads us to revisit the relationship between messages and those who use them at the receiving end of the communication loop (i.e. the audience). Secondly, because frames are tightly associated with the construction of messages with an aim to produce certain effects (Kaniklidou and House, 2013). Thus, framing emphasises *how* a message is constructed, in turn affecting the "window" through which a story is 'seen'" (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 59).

On the other hand, the cognitive orientation of this chapter emanates from metaphor itself, which is also described metaphorically as framing (Semino, 2008). Although framing can be viewed as the effect of metaphor, in this chapter, metaphor and framing are viewed as separate mechanisms allowing the audiences to interpret messages. We use metaphorical thinking to form schemas of reality and create "inner images" (Ötsch and Pühringer, 2017, p. 497) whereby we make sense of the world. What is more, metaphors, especially in the context of the press, can also be highly ideological given the institutional import of newspapers. They can also be ideological insofar as they "define in significant part what one takes as reality" (Chilton and Lakoff, 1995, p. 56) and are "central to critical discourse analysis since it is concerned with forming a coherent view of reality" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 28). According to Chilton (1996, p. 74), metaphors "can contribute to a situation where they privilege one understanding

of reality over others". This central function of metaphor is itself often referred to metaphorically as *framing* (Lakoff, 2001; Ritchie, 2013).

Corpus description

Data for this chapter come from the online edition of pro-Syriza newspaper *I Avgi*. By examining the data, I will investigate the newspaper as a wide and ever-expanding *topos* in which left-wing populist ideas are nested. In identifying the dominant frames in this newspaper, headlines seem to play a key role as they operate as optimal "framing devices" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, p. 3) that "condense information and offer a 'media package' of an issue" (de Vreese 2005, p. 53). The selection of news items to study populism rests on the idea that news media "set the frame in which citizens discuss public events" (Tuchman, 1978, p. ix) and, therefore, "narrow the available political alternatives" (p. 156). As shown in Table 15.1 below, I have manually analysed 120 articles spanning over three years which have been pivotal for the Greek economy, i.e. 2014, 2015 and 2016. Articles were selected and indexed on the basis of their thematic relevance to the topics of austerity and economy. To identify texts, the search terms *austerity*, *salaries*, *pay cuts*, *economy*, *memorandum* and *financial crisis* were used to single out only those texts that were thematically relevant. This topic-based corpus helps link linguistic choice with the overall context and thus avoid lexical-only perspectives. Identification and analysis of the texts included both headlines as they "encapsulate not only the content but the orientation" (Abastado, 1980, p. 149), and parts of the main body which included metaphors or lexical items that were reflective of the frames analysed. In terms of the periods singled out, firstly, the year 2014 is characterised by the fierce pre-electoral campaign waged by Syriza and other parties. This is a period when Syriza gains momentum on the political stage in Greece, with the Greek people deeply discontented with austerity. Secondly, 2015 is the year when Syriza won the elections and formed a government for the first time; and, lastly, 2016 is the first year of Syriza's term in office. The corpus amounts to 63,133 words. A qualitative corpus-based approach was used which was supported by quantitative findings. After the corpus was compiled in a single Word document, I then identified the metaphors, the lexical items and clusters which were reflective of the frames that are consistent with LWP discourse, such as *ordinary people*, *family*, *households* and *common people*. I then entered these findings in an Excel spreadsheet to single out the highest-ranking clusters and facilitate

TABLE 15.1 Corpus description

<i>Year</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>
Wordcount	19,658	21,692	21,783
No. of articles	49	36	35

the counting of frequencies. Clusters were categorised based on which frame they reflected.

In the following two sections, I look at the particular lexical ‘buttons’ *I Avgi* pushes to construct a consistent message and the metaphorical schemas that are activated to appeal to their readership.

I Avgi’s left-wing populist frames

The newspaper *I Avgi* seems to be home to (i) two main frames, namely, *the household* and *corrupt elites*, through which the audience is repetitively invited to interpret reality; and (ii) three metaphorical devices that also serve the same framing mechanism. Both dominant frames are operational in shaping the discursive template deployed by the left-wing populist agenda. They are enacted, on the one hand, through a particular use of lexical items or collocational structures; and, on the other, through metaphors that move out of the literal realm into a symbolic one. The first frame identified prioritises a *topos* of a *household* that is threatened by austerity; the second one focuses on the *corrupt elites* that are undermining the *vox populi*. These frames favour the emergence of inhabited and ascribed identities of left-leaning actors and are closely related to emotional states that may (im)mobilise people. Indeed, the relationship between populism and emotion has been foregrounded by several researchers (e.g. Fieschi, 2004; Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017), who have found that emotional states such as anger, distress or anxiety are related to populism and reactions to it. A corpus-wide screening provides evidence that both frames and metaphors are mainly consistent with a combination of the emotive scripts of hope, fear (Nabi, 2003) or anger. Especially for LWP, anger or fear are valuable emotive scripts that help illustrate how people support or accept populism (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017). These collective orientations suggest a strategy of social mobilisation, fostering a feeling of togetherness and solidarity against a group of threatening others (elites, establishment). The examples below illustrate how hope, anger and fear are constructed and how they tactfully operate in synthesising the discursive template of left-wing discourse in *I Avgi*. All examples provided are my translations of original Greek sentences.

Household frame

The *household* frame is dominant in the corpus and is realised by the consistent use of specific lexical choices, metaphors or catchphrases. These catchphrases or clusters are used strategically to highlight an underlying emotive script of either *hope* or *fear* for the Greek household or family. Four are the clusters used to reflect the household frame identified in the corpus: (i) the *household*; (ii) the *housewife’s shopping basket*; (iii) the *grassroots working family*; and (iv) the *Greek family*. All clusters are employed to point towards a collective feeling of the Greek household under attack by austerity measures that are sweeping over Greek society.

The household frame seems to be consistent with findings on the right-wing discourses played out during the Brexit campaign (Zapettini 2016) where British households were presented as being threatened by immigrants. Table 15.2 below illustrates the frequencies of all collocational patterns that make up the household frame. Apart from the raw data, the table offers the per thousand words ‰ count.

The clusters analysed were more frequent in 2014 with a short decline in 2015 and then 2016. This can be explained by the fact that 2014 and 2015 were considered pre-electoral periods in Greece, when populist messages and arguments become even more pervasive and strong. Although most frames, with the exception of the *Grassroots working family*, show a decline following the 2014 and 2015 periods, the cluster of the *Greek family* seems to remain high. Moreover, the use of these frames points to the repetitive use of inclusive language (household, family) by the left-wing newspaper.

Example (1) activates the household frame by talking about households under attack from cuts and austerity measures. Lexical choice is quite important since choosing lexical items with profound emotional roots such as *house*, *family* or *people* can provide a breeding ground for activating particular emotionally-laden effects such as anger, anxiety, fear or hope. What is even more interesting is the use of the word in its singular rather than plural form. The singular generic form here creates the inescapable feeling that it applies to all households.

(1) The Greek *household* is suffering cutback after cutback (11/28/2014).

In example (2), we observe the cluster the *housewife's shopping basket*, which is linked to a negative emotive script of anger and/or fear rather than a positive one of hope. Fear, in this example, takes the form of a threat created by an endless line of cutbacks coupled with a feeling of incapability to act to remedy a negative situation. Also, anger can be based on the attribution of unfairness imposed on a suffering household. There is an emphatic shift from the male to the female-led household, which exemplifies how populist discourse represents austerity through the activation of mechanisms that traditionally relate to the dominant gender in the household and are ideologically sensitive for Greek society.

(2) The *housewife's shopping basket* remains expensive in Greece in relation to other European countries, since, despite the slight decline of prices, salaries remain dramatically low (27/2/2014).

TABLE 15.2 Household frame/clusters per year of analysis

Frame	Lemma/collocation	2014	‰	2015	‰	2016	‰
Household	Household	65	1.06	52	0.85	45	0.73
	Housewife's shopping basket	34	0.55	39	0.63	32	0.52
	Grassroots working class family	23	0.37	14	0.22	36	0.58
	Greek family	120	1.96	108	1.76	93	1.52

Examples (3) and (4) below reveal a protectionist frame. In (3), the Syriza-led government is going to save the property of the *grassroots working-class family*, threatened by the prospect of foreclosure auctions. The appeal to the working-class family and its delineation as a separate group in need of particular attention has its significance in left-wing populist discourse.

- (3) This government is absolutely committed to ensuring that no change be introduced that allows the primary house of the *grassroots working class family* to be auctioned (12/6/2017).

Protectionist discourse appeared often in the corpus embedded in the use of the lexical token *family* or the cluster the *Greek family*. The latter is particularly deemed to reinforce the collective feeling of belonging to a nation state.

- (4) We will protect the *Greek family* at all costs against the invasion of new measures (6/4/2016).

Corrupt elites

The definition of populism in its left- and right-wing varieties presupposes a built-in dichotomy aimed “at dividing the people living in a country into two quasi homogenous blocs: ‘The people’ are juxtaposed with ‘the establishment’” (Wodak, 2017, p. 552). The underlying argument of left-wing populist discourse is that the establishment or the elites have been ignoring the so-called ‘people’ (*les oubliés*⁵ in the rhetoric of Marine Le Pen’s right-wing agenda, or *vergessene Menschen* in that of the Alternative für Deutschland [AfD]),⁶ neglecting the hopes and interests of the ‘ordinary people’ and focusing on their own agendas. It is within this binary narrative that a discourse of the people’s betrayal by specific elites or groups from the so-called ‘establishment’ is played out. This frame, which I call the *corrupt elites*, was abundant in the corpus.

Table 15.3 illustrates the frequencies of lexical items or cluster (interests of the elites) patterns that make up the corrupt elites frame.

Although there is a decline after Syriza wins the elections, still the numbers show that the claims against neoliberal elites in Greece and the EU are strong. In the pre-electoral periods of 2014 and part of 2015, the lemma *elites* stands out

TABLE 15.3 Corrupt elites frame/lexical items per year of analysis

Frame	Lemma/collocation	2014	%	2015	%	2016	%
Corrupt Elites	Mafia	36	0.58	21	0.34	12	0.19
	Lobbies	67	1.09	52	0.85	21	0.34
	Interests of the elites	43	0.70	54	0.88	62	0.14
	Elites	143	2.3	102	1.66	84	1.37

as the most tactically used item to legitimise anti-elite sentiments. For its part, the frame of *corrupt elites* is also made up of the lemmas *mafia* and *lobbies*, with the former reflecting a criminalisation of political life and the latter reflecting the idea of privileged oligarchy linked either to business and financial circles. The year of 2016 marked the first full year for which Syriza was a governing party, and it seems that discourse is becoming less polarised in comparison to pre-electoral periods.

Two of the most prominent lemmas used for the frame are the words *mafia* and *lobbies*. Examples (5) and (6) are indicative of a corpus-wide use of these two lexical items, suggesting the criminalisation of political life and its consistency with the emotive script of anger. The choice of the word *mafia* reflects a narrative of endemic corruption that speaks to the people's loss of trust *vis-à-vis* the corrupt establishment. Labelling is key for understanding how language can play a role in representing the people as being detached from the elites.

- (5) Who are the *mafia*, the *lobbies* which govern this land and threaten it? (16/9/2014).
 (6) The *mafia of the health system* has been ruining this land (3/6/2016).

The loss of trust and the gradual erosion of the integrity of public politics are important factors in enabling right- and left-wing populism to thrive (Wodak, 2017, p 552). Example (7) is indicative of an anti-establishment communication strategy where the government (before Syriza's rise to power) is metaphorically equated to *vultures* and is described as an ally of the elites' dark interests. The use of this metaphor is deeply ideological, as it triggers cognitive associations with this animal (Richie, 2017). The popular idea about this bird is that it is ugly and evokes corruption and rottenness. This lexical choice co-occurs in the sentence with 'dark interests', implying the existence of the establishment's tacit and unethical interests. Finally, the *suffering people* are directly set in opposition to the imperialist political powers, which are distinguished as the enemy.

- (7) This Government is not hesitating to ally with the "*vultures*", the rating houses, with the *dark interests of the elites* and the invisible world of wealth which has been accumulated for decades now to the detriment of the *suffering people* who succumbed to *imperialist political powers* (8/3/2014).

From the manual analysis of the corpus, *I Avgi*'s distinctive feature is the identification of Syriza as a self-defined saviour coming to people's rescue in their fight against the establishment and the elites from a massive 'sellout' of the country to its creditors. Whereas right-wing populist discourse is also full of the conceptualisation of a saviour, what changes is the enemy. Right-wing populism favours enemy-making focused on immigration and refugees, whereas for left-wing populism the enemy is globalisation, capitalism and the elites. Example (8) reflects the saviour-protectionist discourse where Syriza promises to save the people from the interests of the elites.

- (8) The newly-elect Syriza government is resolved to fight the *interests of the elites* (3/14/2015).

Metaphors in LWP discourse

As shown in the table below, three main metaphorical schemas were identified in the corpus: (i) WAR metaphors, (ii) BODY metaphors and (iii) JOURNEY metaphors.

Unsurprisingly, WAR metaphors formed a major part of the metaphorical devices used by *I Avgi*. Also, the WAR source domain has been found to have a wide scope in politics (Semino, 2008). This metaphor was instantiated via verbs (*fight, go into war, destroy, crash*) or nouns (*camp, flight, battle*). Indeed, WAR metaphors in news discourse and elsewhere are “omnipresent because they express an urgent, negatively valenced emotional tone that captures attention and motivates action” (Flusberg, Matlock and Thibodeau, 2018, p. 2). In the corpus, most of the lexical choices within the WAR domain included the lexical items *war* as a noun linked with an action verb. Examples (9) and (10) use the WAR metaphor to amplify the identity of Syriza as a party (*we*), and Tsipras as a leader who will move on to combat either the corrupt or the austerity elites.

- (9) We will *go into war* with the corrupt elites that have *been destroying* this land (8/3/2014).
 (10) Mr Tsipras has decided to *go into battle* with the austerity elites that have *been destroying* this land (19/1/2015).

In the following example, the WAR source domain is reflected in the use of the lemmas *targeting* and *rules of the war*.

- (11) The government is *targeting* the elites and will change *the rules of the war* this time (24/7/2016).

The second group of metaphorical devices employed are BODY metaphors. The corpus was replete with body-evoking imagery, offering an overly humanising picture of the so-called *ordinary Greeks* or else *common people*. For instance, examples (12) and (13) use the body imagery of *kneeling* but with two different outcomes. Whereas (12) is victimising ordinary Greeks, who are suffering a putative humiliation because of austerity and the signing of memorandum agreements,

TABLE 15.4 Distribution of metaphors

<i>Metaphors</i>	2014	%	2015	%	2016	%	TOTAL
WAR metaphors	131	6.6	114	5.2	98	4.4	343
BODY metaphors	52	2.6	34	1.5	31	1.4	117
JOURNEY metaphors	65	3.3	54	2.4	21	0.9	140

(13) foregrounds an imagery of pride. Thus, we can see that the cognitive topology of the target domain (Lakoff, 1993) is very much context-dependent and affords many other mappings.

- (12) Austerity and Memorandum agreements are *bringing ordinary Greeks to their knees* (3/6/2014).
 (13) Now Greece has to *stand up straight* and *not kneel* before the beasts of the Troika (1/3/2015).

The following examples reveal BODY metaphors that relate to breathing and can also be understood as drawing on the HEALTH source domain. The collocations *fiscal suffocation* (14) and *fiscal breath* (15) reflect the automatic and necessary human physical function of breathing and are directly associated with the negative impacts of an ongoing financial crisis.

- (14) During this time, given the difficulties and the ongoing *fiscal suffocation* that is affecting everybody, Syriza is trying and will possibly succeed to get Greece out of the Memoranda and restore normality (10/11/2017).
 (15) The last *fiscal breath* for ordinary Greeks seems to be to cut back on property taxes (17/7/2015).

The third group of metaphors in the corpus (JOURNEY metaphors) refers to Greece and the Greek economy on the path towards exiting the period of austerity. The JOURNEY source domain is used here but it is often exploited in combination with other metaphors such as BODY metaphors. This third group of metaphors is perhaps the strongest in activating hope rather than fear, which is triggered in previous examples. This metaphor is particularly strong and recurrent as it is grounded on a “calculated ambivalence” (Wodak, 2003, p. 142) about time and space considerations. We have neither details on when the economy will exit the so-called *tunnel* (16) nor an idea of how or when the economy will recover and will exit *the memorandum*. Examples (16) and (17) foreground a discourse of linear journey towards an unknown exit. Example (16) also integrates a BODY metaphor (*walk straight*) to enact the sense of pride on behalf of the Greek, who are in the process of exiting the Memorandum.

- (16) Alexis Tsipras: Nobody can stop us from *walking straight ahead on the pathway towards the exit* of the memoranda (19/1/2016).

Embedded in the language of example (17) is the PATH source domain, linguistically realised by the lexical items *enter/exit*, which evoke the linearity of the pathway on which the Greeks walk in their attempt to overcome austerity measures.

- (17) When we first *entered the memorandum*, we had no idea when we would *exit* (3/7/2015).

Examples (18) and (19) below associate the tunnel/linearity with the concept of *light*. The language used helps to illustrate a transition from darkness to light that equals a transition from fear to hope, from bad to good.

(18) Mr Tsipras stressed that he is fully aware of the challenges and sacrifice of the Greek people all these years. But it is one thing to make sacrifices without any sight of hope and another to see *light at the end of the road* (8/2/2016).

Example (19) is clearer in cueing the sequence between the *dark tunnel* and the *light* at the end. The use of the collective pronoun *we* (see (17) and (19)) aligns with the concept of “inclusionary populism” (Stavrakakis, 2017, p. 524), and is often strategically used in close proximity with the lexical item *us* (as in (16)) and in contrast to the items *them* or *their*, which relate to the ‘other groups’. Associating the Greek economy with a tunnel makes readers anticipate something better at its end.

(19) Slowly but steadily we walk towards the *end of the dark tunnel* where there is *light* (13.11.2016).

Conclusion

We are living in “populist times” (Aalberg and de Vreese, 2017, p. 8) and any sober investigation of populist discourses requires an analysis of how populism, in its left- and right-wing varieties, is mediated and thereby ‘normalised’ in European and US politics, media and the wider public spheres (Wodak, 2015a, 2015b). The analysis provided in this chapter rests on a localised study on the Greek context and shows the level of mediation of LWP in the discourse used in the newspaper *I Avgi*. Evidence shows that there is a recurrent use and deployment of two frames (i.e. *household* and *corrupt elites*) functioning as vehicles of normalisation of LWP discourse. Both frames are supported by specific lexical choices such as *mafia*, *lobbies*, *households* or *families*, and activate a negative emotive script of fear or anger rather than that of hope. Apart from frames, there is also a repetitive use of certain metaphors, which arrange and guide our understanding of the political reality. The corpus gave results for three dominant metaphors: (i) WAR metaphors, (ii) BODY metaphors, and (iii) ECONOMY AS A JOURNEY metaphors. Analysis shows that the language of LWP is used to activate emotion-laden concepts, rather than rely on concrete logical evidence and facts. The deployment of the *household* frame to trigger fear or anger for the outcomes of austerity, and the use of metaphors to enact optimism and hope (*light at the end of the tunnel*) provide evidence of that. In this case, the discourse used by the newspaper seems to sidestep arguments and logic and promote a voice of authenticity rather than evidence-based truth.

Classifications of populism and empirical analyses of local phenomena are important to understand populism. It is equally important, though, to trace

populism through the forces that have allowed it to move from the political fringes to the centre stage of politics; this often requires some spelling out of long-standing painful truths. Understanding how populism operates requires more than simply pointing our fingers at it; it requires an investigation of the underlying factors that have led to its success; the latter speaks for a collective feeling of solidarity or, in the words of Debray (1983, p. 142), “a fraternity that keeps us warm”.

What this chapter argues is that LWP is not a singular phenomenon confined only to the political domain but its manifestations are also visible in other domains such as language and discourse. If populism is to be understood as a discursive or rhetorical style, then linguistic choice is key for the claims-making potential of populist actors. The linguistic evidence in this chapter illustrates the meaning-making trajectories instantiated through different functions of language (metaphors and frames). Interestingly, these frames can be said to reflect emotive positive (hope) or negative (anger/fear) emotive scripts which may (im)mobilise people.

Notes

- 1 Left-wing populism has been profoundly examined in Laclau (2005).
- 2 For example, the Golden Dawn has been classified as *complete populism*, which includes appeals to the people, anti-elitism and exclusion of outgroups; SYRIZA as *anti-elitism populism*, which mainly attacks the elites and the establishment; while LAOS is an example of *excluding populism*, which includes references to the people but mainly wishes to exclude any potential enemies.
- 3 According to Pathanassopoulos, Giannouli and Andreadis (2017, p. 200), ANEL is a case of complete populism.
- 4 R. Donadio and L. Alderman, ‘Rising Greek political star, foe of austerity, puts Europe on edge’, *New York Times*, 18 May 2012, retrieved from <http://goo.gl/hi8jB>;
- J. Defferios, ‘Lunch with Alexis Tsipras, Greece’s rising star’, CNN, 4 June 2012, retrieved from <http://goo.gl/9UQGf>
- 5 Marine Le Pen et les «oubliés», April 12, 2017, retrieved from <http://lvsl.fr/marine-le-pen-et-les-oublies>
- 6 “Wir haben Menschen vergessen”, September 25, 2017, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, retrieved from <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afd-erfolg-in-ostdeutschland-wir-haben-menschen-vergessen-1.3682046>

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16

NEW POLITICS AND THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

A study of populist language in Spanish political discourse: the case of Podemos

Francisco José Sánchez García

Introduction

The recent rise of new political parties in Spain has resulted in the rapid transformation of both political discourse and campaign strategies in the media targeting popular support by reference to direct civil participation.

Until the current legislature, the Spanish parliament had been dominated by two opposing political forces, Partido Popular (right-wing) and PSOE (centre-left), alternating in power and leaving little space for other, smaller groups. Thus, some parties such as Izquierda Unida (left-wing) had remained relegated to the background, maintaining a meagre representation and thereby limiting their capacity for action and public visibility. This changed completely with the irruption of Podemos, a grassroots party born out of the popular discontent voiced by the 15-M movement (otherwise known as “the Spanish Revolution”); this achieved nationwide political projection in record time, becoming an unexpected third force in Parliament after just three years of existence.

This chapter is intended to examine the discourse of Podemos, with the purpose of studying populist language in Spanish politics. More specifically, our aim is to detect and describe the party’s most remarkable discursive dynamics (rhetorical resources, conceptual frames, lexical richness and non-verbal language) as developed in their last congress (Vistalegre II), held in February 2017. To do so, this chapter compares its two most high-profile leaders, Pablo Iglesias and Íñigo Errejón, insofar as they represent the organisation’s two main ideological approaches (i.e. populism vs. social democracy).

Our starting point is the fact that left-wing political parties show discursive divergence in moments of tension or when they are plagued by internal division; this is manifested in the polarisation between the classical discourse of the left (i.e. communism), which is clearly more populist, and another one with a tendency

towards moderation (i.e. socialism). This was the case of Podemos in 2016, when the party suffered a major crisis resulting in the victory of Pablo Iglesias' political mainstream against the critical faction represented by Errejón, who would finally be relegated to almost ostracism when losing the party's spokesperson role in the Lower Chamber.

Theoretical framework. What is populist discourse?

It is a complex task to present a univocal definition of *populism*, since it is an elusive term, with diffuse limits, which varies depending on the historical and political contexts where it happens to emerge (Charaudeau, 2009); consequently, it has been approached from different perspectives and methodologies. Our purpose here is to focus especially on its discursive dimension.

According to Arroyas Langa and Pérez Díaz (2016, p. 54), the concept of *populism* can be defined from three angles: (1) as an ideology (Mudde's division between the "pure" people and the corrupt elite, 2004, p. 543); (2) as a discursive style (i.e. a binary rhetoric generating political identities); and (3) as a political strategy (i.e. as a way to exercise power, through constant mobilisation and the identification of the tendencies guiding the masses).

Far from the pejorative meaning it normally has, drawn on by traditional parties to discredit emerging parties as demagogues, populism has been considered by Laclau (2005) and Mouffe (2007) as a legitimate way of articulating the heterogeneity every hegemonic struggle generates (Palao Errando, 2015, p. 37, author's translation). In fact, for Laclau (2005), populism is not strictly an ideology, but rather a perspective from which to articulate a discourse in order to build a political identity based on the antagonism of the elite against the people. Errejón (2012) himself, who was number two of Podemos and one of its main ideologues and campaign leaders, has defined the concept as follows:

[Populism is] a discursive style that symbolically unifies very different and very fragmented positions in a simplification of the political space, which dichotomizes, making a distinction between the people as representative of the general will and the elites (cited in Arroyas and Pérez, 2016, p. 56, author's translation).

It is important to take into account the cross-cutting nature of populisms (Del Río, 2015, p. 27), as they seek to promote the common interests of different social groups and different ideologies, spreading the most "popular" ideas in more effective discourses, based on a few fundamental messages. In other words, populism stands as a "saviour" movement (Charaudeau, 2009, p. 264), as it aims to reorder the rules of the political spectrum, breaking with the traditional left-right dichotomy, which is assumed to have already been overcome. Thus, it introduces a new opposition among the elites represented by the political system

and the *de facto* powers (financial, media) against civil society (the people) and their needs.

Linguistic keys of populist discourse

In Charaudeau's words, a priori, populist discourse does not differ substantially from political discourse in general, insofar as it uses the same persuasive strategies, which "consist in capturing its public in the name of symbolic values that affect reason and emotion" (2009, pp. 263–264). It is clear, therefore, that the main ingredients of the populist recipe are the same; what varies is the proportion. According to this author, in this case, emotion predominates over reason and a story is often built on the following: (a) a situation of crisis (whether economic or moral) leading to citizens' "victimisation"; (b) the cause of evil and those responsible for it (i.e. the system, the institutions, bureaucracy); (c) the exaltation of ethical values of citizenship (in this situation, it is necessary to react by building a group identity to resist); and (d) the existence of a providential leader who represents the people.

Obviously, populist movements are not all equal, but, following the description proposed by Charaudeau (2009, p. 271), we can identify some common linguistic features amongst them:

- (a) *Populist language is a metaphorical language.* In populist language, a phraseology laden with nominalized phrases and impersonal expressions predominates, resorting to metaphor to simplify complex explanations about the causes of social crisis and to blame the system, embodied by a corrupt political elite.
- (b) *Colloquial record.* Since a dialectic of a good/evil polarization is established, this language is characterized by a flatter and more colloquial tone, close to dysphemism (even in areas that are often incompatible with informality, such as parliamentary discourse).
- (c) *Simplification of cause/effect relationships.* At the argumentative level, there stands out the use of *non sequitur* fallacies, or caricaturing an opposing view or cause as the "straw man" (Weston, 2005).
- (d) *First-person pronouns (singular and plural).* The speaker's positioning requires the use of the first person singular to assert themselves as the undisputed leader; nevertheless, it is convenient to attain a balance using inclusive *we* to embrace the party and, of course, the people.

Emerging political parties in Spain after the "Spanish Revolution". The case of Podemos

If we consider only Europe, we might think that the irruption of a populist party such as Podemos in Spain cannot be explained only based on circumstances of context and conjuncture, as its creation directly relates to the existence

of numerous parties or movements in Europe (both on the left and the right). Nevertheless, the Spanish case seems to be an anomaly. It was only after the massive demonstrations of 2011, that there started to be a political current capable of capitalising on citizens' growing discontent with poverty, high unemployment and social exclusion resulting from the financial crisis. Among Podemos' leading ideologists, there were several university lecturers in Political Science at Madrid's Complutense University, with Pablo Iglesias, Íñigo Errejón and Juan Carlos Monedero at the forefront. The first challenge was to channel people's indignation at the institutions, creating a political brand to access these. In one article entitled "Understanding Podemos", Pablo Iglesias (2015) relates the origin of the party to a favourable conjuncture, which he calls "regime change" in Spain. According to the leader of the purple formation, it is necessary to understand the "Spanish Revolution" as a popular reaction called to build a new paradigm against the already obsolete consensus reached during the transition from dictatorship to democracy back in the 1970s.

Indeed, unlike in other European countries, until recently the conditions in Spain had never existed for a populist party to settle on the political table with guarantees of obtaining broad support. With Podemos, the scenario changes completely; some factors explain its success and rapid growth. Firstly, the presence of its leader in the media has been decisive in order to make the formation visible in the eyes of the general public, for whom his carefully crafted discursive contributions seem to have played a fundamental role. The two major parties were not able to stop Podemos' rapid rise in the political scene; the Socialist Party (PSOE) had just left power without having been able to overcome or alleviate the difficult economic situation, while its alternative, the Popular Party, applied the recipe of severe social cuts, encountering bitter resistance from the public. Given this situation, Podemos took advantage of the gap left by the moderate left to break through, thus trying to occupy the social democrats' symbolic role as the main opposition party, which numerically had not yet occurred, as it had not become a second force after the elections.

The positioning of Podemos as a political "brand" is articulated around the struggle against the "caste" comprising the two traditional parties. To a large extent, it seems to draw inspiration from Latin American populist models (especially Venezuela's, as well as Bolivia's and Ecuador's), as evidenced by the need shown in Podemos' populist discourse to "empower" the people (Abellán and Pardo, 2015, p. 168) and to provide them with the tools to rise to the point of being able to exercise "counter-power" against the establishment, in this case, represented by the Popular Party and the Socialist Party. However, it should be noted that within Podemos we find several sensibilities: we cannot forget the anti-fascist and anti-capitalist currents, which also imprints a particular communicative style on its representatives' interventions.

A fundamental pillar of the party's communication strategy is its good use of the mass media (namely, television) to spread its messages at key moments. In fact, before the official presentation of Podemos as a political party, Pablo Iglesias

had his own television programme and was already well known nationally for his participation in TV political shows. Claudio Elórtegui (2013, p. 17, author's translation) has already called attention to the political exploitation of the media in his study of populism in Latin American countries:

The populist leader of these times is presented as the “great communicator”, the subject who dominates the logic of the “new orality”, the skilful connector of the real and the symbolic, the interpreter and repository of aspirations, expectations and trusts of popular cultures. To the extent that democracies have a greater character of opinion-spectacle than of parties, the populist is preoccupied with “letting himself be seen” and giving visibility to the marginalized and discontented.

Another basic aspect, consistent with the ideology of the party and adjusted to the current moment, is “telecracy”, or “militancy at a distance” (*agora voting*). As Palao (2015, p. 40) claims, Podemos is based on a horizontal organisational model, in which the militants' participation is crucial for decision-making. That is why they are organised in “circles”, and any measure or strategic action that may involve a substantial change is put to a vote (in this case, a virtual vote). In short, if Podemos' intention was to give voice to the people, their internal organisation system necessarily had to be participatory and not hierarchical, unlike the traditional parties. At the end of the day, their aim is to build a popular democratic project (Monereo, 2016, p. 13), to effectively shape an “expansive democracy, committed to equality”.

Podemos and meaning. Empty and floating signifier

Formally, the party's communication strategy is an attempt to implement “Laclauism” in Europe (Palao Errando, 2015, p. 39), insofar as it seeks to “(...) build a popular counter-hegemony based on the mass media and using a ready-made partisan device around the figure of a charismatic leader”. Palao Errando sees an evident trace of this Laclauism in the slogan “They do not represent us” of the 15-M movement, as a form of “enunciative dissolution” that was already preparing the discursive way to undermine the legitimacy of the established political elites.

In fact, most of the slogans adopted and used by 15-M and the organisation Democracia Real Ya (i.e. Real Democracy Now) would eventually be incorporated into the electoral programs of Podemos. These slogans, which we have translated from the compilation of Abellán and Pardo (2015, p. 167), revolve around five themes:

- (a) Criticism of representative liberal democracy
 - They do not represent us.
 - Neither the PSOE nor the PP.

- (b) Appropriation of public space.
 - Take the street.
 - Yes, we camp.
- (c) Lack of future horizons.
 - Youth without a future.
 - Nobody expects.
- (d) Criticism of mercantilism and generalised corruption.
 - We are not anti-system, the system is anti-us.
 - We do not have bread for so much “chorizo” (Spanish colloquialism for ‘thief’).
- (e) Empowering slogans.
 - The Spanish Revolution.
 - We are going slowly because we are going far.

If we look at the purely discursive aspects that Podemos has displayed throughout its still short history, the most striking one is their dichotomous construction of social reality based on antagonism, expressed through easily recognisable conceptual frameworks, which echoes the slogans of the “Spanish Revolution”. Underlying them are those messages oriented towards settling in the collective unconscious, and bringing to the fore the features that differentiate Podemos from the other parties, the appeal to popular participation, and the need to empower themselves to change the system:

- (a) *The caste/the (decent) people.*
 The most recognisable conceptual framework of Podemos is clearly populist. The party devised the concept “caste” to refer to the Spanish political elites (the establishment), to which it attributed negative values such as conformism, ineffectiveness or tolerance towards corruption. Opposite to them is the collective actor “the people”, who, according to Podemos, are able to confront this establishment thanks to the new party. Naturally, with the passing of time, this framework has worn out and lost its communicative effectiveness, since Podemos has already established itself within the institutions.
- (b) *Those above/below.*
 By the same token, such leading political elite is considered part of “those from above”, comprising all the high offices of the State (politicians, judges, prosecutors) and journalists who shape the destinies of citizens (i.e. “the below”). Naturally, according to this orientational metaphor, Podemos is recognised among the “subdued”, attributing the role of counter-ideology to the ideology of the establishment.
- (c) *The plot (or the mafia)/the people.*
 In a certain sense, the “plot” (in Spanish, *la trama*) is a redefinition of the exhausted “casta” concept to refer, more specifically, to all politicians and journalists who have contributed to maintaining the network of relationships that corruption has made possible.

(d) *The old politics/the new politics.*

One of the main foundations of the Indignados movement was the degradation of political parties. Since there was still no strong alternative, the negative image of politics as a whole predominated. This led to the distinction between the old politics (associated with the Popular Party [PP] and the Socialist Party, i.e., the establishment) against the new politics, embodied by Podemos, the true voice of the people's demands.

(e) *Them/us.*

The communicative success of Podemos is based on the construction of an image of otherness that deprecates the "them" and enhances the "us". It is important to highlight the collective value with which it is intended to capitalise on people's discontent and indignation: that *us*, then, groups all those affected by the crisis, by the cuts imposed by the government of the Popular Party.

Having discussed the most prominent conceptual frames, we are able to better understand the subjective burden of many of them. As Laclau (2004, p. 31) explains, there are some concepts such as *democracy* or *homeland* that are owned neither by the left nor the right, insofar as they are "floating signifiers" whose meaning varies "in liberal discourses", among radicals, anti-fascists or anti-communist conservatives. In other words, according to Errejón (2009, p. 12), it is not possible to avoid the use of certain concepts without facing "the dispute for shared meanings":

The political struggle is, to a great extent, the struggle to appropriate those terms that are highly valued by a collectivity, but which, due to their oversaturation (all competing discourses on them) are tendentially empty, are floating. "Democracy", "Justice", "Future", "Youth" or "Order" are some of the most outstanding examples, from which no political actor can be alienated.

Thus, for example, in recent times Podemos has rescued *homeland*, an old taboo word on the left (traditionally it has been considered a typical word in the Franco regime's discourses). In this case, the signifier has been "emptied" to provide it with new content. In this way, for Podemos, the *homeland* is (now) the *people*. Naturally, in this process of "appropriation" of a concept, it is necessary to redefine it explicitly, in a way that it is fully understandable. Here, metaphor stands out as an effective rhetorical resource for the nodal connection of these "floating" signifiers in an ordered and homogeneous set of messages (Žižek, 1992) that are coherent with the image intended to be transmitted.

Methodology and corpus

For the examination of populist discourse, it is essential to delve into a range of linguistic features pertaining to all possible dimensions of discourse research,

from rhetoric to argumentation. In addition, within the general framework of studies on political discourse, we will rely on the major contributions of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), particularly on Wilson's (2001) empirical perspective, Fairclough's (1992) three-dimensional view of political discourse (i.e. discourse as part of a text, discursive practice and social practice), and Van Dijk's (1999) multidisciplinary view of ideology and its reproduction through discourse.

As for our methodological approach, we will observe how populism is construed in the discourse of Podemos, by first analysing its conceptual frames (Lakoff 2007) and word frequency indexes (López Morales, 2011). Later, we will analyse its most characteristic rhetorical resources. For this, we rely on our classification of the most common tropes and figures in Spanish political discourse (Sánchez, 2012), focusing specifically on the role of metaphor in the construction of political arguments designed for its dissemination through the media. Finally, we will delve into the review of its more outstanding nonverbal features (Ekman, 1978, 1994, 1997). It will thus be possible to demonstrate how different the discourse of Iglesias is from the discourse of Errejón, despite the apparent formal similarities between both.

Our corpus, limited to a very specific political event, consists of the speeches of both leaders at the convention held during the second weekend of February 2017 (i.e. their programmatic proposals and farewell speeches after Iglesias' victory). The total sample size is 2,036 words corresponding to Iglesias and 1,577 to Errejón. Given the relevance of the context studied and the exhaustiveness of our analysis, we are sure that we have obtained sufficiently significant results regarding the discursive dynamics of the two main currents of thought within Podemos.

The speech of Podemos' leaders at the Vistalegre II congress

After the 2016 general elections, Podemos experienced a period of internal crisis motivated by the dispute between the party's two leading figures: Pablo Iglesias and Íñigo Errejón, who would end up confronting each other in the "Vistalegre-II" congress, held in February 2017. The differences between Iglesias and Errejón were not strictly ideological, but strategic. Both leaders had conflicting opinions about the mistakes made after the party lost a million votes between the elections of 20 December 2015 and 26 June 2016. According to Errejón, the reason was the way they had managed their negotiations with PSOE; in his view, Podemos had shown "immaturity and arrogance" and needed urgently to recover the parliamentary initiative, since the "left turn" advocated by Iglesias had proved to be little effective. In contrast, for Iglesias, the only errors were due to an excess of moderation and an appearance of artificiality.

The congress was considered the perfect occasion to heal and settle the internal division. The only "real" candidacy was Pablo Iglesias' since Errejón did not run as an alternative candidate; he only proposed an alternative list of people and political principles contrary to the party's official line.

In such a context, it is interesting to study the discursive manifestations of both leaders, since it is clear that, in order to differentiate between both postulates, it is necessary to resort to conflicting conceptual frameworks and to two discursive models that can be clearly associated with each leader. In this case, whereas Iglesias did not modify his discourse substantially, maintaining the signs of identity of Podemos' populist language, Íñigo Errejón did introduce some features that gave his speeches an identity of their own that reflected a more moderate political position.

Strategies and conceptual frames developed

If we look at the speeches by Iglesias and Errejón, we can extract several highly representative frames of their respective positions on the strategy to follow, which are congruent with the archetypal features of the aforementioned populist discourse:

- (a) *Podemos is a transversal party (denial of the “geography of Parliament”).* We pointed out above the negation of the left/right dichotomy as one of the common features of populist parties. For Iglesias, it has lost all validity, so “transversality” is imposed against the “turn system” (bipartisanship):¹
- (1) I am a person of the left, but I do not believe in the parliamentary geography according to which the Popular Party is on the right and the Socialist Party is on the left. They are the representatives of the project of the elites (Pablo Iglesias, 11/2/2017).
- (b) *A “New Transition” begins (break with the “1978 Regime”)/A new social contract (impulse of a New Constitution) is needed.* Recently, Podemos has repeatedly invoked the 1978 Constitution as something outdated and obsolete. In this way, we find references only in Iglesias' speech to the “new transition” that, according to him, is underway from 15-M onwards, and will end with the “1978 Regime” (note the negative semantic prosody of “regime”, which is commonly associated with dictatorships).
- (2) Podemos, together with other political forces, was perhaps the best electoral translation of that new Spain that was growing and that was moving in the substratum of society, and a new transition began (Pablo Iglesias, 11/2/2017).
- (c) *We have to look like the people/We have to build a people.* The appeal to the people is again taken as inspiring decision-making. It is not the citizens who have to follow the parties, but the parties that should be at their service:
- (3) Transversality, comrades, has nothing to do with looking like Ciudadanos or the PSOE, it has to do with resembling people, resembling Spain (Pablo Iglesias, 11/2/2017).

Whilst Iglesias assumes the role of the voice of the people he represents (“Today we speak to the *pueblo*”), and although both leaders refer to the same populist conceptual frame, Errejón uses the term *pueblo* more often while Iglesias prefers to talk about *gente*, i.e. “people”. A trait worth noting in both leaders is that which moves their discourses away from what we universally associate with populism, and has to do with their self-presentation as “spokespersons” for the group, “thus creating the image of a collective hero”, that is, one not necessarily relying on the individual charisma of a single leader “capable of dragging the masses” (Arroyas and Pérez, 2016, p. 61, author’s translation).

- (d) *Those below (the people) are opposed to those above (the elite)*. The elite–people dichotomy has remained constant in Podemos’ discourse since its origin, and of course, it was also reflected at the party congress:
- (4) That is why it is a pride that the translation of the crisis in Spain was not the fearful and aggressive look of the penultimate against the last one, but the proud look of those below compared to those above (Pablo Iglesias, 11/2/2017).
 - (5) To the offense of those above, to the shamelessness of those above, to the criminality of those above, the unity of those who share the same labels is not what should be opposed, but rather popular unity (Íñigo Errejón, 11/2/2017).
- (e) *The project of Podemos is a “patriotic project”/The homeland is the people*. The concept of the homeland, traditionally shunned by the left, was present in the speeches by Iglesias and Errejón. The country is redefined with the values of populism: “it is no longer afraid”, “it is dignified” and “feminist”. In short, “the homeland is the people”, and therefore it is the party’s main support against the establishment.

Rhetorical devices

Above we mentioned the importance of the rhetorical dimension to gauge the populist aspect of political discourse. We have uncovered an abundant catalogue of rhetorical devices, which we have classified according to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1986) taxonomy; for this purpose, we have also drawn on some of the metaphorical concepts described in Sánchez (2012). As we can see in Table 16.1, the differences between the two leaders are evident.

To analyse this in more detail, a representative sample is shown below.

(A) Pablo Iglesias

The results show the party leader’s clear preference for metaphor (20 examples, 68.95%). He also uses parallelism (only four occurrences, but developed in longer structures) as a tool for cohesion and discursive coherence.

TABLE 16.1 Frequency of rhetorical devices per thousand words

<i>Rhetorical devices</i>	<i>Pablo Iglesias</i>	<i>Íñigo Errejón</i>
Structural metaphors	14.25	6.31
Oriental metaphors	10.18	6.31
Ontological metaphors	16.23	1.58
Parallelisms	8.14	17.35
Rhetorical questions	10.18	1.58
Fictional dialogue	–	3.15

Structural metaphors:

- POLITICS IS A METEOROLOGICAL PHENOMENON: “The *wind of change* continues to blow.”
- POLITICS IS MERCHANDISE: “Its policies have *put a price* on the sovereignty of our country.”
- POLITICS IS A COMPETITION: “the *electoral gymkhana* that we had to face”.
- POLITICS IS A BATTLE: “while the *Restoration parties are entrenched* and prevent the participation of the people”.
- POLITICS IS A BATTLE: “self-absorption and division work for the enemy”.

Oriental metaphors:

- “We must *keep walking* to change Spain.”
- “We do not recognize the *ideological geography* of the parliament.”

Ontological metaphors:

- “The shift system *has passed to a better life*.”
- “that new Spain that was *growing and moving* in the substratum of society”.
- “We are able to continue *being an instrument* that helps together with others to push the constituent impulse.”

Parallelisms:

- “*I have to talk about* my candidacy to the general secretariat of Podemos and that’s why *I’m going to talk about* Irene Montero. *I have to talk about* my candidacy.” (thread to present the team of people who are part of his candidacy).
- “*Unity and humility* to build social justice. *Unity and humility* for the people and peoples of our country to recover sovereignty.” (This was the 11-part *leitmotif* to close the congress after its victory.)

Rhetorical questions:

- “What does it mean to win?”

(B) Íñigo Errejón

On his part, Errejón clearly opts for parallelism (11 occurrences, 47.82% of the total), although he also resorts to some metaphors (9 examples, 39.12%) and fictional dialogue:

Parallelisms:

- “*I remember* the complicated decisions, *I remember* the unequivocal will of victory, *I also remember* our will.”
- “*We have not come* to this country to scold the powerful, *we have come* to show them the way out, *we have come* to recover the institutions, *we have come* to affirm popular sovereignty.”

Structural metaphors:

- POLITICS IS A BATTLE: “They have not said that the *enemy they want to defeat* is precariousness.”
- POLITICS IS A GAME: “You do not have to grant them a *minute of extension*”.

Oriental metaphors:

- “We have come to show them *the way out*.”
- “*The above* ones are weaker.”

Fictional dialogue:

- “But since *you dare give advice* on how other political formations meetings ought to be, here is one for you, *be careful* that your next meeting does not have to be held in a penitentiary” (addressing the PP).

Lexical analysis

We analysed the speeches through AntConc v.3.5.7. (Anthony, 2018) to extract a word frequency list (Table 16.2). We mention here all the results with more than five occurrences, except for grammatical words (prepositions, conjunctions, articles).

The indexes of lexical richness² that we have obtained from both speeches are strikingly low: in Iglesias, we find 23.99, with an interval of appearance of lexical words of 4.16 and a hapax index of 1.18. In Errejón, 23.08, with an IAT (index of occurrence of notional words) of 4.33 and a virtually identical hapax index: 1.19. We cannot forget that the record studied is typical of political harangue, and so a discourse without deep arguments or great variation in vocabulary is expected.

TABLE 16.2 List of results, number of occurrences and frequency per thousand words

Pablo Iglesias				Íñigo Errejón		
Results	Raw data	Frequency per thousand words	Results	Raw data	Frequency per thousand words	
1	<i>speak</i>	43	21,11	<i>our</i>	16	10,14
2	<i>no</i>	33	16,20	<i>already</i>	15	9,51
3	<i>unity</i>	23	11,29	<i>people</i>	11	6,97
4	<i>candidacy</i>	18	8,84	<i>congress</i>	10	6,34
5	<i>that</i>	18	8,84	<i>party</i>	9	5,70
6	<i>companions</i>	16	7,85	<i>Podemos</i>	9	5,70
7	<i>humility</i>	16	7,85	<i>we are</i>	7	4,43
8	<i>today</i>	15	7,36	<i>they are</i>	7	4,43
9	<i>general secretary</i>	13	6,38	<i>unity</i>	7	4,43
10	<i>thanks</i>	11	5,40	<i>Vistalegre</i>	7	4,43
11	<i>change</i>	10	4,91	<i>horizon</i>	6	3,80
12	<i>Podemos</i>	10	4,91	<i>new</i>	6	3,80
13	<i>to win</i>	9	4,42	<i>project</i>	6	3,80
14	<i>social</i>	8	3,92	<i>people</i>	6	3,80
15	<i>to build</i>	7	3,43	<i>memory</i>	6	3,80
16	<i>forces</i>	7	3,43	<i>agreement</i>	5	3,17
17	<i>people</i>	7	3,43	<i>to defeat</i>	5	3,17
18	<i>I speak</i>	7	3,43	<i>enemy</i>	5	3,17
19	<i>we</i>	7	3,43	<i>popular</i>	5	3,17
20	<i>Parliament</i>	7	3,43	<i>they want</i>	5	3,17
21	<i>our</i>	6	2,94	<i>to be</i>	5	3,17
22	<i>new</i>	6	2,94	<i>will</i>	5	3,17
23	<i>To follow</i>	6	2,94	–	–	–
24	<i>contract</i>	5	2,45	–	–	–
25	<i>government</i>	5	2,45	–	–	–
26	<i>homeland</i>	5	2,45	–	–	–
27	<i>society</i>	5	2,45	–	–	–

Regarding the use of pronouns, *we* stands out (seven occurrences in Iglesias' speech); it is striking that *I* is hardly ever used (only one occurrence in each speech) and that it only appears to reinforce ideologised positions:

- (6) *We* were born saying that the old categories did not always work. *I* myself am a person of the left, but *don't* believe in parliamentary geography (Pablo Iglesias, 11/2/2017).
- (7) *I* am convinced that there are those who already have books and doctoral theses written about that very nice political formation that forced others to change (Íñigo Errejón, 11/2/2017).

Sticking to a more qualitative analysis, Iglesias maintains some clearly leftist concepts – “hire the labour force in exchange for a salary”, “social contract” and

“social justice” – and redefines others by means of Laclau’s conceptual emptying; this explains the use of *homeland* and *sovereignty*, now anchored in popular power.

- (8) Our *homeland* is no longer afraid, forty years ago many people were afraid, forty years of dictatorship marks a lot [...] Unity and humility to build social justice, unity and humility so that the people and peoples of our *homeland* recover *sovereignty* (Pablo Iglesias, 11/2/2017).

In general, Errejón employs a more moderate tone (*horizon, project, agreement*), with the exception of some references to the battle against corrupt parties (*defeat, enemy*) and the inclusion of the anti-Franco slogan “*They shall not pass*” at the end of his speech, in the same way of Iglesias’ last sentence, “Unity, pride and *victory*”, which reminds us of Che Guevara’s mythical phrase, “*Hasta la victoria siempre*”.

Nonverbal language

The most significant nonverbal communication feature differentiating Iglesias’ and Errejón’s discursive styles has to do with the way they greet the audience. While Iglesias is recognised by his right fist held high, Errejón prefers to make the victory signal with his fingers. At the beginning of Iglesias’ first speech, it is striking that he uses that characteristic gesture, accompanied by cries of “Unity!” echoed by the supporters attending the event (raising his fist three times, with each syllable of the word *unity*). He also punches his chest several times with his fist closed, appealing to the emotion he feels for the support received. Errejón’s stage appearance is very similar. The most remarkable thing is his somewhat prolonged applause, as if wanting to give more bearing and aggressiveness to his stage presence to try to compensate for his youthful appearance.

The body language of the two men is similar: slightly stooped, with both hands placed on the lectern, very open and moving alternately to highlight some key concepts or ideas. Iglesias tends to place his arms by his side when he pauses to allow the audience to express themselves (shouts of “Unity” or “Yes you can”). Interestingly, he usually moves his right arm when referring to the “other”, in this case embodied by the “Government”, “the enemy” or the “old policy”; and his left when he refers to his supporters or the “people” in general. The palm of his open hand (usually his right hand) or his two hands together serve to show sincerity when describing one’s own point of view about his or her project or recognising some errors. To emphasise important ideas, he usually moves both open hands vertically (always with the palm of his hand facing up).

Regarding Iglesias’ facial microexpressions, the furrowed brow predominates, especially coinciding with criticism of the Government, and at times when calling for social mobilisation against budget cuts. Thus, following the classification proposed by Ekman (1978, 1994 and 1997), we observed a frown, tight lips (AU7), rising of the cheeks (AU6) and nose wrinkling (AU9) accompanied by wiping of the lips (AU37), pressing of the lips (AU24), coinciding with closing pauses, before

changing the subject. Regarding the look, normally his eyes look down (because of script dependence, M64) but also to the left (eyes turn left, AU61), with a head posture leaning to the right (AU56) almost throughout all of his speech. His moments of greater facial histrionics coincide with self-criticism (when he defines his project as a successful movement, although it may have generated disenchantment at some moments): shoulder shrug (AU82) or back and forth head shake (AU84).

On the other hand, Errejón's non-verbal communication is less varied but more agitated: his gestures are fewer but faster, denoting some nervousness, constantly looking at both sides of the audience, as if seeking the audience's empathy. In general, he manifests a certain facial tension, constantly wrinkling his forehead and raising his cheeks (AU6). Unlike Iglesias, Errejón sets his lips in a funnel (AU27), and only tightens them (AU24) when he closes a prominent statement. His gestures of showing sincerity are limited to the palm of the right hand open on the chest. We also highlight the slicing gesture (vertical movement of the right hand or palm up) to emphasise some of his ideas about a model of society.

Normally, the charisma of current populist leaders (like Iglesias) is associated with a histrionic character and reminds us of some speeches by Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez or Nicolás Maduro. According to Charaudeau (2009, p. 271), in populist discourse "all this takes place in a staging in turn strongly dramatized, and, if possible, with a corporal, vocal and gestural production of barricade by the speaker". In short, it seems to us that Iglesias' speech is more dominated by arm movements and somewhat theatrical facial gestures; it seems more passionate and, therefore, we would consider it more typically populist than Errejón's.

Conclusions

From the above, it follows that the discourse of both politicians is in line with the characteristics of populism. In actual fact, this research has allowed us to show that Iglesias' speeches clearly fit the typical features of populism, while Errejón's are better suited to the discursive framework of social-democracy.

In this way, the hypothesis is confirmed that the discourse of the candidate who wanted to control Podemos (Errejón) had to resort, paradoxically, to communicative models more typical of traditional politics, renouncing in part the populist metaphorical frameworks he had contributed to settling in the collective imaginary of Spaniards. In general, populist discourse uses more metaphorical conceptual frameworks (e.g. "assault on the heavens", "below/above") in contrast to a less radical leftist discourse, which resorts to more elaborate and deeper messages, appealing to the reflection and analysis of the political reality and the need for a more transversal and operative approach of the political objectives in the medium term. Precisely, Iglesias' discourse is full of metaphors of all kinds, while Errejón prefers parallelism to build and give internal coherence to his speech. The different ways of communicating through non-verbal language are also remarkable. These differences are also manifested in the lexicon, which is much more leftist for Iglesias.

It is true that the most notable differences are revealed in the statements to the media, which showed a critical Errejón with the “left turn” of the party; this position was not so clearly recognisable in his speeches at the Vistalegre-II congress. In the end, Errejón looks more pragmatic, moderate and less biased, whilst Iglesias is depicted as more passionate and inclined to support activism in the street instead of parliamentarianism.

Notes

- 1 Strictly speaking, in Spain there is no bipartisanship as a model of real alternation in power (the way it was in the 19th century). Podemos has redefined this concept precisely to criticise the political turnism that was taking place de facto until the arrival in the Parliament of the new parties. This is another case of an empty significant that has been reused with a persuasive intention. Cf. Laclau (2004, p. 31).
- 2 The index of lexical richness, the interval of occurrence and the hapax index have been calculated using the methodology proposed by Humberto López Morales (2011). Firstly, the percentage of words (PV) is obtained by dividing the total number of words by the total of lexical units and then multiplying the result by 100. This indicator is complemented by the IAT (index of occurrence of notional words), which is calculated by dividing the total number of words by the number of notional words (the greater number of notional words, the shorter the interval, and the more favourable the index of lexical richness). Finally, the hapax index allows for the calculation of the percentage of words of a single occurrence in the text, which results from dividing the total number of words among those that have frequency one.

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17

METAPHORS PORTRAYING RIGHT-WING POLITICIAN GEERT WILDERS IN DUTCH POLITICAL CARTOONS

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Introduction

For the past decade or so, Geert Wilders has undoubtedly been the most controversial politician in the Netherlands. The views of this extreme right-wing leader of the PVV (“Partij voor de Vrijheid”/“Party for Freedom”), founded in 2006 to oppose Islam, immigration, and refugees, as well as his fierce anti-EU sentiments, have caused serious concerns.

Many people in the Netherlands were worried that, in the 2017 national elections, Wilders’ populist PVV might become the largest party, qualifying its leader to become the country’s next Prime Minister. To the relief of many, and not just in the Netherlands, this did not happen. But by securing 13% of the votes, the PVV nonetheless ended as the second-largest party, after the liberal democrats of the VVD (“Volkspartij voor Vrede en Democratie”/“People’s Party for Peace and Democracy”) led by Mark Rutte

Unsurprisingly, numerous critical newspaper articles have been devoted to Wilders’ controversial political views, to the tactics in building his public image and to his popularity. Such textual analyses tend to show awareness of the complexity of most things political. By contrast, cartoons constitute the genre suitable *par excellence* for expressing perspectives on political issues in a simple, immediately obvious manner. As Duus (2001, p. 995) formulates it,

cartoons reveal a side of political culture not found in official memoranda, public speeches and newspaper editorials, theoretical tracts, and ideological pamphlets. They provide access to “everyday” reactions to politics that even public opinion polls cannot capture.

Very often, these cartoonistic “everyday reactions” are expressed via metaphors.

In this chapter, we analyse political cartoons that depict Geert Wilders metaphorically, expecting thereby to chart this politician's image in a highly visible media genre. We aim to formulate answers to the following questions:

- (a) How often is Geert Wilders represented in political cartoons?
- (b) Which visual (and multimodal) metaphors are used in political cartoons to portray him?
- (c) Can any pattern be detected in this portrayal?

Specifically, we will chart to which entities (things, animals, people – the source domains) the target domain “Geert Wilders” is metaphorically compared. Moreover, we will zoom in on which features/emotions/attitudes inhering in these source domains are mapped onto “Geert Wilders”, since this is where the interpretation of the metaphors becomes manifest. In this way, we hope to sketch the contours of Wilders' image and reputation as transpiring from his portrayal in Dutch political cartoons.

The chapter's structure is as follows. We first sketch Wilders' position in Dutch politics. Then, we briefly explain the concept of visual and multimodal metaphor, with specific reference to political cartoons. Subsequently, we describe our corpus and method of analysis. Finally, we present our findings, ending with some concluding remarks.

Geert Wilders

In order to understand the cartoons, a short characterization of Wilders is called for.¹ In the late 1990s, after doing several jobs within the party, Wilders became an MP for the VVD. In 2004, he left the VVD to found his own “Vereniging Groep Wilders”, a forerunner of the PVV, attracting the attention of prospective voters by voicing his opinions in contributions to national newspapers. In October 2004, a Jihadist internet video urged followers to decapitate Wilders. After that, the state decided to officially protect Wilders, among other things by paying for bodyguards – a situation that, because of continual threats, is ongoing at the moment of writing.

In 2007, the PVV leader proposed to prohibit the Qur'ān, calling it “the Islamic *Mein Kampf*” and a “fascist book” (Wilders, 2007, p. 11), and made the much-decried short film *Fitna*, which “interlaces passages from the Qur'ān with graphic images of Islamist terrorist attacks”.² On the basis of this film, Wilders was charged with defaming Islam but, after two trials, he was found not guilty. In the 2010 election, in a political landscape with many (small) parties, the PVV won no less than 24 (out of 150) seats. The VVD and the CDA (Christian Democrats) decided to accept a situation in which the PVV, although not formally part of the government, committed itself to providing passive support (Dutch: “gedoogsteun”) to a VVD-CDA coalition, in return for adopting a number of Wilders' standpoints in the policies of the new government. When

in 2012 Wilders withdrew his support, Prime Minister Mark Rutte saw no other option than to offer his government's resignation to the Queen. Later that year, a new government, this time without any dependence on the PVV, was formed ("Rutte II").

In 2014, Wilders was heavily criticized and ended up having to defend himself in court because of allegedly racist statements against the Moroccan community in the Netherlands. The court found Wilders guilty of offending a group (Dutch: "groepsbelediging") and of incitements to discrimination, but he was discharged from incitement to hatred. No punishment of any kind was imposed, however.

Wilders has often been condemned not only for his political views but also because the PVV, unusually, has no members except the leader himself, which results in a very authoritarian *modus operandi*. Another recurring issue is that Wilders has continually insisted that other parties' refusal to cooperate with him in a coalition government reveals the Netherlands' undemocratic nature, since excluding him, he maintains, would effectively mean ignoring the interests and views of a substantial percentage of Dutch voters ("Wilders argues that VVD and CDA cannot ignore him, since they thereby also ignore his voters" – translation by ChF & NvdL).³

Wilders' gimmick is his striking, heavily blond hairdo (not unlike Donald Trump's). In debates and writings, he regularly comes up with vivid, though offensive, phrases, attracting a lot of media attention. Examples include "kopvod-dentax" ("head rag tax" – a semi-serious proposal to impose a tax on the wearing of head scarfs),⁴ and "tuigdorp" ("hooligan hamlet" – a village where repeatedly convicted offenders supposedly should be deported, so as to make it easier to keep an eye on them).⁵

Visual and multimodal metaphor in cartoons: a brief introduction

Taking seriously Lakoff and Johnson's claim that "metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and action, and only derivatively a matter of language" (1980, p. 153), Forceville (1996) proposed a model for visual (or pictorial) metaphor that was based on Max Black's (1979) "interaction theory", but adopted the generally accepted terminology introduced by Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). The founders of CMT stipulate that "*the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another*" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 5, emphasis in original). Any metaphor should be rephrasable in terms of an "A IS B", or rather "A-ING IS B-ING" form, as the interpretation of a metaphor boils down to the mapping of typical attributes, actions, and attitudes associated with B upon attributes, actions, and attitudes associated with A. In a purely visual metaphor, both the topic (A, the "target domain") and the phenomenon the target domain is compared to (B, the "source domain") are depicted (in the hybrid and simile subtypes), or visually suggested (in the contextual subtype).⁶ Multimodal metaphors, by contrast, are "metaphors whose target and source are each represented

exclusively or predominantly in different modes” (Forceville, 2009, p. 384). In cartoons, only two modes are pertinent: (static) visuals and written language; indeed, this is probably the most common combination of modes.⁷ In our corpus, by far most of the metaphors proved to be purely visual.

For something to be identifiable and interpretable as a visual or multimodal metaphor, the following criteria must be met:

- (i) An identity relation has been created between two phenomena (Lakoff and Johnson’s “things”) that, in the given context, belong to different categories.
- (ii) The phenomena are to be understood as target (domain) and source (domain), respectively.
- (iii) Target and source are not, in the given context, reversible; at least one characteristic/connotation/emotion/attitude associated with the source domain can be pertinently “mapped” onto the target domain; often a cluster of internally related connotations is to be so mapped. It is this mapping of (clusters of) features that constitutes the interpretation of the metaphor (adapted from Forceville, 2013, p. 59).

The genre of political cartoons is rich in visual metaphors. Over the past 15 years, a robust number of papers and chapters has appeared that focus specifically on metaphors in this genre, pioneered by El Refaie (2003). Other studies include El Refaie (2009), Schilperoord and Maes (2009), Teng (2009), Abdel-Raheem (2016), and Groarke (2017). Unsurprisingly, cartoons (like advertisements; see Forceville, 1996) often draw on metaphors, since metaphors are highly efficient means to quickly present a specific perspective, and the emotions, valuations, and attitudes inhering in that perspective, on a given topic (Charteris-Black, 2004; Musolf, 2016). One crucial difference between metaphors in advertising (PRODUCT IS X) and those in political cartoons (POLITICIAN IS X) is that the former typically map positive features, whereas the latter typically map negative features onto the target domain. The genre, after all, is humorously critical of politicians: “the cartoon subverts political authority by mocking its claims to superiority and/or legitimacy” (Duus, 2001, p. 965).

Bounegru and Forceville (2011) analyzed a (modestly sized) corpus of cartoons sharing the same target domain, namely the FINANCIAL CRISIS of 2008, in order to test Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) claim that human beings understand and experience abstract and complex issues *systematically* in terms of other, more concrete phenomena. “Concrete” in this case means pertaining to sensory perception and locomotion (Johnson, 1987; Kromhout and Forceville, 2013). In their examination of which structural metaphors were used to reveal how the financial crisis was depicted in cartoons, these authors found that certain source domains for the target domain FINANCIAL CRISIS recurred, such as NATURAL DISASTER and BEGGING FOR MONEY (see also Domínguez, 2015a, 2015b).

Expecting that metaphorical analysis would yield comparable patterns when applied to Wilders-cartoons, we here analyze a series of cartoons with metaphors of the underlying form GEERT WILDERS IS X.

Corpus and method of analysis

Initially, we considered comparing Wilders–cartoons that appeared in a right-wing newspaper versus Wilders–cartoons that appeared in a left-wing newspaper, as this would have enabled us to chart whether the political affiliation of cartoonists influenced (1) which metaphorical source domains they had chosen for Wilders; and (2) whether, even when they had chosen the same source domain, they had perhaps opted for different *mappings* from these source domains. However, since it turned out to be impossible to get access to digital archives of such cartoons, we had to abandon this option. We also dismissed using Google Images (choosing “Geert Wilders” and “political cartoons” as search terms) or the Cagle cartoons website (<http://www.caglecartoons.com/>) as a source. The former yielded cartoons ranging from professionally clear instances to amateurish, often incomprehensible ones, while the provenance of these cartoons could often not be established; the latter yielded too few instances of Wilders–cartoons to allow for any generalizations whatsoever.

We then found that the annual “Prent in Politiek” award shortlist for the best political cartoon in a Dutch newspaper or magazine was published in book form. It was first awarded in 1994, and in 2013–2014 it was renamed the “Inkspot” award – a Dutch pun on “ink (s)pot” and “ink mockery”. We analyzed the cartoons in the yearbooks from 2006, the year Wilders founded the PVV, until 2017 (Ijsselstein Mulder and De Ranitz 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, Ijsselstein Mulder and Kistemaker 2011, Beugeling *et al.* 2012, N. N. 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).

In order to allow for comparison with the (metaphorical) depiction of other Dutch party leaders, we decided on the following procedure. After jointly analyzing the cartoons in the 2006 edition, we separately answered the following questions for each political cartoon in the yearbooks:

- (1) Does the cartoon name and/or depict one or more Dutch party leaders visually and/or verbally?
- (2) If (1) applies, are one or more of these party leaders presented via a visual or multimodal metaphor?
- (3) If (2) applies, what source domain is employed to portray the party leader(s)?

We subsequently analyzed any recurrent source domains in the portrayal of Geert Wilders. If we did not agree on the answers of questions (1) to (3) – an issue to which we come back in the conclusion section – we resolved this through discussion.

Case studies: findings

How often did party leaders feature in the cartoons?

We began by counting how often Geert Wilders and other Dutch party leaders were represented (i.e., verbally mentioned and/or visually featured) in our

corpus (the “**R**” columns in Table 17.1, see p. 298), and then counted how often such a representation could be considered to be a metaphorical one (the “**M**” columns; **M** is thus a subset of **R**). In order not to overcomplicate the analysis, we counted each party leader that appeared in six or more cartoons in at least one yearbook individually (i.e., Wilders, Verdonk, Balkenende, Rutte, Bos, Rouvoet, Verhagen, Samsom), and each party leader represented in fewer than six cartoons in any one year collectively (“other party leaders”). When, as happened a few times, a party leader was represented in terms of one, two or even three metaphorical source domains simultaneously, these were counted as separate metaphors. We did not take into account the cartoons (14 in all) in which more than three politicians were metaphorized, as in such cases all or most of them were depicted collectively with the same source domain (for instance, “athletes” in a race; “flies” in a spider’s web; or “exhibitionists” trying to win votes), and this would have had a misleading influence on the number of times party leaders were assessed to be metaphorically represented.

Table 17.1 shows that Wilders features in over 25% of the cartoons (107/407) representing Dutch party leaders. It is noteworthy that this is even more than Mark Rutte, who was active during the same period as Wilders; and who, as the country’s Prime Minister since 2010, could be expected to be very frequently portrayed. Not only is Wilders represented more often than Rutte; he is also more often *metaphorically* represented: Wilders is metaphorized in two-thirds of his appearances (72/107), and Rutte only in about half of them (42/87). Notably, Rita Verdonk, who preceded Wilders in founding a right-wing populist party (“Trots op Nederland”/“Proud of Holland”), is emphatically present in the cartoons of 2006 and 2007, trumping then-Prime Minister Balkenende in these years both in literal and metaphorical manifestations. We will come back to this issue later.

Which metaphorical source domains characterize Wilders?

Labelling source domains verbally is a thorny issue, as there are many different ways in which a source domain can be named. We opted for broad labels to enable discussion of any recurring patterns in Wilders’ portrayal, comparing them to source domains used to depict other party leaders.

WILDERS IS A FOULNESS-EXUDING CREATURE (5 occurrences). In this source domain, we incorporate excretion (shit, vomit) and improper language (the latter visualized via “pictorial runes” and “pictograms” – see Figure 17.1).⁸ “Excreting” and “improper language-use” exemplify bodily activities considered “not done” in professional politics. The metaphorical mappings can be phrased as “behaving improperly, being uncivilized, causing embarrassment, being childish ...” Another cartoon depicts Wilders metaphorically as a poisonous detergent, while in yet another one Wilders is seen sowing seeds from a bag with “hatred” written on it. In all of these cases, the crucial property that is mapped from the various source domains onto Wilders is that something “bad” emanates from him.

TABLE 17.1 Metaphorical and non-metaphorical occurrences of Dutch party leaders in the period 2006–2017, specifying the period of their leadership, in the cartoon yearbooks

Yearbooks + total no. of cartoons	Wilders (PVV) Feb 06–now		Verdonk (ToN) 3/4/08– 19/11/11		Balkenende (CDA) 1/10/01– 9/6/10		Rutte (VVD) 31/5/06– now		Bos (PVDA) 12/11/02– 5/4/10		Rouvoet (CU) 12/11/02– 8/04/11		Verhagen (CDA) 9/6/10– 10/12/16		Samsom (PvdA) 16/3/12– 10/12/16		Other party leaders		Total			
	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M		
2006 (191)	1	–	18	14	13	7	3	1	4	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	2	43	25
2007 (168)	11	9	13	9	7	3	6	3	11	4	5	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	5	3	58	33
2008 (162)	14	8	3	3	10	9	–	–	11	10	3	2	1	1	–	–	–	–	2	2	44	35
2009 (160)	9	4	2	2	12	10	1	–	3	2	2	2	1	1	–	–	–	–	1	0	31	21
2010 (167)	35	27	–	–	5	1	23	14	–	–	–	–	15	8	–	–	–	–	4	3	82	53
2011 (168)	16	10	–	–	–	–	13	5	–	–	–	–	6	3	–	–	–	–	6	3	41	21
2012 (154)	6	3	–	–	–	–	25	13	–	–	–	–	2	–	15	9	11	5	11	5	59	30
2013–14 (131)	6	5	–	–	–	–	7	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	4	3	–	3	–	20	13
2014–15 (131)	1	–	–	–	–	–	4	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	1	2	1	2	1	10	3
2015–16 (130)	3	2	–	–	–	–	2	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5	3
2017 (100)	5	4	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	1	1	5	2	14	7
Total 1662	107	72	36	28	47	30	87	42	29	17	10	6	25	13	23	15	43	21	43	21	407	244

The text in Figure 17.1 refers to the question whether the coalition (represented by “grooms” Prime Minister Rutte and Vice-Prime Minister Verhagen) will be able to navigate the government through various political crises while “bride” Wilders passively supports the coalition without doing any work himself.

WILDERS IS A BOMB (3 occurrences; see Figure 17.2). Wilders is here depicted as the fuse of a bomb that is part of a mosque. The mappable feature here is clearly



FIGURE 17.1 WILDERS IS A FOULNESS-EXUDING CREATURE and WILDERS IS A BRIDE. Text: “2012: The year of the truth”. Berend Vonk, *Trouw* 19-9-2011 (original in colour).



FIGURE 17.2 WILDERS IS A BOMB, Arend van Dam, *Tribune* March 2008 (original in colour).

“capable of exploding and thereby making a lot of victims and causing a lot of damage”. This source domain may refer to Kurt Vestergaard’s controversial cartoon in the Danish *Jyllands-Posten* (2006), in which a Muslim (Muhammad?) was depicted with the metaphor *TURBAN IS BOMB* (or non-metaphorically with a turban *hiding* a bomb). This cartoon was subsequently used, without Vestergaard’s permission, by Wilders in his anti-Islam film *Fitna*, which made Vestergaard himself in turn respond with a cartoon showing Wilders with a bomb-hat. The three examples in Dutch cartoons (all from 2008) thus resonate intertextually on various levels.

WILDERS IS A DOG (3 occurrences). The features to be mapped from *DOG* to *WILDERS* differ from one cartoon to another. In one, Wilders howls against the moon (symbol of Islam); in another, he is an angry dog pursuing an Arabic-looking person; in the third, he is the obedient poodle of French Front National party leader Marie Le Pen (Figure 17.3), who heads one of the most successful extreme-right factions in the European political landscape.

WILDERS IS A BABY/CHILD (3 occurrences). The mapped feature is “immature, uncontrolled, irresponsible behaviour” (see Figure 17.4). It is not just the angrily red head that cues the target domain “Wilders”; giving the middle finger is typical of him (and not of prototypical babies), too.

WILDERS IS A HELMSMAN (2 occurrences). The label “helmsman” has been used in this chapter for any person who “steers/fails to steer/pretends to steer” some sort of vehicle (boat, car, bike, wagon, etc.). The mapped feature is “(supposedly) steering a vehicle toward a specific destination”. In the context of the cartoons in which this source domain is used, Wilders is at the helm in situations where he should not be. We will discuss this metaphor at greater length below.




FIGURE 17.3 *WILDERS IS A DOG*. Text: “Company poodle”. Bas van der Schot, *De Volkskrant* 26-5-2014 (original in colour). The Wilders-poodle’s unhappiness transpires from the black “pictorial rune” above his head.



FIGURE 17.4 WILDERS IS A BABY. Siegfried Woldhek, *NRC Handelsblad*, 24-9-2011 (original in colour).

WILDERS IS A PUPPET PLAYER (2 occurrences). The mapped feature here is “making other people behave in the way the player desires”. In both cases, the cartoon pertains to the situation in which Wilders has inordinate influence on the policies of a government (“Rutte I”) of which the PVV is not formally a part. Of course, these cartoons criticize the government coalition and, in Figure 17.5, specifically Prime Minister Rutte, at least as much as – if not more than – Wilders.

WILDERS IS A SPOUSE (2 occurrences). The mapped features are something like “having an intimate, long-term relationship involving loyalty and commitment”. In one cartoon, the visually represented “bride”, Prime Minister Mark Rutte, runs with outstretched arms to off-screen groom “Geert”; in the second, Wilders is the bride in a boat rowed by grooms Rutte and Verhagen, leaders of the two coalition parties (Figure 17.1).

WILDERS IS A HORROR-FILM MONSTER (2 occurrences). Wilders is once depicted as Dracula, and once as a zombie, in both cases “frightening”, “potentially murderous”, and “unreal” being features that qualify for mapping.

WILDERS IS A CRUSADER (2 occurrences). The mediaeval Crusaders were soldiers fighting the Moors in defence of Christian values. This is the feature of the source domain that is mapped onto Wilders, who has similar motives to battle against Islam. One of them appeared in the paper *Spits*, distributed free of charge at train stations. Interestingly, depending on the reader/viewer’s political convictions, this mapped feature can be understood in a positive as well as in a negative light.



FIGURE 17.5 WILDERS IS A PUPPET PLAYER. Ruben Oppenheimer, *nrc.next*, 27-10-2010 (original in colour).

Discussion of the source domains used for Wilders

The domain occurring most frequently (but still only five times) is the one we labelled FOUL-EXUDING CREATURE. What makes this specifically pertinent as a characterization of Wilders is that this source domain, in either of its two varieties, is used for no other politician in our corpus (not even for Wilder's populist predecessor Rita Verdonk). The same holds for BOMB, PUPPET PLAYER and HORROR-FILM MONSTER: only Wilders is metaphorically coupled with these source domains. The other source domains occurring more than once with Wilders as target domain were HELMSMAN, DOG, SPOUSE, BABY/CHILD and CRUSADER. These latter domains, however, were not unique for Wilders. Let us say a few words about each of them.

The HELMSMAN source domain clearly taps into the “ship of state” metaphor, itself a variety of the JOURNEY metaphor (e.g., Forceville, 2006): political leaders are supposed to lead the country (movement, party) into the “right” direction. The “ship of state”, incidentally, need not be a boat: any vehicle will do. Thus party leaders are coachmen, skippers, rowers, drivers, driving instructors, horse riders, etc. Unsurprisingly, this metaphor is used for other party leaders besides Wilders. But given the conventions of the genre (say, humorously criticizing political leaders and events in the world), there is in the cartoons almost *always* something wrong with the politicians' steering attempts, which are thus usually, in one way or another, doomed or ineffective; for instance, there are two “helmsmen” who each want to go in a different direction, or the helmsman holds a fake steering wheel, or the ship has already sunk.

The SPOUSE domain similarly taps into a familiar scenario, which can be phrased as POLITICAL PARTNERSHIP IS A MARRIAGE. Party leaders are depicted as bride and groom (particularly when they are forming a coalition) or as parents; apart from

the cartoons featuring Wilders, there were various others portraying one or more politicians as spouses or fathers or mothers.⁹ Tellingly, Wilders himself is never metaphorized as a parent – presumably because he was never formally part of a coalition and thus never shared the responsibility of governing the country (the pertinent mapping being: “taking responsibility for one’s children”).

Wilders is also not the only party leader portrayed as a dog. Dogs are used four times as source domains for other politicians. Presumably, this is due to the fact that, in Dutch society, dogs are popular pets, evoking many different connotations that are potentially mappable onto the target domains with which they are metaphorically coupled. They can be loyal, guard you, bite, threaten, be obedient, be disobedient, defecate... Put differently, interpreting a metaphor of the form X IS A DOG depends heavily on the specific context in which this source domain is used since no unambiguous “default” connotation comes to mind (unlike, for instance, “frightening” for HORROR FILM MONSTER).

There is one instance in the corpus of WILDERS IS A BABY, whereas two cartoons portray him as an (unruly) child. Balkenende, leader of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and Prime Minister from 2002 to 2010, is also twice depicted as a child, but what is mapped in these cartoons is naivety or innocence, not lack of a sense of responsibility or unruliness.

Apart from Wilders, Rouvoet, leader of the traditional Christen Unie (CU), is also once portrayed as a crusader; his enemy, however, is not Islam but embryonic stem cell research.

Contrary to what we had anticipated, we found that, by far, most of the metaphorical source domains used for Wilders (and, indeed, for the other party leaders) are used only in *one* cartoon, and thereby exemplify creative metaphors in the sense of Black (1979). In other words, in the majority of cases, the cartoonist had created a more or less unique source domain, with no intrinsically negative connotations, which requires the specific narrative context of a particular cartoon to evoke the intended critical or negative mappings. Examples of such unique source domains for Wilders are MOZART, ASTERIX, STEAK TARTARE, MALE GENITALS, and ICE CREAM SCOOP – none of whose pertinent mappings can be guessed outside of the scenario of the cartoon in which they appear. In many cases, proper analysis, in turn, requires an understanding of the political-historical situation rather than only expertise in analyzing visual metaphors.

Some methodological considerations

In the interest of aiding future researchers intending to embark on similar metaphor-identification projects, we want to end this section by mentioning several practical problems we encountered in our analysis. In the first place, it sometimes happened that one of us did not *recognize* a certain party leader, for instance because of unfamiliarity with the drawing style of a specific cartoonist. Secondly, occasionally one of us did not immediately understand the depiction of a party leader as metaphorical. This could be due to not recognizing a source-domain scenario (see

Forceville, 2017), but also to initially overlooking a metaphor because it exemplified a *clichéd* scenario (e.g., politicians as parents) – which of course still meant it was a metaphor. Moreover, given that there are *degrees* of metaphoricity, we sometimes disagreed whether in a specific situation a depiction should count as metaphorical or not. A final issue concerned the precise verbalization of a metaphor. Should a given source domain be labelled as ANIMAL, DOG or POODLE? As SPOUSE, GROOM or PARENT? As CHILD or BABY? Different formulations suggest different potential mappings, and thus different interpretations. Given the relatively small size of our corpus, we opted for formulating broad categories; but with larger corpora, it is advisable to refine the categories. To further illustrate the impact of verbalization, it is worth noting that, while opting for the label DOG means that this source domain is exploited for various politicians, not just for Wilders, rephrasing the three DOG metaphors for Wilders as WILDERS IS A DOG HOWLING AGAINST AN ISLAM-SYMBOL MOON, WILDERS IS AN ANGRY DOG PURSUING AN ARAB-LOOKING PERSON and WILDERS IS MARIE LE PEN'S PET DOG would turn all three into source domains uniquely associated with Wilders.

Concluding remarks

We cannot be sure, of course, that the cartoons selected for the shortlists of the year's best political cartoons are representative for *all* Dutch cartoons that appeared in that year, so any conclusions about the representation of Wilders are necessarily tentative.

Compared to other political leaders, Wilders appears to be represented very frequently in Dutch political cartoons, just as right-wing party leader Rita Verdonk was before him. This is not surprising: Wilders' views, whatever one may think of them, make him a political force that is difficult to ignore. His extremist statements and provocative behaviour moreover undoubtedly make him an attractive subject for satirical portrayal by cartoonists, who may moreover be inspired to create vivid metaphors due to this selfsame extremism. This starkly contrasts with the frequency with which, for instance, Alexander Pechtold – arguably Wilders' most unwavering and eloquent critic in the House of Representatives – has been represented. Pechtold, the long-time leader of D66 (Democrats 66), does not even feature by name in Table 17.1, as he never appeared more than three times in a single year-book, and therefore is one of the “other party leaders”. This leads to the somewhat worrisome conclusion that reasonable, decently behaving politicians run the risk of not being visible, whereas politicians with extremist ideas are rewarded with attention by cartoonists, who thereby willy-nilly help keep the very ideas they criticize in the limelight.

While we had expected, in line with Bounegru and Forceville (2011), to find many recurring instantiations of the same few source domains to characterize Wilders, this turned out not to be the case. Indeed, only a few source domains occurred more than once; most of them were unique. We can only speculate about the reasons for what was, for us, this unexpected result. The cartoon metaphors we studied in Bounegru

and Forceville (2011) (a) pertained to an event (FINANCIAL CRISIS) that affected the whole world rather than a person in a specific culture; (b) were all published in a very short period of time (two weeks in October 2008); and (c) originally appeared in newspapers all around the world. This means that cartoonists had to come up very quickly with an appropriate metaphorical source domain, and – being artists, not financial experts – perhaps inevitably fell back on the same few “embodied”, source domain scenarios (such as NATURAL DISASTER) that would be universally understood. Moreover, these cartoons all appeared more or less simultaneously, in different cultures and languages, so the cartoons would not be so easily judged unoriginal. By contrast, the metaphors examined here pertain to a specific *person* who moreover behaves differently in different situations over a period of 12 years, in cartoons that were all published in Dutch media. One may expect that Dutch cartoonists closely monitor each other’s work, and would want to be as original as possible and thus avoid using the same metaphorical source domains as their colleagues.

Nonetheless, a few source domains recurred and were moreover uniquely used to characterize Wilders. The FOUL-EXUDING CREATURE domain particularly stands out, as it represents behaviour unworthy of serious politicians of any persuasion. Like the BABY/CHILD domain, it emphasizes immaturity and lack of self-control; and with the BOMB and HORROR FILM MONSTER domains it shares the characteristic of being potentially harmful. Incidentally, a search on Google Images using “Geert Wilders” and “political cartoon” as filters, as well as our own non-systematic monitoring in newspapers, yields several other cartoons exemplifying source domains we found recurring in our corpus, notably FOUL-EXUDING CREATURE, BABY and BOMB. These source domains, then, probably are quite typical of cartoonists’ views of Geert Wilders.

The fact that most of the metaphorical source domains associated with Wilders, and with other party leaders, however, are unique ones, suggests that analyzing metaphorical cartoons portraying politicians requires researchers to take into account the highly specific context of the socio-political situation they satirize.

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Notes

- 1 Information about Wilders comes from <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Geert-Wilders> and https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geert_Wilders (both last accessed 10-7-18), and the authors’ first-hand knowledge.

- 2 See <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Geert-Wilders> (last accessed 5-2-19).
- 3 See at <https://www.nu.nl/verkiezingen-2017/4560714/vvd-en-cda-willen-niet-met-pvv-tafel.html> (last accessed 10-7-18).
- 4 See e.g. “Wilders wil ‘kopvoddentaks’”, *Trouw*, 16 September 2009. <https://www.trouw.nl/home/wilders-wil-kopvoddentaks~ad027ad3/> (last accessed 10-7-18).
- 5 See e.g. “Wilders wil veelplegers in ‘tuigdorp’”, *De Volkskrant*, 10 February 2011, <https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/wilders-wil-veelplegers-in-tuigdorp~b9a877b1/> (last accessed 10-7-2018).
- 6 See Forceville (1996), and Forceville (2016) for a recent discussion.
- 7 See Bateman (2014) for a survey of approaches.
- 8 See and Forceville et al. (2014) for discussion of these labels.
- 9 The unlikely coalition between the Liberal-conservative VVD and the Labour-party PvdA resulted in several “courting” scenarios featuring party leaders Rutte and Samsom in 2012.

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