


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# The limits of analogy: comparing Islamophobia and antisemitism

**BRIAN KLUG**

**ABSTRACT** The predicament faced by Muslims today, either in the United Kingdom specifically or in the West more generally, is often compared with the predicament faced by Jews at some point in the past. Muslims, it is suggested, are the new Jews. Klug's article homes in on one element in this view, the claim that Islamophobia is the new antisemitism, and considers the analogy between them. An introductory section sketches the political context, after which Klug focuses on logical or conceptual issues. The two middle sections contain the core of the analysis: consideration of the two terms 'antisemitism' and 'Islamophobia' in relation to the concepts they denote, followed by an examination of the concepts as such. Certain conclusions are drawn about both their *general* logic and their *specific* logics. The final section returns to the political context and, via critique of a thesis put forward by Matti Bunzl, discusses the uses of the analogy. Klug argues that the question we need to ask is not 'Are Islamophobia and antisemitism analogous?' but 'What is the analogy worth?' The value of the analogy lies in the light it sheds on the social and political realities that confront us in the here and now. Does it illuminate more than it obscures? These things are a matter of judgement. Klug leans towards asserting an analogy between antisemitism in the past and Islamophobia in the present, within limits.

**KEYWORDS** analogy, antisemitism, Islamophobia, limits, new Jews, Muslims, new antisemitism

## Are Muslims the new Jews?

In July 2008 Shahid Malik, the first Muslim minister in a British government, gave an interview for a Channel 4 *Dispatches* programme that marked the third anniversary of 7/7, the London bombings that took place on 7 July 2005.<sup>1</sup> He said: 'I think most people would agree that if you ask Muslims today what do they feel like, they feel like the Jews of Europe.' He immediately clarified what he meant: 'I don't mean to equate that with the Holocaust but in the way that it was legitimate almost—and still is in some parts—to target Jews, many Muslims would say that we feel the exact same way.' He spoke as someone

1 At the time, Malik was International Development Minister in the New Labour government of Gordon Brown. Subsequently, he was Justice Minister, Home Office Minister and Minister for Race, Faith and Community Cohesion.

who is the regular recipient of hate mail and whose car had been firebombed.<sup>2</sup>

A *Daily Mail* headline paraphrased his remarks as 'We Muslims Are the New Jews'.<sup>3</sup> In what seems a direct riposte, the *Jewish Chronicle* the following week used the headline 'No, Muslims Are Not "New Jews"' for an opinion piece in which Miriam Shahiv took the minister to task: 'For Mr Malik ... to use the Jews in order to claim the mantle of victimhood ... is cynical in the extreme.' She rejected any suggestion that 'UK Muslims today' face the persecution meted out to 'Europe's Jews under the Nazis'. 'It is,' she wrote, 'a perverse comparison'.<sup>4</sup>

Shahiv went on to say that 'the accusation has become fashionable'. She is right if she means that the predicament faced by Muslims today, either in the United Kingdom specifically or in the West more generally, is often compared with the predicament faced by Jews in the past; sometimes the parallel is with Jewish immigrants to Britain from Eastern Europe at the turn of the last century, at other times it is with Nazi Germany in the 1930s. On the other hand, normally the comparison is qualified, Malik's comments being a case in point. And, as the two newspaper headlines I have quoted illustrate, as strongly as the parallel is asserted by some, it is denied by others. Moreover, 'accusation' puts an aggressive spin on the minister's remarks, while 'fashionable' implies a view that is either superficial or transitory or both. Thus, aspersion is cast on his point simply by the phrase that alludes to it.

This rhetoric is not surprising in a public debate that is deeply political. Part of the political context is demographic change in the United Kingdom since the Second World War, which, due largely to immigration from former colonies in South Asia, has led to a significant increase in the size of the Muslim population. A further factor is the international climate, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent escalation of conflict in the Middle East that brought a number of western states, including Britain, into direct confrontation with several countries with majority Muslim populations. During this same period, the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had a knock-on effect at home, with sympathies among British Muslims and Jews tending, on the whole, to be on opposite sides. Other

2 'Muslims "under siege like Jews"', *BBC News*, 4 July 2008, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/7489392.stm> (viewed 4 August 2014).

3 Steve Doughty, "'We Muslims are the new Jews' says MP who has been victim of a hit-and-run and a firebomb attack', *Daily Mail*, 4 July 2008. Two years earlier, in her piece 'Muslims are the new Jews' published in the *Sunday Times* (15 October 2006), India Knight called Muslims 'the new Jews': cited in the editors' introduction in Ansari Humayun and Farid Hafez (eds), *From the Far Right to the Mainstream: Islamophobia in Party Politics and the Media* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag 2012), 21. Earlier that year, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown wrote: 'Today the new Jews of Europe are Muslims' ('Why Muslims must remember the Holocaust', *Independent*, 23 January 2006).

4 Miriam Shahiv, 'No, Muslims are not "new Jews"', *Jewish Chronicle*, 11 July 2008, 31. For a similar approach, see Norman Lebrecht, 'No, Muslims are not the "new Jews"', *Evening Standard*, 6 February 2007.

factors play a part in setting the scene. At the end of this article I shall return, albeit briefly, to this political context.

The claim that I shall be discussing is narrower than the claim that Muslims today are the new Jews. It is the claim, in the words of the Australian political commentator Guy Rundle, that 'Islamophobia is the new anti-Semitism'.<sup>5</sup> Even my discussion of *this* claim will be sharply curtailed, as I shall shortly explain. The claim is narrower because it focuses on that element in the treatment of Muslims and Jews that can be assigned to a specific bigotry aimed at them *as* Muslims and *as* Jews.<sup>6</sup> In practice, when we analyse cases in which minority ethnic or religious groups in society are disadvantaged or regarded negatively, it is not always easy to divide the pie of hostility between, say, xenophobia, nationalism, anti-immigration sentiment (if the group are relative newcomers), general racism or a specific form of bigotry aimed at their ethnic or religious identity. Moreover, in the real world these factors tend to overlap and there is often a synergy among them, compounding the general misery of the group in question. Nevertheless, for purposes of analysis, we need to try to pick apart these different factors. Islamophobia is a significant ingredient in the hostility aimed at people who are Muslim, and typically the idea that Islamophobia is the new antisemitism is part and parcel of what people mean when they say that Muslims are the new Jews.

Let me first clear up two possible misconceptions to which the language we are using could give rise. A copious literature exists on the subject of 'new antisemitism'. This is the view that hostility to Israel or Zionism constitutes a new form of antisemitism.<sup>7</sup> But when Rundle and others say that Islamophobia is the new antisemitism they are certainly not equating it with hostility to Zionism or Israel. Furthermore, they are not *equating* it with anything at all; they are asserting an equivalence. The 'is' in 'Islamophobia is the new antisemitism' should be read as 'is equivalent to' or 'is strongly like', with 'new antisemitism' replaced by 'antisemitism in the past'. In other words, 'Islamophobia is the new antisemitism' is a hyperbolic way of saying that Islamophobia today is equivalent to—or strongly analogous to—the antisemitism of yesteryear. Conversely, the 'is not' in 'Islamophobia is not the new antisemitism' really means 'is not remotely like' the antisemitism of

5 Guy Rundle, 'Rundle: what's with Galliano, Gibson 'n' Sheen's anti-Semitism?', *Crikey* (online), 8 March 2011, available at [www.crikey.com.au/2011/03/08/rundle-whats-with-galliano-gibson-n-sheens-anti-semitism/?wpmp\\_switcher=mobile](http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/03/08/rundle-whats-with-galliano-gibson-n-sheens-anti-semitism/?wpmp_switcher=mobile); see also Mya Guarneri, 'Islamophobia: the new antisemitism', 26 August 2010, available on the *Guardian's Comment Is Free* webpages at [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-america/2010/aug/26/islam-religion](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-america/2010/aug/26/islam-religion); and Daniel Luban, 'The new anti-Semitism', *Tablet* (online), 19 August 2010, available at [www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/43069/the-new-anti-semitism-2#](http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/43069/the-new-anti-semitism-2#) (all viewed 3 August 2014).

6 'Bigotry' might not be an adequate term. I use it as a place-marker only.

7 See Brian Klug, 'Interrogating "new anti-Semitism"', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2013, 468–82.

yesteryear. The same logic applies with 'Muslims are the new Jews', and its negation 'Muslims are not the new Jews'.

Actually, the claim is twofold: it makes a comparison with antisemitism in the past *and* it asserts that Islamophobia has replaced or superseded antisemitism in the present. One response to the second claim is to say, as one blogger on *Standpoint's* website puts it, that 'anti-Semitism is the "new anti-Semitism"'.<sup>8</sup> In other words, antisemitism has not gone away: it is as virulent as ever, and bigotry against Muslims (or any other group) has not taken its place. Much of the time, the protagonists on either side of this argument engage in a slinging (as well as slanging) match, hurling rival sets of statistics at each other to show either that Jews are at greater risk from antisemitism today than Muslims are from Islamophobia or vice versa. I would not want to act as umpire. Survey data and other social statistics can be notoriously unreliable or misleading; the very fact that there appears to be conflicting evidence testifies to this.<sup>9</sup> Numbers must be scrutinized and contextualized before they can be interpreted. The claim that Islamophobia has taken the place of antisemitism calls for this sort of attention and much else. But I shall put all this to one side as my interest is in the first claim: the analogy.

Are Islamophobia and antisemitism—whether past or present—analogous? Analogies in general have two curious properties. On the one hand, they can be stretched so thin that almost anything can be said to be like almost anything else: all you have to do is specify one or more properties that A and B have in common and you have grounds for asserting a similarity between them, even if in all other respects A and B differ. On the other hand, there is no such thing as a *perfect* analogy: if A and B are exactly alike in every respect then they are identical rather than analogous. All analogies are limited but some are more limited than others. The question, then, becomes this: how limited is the analogy between Islamophobia and antisemitism? Is the analogy strong or weak?

How do you assess an analogy? Matti Bunzl, who has published in this area, points out that 'if one undertakes a comparison—as anthropologists, sociologists, or historians do—in the broadest sense we can always find, between essentially any two groups, similarities and differences'. He adds: 'And it is often a political choice or an analytic choice whether we want to

8 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, 'The new anti-Semitism?', 23 November 2010, blog available on the *Standpoint* website at <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/3608> (viewed 3 August 2014).

9 For example, Miriam Shahiv, citing 'police figures from 2006', says that in Britain today 'Jews are four times more likely to be physically attacked because of their religion than Muslims' (Shahiv, 'No, Muslims are not "new Jews"'). On the other hand, figures for London produced by Scotland Yard and the Greater London authority in 2005 suggest that people from a number of predominantly Muslim states are twelve to thirteen times more likely to be 'the victim of a racial crime' than a white European, while a Jewish person is 'three times as likely to be subject to a racially or religiously aggravated crime' (Hugh Muir, 'Report reveals hierarchy of hate', *Guardian*, 7 March 2005).

foreground the similarities or the differences.<sup>10</sup> This is a helpful observation but it calls for clarification. We can choose the basis for comparing two phenomena A and B and, having chosen, we can select those similarities or differences that we wish to emphasize or de-emphasize. *Politically*, these choices reflect the larger agenda that we are promoting. *Analytically*, they depend on the enquiry that we are pursuing. But, either way, we cannot determine by choice whether A and B do or do not have certain features in common. If we could, then analogy would be purely in the eye of the beholder and there would be no room for rational argument. So, for example, Bunzl foregrounds what he sees as the *differences* between Islamophobia and antisemitism. This is because his interest lies in how they function and he wants to emphasize what he sees as a crucial difference: the difference between the historical role played by antisemitism in protecting the purity of the ethnic nation-state and the current role played by Islamophobia in the project of creating a new Europe.<sup>11</sup> Whether he is right about this or not is not the point. (I shall revisit his thesis in the final section.) The point, in the first place, is this: while he can choose to examine the analogy from the point of view of function, the question of whether antisemitism and Islamophobia do function differently is not in his gift; it is a matter for investigation and argument. And, of course, he is well aware of that and, for this reason, includes six critical responses to his thesis in his book.<sup>12</sup> Second, function is only one basis for the analogy. We can ask other questions. Are the two phenomena alike in terms of their sources or causes? Do they have a similar impact on the lives of Jews and Muslims? Is the scale of bigotry comparable? And so on. How we assess the analogy depends, in the first place, on which question we are asking.

Thus, there is no single question 'Are Islamophobia and antisemitism analogous?' and no single answer: this, if you like, is the first limit to the analogy. The questions pile up—far too many for one article—and I shall not even try to address most of them. This article is intended only as a small contribution—a kind of propaedeutic—to a larger enterprise: comparing Islamophobia and antisemitism. This itself is part of the still larger question about whether Muslims today are or are not the 'new Jews', which in turn is one element of an enquiry into the state of pluralism in Britain and other western societies today. As an academic philosopher, my focus is primarily on logical or conceptual issues, though it is impossible to avoid the odd fact and the occasional excursion into history. Other issues call for work in other disciplines. The analysis in the next two sections is the core of the article. I begin by discussing the two terms and their relation to the concepts they

10 Sindre Bangstad and Matti Bunzl, "'Anthropologists are talking" about Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in the new Europe', *Ethnos*, vol. 75, no. 2, 2010, 213–28 (215).

11 Matti Bunzl, *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press 2007).

12 *Ibid.* The responses are by Dan Diner, Paul Silverstein, Adam Sutcliffe, Esther Benbassa, Susan Buck-Morss and myself.

denote, after which I concentrate on the concepts themselves, comparing them in terms of both form and content. Finally, taking a step beyond my self-imposed brief, I return to the wider political context and comment on Bunzl's thesis.

## Word and concept

Any analogy between Islamophobia and antisemitism might, at first sight, seem to fall at the first hurdle: the terms themselves. In both the public debate and the more scholarly literature, a great deal of attention is paid to these terms, as if a great deal hangs on the matter. Commentators point out that both words are complex; and, assuming that a word is the sum of its parts, they proceed to enumerate the differences of meaning by adding up the parts. 'Antisemitism' is the product of placing the prefix 'anti' before the substantive 'Semitism'.<sup>13</sup> 'Islamophobia' combines 'Islam' with 'phobia'. Now, 'Islam' names a religion, while 'Semitism' (at the time that 'antisemitism' was coined) signified 'a body of uniformly negative traits supposedly clinging to Jews'.<sup>14</sup> 'Phobia' means fear, 'anti' indicates opposition. Put the parts together and what do you get? What you seem to get, in the one case, is opposition to a particular group (or the traits ascribed to them), and, in the other, fear and trembling in the face of a certain religion. These are not similar. They could hardly be more different.

But is this the way to understand the meaning of words? Salman Sayyid refers to this species of reasoning as 'etymological fundamentalism'.<sup>15</sup> It consists in thinking that the meaning of a word—the concept for which it stands—is given by its semantic origins. You could also call it a form of literalism. Or, to use an analogy (which naturally isn't perfect), imagine asking someone what a pen is and they answer: a pen is a thin object, normally made of metal or plastic, usually about six inches long. Just as the etymological fundamentalist reduces a word to the parts that make it up, so this answer reduces the pen to its material properties; consequently, it fails to explain what a pen *is*. So, what is a pen? It is a writing implement of a certain kind. To understand the concept it is necessary to look beyond the list of the pen's physical properties and grasp the use to which it is put. Similarly, to understand the concepts of antisemitism and Islamophobia we must look at how the words are used. Wittgenstein remarks: 'For a *large* class of

13 Richard S. Levy, 'Antisemitism, etymology of', in Richard S. Levy (ed.), *Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution*, 2 vols (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO 2005), I, 24–5 (24). The word can also be looked at as a combination of two affixes, 'anti' and 'ism', plus the stem 'Semite'; it comes to the same thing.

14 Ibid.

15 Salman Sayyid, 'Out of the devil's dictionary', in Salman Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil (eds), *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives* (London: Hurst 2010), 5–18 (13).



cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.<sup>16</sup> ‘Islamophobia’ and ‘antisemitism’ fall into this class. If, despite the disparities in the origin and composition of the two words, their uses turn out to be similar, then the analogy clears the first hurdle.

There are a number of related fallacies that suffer from the same fault, namely, making a fetish out of the words. So, for example, again and again I have run into the view that antisemitism is aimed at Arabs as well as Jews as both groups are ‘Semites’. But, setting aside the dodginess of the category ‘Semite’, the word ‘antisemitism’ in practice singles out Jews. This, its use in the language, is its meaning. As regards Islamophobia, some scholars prefer the term ‘anti-Muslim racism’, others have argued for ‘anti-Muslimism’ or ‘Muslimophobia’.<sup>17</sup> There is a similar debate over the word ‘antisemitism’, with ‘anti-Jewish racism’ and ‘Judaophobia’ among the alternatives. To which Wittgenstein’s response to an interlocutor in another context seems apt: ‘Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts.’<sup>18</sup> The word ‘Islamophobia’, as Kofi Annan lamented in 2004, has come into use in order to name a reality: ‘... when the world is compelled to coin a new term to take account of increasingly widespread bigotry, that is a sad and troubling development. Such is the case with Islamophobia.’<sup>19</sup> This brand of bigotry is the same by any other name, so choose another name if you will; but once a word is out of the box and into the language it takes on a life of its own. ‘Islamophobia’ has caught on. No one can be compelled to use it but it is too late for a committee of academics to veto it. Like it or not, we are stuck with it. Rather than pursue a fruitless debate over the felicitousness or otherwise of the word, which I shall continue to use, better to pay attention to the concept, for the concept has arrived.<sup>20</sup>

16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell 1958), 20.

17 Fred Halliday, for example, argues that ‘the more accurate term is not “Islamophobia” but “anti-Muslimism”’: Fred Halliday, ‘“Islamophobia” reconsidered’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 22, no. 5, 1999, 892–902 (898). See also his *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris 1996), ch. 6, in which he introduces the term ‘anti-Muslimism’.

18 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 37. The interlocutor is imaginary (and could be himself).

19 ‘Secretary-General, addressing headquarters seminar on confronting Islamophobia, stresses importance of leadership, two-way integration, dialogue’, press release, 7 December 2004, available on the UN website at [www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9637.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9637.doc.htm) (viewed 6 August 2014). Annan, who was Secretary-General at the time, was addressing a UN Department of Public Information seminar in New York. The French *islamophobie* has been traced back to 1918: see AbdoolKarim Vakil, ‘Is the Islam in Islamophobia the same as the Islam in anti-Islam; or, when is it Islamophobia time?’, in Sayyid and Vakil (eds), *Thinking Through Islamophobia*, 23–43 (38).

20 As with antisemitism, there is always room for debate about what account to give of the concept and of its relationship to neighbouring concepts, such as xenophobia. But the claim that it has no basis in reality does not hold up. See Brian Klug, ‘Islamophobia: a concept comes of age’, *Ethnicities*, vol. 12, no. 5, 2012, 665–81.

The concept of antisemitism provides a good example of the way a word evolves once it escapes into the world. *Antisemitismus* is a term that was coined in a particular place and epoch: Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century. New terms are coined for a reason. The reason in this case was to mark a departure from the old hatred of Jews with its vulgar name: *Judenhass*.<sup>21</sup> The new term was a highfalutin' word for a secular idea that reflected advances in modern science, especially the 'science' of race; and racial ideas were fundamental to the *völkisch* nationalism that was on the rise and that led to the National Socialism of the Nazi era. Thus the term 'antisemitism' was initially associated with a quite specific phenomenon: a biologically based conception of Jewish identity and a political movement rooted in a racial ideology. But, despite the practice of some academics who prefer to confine the word to its original, narrow sense, the word is out of the box. Today, in its usual, everyday employment, 'antisemitism' covers a broad spectrum of hostile attitudes and acts directed at Jews, whether those acts and attitudes are based in biological racism or not. Moreover, the reach of the word now spans the centuries. We speak of antisemitism in antiquity and of antisemitism today. This is how the word has come to be used; this is what it has come to mean. Neither its etymology nor its provenance determines its meaning; only its use in the language does.

### Form and content

At the heart of the concept of antisemitism is not so much the Jew as the 'Jew'.<sup>22</sup> The scare quotes indicate that this is essentially a figment, a figure of fantasy or myth. I say *essentially* because it can happen that there are individuals who are Jewish and resemble this figure, but this does not make the figure any more real: it merely muddies the waters by imparting an empirical sheen to the stereotype. The stereotype is a frozen image projected on to the screen of a living person; the fact that the image might on occasion fit the reality does not affect its status as image. Or to make the same point in a different idiom: the logic of antisemitism in its formative stages might well be inductive, going from 'J, who is Jewish, is powerful and wealthy' to 'hence, Jews in general are', and ending up being deductive: 'Jews are powerful and wealthy, just look at J.' The 'Jew' becomes a priori.<sup>23</sup>

21 Ali Rattansi, *Racism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 5.

See also Richard L. Rubenstein and John K. Roth, *Approaches to Auschwitz: The Holocaust and Its Legacy* (Atlanta: John Knox Press 1987), 28.

22 The analysis of antisemitism in this section follows the analysis I first gave in 'The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism', *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 37, no. 2, 2003, 117–38.

23 Similarly, Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood have observed: 'What we are now witnessing in the treatment of Muslims in the West is the shift from inductive to deductive generalisations about them': 'Liberal democracy, multicultural citizenship and the Danish cartoon affair', in Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood (eds),

Consider the case of Peter Rachman, whose name has become synonymous with 'slum landlord'.<sup>24</sup> In the 1950s, Rachman ruled over a property empire based in the Notting Hill area of west London, charging his low-income tenants high rents that they could barely afford. Rachman was Jewish. He was also, apparently, money-grubbing, unscrupulous, shady, exploitative: stock themes in the figure of the 'Jew'. Thus he was also 'Jewish'. Antisemitism consists in collapsing this distinction so that to be Jewish is to be 'Jewish'. The image, so to speak, fastens on to the reality: it *uses* the reality to proclaim itself falsely as real.

It is the same with Islamophobia. The same collusion, as it were, between reality and image occurred in May 2013 with the 'Woolwich attack', when an off-duty British army soldier, Lee Rigby, was attacked and killed by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. The *Daily Telegraph* reported that the men, described as 'Islamist terrorists', 'attempted to behead the soldier, hacking at him "like a piece of meat"'. One of them, 'holding a knife and a meat cleaver and with his hands dripping with blood' spoke into a witness's video phone, swearing 'by almighty Allah' and declaring: 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' As they carried out the attack, 'one of the men shouted "Allahu akbar", or God is Great', while, according to another witness, 'they appeared to pray next to the body as if the soldier were a "sacrifice"'.<sup>25</sup> These descriptions could almost have been lifted from a manual of negative stereotypes of Islam. Almost every major trope is there: backwardness, callousness, bloodiness, an ethic of revenge, mindless worship of a merciless God and so on. Thus the perpetrators were not only Muslim, they were also 'Muslim': they acted out the script written into the Islamophobic figure of the 'Muslim' before the eyes of witnesses. The witnesses did not imagine what they saw. The attack really occurred. Nonetheless the *figure* is not real: it is no less fantastic—in the sense of being an image projected on to Muslims collectively—for having been incarnated on the streets of Woolwich.

I speak of *the* figure of the Muslim and *the* figure of the Jew. This might suggest that at the heart of the concepts of Islamophobia and antisemitism is a fixed, finite stereotype that does not change over time. But this is not the case. Nor does it need to be the case. It is tempting to think that, if the stereotype changes, then the concept changes. But this is a misconception about concepts, the kind that Wittgenstein tackles in his later work. In *The Blue Book* he points out that there is a 'tendency to look for something in common

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*Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009), 216–42 (239). See also Nasar Meer, 'Semantics, scales and solidarities in the study of antisemitism and Islamophobia', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2013, 500–15 (503).

24 'Rachmanism' is a word in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. Rachman's exploits (or exploitations) led to the Rent Act of 1965 that gave tenants security of tenure.

25 Gordon Rayner and Steven Swinford, 'Woolwich attack: terrorist proclaimed "an eye for an eye" after attack', *Daily Telegraph*, 22 May 2013.

to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term'. He explains, using the example of 'game':

We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term 'game' to the various games; whereas games form a *family* the members of which have family likenesses.<sup>26</sup>

The same can be said about the concepts of antisemitism and Islamophobia. Indeed, this is what one of the editors of *Thinking Through Islamophobia*, a volume of essays by twenty-eight different authors, *does* say: the aim of the book is to think Islamophobia 'through the notion of a family resemblance based on overlapping similarities'.<sup>27</sup>

One way of taking up this insight is to parse the two concepts into form and content. So, in the case of antisemitism, we can say that the *form* of the concept—the form of the figure at its heart—is this: 'to be a Jew is to have traits a, b, c ...', as though those traits constitute the being or essence of a Jew. The *content* of the concept would be a set or subset of traits that flesh out the form, describing what the 'Jew' is like; for example, arrogant, legalistic, cunning, conniving, clannish, rootless, parasitic, power-grabbing, money-grubbing and so on. At any given moment in time, the set is open-ended. And, as time passes, new traits might be added while others drop out. Moreover, in different instances of antisemitism different traits or combinations of traits might be selected or emphasized. But there is a family resemblance between the different instances that holds the concept together. Thus, the 'Semite' of 'antisemitism' is the *Jude* of *Judenhass* in modern dress: the figures are similar. This is what enables the scope of 'antisemitism' to expand, reaching backwards to cover what used to be called *Judenhass*, and forward to today, when the antisemite does not necessarily reduce Jewishness to biology. The use of the same word to span the centuries does not mean that there is a single, unchanging phenomenon that it names (though some people maintain that there is). It merely reflects the way that concepts in general work: they work, to use a Wittgensteinian metaphor, like a length of rope whose strength 'does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres'.<sup>28</sup> The overlapping sets of defining traits inserted into the empty form 'to be a Jew is to have traits a, b, c ...' are what constitute *the* figure of the 'Jew'.<sup>29</sup>

26 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations'* (Oxford: Blackwell 1969), 17.

27 Salman Sayyid, "'Thinking through Islamophobia'", in Sayyid and Vakil (eds), *Thinking Through Islamophobia*, 1–4 (2).

28 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 32.

29 This oversimplifies it. The figure of the 'Jew' is not just the sum of its traits but the character that results from the way those traits are put together. Even this is too quick, but it must suffice for the present purpose.

It is the same, *mutatis mutandis*, with Islamophobia; and in this point of similarity the analogy between the two concepts is at its strongest. They share the same general logic. Interestingly, in his study of websites on which Jews and Muslims are the butt of malicious so-called humour, Simon Weaver concludes that 'the underlying logic of racism is the same' in both cases.<sup>30</sup> Taking his cue from the work of Michel Wieviorka, he argues that there is a 'dual logic' in racism: it either excludes the Other from society altogether or includes the Other as an inferior.<sup>31</sup> This makes the concept of the Other fundamental to the underlying logic of racism, and it implies that the Other is the general category under which the figures of 'Jew' and 'Muslim' can be subsumed. Now, the category of the Other can be given by the formula, 'to be X is to have traits a, b, c ...', in which the list of traits differentiates the Other from the insider. Thus, when we abstract the schemata of the concepts, we can see that 'Jew' and 'Muslim' share the logic of the Other. Sharing the same *form*, they share the same *general* logic.

The *specific* logic of antisemitism and Islamophobia, however, is determined by the *content* of the concepts. That is to say, in each case, there is a particular bigoted discourse, and this discourse is shaped by the particular traits that make up the figures of 'Jew' and 'Muslim', respectively. And here the comparison becomes complicated. I shall speak first about similarities and then about differences.

Since both are forms of Othering, it is not surprising if the figures of 'Muslim' and Jew' have certain attributes in common: attributes they share with other Others. But, over and above this, Judaism and Islam share a similar fate in certain ways. First, they are both religions with, moreover, a troubled relationship to Christianity. Second, they were thrown together in the Enlightenment. Third, they are both part of the history of what Edward Said calls 'Orientalism'.<sup>32</sup> These three ways overlap and between them give rise to a number of affinities between antisemitism and Islamophobia. I shall comment on them briefly.

First, Judaism and Islam are religions.<sup>33</sup> This is not to say that either Islamophobia or antisemitism is reducible to religious bigotry, though both can be expressed by attacking the religion in question. Nor is it to suggest that only Muslims and Jews who are devout are at risk. But, as the press coverage of the Woolwich attack reminds us, the religions provide material that is grist for the racist mill. The so-called *lex talionis*, 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a

30 Simon Weaver, 'A rhetorical discourse analysis of online anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic jokes', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2013, 483–99 (483). On the other hand, he found that 'the stereotypes and exclusions of Muslims and Jews presented in the jokes are not the same' (483).

31 *Ibid.*, 485.

32 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books 1979).

33 Elsewhere I have argued against the idea that Judaism can be adequately summed up as a religion: see Brian Klug, *Offence: The Jewish Case* (London: Seagull Books 2009), 5–27. But let that pass.

tooth', cited by one of the perpetrators of the attack, is not only in Exodus (21:23–5) but also in the Qur'an (5:45), which refers to the Exodus passage. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus refers to the same passage, but as a foil: he advocates turning the other cheek as a superior ethic (Matthew 5:38–9). From this teaching there developed over the centuries a persistent and powerful binary in Christian polemics, with Christianity on the side of the angelic—the loving, the forbearing, the forgiving—and Judaism and Islam occupying the other side: the legalistic, the vengeful, the merciless. This binary morphs into a duality between Us and Them, in which the Us is conceived as 'western' or 'British', and which is played out on many different sites. One familiar site is the controversy over 'ritual slaughter', in which Jewish and Muslim methods of killing animals for food are singled out and targeted in the name of kindness to animals. Some of the phrases and images in the *Daily Telegraph* article that I cited earlier—the barbarism, the slaughterer with hands 'dripping with blood' and the description of the victim as a 'sacrifice'—are commonplaces in the periodic campaigns on this issue, peppering the polemic against Muslim and Jewish practices.<sup>34</sup>

The Enlightenment, by and large, assimilated and secularized the predominantly negative narrative about Islam and Judaism handed down to it by the very Christianity that it saw itself as overturning. The two religions tended to be seen as antithetical to the Enlightenment project: the project of promoting reason over unreason, science over myth, freedom over tyranny and so on.<sup>35</sup> As such, their unsavoury images overlapped. Furthermore, not only was Islam firmly located in the East by Enlightenment thinkers, but Judaism was widely seen as an Eastern interloper, the Jews as the Oriental within, 'the Asiatics of Europe', in Herder's phrase.<sup>36</sup> 'The standard image of the Jews in eighteenth-century British caricature', Sander Gilman tells us, 'was the Maltese Jew in his oriental turban'.<sup>37</sup> To Said, the connections are so

34 See Brian Klug, 'Ritual murmur: the undercurrent of protest against religious slaughter of animals in Britain in the 1980s', *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1989, 16–28. See also Tony Kushner, 'Stunning intolerance: opposition to religious slaughter in twentieth-century Britain', *Jewish Quarterly*, no. 133, 1989, 16–20.

35 I develop this theme in 'Dealing with difference: Jews, Muslims and the British left today', lecture delivered in the European Leo Baeck Lecture Series, London, 16 May 2013, unpublished but a podcast is available on the *German Historical Institute* website at [www.ghil.ac.uk/download/podcast/2013-05-16\\_Klug.mp3](http://www.ghil.ac.uk/download/podcast/2013-05-16_Klug.mp3) (viewed 6 August 2014).

36 Johann Gottfried Herder, quoted in Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, 'Orientalism and the Jews: an introduction', in Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar (eds), *Orientalism and the Jews* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press 2005), xiii–xl (xiv). Herder (1744–1803) is a figure of both the Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction that followed. Kalmar and Penslar observe: 'orientalist depiction of the Jews was common in the late eighteenth century' (xvi). It persisted into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

37 Sander L. Gilman, 'Can the experience of diaspora Judaism serve as a model for Islam in today's multicultural Europe?', in Sander L. Gilman, *Multiculturalism and the Jews* (London and New York: Routledge 2006), 1–22 (8).

intimate that in the introduction to *Orientalism* he goes so far as to say: 'I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of Western anti-Semitism.'<sup>38</sup>

There is, however, a limit to the sharing. Even commentators who, in Matti Bunzl's word, foreground the similarities between Islamophobia and antisemitism, acknowledge this limit. Take Thomas Linehan, who points out 'discernible and significant analogies in the content of earlier antisemitism and the content of later Islamophobia'. He believes that these analogies 'help shed light on the nature of the latter'. But he concedes that 'there are some significant points of divergence'.<sup>39</sup> He mentions two. First, while there is an antisemitic trope of the stubborn Jew stuck in antiquity, there is also, paradoxically, the image of the rootless Jew as the agent of materialistic modernity, threatening traditional values and ways of life.<sup>40</sup> There is no counterpart to this in the figure of the 'Muslim'. Second, in contrast with the antisemitic image of the money-making Jew, Muslims are not, according to Linehan, correlated with capitalism in Islamophobic discourse. He adds: 'neither is there an equivalent discourse alleging Muslim control and orchestration of international finance, as in the Jewish "hidden hand" myth.'<sup>41</sup> This amounts to a third point of divergence, since the 'hidden hand' of the 'Jew' has a wider reach, controlling not only the banks and markets but also the corridors of political power. As Nasar Meer and Tehseen Noorani observe: 'it appears that a recurring feature of anti-Semitism [is] the way in which Jewish minorities were imagined to be exercising a hidden power, which contrasts with the way in which Muslims are currently represented.'<sup>42</sup>

That said, several commentators draw a parallel between the antisemitic *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and the Islamophobic 'theory' of Eurabia, in which Muslims are, in the words of Matthew Carr, 'agents in a conspiratorial program of world domination'.<sup>43</sup> We leave the charming *Arabian Nights* behind and enter an alarming Eurabian nightmare in which 'a masochistic and suicidal Europe' surrenders to 'Islamic cultural and religious domination'.<sup>44</sup> This scenario of invasion and domination of a weak and abject Europe

38 Said, *Orientalism*, 27. There is a voluminous literature on Said's general thesis about Orientalism as well as his specific take on antisemitism.

39 Thomas Linehan, 'Comparing antisemitism, Islamophobia, and asylophobia: the British case', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2012, 366–86 (380).

40 I have slightly embellished what Linehan says.

41 Linehan, 'Comparing antisemitism, Islamophobia, and asylophobia', 380.

42 Nasar Meer and Tehseen Noorani, 'A sociological comparison of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain', *Sociological Review*, vol. 56, no. 2, 2008, 195–219 (209). This article is notable for its careful, measured approach, drawing attention to significant analogies and disanalogies.

43 Matthew Carr, 'The Moriscos: a lesson from history?', *Arches Quarterly*, vol. 4, no. 8, 2011, 10–17 (14).

44 *Ibid.*, 14.

is reminiscent of the picture of Germany in *Der Sieg des Judenthums über Germanenthum* (The Victory of Judaism over Germandom), the 1879 pamphlet in which Wilhelm Marr laid the basis for his League of Antisemites.<sup>45</sup> But, it could be argued, the 'hidden hand' of the *Protocols* is absent in Eurabia, where the 'Islamicization' of Europe is apparent to the naked eye. There again, Martha Nussbaum believes that 'part of the stereotype (as in the case of Jews in the *Protocols*) is that the enemy is a master of disguises'.<sup>46</sup> She makes this suggestive remark about the popular reaction to Islamic women covering their face: 'The obsessive focus on removing the veil follows a long tradition ... of imagining the existence of a secret conspiracy that will pop out of hiding to kill us when its time is ripe.'<sup>47</sup> This prompts the thought that the Islamic 'hidden face' is the Jewish 'hidden hand'.

But is it? Or is the resemblance superficial? A complex and nuanced account is needed of the connotations of hiddenness in these two contexts. Likewise with the ways in which Judaism and Islam are represented in campaigns against 'ritual slaughter'. How deep do the similarities go? In the Jewish case, there are echoes of the mediaeval 'blood libel' that are missing in the Muslim case. This harks back ultimately to a Christian image of the Jew as Christ-killer, leaving all Jews with blood on their hands. There is no such view of Muslims within Christianity. Equally, notwithstanding the similarities, the treatment of Judaism and Islam in the Enlightenment and in Orientalism are far from identical. How do the differences inflect the specific logics of 'Muslim' and 'Jew'? These questions—and a host of others—call for further analysis and research.

So, are the concepts of antisemitism and Islamophobia analogous? There is no simple answer. Or, rather, the simple answer is: yes and no.<sup>48</sup>

### The uses of analogy

None of this would matter very much were it not for the political context in which the analogy is made and repudiated, and which leads to the questions I have just indicated. The analysis in this article is idle unless it makes a contribution towards clearing away the mists that prevent us from seeing our situation in the world today. The same is true for other work in this area. We need to know whether and how the analogy between Islamophobia and antisemitism—past or present—does or does not shed light on the conflicts and controversies of our time. It is in this spirit that Matti Bunzl wrote the

45 See the excerpt in Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (eds), *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), 331–3.

46 Martha C. Nussbaum, *The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2012), 237.

47 *Ibid.*, 24.

48 Much analysis and research has, of course, been done in this area, but it is scattered and uneven.



perceptive and thought-provoking essay *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia* to which I refer in the introduction and on which I shall reflect in this postscript.

Bunzl acknowledges that there is 'some validity' to the parallel between antisemitism and Islamophobia.<sup>49</sup> But, viewing the two phenomena in terms of their role or function in the bigger political picture, he believes that to 'argue for the fundamental analogy ... is misleading'.<sup>50</sup> As he sees it, 'while anti-Semitism was designed to protect the purity of the ethnic nation-state, Islamophobia is marshalled to safeguard the future of European civilization'.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, on his account, the position of Jews in Europe has changed radically since 1945 with the emergence of a European political project out of the ruins of the Second World War and the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust: 'Jews no longer figure as the principal Other, but as the veritable embodiment of the postnational order.'<sup>52</sup> At the same time, he argues, the far right no longer has Jews in its gunsights: the viewfinder has swivelled and now seeks out Muslims. If anything, far-right parties try to recruit Jews to their anti-Muslim cause, and not without some limited success.<sup>53</sup> In a nutshell: 'Whereas traditional anti-Semitism has run its historical course with the supersession of the nation-state, Islamophobia is rapidly emerging as the defining condition of the new Europe.'<sup>54</sup>

Curiously, Bunzl could have expressed this same thesis by arguing *for* a 'fundamental analogy'; such is the pliability of analogy. Put it this way: what antisemitism was to the project of the ethnic nation-state, Islamophobia is to the project of a postnational Europe. They serve a similar function: each is the Other to the dominant political project of its time. Similarly, when asked the question 'Are Muslims the new Jews of Europe?', Bunzl could have said 'yes', for the reason that they are the defining Other of today, but he replied 'no', for the reason that Muslims are not 'about to be targeted for something like a second Holocaust'.<sup>55</sup> Bunzl chooses to *deny* a 'fundamental analogy' because he wants to emphasize what he sees as a fundamental change in the bigger political picture: the shift from the ethnically pure nation-state to the postnational idea of a unified Europe. And if, despite his insights, I take issue with his attitude towards the analogy, it is not because I think a 'second Holocaust' is on the horizon but because I am not as persuaded as he is that the bigger picture has changed fundamentally.

There are two main reasons for my reservations. First, even in the heyday of ethnic nationalism, an idea of Europe and the superiority of European civilization lurked in the background and came to the surface in antisemitic

49 Bunzl, *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia*, 45.

50 *Ibid.*, 14.

51 *Ibid.*, 45.

52 *Ibid.*, 14.

53 *Ibid.*, 37–43.

54 *Ibid.*, 4.

55 Bangstad and Bunzl, "'Anthropologists are talking' about Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in the new Europe", 214–15.

discourse. Consider this remark: 'It is only when [he] insists upon posing as a European, and being judged as a European, that one realises what an obnoxious creature he is, and how utterly out of place in a European country and in European society.' This is not a latter-day Islamophobe speaking about Muslims but Joseph Banister writing in 1901 in *England under the Jews*.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, beneath the surface of the multiple nationalisms that divided Europe there was a broad-brush racism: for the most part, the various ethnicities were different shades of white, where white was the colour of Europe as distinct from the brown of Asia, the black of Africa and so on. The same passage in Banister illustrates the point. It continues thus: 'His newspaper organs may flatter him by representing him as possessing all the moral and intellectual qualities of the European, but all the same he is an Asiatic, with all the Asiatic's habits, principles, prejudices, ideas and morals.'<sup>57</sup> Banister was an Edwardian antisemite. But this sentence—the second half at least—could almost have fallen from the lips of an Islamophobe today. 'Eurabia' might be 'Eurasia'. So, in both cases and in both eras, there is a *civilizational* discourse that is also *racialized*.<sup>58</sup>

Second, the 'postnational order' does not yet exist. It remains a noble idea, a work in progress with a long way to go before it comes about, if it ever does. Though the hyphen that once linked 'nation' to 'state' might be fading, Europe is still a collection of nations and states; and, while the civil concept of the nation now trumps the ethnic, the 'neutral' liberal state passes laws with a pronounced national accent. I am not thinking only of the way *laïcité* works in France. Nonetheless, it is worth quoting from Paul Silverstein's response to Bunzl's premise about the place of the nation today:

In their experiences of institutionalized discrimination, French Muslim men and women do not, pace Bunzl, face the nation as superceded. They precisely feel excluded from a nation whose citizenship they nominally hold, but whose recent laws ... appear to disproportionately victimize them.<sup>59</sup>

It is similar across much of Europe. It is part of what Shahid Malik was referring to when he spoke about what many Muslims feel today.

56 Joseph Banister, quoted in Bernard Harris, 'Anti-alienism, health and social reform in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain', *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 31, no. 4, 1997, 3–34 (6).

57 Quoted in *ibid.* The passage begins: 'While not possessed of the courage of some Asiatic races, the immateriality of others, and the love of cleanliness of others, [the Jew] is nevertheless a fair specimen of the Asiatic brand of man.' In other words, the Jew is cowardly, materialistic and dirty—classic antisemitic qualities—and thus a poor 'specimen' of the 'brand'. But there *is* a *brand*: a broad racial identity that he calls 'Asiatic'.

58 On Islamophobia as the racialization of Muslims, see Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, 'The racialisation of Muslims', in Sayyid and Vakil (eds), *Thinking Through Islamophobia*, 69–83. See also Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, 'Refutations of racism in the "Muslim question"', *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 43, no. 3–4, 2009, 335–54.

59 Paul Silverstein, 'Comment on Bunzl', in Bunzl, *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia*, 61–8 (63–4).

In short, the old Europe is more like the new Europe, and the new Europe more like the old, than Bunzl's argument assumes. The bigger political picture *has* changed, but perhaps not as much as he suggests. And this affects the question of whether we say that there is a 'fundamental analogy' between the way that Islamophobia functions today and the way antisemitism functioned in the past. Basically, the more the gap between the two Europes shrinks, the stronger the analogy gets and the more pertinent it becomes. In my view, asserting it is more useful than not.<sup>60</sup> It comes to this. The question we need to ask is not 'Are Islamophobia and antisemitism analogous?' but 'What is the analogy worth?' Is it worth asserting or better to deny it? The value of the analogy lies in the light it sheds on the social and political realities that confront us in the here and now. If it illuminates more than it obscures, embrace it. If the opposite, reject it. These things are a matter of judgement. Alluding to the turn of the twentieth century, Maleiha Malik writes: 'Despite important differences, the treatment of British Jews provides an illuminating comparison with contemporary anti-Muslim racism.'<sup>61</sup> On the whole, I agree.<sup>62</sup>

Finally, while Bunzl argues convincingly that in the context of the European Union Jews have moved from being 'the principal Other' to being the 'veritable embodiment' of the postnational idea, I am not so sanguine about the future. On the one hand, as he points out, many far-right parties are wooing Jews with their anti-Muslim agenda and for this reason dropping antisemitism like a hot potato.<sup>63</sup> Meanwhile, Judaism has been written into

60 In an unpublished discussion paper, David Cesarani rejects Bunzl's thesis. His grounds, however, are different from mine. So is his bottom line: the comparison between antisemitism and Islamophobia, in his view, 'is not only inappropriate' but 'positively dangerous' (quoted with permission of the author). See David Cesarani, 'Are Muslims the new Jews? Comparing Islamophobia and anti-semitism in Britain and Europe', 2008, originally a Discussion Paper for the Yale Institute for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism (since closed), now available on the *Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy* at [www.isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/cesarani-paper.doc](http://www.isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/cesarani-paper.doc) (viewed 11 August 2014). See also David Cesarani, 'Why Muslims are not the new Jews', *Jewish Chronicle*, 22 October 2009, and his 'Muslims the "new Jews"? Not by a long way', *Jewish Chronicle*, 17 January 2008. The latter is in part a response to the article by Maleiha Malik cited in the next footnote.

61 Maleiha Malik, 'Muslims are now getting the same treatment Jews had a century ago', *Guardian*, 2 February 2007, available on the *Guardian Comment Is Free* website at [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/feb/02/comment.religion1](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/feb/02/comment.religion1) (viewed 11 August 2014).

62 For a model of how to handle the question with both balance and sensitivity, see Sabine Schiffer and Constantin Wagner, 'Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia—new enemies, old patterns', *Race and Class*, vol. 52, no. 3, 2011, 77–84. See also Nasar Meer (ed.), *Racialization and Religion: Race, Culture and Difference in the Study of Antisemitism and Islamophobia* (London: Routledge 2014). The book was originally published as a special issue of *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2013.

63 Bunzl, *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia*, 37–43; Bangstad and Bunzl, "'Anthropologists are talking" about Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in the new Europe', 225. The far right also leans towards Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thus exploiting a further wedge between Muslims and Jews.

the script of mainstream Europe via the term 'Judaeo-Christian', a cliché that by definition does not include Islam. On the other hand, as Dave Rich of the Community Security Trust observes: 'What targets one community at one time can very easily move on to target another community if the climate changes.'<sup>64</sup> And the climate does change. When I read that the 'modern form of anti-Semitism has run its historical course',<sup>65</sup> I am reminded of another pronouncement: that the spread of liberal democracy spells 'the end of history'.<sup>66</sup> But history has a habit of turning full stops into commas. Both Fukuyama and Bunzl seem to forget that the clock is ticking and that formations from the past can reappear in a new guise. Bold statements like theirs can certainly be clarifying, drawing our attention to a turning of the tide in human affairs, but their value is always limited. Like analogies.

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64 Quoted in Anne Karpf, 'Don't be fooled. Europe's racists are not discerning', *Guardian*, 28 March 2012, 30.

65 Bunzl, *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia*, 24.

66 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin 1992), xi. Fukuyama had second thoughts about his thesis; see his 'Second thoughts: the last man in a bottle', *The National Interest*, no. 56, Summer 1999, 16–33.