# CLASS FORMATION, SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND THE NAGAS IN NORTH-EAST INDIA

Andreas Küchle

# Class Formation, Social Inequality and the Nagas in North-East India

This book examines the question of class formation and social inequality within tribal groups in North-East India.

Focussing on the Nagas, it analyses and challenges common perceptions about them as a class-less society with a uniform culture. It looks at the previously neglected themes of class formation and structure, division of work, emerging social milieus and cultural differentiation among the Naga youth – and presents fresh arguments about notions of modernity.

Providing a theoretical understanding of inequality, this volume will be useful for scholars and researchers of North-East India, tribal studies, exclusion studies, sociology, social anthropology, political studies, development studies, cultural studies and South Asian studies.

**Andreas Küchle** is a data science professional and an independent researcher affiliated with IAAW, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, where he completed his doctoral studies in social sciences.

# Class Formation, Social Inequality and the Nagas in North-East India

Andreas Küchle

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*



*British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data*
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN: 978-1-138-34686-4 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-27436-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To my parents

Rosa & Josef Küchle

# Contents

# Figures

# Tables

# Acknowledgements

This book is based on my dissertation in Social Sciences at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, for which I received financial support by the Berlin Funding for Graduates (Elsa-Neumann-Stipendium des Landes Berlin). I thank those responsible for the award for their trust. Earlier versions of the manuscript gained a lot from the three anonymous referees – thank you for your valuable advice and criticism.

I'd like to thank my teacher Boike Rehbein, who supported me in pursuing my research interests throughout my academic life. He made it possible for me to go to India in the first place, and without him this work would not exist. For their thorough reading and critique of earlier versions of the manuscript I want to thank Bengt G. Karlsson, Gernot Saalmann, Simin Fadaee. My research, which spanned over many years, would not have been possible without institutional and personal support from many sides. Specifically, I want to thank Erik de Maaker for his help during my research visit at Leiden University; Prof. Xaxa from TISS in Guwahati and Walter Fernandez from NESRC in Guwahati for the possibility to present an early draft of this research; Prof. Kumar from NEHU for the discussions in his car during my research stay; and Prof. Lanunungsang from Nagaland University for his hospitality during an early stay in Nagaland. For organising a presentation and discussion of preliminary results at JNU New Delhi, I am grateful to Dr. Lipokmar Dzuvichu and Dr. Rakhee Bhattacharya from NEISP. Special thanks go to Prof. Jodhka and Prof. Nongbri from JNU New Delhi, who always had an open ear for me during my stay-overs in Delhi.

Research for this book would have not been possible without the numerous participants who shared details, narrations and their time with me without expecting anything in return. My deepest gratitude therefore goes to everyone who has helped me by participating in the research – especially by participating in interviews, filling up the online

survey and sharing their life with me for the time of the fieldwork. I am especially indebted to Yanpvuo Yanfo Kikon, who has offered his full support for launching my survey on the Naga Blog, as well as Chuba "CJ" Jamir, the Kiphire "SBI gang", my dear friend Bots and finally Mrs. and Mr. I. Mangko Jamir for being great hosts during my research stays in Dimapur, Kiphire, Kohima and Mokokchung, respectively.

I would also like to thank my brothers Stefan, Alexander and Maximilian, who have supported me morally and financially over all these years of research and writing. I am thankful to my parents Rosa and Josef for their continuous support on this path. I dedicate this book to them.

The "was" group deserves special mention and thanks for always making my stays in India enjoyable. Special thanks go to Toshi for his inspiring discussions and inputs, his great help in editing the manuscript and for being a great friend. Finally, I thank Onen for her love, inspiration and unconditional support.

# Introduction

## Naga modernity

Situated in the hilly region at the border between India and Burma, Nagaland is a peripheral state in a peripheral region of global capitalism as well as of the Indian state. Until today, it is a largely agrarian state with roughly two-thirds of the active workforce engaged in subsistence agriculture. But if one enters Nagaland from Assam through Dimapur or Mokokchung with its car-congested streets, multi-storey buildings and advertisement boards, urbanisation and non-agricultural economic activities are clear signs of the increasing integration into state and market structures. This integration becomes less visible if one travels eastwards towards the border of Burma, where one can still cross a street in the main town of Kiphire without being afraid to be over-driven by a honking Gypsy. During my first research on Nagaland several years back, when I studied social change in Ao Naga villages, it became increasingly clear to me that a wider context was needed to understand what was going on. This book now attempts to approach this context "outside" the Naga village.

This book therefore deals with the larger "modern transformation of the Nagas". In the context of increasing integration into the Indian state as well as global capitalism, it investigates how the peripheral status – from the perspective of the world system – affects the social and cultural setting the Nagas from Nagaland find themselves in. My specific interest is the interplay between these vertical and horizontal dimensions of social differentiation, or between class and culture within and above the segmentary structures of tribe, village and clan. The contribution to the sociology of Nagaland is to provide a specific perspective on social inequality that is strongly influenced by my background in European class theories, a perspective that was itself strongly challenged and corrected through the confrontation with complex empirical findings.

The focus on social inequality among Nagas did not only arise out of my general research interest, but also because the topic of class formation has been suspiciously absent in the literature on Nagaland (and on North-East India in general). Available studies have been mainly concerned with describing specific traditions (most often those of their own tribe), analysing the political scenario around Naga nationalism or portraying the dynamics of Christianity. While these topics are certainly most relevant for understanding the current social configuration in Nagaland, they neglect the growing importance of economic factors and the resulting social divisions among the Nagas, as well as the interconnections between the different social contexts. Many of the described changes are more visible in the urban settlements and among the youth, sections that have also been largely neglected by previous research. The narrative this study presents is therefore not only one of emerging class divisions, but also one about inter-generational differences, diversifying cultural orientations and the every-day struggles of the current Naga youth while navigating their lives after the rather stable phase of education. They are not mere victims or spectators of outside processes, but the way they experience and express their agency within these social contexts are themselves key to understanding the interplay of structural, cultural and symbolic dimensions of inequality.

Against classical class theories, the findings indicate that the dual processes of class formation and cultural differentiation do not lead to distinct "class milieus" or an outright "class society", but to a configuration of cultural milieus and classes that depend heavily on the degree of urbanisation and the location within or outside the state. In contrast to the major focus on educational degrees and skill-development, this book advances the argument that today geographical autonomy is overall a more important factor for the Naga youth than education in determining economic success, at least the urbanised sections. The common thread that emerged in the course of analysis is the importance of these two geographical factors – place of residence and mobility – for understanding the overall situation of young Nagas. Far from dealing with these subjects exhaustively, the aim of this book is to encourage discussions on modernity and cultural change in Nagaland, particularly regarding class formation, and develop some hypotheses that future research might see as a useful point of departure.

### *Peripheral modernity*

Modernisation theory generally assumes that modernity found its highest development in the Western world, a model that the rest of

the world was to follow sooner or later. For many classic approaches, be it the general discourse on development and its functionalist underpinnings or the dependency and world-system theories in the Marxian tradition, there is not much to gain from an undertaking as it is pursued here. Modernity is for them largely reducible to capitalism, and capitalism has to be understood from the perspective of its most developed part (Marx) or its centre (Wallerstein 1980). This view has been fundamentally challenged by post-colonial and post-modern theories, which questioned the uni-linear model of historical development that underpinned these theories. It has been shown that capitalism and modernity do not result in a uniform culture, but instead we have to talk of "multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt 2003) that arise as modernity hybridises with existing civilisations and becomes embedded in different institutional settings.

First reactions to the growing disenchantment with modernisation theory were post-modern "fluid" conceptions of culture and society (cf. Appadurai 1996; Urry 2000), which made it difficult to conceive of any social units and social laws. Despite the increasing perception of the social world as "fluid", there was growing evidence that the extent of social inequality (at least in economic terms) remained a salient problem in the globalised world (cf. Kaplinsky 2007). However, it has remained unclear how to think about inequality on a global scale, especially with respect to the universality or relativity of the processes as well as of the concepts that try to grasp them. Is what we see today the belated formation of a global working class, as Marx and Engels envisioned it as a result of the global spread of capitalism (2004)? Is it merely the continuation of the world system as Wallerstein (1980) has it, or have we already entered a "world society" that is defined not by classes but by an encompassing functional division of labour (Luhmann 1997)? What is the connection between class and more "local" or historically older forms of inequality, such as caste (Dumont 1970)? Then, what is more exactly the relation between modern forms of inequality and traditional forms, and of economic and other forms of inequality?

One recent work that approached this question of peripheral modernities was particularly inspiring for this book. Boike Rehbein's analysis of "Globalization, Culture and Society in Laos" (2007) shows with a systematic yet fine-grained perspective how the specific historical contexts of Laos are interacting with the increasingly transnational economic and cultural influences, leading to a complex picture of potential winners and losers amidst a transforming economy, a strengthened state leadership and partly reviving local traditions.

Rehbein also warns that these examples show that our derived theories become increasingly inappropriate, forcing us to critically examine our theoretical traditions (Rehbein 2010, p. 1). I have attempted to provide such a critical review of European class theories in the first chapter, which also serves to acquaint the readers not familiar with class theory with the concepts used in the remainder of the book.

### *Modernity and class in Indian sociology*

Like in other post-colonial sociologies, this co-existence and intermingling of tradition and modernity became one of the central themes of Indian sociology. Rather than aiming at a comprehensive overview, I want to draw here on two classical studies of social change in India that, though theoretically opposed, arrive at similar conclusions: André Béteille's "Caste, Class and Power" from the 60s, representing the "field view" in the tradition of "village studies", and Yoghendra Singh's functionalist theorising "Modernization of Indian Tradition" from the 70s, which represents the opposite "book view", as it was called in the tradition of "Indology".

André Béteille (1996) argues in his study of a Tanjore village that caste, class and power got increasingly detached from each other, allowing for greater social mobility as modernity opened up new avenues that did not exist before: geographical mobility, new occupations and electoral politics (ibid., p. 220). At the same time, castes remained and became more homogeneous within, while the distance between castes rather got enforced (ibid., p. 211). The traditional social order, the economic and political system gained each a "relatively autonomous character" (ibid., p. 225). Rather than destroying old structures, these new structures opened up new avenues that did not exist before: geographical mobility, new occupations and electoral politics (ibid., p. 211). In his functionalistic inspired study published in the 70s, Yoghendra Singh recognises that modernity developed initially only as a "sub-structure and sub-culture without pervasive expansion in all sectors of life", "totalizing" only after independence (Singh 2009, p. 209). Drawing on the distinction between "instrumental" and "independent" or "categorical" values, he concedes that while many people change towards modern "instrumental" values that arrive with modern rolestructures in the economy, they retain their traditional "categorical" values in other spheres of life. This independence of certain value categories leads him to conclude, preceding Eisenstadt (2003), that while a uniformity of modernisation will be established everywhere, diverging traditional "categorical" value

systems, political ideologies and inequality will lead rather towards particularistic forms of modernisation rather than one universal form (Singh 2009, p. 215).

Rather than being an all-pervasive force that marginalised or replaced traditional structures, colonial modernity added to and pervaded them. Many traditional contexts partly modernised themselves or even got restrengthened in the form of conservatism and neo-traditionalism. These different spheres with their often-opposing values, as Yogendra Singh argued against modernisation theory, may even coexist within a single person, as an engineer or doctor committed to modern instrumental values may at the same time commit to traditional categorical values (ibid., p. 214). Summing up, the insights of historical difference and the emergence of relatively autonomous spheres are crucial to post-colonial sociology of India. They should form the bottom line of any sociological inquiry into modern India. It is due to these experiences with modernisation theory that current Indian sociology tries to walk the line between universalisation and indigenisation of sociological concepts. This is achieved by re-conceptualising them to Indian social realities and recognising the general plurality of theoretical and social perspectives in the diverse social landscape of India (Singh 2009, p. 4; Kumar and Welz 2003; Welz 2009, p. 648; Oomen 2007, p. 12). One outcome of this plurality of perspectives has however been that exchange between different sociologies has been rather minimal – at least with regard to a fruitful conversation between the study of social inequality within the tradition of Indian sociology and the branch that concerned itself with "tribal" sociology, which remained the subject of highly descriptive ethnographic studies in India.

### *Tradition, modernity and "tribal equality" in North-East India*

In contrast to "mainland" India, the consequences of colonial and post-colonial modernity have been much less the focus of empirical studies in North-East India, especially in the tribal dominated areas. The discourse on tribes in academia, as in the bureaucracy, is still dominated by the pervasive idea that the term "tribe" not only denotes a certain society, but at the same time a distinct kind of society which represents a certain stage of evolution (Xaxa 2008, p. 25). I will argue that this perception is still prevalent and plays still a big role for the self-perception of the Nagas. Due to this traditionalist discourse, change in tribal societies is usually equalised with the disappearance of that

society, of their becoming a caste ("sanskritisation" [Srinivas 1995]), "peasants" or part of class-stratified Indian society, thereby confirming the general narrative of successive integration of tribes into the "mainstream" (Xaxa 2008, p. 25). In many works from Naga scholars, especially of the older generation, this fear of a loss of "culture" is a major theme of their works (N. T. Jamir and A. Lanunungsang 2005). However, this static and pessimistic conception of "tribe" has rendered the study of social change in tribal societies rather difficult, if not turning it into an oxymoron. As a consequence, North-East India has mainly remained outside the purview of mainstream sociology in India and usually does not appear in collections that claim to represent studies on various aspects of Indian society.

Besides the changes that are induced by increasingly global interconnections, the enormous heterogeneity of "tribal" societies already in pre-colonial times is often not fully recognised. As famous anthropological works on the region pointed out, there existed rather diverse social structures even on the village level, ranging from "democratic" to rather "autocratic" systems (Leach 1954). Due to the colonial pattern of classifying every society outside the caste system as a "tribe", these differences were rendered largely opaque (Xaxa 2008, p. 1). This classification raises questions of its own that cannot be addressed here, though it has a huge influence on the lives of people who are classified as tribes. In India, this influence works especially through the reservation system based on the notion of "backward" tribes. Lately, the notion of "indigenous people" has been an increasingly controversial political classification for Indian "tribes". It allows them to align with a global discourse on "indigenous rights" that is recognised by international institutions (Karlsson 2003).

Representing the past and present of tribal societies in a static way appears from this perspective as a discourse rooted in a politics of identity and recognition that tries to conform to the policy documents directed at them. Taking the example of Meghalaya, Erik de Maaker has shown that among the "tribal" Garos there is renewed interest among the educated elites of the tribes in their folklore and dances, especially as they get transferred to the national stage (Maaker 2013). Given government schemes and constitutional provisions for Scheduled Tribes (STs), the preservation of otherwise abandoned (and sometimes despised) customs, however altered and "polished", remains important for claiming the status of an ST, but certainly also of maintaining a distinct social identity based on folklore (ibid.).

The static understanding of tribes gains importance not only with regard to being recognised by the state, but similarly as a political

discourse within these communities themselves. In the case of Nagaland, the notion of customs has been frequently employed to resist women serving in both the panchayat and at the state level; on the other side, most traditional practices, like drinking ricebeer, are branded as unchristian or backward, pointing towards the selective – and therefore political – dimension of traditionalist discourse. Indeed, as female scholars have pointed out against the common narrative of "equality as tradition" (Shimrai 2002), gender inequality has always been an intrinsic feature of Naga society and was based on the systematic exclusion of women from the public realm (T. Jamir 2009).

Debates on tradition and modernity are therefore not only part of a politics of recognition, but involve power struggles within these societies as well. This is explored in great detail in Bengt G. Karlsson's work "Unruly Hills: Nature and Nation in India's Northeast" (Karlsson 2011), which takes on the political ecology of the North-East Indian state Meghalaya, on of the few works that explicitly deals with the impact of capitalism in North-East India. As Meghalaya is increasingly integrated as a supplier of raw materials into the capitalist world economy, he provides a detailed account of how the extension of the capitalist "resource frontier" is mediated by local actors, institutions and ways of being-in-the-world. He argues that capitalist expansion proceeds in this region especially through the "commodification" of nature, in which minerals, land and forests are subject to competing claims of control and increasingly acquire a "capitalist colouration" (ibid., p. 304) in which customary rights to land and resources are undermined by the joined hands of local elites and multinational companies. Unfortunately, he does not further explore the role of class in this process of extraction and capital accumulation.

Despite the common influences above, the situation I encountered in Nagaland differed to a large degree from the settings that were analysed by Bengt G. Karlsson and Boike Rehbein. Overall, the North-Eastern states exhibit major differences with regard to their pre-colonial as well as colonial and post-colonial history that forbid generalisations unless fieldwork is actually carried out in all the states one likes to compare. Unlike Meghalaya, Nagaland has not experienced the full integration as a resource-exporting state yet, but is economically still almost completely dependent on the state. In contrast to Laos, Nagaland is not a nation-state with a unifying socialist party and a well-documented history, but has retained an immense intertribal heterogeneity. This heterogeneity is reflected in the multiplicity of languages that have remained important until today. This heterogeneity, and the continuing importance of armed nationalist groups, are

two major factors that differentiate Nagaland from Mizoram, not to speak of the differences with Tripura and Manipur, in which Hinduism is the dominant religion and princely states existed already in the pre-colonial era.

Today, tribes that identify themselves as Nagas are found in the Indian States of Nagaland, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur as well as in neighbouring Burma. I restrict myself here to the Nagas born within the State of Nagaland for two reasons. The first is that historically the emergence of statehood in 1963 had a great impact on the Naga tribes that are currently recognised as Scheduled Tribes within Nagaland, because it enabled a large section to gain control of the bureaucratic apparatus while restricting access to other groups. The second reason is methodologically, as it is important to define the population of interest by certain background criteria to make it possible to explore internal differences and changes within the group. This does not imply that a study comprising all Naga groups, or including all residents of Nagaland irrespective of their socio-cultural community, could not be insightful for other research interests – on the contrary. For pragmatic reasons I have not always strictly distinguished between the geographical realms inhabited by Nagas today, the state Nagaland and the colonial territory called the Naga Hills. I use these terms mainly to refer to people who were born in the area of the present state Nagaland and who identify themselves as Nagas. Rather than referring to the "Naga society", with its implication of uniformity and clear boundaries, I explicitly restrict my findings to this specific "social formation" of the Nagas within the state. Since my ground fieldwork is restricted to Naga youth (aged 20–40 years, students excluded) from different towns and cities in Nagaland as well as Delhi, my findings should not be generalised beyond that realm.

### *Nagaland: rural decline and urbanisation*

Nagaland is often cited as remote and isolated. While it may be geographically remote from e.g. New Delhi, its people are not as isolated as it seems. As far as we know from the pre-colonial period, the village realm was the major social unit. But how has the integration into larger practical milieus changed this situation? The distribution of survey respondents revealed that the majority were born in urban places (2/3).

A look at the the current place of residence of the sample shows that though one-third of respondents were born in the village, the vast




*Figure I.1* Place of residence

majority now lives in urban settlements (Figure I.1).[1] A look at the movement pattern in table (Table I.1) reveals that there are two associations between place of birth and place of residence that are highly significant. The first pattern is, not surprisingly, that of spatial resilience (those living in the same type of settlement as they were born), the second can be interpreted as urbanisation.[2] When going from towns to cities, we see a proportionate growth of Nagaland-internal migrants: the resilient population shrinks from 61% in the towns to 41% in the cities.

These numbers highlight the pattern of large-scale urbanisation within the lifetime of my respondents. Internal migration streams lead only in one direction: from the village to the towns, and from the towns to the cities. The fact that almost 32% of the sample are now living in cities outside their state shows that the Naga youth are highly mobile, even beyond their state. What is surprising here is that Indian cities outside Nagaland seem to be almost as attractive to those from villages and towns as to those from the cities in Nagaland. This mobility is in stark difference to experiences from interviews with their parent generation, who often expressed a fear to leave the state or even the district, especially if they stayed in villages. In the present generation, living outside the state – if only for some time – appears to be a normal state of affairs.

What are the reasons for this large-scale urbanisation? Though the focus of this book is not on the rural-urban dynamics within

*Table I.1* Resilience and urbanisation pattern in the sample

| *Place of residence* | | *Place of birth (Nagaland)* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Village* | *Town* | *City* | *Total* |
| Nagaland village | % | 75.0 | 14.3 | 10.7 | 100.0 |
| | Ad. Residual | **4.9**[a] | **–2.5** | **–2.4** | |
| Nagaland town | % | 30.9 | 61.7 | 7.4 | 100.0 |
| | Ad. Residual | –0.4 | **5.2** | **–5.0** | |
| Nagaland city | % | 26.7 | 32.4 | 41.0 | 100.0 |
| | Ad. Residual | **–2.5** | –1.6 | **4.2** | |
| Other city | % | 34.0 | 32.7 | 33.3 | 100.0 |
| | Ad. Residual | 0.4 | –1.2 | 0.8 | |
| Total | % | 32.6 | 36.4 | 30.9 | 100.0 |

[a] Bold numbers show cells with significant contributions to chi-square statistics.

Nagaland, my previous research on social inequality in Ao Naga villages (Küchle 2016) showed that despite the continuing dominance of cultivation based on small-scale landholding, those living in villages experience themselves pervasively as "backward" compared to the towns and cities. This experience is mainly based on the devaluation of the cultivator way of life, but also due to the minor quality of public village schools, where teaching is often in the local language rather than in English, as well as market-related economic opportunities. Those with concrete plans and possibilities to leave the village are especially the children of the "village elites" with government jobs or other non-agricultural incomes, who often have the opportunity to study in the cities or even outside the state; another group are the "self-employed" like shop owners etc. who seek to give up cultivation for non-market activities, which are limited by the weak village economy. Furthermore, there is a relatively large group of so-called "educated unemployed" who experience a mismatch between their aspirations and the village culture and wait for opportunities to attain government jobs in the towns – which in most cases never happens. In many cases, children are also sent to relatives in the towns and cities to avail better education opportunities. The effects of modernisation hence reach well into the village through education and the symbolic influence of middle-class life-styles, despite a relative stability of cultivation agriculture as major economic practice.

## Fieldwork and limitations

Almost until the beginning of my first fieldwork in 2009 it was not possible for foreigners to conduct research in Nagaland. One effect

of this academic isolation was that there existed a huge gap in the literature about the Nagas after the major accounts from colonial ethnographers, one that is now closing quickly. The missing line of discussion had the effect that gathering one's own empirical data – both quantitative and qualitative – was by far the only means to both develop and test specific assumptions on the social formation of the Nagas in an iterative process. My findings are therefore mainly limited by my empirical data, especially my missing knowledge of the various tribal languages and the reliance on an online survey, which excludes the population without access to smart phones and acceptable knowledge of English. Since I am only concerned here with the urban youth, I regard these limitations however as justifiable.

Like all studies based on voluntary participation, the online survey suffers furthermore from the self-selection bias, since only those willing to answer surveys are represented. These limitations should be kept in mind while reading this book. The gap in the literature on social inequality in North-East India and Nagaland is the main reason that the European, specifically the German, discussion on social inequality was used as a starting point for my research. Unfortunately, not all of these works were translated into English. Since this book is not about German sociological traditions, I have summarised the most important arguments rather than discussing them in detail. For the scope of this work, this basic understanding will certainly be sufficient for non-German speaking readers.

## Organisation of the book

The subsequent chapters will develop this argument by looking into four analytical layers that are closely interconnected but exhibit their own dynamics, moving from the macro to the micro level – socio-cultures, economic structures and practice milieus, cultural milieus, classes and career types.

The first chapter introduces the major theoretical approaches to class and social inequality during the 20th century, showing how the concept of a one-dimensional class society turned into a more complex and multi-dimensional understanding of social inequality. It specifically emphasises how cultural, spatial and temporal dimensions (both history and the life-course) became increasingly important, thus making the subject multi-faceted but also more fragmented compared to classic class theories. To overcome this conceptual fragmentation, the last section of the chapter introduces a unifying framework based on practice theory. Advocating the conceptual clarity of classical class theories, it argues for a two-dimensional concept of class based on

"hierarchy" and "division of work". Differing from the classic theories, the chapter tries to explicitly recognise the influence of multiple factors, including historically received social classifications, on class membership by shaping patterns, and contexts of social practices.

The second chapter applies this framework to the historical and larger socio-economic context of Nagaland, especially its role within the larger regional, national and global economy. On this level, the question is to identify the social and cultural contexts that form the base for daily practices, and the larger economic pattern behind the class structures, e.g. role of different industries, trade and capital flows. It uses a historical-ethnographic approach as well as desk research, which is used to get an in-depth understanding of the social and historical context.

In the third chapter the focus shifts to the empirical data collected specifically for this research, probing into the cultural differentiation of the urban Naga youth that emerged from the interplay of these historical and contemporary influences. The first section deals with the different patterns of involvement in practice milieus, while the second section focuses on occupational aims and positionings within the public. The third section summarises the findings and characterises the major cultural milieus that can be established among the present generation. Do all young Nagas participate equally in politics, church, etc., or can we identify specific patterns of cultural differentiation or even distinct cultural milieus among the Naga youth? Which cultural contexts shape the public discourse and frame their perceptions and orientations? This chapter uses a quantitative mapping approach towards culture and social practices that was popularised with Pierre Bourdieu's study of French society and then adopted by the various strands of "milieu" studies.

The fourth chapter brings attention to the class structure and class formation of the urban Naga youth. What are the processes of class formation – do we see a pattern of intergenerational class reproduction, as European theories of class often argue? It starts by explaining in detail the two dimensions of hierarchy and division of work as argued in the theoretical chapter. The second section presents an overview of the class structure of the urban Naga youth. Specific dimensions of class are used to test Bourdieu's theory of social reproduction as well as the competing approach that emphasises overlapping symbolic inequalities with the survey data, showing that social origin has on average no significant impact on the class structure of the youth.

In the fifth chapter, I take the discussion to the micro scale and looks at concrete life-courses of young Nagas and their experiences with the

work sphere. This chapter uses a qualitative interpretative approach that provides a detailed analysis of life-course sequences and the career orientations that guide young Nagas in the transition into and within the work sphere. Before analysing the interviews in detail, the first section provides a short outline of the concepts and methods used in the qualitative analysis. The second section then provides an empirically grounded typology of career patterns based on the life-course interviews. It differentiates between four distinct types – "meritocratic planning", "pragmatic/ occasionalist", "exploring" and "resigned/ reorienting", which are mainly characterised by distinct combinations of work orientation and career sequence pattern. The last section then reconnects this typology to its social basis. It shows how the regularities found within these groups point towards underlying processes of class formation that complement the statistical influences and put them into perspective taking the actors' point of view.

The final chapter summarises the findings from the previous chapters towards the central research questions. A central aim is to explore further hypotheses regarding cultural differentiation and class formation that can inform future research in the field. Finally, I sketch some general scenarios regarding the impact of further economic integration of Nagaland on cultural milieus and the class structure among the Nagas.

## Notes

1 The categories "villages outside Nagaland" and "other" is neglected in the following as the frequencies are too low (n = 11). This category mainly concerns villages in the direct vicinity to Nagaland.
2 The adjusted standardised residuals can be interpreted as significant associations if > 2 (Bühl 2014, cf.).

# 1 Class and social inequality in a multi-dimensional perspective

Bourdieu's class theory in "Distinction" (Bourdieu 2012) marked a peak when he combined a multi-dimensional approach with the scope of explaining class society in total. His theory not only attempted to integrate both differentiation and class theory, but also highlighted the cultural and symbolic dimension of class. Despite this enlarged vision, which sets him off from classic theories as well as from his contemporary stratification theory, he remained with one foot – arguably the stronger one – within structuralism. Nevertheless, his comprehensive view of social ontology and his empirical orientation are still valuable today, especially because later theories of social inequality started focussing largely on single aspects of inequality.

After outlining his major concepts, the chapter specifically looks at how functional, cultural, but later spatial and temporal dimensions were also added to class theory. The major tendency of these later developments was to accord greater autonomy to cultural dimensions than Bourdieu did. This process of recognising the multiplicity of inequality certainly made the subject more multi-faceted and complete, but it can also be argued that it became more fragmented and less theoretical than earlier studies. Sociological theories of inequality must situate themselves in this area of conflict – balancing between either being overly reductive or incapable of distinguishing relevant from irrelevant social differences. After all, not all differences between humans are of interest to a sociology of inequality and not all inequalities are equally important in a given social formation. It is therefore imperative that theories of inequality are sensitive to the historical and social circumstances in question. Theories that recognise multiple dimensions of inequality are certainly better suited for this task than economistic class theories, though the global spread of capitalism arguably makes economic criteria important almost everywhere. It is therefore valuable to look back to the origins of class theories once

more to appreciate both their clarity as well as the subsequent refinements that reacted on new developments in society but also reflect improvements in the analytic tools at hand for sociologists studying inequality.

## Class and stratification theory from Marx to Bourdieu

Marx is usually considered the founder of modern class theories and dates to Marx and Engels' "The Communist Manifesto", which appeared as a political pamphlet in 1948 (Engels and Marx 2004). The "Manifesto" famously predicted the emergence of a visible class division through capitalism, dividing society into the capital-owning bourgeoisie and the proletariat, whose only capital is their own labour power. Despite the prominence of this statement, it is often overlooked that Marx did not really develop a concise class theory. His later major work "Capital" (Marx and Engels 1981) stops shortly after beginning to deal with the question of classes in the end of the third part (Horvath and Bernhard 2009). Since in "Capital", Marx was more concerned with the working of capitalism, he used the term "class" in a structural meaning rather than dealing with its empirical instantiations as actual social phenomena. Nevertheless, his heritage to class theory was to put the production process into the centre of interest, a decision adopted largely by his followers and even many adversaries. Though coming from a Marxian background of class analysis that privileged ownership of the means of production, stratification theories later turned more towards a Weberian, market-based understanding of class. However, like Marx, his liberal opponent Max Weber did also not present a class *theory*, but a sketch of categorical differentiations between empirical groups without a deeper theoretical underpinning.

Unlike Marx, Weber distinguished more clearly between economically defined property and income classes on one side and social classes on the other side. Weber saw that *social* classes were constituted by many other factors besides economic criteria, e.g. the possibility of intra- and intergenerational mobility and a common life-style. He combined the rather heterogeneous economic classes into four basic social classes: working class, petite bourgeoisie, property-less educated and the owning and educationally privileged class (Weber 1922, p. 177ff.). Most importantly, Weber (like Marx) did not assume that economic class position leads automatically to a social class with a common life-style or political action, though empirically they often might (ibid., p. 180). Rather, he saw economic classes as a structure of

purely economic opportunities and restrictions that were regulated in the market sphere. In contrast, social "stands", or status groups based on differentiated social prestige, consisted of empirically observable communities based on life-style, connubiality, commensality and other criteria. Political parties are the third component of Weber's stratification model. In liberal democracies, they exist in a relatively independent realm in which organised groups aim to advance their power in society. Unlike classes or stands with their focus on either production or consumption, political parties are formal organisations consciously directed at attaining benefits for their members – irrespective of their class or stand. Given this three-dimensional model of social structure with relatively independent dimensions, "social classes" were for Weber a possible though unlikely form of a status group, one that was based on the prestige or stigma of a common occupational background (ibid., p. 180). In his understanding, economic classes are not homogeneous, but usually highly diversified within themselves – Weber accorded only property-less, uneducated workers in unstable employment situations a homogeneous class position *ex negativo* (ibid., p. 177).

The Weberian influence on later stratification theory is reflected in their use of legal and market-related indicators like wealth, income and occupation or combinations of them to differentiate society into different layers (Geiger 1932; Goldthorpe 1980; Erik Olin Wright 1997). Social inequality in this tradition refers to the distribution of economic resources and occupational positions in a society, and people (or the "heads of the family" as representatives) can be attributed to them in a straightforward manner. John Goldthorpe's internationally influential class scheme is based firstly on the "basic employment relationships" that differentiate employers, self-employed and employees, and secondly on the "varying employment functions and conditions of employment which differentiate categories of employees" according to subordinate and authoritative positions (Goldthorpe 1980, chapter 2, 1983, p. 467).

Despite these differences between class and stratification theory, I will treat class and stratification theory here as largely synonymous due to their common presuppositions: that society is structured into defined groups that are vertically ranked; that the economic dimension of inequality is fundamental; and that class reproduction is based on rational, universal processes. Though there are different competing versions of either strand of theory, the strength of Marxism is clearly in its theoretical foundation, while stratification theories following Weber have developed more refined empirical categories and descriptions of inequality.

### *Bourdieu's class theory*

Pierre Bourdieu's class theory, which he developed in "Distinction" (Bourdieu 2012), broke with these main assumptions of stratification theory and tried to synthesise the strength of both theoretical strands. On the one hand, he shifted the focus away from universal principles to the every-day life of social actors. On the other, he was not satisfied with mere descriptive analyses but focussed once again on the question of *how* class structures are *reproduced* in society.

Bourdieu's class theory provides a good starting point for further discussion because it provides a clear hypothesis regarding the relation between theoretically constructed classes and observable groups with a common life-style. Since he conceived his theoretical model to be universally applicable in modern societies, I put the focus on his class theory rather than on his faceted empirical works, especially on the conceptual trinity of habitus, social space and capital. Bourdieu retains the rationalism inherited from both Marx and Weber, but the principle of relationalism distinguishes his theory from the classic theories and serves as a major explanation for class dynamics (cf. Vandenberghe 1999). These concepts and their interconnections are briefly outlined in the following.

#### *Habitus – embodied structure*

Bourdieu developed his concept of "habitus" mainly in the "Outline of a Theory of Practice", his ethnography of the tribal Kabyle society in Algeria during the 1950s and 60s. The major theoretical question Bourdieu sought to address in this work is how social order, the regularity of human practices as "a certain statistically measurable frequency" (Bourdieu 1977, p. 29), can be explained *without* taking recourse to either objective representations or unconscious rules (or both), as the structuralism and objectivism epitomised by Claude Lévi-Strauss assumed during that time. Structuralism, according to Bourdieu, committed the "scholastic fallacy" by confounding the theoretical model of human practice with the "real" cause of a practice (Bourdieu 1977, p. 29), leading to a naive understand of both social action *and* scientific practice.

Bourdieu's solution to the problem of explaining social order is the "habitus". Understood as internalised structure, itself produced by former states of objective structures, it accounts for the regularity of observable behaviour, without necessitating any observance of rules (ibid., p. 79). The dialectic of structures, objective and incorporated, allows Bourdieu to re-introduce the factor of time into structuralism,

which it had before expelled (ibid., p. 78). The habitus concept acquires three different theoretical functions in Bourdieu's model, which are not always clearly differentiated by Bourdieu and his followers: first, they are a "*result of an organizing action*", which he interprets as structure, second "a *predisposition*, *tendency*, *propensity*, or *inclination*" (ibid., p. 214, all emphases in original) and third "a *way of being*".

Gernot Saalmann has argued that the habitus points not at the determination but the *automatism* of actions (Saalmann 2012, p. 100). This usage of dispositional automatism resembles pragmatist understandings of the concept of "habit". Indeed, it has been argued that already Charles Sanders Pierce understood habit as a disposition or tendency rather than as an observable regularity of actions (Kilpinen 2012, p. 50). In my opinion, there is an important difference concerning the relationship between reflexivity and action in both accounts: while pragmatists emphasise the complementarity and simultaneity of thinking and acting, Bourdieu has expressed a Cartesian dualistic view of action and reflection as separate faculties. This is obvious when he refers to Leibniz' notion that " 'we are automatons in three-quarters of what we do' " (Bourdieu 2012, p. 476). This move is an important argument Bourdieu employs against subjectivist notions of *conscious calculation* that he sees working in rational action theory. Leibnitz' notion however also presents some problems. One of them is the crucial question whether habitus governs all sorts of action or denotes merely a certain, common *type* thereof. Piaget himself had e.g. distinguished between "action schemes" and "logical structures", and therefore between the practical and the symbolical, while Bourdieu at times collapses them towards the practical (Lizardo 2004, p. 17). This is apparent when he states that "[p]ractical sense, social necessity turned into nature, converted into motor schemes and body automatisms, is what causes practices" (Bourdieu 1990, p. 69).

### *Social space and capitals*

His subsequently introduced relational concepts of social space, social fields and capitals are understood as the general environments, or objective structures, within which the habitus operate and are *actualised* as practices. The social space, as Bourdieu elaborates, is mainly a theoretical device (Bourdieu 1985, p. 725). The "classes on paper", which exist as a theoretical construction and classification, "make[s] it possible to explain and predict the practices and properties of the things classified – including their group-forming practices" (ibid., p. 725). He locates the theoretical status of these

theoretical classes between *nominalist relativism*, which regards them only as one among innumerable arbitrary classifications, and the *realism of the intelligible*, which refers to the false reification of theoretical concepts (ibid., p. 725).[1] Compared to other possible classifications, e.g. ethnicity or gender, those based on the social space are considered by him as "more likely to be stable and durable, while other forms of groupings are always threatened by the splits and oppositions linked to distances in social space" (ibid., p. 725). These distances in social space, which he regards hence as fundamental, are, like in the stratification models, based on the relative distribution of economic and educational qualification, or rather cultural capital.[2] The notion of "cultural capital" is one of Bourdieu's important concepts, since he assumes that the education system works according to the same accumulative logic like the economic field.

Bourdieu's major theoretical argument in "Distinction" is that the space of life-styles, which combines both practices and symbolic classifications, is "homologous" (e.g. being structured by the same logic, following the same rule, being organised by the same principle) to the social space, which is explained by the transfer of the "generative schemes of the habitus [. . .] to the most dissimilar areas of practice" (Bourdieu 2012, p. 171). The position in social space explains and predicts therefore (though Bourdieu prefers to speak of "governing", "generating", "producing" or "transforming into" [cf. ibid., p. 171]) statistically the position in the field of life-styles and the field of symbolic production. The theoretical space of habitus' that effectively mediated between them is not directly accessible to statistical analysis. Struggle for symbolic capital, or the "struggle over the production of common sense" (Bourdieu 1985, p. 731) follows the functioning of the dominating social space by the imposition of the dominant habitus and "their vision of the divisions of the social world" (ibid., p. 732), which is in the last analysis exerted by the state as "the holder of the *monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence*" (emphasis in original ibid., p. 732). In the same manner, he distinguishes the tastes of luxury from the taste of necessity, "which is defined as such only negatively, as an absence" (Bourdieu 2012, p. 174). While the former is an expression of freedom conditioned by the freedom from restraint associated with the higher positions, the latter is an inclination of the agents "because they have a taste for what they are anyway condemned to [. . .] [a] choice of destiny, but a forced choice, produced by conditions of existence that rule out all alternatives as mere daydreams and leave no choice but the taste for the necessary" (ibid., p. 173–4).

## Cultural, spatial and temporal dimensions of social inequality

The second section presents aspects of social inequality that were largely discussed after Bourdieu's work and relate roughly to the cultural turn, which regarded cultural differentiation (e.g. between milieus or ethnic groups) and symbolic structures (e.g. male-female) as primary mechanisms of social differentiation. In Germany, the concept of "social milieus" became prominent when the "thick" concept of class became more culturally defined. Only then, social milieus were regarded as the relevant object of study, though the theoretical linkage to class differed greatly among different proponents of milieu theory: some saw it in opposition to class theories, others followed Bourdieu's close coupling of class and culture. Another strand of theory focussed on the temporal aspects of class and pointed towards the variability of class status within the life-course, others discussed the importance of gender for class theory, or looked at the role geographical and spatial criteria play for social inequality. Rather than presenting new approaches, they focussed on additional aspects that were previously considered to be outside the realm of inequality studies.

In the following, I discuss these dimensions in more detail, though without claiming comprehensiveness in covering them exhaustively. The aim is here less to provide detailed accounts of the history of ideas, but to combine some of their central concerns for the analysis of a concrete empirical problem: the production of social inequality among the Naga youth. The question remains, whether these dimensions of sociological enquiry do not merely reflect changing patterns of inequality in Europe; and it might hence not be legitimate to apply them to a society that is quite different both in its historical path as well as its current formation from Western societies. Indeed, these theories or perspectives are often presented as mirroring actual historical developments that fundamentally altered the clearly stratified class society that was thought to have existed in Europe at the heights of industrialisation. Recently, Jörg Rössel has convincingly shown that this claim is empirically unfounded and betrays a flawed conception of the industrialisation period: processes like individualisation and a weakening of *social* classes as empirical groups, thought to be recent phenomena of a dissolving class society, existed already at the beginning of the 20th century during the heights of industrialisation (Rössel 2005, chapter 1). Rather, Jörg Rössel claims that these critics of class theory are better understood to represent genuine developments in the theoretical and methodological tool box of social sciences rather than

representing new social phenomena. Understanding these debates as genuine progress of sociological imagination and scope makes them complimentary to conventional class and stratification theory rather than challenging its basic tenets: they help to make the study of social inequality more comprehensive and adequate.

## *Symbolic and practical dimensions of inequality*

### *Symbolic classifications*

The oldest critique of stratification theory is that it reduces the variety of social inequalities to economic criteria. As Boike Rehbein has argued, this bias probably has to do with the emergence of social science from economics as well as the historical period, which saw Europe gaining economic and political hegemony throughout the world (Rehbein 2007, p. 15). However, the dominant position of stratification theory as well as its empiricist and positivist methodology were challenged by feminists and cultural theorists. They argued that ascriptive criteria and classifications like ethnicity/race, region and age, among others, are important for inequality as well, and cannot be reduced to class or wealth. Rather than pointing towards rational criteria, symbolic classifications are perhaps better understood as rooted in the logic of "recognition" (Honneth 1986; Frazer 2000).

In this regard, a central problem of traditional stratification theories (and still of Bourdieu) comes to the fore: where to put women and people outside the market economy in a class model that is based on occupational categories? Stratification theories (Goldthorpe 1983), and still Bourdieu, simply grouped women who were outside the labour market with the family. The position of the family in return was determined via the male *head of the household* (cf. Bourdieu 2012, p. 5). Differences based on gender and ethnicity were considered by him explicitly as only "secondary variables" within the class structure (ibid., p. 97).

When taking multiple sources of inequality into account, we may also ask why inequalities within different social realms (e.g. sports, media, relationships, religion, etc.), which after all work according to their own logic, should be reducible to one position in the social space or class structure (Luhmann 1985; Weiß 2004, p. 217; Rehbein 2007, p. 23)? There must be an account of how inequalities intersect with each other and how they are able to accumulate between social realms – or not. The same question also arises about the habitus. Can we speak of the habitus as a systematic, unifying and transposable

disposition in a society characterised by differentiated realms, or must we assume that different existential conditions in modern societies lead to an irreducible plurality *within* actors, as Bernard Lahire has argued (Lahire 2011)? To integrate this critique into class theory, Anja Weiß argued for an approach that keeps the prominent role of economic and cultural capital but includes the effects of symbolic domination for the formation of empirical classes. Social classifications like age, gender and ethnicity and racism are not only an effect, she argues, but a cause of (economic) social inequality as well (Anja Weiß et al. 2001). This view breaks with the rationalist understanding of inequality that Bourdieu advocates with the term capital by including "arbitrary" aspects of class – domination – into the analysis (Weiß 2004, p. 224). Weiß explicitly takes class as a structural reference category and focusses on the addition of inequalities into overarching social classes, which remains central to her approach.

Though arguing from diverse angles, the common threat of feminist critiques of stratification theory has been threefold: First, theoretically, the need to incorporate multiple factors like gender and race as determinants of social inequalities. Second, methodologically, the need to develop a stronger empirical-inductive focus in the analysis of inequality, rather than relying on a purely functionalist definition of class *alone*. Third, empirically, the need to test whether the existence of multiple factors of inequality leads to the appearance of overarching social classes or to rather unrelated inequalities that do not add up into the formation of cohesive groups or social stands.

### *Social milieus*

While the feminist critique pointed to the importance of symbolic and ascriptive classifications for social inequality, in Germany *milieu* has become a prominent counter-concept to *class*. Social milieus typically denote socio-cultural groups based on similar life-styles, attitudes and behaviours. And while one strand of milieu theory followed more closely Bourdieu by emphasising the structural determinants of social milieus (Vester 1993, 2006), the majority questioned the strict relation between social structure, habitus and life-styles (Hradil 1987; Gerhard Schulze 1992). Ulrich Beck was most radical in the critique of class theory and argued that class structures as well as culturally homogeneous social milieus are misleading concepts, as both types of social units are being dissolved by a reflexive modernity characterised by "individualisation" (Beck 1994). Radicalising the modernist thesis of alienation and detachment, Beck denied that classes or milieus have any empirical reality and advocated to base theory on the individual

alone. Despite these criticisms, the utility of socio-structural and life-style models persisted. Milieu and life-style typologies renewed an interest in every-day life and became a new paradigm in social structure analysis (Diaz-Bone 2004). As a result, vastly different ways to typify life-styles and milieu groups have emerged since the 80s, partly inspired by methodological advances in market research and multivariate statistical analysis (e.g. Sinus Markt- und Sozialforschung 2014).

Given the basically unlimited options to construct groups, the transformation of objective structure into subjective values and experiences largely remains oblique (Vester) or is left open (Hradil), which makes the interesting process of the *genesis* of social milieus difficult to understand. One problem is that milieu groups have often been considered as a historical successor of "classes" rather than a sociological concept in its own right (cf. Hradil 1987). The problem of milieu genesis is hence resolved by a Eurocentric philosophy of history. It might be instructive to think of milieu theory not from the perspective of class, but from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge in the tradition of Karl Mannheim and Durkheim. This strand conceptualises milieus as "experiential realms" based on practical and existential rootedness in the world and explicitly takes on the topic of milieu genesis (Weller and Pfaff 2013, p. 58). Since Nagaland can hardly be considered as a transforming class society akin to Western societies, it is even more important to avoid this implication and develop the milieu concept independently from the concept of class.

Besides complementing class and stratification theory in predicting social behaviour and attitudes, there is another value of milieu theory that is not fully captured by its explanatory power alone. One of the true innovations of milieu and life-style research is to shift the focus of inequality studies away from the work sphere – which only encompasses a certain fraction of society in all times and places – to the whole human being. People taking care of the household, children, students, unemployed etc., who are the majority in most countries, are simply left out of the analysis (Rehbein 2007, p. 23). By looking at the every-day life and the symbolic realm, not only differences between what people *have* but also what people *do* and what they *value* can be discovered and hence an improved *understanding* of social and cultural structures. On the other hand, the question is not only whether class can predict outcomes like opinions or behaviours, but also how culture can influence and define resource inequality e.g. class. Michèle Lamont has defined cultural processes in this regard as "ongoing classifying representations/practices that unfold in the context of structures (organizations, institutions) to produce various types of outcomes [. . .] that may

feed into the distribution of resources *and* recognition" (emphasis in original, Lamont, Beljean, and Clair 2014, p. 14). This definition of cultural processes is compatible with the definition of social practices and symbolic discourses used here. Empirically, the task is then to identify processes and practices that are not necessarily directed at producing or maintaining inequality, but are nevertheless effective, directly and indirectly, in producing it.

### *Temporal aspects of inequality*

> The interest leading an agent to defend his symbolic capital is inseparable from the tacit adherence, inculcated in the earliest years of life and reinforced by all subsequent experience, to the axiomatics objectively inscribed in the regularities of the (in the broad sense) economic order which constitutes a determinate type of symbolic capital as worthy of being pursued and preserved.
>
> Pierre Bourdieu, "Outline of a Theory of Practice", p. 182, 1977

With the concept of the habitus, Bourdieu accords a primary role to early childhood and social origin for the explanation of social practices of a social actor. Its obvious aim was to counter theories that explain human action as ever new events of decision making unsullied by previous decisions, as in theories of the rational actor or symbolic interactionism. But the processes by which the habitus is transformed in the life-course was not explicitly considered by Bourdieu. A life-course is for Bourdieu therefore mainly a trajectory – defined by the beginning (social origin) and the end (current social position). Since his interest was in the reproduction of class, the actual path is not a central object of research, and it is assumed that the trajectory is mainly a function of class and habitus.

This linear view, commonly shared by stratification theories and Bourdieu, is questioned by the "dynamic" view on social inequality. This perspective takes the trajectory itself into focus by looking at the *form* of the life-course (Mayer 2000, 2009; Diewald and Mayer 2009). One result of these studies is that class reproduction, at least in Western countries, does not evolve as automatically and linearly as Bourdieu believed. Rather, individual trajectories exhibit not only synchronous status inconsistencies with respect to different social fields, but similarly temporal inconsistencies, as changing positions in the different life phases do not always add up (Berger 1995, p. 13). The life-course perspective, while not abandoning the concept of the social space per se, has pointed out the importance of institutions and their

interconnections to produce inequality. One of the fundamental theses of life-course research in German sociology has been that in modernity, the life-course has become institutionalised: modern institutions of education, labour market and retirement divide the life-course into three distinct phases centred around economic participation (Kohli 2003). By introducing general age norms for phase transitions, life is being rationalised by orienting it to long-term ends, epitomised in the promise of pension etc. in Western welfare states (Sackmann 2007, p. 21). While this view of life-course structures is easily integrable into Bourdieu's objective trajectories, it appears overly linear, Eurocentric and not readily applicable to the case of countries without a welfare state and pension system.

Besides these perspectives that put the institutional structuring of the life-course into its focus, it is also important to keep in mind that a life-course has always a subjective moment, as people do not mindlessly follow specific paths through their life but are also guided by hopes and wishes towards their future. Especially in more complex institutional settings that allow for a degree of choice within one's life, imagined future perspectives take up a decisive role in shaping the actual path of life by opening or foreclosing actual possibilities in life. When strong institutional and community-based norms regarding a life-course are absent, future perspectives take on a larger role in both restricting and enabling personal trajectories. Recent research by Florian Stoll regards perceptions of time and future as central for the differentiation of social milieus within urban middle classes in Brazil and Kenia (Stoll 2012, 2017). He shows how the differences in imagined futures are directly related to the relation to work, to the nuclear family vs. the larger ethnic group as well as towards investment behaviours and attempts to improve one's own economic position. The advantage of this approach to milieu theory is that it provides a specific theoretical justification to regard one dimension – the relation to time – as central. This turns the construction of specific milieus transparent and subject to empirical testing and international comparison. If the milieu concept is theoretically rooted as in this example, many of the above criticism can be avoided and the concept can be made applicable even outside the realm of the nation-state and the "Global North".

### *The spatial dimension of class*

The discussion regarding class and milieu concepts has also a spatial dimension. Recent discussions on the phenomenon of globalisation have posed the question whether social phenomena can still be

understood within the framework of the nation-state alone. Some scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein maintain that the nation-state was indeed never the appropriate framework of analysis, but that society has been connected on a global scale already for centuries – and can therefore only be understood on a global scale. Indeed, he points out that the capitalist system is the first world system in which the economy is global, while the political organisation is based on nation-states, leading to the paradox that economic classes refer to the world-system, while political classes can only fight for power within the single states. Third-world nationalism is in his analysis therefore only the expression of the class conflict specific to the periphery (cf. Wallerstein 1974, 1980). Indeed, international institutions, the international division of labour, financial streams and media influence even remote villages, which can be clearly seen in Nagaland.

Considering spatial differentiation and mobility practices in their own regard helps us to gain a deeper understanding of the "territorial moment" for social inequality. Anja Weiß's work is one of the few that explicitly deal with the connection between class and space. She argues that class models built on methodological nationalism become increasingly challenged by the fact that in a country like Germany it cannot account for one-sixth of the population with a migratory passport, who might own property in several countries, rely on transnational support networks and might be paid less due to this status alone (Weiß 2005, p. 709). She concludes, following the distinction between objective and relational space, that we must consider not only the container type of space, which is objective and based on borders, but similarly the relational, in which the kind of relations are important. Functionalist systems and institutions like churches etc. only integrate parts of people and at the same time transcend the borders of container spaces (ibid., p. 712).

In a globalised economy, she argues further, we can make out two basic ways through which spatial relations impact on social inequality: in the form of *spatial autonomy*, as an advantage, and in the *quality of the spaces* to which one has access (ibid., p. 714). With Wallerstein, she differentiates three transnational classes: while for the upper classes the nation-state becomes less relevant, the lower classes inhabit places where the state is not able to protect them from the globalising economy; the nation-state and its welfare regime are only relevant for the middle positions on the world scale (ibid., p. 716). Rather than being an epistemological presupposition, the nation-state and its public goods are increasingly structuring forces for transnational classes of skilled migrants, next to transnational labour markets and epistemic communities (Weiß 2006).

Both levels of spatial inequality are increasingly important in the Global South, as Seth Schindler (Schindler 2015) argues, especially in the mega-cities that form an important part of Non-European modernisation. With the shift of capital investment from production to real estate and the corresponding disconnect of capital and labour, he witnesses a "territorial moment" in the urban governance of these mega-cities. Rather than directing policies on the people, as he argues, they are now seeking to transform the spatial order. The aim of these policies is to accord with the new regime and its aim to separate capital accumulation and oversupply of labour through various means, ranging from taking control of "difficult areas" to the creation of new cities. Restrictions on mobility and the quality of the spaces is shown to be an integral part of politics in these cities at the forefront of urban dynamics in the 21st century. But how about the rural areas? Dipankar Gupta (2012) provided us already ten years ago with the argument that it is the general devaluation of rural life, rather than urban job opportunities that provides the background for uncontrolled urbanisation in India. And unlike the experiences during industrialisation in Europe, Surinder S. Jodhka points out that the "marginalisation of agriculture [. . .] is not being accompanied by a similar degree of shift of population to non-agricultural employment" (Jodhka 2005, p. 10). As a result, large portions of the population in India move to the cities without being able to find appropriate means of living and become subject to the above-mentioned urban controlling policies. The question of the possibilities of migration as well as the quality of space provide us here with an important heuristic to analyse the role of space and migration for social inequality among the Nagas.

## Central concepts used in this study

The common thread of the previous arguments is that European theories of social inequality need to be freed from the pre-suppositions that come along with the "thick" concept of class, as well as presumptions of a uniform habitus guiding all actions or of a universal symbolic discourse that accords unambiguous meanings to practices and language. As shown, research in the specific subject areas moved on from these overgeneralised concepts towards a deeper understanding of the single dimensions of social inequality. This turn away from received generalisations is especially needed in the case of Nagaland, where taking a vertically stratified society as a starting point appears rather misplaced. Yet, there are at the same time obvious economic inequalities within the Nagas and my interviews showed that to a degree "class"

has become one of the categories my respondents classified themselves to describe their social background. Instead, I like to dissolve these strong theoretical settings into distinct and clearly defined empirical questions in order to reconstruct their relationship at the end of the investigation. Rather than concluding straight from economic criteria or subjective self-classifications to the existence of social classes, this study analyses social practices, future aspirations, spatial patterns and discursive positionings first in their own right before looking at their connection with socio-structural categories. Unlike economic differences that can be assessed by rather straight-forward indicators, cultural and social differences are more difficult to measure and require a background understanding of the society to be studied. The importance of this background-understanding has been shown by taking recourse to philosophical debates but needs to be turned into a sociological concept to make it empirically accessible.

### *Milieus and discourses*

As long as practice theory remains on the level of single practices, it is of doubtful use for the sociological study of larger phenomena or even societies. For this reason, concepts of larger complexes of intertwined practices are required that allow statements on the aggregate level. Generally, there are two major ways to aggregate practice arrangements – according to practice-internal criteria like inclusion of people or teleological reference (like Bourdieu's field concept) or from the perspective of the carriers of practices (like milieu theory). The first option I like to call "practice milieus", referring to an arrangement of practices, often regulated through specific discourses; the second "cultural milieus", in line with milieu theory referring to people who share a similar pattern of being involved in a range of practice milieus. Neither concept assumes that these milieus form strictly defined entities with clear boundaries.

#### *Practice milieus*

Rather than taking social structures as the starting point of the analysis, I argue that it is better to start with the concept of practice. Not all practices are of similar importance. A good strategy is therefore to start with certain "core practices" and trace their organisation into larger practice milieus, using the ecological meaning of milieu as the immediate environment or context a practice is situated in. This milieu concept resembles Bourdieu's definition of the field, or the concept of functional systems of systems theory. In my usage, a "practice milieu"

is not defined by its function (systems theory) nor is it necessarily competitive in nature (Bourdieu's field theory). A practice milieu does not need to be homologous to other milieus; the essential characteristic, following Schatzki's definition of practices, is the overarching normativity and teleology a practice milieu exhibits. They provide individuals with a practical sense of *how to go on*, and, if needed, they guide action by explicitly stating the rules that should be accorded by those carrying them out.

The outcome of these ideas is that we have to analyse practice milieus as not only accidental but *principally* different from the distribution of resources. Practice milieus are furthermore interwoven with material arrangements and not independent of time and place. Arrangements, according to Schatzki, are the objective relations between objects that are established by practices and which in turn enable and guide these practices (Schatzki 1991). A typical example is the complex set-ups of modern factories and industrial harbour landscapes with deeply integrated practice-technology-bundles. Similarly, villages and cities exhibit specific and elaborate infrastructural orders of things, which are based on the specific practices they help to sustain. If practices do not match arrangements, as it can happen through migration or fast technological change, people literally do not know what to do where others see endless options for activities. This "material" perspective also allows us to look at the different spatial patterns of practices as an additional way to characterise specific practice milieus vis-à-vis others. Comparing the inclusion profiles of individuals into different practice milieus, e.g. the intensity and frequency with which people are integrated, can therefore provide a good overview over the relative importance and openness of important practice milieus. A recent study from the perspective of systems theory has shown that there are vast differences in the ways social systems integrate, from compulsion like education to optionality as in sports, with different entry costs and required time consumption (Burzan et al. 2008). Regarding social inequality, integration pattern can also reveal which practices relate to structural patterns of social inequalities by excluding certain sections of people. Taking inspiration from the work of Burzan et.al (ibid.), I aimed to get access at the way milieus include the youth through my survey. Specifically, I looked at the milieus of religion, politics as well as the integration into leisure practices, especially sport and music as the most globalised milieus today.

### *Discourses and interdiscourse*

As shown in the example of the ban of alcohol in Nagaland, we can see that practices and practice milieus are also defined by specific

discourses that articulate normativity and classification systems, e.g. discourses regarding rules for consumption practices. Discourses may be confined to their practice milieu but also have a more universal aspiration. Rainer Diaz-Bone has argued that Foucault's discourse-analysis provides a necessary supplement to Bourdieu's materialistic account of culture because it recognises the particular reality of discourse and its power to bring about the practical meaning of culture (Diaz-Bone 2006, p. 29). By considering the sphere of "interdiscourse", he argues against Bourdieu's reduction of discourse to its structural and practical underpinnings. Interdiscourse is the realm in which discourses seek coherence, aim to distinguish themselves from each other and make the articulation of different normativities within a single milieu possible (ibid., p. 29; 35).

Discourses can hence be analysed through manifestations like texts or law documents, but in order to encompass the reception of discourses, I regard individual positioning within these discourses as more appropriate in this case. If we assume that the normativity of practice milieus is enforced discursively mainly in cases of *deviations* from the taken for granted conduct, discursive positionings are best assessed by asking respondents about *problems* rather than the aims or rules of certain practice milieus. Discourses are not only normative, but also prescriptive in that they are propagating their aims and goals as worthwhile pursuing. The effectiveness of these prescriptive discourses can be assessed by looking at the aspirations of respondents regarding specific practice milieus.

### *Cultural milieus*

My usage of the term "cultural milieu" resembles that of "social milieu" theories, but it refers here specifically to people with similar integration pattern into practice milieus, similar discursive positionings as well as aspirations, which I regard explicitly as cultural rather than socio-structural categories. Against milieu and class theory, I do not assume that people who share similar practice pattern or have similar opinions and aims form a social group in the strong sense or even organise themselves as groups. By defining them as theoretically independent of socio-structural categories it becomes possible to see empirically whether any relations between cultural milieus and socio-structural categories exist, rather than foreclosing the analysis by the very definition of the term. Only if there are clear influences of structural or class factors on affinity to a cultural milieu can they turn into

"social milieus", though this term still does not imply the existence of increased social interaction that might justify calling it a group rather than a theoretically defined category based on similarities.

### *Socio-cultures*

Looking at the practice inclusion patterns and problem discourses can help us a great deal in getting a view of relevant practices and their organisation. Yet, the dimension of understanding remains problematic as it evades standard research methods based on explicit expressions. How can this background understanding be made accessible for a sociological analysis of cultural and social differences? One way certainly has to be the practical familiarisation with the relevant practices by the researcher by way of participation and familiarisation, which can lead to a certain degree of understanding a different form of life. Another way is to look at the specific history of a practice and its context in order to render taken-for-granted aspects more visible. Boike Rehbein in his study of Lao society has suggested the concept of "socio-cultures" to provide a sociological account of macro historical influences that shape contemporary societies (Rehbein 2007, p. 25). Socio-cultures are specific patterns of acting that are socially differentiated: "Patterns form the cultural element of the term, while differentiation is the social element" (ibid., p. 25). They are therefore no cultural "essences", but past combinations of social structures and social practices. Many current practices and structures of inequality can hence be traced back to their historical origin and need not be taken as a given or as an essential ingredient of a timeless culture. The reconstruction of socio-cultures can also be extended towards the symbolic sphere. Again, Foucault can provide guidance when in "Discipline and Punish" (Foucault 1991) he proposed another method to focus on the historical forces that lead to the emergence of a *specific* "discoursive formation". The genealogical reconstruction of the emergence of discourses does not claim to arrive at the socio-cultures "as such", but to find the relations between institutionalised power and symbolic representations within these discourses.

### *Classes*

Since this book deals with social inequality, the concept of class and the specific meaning it acquires here will be treated in more detail. The aim of class theory is first to find the most relevant principles

and categories that describe existent inequalities of life chances in a population. As a theoretically guided abstraction and simplification, it presents an interpretation that should be adequate and "viable" in constructivist terms: this means that the model is one of several possibilities to represent class structure, which in principal could also be different. Second then, the relevance of a class theory can be justified by its explanatory or predictive power. The aim of the theory would then be to predict (probabilistically) empirically observable behaviour and attitudes by inference from theoretically defined classes. In capitalism, most authors agree, life chances are mainly determined by their relation to economic institutions, be it means of production, the market or occupational hierarchy. The systematic classification of a population into classes is however always to a certain extent subjective, since the standards of classification are based on one theory rather than another. Another source of simplification is that many criteria that are used for class analysis are continuous rather than discontinuous, as in the case of income. There always has to be a compromise between the accuracy of measurement and the willingness of respondents to invest the time and information for a detailed survey. Popular discourse on class is also of limited help, as categories are applied according to the social needs at hand, not for theoretical purposes, as Bourdieu famously had pointed out in his work on Algeria (Bourdieu 1977).

In order to avoid arbitrary classifications here, it is hence necessary to use a historical and interpretative approach to identify the relevant contexts of work and labour first, before systematising them theoretically. Since class structures are not static but evolve over time, class theory should also be able to provide a logic or process of its development. Indeed, while Weber, Goldthorpe and Bourdieu focussed mainly on available resources as criteria of vertical and horizontal stratification, Durkheim had pointed to another phenomenon, that of an increasing division of labour. The concept of the division of labour has however hardly been recognised by stratification and class theories. As shown in the theoretical part, it is necessary to relate social structure to the division of practices in a society, especially those practices that are important for capitalism. These are the more narrowly *economic* practices that allow access to remuneration, but similarly those that are not valued directly like education. I therefore like to distinguish in the following between labour, which denotes any kind of remunerative practice from work, which includes those practices only indirectly related to capitalism, and other kinds of practices that include any socially organised activity.

*Horizontal differentiation*

Rather than starting with the vertical differentiation in the tradition of stratification theory, I think it is theoretically and historically more appropriate to begin with horizontal differentiation. Horizontal differentiation enlarges hierarchical models with another dimension, even though there is no consensus on its content. Examples are especially cultural capital in Bourdieu's class theory, other classics like Theodor Geiger (1932) differentiated horizontally according to economic or cultural capital, using the "relations of production", like Goldthorpe, as the vertical dimension.

Newer approaches that aim to capture the expansion of the service sector, welfare state and female participation in Europe have recently criticised the focus on industrial capitalism in the classic models. A prominent example is Daniel Oesch's (2006b) class scheme. Oesch differentiates vertically according to the material advantage of the employment relationship, measured especially by work income, because "an employment relationship essentially boils down to an exchange of work effort for economic resources" (Oesch 2006a, p. 274), along with the promotion prospects of a position. Horizontally however, Oesch argues that a differentiation between different *work logics* is more appropriate rather than e.g. cultural capital. Cultural capital, he argues, is mainly important for differentiating the middle classes. While both managers and professional occupations have become dependent on skills, education is not useful to distinguish between the factions of the lower class (ibid., p. 266). This argument has been confirmed by the high correlation between economic and cultural capital in the case of Germany (Otte 2005, p. 450; cf. also Blasius and Winkler 1989).

Nevertheless, even Oesch's revised class schema must be adapted to the context of the Nagas, as it is intended only for European societies. I therefore replace the abstract work logics with the historically evolved milieus between which the division of work among the Nagas takes place. While I reconstructed the most important milieus and their roots in specific socio-cultures in the previous chapter in a historical-genealogical manner, the emphasis of this chapter is not on the milieus themselves, but on those parts that are relevant for capitalism. For the analysis of the Christian milieu, for example, all intensities of inclusion are of interest, ranging from priests to deacons, voluntary Sunday school teachers and lay persons; for class analysis, only those positions are of direct interest that are included as remunerative work or labour in the sphere of capitalism. The division of practices therefore

encompasses the more narrowly defined division of work, which only refers to practices that are directed towards sustaining the material survival. Though there can be obviously no clear-cut distinction between practices and work, I include here cultivation, housework, secondary education and unemployment as different ways of belonging to the division of work, as they reflect a rather clear relation to securing the means for subsistence, compared for example to sports or leisure activities. An even narrower approach is that we can refer to all work that is paid as belonging to the division of labour, as they are directly integrated into the monetary base that makes capital accumulation in capitalism possible. Though the use of money obviously pre-dates capitalism and is therefore different from it, money is also necessary for capitalism to exist. But while money is a means for the exchange of commodities before capitalism (C-M-C), the exchange of commodities for the sake of capital accumulation (M-C-M) becomes the dominant form of exchange in capitalism, as Marx argued in his "General Formula of Capital" (Marx1909, chapter 4). Here, I therefore call labour those forms of work which are within the narrower sphere of money circulation and simultaneously directed at securing the material subsistence of those who engage in it. Additionally, I include not only the division of labour but the division of work into class analysis as it encompasses a considerably higher proportion of the Naga youth who are equally important for the understanding of social inequality.

With this differentiation between practices, work and labour I want to point to another problem of Oesch's class model that has been pointed out by Weber-Menges and Vester. Oesch's class model, as most stratification models, is primarily focussed on people in employment, and thereby neglects the increasingly large group of unemployed people, as well as other groups like financial speculators, capitalists and household labour (Weber-Menges and Vester 2011, p. 475). One might add here the large group of subsistence cultivators in Nagaland, who certainly belong to the sphere of work without being directly integrated into the money economy. Oesch's schematic approach, which certainly captures well advanced capitalist societies, therefore needs to be reread in a fashion that appreciates the particularities of a certain region, especially older forms of social structure and division of work that Marx understood as *modes of production*.

For that aim I draw again on the work of Boike Rehbein. Rehbein repeatedly pointed out that it is essential to adopt a historical-reconstructive approach to social structure, especially in an Asian background that differs from the narrative of Western modernisation (Rehbein 2007). Rehbein argues that European theories since Marx

relied on a wrong equation between social structure and the division of labour; this equation is typical only for stratified societies, like those of medieval European "stand" society or the Indian caste system. In these hierarchical systems, an activity like farming, trading or preaching implied automatically a certain position in a clear-cut hierarchy. This kind of stratified social structure has increasingly dissolved in modern societies, where "social structure and the division of work refer to each other; they are interdependent but not identical" (ibid., p. 28).

### *Vertical differentiation*

A theory of class differentiation in capitalism, I argue, should focus first on that part of the division of practices that is "valuated" and therefore expressed in monetary terms. It is specific for capitalism, as Marx found out, that different use values become expressed in a common exchange value, and function in return as a means to increase the exchange value. Taking capitalism explicitly as the background category of comparison, Max Weber's market-oriented approach appears to be more useful to construct vertical differences, as it abstracts (as does money as a "real abstraction") from the actual work and specific milieu-related hierarchies. This focus on income also avoids the shortcomings of a narrow definition of class hierarchies. Weber however showed that Marx' focus on the sphere of industrial production does not cover all occupations, but has to include historically older occupations like bureaucrats, land-holders, crafts and farmers that persist in capitalism. It seems more appropriate to use the market value of an occupation as criterion of relative advantage in capitalism, as it is more general than ownership of the means of production. Using income as a measurement for vertical inequality in the sphere of capitalism as a common denominator is a better choice than direct occupational criteria (e.g. Goldthorpe). Occupational criteria are however partly accounted for by the horizontal dimension of social differentiation. Especially in societies with weak institutional redistribution mechanisms[3] income might be a good measure to compare vastly different, formal and informal kinds of labour that are not easily classified with the international standard classifications of industrialised countries.

In addition to income, I introduce educational level as a secondary principle of vertical differentiation. Rather than seeing it as an independent axis, I argue that Bourdieu's inclusion of cultural capital into class theory is of high importance for differentiating those that are *outside* the production process – such as higher education students

and the unemployed. For those people with a negative relation to the labour market, I hence take the "relation towards the education system" as a second-order principle of vertical differentiation. This makes it possible to avoid the short-comings of classic stratification theory and still of Bourdieu in excluding unemployed from the analysis, and second to fall into the trap of regarding exclusion as a positive feature and to regard all those who are excluded from the economic system automatically as a common class.[4] The different life chances and possibilities of those investing into more cultural capital, those fighting for their inclusion into the labour market and those withdrawing from it are hence made visible. The reason why educational stratification is a secondary rather than an independent principle of categorisation is because educational capital is mainly important *before* entering an occupation. It is hence not very useful to use educational level as an independent dimension from economic capital *within* the work sphere. If a person with a high educational title performs an occupation for which a much lower qualification is needed, formal qualification is not directly important for the class position (Oesch 2006a, p. 271). Most of the time, ascending in the hierarchy of bureaucracy, increasing the wage or making more profit does not depend on the formal education but on criteria specific for the practical milieu, be it examinations for government service, promotions within companies or increasing the market share or profit rate for entrepreneurs.

## Notes

1 His conception is therefore indeed close to a critical realist understanding, which Bourdieu seems to admit (cf. Vandenberghe 1999; Reed 2010).
2 Bourdieu regards a third important capital, social capital, but does not elaborate on it in his statistical analysis, as it is more difficult to measure (Bourdieu 1986).
3 Nagas living in Nagaland are e.g. exempted from income tax.
4 This tendency is already present in Weber, who regarded the property-less, uneducated, unstable workers as the only homogeneous social class (Weber 1922, p. 177). His point of view is echoed in Niklas Luhmann's system's theory, who stated about modern society that "exclusion integrates much stronger than inclusion" (Luhmann 1998, p. 631).

# 2 Socio-cultures

## From the Naga village to peripheral capitalism

In the following, I trace the main socio-cultures that became historically prominent in Nagaland. It is because of these specific historical processes that Naga modernity differs not only from European modernity, but also similarly differ from others' experiences with colonialism and modernisation in India and even within the North-East. Modernisation processes interact with existing social formations and cultural traditions (Saalmann 2015) and lead to "multiple modernities", as argued by Eisenstadt (Eisenstadt 2003). A socio-culture is characterised by the division of practices, its social structure of inequality between those involved in it and the symbolic discourse(s) that guide the socio-culture. Where possible, I also attempt to define the "ethos" of a socio-culture that relates both to the teleoaffective structure as well as to the specific way these aims were understood. Readers interested in historical arguments and ethnographic detail about the Ao Nagas will find them in a recently published article (Küchle 2015). Rather than assuming clear-cut historical breaks between the historical phases, my interpretation stresses the relative historical continuity of practices in Nagaland.

### Naga village culture

#### *Division of practices*

Cultivation of rice through slash-and-burn or *jhum* agriculture was the dominant economic activity among the Nagas at the time of colonial ethnographers (J. P. Mills 1926, p. 107; Smith 2009) and is still practised today by most rural people in Nagaland. Typically, trees are cut in the wintertime and burned in the fields before the sowing period, while the trunks are left in order to avoid erosion of the fields (J. P. Mills 1926, p. 107). Since fallow periods are necessary for the

soil to recover, new plots of land are cleared every or every alternate winter. The length of fallow periods depends on the relation between land and population, leading to an intensification of land use in case of a growing population. This agricultural practice is adjusted for a situation of enough yield with low labour input but not regarded productive from the perspective of intensive cultivation (Rawat, Riba, and Rina 2010, p. 998f). The jhum cycle had a huge impact on the cultural organisation of village life and most festivals related to the agricultural rhythm (J. P. Mills 1935). Hunting and gathering in the fallow and virgin forests on the village land were additional economic activities that supplanted agriculture and provided food and resources for the village (Küchle 2015, p. 145).

The economic system of pre-colonial Nagas can be interpreted as an example of a "ritual mode of production", a concept that was coined by Roy A. Rappaport to account for the overarching importance of rituals for the structuring of communal relations (Rappaport 1968, p. 233). The important feature of traded goods in the "ritual mode of production" was not so much that they supplanted missing resources or were the outcome of an economic specialisation between villages but because they supplied socially valued goods for increasingly elaborated community rituals (Spielmann 2002, p. 198).

While cultivation and certain leisure practices could be performed by everyone, the division of work about crafts was strictly regulated by gender roles, the agricultural cycle and the incidence of warfare (Jamir and A. Lanunungsang 2005, p. 154ff.). The division of practices between the genders followed the dichotomy between public and private realms: public practices like politics, priesthood, trade and warfare were restricted to men, while household works like cooking and raising children were the domain of women (Küchle 2015, p. 150). Men's dormitories, the central buildings of pre-colonial Ao Naga villages, were the institution through which the reproduction of the division of work as well as symbolic reproduction took place (ibid., p. 151).

### *Social structure*

Naga villages had different political structures that depended on the ranking of clans. Stratified clan systems could lead to a monopolisation of land by the chief clan, which lead basically to a dual class society of landless and aristocratic clans, though symbolic ranks were usually more differentiated (Fürer-Haimendorf 1939). In other villages, like among the Ao Nagas, power was shared between the clans, while the symbolically most important offices were the hereditary right of

a senior clan (Bendangangshi and I. T. A. Aier 1997; Jamir and A. Lanunungsang 2005).

On the individual level, different social practices provided cultural processes of status differentiation, though they were simultaneously important for integrating the village societies. Within the "ritual mode of production", body ornaments were one important means of expressing symbolic hierarchies and social identities among its members. Today, most Naga tribes have a unified shawl pattern that is worn by all members; attires and shawls have lost their meaning as status markers to expressions of common heritage and tribal identity within the larger realm of the state and the ethnic Naga community.

Warrior status, which was achieved in warfare and head-hunting, was specific to men. Besides head-hunting, wealth was specifically important for men at the time of marriage.[1] We can reasonably assume that men's village identity was uncontroversial in the strictly patrilineal society of the Nagas. Women were and are considered mobile, since they leave the family and move to their husband from another clan. It is probably for that reason that their clan found expression in the body ornaments. Feasting status was a prerogative of married couples and was expressed both by men and women. Unlike individual and clan symbols, feasting status referred to the core family as an important social unit within the clan.

*Mithun* sacrifices formed the major ritual to enhance a family's status within the clan, though they cannot be reduced to their political function. As I. Bendangangshi argues, these sacrifices were parts of the religion of the Ao Nagas and served a variety of purposes (Bendangangshi and I. T. A. Aier 1997, pp. 97–133). *Mithun* sacrifices were a common practice among all Naga tribes, and its rules provide a hint at the power structure within the different configurations of power among the Nagas.

Wealth consisted mainly of rice stocks and could be accumulated mainly through intensifying fieldwork, as well as by charging high interest rates (Chungli: *tsüktem*) within the village. Usually, people were asked an interest of 100% per year for borrowing food grains, making families with poor harvests over time heavily indebted to the richer section (Jamir and A. Lanunungsang 2005, p. 342f.). Jamir and Lanunungsang describe traditional Ao villages as societies where people were ultimately divided into poor and rich, a division that was perpetuated by social mechanisms of interest and indebtedness (ibid., p. 342f.).

Age and gender were other pervasive classifications for organising practices and symbolic inequality. Older people, starting with older siblings, had to be addressed by title and not by name. They had to be

respected and it was believed that misfortune would befall those who transgressed this rule (J. P. Mills 1926, p. 185).

Gender was also a major dimension of inequality, though its role was more ambivalent than age. Though J.P. Mills argued that the status of Naga women was "no whit inferior to that of a man" (ibid., p. 211), they were excluded from the most prestigious practices like warfare, politics and important religious functions in the villages (Jamir and A. Lanunungsang 2005, p. 219). Many rituals accorded women a lesser status than men, as many ethnographic accounts have shown regarding birth and death rituals (J. P. Mills 1926, p. 264f. Bendangangshi 2008, p. 230).

Major social practices that related to agriculture, hunting, gathering, trading, handicraft production, feasting and warfare were shared by most of the Naga groups. These practices were not isolated but embedded within a segmentary division of work between hill villages and within ambivalent hill-valley relations. Ethnographic accounts present a clear picture of the division of practices along the lines of gender and age, besides more restricted areas that allowed a specialisation towards military, political and religious functions of the village. This division was objectified in the institutions of the young men's and women's dormitories that were found all over the region, though they have now completely disappeared. Social inequality between clans, families, gender and age existed among the Nagas in pre-colonial times – in contrast to the ill-founded claim to "tribal equality" in present public discourse. However, village subsistence was the umbrella that ultimately restricted all possibilities of individual accumulation (Küchle 2015, p. 160). The *ritual mode of production* combined cultural processes of competitive performance, interest-taking on rice and hierarchical redistribution. This mode of production was not carved in stone but was responsive to ecological crises. In times of scarcity, the ethos of *village subsistence* or "equity" (W. Fernandes and Bharali 2008) became more prominent; in prosperous times the "meritocratic-redistributive ethos" on the clan levels flourished (Küchle 2015). Symbolically, discursive classifications between men and women, young and old as well as between clans organised the division and restricted access to the most socially valued social practices.

## State and government

### *Emergence of the colonial state*

Colonialism in the Naga Hills brought about the forceful integration of traditional Naga villages into larger political and social structures.

Unlike the Assam Valley, the hill areas provided no scope for generating profits for the Empire. Rather, they had to be conquered to secure the border to Burma after the war and to stop the raids on the tea estates bordering the hills (Elwin 1969). The *Inner Line Regulation* from 1873 restricted entry into the hill areas in order to secure the (cheap) working of indigenous institutions, but the occupation nevertheless remained greatly deficient (Downs 1992, p. 23). As Zou and Kumar state, the isolationist policy not only intended to preserve indigenous institutions but was as much a move to control the trade in pottery, salt and rubber that existed between the areas, and cut off hill traders' access to markets as well as to their sphere of influence in the valleys (Zou and Kumar 2011, p. 160).

The political and administrative integration of the Naga Hills was not easily achieved. The process of conquest from the Assam Valley towards the border to Burma took almost one century to proceed, and not all areas came under British control. Since they could not rely on local elites with formal education, new offices were created in the villages to create a link between both milieus. *Gaonboras (GBs)* were appointed headmen in villages governed by a council of elders, a position that was usually occupied by the legitimate chiefs in "autocratic" villages. In most cases however traditional authorities were undermined by these newly created offices (W. Fernandes and Bharali 2008, p. 5). Where monetary or symbolic means to win over village elites failed, they were removed by force (J. P. Mills 1926, p. 405). Appointed interpreters, so-called *dobashis* that were used by the British to judge on matters of tradition law, came to be the first truely *Naga* as opposed to mere village and tribal elites (Lotha 2007, p. 56).

### *Colonial discourse*

Colonialism was unthinkable without its discourse of progress and civilisation, which accorded inferior and backward status to all non-white populations and both justified and demanded their transformation (Thong 2014, chapter 1). Inspired by Darwinian and Spencerian ideas of the struggle between races and their ordering on a ladder of civilisation, "tribals" came to occupy an ambivalent place either at the lowest place of the hierarchy or even outside of it. Academic discourse of the time, during which the study of tribes in the African colonies was *en vogue*, supplied the concepts to ethnographers, whose task was to ensure the justification of the civilising mission of the Empire at home.

Despite the official discourse of indirect rule and preservation, gaining control over the local society was often the most immediate need

and turned ethnography into a "handmaiden of colonial administration" (Lotha 2007, p. 60). I. Bendangangshi blames the five *dobashis* accompanying Mills for the "countless mistakes" in his records, since "they were all young men who knew not even the ABC of English language [and] at the same time their knowledge was very much limited pertaining to socio-culture" (Bendangangshi and I. T. A. Aier 1997, p. 4). Written records of singular perspectives fixed previously contested myths and identities into a durable symbolic representation. Fixation and standardisation emerged as a powerful ethos of colonial ethnography that served to map conquered territories and to control its population.

Cultural performances, symbolic traditionalism and the empowerment of tribal languages in universities similarly express the search for a source of belonging, since both Indian and Western mainstream cultures are considered insufficient, given the background of Hindi and Assamese hegemonic projects. This affirmation is profoundly ambivalent. During my fieldwork in Kohima and Dimapur it was a common experience that I was told to go to Eastern Nagaland if I wanted to learn something about the "real Nagas". There, people however regarded themselves mainly as "underdeveloped" and a young member of the students' union claimed that Eastern Nagas are being "exploited" by the Western Nagas. Until now, it is difficult to escape the order of colonial discourse that permits only an either-or solution to the quest of an authentic identity on the one hand, and a good life on the other, while the fixation of "traditional" culture makes it difficult to develop viable forms of authenticity.

In recent years, however, there seems to be a shift in the academic discourse on the Nagas, which is mainly since Naga scholars themselves are increasingly taking part in it. After a period of mere recitation and repetition of colonial style ethnographies, important landmarks in the critique of colonial conquest as well as colonial discourse are the recent publications by Abraham Lotha (2007) and Tezenlo Thong (2014). These works mark the very beginning of post-colonialism in the academic discourse on the Nagas.

### *Post-colonial statehood*

With Indian independence and even more after statehood was granted to Nagaland in 1963, administrative structures extended their influence on every corner in Nagaland. The Indian state has included the newly created state Nagaland into its encompassing project of "development", incorporating a myriad of schemes and programmes and

bringing income, status and employment to a sizeable proportion of the Nagas.

Economic integration of Nagaland has been growing exponentially during the recent decades, as can be seen in the development of the state GDP in Figure 2.1 (2010).[2] The state government of Nagaland, and indirectly the whole economy of Nagaland, is almost completely dependent on funding from the Central Government: according to the Budget Report in 2006, it can only generate 7–8% of its annual budget from own sources (Finance Minister, Nagaland 2006).

In the absence of industrialisation and large-scale cash-crop production, government jobs are unique in providing a secure life-long income, pension[3] and hence independence from children's income in old age. They also signify, especially for the older generation that grew up in a predominantly cultivator setting, to be free from the hard, agricultural life and be associated with the realm of progress and symbolic power. It is not accidental that many government servants wear formal shirts with pockets, usually carrying a pen, as an insignia of their position even outside their formal duties. It reveals the importance of the signature from a legitimised person within administrative practices, but also extending beyond it given its economic dimension. Depending on the position within the clearly defined hierarchy of the bureaucratic socio-culture, there can be further benefits like cars, personal drivers and possibilities to use the position or connections within




*Figure 2.1* Development of Nagaland GDP

the system for personal benefits.[4] Given the stability of the position and the possibilities to influence the streams of money entering from outside, having a government job translates into an overall status that is not defined by income alone; it can only be understood on the background of its colonial pre-history.

## Christianity

### *The spread of Christianity*

Christian missionaries often followed the advance of European expansion. This was the same case in British India. Despite their common expansionist agenda, however, it would be too simple to regard them as mere agents of British occupation, since the missionaries in North-East India were mainly American Baptists and Welsh Presbyterians (Downs 1992, p. 30). Due to the increasing importance of "science" rather than religion as a means of control and justification of colonialism, there was already a marked distance between colonial administration and Christianity, though the relation differed in the hills and the plains (ibid., p. 31). In Assam, the different Christian denominations could not replace institutionalised Hinduism, despite their relations to those in political power (S. Fernandes 2009, p. 134).

Despite the backing of the colonial powers, Christianity only gained a sizeable number of followers after Indian independence. Like British occupation, Christianity spread from the West of the hills to the East, a process of conversion that lasted more than a century and is still going on. Located at the headquarters of the mission, the Ao tribe was at the head of the movement: Christians accounted already for more than 25% in 1921 (J. P. Mills 1926, p. 410). Ao missionaries were later the major factor in spreading Christianity first to the Sema/Sumi tribe during the 1920s, to the Kyong/Lotha tribe during the 1930s (Downs 1992, p. 108). The church leadership became completely indigenised from the 1950s onwards, when the Indian Union expelled foreign missionaries from the region and blamed them for the rising national movement among the Nagas (ibid., p. 117).

### *Missionary ethos and discourse*

Baptist discourse introduced important classification pattern into the Naga society, which were linked pervasively to the colonial situation rather that to the belief system as such. Important were the superiority of Western style dress and of "sitting and eating" jobs over manual

labour (Smith 2009, p. 196). Similarly, abstaining from alcohol was introduced as a marker of Christian identity. According to Mills, Christian converts were called "non-drinker[s] of 'madhu'" (Ao: *rice beer*) (J. P. Mills 1926, p. 416), which used to be widely consumed by all sections of society. Indeed, cultural conversion was regarded necessary for joining the realm of education. The new practices that were introduced differed greatly from the previous life-style of young Nagas and were introduced with the help of mission schools (cf. Downs 1992, p. 146).

Besides the introduction of a new milieu, Christianity also altered the existing division of work, though not fundamentally. New professional groups like carpenters and lower government servants remained first cultivators (J. P. Mills 1926, p. 102). Though many taboos and restrictions collapsed with partial or sudden conversion of a village, the gendered division of labour in the villages was not altered through Christianity (ibid., p. 100).

In the course of time, Christian institutions increasingly sustained themselves and gained a powerful role in Nagaland. Staring from 1897, the Baptists organised annual mass gatherings beyond village level with thousands of participants (Smith 2009, p. 200). The religious milieu established itself slowly as an autonomous milieu, a differentiation that acted as a counterforce to the dominant milieus of the village and colonial rule (S. Fernandes 2009, p. 136f.). Like colonial ethnography, Christianity fixed previously rather fluid identities and integrated the tribes symbolically by choosing a dominant language for translating the Bible (ibid., p. 138). A common language and script at the same time empowered the Nagas to a great degree and provided them with the most important tools of modernity.

The end of Baptist monopoly with Indian independence introduced new Christian denominations in Nagaland. Despite these differences, there is a strong continuity in the Christian milieu with that introduced by the early missionaries, especially regarding its central ends and ethics. The first is the ethos of outward "proselytisation", of spreading the Gospel in order to win over new members from other denominations or religions. It has led to an intense spread of Naga missionaries in India, South-East and East India (CBCNEI 2018), an expensive venture that has been financed completely by the Naga churches and parishes (Downs 1992, p. 126).

The second is the ethos of "communitisation", of decentralising the church administration and giving first-most importance to the local congregation. In Nagaland, most congregations (except the Catholic church) finance their village churches autonomously by paying

the tithe of their income or harvest to the church (ibid., p. 114). It is almost natural then that the churches are not only dependent on the respective communities, but similarly on their well-earning members. Redistribution of resources to the community, an ethos rooted in the pre-colonial village culture, is until today very important for gaining social esteem.

Communitisation is especially visible in towns, where members of different tribes and ethnic communities live side by side. During my research in Kiphire district, Ao Nagas would go to the local Ao Baptist church, while the local Sangtam tribe go to the Sangtam Baptist church, and Gorhkas or Nepalis to the Gorkha Baptist church, or that of other denominations that exist within the tribe. While the communitisation ethos is also due to the different languages used in the service, it is also a heritage of the socio-culture and the close alignment of church structures and tribal units.

Another important feature is the historical connection between Christianity and formal education in Nagaland, which persists today despite the introduction of government schools in almost every nook and corner of Nagaland. Education in general is given very high importance. "Education" is even sometimes regarded as a *moral* quality in Nagaland: being a "good Christian" is often equated with being an "educated person". Being educated is often expressed by wearing formal clothes. This socio-cultural influence of the missionaries can especially be seen in Eastern Nagaland, where the influence of global media culture and its emphasis on "fashionabiliy" and "street wear style" is not felt so strongly yet. Formal clothing in this context expresses also that one has left behind cultivation and its "dirty" way of life based on hard manual work. Christianity is the basis of legitimate culture today, and it was frequently pointed out that denomination, along with tribe, is an important criterion for determining eligible spouses.

The provision of schools by various denominations is a major vehicle to get a foothold in new areas. Downs writes that the number of Catholic educational institutions doubled from about 600 in 1954 to over 1,200 with 115,000 students in 1990 within North-East India (Downs 1992, p. 121). Other denominations, especially the Baptist church, have since then established prestigious schools in the towns and cities of Nagaland, though they lack the means to subsidise schools in poor regions to the same degree as the Catholics. The rise of new denominational schools is largely due to the bad situation of the public government schools, especially the lack of teachers' supervision. Teachers' absence is a common problem in village government schools and these educational institutions also often lack in quality (e.g. teach in local languages rather than in English). A look at the results of




*Figure 2.2* Performance indicators of government and private schools

the High School Leaving Certificate Examinations for the year 2015, which were published by the Nagaland Board of School Education during the time of research, supports the low performance of government schools compared to their privately owned counterparts.

As Figure 2.2 shows, government schools lag behind in all relevant indicators. The pass percentage in government schools is less than half of the private schools, and they lag behind twelve percentage points regarding exam appearance in the first place. A significant number of those attending government schools hence already disqualify themselves before even trying. The bad performance of government schools is also reflected in the overall enrolment figures: almost three-quarters of students in the batch are enrolled in private schools. The relation between the Christian and the educational milieu in Nagaland is also revealing regarding the paradox of the government milieu. Despite their rather bad reputation in the educational field, government teachers belong to the best-earning group in many villages with a salary up to INR 14,000 per month for primary schools, which is almost double the salary paid by private schools.[5]

## Politics

In Nagaland, politics is a very heterogeneous socio-culture including village politics, the partly armed struggle of Naga nationalism, the

integration into the Indian political system after statehood in 1963 and student politics, all with multiple organisational structures existing side by side. Public discourse differentiates usually between over- and underground politics, the latter referring to the Naga national groups and the former to the political parties. Despite this dichotomous discourse, the practices of politics in Nagaland are not as different as one would think. Frequent side-changes of people actively involved in any of the political organisations, as well as the dominance of muscle power and economic capital as main resources, reveal the low degree of institutionalisation and formalisation of this socio-culture. While ideology still plays a certain role in the strongly hierarchically organised nationalist groups, affiliation to political parties both by candidates and voters is largely determined by considerations of personal, village and tribal loyalty in exchange for economic benefits. Political ideologies, in a stark difference to mainland India, do not play any role in Nagaland elections.

### *Naga nationalism*

> During the Great War several hundred Ao Naga men, who went to France to work behind the lines, had experiences they never could have dreamt of. Among other things, they got shipwrecked and faced dangers in the submarine zone. When they returned each man gave a thank-offering of twenty-four rupees to the church, a large sum for them, amounting to about £1 12s. It would be interesting to know what effect these experiences will have. Will any noticeable disorganization result?
>
> W.C. Smith, "The Ao Naga Tribe of Assam", p. 187, 2009 [1925]

> So far very little, I think.
>
> Footnote by J.H. Hutton, in: W.C. Smith, "The Ao Naga Tribe of Assam", p. 187, 2009 [1925]

In 1925, when American sociologist and missionary W.C. Smith wrote the first study on the Ao Nagas, he and J.H. Hutton, then Honorary Director of Ethnography for Assam, could not yet see the seeds of nationalism – an ideology that just had led Europe to the first catastrophe of the 20th century. In the course of the century, nationalism emerged as a powerful discourse and distinct milieu in the region that has left its imprint until today.

The seeds were sown when the British recruited Nagas for serving in the labour corps in France during World War I. Those who returned brought along the idea of nationalism, which resulted in the formation of the Naga Club in 1918, the cradle of Naga nationalism (Stockhausen 2008, p. 64) and later led to the foundation of the Naga National Council led by the "father of Naga Nationalism", Angami Zapu Phizo. As can be seen in Phizo's speech, the distinction between Nagas and Indians is the central classification pattern of ethno-nationalist discourse, one that is prototypically applied here to all spheres of society and aims to provide a clear distinction between in- and out-group. Though the development of Naga nationalism is a rather complex topic than cannot fully be discussed here,[6] this classification system is powerful until today, irrespective of the actual strength of or support for nationalist groups. A prominent example is the ban on intermarriages of Naga women with non-Naga immigrants that was issued by the influential Naga Students' Federation (NSF) in 2003 (Singh 2010, p. 23).

After the end of the British colonial system the status of the formerly "excluded areas" was not clarified and the territory was eventually annexed by the Indian Union. The Naga National Council (NNC) under Angami Zaphu Phizo refused to join the Indian Union and declared independence on August 14, 1947, one day before Indian independence. An armed struggle followed between the Indian Army and the Naga National movement after the Naga Hills was declared a "Disturbed Area" by the Indian Government in 1956, followed by the establishment of the "Federal Government of Nagaland" two months later (Inoue 2005, p. 25). It is estimated that this struggle claimed between 100,000 and 200,000 casualties and resulted in hundreds of burnt villages and human rights violations – without much notice in the rest of the world (Oppitz 2008, p. 25).

What started as a mass movement with large-scale popular support and participation evolved first into bureaucratic organisations headed by charismatic leaders and became more and more sectarian. In the recent speech (Chishi Swu 2015) by the Chairman of the NSCN(IM), Isak Chishi Swu, it can be seen that nationalist discourse has changed towards an internal differentiation between "traitors" and "revolutionaries". The aspiration of nationalism increasingly involves religious overtones rather than socialism, which was present more strongly in the earlier days. While Phizo still differentiated between "originally animist" Nagas and "Hindu Indians", self-determination is now "God given" and fused with a Christian teleology. The slogan "Nagaland for

Christ", which is used as a common theme by all factions up till now, shows the attempts to create this common symbolic space through equating "Naga" with "Christianity". Nevertheless, there are also people who count as "Nagas" who have never become Christians (Stockhausen 2008, p. 70). The organisation patterns of Naga nationalist groups are akin to modern state structures, comprising of ministers, military and other wings as well as a bureaucratic organisation that extends down to the village levels, providing hospitals, camps and other infrastructure. Citizens in Nagaland are exempted from income tax of the Government of India, but they must pay tax to the nationalist groups. For bureaucrats, these taxes are often already deducted before they receive their salary, showing the strength and deep integration of nationalist groups with the state structures of Nagaland.

### *Party politics*

The formation of Nagaland State not only brought along major Indian political parties like the Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), but also led to the formation of local parties like the Naga People's Front and most recently the Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (NDPP) led by former Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio, among other smaller regional parties. While party networks extend down to the village levels, at least from the two major parties, the Indian National Congress (INC), the Naga People's Front (NPF) and its recent split-off NDPP, Naga intellectuals like I. Bendangangshi blame political parties for many problems encountered by the villages:

> In olden days there was no outside source of fund for the village Putu menden, whereas today, various funds are made available to the village Putu menden from the Government sources and also from political parties. These are incentives to win over the people and the representatives of the village government.
>
> I. Bendangangshi, "Glimpses of Naga History: Origin & Migration of the Nagas", Vol. II, p. 132, 2008

Political party structures are similarly accused by Lanunungsang and Jamir (2005, p. 234) for destroying the "well-knit village society", through experiences of "booth capturing, muscle and money power, proxy votes, violence, life attempts, selling and buying of votes, killing during elections etc". While one might expect that there is a deep divide between nationalist groups fighting for an independent state on the one side, and official, India-backed politicians on the other side,

this seems however not to be the case. Sometimes, they are not even strictly divided between persons. In many cases, politicians chose to join the "overground" political field after emerging from the "underground", a typical story of the generation that was in its youth during the 1950s and 1960s. Others joined the national groups after having served in the Indian Army or change now between the warring factions. On the other side, a Naga Regiment was established in 1970 as the youngest regiment of the Indian army, including recruits from rehabilitation camps of Naga underground fighters (Indian Army 2010).

Similar dynamics can be seen regarding whole groups in the North-East of India. As Bhaumik (2009, p. xv) remarks, "[w]henever a rebel group has signed an accord with the Indian government in a particular state, the void has been quickly filled by other groups, reviving the familiar allegations of betrayal, neglect and alienation". Politics, whether official or underground, appear to follow a common logic. Bethany Lacina has described the political situation in North-East India as a consolidation of regimes of "local ethnic autocracy", which she sees as a political strategy of the centre to maintain stability in the North-East (Lacina 2009).

However, analyses that explain the working of the political milieu in Nagaland from the larger political structures of North-East India alone do not tell the whole story. Specifically, they fail to specify the exact relation between politicians and their electorate – after all, politicians still need to be voted into power according to official democratic rules. The political system in Nagaland is, according to Naga scholar T. Zarenthung Ezung (2001, p. 2f.), a major driver and source of corruption in Nagaland:

> A person who is elected through the use of money will always try to cover up the expenses he/ she made during the election and will also try to retain some extra money for the next election. Thus, the developmental money in his/ her department goes into his/ her pocket first and development last. Moreover, a person elected based on area, village and clans will automatically practice nepotism. It was often found that development funds were being diverted to less feasible areas to appease his/ her voters. [. . .] When corrupt officials are caught in any corruption scandal, the community or clan to which he/ she belong comes out openly in defense of that person.
>
> T. Zarenthung Ezung, "Corruption and its Impact on Development: A Case Study of Nagaland", p. 2f., 2001

However, if we reserve the term "corruption" to cases of " 'the abuse of public power for personal ends' ", as Ezung defines it initially (ibid., p. 1), the relationship between politicians and their constituency/voters might be better termed as involving an ethos of "patrimonialism". Patrimonialism, a term coined by Max Weber, is characterised by two features: first, a fusion between bureaucratic and personal domains on the side of the ruler, and second a restriction of the rulers less by laws but by tradition (Swedberg and Agevall 2005, p. 195). Patrimonialism can appear in several, centralised or decentralised, forms and may be more generally described as family-like relationships that are based on a hierarchically structured exchange of loyalty against protection and remuneration (Rehbein 2007, p. 137). In the context of Nagaland, patrimonialism does not refer to a constant ruling elite (as Rehbein describes in Laos), but to a competitive system of local elites that is mediated through party networks in representative democratic structures.

This patrimonial relationship is expressed by statues or memorial buildings honouring politicians in their villages on the one side, and frequent changes of party affiliation on part of politicians on the other side. It is now combined with a logic similar to venture capitalism, as the competition of parties for power in the state renders the relationship intrinsically unstable and introducing a high amount of risk, especially financial risk for candidates. If it is true that one can obtain up to Rs. 10,000 for a vote (the practice is widely acknowledged among my interviewees), a successful candidate will have to engage in quite substantial credits or access to other funds, even if only a certain part of the votes involves monetary transactions (often families without access to regular income). Indeed, if the practice is established in a way that there are *generalised*, habitualised expectations towards money during election, it may be difficult to compete successfully without engaging in considerable expenses. However, in case of non-election, this will theoretically lead to a complete financial disaster for the concerned person; it will be rather difficult to regain both the money and the trust of those who were funding the election in the first place.

The logic of politics in Nagaland hence resembles what has been termed "Matthew-effect" or "winner-take-all-markets", similar to what has been found in lottery, labour markets of movie directors, actors and other media related occupations (Beckert and Lutter 2013; Lutter 2013) as well as among political and economic elites in USA (Frank and Cook 1995; Hacker and Pierson 2010). According to Mark Lutter, winner-take-all-markets are characterised by two elements: first, there are a few actors in the field that concentrate most

success chances, and second, a permanent over-supply of new actors that enter the market and keep the overall success rates down (Lutter 2013, p. 598). As an effect, we can witness the establishment of rising market entry costs for newcomers in the political arena, which would encourage elite formation in politics over the course of time, a process that is enhanced by the principal scarcity of high-level posts in any government set-up, as well as by the dependence of a large section of the population on income sources outside stable occupations.

### *Summary*

Until now, the conflict between Naga and Indian nationalism is far from facing a lasting solution, and the analysis of its history highlighted some of the reasons. One of the structural problems seems to be, as Abraham Lotha concludes, the perpetuation of colonial tribal policies and attitudes that are perpetrated by media, army officers and government officials that "is radically opposed to the Nagas' conception and representation of themselves as unconquered people whose spirits of independence and dignity fuel their wish to be treated as an equal" (Lotha 2007, p. 55). This also resonates with the general attitude described by James Scott and Bengt Karlsson who noted that people having distrust and ambivalence towards the state (Scott 2009), regard themselves as "reluctant Indians" at the most (Karlsson 2011, p. 50).[7]

But the present generation feels similarly alienated from their own political leadership. Among many young Nagas I have talked to, the state of politics in Nagaland appears pathetic, especially when looking at the abysmal state of public infrastructure despite the funding from the centre. The low degree of institutionalisation of the political parties and the dominance of "strong men" shows a continuity of the personal, paternalistic ethos of the village culture and its extension into the realm of the State. The difference is that in the village culture, political participation was strongly regulated by custom, while political leaders today are not bound by usual moral or customary considerations. Another reason is certainly the bad economic situation in the state that makes voters susceptible to paternalistic offerings, but also a lack of visions beyond the "development" paradigm that has hitherto failed to provide an improvement in Nagaland. Since the largest part of economic resources are distributed through governmental and political networks, "development" has followed an ethos of "privatisation", an ethos I argued has also found its way into the Naga national groups, at least on the lower levels. While one might

expect public outcry against the privatisation of public goods, open resistance to these practices is hardly seen. Given the general culture of impunity in Nagaland, even open violation of the law by elites does not lead to any legal consequences as the administration is itself part of the patrimonial network. Most youth act pragmatically and try to use their or their families' connections to get jobs, contracts or at least some lump sum as their share during elections in return for their temporary loyalty.

## Economic practice milieus

All the mentioned socio-cultures in Nagaland have an economic dimension, and indeed are more important that the capitalist market culture that dominates in the economic centres. Rural cultivation and the administration, rather than the market economy, provide the bulk of employment and income opportunities in Nagaland. The churches, directly or indirectly through educational institutions, also provide employment for educated Nagas both in rural and urban areas. But while the social esteem of church employees is rather high, income is rather on the much lower levels of private jobs. Since most churches, with the exception maybe of the Catholic church, are funded via contributions from its members, these opportunities are usually in areas with an overall higher level of economic development. Among the various objectives to bring "development" to the region (including Nagaland), the major aim has been to develop the private economy. But before looking at the diverse practice milieus of the private economy I quickly outline the two most important economic sectors of Nagaland – agriculture and administration/government.

### *Agriculture and administration*

Until recently, agriculture was the main economic practice in Nagaland, absorbing about 60% of the working population, but contributing only about 33% of the State GDP (National Informatics Centre 2013; Nayak 2014). Cultivation based on small-scale landholdings continues to dominate agriculture in Nagaland (Government of India 2012). Though cultivation and other remunerative occupations go hand in hand in Naga villages, commercialisation of agriculture is still at a low level. Initiation of cultivating cash-crops has mainly supplemented subsistence-based cultivation rather than replacing it. Usually, the whole village – rather than a single agri-entrepreneur – specialises in specific commercial vegetables. This leads to hybrid forms of village

socio-culture and a capitalist market orientation. Since the additional income is often invested in education rather than circulating back into agriculture, commercialisation remains slow and risky. Many farmers complained of lack of cooling houses for sensitive products like tomatoes during the harvest season, but no efforts were made to finance such a facility by individual means. This points to a lack of resources or proper knowledge – or both. And because land-holding follows largely customary patterns, the slow commercialisation of agriculture does not lead to the formation of new land-holding groups in the rural areas or larger agricultural entrepreneurs with enough capital to improve the profitability (Küchle 2016). Most farmers I talked to expected the government to help them with investments and infrastructures. But they also expressed a strong feeling of being neglected by the state.

Trade is usually conducted by the cultivators themselves on a small seasonal scale, and in the weekly markets in the towns one sees exclusively Naga women selling their produce, along with men from other parts of India. There is also large-scale, long-distance trade into the larger cities like Kohima and Dimapur, but even here it is often conducted through personal networks like relatives or village emigrants. But the low degree of agricultural industrialisation does not produce enough food for the growing and increasingly urban population in Nagaland, making it dependent on massive food imports from outside the state (Finance Minister, Nagaland 2006). This applies to all categories of food, including rice, vegetables, meat and fish. The recent ban on imported fish in 2008 due to chemical residuals revealed that it is transported all the way from Andhra Pradesh, taking about one week to reach Dimapur, the entry place to Nagaland. Even pork, the food given most importance by the Nagas, is imported from Assam in large quantities. When taking the overnight bus from Mokokchung to Guwahati, one can witness the oncoming pig-transporting convoys.

Besides agriculture, the administration is a major provider of income and livelihood: In 2011, almost 9.4% of the working population in Nagaland were directly employed by the government, against 3.1% (3.6% including the Central Government) in India as a whole (own calculations based on National Informatics Centre 2013, part A56; Nagaland State Information Commission 2014; Government of India 2011, chapter 4). Among the state employees, police officers and teachers form by far the largest groups (own calculations based on Directorate of Economics & Statistics 2007, p. 44; 121; 124f.). But although it is oversized for political reasons, the administration cannot supply the huge demand for office jobs by educated people who are

formally allowed to apply for them (to count as educated, one usually needs to have at least a graduate degree). As in most countries that opened access to higher education during the last decades without a proportionate increase in government jobs, this process has led to a devaluation of educational degrees. Kedilezo Kikhi wrote that in 2006 more than 60% of the registered unemployed had at least a graduate degree, and there was an average ratio of 508 applications for higher government jobs (Kikhi 2009). The scarcity of government jobs has strengthened the competitive culture especially in the private schools, as for many parents a government job is the only legitimate future employment for their children.

### *Trade*

The dependence on imported goods from outside Nagaland, the disconnect between production and consumption is an outcome of the isolationist policy introduced by British occupation, a policy that has deeply disrupted the trading practices of the hill communities. As has been pointed out above, Naga villages were already structurally incorporated into larger trade patterns of the area. The British administration integrated the Naga Hills formally into the major Indian markets through the introduction of the rupee that replaced barter and the local *japili* currency. New players entered the scene in the hills, where shops by trading communities from Rajasthan were opened in administrative towns like Wokha and Mokokchung. But since the families in the villages remained largely self-sufficient, the extent of trade remained small. However, a lot of new goods entered the hills and replaced items that were produced by the villagers themselves before: metal cooking pots replaced bamboo tubes and pottery, umbrellas replaced banana leaves and Western clothes hand-made cloth (Smith 2009, p. 181).

Despite regulations like the Inner Line Permit and the ban on land sale to non-Nagas, immigrants dominate a large part of the trade and provide cheap labour all over the state. By conservative estimates, around 100,000 illegal immigrants from Bangladesh (Bengali-speaking Muslims) are suspected to live in Nagaland (Singh 2010). According to Amarjeet Singh, a survey conducted by the Government of Nagaland in 2003 revealed that large parts of the private economy are dominated by non-Nagas, who owned 72% of the surveyed businesses. According to a study by the Department of Evaluation from 2006, most of the non-Naga workforce is engaged in construction works,

load carrying and trading, followed by small pan shops, grocery shops and handcart and rickshaw pulling (ibid., p. 24–5). He resumes:

> Prospects for better employment and the dislike of the locals for manual labour have significantly contributed to the influx of immigrants, with the immigrants easily finding work, be it in the agricultural fields, in homes, or as rickshaw pullers and manual labourers. As Nagaland faces a labour shortage, certain sections of Naga society also encouraged immigrants by providing them shelter, land for settlement and cultivation. Local contractors and businessmen also prefer to engage immigrants as they provide cheap and skilled labour.
>
> M. Amarjeet Singh, "A Study on Illegal Immigration onto North-East India: the Case of Nagaland", p. 21. 2010

While staying in Dimapur, I realised that my local hosts went to buy groceries and other small goods at shops owned by non-Nagas, even though there were shops by Nagas next to them. Asking them about their decision in the face of similar alternatives, they explained that with Nagas, one always must pay the specified price, whereas with immigrants it is possible to get a bargain. Since immigrants are accorded clearly a lower status compared to Nagas, one does not owe them the same degree of recognition and respect. Bargaining about the price with traders from the same community would be counted as stingy, greedy and individualistic, and therefore lower one's social esteem – a rule that does not apply in the case of outsiders.

Though weaving was an important practice in the pre-colonial village culture, most clothes are nowadays imported from outside. Many Naga women buy them in bulk from Kolkata or directly in Thailand and resell them privately or in small cloth shops, which dominate the markets next to second-hand shops. Branded retail shops are rather scarce, and usually rather empty. With the current entry of global online fashion shops in Nagaland, local (branded) fashion retail might vanish before it even had a chance to grow.

## *From colonial socio-cultures to peripheral capitalism*

### *Peripheral capitalism*

On the background of declining agriculture and a saturated administration, the solution for providing additional income opportunities

is seen in the private sector. The development of the private sector and development programs are closely interlinked and need to be seen in the larger context of North-East India. While other North-Eastern states like Meghalaya or Arunachal Pradesh are already much deeper integrated into development economics and the discussions linked to it, Nagaland still has to experience many of the prospects and perils of deeper economic integration.

A look at the statistics confirms the comparative low economic status of the area. North-East of India in general is far behind in industrial development compared to other parts of India (Mishra 2002). While Assam, which included all North-East states, was above Indian average in Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) at the time of independence, the whole region is now lagging far behind both in absolute and per capita numbers (2008, p. iii). In recent years, this situation has aggravated, and the contribution of NE India to the NDP of India has consistently fallen from 3.05% in 1999–2000 to 2.76% in 2006–7. The economic upsurge in India over the last decades did not touch the region, and where economic growth was observed it was erratic (ACCESS Development Services and M2i Consulting 2010, p. 18f). The roots of this developmental lag date back to both British colonialism and Nehru's import substitution policy, which land-locked the area that was and is to a large part surrounded by geopolitical adversaries. What could have been a major trading hub in other circumstances turned out to be an area with no priority to settle large-scale industrial hubs in post-independence India. In the phase of liberalisation in India after 1990, however, multinational companies have started extractive enterprises in the region.

Within India and outside, North-East India has until recently been discussed mainly under the political paradigm of insurgency and political unrest. The economic dimension was equalled with a low performance in economic indicators and a general low degree of infrastructural development. In the last two decades, linked to the change in India towards a liberal and neoliberal economic policy, this discourse has changed profoundly. Started by former Prime Minister Narashima Rao and furthered especially under Atal Bihari Vajpayee, North-East India has become the focal point of an ambitious "Look East policy" that aims to reconnect the region to the ASEAN countries with an aim to combine free trade agreements with comprehensive antiterrorism cooperation (Shahin 2003). Though there is air-connectivity with all ASEAN capitals, and plans to build a continuous motorway from India to Vietnam as well as a railway link, there have been hardly changes in ground realities. Cross-border trade is still mainly carried

out through sea-borne rather than continental borders. In the case of Meghalaya, cross-border trade suffers from irregular border openings and huge administrative hurdles (Karlsson 2011, p. 35), and many land-based routes are geographically rather inaccessible and badly connected to larger centres of production and consumption on both sides of the border. Nevertheless, the vision of a revived and reconnected North-Eastern Region has taken a hold on the imagination of scholars in that it "could give Northeast India access to global markets and technology and help the region overcome the handicaps of its landlocked condition" (Baruah 2004, p. 1).

Following Bengt Karlsson's recent study on the political ecology of North-East India (2011), this current wave of inclusion is indeed not entirely new but resembles the ethos of colonial extractive capitalism. Colonial enterprise in the region began with the discovery of tea by the British in the beginning of the 19th century, though they were already engaged in the lime-stone business during the 18th century (ibid., p. 37). Though the plantation economy in Assam, as elsewhere in India (Xaxa 1997), remained isolated from the surrounding society, it led to a deep transformation of the previous practice-arrangement patterns. Forests were cleared for tea plantations, fuel, tea chests and commercial logging – a process propelled by the construction of railway tracks that in turn allowed large-scale timber logging and the export of lime-stone and coal from the region (Karlsson 2011, pp. 31–2).

Karlsson's main argument is that "the basic modality of resource extraction that was established during the colonial period has continued to structure the economy of the region to the present day" (ibid., p. 33). He explicitly refers here to James Ferguson's concept of "socially thin" extraction, developed along the prototype of offshore oil extraction in Angola (James Ferguson 2006). Immanuel Wallerstein (1980) has characterised such regions prominently as the *periphery* of the global capitalist system. I would agree here with Karlsson's argument that it is especially the "way" and not resource extraction per se that determines the peripheral character of a region (Karlsson 2011, pp. 43–4). Peripheral capitalism, often a successor of colonial socio-cultures, is an umbrella term to describe related economic practices that are based on extracting a region's natural wealth for capital accumulation in a different region while avoiding any connection to established economic and social practices of that region as far as possible. But rather than existing side by side with these established practices, they undermine local practice-arrangement patterns by monopolising resources like land or natural resources that are necessary for all practice milieus and by their very nature limited. Unlike colonial extractive

capitalism, peripheral capitalism is not based on a parallel political structure of domination but – under conditions of a democratic electoral system – actively includes local elites as intermediaries in the process. This abstract definition is exemplified below with relation to two economic milieus – the industrial-extractive milieu as well as the financial milieu.

### *The industrial-extractive milieu*

> The people would like to see the large river systems converted into a source of prosperity. Mineral wealth can be used to create opportunities to increase employment and income. They would like to harness the vast hydroelectric energy potential and use the comparative advantage to expand economic activities in the region.
>
> Ministry of Development on North Eastern Region, Government of India, "Vision 2020", p. 13, 2008

Despite the promise of "inclusive development" through raw materials and energy production, the ethos of "socially thin extraction" still shapes the industrial-extractive milieu today. A look at other states in the North-East that have already more experience in this regard can show how further integration might progress, though there are important local differences in both politico-legal landholding structures and economic structure. The general pattern is that raw materials are immediately exported outside the region, and instead of local people taking up at least the work in the mines, plots of lands and stone queries are leased out by local chiefs or government employees to multinational companies. Surprisingly, it mirrors the practice of economic extraction when the area was under company rule 200 years before (Karlsson 2011, p. 37).

In the case of limestone in Meghalaya, this ethos of extraction has been put to perfection when the cement multinational Lafarge built a conveyor belt through the mountain forest to transport raw limestone directly to its cement plant in Bangladesh, from where it can easily be shipped overseas (ibid., p. 209). Other examples include the strategy of the centre to develop North-East India into the "powerhouse of India" (Ministry of Development on North Eastern Region 2008, p. 179), mainly by developing large-scale hydro-projects for the fast-increasing power consumption of the country. The generated energy is not used for consumption within North-East India, as Sanjib Baruah argues, but the region plays the role of a "supplier of a key natural resource

to fuel the engines of economic dynamism elsewhere" (Baruah 2012, p. 50). Altogether, it is estimated that in North-East India alone forcible displacements from agriculture due to large dams amounted to two million in the period 1947–2000. If current plans to develop 60 GW through large scale hydro power in the region are executed, it is predicted that three million more, or 25% of the currently active workforce in the North-East, will be affected by the proposed projects (W. Fernandes and Barbora 2009; W. Fernandes and Bharali 2008).

Due to the special provisions of Article 371A, section (1) under the Constitution of India, the state plays a significant role for the integration of Nagaland into global capitalism. The article excludes "Naga customary law and procedure" and, even more importantly, "ownership and transfer of land and its resources" from any act of the Parliament, "unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides" (India 2010, section 371A). This constitutional provision has certainly avoided the large-scale displacements from land that other states in North-East India experienced through large-scale development projects. Market integration has however picked up pace recently and will make land and resource ownership a central issue soon of the state – with strong implications for its internal class structure.

Nagaland is now on the verge of extensive economic integration, given the availability of major resources in the area, especially coal, limestone, iron and nickel (Finance Minister, Nagaland 2006; Ngullie 2013). The most significant resource, however, is that Nagaland has reserves of around 600 million tonnes of oil. Indeed, the state is one of the last in the region to "benefit" from extractive industries, and Karlsson predicted that the extraction of oil in Nagaland will follow the current scheme of enclave extraction, secured by private security forces and under the control of foreign companies. Recent examples in the case of oil extraction indicate that his prediction is already becoming true. Its first exploration by the central state-owned ONGC was however stopped after protest from several political and civil groups in 1994 (Majumdar 2014b). Resistance against large-scale infrastructural projects in North-East India is mainly based on the counter-"ethos" of ethnic exclusivity and increasingly by claims to "indigeneity" (Karlsson 2003; Baruah 2008), and has frequently been successful in stopping extractive enterprises not only in Nagaland, but also in Meghalaya, where the Khasi Students Union resisted the connection of an industrial estate to Assam (Karlsson 2011, p. 70).

A look at the level of discourse alone would lead one to construct a familiar opposition between global capital and ethnic local resistance, of "Jihad vs. McWorld" or "Empire vs. Multitude" of early

globalisation theory (Benjamin R. Barber 1995). I want to highlight that this is misleading as shown in the case of the Changpang oil fields close to the border to Assam, which is a prototypical example of how the state and local organisations are involved in negotiating the way resource extraction takes place. According to journalist Ushinor Majumdar from the investigative newspaper "Tehelka", the present story started when oil explorations conducted by the central government-owned oil company ONGC were stopped in 1994 after public protest by the NSCN, tribal bodies and the Students' Union that forced the company to leave the site. With the sudden retreat, residents were left with the environmental and health hazards due to previous explorations. Oil spilling destroyed the crops and soil, an issue that led to renewed resistance when the ONGC tried to return in 2007 together with a Canadian company (Majumdar 2014b). Demands raised by Naga groups like the Naga Hoho, the representative body of the village leaders, were indeed encompassing: according to Majumdar, extractive net revenues should according to demands go up to 40% to the landholders, and all the jobs should be reserved for locals (Majumdar 2014a). Furthermore, the NSCN-IM asked 10 million INR from the ONGC for its permission, which eventually made the oil company retreat.

Local protest silenced when in 2012 article 371A was used by the Nagaland State Government to claim control on the oil blocks from the Centre under the Nagaland Petroleum & Natural Gas (NPNG) Act. After issuing the Expression of Interest (EoI) for eleven zones, the zone in Changpang along with others fell to a Delhi-based company that was established shortly after the EoI. As Majumdar writes, it was through a public interest litigation (PIL) from the tribal body of the Lotha/Kyong tribe, the Kohima Lotha Hoho, that the fact became public that none of the requirements stated in the NPNG Act were actually met: neither did they provide statements on previous experiences in oil extraction, nor did they disclose details about their legal structure and financial standing. "The erstwhile Neiphiu Rio government seems to have handed over a rich oil reserve to a company that is deeply in the red and needs revival as much as the Wokha oil zone" (ibid.). He further writes that the deal included only relatively meagre benefits for the state but no clauses to with regard to shares of local stakeholders or employment guarantees (Majumdar 2014a, 2014b). Opposing protesters from the local Kyong Students Union (KSU) that went on the street against the new deal in return were beaten up by the security forces that were employed under the draconian Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code of India (CrPC) (Majumdar 2014b).

What this story clearly shows is that in the process of setting up extractive industries in Nagaland, we have a complex configuration of actors that are involved in determining the course of events and the formation of the extractive-industrial milieu: students, national groups, tribe representatives, local organisations, courts and finally international stock markets, companies and state representatives. All these actors determine with varying power and coalitions the way oil extraction in Nagaland proceeds. The ethos of "socially thin extraction" is intrinsically linked to the involvement of local and state elites, who benefit from the neo-colonial arrangements at the expense of other parts of the community. Nevertheless, the story also shows that actors other than companies or the state have a significant amount of agency as well. There is not automatism as the often-cited "resource course" suggests, because the relevant structures of peripheral capitalism are already in place before any extractive industry starts.

This is also apparent in previous attempts by the state to open factories, as in the Tuli paper mill or the defunct sugar mill in Dimapur, long before the current focus on oil extraction. Their example shows how a different ethos, state-led development, has similarly failed in the region. The Tuli Paper Mill in Mokokchung district managed by the Nagaland Pulp & Paper Corporation Ltd. (NPPC) district was the only heavy industry in Nagaland, inaugurated in 1971 as a subsidiary of the Central Government owned Hindustan Paper Corporation Limited (HPCL), with a 5% ownership of the Government of Nagaland. Aiming to produce 33,000 MT of paper annually from local bamboo, operation started in 1982 only to close ten years later due to continuing operational losses and lack of power supply (India Enterprise 2018). Plans to revive the plant since around 2006 have not materialised, and recent reports indicate that the HPCL is in a corporate insolvency resolution process (The Morung Express Online 2018), leaving Nagaland without any major industrial unit for the time being.

The backside of the coin is the negligence of public infrastructure and more general missing policies that would benefit the local economy not by introducing large-scale industries, but by providing a stable production environment as well as lower transportation costs within the state. Most infrastructure provided by the state such as roads, medical facilities, waste collection and treatment etc. are in a very poor condition or non-functional. The recent "Tariff Order FY 201415" issued by the Nagaland Electricity Regulatory Commission exemplifies the infrastructural situation in Nagaland with respect to the supply of electricity. Since Nagaland owns only one hydro project (Likhimro Hydro Electric Project) with a capacity of 24 MW

(95 MU in 201213), it could only generate around 17% of its electricity requirement in 2013 – even though consumption was as low as 192 kWh per capita (*Tarif Order Financial Year 2014/2015* 2014, p. 21), compared to India (684 kWh in 2011) and Germany (7081 kWh in 2011) (The World Bank 2015). Though village connectivity is close to 100% (Nayak 2014), there is a high loss of electricity (36% in 2011–12) and bad maintenance of infrastructure (over 11% transformer failures in 2011–12) (*Tarif Order Financial Year 2014/2015* 2014, p. 52). In addition to the rationing system that provides electricity only to certain hours of the day e.g. in Dimapur, this adds to a very unstable and volatile power situation in Nagaland. Given the constant losses of the Department of Power in Nagaland, which amounted to a gap of Rs. 700 million in 2011–12 (average tariff of Rs. 4.54 vs. average cost of Rs. 6.09–9.05 per Unit), it is difficult to see how this situation will change in a degree that would make the grand visions of industrialisation realistic.

A policy focus on socially thin extraction makes ownership and control over land more important than engaging in productive activities. This leads to the concentration of capital in the hands of the landowning elite and those with access to the streams of development funds. With the current form of development – exemplified both by large-scale companies or government agencies – an integrative economy and sustainable improvement in life chances for the Nagas seems highly unlikely.

### *The financial milieu*

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that local capital is mainly invested in land rather than industry. In Nagaland as in other parts of North-East India, the middle-classes, who often benefit from reservation quotas in the government, have sometimes acquired substantial landholdings. Interestingly, there is a close parallel with what Seth Schindler described as a disconnect between urban capital and labour due to investment in real estate rather than production (Schindler 2015). In Nagaland, one can witness the same process as in the metropolises: capital is to a large degree invested in property, real estate or land, rather than in employment-generating industries. Growing urbanisation makes good returns on investment almost infallible – especially since land is to my knowledge often bought with savings (or government pensions) rather than credit, and the risk of falling prices is therefore less severe. People also aim to avail land that is within the proposed railway connection between Dimapur and

Kohima and can be sold to the government later for high profits. The practice of investing capital mainly in land is manifested in the soaring prices for plots, especially in the towns and in the cities of Dimapur and Kohima. Many interviewees complained that it is now almost impossible to even get land at all, even if enough funds are available.

In some cases, anthropologist Dolly Kikon reported that it was the need for money in order to pay for healthcare or education that has led people to sell their ancestral land to members of the community (Kikon 2009). Privatisation of land does not only have negative effects but was the pre-condition for the establishment of the growing towns and cities. Mokokchung town is built mainly on the land that belonged to Mokokchung village, where most of the land has been sold already (I. L. Aier 1987); the same holds true for the capital city Kohima, and the villages in the vicinity of Dimapur, which have been turned into suburbs that provide the necessary living space for the growing population of the economic capital. An often-overlooked aspect of land privatisation is that it opened access to land, and therefore to social security and independence, for women with no rights to ancestral land according to customary law. The process of land privatisation is not uniform and its impact on economic and social inequality seems to depend mainly on modality, scale and purpose.

Access to financial capital is crucial for the involvement in capitalism, especially for the investment needs of entrepreneurs. As Florian Stoll showed in the case of Brazil, financial practices like credit and instalment payment are crucial for basic consumer goods in the so-called emerging societies. While in Germany and the USA people buy houses, cars or expensive consumer goods on instalment, it is used in Brazil for all kind of goods, even chewing gum, by all sections of society (Stoll 2012, p. 303). Since bank credits are difficult to get, instalment allows even the lower classes to afford goods like refrigerators that would be otherwise impossible for them to buy. They also allow the lower middle classes to finance a life-style that imitates the upper middle classes by buying expensive branded clothes or even cars, with the downside that a large proportion of them find themselves heavily indebted compared to their income generation (ibid., p. 252). The situation for Nagas, even if they might have similar income levels, differs from this description immensely. Regular credits are usually only available for those with regular income, and the specific role of customary law, which makes land as security for banks unavailable, restricts its availability basically to government servants or people that already have high income or savings. In case credits are needed, as in the case of urgent medical expenses, people without savings must

rely on neighbourhood and family networks for their credit needs. Private lending of money usually involves high interest rates of 10% per month. While this high interest certainly reflects the actual risks of failure to a degree, it effectively leads to further accumulation of capital by those who have access to stable income. On the part of the credit taker, the inability to repay might severely impact social respect – often the only security. Due to this high risk on both sides, credits are therefore taken mainly to cover up emergency needs like health costs rather than being invested into productive small-scale businesses.

One can therefore conclude that the weak position of North-East India is matched, and to a certain degree also caused, by missing access to financial products. Some important indicators of financial inclusion are shown in Table 2.1. In 2009, only 32% of the population in the North-Eastern Region had a deposit account, and only 18% of the population in Nagaland, which was among the lowest in India at that time. And at that time, there were still around 40% who were excluded from formal banking facilities (ACCESS Development Services and M2i Consulting 2010, p. 22f.). Indeed, access to formal banking has improved considerably over the past few years, especially in Nagaland, though they are still far behind the Indian average. Interestingly, this access is not matched with access to loans: the credit-deposit ratio in North-East India as well as in Nagaland has even decreased over the years, while it has increased in India in total. Overall, this amounts to an increasing outflow of capital from the region into more industrialised areas in India, capital that is hence missing in the region. The high ratio of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) also shows that the quality of

*Table 2.1* Comparison of finance indicators

| *Indicator* | *India* | *North-Eastern region* | *Nagaland* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average population/ bank branch (rounded) 2009/2013 | 15,000/ 12,000 | 21,000/ 17,000 | 26,000/ 17,000 |
| Credit/deposit ratio 03/2009 and 03/2013 (in %) | 72.6/79.1 | 35.8/33.1 | 30.7/27.9 |
| Non-performing assets 03/2009 (in %) | 2.4[a] | 8.5[b] | 11.3[b] |

Source: World Bank; ACCESS Development Services and M2i Consulting 2010; Reserve Bank of India 2013.

[a] Data from 2010 for banks.
[b] Data from 03/2009 including banks, Regional Rural Banks (RBBs) and SHG-bank linkages.

credits is very weak: in Nagaland, almost one out of eight loans is in danger of defaulting. Despite increasing physical access to banking, both depth and quality of loans are very weak in North-East India and Nagaland and are even decreasing regarding major indicators of financial inclusion. There is a disconnect between the population and banks about banking practices, leading to a structural outflow of capital from the state, one that is matched by the fact most products including food and energy need to be imported.

Is peripheral capitalism and the resulting failure to bring about economic and social development a cruel fate? It is indicative here to refer to former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz' explanation of the "East Asian Miracle", the sustained economic growth and simultaneous decrease of poverty in the decades after 1965 (Stiglitz 1996). Stiglitz argues that this success story was based mainly on the constant re-investment of capital into the rural economy, along with rising wages, limited commodity prices and a spread of universal education. Although these experiences should not be overgeneralised, it is apparent that there are different policy choices that proved successful over an extended period for many formerly poor countries. Their story also shows that economic development does not necessarily go along with increasing economic inequality, as e.g. the "Kuznet curve" or "inverted-U" theory suggests. It is the ability of the average citizen, instead of only a patrimonial elite, to consume and (re-)invest that is integral to sustained development.

In this chapter I described broadly four major socio-cultures that are important to understand current practice milieus in Nagaland – the Naga village culture, the state administration, Christianity and politics, especially Naga nationalism. These socio-cultures form the foundation of most current practice milieus in Nagaland. Present milieus are directly rooted in these pre-colonial and colonial structures and cultures, with no clear distinction between historical and current forms of practice. Far from being complete, these sketches are meant to provide some background knowledge to readers not acquainted with Nagaland for a better understanding of the following chapters.

Some practice milieus like the education milieu are internally structured by different socio cultures with direct effects on social inequality, as the analysis of school enrolment and performance revealed – leading to a great disadvantage for those who are not able to enrol in private, usually church-led schools and colleges. Indirectly, this underperformance of public education institutions further accelerates the processes of urbanisation and capital outflow from rural areas. The

last section dealt with the influence of these socio-cultures on diverse economic milieus.

The modernised form of colonial extractive capitalism, which I termed along Wallerstein's theory as "peripheral capitalism", hampers the development of a viable locally integrated economy. Directly and indirectly, peripheral capitalism leads to an outflow and non-productive accumulation of economic resources and undermines the development of other economic milieus in the area. It was shown that this is not a process that comes from the outside but that it requires the cooperation of local political and administrative elites. Via the patrimonial ethos that is deeply embedded in these milieus almost everybody takes part in this mesh of practices sustaining the current arrangement of milieus, as well as the structure of dependence and economic inequality that comes along with it. Finally, the chapter also argued that the policies of state-led industrialisation as well as socially thin extraction are partly responsible for the failure to bring about integrative economic development, but not without alternatives.

## Notes

1 I owe this important insight to my friend Imsutoshi.
2 The data in this table is not comparable in a strict sense, since the GDP 1980–90 is measured in prices from the year 1999, the GDP from 1995–6 in prices from the year 2007 and 2000–5 in prices from 2010. Finally, the 2011–12 data reflect the statistically more conservative NDP (GDP minus capital depreciation) in current prices. Since comparable data covering the whole period is not available, these figures shall serve merely as a heuristic device to capturing the larger picture.
3 While writing this book, the pension system for government jobs has been largely abolished and replaced by one-time lump sum after retirement.
4 According to a popular joke, "[w]orks are executed in heaven, but payments are made on earth" (Sumi 2002).
5 Salary figures are from 2015, but the relations are still valid to my knowledge.
6 A collection of important documents can be found in Franke (2009); an analysis from different angles in Ao (2001), South Asian Terrorism Portal (2010), Laishram (2005) and Lotha (2012); studies concerning nationalism in the larger North-East Region in Bhaumik (2009) and Misra (2000).
7 An opposite interpretation has been voiced by Wouters (2011).

# 3 Patterns of cultural differentiation

In the previous chapter, I described four major socio-cultures that are important to understand current practice milieus in Nagaland – the Naga village culture, the state administration, Christianity and politics. These socio-cultures impact current practice milieus by structuring them internally (education) or even leading to rather separated milieus that are integrated by a common structure of dependence (economy). This chapter now steps down from this historical reconstruction of socio-cultures and looks at the present involvement in practice milieus, ranging from church and politics to other cultural realms of music, sports and practices related to alcohol and media consumption based on empirical data.

The first section aims to discern the relative importance and openness of these practice milieus by looking at their inclusion profiles defined by the intensity and frequency with which people participate in them. Besides factual involvement in practices, emotional and symbolic affinities are further defining dimensions of practice milieus. They are analysed in the second and third section. The fourth section transposes the perspective and looks at cultural milieus: groups of people sharing similar patterns of involvement, affective and discursive-symbolic affinity towards these practice milieus.

## Practice milieus and integration pattern

### *Inclusion profile of the Christian milieu*

Integration into the religious milieu, e.g. the various Christian denominations, can be differentiated by two dimensions. Following the recent study on inclusion patterns in Germany by Burzan et al. (Burzan et al. 2008), I exclude professional actors (*work classes* in my terms) here, since my interest is on the milieu integration of lay actors who do not

depend on the milieu for their material subsistence. The first dimension I look at is the *intensity* of inclusion. Intensity refers to the strength of commitment to a certain milieu, which I measure here in two levels. The strongest form of commitment for lay actors is taking part actively in institutionalised church groups, such as prayer groups etc. On the other hand, attending church services is used as a lower form of intensity, an activity which still requires commitment but allows for a more passive participation as well. The second dimension of inclusion is the *frequency* of participation and involvement. Frequency is different from intensity as it measures the regularity and quantitative aspect of involvement and can be applied to both levels of intensity measured here. Taking both levels together, we get a differentiated picture of the way the milieu includes its non-professional participants.

As shown in Figure 3.1, Christianity as a practical milieu enjoys considerable participation on both levels of intensity. Of the youth in my sample, 78.4% claim that they visit church services at least occasionally, and 41.4% even frequently. On the other hand, only 2.3% say that they never visit church service. Participation on the level of being actively involved in institutionalised church groups is of course lower, but still quite high. Besides a very active core fraction of 18.2% who participate frequently in these groups, there is a majority of 62.1% who at least sometimes take part in these organised groups. This points to a rather strong institutionalisation and integrative strength




*Figure 3.1* Milieu integration: christianity

of these institutions, as its activity is not restricted to only a small group but can adjust to members with a lower frequency of participation, as well. Besides the core and the large intermediate group, we also find 19.7% of the sample who do not take part more actively but form a more peripheral group regarding religious practices attached to church.

Besides proselytisation and communitisation, which describe the ethos regarding the relation towards the "other" and the organisation of the "we", abstentionism is an important "ethos" of the Christian milieu for the regulation of every-day social practices like intimacy and the use of stimulants, especially alcohol. Hence, to abstain from alcohol consumption and/or to proclaim it is an important symbol of a Christian life-style in Nagaland. Introduced by the Baptist Missionaries, abstentionism is accepted as the morally right way of life by adherents of most denominations in Nagaland – though the official discourses of e.g. the Roman Catholic Church differ from this view. This discursive hegemony of abstentionism does however not mean that the majority adheres to it: this would be a confusion of the normative and the empirical I argued against above, and the ethos of other practice milieus clearly contradict the abstentionist ethos. But for a certain norm to be considered valid by most people it is not necessary that most, or even on the average, people adhere to it – though a complete disconnect might eventually lead to a questioning of the norm if counter-discourses are available.

As a closer look at the discourse around alcohol in Nagaland reveals, the hegemony of the "abstentionist discourse" has not remained unchallenged, as other milieus introduce their normative aims into the discourse as well. In my discussions of the topic, several counter-discourses are provided: the pragmatic economic reference to the need of the state to create revenues; the liberal insistence that moral decisions are based on freedom of conscience; the hedonist view from Naga village culture as well as from global pop culture that enjoyment itself is a legitimate aim; and finally the pragmatic health-conscious view that prohibition has actually worsened the situation of alcoholism in the state and legalisation would allow for better care of those affected. Without analysing these discourses in detail, one can conclude that an inter-discursive sphere has emerged around the practice of alcohol consumption, in which normativities are controversially disputed. There is no monopoly of the churches any longer in defining the "common good", since the question of what makes a "good life" has itself become differentiated in modernising societies (cf. Rehbein 2011).

Historically, alcohol has been a contentious product in the modern history of the Nagas ever since Baptist missionaries arrived in the area. The last culmination point was the Nagaland Total Liquour Prohibition Act 1989, which was enforced after agitation of the Nagaland Baptist Church Council and the powerful Naga Mothers' Association (NMA). Despite the ban, however, alcohol is available everywhere, and according to a newspaper report there are thousands of liquor shops in the two cities of Dimapur and Kohima alone (The Telegraph 2012). Alcohol consumption is rampant and bootlegging a well-going business. In the public realm, however, even low-voiced criticism of politicians who would like to retain the estimated yearly loss of roughly 750 crore (7,500 million) INR in taxes meet with stiff resistance. The central body of the Baptist Church in Nagaland, the Nagaland Baptist Churches Council (NBCC), has announced to "fight tooth and nail against lifting of prohibition" since "life is more precious than Rs. 750 crore" (quoted in: ibid.). The position to legitimately represent the Nagas is apparent in the following open letter issued by major church leaders (2010) during the debate on the lift of the prohibition:

> Prohibition is a step towards a healthy, clean and peaceful society. It was the Church that prayed and struggled for Prohibition of Liquor and it is becoming a reality. It is unthinkable that any Government should retrieve back to lift the Prohibition Act totally or partially. We believe that the Government is of the people, for the people and by the people. The people's representatives in the Government are expected not to take any decision against the wishes of the people. Majority of the Nagas are Christians; the voice of the Church should be taken into consideration as the voice of the people.
>
> Rev. Dr. Visor H. Zeliang et al., "An Open Appeal by Some Concern Senior Church Leaders", in: The Morung Express Online, 14.07.2010

However, it was especially the loss of lives that most of my interviewees cited as a reason to lift the ban. While some agree that the highly indebted state needs to increase revenue, the major argument is usually the impoverishment of drinkers and especially the health effects of prohibition. In the aftermath of prohibition, there was a huge increase in the use of drugs in the area. The "1990s drug wave" is known to everyone in that age-group and certainly qualifies as a generation marker in the Mannheimian sense. There was hardly anyone in my qualitative sample who had not lost a family member or friend due to

drugs during that time. Except for those who support the ban on religious grounds – most of them blame the NBCC's policy for the drug wave and regard prohibition as a harmful failure. Due to prohibition and the strict discursive division between drinkers and non-drinkers, there is no data on alcohol consumption among the Nagas. Public debate, irrespective of the individual position, is hence based merely on personal convictions, while evidence of any sort is not considered. Therefore, I included a question on alcohol consumption in my survey to get a broad view on empirical consumption habits.

Furthermore, I regarded alcohol consumption not as an *individual* practice per se that is detached from other spheres of life, but as a *social* practice that can exist in different forms. Specifically, I pre-defined three milieu-based drinking practices, which are furthermore attached to specific places: a market-oriented pattern closely related to "going out", embedded in wider practice pattern like going to public bars or clubs; a "traditional" peer-group oriented pattern of consuming alcohol with friends and neighbours, usually in one's private premises (typically the kitchen); finally, alcohol consumption as a "secluded" activity of drinking alone in one's private premises.

Figure 3.2 shows the frequencies of consumption regarding these three patterns. While we can see that less than one-third never consumes alcohol, the bulk of the sample could be characterised as rare and occasional "social drinkers". Only 2.7% frequently take alcohol alone, and only 10% frequently drink alcohol in social patterns. Surprisingly, market related drinking while "going out" is as wide-spread as peer-group related drinking. Even though this can be explained




*Figure 3.2* Milieu integration: alcohol consumption

by the sizeable proportion of those in the sample who live outside the state, it points towards an existing infrastructure and established practice pattern even within Nagaland. Given the legal and discursive situation, this is remarkable and shows a great divergence between normative discourse on one side, and practice and the economic structure of alcohol trade on the other side – a divergence that will keep the discussion alive for the time to come.

### *Inclusion profile of the political milieu*

When measuring the integration into the political milieu, two different organisations have to be considered. Leaving out the integration into the nationalistic groups here, the political parties and the students' union are of major importance. Political parties, especially from the two largest parties of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the ruling Naga Peoples' Front (NPF), are often organised down to the village level. On the other hand, activities within the students' union in many cases pre-date a political career, as in the case of former Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio. Students' unions are organised bottom-up from village, range, tribe to the state and ethnic level, and are a powerful voice in most political debates. In any matter, it is a publicly present and numerically strong organisation that must be reckoned with: already the Naga Students' Union Delhi (NSUD) has, according to their own statement, more than 20,000 members. In case of students' union inclusion, we can again differentiate between passive and active involvement as two different intensities of inclusion.

Figure 3.3 shows the inclusion profile for party politics. Less than 6% frequently take part in party politics, while almost 45% never do. Indeed, this rather low activity is not due to missing interest – on the contrary. 74.1% follow political debates at least occasionally, while only a minority of 9.3% never does so. This picture seems to support the analysis of the political milieu provided above: political parties in Nagaland are not mass-based organisations, but rather close-knit social networks with high entry costs. Occasional and rare participation in party politics is hence likely restricted to election times alone, giving the milieu an erratic though periodical activity pattern, and their activities outside election time remain rather oblique. According to one activist from the influential "The Naga Blog" on a social networking page, it was only on their request during the last elections that the parties issued even an election manifesto – for the first time since 1963.

The students' unions on the other hand are indeed much more integrative towards the youth of my sample as can be seen in Figure 3.4:




*Figure 3.3* Milieu integration: politics




*Figure 3.4* Milieu integration: students' union

though around 10% stay away even from the meetings, almost 75% have already occupied an office. With 13%, the number of those who frequently occupy positions is comparatively low regarding overall participation. This pattern matches the visibility in media and the public realm in general, ranging from lobbying to agitations and

strikes. More than just representing students, the unions are political multi-issue organisations: many initiatives have often concentrated on conservative issues of protecting "traditional Naga values", as in the banning of intermarriage of Naga women with Non-Nagas, research from Non-Nagas on Naga history or the use of traditional symbols in modern design contexts that contravene traditional restrictions etc. Another strand of politics has been more related to human rights, as in the opposition to the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Nagaland, the state-company nexus in grabbing the oil reserves in Wohka district or, not surprisingly, the fight for students' issues and rights in the state.

### *Inclusion profiles of leisure milieus: sports and music*

In the analysis of present practice milieus, the emphasis has been clearly on practices that are related to institutionally organised and rather deeply rooted in the historical socio-cultures of Nagaland. But many practices, especially those related to the globalised pop and media culture, are based on relatively recent technologies and are not directly related to historically older practice pattern in Nagaland. Hence, many of my interviewees were deeply disappointed by my lack of knowledge on European football. On the other hand, I had more common ground when it came to music, which plays a big role in any gathering and meet-ups with friends. Music practices are certainly also found in the village culture as well as in the Christian socio-culture, but these are only special instances and are itself part of a globalised music milieu. Based on my experiences in the field as well as on the importance Bourdieu accorded to them, I was interested in the social differentiation of sports and music practices in Nagaland.

In order to differentiate between different levels of intensity in the integration into sports, I distinguished between taking active part of any sort e.g. exercising against a more passive and mediated participation. As shown in Figure 3.5, exercising in any sports is done frequently only by a small proportion of 11.6%, while the bulk of my sample is only marginally active. On the other hand, low-intensity integration into sports is very high, and only 5.4% claim that they never follow sports on the media like e.g. watching football matches on TV. Indeed, many of my interviewees were very well versed in the actualities of global football, especially the British Premier League and to a lesser degree the German Bundesliga, while the World Cup final was – for the first time – shown in public places in Dimapur. Medialisation and virtualisation of sports has certainly struck Nagaland with the spread




*Figure 3.5* Milieu integration: sports

of TV over the last decades like other places in the world. Attempts to professionalise sports has so far been fruitless, though there were efforts to establish a football league in Nagaland (Nagaland Premier League [NPL]), which was founded in 2011 and started its first season in 2012. With ten teams participating in 2014 (NPL 2015), the league connected with the fans mainly through social media. Since 2014 there have been no new posts so the attempt at institutionalisation appears to have failed meanwhile. Medialisation is itself not a unitary cultural process, and the rise of the network-pattern paradigm in media technology has certainly provided the means for a re-strengthening of the local compared to the more centralised mass media paradigms (TV channels, newspapers, etc.). However, the attention monopoly of established football leagues and clubs in all types of media, the lack of grass-root organisations rooted in local socio-cultures as well as missing infrastructure make it difficult to establish institutionalised or (semi-)professional sports milieus.

In the case of music (Figure 3.6), I distinguished between three intensity levels: playing music, going to concerts and listening to music through media. Not surprisingly, there is hardly anyone who does not listen to music at all: more than 90% listen to music at least occasionally. But even attending music concerts or playing some sort of music oneself is widespread practice. Only one-third never sings or plays an instrument, while more than 50% go to music concerts occasionally.




*Figure 3.6* Milieu integration: music

This number is even more surprising if we consider the largely rural character of Nagaland, and probably shows the urban bias of the sample. On the other hand, especially the churches are a major institution for nascent bands or choirs, as my interviews revealed, even in the case of metal bands. Indeed, Nagaland and North-East India in general is a prominent place for international rock or metal bands from the *Scorpions* to *Sepultura*. It has also seen the rise of concerts and music festivals with local acts, as on the annual "Hornbill International Rock Contest" that accompanies the Hornbill festival, the main tourist festival of Nagaland. To a degree, bands and singers (similarly to e.g. designers) from Nagaland have become part of the hype cycles of the global pop scene and are not merely passive recipients or localised actors in these milieus.

### *Summary*

Integration into practice milieus varies not only by the frequency of participation, but also by intensity. Inclusion pattern point to the relative autonomy of the practice spheres as well as their internal differentiation into – sometimes organised and hierarchically structured – sub-milieus. They also reveal certain contradictions regarding the overlapping involvement in practice milieus that are supposedly mutually exclusive.

For the Christian milieu, the pervasive influence of the Christian socio-culture can clearly be seen in the present integration pattern. Almost all respondents state they go to church at least sometimes,

almost 80% at least occasionally – overall a high degree of passive integration compared to other practices; active integration in the form of being active in church groups is comparatively on a lower level, albeit expectedly, as it is an additional rather than a complimentary form of integration. Given the prohibitionist or abstentionist stance of most churches in Nagaland, one would expect an inverse pattern of alcohol consumption in comparison to church attendance and participation. This is only partly the case, especially when it comes to taking drinks alone, which is for most respondents never or rarely carried out. But at least 70% of respondents indulge at least sometimes in forms of social drinking – which shows that the abstentionist or prohibitionist discourse is contradicted by most respondents in practice. This does not lead to a rejection or disengagement from the church milieu but shows the limited power of the church discourse in regulating other practices outside its realm by making its aims and rules authoritative.

The political milieu shows clearly different integration pattern for its sub-milieus *party politics* and *student politics*: though most respondents (74%) are rather interested in politics, only a minority of the respondents takes active part in it. This pattern was explained by the close-knit networks and rather high entry costs, though the factor of age might also be important, as the village culture restricted politics to older men – which might still play a certain role in partly politics with its patrimonial ethos and the importance of personal ties that need time to develop. On the other side, students' unions appeared to be much more inclusive for the age group in question, and the vast majority (90%) takes part at times in the meetings; 74% already occupied an office at least once. Given that politicians like currently re-elected CM Neiphiu Rio were former students' union leaders, the connections and transition patterns between these political sub-milieus deserve further research.

Finally, a look at the integration pattern of the two leisure milieus sports and music showed that sports is mainly followed in a passive way – only 12% practice a sport frequently. Music shows a more active integration pattern, with more than half of respondents going at least occasionally to concerts and about 40% singing or playing in a band on a regular basis. This points to the fact that music practices are more deeply rooted in local socio-cultures like e.g. Christianity and hence require less organisational and probably material resources.

## Problem discourses and positionings

A major theoretical stance of practice theory is that practices are intricately related to symbolic discourses. The analysis of practice milieus

and their inclusion pattern therefore needs to be combined with an analysis of interpretation pattern that are present among the Naga youth. Since interpretation pattern are individualised interpretations of abstract symbolic discourses, they can provide a key to map the pattern of the inter-discursive sphere. The theoretical idea behind this interest is that discourses provide normative pictures of the "ideal" society (which is often the generalisation of a specific socio-culture or milieu ethic that is expressed in a discourse). Since most people take part in several milieus, they will usually regard all or most normative pictures transported by the respective discourses as valid, and only on rare occasions one might be forced to take a specific position as priority. This might lead to conflict and expulsion from practice milieus whereby open prioritisation is usually avoided by self-censorship (an effect known as "social desirability", though specifically linked to practice milieus). Especially when certain discourses are dominant in the inter-discursive sphere as is the case with Christianity in Nagaland, stated discourse affinities are likely to be biased and not reflecting ethical affinities. Nevertheless, these discursive positionings are important as they reveal the emotional and existential affinity to the respective practice milieus and the future participation in practices. I therefore operationalised this question by asking not directly about the most important ideals and values, but indirectly about the major problems of society that are but the flip-side of the same coin. Besides the formulation in negative terms, restricted and forced ranking was used as a methodical tool to avoid self-censorship, while respondents needed to make trade-offs between problems, resulting in better discrimination between discourse affinities.

Figure 3.7 shows the relative rankings of some pre-defined problems that I encountered in conversations and interviews during my fieldwork. The percentages clearly indicate that the majority (40%) regards corruption as the major problem in Nagaland, and three-quarters of the youth count it among the top-three problems. This priority shows that in the sphere of discourses *socio-liberal* ideologies have become dominant, while I have not found anyone defending patrimonial or neo-patrimonial practices – though they might even dominate in practice. This mismatch of values and practice about bribery was already pointed out in Kikhi's study that I mentioned above. Competing problems are "missing Christian values", which has a high number of first rankings despite being a top-three problem only for about one-third of the sample. This pattern indicates that the specific Christian discourse is carried by a socially rather dense group. Unemployment and the "political situation" are ranked to a similar extent as a major problem




*Figure 3.7* Problem perception

and many consider them as one of the three most important issues in Nagaland. On the other hand, neo-traditional discourse that regards the loss of traditions as the major problem is not very widespread compared to other discourses. Missing freedom of expression, which might indicate the influence of a more radical individualist-liberal discourse, has also hardly supporters, though freedom of speech is certainly restricted especially regarding legitimate traditions within the villages, but also by political groups and the dominance of the Christianity discourse. The main problems, as they are perceived by the urban Naga youth, however, relate to the economic milieu and its ethos, as well as the structural unemployment that is often perceived as its outcome. Additionally, it is important to see that the matter of Naga nationalism and political conflicts has not been replaced by economic concerns but is still regarded as of major importance for Nagaland.

## Professional aspirations

Affinity to practical milieus is not only expressed by passive and active participation or discursive positionings, but also by professional aspirations, the aim to base one's subsistence on positions and practices within a single or a small number of practice milieus, which I denote with the term "work milieus". In principle, almost every practice can be turned into work in so far as it is evaluated and eventually

demanded and traded on a market or, as in the case of cultivation, is directed immediately at the production of subsistence. The type and the degree to which practices can be turned into work is however regulated by the state as well as other dominant milieus. And while in the pre-colonial village culture subsistence was not a matter of choice but of tradition, the modern division of work brings along the need to make choices and develop preferences regarding which practice milieu one wants to work in and rely on for subsistence. Though professional aspirations should not be regarded as actual predictors of future working positions, they point towards an affinity to certain practice milieus which are regarded as more desirable than others, and along with practice involvement and discursive positioning, is an important dimension for understanding cultural differentiation.

In the available literature on work preferences among Nagas, I am only aware of Kikhi's study from 2009, who found a clear preference for government jobs, fuelled by the desire to attain a stable position, assured income and a guaranteed retirement benefit (Kikhi 2009, p. 151). This perception was mainly confirmed during my fieldwork, and more than the Naga youth themselves they usually claimed that it was their parents and relatives who wanted them to find a government job – one more reason to clearly distinguish between personal aspirations and actual choices, which are influenced by a variety of other factors as well. Nevertheless, it was surprising to see that government jobs were not the major aspiration of the Naga youth in the survey, but only second to jobs in the private economy – which hardly offers opportunities in Nagaland itself. The hypothesis is therefore that job aspirations are intricately linked to the topic of geographical mobility. I am not aware of any study though that tried to quantify how many young Nagas have moved outside Nagaland, especially for working in private sector. But overall this tendency indicates a clear shift from Kikhi's study within less than a decade. To be clear, government jobs are still aspired by many and the qualitative interviews similarly revealed the importance of the attached benefits, but this preference is not unchallenged any more.

As Figure 3.8 shows, working in the private economy (including both private employment and running a business) is rated higher than government jobs in the overall sample, both regarding the first ranking as well as by looking at the top-three ranks. Additionally, it is the most uncontroversial work milieu with hardly any rankings below the top-three levels. Followed by the aspirations to work in politics and for the church, Figure 3.8 also reveals that household and cultivation as main areas of economic engagement are hardly appealing to




*Figure 3.8* Work aspirations

young Nagas. Surprisingly, many still regard cultivation as a second or third option. This shows that it is probably not a desired work milieu but nevertheless one that is respected enough to be taken into consideration. In return, household work (as major economic activity) has by far the lowest rankings, which is clearly an effect of the growing emancipation of urban Naga women. Politics has received a high number of lowest ranks, showing the controversial image of the political milieu within the present generation, who blame politicians for the desolate state economy and for not providing enough jobs for the youth. Working for the church received divided rankings. My previous fieldwork in Ao Naga villages showed that becoming a pastor is often not a decision or aspiration of an individual; instead, children are often "promised" to the church, either because parents believe that specific family hardships were overcome by the interference of God, or in order to thank God for something good that has happened in the past. To give an example from fieldwork, I was told by an interviewee working for the church that he was severely sick during his childhood, which led the parents to promise that he would work for the church in the case of his survival. Such a promise might have already been made before the birth of the child. Having a member of the family who is working for the church also brings respect to the family, especially from those who are rather close to the Christian milieu.

## Cultural milieus among the urban Naga youth

The previous section of the chapter looked at practice integration from the perspective of the practices, whereas this section looks at it from the perspective of the actors. It analysed differences between the practice milieus, but did not tell us yet whether frequent participation in one milieu goes along with frequent participation in another – and how they relate to positionings as well as professional aspirations. In short, this section aims to discern groups with similar integration and interpretation pattern to justify talking about relatively distinct cultural milieus – people sharing similar overall cultural orientations. First, similarities in milieu involvement are used to differentiate practice groups. In the next step, these groups are further related to discursive positionings as well as job aspirations to find groups that are differentiated in all three dimensions of culture.

### *Profiles of practice milieu involvement*

The method of cluster analysis aims to do exactly that: discern groups that are most similar to each other (according to a specified criteria) while groups should be most distant to each other by the same criteria. In order to find groups with similar patterns of involvement in the practice milieus, I used the statistical programming language R (R Core Team 2017), specifically the packages "tidyverse" (Wickham 2017) and the two-step clustering procedure from package "prcr" (Rosenberg, Schmidt, and Beymer 2017). Two-step clustering combines the benefits of hierarchical clustering and k-means clustering algorithms.

As a first step, the hierarchical clustering uses Euclidean distances and "Ward.D2" linkages to combine observations one-by-one with others into similar clusters until all respondents are members of a single cluster. Ward's procedure combines those clusters or observations that result in the smallest increase in total variance (Ward 1963). In a second step, these cluster-memberships are taken as starting points for the second k-means algorithm which aims to re-assign respondents to clusters in order to minimise the sum of squared deviations between observations and clusters-centres. By taking the results of hierarchical clustering as starting points, this twostep algorithm overcomes the weakness of k-means of having to choose random starting points, which makes it difficult to reproduce results.

Cluster analysis is an exploratory method and does not determine the number of clusters to be extracted from the data. This decision must be made by the researcher himself and should be based on the

interpretability of the solution. After looking at several solutions, I decided to use the solution with four clusters as it provided the best face-value and was supported by the "elbow method", as statistical rule of thumb based on a graphical analysis of the R-squared curve. A look at the graph suggests a relatively strong drop in the marginal gain of explained variance after the solution with four clusters. Having decided on the number of clusters, I plotted the mean frequency scores of the practices next to the relative distances of the cluster centres (representing a *typical* member of each group) to the means. The group profiles are shown in Figure 3.9.

On a first glance, one can immediately see the differences between the four groups: clusters 1 and 2, as well as clusters 3 and 4 are almost mirror images of the other, respectively. Clusters 1 and 2 show overall low vs. high frequency of participation on a general level, but especially regarding student union and party politics participation. Clusters 3 and 4 show more pronounced profiles, with differences especially in church and SU participation as well as in – very pronounced – drinking habits. Taken together, three dimensions appear to structure the differentiation between the practice groups: first, the clusters differ according to their average frequency levels: cluster 1 is clearly less active than the average (–0.48), while the second cluster is more active than average (+0.44), while both cluster 3 and 4 are about average when it comes to overall activity. Second, drinking and abstaining from alcohol appear to be practices that discern rather well between the different clusters, and as a third dimension church and political activity appear to be inversely related, at least for the latter three clusters.

Members of cluster 1 participate less frequently than average in all practice milieus, especially regarding politics (–0.5 and –0.78), but also sports (active –0.74) and passive (–0.66; –0.86), music (–0.61) and active participation in church (–0.48). In return, they are closest to the average in attending church services as well as in taking drinks, where the average is already on the lower side of the 1–4 scale. Overall, this group participates to a very low degree in the assessed practices and its members live mainly in the private realm besides the occasional attendance of church services. I call them in the following therefore "low participators". In the survey, they represent about 20% of the sample.

Those respondents who were grouped in cluster 2 present the opposite picture: they take part in all mentioned practices more frequently compared to the average. Involvement is specifically high with respect to party politics (+0.90) as well as to student union (+0.73 passive




*Figure 3.9* Cultural milieus: practice groups

and +0.83 active). Social drinking (+0.54 and +0.46) as well as active exercising (+0.47) and playing music (+0.42) are also clearly above average. In general, one can characterise this group as socially highly active people with highest degree of involvement in political activities, so I will refer to the group as "political socialisers". Altogether, 22% of the sample is characterised as "political socialisers".

The third cluster shows peaks in involvement when it comes to church activities (+0.75) and visits (+0.55) and to a lesser degree in playing music (+0.35). Similar to the "political socialisers", they are active in strongly institutionalised practice milieus, though the weight in this group clearly tilts towards church rather than politics. In return, their drinking patterns are much below average (–0.98, –0.90 and –0.50) very close to the "never" pole of the scale. I therefore call this group "abstaining churchgoers", amounting to about 31% of the sample.

Cluster no. 4 is the mirror image to the "abstaining churchgoers" with below average involvement in church activities (–0.75) and attendance (–0.59), but also when it comes to student union participation (–0.49 and –0.64). In these practice milieus, their pattern resembles that of the "low participators", but the remaining participation pattern differ from them. While the participation frequency for most other practices is about average, this group shows a high affinity to sports like the "political socialisers", but more focussed on passive consumption of sports via TV etc. This group, which I call "consuming sports fans", differ especially from the "low participators" and the "abstaining churchgoers" evidently by their above average social drinking frequencies (+0.88 and +0.81), which is again somewhat higher than that of the "political socialisers". About 27% of respondents belong to this group.

### *Structures of cultural differentiation*

Participation is only one dimension of practice inclusion, but carrying out a practice, as argued by practice theory, is more than just a factual (self-)observation of an activity. A practice, at least if it is part of a larger agglomeration like practice milieus includes taking over and engaging with norms, aims and classifications that are specific of a practice milieu. Practice integration pattern therefore need to be related to attraction and relevance rankings to get a more complete picture of the differentiation and constitution of cultural milieus. Of course, these three dimensions are far from exhaustive, but are chosen to represent the most important aspects from the perspective of

practice-theory. Membership in practice groups, primary job aspiration as well as discursive relevance setting are looked at together to find the commonalities and differences between cultural milieus. The "PLMIX" package for R provided a simple way of extracting first rankings out of the multiple and partial rankings (Mollica and Tardella 2017). Though the reduction of the data to practice groups and first rankings presents already a loss of available information, these preliminary steps also ease the later graphical interpretation by keeping the number of categories to a minimum.

Like Bourdieu, I regard the method of multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) as especially suited to find commonalities and differences between cultural milieus. MCA is used less as a statistical and more as an inductive, graphical method where in principal the model follows the data rather than the other way around as in classic statistical analysis. It reduces the information captured in qualitative, categorical data to a low-dimensional, more easily interpretable space. This characteristic makes it possible to find relevant connections and relations that would else be missed in the complexity of the data and accords the method with an invaluable practical importance (Backhaus, Erichson, and Weiber 2013, p. 394). Correspondence analysis was mainly spread during the 1960s by the works of Jean-Paul Benzécri (e.g. J.-P. Benzécri 1969) in France and was later introduced to an English-speaking academic audience by his student Michael J. Greenacre (Greenacre 1984). Given its French origin, it is no accident that Bourdieu's usage of correspondence analysis was among the first in a social scientific context.

I used the R package "FactoMineR" (Le, Josse, and Husson 2008) by Lê, Josse and Husson for conducting MCA, using the three dimensions practice group, primary job aspiration and primary discourse positioning to determine the pattern behind the answers (respondents with missing answers in these variables were excluded from the analysis). Though it shares similarities to cluster analysis, correspondence analysis does not deterministically group respondents together but is, in the taxonomy of Bacher et al., an incomplete form of clustering because only a graphical representation is given; the classification of respondents into groups is based on the researcher's subjective interpretation of the graph (Bacher, Pöge, and Wenzig 2010, p. 37). Especially in exploratory analyses where the structure of dispersion and agglomeration is of primary interest, incomplete clustering can better display the structure of similarities and dissimilarities between categories at first without presuming clear boundaries between clusters and respondents.

The resulting graphical outputs of the MCA are shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. Major constituents of the shown plots are the three clouds of points (labelled as "Variable" and plotted in three different shades of grey) as well as the two axes that construct the principal plane 1–2 and the secondary plane 1–3 respectively. These planes are projections that reduce the high-dimensional clouds of categories and individuals to the three major orthogonal axes. The dimensions are extracted from the data in such a way that the first dimension on the horizontal axis accounts for the maximum variance of the data, the second, vertical axis for the maximum variance of the remaining variance etc. (Backhaus, Erichson, and Weiber 2013, p. 411).

Though in principal more than three dimensions can be interpreted, I will restrict the analysis to the three major axes that are displayed in the principal plane 1–2 as well as in the secondary plane 1–3. The decision to include three out of the thirteen possible (no. of categories – no. of variables) dimensions was based on their interpretability, which appeared to display noise rather than useful information in the higher axes.

Indeed, the dimensions are the major result of the MCA rather than the clouds of points. One important point, which is often violated in




*Figure 3.10* MCA of cultural dimensions, Dim 1 vs. Dim 2




*Figure 3.11* MCA of cultural dimensions, Dim 1 vs. Dim 3

the application of MCA, is that the distances between the categories of different variables *cannot* be interpreted, as they are not explicitly defined by this method (ibid., p. 421). The interpretation of the graph looks primarily at the contributions of categories to the construction of dimensions, according to Benzécri's (J.-P Benzécri 1992, p. 405) dictum:

> Interpreting an axis amounts to finding out what is similar, on the one hand, between all the elements figuring on the right of the origin and, on the other hand, between all that is written on the left; and expressing with conciseness and precision the contrast (or opposition) between the two extremes.
>
> J.-P. Benzécri, "Correspondence analysis handbook", New York, Marcel Dekker, 1992, p. 405

The first dimension displayed on the horizontal axis captures almost 12% of total variance and is mainly defined by the variable "aspiration", followed by "discourse" and "practice" on an almost equal level. It opposes the aspiration to work for the church on the extreme left from all other aspiration categories, most pronounced from those

aspiring politics, private jobs and working as a housewife/houseman. Government jobs are situated at the centre of the graph which represents the "barycentre", the weighted average of points (cf. Roux and Rouanet 2010, p. 15) or the average profile of respondents (Backhaus, Erichson, and Weiber 2013, p. 420). Contribution to the axis is not directly visible from the representation of the category on the axis, since the relative frequency of the category is not visible here but is important for the construction of the axes. The weight of "cultivation" therefore hardly contributes to the first dimension, and although "household" is displayed further right from "private", its contribution to the axis is smaller since it represents far less respondents than those who aspire "private" jobs.

For the variable "discourse", the axis is defined by the opposition of "missing Christian values" on the left side, and "political situation" and "missing expressive freedom" on the right side, while "loss of tradition", "unemployment" and "corruption" do not contribute significantly to this axis. On the level of practice, we finally see an opposition between "abstaining churchgoers" on one side, and "consuming sports fans" as well as "political socialisers" on the other. "Low contributors" do not play a major role in defining this axis. Looking at all three variables, we might denote this axis as the opposition between a focus on "spirituality" and "asceticism" on the left side and a prominence of "materialistic", "hedonistic" orientation on the right side.

The second axis is also mainly defined by "aspiration", followed by "practice" and with some distance "discourse" and captures overall about 10% of variance. Aspiring to work in either "politics" or for the "church" defines the upper side of the second axis and is opposed by those wanting to work in "government" or in "cultivation". Again, the "government" category carries much greater weight in defining this dimension than "cultivation" due to the much higher number of respondents. In the variable "practice", this axis is mainly defined by the contrast of "political socialisers" and to a lesser degree by "abstaining churchgoers" against the practice group "low participators", while the group "consuming sport fans" is at the centre. Regarding discursive positionings, giving highest importance to the "political situation", "missing expressive freedom" and "missing Christian values" on the upper side of the axis distinguishes respondents from those who see "unemployment" and to a much lower degree "corruption" as the primary evils of Naga society. Taken together, I interpret this axis as the opposition between a "public", "transformation"-seeking orientation on the upper pole, and a "private", "security"-seeking orientation on the lower end.

The third axis captures slightly less variance than the second axis (about 9%) and is defined mainly by "aspiration" and "discourse". Its interpretation is very straight-forward as it opposes the aspiration for "household" and "cultivation", along with regarding the "loss of tradition" as major problem from all the other categories (which can be clearly seen in Figure 3.11), with a slightly stronger opposition to the discourses "missing expressive freedom" and "corruption". In my interpretation this axis accounts for a distinction of "traditionalist" from all other orientations, which could be described as comparatively more "liberal" in its views. As the pattern of practical involvement seems to hardly play a role for this dimension, it can be seen mainly as a "discursive" or ideological opposition rather than being a full-fledged practical orientation or ethos.

### *Cultural milieus*

Having discerned the structure of cultural differentiation as following oppositions between "asceticist" and "materialist', "progressive" and "conservative" orientations as well as "traditionalist" vs. "liberal" ideologies, I classified respondents into cultural milieus based on their coordinates within these planes. Statistically, out of the thirteen dimensions (number of variables – number of categories) six dimensions have an above-average contribution to the explanation of variance ($> 1/13 \approx 0.077$) (cf. Roux and Rouanet 2010, p. 46). In order to remain within the same interpretation frame, I used only the three informative dimensions accounting for about 31% of total variation to compute the clustering solution within the "FactoMineR" package (which uses Euclidean distances with Ward's procedure and subsequent k-means clustering [Le, Josse, and Husson 2008]). The hierarchical clustering procedure suggests a maximum marginal inertia gain with the four-cluster solution.

The clusters are based on the coordinates of cultural differentiation and hence discern cultural milieus that share similarities within the cultural dimensions of practice involvement, job aspirations as well as problem discourses. In Figures 3.12 and 3.13 the four cultural milieus are displayed (indicated with different signs) within the planes of cultural differentiation that makes their commonalities and differences intuitively understandable. Their location in these dimensions reveals their relative distances as well as partial overlap within the cultural realm. Though these cultural milieus are a construction of the researcher in order to condense information, I showed that this process in not arbitrary and includes theoretical definition of criteria




*Figure 3.12* Location of four cultural milieus in the principal plane 1–2




*Figure 3.13* Location of four cultural milieus in the secondary plane 1–3

and relevant variables, as well as statistical criteria and interpretability based on understanding gained during extended fieldwork. The ability to combine insights from all these processes of research makes the MCA indeed a very valuable tool for the analysis of culture.

Cultural milieus can now be characterised by the categories of the three variables that are significantly over- and under-represented in the clusters. It is important to remember the difference between the cultural milieus described here, which refer to groups of people with similar cultural orientations, and practice milieus, which refer to groups of interrelated practices as well as their problem discourses and work attractions. Indeed, some practice milieus exert a rather strong pull and exclusivity that leads to the formation of distinct cultural milieus.

This can be observed especially with regard to the Christian practice milieu, which gives rise to a cultural milieu of people that belong significantly more often to the group of "abstaining churchgoers" (84% vs. 30% globally), aspire to work for the church (63% vs. 7%) and regard "missing Christian values" as the major problem in Nagaland (70% vs. 16%). The "pious milieu", as I call this group, is hence rather compact and consists of the core proponents of the Christian milieu in the tradition line of the Christian socio-culture. According to the analysis, about 12% of the sample belong to the "pious milieu", which is a relatively smaller proportion than the broader category of "abstaining churchgoers" looked at above. Its representation in the plane of cultural differentiation is on the upper left quadrant in Figure 3.12 defined by the "asceticist" and "progressive" poles.

While the "pious milieu" is an example of a rather specialised cultural milieu rooted in a single practice milieu, the second cultural milieu, which I denote due to its size as the "popular milieu", represents a rather broad category of people accounting for more than half of the youth sample (57%). The "popular milieu" is characterised mainly by above average aspiration to work in a government job (53% vs. 37%) and regarding corruption (65% vs. 49%) and unemployment (21% vs. 15%) as major problems in society. Two practice groups are defining the "popular milieu", namely the "low participators" (31% vs. 20%) and the "consuming sports fans" (33% vs. 28%). Though significantly over-represented, the size and the relatively low distances to the global averages of these categories suggests that this milieu represents the cultural "centre" of the Naga youth, an interpretation that is also supported by the location of its members close to the centre of the intersection in Figure 3.12 representing the global average of all answers, only with a slight overall deviation towards the "conservative" pole but no tendency towards the "asceticist" or "materialist" poles of Dimension 2.

The third cultural milieu is, like the "pious milieu", very specific and distinguishes itself from the other milieus mainly by following a "traditionalist" ideology in the third axis. Indeed, this cultural milieu is mainly defined by regarding the "loss of traditional culture" as the major problem in society (71% vs. 4%) and aspiring to work in the household (38% vs. 2%), while the representation of all practice groups is not significantly different from the global average. Though a significant contributor to the "traditionalist-liberal" axis, aspiring to work in cultivation is not significantly related to this (or any other) milieu, most likely due to the small overall number of people voting for it. Besides these over-represented categories, the "traditionalist" milieu harbours a significantly lower proportion of people regarding "missing Christian values" or "corruption" as major problems – confirming its mainly ideological definition and distinction from other groups that can be seen at the upper section of Figure 3.13. Overall, only 6% of the sample belong to this cultural milieu.

Lastly, the fourth cultural milieu assembles a second relatively broad group accounting for the remaining 26% of respondents. Its practical core is in the political practice milieu, with aspiration to work in politics (31% vs. 8%), belonging to the "political socialisers" (55% vs. 23%) and regarding the "political situation" (36% vs. 12%) or alternatively "missing expressive freedom" (16% vs. 4%) as the major problems. However, this milieu is also inclusive towards other practice milieus, which can be seen that the majority (56% vs. 43%) of the milieu actually aspire to work not in politics, which is a rather specialised occupation, but in the private economy – aspirations for working for the church or for the government are in return significantly under-represented (0% vs. 7%; 13% vs. 37%). This cultural milieu is located on the upper right quadrant in Figure 3.12 defined by the "progressive" and "materialistic" poles, which I will therefore call the "ambitious milieu".

## Spatial pattern of practice milieus

As argued in the introduction, geographical mobility has become a normal pattern in this age-group, therefore I asked the respondents to report their mobility experiences and find out about the patterns of geographical mobility. Mobility is usually not a purpose of its own but connected to specific social practices, so together with the geographical scope I asked for the purpose of the respective experiences of staying outside the state for at least six months.

The results are shown in Figures 3.14 and 3.15. Only a minority of 18.6% had never left the state at the time of the survey, while more




*Figure 3.14* Mobility experiences




*Figure 3.15* Mobility purposes

than 60% even went beyond the North-Eastern region and more than 8% even travelled abroad. The picture of "remote" and "isolated" Nagas is hence clearly mistaken, even if we take into consideration the urban bias of the sample.

The results confirm the hypothesis that education is the major reason to leave the state. Almost two-thirds of those who left the state at least

once did so for education. If we include trainings and coaching classes for government exams, then almost three-quarters can be attributed to this purpose. Those who migrated in order to work outside Nagaland constitute the second largest group and account for more than one-fifth of migrations. Marriage, visiting family and friends play only a marginal role and were responsible for less than 2% of migrations. At this point, it is interesting whether there is a relation between purpose and geographical scope of mobility. Is there any statistical connection between them, for example that work is sought for within a different scope than education?

Leaving aside the purposes of family and friends' visits and the "other" category due to the small total counts, the data (Table 3.1) shows a weak relative association of purposes with different mobility ranges. Relatively, though by far not in absolute numbers, North-East India is more important for educational purposes than for work and especially for coaching. Coaching and training are associated mainly with moving outside North-East India (but within India), which is not surprising given that the major coaching institutes for public service exams are in New Delhi. Relatively more (though not in absolute terms) people went outside the country for work, a number that is indeed surprisingly high – more than double the share of those leaving the state to work in North-East India. These tentative results show first that in total numbers the Indian union is the major field of geographical mobility for all purposes. Second, they also reveal that specifically the educational and governmental milieus are closely connected with the regional and national realms, respectively, while the market economy spans all over the globe and leads to a larger actual range of mobility than other purposes. Unfortunately, it was not possible within the scope of this study to examine the exact areas of work and their connection to mobility. This remains a desideratum that could complement research undertaken on the migration of highly skilled

*Table 3.1* Relations between mobility scope and purpose (n = 392)

| *Purpose of migration* | | *Scope of migration* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | NE India | India | Abroad | Total |
| Education | % | 16.3 | 77.9 | 5.8 | 100.0 |
| Work | % | 8.1 | 72.4 | 19.5 | 100.0 |
| Family | % | 28.6 | 28.6 | 42.9 | 100.0 |
| Training/coaching | % | 3.3 | 93.3 | 3.3 | 100.0 |
| Other | % | 10.0 | 50.0 | 40.0 | 100.0 |

migrants to Europe (Nohl et al. 2006; Weiß 2006). Certainly, not all work milieus are nationalised or even globalised to the same degree and based on the historical socio-cultures we might expect significant influences of Christianity on international migration, given its global scope and deep roots in Nagaland.

This chapter aimed to provide an account of cultural differentiation among the urban Naga youth. It took two angles on the interplay between practices and the people carrying them out: first, from the perspective of practice milieus, and second that of people sharing similar participation and affinity patterns that I called cultural milieus. Integration profiles showed a somehow contradictory picture of and overall high frequency of church visits as well as of occasional social drinking – revealing the limited power of the prohibitionist discourse even over those taking part in the Christian milieu. On the other side, the political milieu appeared divided between a rather low active involvement in active politics – despite a rather high level of interest in political matters. Political activity and participation are much higher within the students' unions, which might be due to the relative younger age and its function as a preliminary stage before joining and participating in political parties. With regard to leisure practices, involvement in sports was shown to be mainly passive by following sports through one of the many channels of modern media, while the development of active sport organisations like a state football league has been unsuccessful until now. Active participation in music, not only as consumers, is distinctively higher, which can be explained through its attachment and support by the Christian socio-culture as well as village culture. In the second section, corruption was identified as the most often cited problem in Naga society, both as a major as well as one of the top-three important problems. Regarding the dimension of job aspiration, used as an identifier of existential affinity to a practice sphere, an aspiration for private jobs was surprisingly found to be most widespread, followed by government jobs. This contradicts previous studies but might point towards a change in perspective due to the saturated opportunities in the government sector.

The fourth section aimed to find relevant cultural milieus among the urban Naga youth, defined by similar patterns of involvement, discursive and existential affinity to practice milieus. In a first step, cluster analysis identified four major types of rather equally sized practice groups: "low participators" (20%), "political socialisers" (22%), "abstaining Churchgoers" (31%) and "consuming sports fans" with a proportion of 27%. Second, these practice groups, together with the first choices of problem discourses and job aspirations, were jointly

analysed by MCA to find common structures of cultural differentiation. The most important axis opposes an asceticist pole defined by affinity to the Christian milieu from a materialist pole defined by affinity to the political practice milieu as well as practice groups with relatively higher alcohol consumption. Private, security-seeking orientations vs. public, transformation-seeking orientations are the poles of the second axis, whereas the third axis differentiates a "traditionalist" orientation from all the others. The coordinates within these three axes of cultural differentiation were then used to determine the distinct cultural milieus among the urban Naga youth: 12% of the respondents belong to the "pious milieu", 57% to the "popular milieu", 6% to the "traditionalist" milieu and 26% to the "ambitious milieu".

The analysis of migration pattern finally showed that most migration motives are connected to the national sphere, especially in the field of coaching for government jobs. But interesting results show up in the second-most chosen migration scope: North-East India is rather relevant for education, whereas work-related migration is relatively closer related to international migration. Taken aside the dominance of the national realm, this clearly shows that these milieus have different spatial patterns that are based in their different socio-cultures. Given the background of educational and financial indicators, it is not surprising that education, coaching and work are by far the major reasons for young Nagas to leave their state, and in the case of work often even their country.

# 4 Class structure and class reproduction

Having established that the cultural sphere of social practices and their discourses among the urban Naga youth can be organised along the axes of asceticism and materialism, those being opposed as a transformative pole to a security-oriented pole and all of them in the third axis to a traditionalist pole, this chapter now turns to the structure of economic differentiation before we can look at the interplay between these two spheres in chapter 6. The focus of this chapter is on the *statistical* pattern of class (re-)production. Just as before with the division within the cultural realm, the question of class is first analysed distinctly, before the respective findings can be fruitfully projected on each other at an attempt of synthesis. Only by adopting this multifaceted view on class is it possible to go beyond a descriptive account towards understanding and explaining the class structure by its constitutive causal processes (cf. on causal processes: Ekström 1992).

Relative advantage in the capitalist economy, or power, is the abstract concept that underlies most class analyses, though they greatly differ in how this relative advantage is operationalised and measured. As I have argued in the theoretical chapter, it is more appropriate to use market values of occupations measured by income rather than occupational categories themselves as criteria of relative advantage in capitalism. Income is more general than ownership of means of production and theoretically better suited to the functional division of labour in global capitalism that abstracts from the actual content of labour. In addition to income, educational level is taken as a secondary principle of vertical differentiation. Rather than seeing it as an independent axis like Bourdieu did with his notion of cultural capital, I regard it as an important criterion for differentiating those *outside* the production process but within its discursive and aspirational sphere. Formal qualification is not directly important for the class position (Oesch 2006a, p. 271) if someone performs a lower-qualified

occupation, so educational degrees are mainly important *before* entering the work sphere. Though not used as a criterion for relative advantage, occupational categories are nevertheless important outside the narrowly defined market sphere by historically influenced differences in security, status and prestige. Work spheres are related to historical socio-cultures with their own internal hierarchies but also carry along hierarchies *between* them (such as that between government and cultivation that still reflect the colonial order). Hence, the ranking of work spheres stands orthogonal to the income structure (since their internal hierarchies conform to the income structure) and is accounted for by the horizontal dimension of social differentiation, which I term "work classes".

## Class construction

I approach the question of class formation from two different angles. The first circles around the question which classes can be theoretically distinguished among the Nagas, and whether there is an intergenerational *class reproduction* based on this classification. The second investigates more closely into the empirical *factors* of class formation, trying to test theoretically derived hypotheses of class production and reproduction. Investigating the question of class reproduction requires a theoretical definition and operationalisation via "quasi-observations", and we need to be aware that we are dealing here less with observable social classes but with theoretical classes or *classes on paper* (Bourdieu). Rather than empirical face-value, these definitions need to achieve a degree of comparability and theoretical meaningfulness (Otte 2008, p. 45). Since they are historically prior and directly linked to the previous analysis of socio-cultures, I start with the horizontal axis of differentiation between work classes.

### *Horizontal differentiation: work classes*

As outlined in the theoretical chapter, I argue that the division of work cannot be reduced to the division of labour alone but must include all economic activities that are directed at securing subsistence in the wider sense. With this conceptual innovation, it becomes possible to include class categories that are left out by European class theories. While cultivators were not present in my sample of the Naga youth, it became obvious that other class locations need to be included that represent a large proportion of the Naga youth: those engaged in further education and aiming to increase employability, and the unemployed,

who are directly related to the labour market in a negative way, by exclusion. Since people taking full-time care of the household were marginal in my sample, they were excluded from the analysis, as well as those engaged in education below master's level.

In order to classify the position within the horizontal division of work, I constructed five major work classes: these are the unemployed and those in higher education on the one side, and private employees, government servants (including those working for the church) and business-owners or self-employed on the other.[1] The concept of "work class" serves as a theoretical connection between capitalism and the socio-cultures from non-capitalist divisions of activities and social inequalities. Since they refer to the contexts in which economic practices transpire, they resemble Goldthorpe's "basic employment relationships" and "employment conditions" as well as Oesch's "work logics". But in my view the different status of these work classes is not so much due to functional criteria but rather an effect of socio-cultures that are differentiated according to employment stability and social esteem. Figure 4.1 shows the proportions of these work classes within my quantitative sample. Only 61% of the age-group are engaged in economically rewarding activities, and only 28% conform to the classic categories of workers and entrepreneurs epitomised by Marx. Instead, the largest group with 33% is employed by the government or by the church (3%). I decided to merge these two groups due to the small number of church employees and because they have similar




*Figure 4.1* Distribution of work classes

employment conditions (especially life-long employment) and social esteem, though they belong to different practical milieus from the cultural perspective. The importance of the government sector mirrors the larger economic and political structures the Nagas from Nagaland find themselves in, though the number of private employees and entrepreneurs in this age-group is certainly higher than one might expect.

Work classes are rooted in practices and are therefore not independent from arrangements and their location in physical space. Indeed, the association between work classes and geographical locations is highly significant and has a relatively strong effect size with a Cramer's V of 0.267.[2] Table 4.1 shows the association of work classes with places of residence for the single cells.[3] By looking at the table, it is possible to find out those associations whose effect has been strongest for the overall connection.

Regarding geographical location, we can differentiate between two groups. On the one side are the unemployed, government servants and business owners, who are under-represented among those Nagas who reside outside Nagaland. On the other side are those in higher education or in private employment, who are both significantly over-represented among those who reside in the cities outside Nagaland. The common perception (e.g. McDuie-Ra 2013) that higher education as well as employment opportunities are major factors for young Nagas to move to cities outside their state is here confirmed by the available data, though it must be qualified. Indeed, the situation of government servants and business owners is detrimental to this observation, as they are significantly under-represented in the other cities but over-represented in the towns and cities in Nagaland. This is certainly

*Table 4.1* Place of residence and work class (n = 455)

| *Class* | *Place of residence* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Village* | *Town* | *City Nagaland* | *City India* |
| Unemployed | 1.5 | 4.2 | 11.4 | 4.8 (–2.5)[b] |
| Higher education/ Training | 0.9[a] | 1.1 (–2.8)[b] | 3.1 (–5.1)[b] | 11.9 (7.7)[b] |
| Private employed | 0.9[a] | 2.6 | 8.8 | 10.5 (3.4)[b] |
| Government | 1.8[a] | 9.0 (3.7)[b] | 18.0 (2.9)[b] | 4.6 (–6.0)[b] |
| Business | 0.4[a] | 0.7[a] | 3.1 | 0.7[a] |

Numbers in cells refer to percentage of total.

[a] This cell has less than 5 subjects and has to be interpreted carefully.
[b] Adjusted residual ≤–2 or ≥2, therefore significant contribution to chi-square statistics.

not surprising given the state-specific reservation policies for scheduled tribes, assigning the bulk of government jobs in Nagaland to the local Naga tribes. In case of the business owners, this might hypothetically point towards the importance for local networks in this area.

### *Vertical differentiation I: income classes*

The distribution of income among the labour classes is shown in Figure 4.2. Though 15.5% of the working population did not want to give information on their income, it nevertheless appeared to me as valuable information for class differentiation. The figure shows that the bulk of subjects, 47.4%, earns between 10,000 and 30,000 INR per month. While the amount of people with higher income is slowly declining, a small peak exists again in the residual group with income above 60,000 INR. As these income groups were too small for meaningful statistical analysis, I grouped them into three larger income classes: the upper classes, with an income above 50,000 INR per month, the middle classes with income between 20,000 and 50,000 INR and the lower classes with an income of 20,000 INR and below.

In producing a three-class model, I follow here largely the self-classifications of interviewees from the qualitative sample. The boundary between "poor" and "middle-class" was usually drawn at an income of 20,000 INR, which is around the highest amount still reachable by cultivators engaging in part-time trade, teachers in private




*Figure 4.2* Income distribution

schools or small church employees, while income above 20,000 INR requires a qualitative step towards more skilled professions, government jobs or trades with stronger entrance barriers. Income above 50,000 INR in this age-group is certainly above middle-class standards and is only possible for high-class officials, successful entrepreneurs or highly skilled professionals or managers. As "bragging" is largely discredited among the Nagas, no one classified themselves as "upper class", but nevertheless the graph indicates that there is a qualitative break between middle- and upper-income class. Jamir and Lanunungsang have also argued for a similar class schema among the Nagas, though they did not make their classification criteria explicit (Jamir and A. Lanunungsang 2005, p. 213).

It also has to be noted that this data refers to individuals. If one were to look at the household level, class differentiation would likely be higher, as the income ratios per capita might either inflate or accumulate depending on marriage practices. First, according to my observations, the household sizes of cultivators and lower classes are larger and often rely on a single breadwinner. Second, according to A. Lanunungsang, educated people in the cities increasingly marry among themselves across tribal boundaries (ibid., p. 213), which could indicate that there are two or more people with regular income in the family. With the available data it is not possible to confirm or falsify this hypothesis, but my qualitative research indicates continuing importance of tribal (and denominational) membership among the Naga youth, though social class formation within these categories is certainly highly probable.

### *Vertical differentiation II: educational degrees*

What is astonishing in Figure 4.3 is the generally high level of education in the sample: 92.1% have a graduate degree or above, half of the subjects have an MA degree or higher. Given this density of distribution, I combined the categories below bachelor level and above master in order to give more importance to the fine differences. This inflation of cultural capital (Collins 1979; Bourdieu 2012) however makes both conclusions, that it serves either as a principle of horizontal differentiation (Bourdieu) or as a correlate of hierarchical differentiation regarding *occupations* (Oesch, Otte) questionable. How is education indeed related to both income and work classes?

When testing the assumption that there is a positive correlation between income class and education level against the null hypothesis of independence, we indeed find a significant positive correlation in




*Figure 4.3* Distribution of educational degrees

*Table 4.2* Association and correlation of education with income and work class

| *Dimension* | *Association (Cramer's V)* | *Correlation (Kendal's tau-c)* |
|---|---|---|
| Education x income class | 0.139** | 0.134*** |
| Education x work class | 0.179*** | |

** Significance level $\alpha < 0.05$
*** Significance level $\alpha < 0.01$

all non-parametric tests as shown in Table 4.2.[4] However, the strength of the correlations is rather weak, and even the nominal association is hardly significant on the 95% level. On the level of the individual cells, only two of the adjusted standardised residuals stand out with a significant contribution: the numerically small group with an education level below bachelor is, not surprisingly, over-represented in the low-income class and correspondingly under-represented in the middle class. The overall weak association of education and income in the other categories is however evenly distributed across the ranks, and therefore represents a rather general influence not restricted to certain education or income categories.

The comparison of education and work class on the other hand yields a highly significant result for statistical dependence, though with a relatively low strength as shown in Table 4.2. A closer look at the table reveals that significant contributions arise from three work classes. First, the unemployed have more often than others BA level, while being significantly under-represented among those above MA. Second, the case is exactly detrimental with those indulging in further qualifications: here, the majority has above MA level, while BA level is comparatively scarce in this group. As the middle levels, honours and MA, are however rather evenly distributed among both groups, educational level alone might not be sufficient to differentiate these groups. The associations on the above MA level are certainly not surprising, as they arise to a certain degree from the very definition of the "higher education" group. Nevertheless, the data shows that the groups are not only differentiated according to their relation to the labour market, but similarly regarding the vertical dimension of educational qualifications. In this case, the question arises if the inclusion of cultural capital is even necessary at all, as it expresses almost the same difference as the categorical distinction between these groups.

The third significant association is interesting here, because it shows that among the work classes, those with the lowest level of education are over-represented among the private employed – not among the unemployed as one might expect. On this level, one might even conclude that graduation alone has rather negative outcomes compared to not graduating at all. The previous assumption, that cultural capital can be understood as a means for gaining employment, would then have to be revised, at least for the lower educational ranks.

Based on this observation, one can assume that it might be the work class, rather than education, which influences income. In the next step, I therefore tried to find out in what way the positive correlation between income and education is mediated by the significant association between education and work class. Is the correlation between income and education still evenly distributed when controlled for work class? If not, from the cultural perspective of the analysis this would mean that the practical milieus have established a rather different mechanism of stratification regarding the importance of educational titles.

The results show that both association and correlation between income and education are basically reducible to government service (Cramer's $V = 0.290^{***}$; Kendal's tau-c $= 0.247^{***}$) and low (Kendal's tau-c $= 0.159^{*}$) or even negative (Kendal's tau $= -0.440^{*}$) for the other work classes. However, due to the small total numbers of

subjects in the business category, interpretation is rather difficult.[5] It appears therefore that educational capital can be best transformed into economic capital in the government work milieu, while it does not seem to play a big role in the market-oriented spheres of the economy. Hypothetically, we may assume that the private sector is far less organised when it comes to the importance of education than the state sector and, rather opposite e.g. to Germany, the practical milieus of education and market are rather disconnected from each other. The analysis of the concrete institutional *mechanisms of hierarchisation* of income in the market milieus remains however a desideratum at this point of the analysis.

### *Interdependence or independence between horizontal and vertical differentiation?*

The major argument in this section is that the principles of horizontal and vertical differentiation are interdependent, but at the same time rather independent in capitalism compared to stratified societies. In this case, work class and income can be associated to a high degree, as this would merely indicate an interdependency. A strong directed *correlation* between work classes and income would on the other side be problematic for this theoretical approach. The differentiation between income and work class would be meaningless if entrepreneurs, government servants and private employees had large differences in incomes. In this case both categories would refer to the same underlying principle of stratification, namely that of a hierarchical division of labour rather than a functional division of labour.

I therefore tested the two null hypotheses that there is neither an association and second, no correlation between the work classes and the three income classes. As the work classes refer to categorical differences in my approach, I ranked them for this purpose along the criteria used by the classical theories, esp. relations of production, which results in an ascending order from the *private employed* through the middle section of *government servants* to the *business owners*. As for the association between the variables, Cramer's *V* attained a significant value of 0.200, which however only points to a weak connection. A look at the standardised residuals reveals that there are certain significant connections. First, among the lower classes, business owners are clearly under-represented. Due to the low number of business owners in this specific sample and a high rate of "no answers", this association is hard to interpret, but certainly not unspecific for private enterprises. The second significant association is that of government

servants and the middle class, where in turn private employees are clearly under-represented. However, looking at the upper classes, we find a significant association with business owners, while government servants are under-represented. These significant associations are perfectly compatible with the proposed weak interdependency between work class and income class.

Even more important for the test of my theoretical decision is the question of a correlation between the two categories. Despite the significant general association, there is however no indication of any relevant correlation between work class and income class in the data.[6] However, this already low correlation is not significant on the standard levels.[7] As a result, there is no empirical basis to reject the null hypothesis that work and income class are not correlated to each other. The results also clearly indicate that work class, hence division of labour, is more suited as an independent axis of differentiation compared to educational capital. The association of education and income is with a Cramer's *V* of 0.158 slightly lower than that of work class and income but in contrast to work class, there is a significant correlation between education with income and hence cannot be meaningfully interpreted as an independent dimension of differentiation along Bourdieu's lines. To conclude, the data supports the assumption that work class and income class are suited to measure two associated (or interdependent), but uncorrelated theoretical dimensions of social structure: the historically developed division of work on one side, and the hierarchical position within the capitalist labour market on the other side.

### *Summary*

Theories of class have undergone, despite their impressive continuity, adaptations to their changing fields of investigation as well as theoretical developments in their approach. After discussing some of the more influential theories from Goldthorpe to Bourdieu and recently Oesch, I argued for a modified model that takes up ideas from all these theorists but nevertheless combines them in a way I believe is most appropriate for the case of the Nagas. In this class model that is inspired by Rehbein, classes express a configuration between two interdependent but increasingly independent principles: the division of work and social structure. I used occupational criteria, which are culturally embedded in practical milieus, to express the position within the division of work related to capitalism. The membership in a specific practical milieu, e.g. government service or cultivation, leads to a "work class" that comprises the part of the milieu that is related

to capitalism. "Work Class" is like Goldthorpe's "basic employment relationships" and "conditions of employment". It expresses especially the security and stability of an occupation, as well as the "prestige" or the dimension of the social "stand" (Weber). My innovation here is to include two different work classes into the analysis, the unemployed and those engaging in upgrading their cultural capital – higher education students. Even though they do not engage in remunerative labour and remain outside traditional class analysis, their structural connection to capitalism as well as their empirical size and importance justify their inclusion.

## Classes among the Naga youth

Following the theoretical discussions above, a class map only represents a current state in the configuration between the division of work and the hierarchies established by the work classes, which are in capitalism expressible in economic capital. Even though these maps are only temporarily valid, changes over time can only be assessed by comparing different states of class structures. In order to arrive at a class map of the Naga youth, I applied the following principles to the sample data:

1 The position within the division of work
2 a) The position within the capitalist hierarchy of labour valuation
  b) The position within the hierarchy of educational titles

The outcome is a division of Naga youth into eleven classes that represent the division into work classes as well as income classes. With the use of this model, I will aim to discover the influence of class on specific life-worldly data.

As indicated in Table 4.3, those in further education and the unemployed could be further divided into three groups according to their amount of cultural capital. The shares that would arise in this fifteen-class solution are indicated in parenthesis but will not be used in the following discussions. My argument here is that this class model is powerful both for predictive modelling purposes, but at the same time empirically adequate with respect to understanding localised social action. The division of work provides here a theoretical bridge between structural economic as well as practical, life-worldly criteria, which include the temporal and local specificities of the region more than "universal" models that focus on supposedly *universal* criteria (cf. the process of *generalisation* in Rehbein 2015). This makes

*Table 4.3* Class structure of the Naga youth (n = 456)

| *Hierarchy level (in %)* | | *Work class (in %)* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Business* | *Government* | *Private employed* | *Higher education* | *Unemployed* |
| | Total | 4.3 | 32.5 | 21.5 | 18.0 | 23.9 |
| High | 8.6 (14.5)[b] | 1.8 | 2.9 | 3.9 | (13.0)[c] | (10.4)[c] |
| Middle | 26.4 (45.4) | 1.8 | 16.9 | 7.7 | (4.6)[c] | (12.3)[c] |
| Low | 23.3 (40.1) | 0.7[d] | 12.7 | 9.9 | (0.4)[c,d] | (1.3)[c] |

[a] Percentages in parentheses of total work classes (n = 506).
[b] Percentages in parentheses of total income classes (n = 269) excluding higher education students and the unemployed.
[c] High, middle and low refer to "masters and above", "bachelor/honours" and "below bachelor". Percentages refer to the sample with available data on education (n = 454) and differ therefore marginally from the totals.
[d] This category has less than 5 subjects and must be interpreted carefully.

it possible to connect capitalist inequality not only to the division of labour, but similarly to the practical milieus and symbolic discourses of its reproduction.

## Class production and reproduction among the Naga youth

The construction of the class model above is until now not more than a snap-shot of current capitalist class structure, though theoretically grounded and supported by limited empirical evidence. Yet, the constituent factors and processes that produce this class structure, as well as its interactions with other forms of inequality, such as gender, age or region, are still undiscovered. The general question is whether different dimensions of inequality overlap, resulting in the constitution of clearly distinct social classes, or, as Thomas Schwinn has emphasised, different dimensions of inequalities might be better understood as following a logic of compensation (Schwinn 2008, p. 37). Ethnically discriminated and unemployed men are, according to him, more prone to discriminate close female relatives in a similar position (therefore trying to compensate low ethnic and class status with gender status) rather than identifying with them. In such a scenario the formation of distinct classes is rather improbable due to multiple overlapping and compensating structures of inequality.

Discovering social processes that are constitutive for a class model allows us to arrive at sociological explanations and, if limited,

possibilities of extrapolation into its future development. The aim of this section is therefore to formulate a theoretical model that can provide an answer to the question: Which social factors have an impact on the probability of subjects to belong to one class rather than another?

The aim is therefore to investigate the influence of social factors on class with the help of a statistical model. If the explanandum in this context is individual class membership, there are two major theoretical hypotheses from the perspective of sociology of inequality that may be considered as explanatory factors:

1 Historical processes of class reproduction (Class Theory: Bourdieu, Goldthorpe)
2 Interactive processes between distinct forms of social inequalities (Differentiation Theory: Weiß, Schwinn)

The models should hence account for the relative probability of belonging to a certain class rather than to others by assessing the influence of both historical class effects and interactive processes independently. Both processes are measured by specific indicators: social origin, measured by parents' work class, education and the place of birth, and inter-sectional effects, measured by age, gender, education and place of residence. Before testing the multivariate models, uni- and bivariate analysis are conducted to explore the relations between these variables and youth class, income class and work class. Since the classes are rooted in the practical milieus and symbolic discourses that were investigated before, the findings can directly be related to concrete historically evolving social and cultural contexts. Beyond statistical explanations based on likelihood this theoretical extension opens the way for a further-going interpretative explanation as pointed out by Max Weber.

### *Social origin*

Social origin, like class, can be measured in a variety of ways. During my fieldwork, it became increasingly clear that most people in the cohort in question do not really know about their parents' income, but instead gave great importance on their present or previous occupations and educational achievements. Therefore, I took these indicators to account for the social origin of the family. However, there is another dimension of social origin that could be established by previous research on Naga villages. Having grown up in the village, and to a lesser degree in a town, was perceived as being greatly disadvantaged

especially referring to the educational infrastructure. This experience is persistent throughout the interviews, which led me, in line with current strands in the theory of social inequality that emphasises the access to public goods, to include the place of birth into the social origin.

### *Parents' education*

Looking at the distribution of educational titles in Figure 4.4, we immediately see a strong kurtosis to the left side in the first one, especially among the mothers, of whom 63.1% did not complete more than ten years of school; many of them, as indicated by commentaries in the survey as well as by the answers in the "don't know" category, have not attended school at all. From the level of diploma upwards, men are usually over-represented around two to four times compared to the mothers, indicating that higher education was still to a large degree a prerogative of men. At the same time, as Table 4.5 shows, there is nevertheless a considerable amount of 40% of fathers and almost 15% of mothers with at least a graduate degree.

Comparing the parents' educational levels with that of their children, the generational gap is probably most visible. Not only is there now only a small minority below graduate level for both genders, the data shows that the gender trend has been reversed as well: the women in the sample lead with almost 20% over the men on the highest level of education. This trend is astonishing, and it will be interesting to




*Figure 4.4* Educational level of the parents by gender




*Figure 4.5* Educational level by generation and gender

see in how far this achievement has impacted on the representation of women in the class structure. As the percentage of parents with higher education is indeed rather rare, we might hypothetically assume that it will have a major impact on the class position of the children.

Theoretically, such an outcome would be very well compatible with the class theories of both Bourdieu and Goldthorpe. Since we must assume, however, due to the distribution of cultural capital in the parents' sample, that cultural and economic capital are more highly correlated than in the youth sample, it will be difficult to test different class theories against each other, especially as cultural capital is taken here as a proxy for the hierarchical position within capitalism. This indicator would, as has been shown already, not be applicable to the current generation where educational titles have suffered from a strong inflation.

### *Parents' work classes*

The second dimension to consider for social origin is the central work milieu in which the parents are or, in case of retirement or demise, were engaged, as shown in Figure 4.6. A quick look at the distribution reveals that there are pronounced differences not only in the educational status, but similarly in the division of work between the generations. Church, politics, cultivation and the household as important parts of subsistence, of which at least the latter two were not included




*Figure 4.6* Parents' work milieus

into capitalism directly, played basically no role in the youth sample, but are major work classes for their parents.

There are two possible explanations for this change, namely age and historical change. In politics and church, this change might be suggestively explained by the factor of respondents' age. In the case of household and cultivation, however, it seems to indicate a real historical trend away from both "bourgeois" household forms with a gender-based division of work as well as away from the life form of the rural cultivator life. Indeed, a Cramer's V of 0.205 shows a weak, but strongly significant connection between father's and mother's work milieu.[8]

The significant patterns on the cell level are most indicative here. Positive associations exist especially between government job on the fathers' and household work on the mothers' side, as well as between cultivators and church employees on both parents' sides. If women are in a government job, men are significantly more engaged in business, while this connection is not there the other way around. This supports the hypothesis that the role model of the men as breadwinner is not given up in case the mother has attained a government job.

Hence, these associations reveal two larger trends: First, a strong trend on both sides to leave cultivation if other opportunities become available; while double-cultivator parents remain a strong, most likely residual group, church employed parents are a significant pattern as

well. Second, if fathers attain a government job it leads to the establishment of a "bourgeois" division of work between household and office, while in the case of mothers having a government job, men do not become home-makers in return; women however are full-time housewives significantly more often if fathers are government servants than if they have other occupations. In return, fathers engage in business rather than turning to the household if the mothers work for the government.

The pattern that the work milieus of household and cultivation are hardly existent among the youth cannot be explained by a supposedly evolutionary differentiation of fields and institutions that is assumed by modernisation theory and still by Bourdieu's field theory. Instead, it appears that a de-differentiation of social spheres has occurred, at least in those practice areas that are regarded as legitimate sites of subsistence work. What influence parent's work milieu or occupation has on their children, and further on their income class as well, is a question that the model tries to answer. Neither Bourdieu nor Goldthorpe have focussed on these work contexts and their reproduction. From the perspective of practice theory, practice milieu reproduction should be at least as strong as class reproduction, except in cases where classes establish institutions and practice milieus aimed at social reproduction and working through processes of social closure.

The class structure of the fathers in this sample represents on the one hand a pyramid structure regarding the distribution of cultural capital, where 60% of the fathers have not attained a higher education degree (see Figure 4.4). On the other, with a proportion of almost two-thirds, government service is their most prominent work milieu, while cultivation appears on a similar marginal level along with church employment, politics and even below business. Private employment does hardly play any role at all. These numbers are indeed surprising, given that according to the census from 2011 cultivators still dominated at least the rural economy, employing 73% of the rural workforce in 2001 and still 68% in 2011 (Government of India 2012). This can only be explained by considering the sampling bias against villages and additionally in favour of non-cultivators. Nevertheless, the sample might well be indicative of the city and town-dwellers, who were able to give up agriculture due to the introduction and expansion of the government sector following statehood in 1963.

Like the youth sample, we find a significant weak association between education and work milieu among the fathers (Table 4.4). Of special interest is certainly the expected positive association of cultivation with the lowest education group: there is only one cultivator in the

*Table 4.4* Class structure of fathers (n = 448)

| *Hierarchy level (in %)* | | *Work class (in %)* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Business* | *Government* | *Private employed* | *Church* | *Politics* | *Cultivation* |
| | Total | 10.5 | 68.5 | 2.5 | 5.8 | 5.6[c] | 7.1[c] |
| High[a] | 9.4 | 0.2[b] | 6.3 | 0.4[b] | 1.6 | (0.9)[b] | (-)[b] |
| Middle | 31.0 | 4.7 | 21.9 | -[b] | 2.0 | (2.2) | (0.2)[b] |
| Low | 59.6 | 5.6 | 40.4 | 2.0 | 2.2 | (2.5) | (6.9) |

[a] High, middle and low refer here to "master's and above", "bachelor/honours" and "below bachelor".
[b] This category has less than 5 subjects and has to be interpreted carefully.
[c] Hierarchy in parentheses, since it is assumed that cultural capital is not related to hierarchy in these work classes.

*Table 4.5* Class structure of mothers (n = 441)

| *Hierarchy Llevel (in %)* | | *Work class (in %)* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Business* | *Government* | *Private employed* | *Church* | *Household* | *Cultivation* |
| | Total | 4.3 | 35.8 | 2.3 | 5.2 | 42.0[c] | 10.4[c] |
| High[a] | 2.9 | -[b] | 1.6 | 0.5[b] | 0.5[b] | (0.5)[b] | (-)[b] |
| Middle | 10.7 | 0.9[b] | 5.7 | 0.9[b] | 1.1 | (2.0) | (-)[b] |
| Low | 86.4 | 3.4 | 28.6 | 0.9[b] | 3.6 | (39.5) | (10.4) |

[a] High, middle and low refer here to "masters and above", "bachelor/honours" and "below bachelor".
[b] This category has less than 5 subjects and has to be interpreted carefully.
[c] Hierarchy in parentheses, since it is assumed that cultural capital is not related to hierarchy in these work classes.

sample with a bachelor's or honours degree at all. On the other hand, church employees are over-represented among the highest educated group but under-represented among those without higher education. Interestingly, government service jobs are not associated significantly with any hierarchy but are distributed akin to the pyramid of the educational levels. Among the work milieus in the private sectors, the middle class is found more in their own business and less as employees in private companies, who in any case form only a minority.

For the mothers, it had been shown that the pyramid is even more extreme with regard to educational titles, which matches well with the finding that while around two-thirds of men were engaged in rural

agriculture rather unchanged since the nineties, the proportion of rural women hovered between 90 and 100%; only since the year 2000 can we see a small decline in female agriculture to 85% in 2010 (ibid.). Educational achievement is for women even higher related to the work class than for men. It is indicative for the class structure shown in Table 4.5 that all female cultivators are below graduation level. The other group that is significantly associated with low education are those in household work, while the middle classes tend to work in private organisations or government jobs. For the higher classes there are no clear connections due to the small total numbers, but they confirm mainly the trends of the middle class: education avails significant higher opportunities to women in the church, government and private companies, while those of the lowest level engage more in cultivation and household work. Besides these relative numbers, however, it should be noted that the government employees below bachelor's degree still form the second largest group with more than one-quarter of mothers. The expansion of the government sector has therefore nevertheless created the bulk of alternatives to cultivation for women even without higher education, besides leaving it for household work that had been shown above already to be connected to the father's government job.

Looking again at the associations between work class and education for parents and the current sample, we see that though a significant weak connection exists for all the groups, it decreases from mothers to fathers and the youths. There is a clear trend that educational attainment is increasingly less associated with a certain activity or occupation, which harmonises with the theses of "educational inflation" forwarded by authors like Bourdieu (Bourdieu 2012) and Collins (Collins 1979) for France and the USA. Since the title pyramid has been turned upside down, the decreasing importance correlates with the spread of educational titles in total. On the other hand, this can also be interpreted as an increasing differentiation of the education milieu from that of capitalism, where each work class establishes

*Table 4.6* Association of education with work class for both generations

| *Education x work class of* | *Association (Cramer's V)* |
|---|---|
| Fathers | $0.219^{***}$ |
| Mothers | $0.242^{***}$ |
| Youth | $0.179^{***}$ |

$^{***}$ Significance level $\alpha < 0.01$.

own criteria of remuneration. Educational titles do not have the same importance in every work milieu but correlate positively with income only in the government sector.

### *Is there class reproduction among the Nagas?*

The associations between central indicators of social origin are shown in Table 4.7. Given the scarce availability of educational titles and their strong relation to work class among the fathers and mothers, it is all the more surprising that there is neither a significant association nor a correlation between both parents' education levels and youth class.[9] The thesis of class reproduction, using parents' educational level and class position of the youth as an indicator, is difficult to sustain.

With regard to the effect of parents' education on the income level, only mothers' education level has a significant overall impact (with a rather low Cramer's *V* of 0.191). But significant associations exist only between the highest income class of the youth, and mothers' education level of master and above. There are no connections between parents' education level and the work class of their child.[10] This general finding, which locates class reproduction only in a numerically small upper income class and explains it mainly with mothers' educational level, departs to a great degree from classical theories of class reproduction. Certainly, class reproduction of the rural cultivator population is not assessed properly with this sample, but nevertheless, given the qualitative variety and size of the sample, these findings run against the mainstream of class theory.

Similarly, when taking the parents' work classes as social factors, neither fathers' nor mothers' work classes have a significant association with the youth class, income class or even the work class of the youth.[11] Due to the limited number of fathers with jobs other than government service or business, the suitability of this social factor

*Table 4.7* Associations between social origin and youth classes

| *Social origin* | *Class* | *Income class* | *Work class* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Father's education | - | - | - |
| Mother's education | - | 0.191*** | - |
| Father's work class | - | - | - |
| Mother's work class | - | - | - |
| Place of Birth | - | - | - |

*** Cramer's V with a significance level $\alpha < 0.01$.

towards predicting class memberships of the youth is certainly limited and points towards the need for further, more differentiated, data.

A look at the level of the cells might nevertheless show some tendencies: there is a positive association in case the fathers engage in business with business activity of their children, especially in middle- and higher-income positions. Some associations might well be significant with increased sample size, but altogether indicate only a rather loose reproduction of the work milieu between the generations. One association that emerges from the data is the opposition between government and the two private sectors, though only the business milieu seems to be intergenerationally stable.

Finally, place of birth also has no significant association with class or any of its dimensions. Neither the work class, nor the income level depends on the birth place's level of urbanisation. While this finding may be due to a self-selection bias, which over-represents "successful urbanisers", the data nevertheless shows that more than 30% of those born in a village, or the roughly 35% born in a town within the sample, were in not disadvantaged compared to those born in the big cities with more infrastructure at hand. Only further analysis of larger samples will be able to show whether these outcomes are sufficiently reproducible. Like what has been said about the other indicators of social origin, this result puts the theoretical premises of class reproduction theory into question about Nagaland.

### *Symbolic inequalities*

How about the interrelation between symbolic inequalities which are not based on social origin but rather on other symbolic dimensions like education, gender, age and place? These symbolic factors refer to inequalities produced in different practice milieus rather than through reproduction of parent's class position. Age and gender as symbolic hierarchies can be traced back to the Naga village socio-culture, educational capital to the education milieu and the evaluation of place of residence to the government milieu, the latter indirectly through its differentiation between hierarchical levels of space concerning access to public infrastructure. As I argued above, the degree of integration into the differentiated economic milieus is on a rather low level which renders the valuation of places largely dependent on the government sector.

#### *Age and gender*

The results of a one-way ANOVA comparing the age means of the different classes are presented in Figure 4.7. Indeed, there is an almost




*Figure 4.7* Mean age per class

linear relationship between the mean ages and class, one that is shown to be highly significant.[12] The association also exists on a nominal scale, with a highly significant Cramer's *V* of 0.268, which again can be completely explained by the rank correlation of Kendal's tau-c of 0.334.[13] It is therefore possible to say that the higher the class, the higher the age. Due to the common problem of collinearity of age (= time – cohort), cohort (= time – age) and time of measurement (= cohort + age), a differentiation of cohort (e.g. people born in a similar age-group), age (e.g. biological age) and time of measurement (e.g. historical) effects cannot be attained here (Settersten and Mayer 1997).

How can these overall results be explained on the inter-group level? By using post-hoc multiple comparisons via Scheffe test ($\alpha = 0.05$), it is possible to assess in detail which groups are responsible for the significant association between age and class. The results from Figure 4.7, which hint to a rather low mean age in the first two classes, are thereby confirmed statistically. Both unemployed and those in higher education are significantly younger than most of their earning counterparts, in average between four to six years. The lower private employed and business groups occupy a middle position between these groups but confirm the overall trend. Though the means of higher government and business classes differ similarly in age, these results are not significant due to their small total numbers. Once subjects are in a paid

employment, the Scheffe test suggests that age ceases to differ significantly between the classes. The impression from the rank correlation coefficient therefore must be qualified accordingly, as it mainly differentiates two types of groups, employed and not employed.

Gender, unlike age, is surprisingly not significantly related to class. The only significant association on the group level exists in the lower government jobs, where women are comparably over-represented.[14] Though women are under-represented in the sample, there is no hint about any significant contribution to class formation from gender divisions within the sample.

### *Place of residence*

Since education has already been shown to be strongly associated with class, I want to look at the influence of the current place of residence. During the fieldwork, I got the impression that the place of residence is indeed perceived as a strong indicator of social position, and migration to the towns and cities was often seen as a social uplift. In a study on highly qualified international migrants, Anja Weiß had shown that geographic location and the possibility for mobility can be considered as new important structuring aspects of class formation in the global economy (2005). Rather than looking at different nation-states as spatial criteria of inequality, I consider here the division between urban and rural areas within one state, a division that equally reveals differences in the valuation of arrangements and environments in a certain area. Indeed, a highly significant Cramer's $V$ of 0.320 supports the view that place of residence and class position, compared to other indicators I have tested so far, are strongly associated.[15] However, despite the association, there is no correlation between degree of urbanisation and youth class.[16]

Given the importance of government jobs for the total availability of paid employment in Nagaland, I expected at least a weak correlation between both, as most of these jobs are created in urban areas. But since a significant proportion of young Nagas have moved outside the state, this interpretation is not straightforward. For that reason, and because place is less commonly used as a contributor to class position, I analysed more closely the associations on the cell level.

As Table 4.8 shows, there are many categories with rather small counts, especially for those living in the villages and the numerically small class categories of business and higher government employees. Nevertheless, there are two complimentary significant associations: First, between the unemployed and those in higher education. Whereas

*Table 4.8* Place of residence and youth classes (n = 415)

| *Youth class* | *Place of residence* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Village* | *Town* | *City Nagaland* | *City India* |
| High business | 0.0[a] | 0.0[a] | 1.0[a] | 0.5[a] |
| High government | 0.0[a] | 1.0[a] | 0.0[a] | 1.0[a] |
| High employed | 0.0[a] | 0.5[a] | 0.2[a] | **3.1** (4.1)[b] |
| Middle business | 0.2[a] | 0.0[a] | 1.2[a] | 0.2[a] |
| Middle government | 1.0[a] | 4.3 | **9.6** (2.4)[b] | **2.2** (–4.1)[b] |
| Middle employed | 0.2[a] | 0.2[a] | 2.4 | **3.9** (2.7)[b] |
| Low business | 0.0[a] | 0.2[a] | 0.5[a] | 0.0[a] |
| Low government | 1.0[a] | **3.9** (2.2)[b] | 7.5 | **1.4** (–4.0)[b] |
| Low employed | 0.2[a] | 1.7 | 5.3 | 2.9 |
| High education | 1.0[a] | **1.2** (–2.8)[b] | **3.4** (–5.0)[b] | **13.0** (7.5)[b] |
| Unemployed | 1.7 | 4.6 | 12.5 | **5.3** (–2.8)[b] |

Numbers in cells refer to percentage of total.

[a] This cell has less than 5 subjects and has to be interpreted carefully.
[b] Adjusted residual ≤ –2 or ≥ 2, therefore significant contribution to chi-square statistics.

the first reside mainly within the state, the latter are outside the state. Second, between government and private employees: private employees of the middle and high positions are significantly more often living outside the state, while the lower and middle government employees are more often within the state. The relative amount confirms here the hypothesis stated before, as low government jobs are more often situated in the town level whereas the middle positions are associated with the city level.

This spatial dispersion along class lines carries important implications for a political sociology of class. As far as the numbers and spatial proximity are concerned, the present division of work makes it difficult to mobilise politically vocal middle-class groups, especially private employed and higher education students. Though both are usually considered important for political change, they live mainly outside the state, and hence away from direct political influence. On the other hand, both unemployed and low employees, whom one might consider the proponents of working-class movements, are distributed on all levels inside the state. However, their numbers in combination with the insights into the larger political economy of Nagaland state suggest that they might not so much struggle against the hardly present capitalist class but are competing with government servants about their share of funds that enter the state from outside.

The associations of social inequalities with class are presented in Table 4.9. Unlike the thesis of social reproduction, which assigns major explanatory importance to factors of social origin, we can find ample empirical evidence for associations between other inequalities and class, as well as with the two constituent dimensions of class. Surprisingly, the geographical factor "place of residence" provides the strongest relation with class, followed by education level and age. The influence of age can be explained completely by its association with work class: the fact that unemployed and students are significantly younger than most of the groups engaging in remunerative work. One can argue that the logic of class division between these two groups follows a life-cycle logic, where unemployment and higher education are states generally inhabited *before* gaining employment – akin to the thesis of a "temporalisation" of inequality put forward by Peter Berger in Germany during the 90s (Berger 1995). In a stark contrast to age, gender has no association with any dimension of class at all. This is indeed surprising, as gender inequality has been a constant topic in public debates. However, as these debates circle around the representation in politics on the one hand, and the exclusion from inheritance rights on the village level on the other, they are likely of less concern for the more urbanised, younger generation of this study, where neither cultivation nor politics play a big role. The historically newer milieus do not seem to perpetrate the traditional gender divisions that exist in both older milieus of village culture and politics.

Education, as has been shown above, has a complex relation to class. As it is connected significantly to work class on the one hand, and correlates strongly with income for government employees and lightly for private employees, the combined class model achieves a much higher association with education than the single dimensions. Its linear correlation with income is however only valid for these

*Table 4.9* Associations between symbolic inequalities and classes

| *Dimension* | *Class* | *Income class* | *Work class* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age | $0.268^{***}$ | - | $0.321^{***}$ |
| Gender | - | - | - |
| Education | $0.285^{***}$ | $0.139^{**}$ | $0.179^{***}$ |
| Place of residence | $0.320^{***}$ | $0.243^{***}$ | $0.267^{***}$ |

$^{**}$ Cramer's V with a significance level $\alpha < 0.05$.
$^{***}$ Cramer's V with a significance level $\alpha < 0.01$.

two work classes – as it is even strongly negative in the case of business owners. However, education is also important in distinguishing between the two classes without personal income: the unemployed and the students. State residence is associated with government jobs, low employees and the unemployed, while higher education students and the middle and high private employees are over-represented outside the state.

### *A statistical model of class determinants*

In this section, I have so far tried to arrive at empirically supported hypotheses as explanatory factors of class position. Class position was defined theoretically in a configurational class model that is based on the two dimensions of work class and income class. These dimensions consider the evolving division of work as well as the hierarchical nature of remuneration that can be assessed in capitalism with the level of income, with the secondary factor of cultural capital as a prerequisite and resource for future employment and position. I suggested to differentiate between eleven classes altogether, which were presented as to their relative size, and include the important classes of the unemployed and the higher education students – groups that are otherwise neglected in their relevance for class theories. Despite the increased scope of this model, its focus remains on the young urban population and does not cover the major classes of the rural areas, especially cultivators.

Bivariate analyses of the indicators have already revealed regularities between possible factors and class membership. Now, the question is how these factors influence these probabilities of class membership. The advantage of multivariate models, such as logistic regressions, is that they can do exactly that: consider the influence of all indicators *together*, rather than treating them independently from each other. By fitting a logistic regression model, it is possible to determine the impact of these factors on the probabilities of class membership.

#### *Formulation of logistic regression analysis*

In the following lines, I introduce the statistical model for the simple case of a binary logistic regression. Rather than fitting a linear regression model via ordinary least squares (OLS), logistic regression can be used to assess the impact of categorical and metric variables on categorical outcomes such as class by estimating the probability of

an outcome rather than the outcome itself. For the probabilities of a binary event, e.g. being unemployed (1) or not (0), we can, following Backhaus et al. (2006, p. 425f.), specify following relations:

$$P(y=0)+P(y=1)=1$$
and: (1)
$$P(y=0)=1-P(y=1)$$

It is assumed that the probability of the event (1) is produced by the latent, not observable variable $z$ depending on the value of the explanatory variable $x_j$:

$$y=\begin{cases}1 if\ z_k>0\\ 0 if\ z_k\le 0\end{cases} \quad \text{with: } z_k=\beta_0+\sum_{j=1}^{J}\beta_j x_{jk}+u_k \tag{2}$$

$z$ can be interpreted here as the sum of the effects of the different explanatory variables $x_j$ in bringing about the event $y$ in the observable case $k$, where $\beta_0$ refers to the constant, $\beta_j$ to the coefficient and $u$ to the latent disturbance variable that accounts for the observable residuals $e_k$, the differences between predicted and observed events that cannot be explained by the model. In order to calculate the probabilities of the events according to the aggregate effect $z$, logistic regression relies on the so-called *logistic function*:

$$p=\frac{e^z}{1+e^z} \quad \text{or} \quad p=\frac{1}{1+e^z} \tag{3}$$

The probability for the event (1) is now calculated by the logistic function, where the constant $\beta_0$ and the regression coefficients $\beta_j$ – or *logit coefficients* – show the influence of variable x on the probability of the event $y = 1$. The logistic regression follows therefore the following combined equations (1) and (2):

$$p_k(y=1)=\frac{1}{1+e^{-z_k}} \quad \text{with } z_k=\beta_0+\sum_{j=1}^{J}\beta_j x_{jk}+u_k \tag{4}$$

The logistic regression produces therefore a distribution of probabilities for infinite positive or negative values of $z$, where the probability always assumes values within the interval [0,1] and is symmetric around the turning point of $P(y = 1) = 0.5$. Logistic regression hence assumes a non-linear connection between the explanatory and

dependent variables, but follows a s-shaped distribution approaching 0 for negative values and 1 for positive values of $z$. On the other hand, as shown above, it assumes a linear relationship between the weighted influences of the explanatory variables in the formation of $z$.

*Tested variables and hypothesis*

For calculating the probabilities of the Naga youth to belong to a certain class, I took all the theoretically defined indicators into consideration. Before calculating the model, the hypotheses and their empirical support from bivariate analysis are listed below. Based on the theoretical explanations of the two dominant kinds of class theory, we would expect the following social factors having an influence on class membership:

- **Class reproduction**
  1. Parent's education level on class position (weak empirically support for mother's education)
  2. Parent's work class on class position (no empirical support)
  3. Place of birth on class position (no empirical support)
- **Symbolic inequalities**
  1. Age (empirical support for work class)
  2. Gender (no empirical support)
  3. Education (empirical support for both income and work class)
  4. Place of residence (empirical support for both income and work class)

Since regression models rely on the independence of the explanatory variables, a high correlation between them (*multi-collinearity*) introduces redundancy in the models and leads to high standard errors of the coefficients (Backhaus et al. 2005, p. 89). It can lead to the problem that the overall model might have significant power with insignificant single coefficients, and significant influences of explanatory variables might not be detected if their effect overlaps to a high degree with others. In order to test for first-order multi-collinearity, I constructed a correlation matrix of the predictors.

There are several significant correlations between variables – as usual with empirical social data – but they only show weak coefficients (most Kendall's tau-b < 0.2). According to the standard usage, even the highest correlation coefficient between fathers' and mothers' education (Kendall's tau-b = 0.417, $\alpha \leq 0.01$) only qualifies as "very

weak" (Bühl 2014, p. 426). Though higher-order collinearity cannot be ruled out by this method, the variables appear independent enough to justify their usage in the regression models below.

Due to the small numbers in some categories, not all classes can be assessed by the statistical models. I hence look at three important class differentiations: the first focusses on the category that only emerged with the present generation: the class of the unemployed. This class is certainly one of the most interesting, is publicly vocal in Nagaland politics and high in relative numbers. It is also indicative that there were no unemployed among the parents' generation, as cultivation of household work was regarded as subsistence activities besides remunerative labour as well. This group represents therefore not only social, but also cultural change, making it an interesting question which factors lead to membership in this disadvantaged group of modern capitalism. Second, I examine how the division of labour among the earning classes comes about. Third, I want to look at the highest income class, and see which factors lead people to reap the benefits of capitalism among the Nagas.

### *Model I: unemployment*

The first model tries to answer the question: Which socio-structural factors influence the chance of being unemployed? For that purpose, I classified the sample into two outcome groups: unemployed and not unemployed. Then, I conduct a binary logistic regression with the theoretically established factors. In contrast to the descriptive analyses used until now, regression analysis has the advantage to test the statistical significance while controlling other variables and include the interaction effects between the variables. However, in order to avoid minuscule categories, I only used the main effects into the model. They were added in two blocks, first those indicating social origin and second symbolic inequalities, in order to assess relative model improvement. Following bivariate analysis, we might expect significant influences of three explanatory variables on unemployment: education level, age and place of residence. Since one can theoretically assume that a higher level of education increases employability, education was regarded here as an ordinal variable. Of the total n = 483, 85.3% of the cases (n = 412) were included in the analysis.

For the evaluation of the quality of the model, we can distinguish between "goodness of fit" tests, and measures of predictive power on the other hand. The first type of test is problematic when using ordinal or scale explanatory variables in the model, which must be

regarded with some caution. The criteria for cell counts using chi-square statistics might not be met and alternative solutions like the Hosmer-Lemeshow test have shown to be problematic, as well (Allison 2014, p. 5). First, the comparison of the models according to their total Deviance ($-2LL$) shows that only the second model improves the model fit significantly ($Chi^2$ (20) = 64.984; $p$ = 0.000) against the null-model without explanatory variables, while the first model with indicators only for social origin is not significant ($Chi^2$ (14) = 13.618; $p$ = 0.479). According to the "Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients", the second block with the symbolic inequality variables provides a significantly improved explanation of whether one is unemployed or not ($Chi^2$ (6) = 51.366; $p$ = 0.000).

The second strand of goodness of fit test aims to evaluate the percentage of variance that is explained by the model. In logistic regression, explained variance cannot be determined by an $R^2$ statistic, but there are two so-called "pseudo $R^2$ values" with a similar interpretation of relative improvement versus the "null-model" without predictors.[17] By including symbolic inequalities, the final model explains between 14.6 and 22.9% of the chance to be unemployed, based on the values of Cox & Snell or Nagelkerke R Square indicators, respectively. According to the standard work of Backhaus et al. (Backhaus et al. 2005, p. 456), these values are acceptable given the diversity of the class and a strong improvement over the 3–5% explanations of the first model based on social origin alone.[18] As most of the classic indicators of social structures have failed as explanations of unemployment, the group is heterogeneous with regard to social origin: other criteria seem to be more important. Here is certainly need for further research and theoretical development of class theories to account for the phenomenon of unemployment.

Predictive accuracy is measured by looking at the classification results, though they might be overly high when the same sample is used for fitting and testing as I do here (ibid., p. 456). Given the restricted number of interviews, I decided not to split the sample into training and test set, which would be necessary for assessing predictive rather than merely explanatory accuracy. While the first model did not improve classification results based on the null model, which classifies all people with the larger group, the second improved it more than 2%. The model summary of the logistic regression model for unemployed is shown in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10 shows which of the variables significantly influence the chance to be unemployed. Only age and place of residence are significant, while cultural capital, treated as an ordinal variable, is not

*Table 4.10* Logistic regression model for unemployed class

| | *Model I SO* | | | | *Model II SO + SI* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *B* | *SE* | *Sig* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *Sig* | *OR* |
| Constant | −1.858* | 0.804 | 0.021 | 0.156 | 4.073** | 1.439 | 0.005 | 58.711 |
| *Education parents* | | | | | | | | |
| Level father | 0.102 | 0.223 | 0.647 | 1.108 | 0.035 | 0.240 | 0.884 | 1.036 |
| Level mother | −0.204 | 0.350 | 0.559 | 0.815 | −0.156 | 0.391 | 0.689 | 0.855 |
| *Place of birth (base=City)* | | | 0.468 | | | | 0.325 | |
| Village | 0.111 | 0.331 | 0.736 | 1.118 | 0.217 | 0.362 | 0.550 | 1.242 |
| Town | −0.268 | 0.310 | 0.188 | 0.765 | −0.321 | 0.353 | 0.363 | 0.726 |
| *Work class father (base=cultivation)* | | | 0.287 | | | | 0.297 | |
| Private | 0.816 | 1.0009 | 0.419 | 2.260 | 0.533 | 1.094 | 0.626 | 1.704 |
| Government | 1.139 | 0.670 | 0.089 | 3.124 | 1.045 | 0.705 | 0.138 | 2.844 |
| Business | 0.873 | 0.773 | 0.259 | 2.395 | 0.567 | 0.816 | 0.487 | 1.764 |
| Church | −0.618 | 1.227 | 0.614 | 0.539 | −0.630 | 1.270 | 0.620 | 0.533 |
| Politics | 1.341 | 0.822 | 0.103 | 3.824 | 1.360 | 0.868 | 0.117 | 3.894 |
| *Work class mother (base=cultivation)* | | | 0.772 | | | | 0.682 | |
| Private | −0.307 | 0.972 | 0.752 | 0.736 | −0.580 | 1.053 | 0.581 | 0.560 |
| Government | −0.543 | 0.490 | 0.267 | 0.581 | −0.427 | 0.536 | 0.426 | 0.653 |
| Business | −0.069 | 0.731 | 0.925 | 0.933 | −0.193 | 0.781 | 0.804 | 0.824 |
| Household | −0.287 | 0.454 | 0.528 | 0.750 | −0.274 | 0.503 | 0.586 | 0.760 |
| Church | −1.027 | 0.858 | 0.231 | 0.358 | −1.517 | 0.894 | 0.090 | 0.219 |
| *Age* | | | | | −0.215*** | 0.038 | 0.000 | 0.806 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Place of residence (base=city outside)* | | ** | | 0.009 | |
| Village Nagaland | | 1.179* | 0.598 | 0.049 | 3.251 |
| Town Nagaland | | 0.769 | 0.451 | 0.088 | 2.157 |
| City Nagaland | | 1.154*** | 0.346 | 0.001 | 3.171 |
| Education level | | −0.149 | 0.226 | 0.512 | 0.862 |
| *Gender (base=Male)* | | | | | |
| Female | | −0.412 | 0.325 | 0.204 | 0.662 |
| *Model tests* | | | | | |
| Deviance (−2LL) | 403.111 | | 351.745*** | | |
| Nagelkerke R2 | 0.051 | | 0.229 | | |
| Cox & Snell R2 | 0.033 | | 0.146 | | |
| Classification Acc. | 79.6% | | 82.0% | | |

* Significance level $\alpha \leq 0.05$.
** Significance level $\alpha \leq 0.01$.
*** Significance level $\alpha \leq 0.001$

significant in explaining unemployment. The well-known claim that investment in education generally protects against unemployment is hence falsified in the case of the Nagas. The negative $\beta$ coefficient B of age shows that its influence is negative: increasing age is related to reduced unemployment. According to the exponential coefficient $e^B$, we can conclude that with higher age, the chance of being unemployed decreases about 19.4% per year of age. Certainly, it is not possible to predict what happens with the unemployed with increasing age – this depends similarly on the situation of the labour market that is difficult to predict in Nagaland, as the government sector seems to be saturated. We might see an increase of unemployed youths taking up jobs in the private economy, but we might similarly see the formation of a stable class of unemployed whose average age increases as people get tied to it in the coming years.

The influence of place of residence is also overall significant and reveals a rather strong influence on the likelihood of being unemployed. Youth living in the village or in the cities in Nagaland are three times as likely to be unemployed, and those in the towns still twice as likely compared to those staying outside Nagaland. Unemployment is hence strongly related to residence within the state Nagaland. Spatial location, in accordance with studies on the effects on neighbourhoods and states on inequality (Lamont, Beljean, and Clair 2014; Weiß 2005), has its own structural force on class position. In the case of Nagaland, this influence is related mainly to the position of the state economy within the Indian and global economy.

*Model II: government vs. private sector*

Previous bivariate analyses showed a high association of work class with age, cultural capital and place of residence. In this model, I am especially interested in the determinants of the division between those working in government and those in the private sector. Due to the small numbers of business owners, they are merged with the private employed. I leave out students and unemployed in order to focus on the division of labour classes with remunerative work. Hence, of the total n = 483, only 50.3% of the cases (n = 243) are included in the analysis. This model tries to answer the question: Which socio-structural factors impact on the chance of having a government job against working in the private sector?

The comparison of the deviances ($-2LL$) shows a significant improvement in the model fit compared to the null model as indicated by omnibus test ($Chi^2$ (23) = 59.038; $p$ = 0.000). This time,

both indicators of social origin ($Chi^2$ (16) = 29.502; $p$ = 0.021) and those of symbolic inequalities provide a significantly improved model of whether one works for the government or in the private sector ($Chi^2$ (7) = 29.535; $p$ = 0.000). Both social origin and symbolic inequalities increase the explanation of the variance of odds to work in the government rather than in the private sector compared to the null model. While social origin taken alone explains between 11.4% (Cox & Snell $R^2$) and 15.3% (Nagelkerke $R^2$) of this variance, the complete model accounts for between 21.6% and 28.9%; both theoretical explanations seem to have equal weight in this case. Compared to the previous case of unemployment, these numbers point towards a larger causal power of social structure for the division of labour among the Nagas. This improved model fit is also highly visible in the improvement of classification results, which is only 56.0% for the null model. Taking social origin into account, already 63.4% of observations are predicted correctly, and 71.6% for the complete model. The details are shown in Table 4.11.

Which of the variables influence the chances to work for the government rather than in the private sector? In the first model, it was especially the work class of the father that showed a significant impact: if the father worked in the government, the odds of the child to work for the government rather than private are almost four times higher compared to fathers working as cultivators. For fathers working in the church, the odds are even six times higher compared to cultivating fathers. If we take the symbolic inequalities into account, this influence remains but loses statistical significance. In the complete model, only the influence of fathers employed by the church is significant, while the father's government job is not significant any more: its previous effect seems to rely instead on other factors in the model. Here, we can see that the work class of the mother, though short of being significant with the defined cut-off mark, has gained in explanatory power: both mother's household and church work is strongly negatively related to the chances of the child to work for the government. Compared to children of mothers working in cultivation, the chances for a government job are only one-fourth if the mothers are housewives, and even less than a fifth if the mothers work for the church. It is surprising that working for the church, which concerns only small groups of parents, has opposite effects. Though more research is needed to investigate this connection, a clear result is that, other than expected, a parent's government job has no significant influence – there is no reproduction of the government class among the Nagas if other factors than social origin are considered.

*Table 4.11* Logistic regression models for government vs. private sector

| | *Model I SO* | | | | *Model II SO + SI* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *B* | *SE* | *Sig* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *Sig* | *OR* |
| Constant | −0.801 | 0.980 | 0.414 | 0.449 | −0.911 | 1.621 | 0.574 | 0.402 |
| *Education father (base=master and above)* | | | 0.378 | | | | 0.435 | |
| Below bachelor | −0.310 | 0.596 | 0.602 | 0.733 | −0.141 | 0.623 | 0.821 | 0.869 |
| Bachelor/honours | −0.679 | 0.592 | 0.251 | 0.507 | −0.568 | 0.611 | 0.352 | 0.567 |
| *Education mother (base=master and above)* | | | 0.312 | | | | 0.445 | |
| Below bachelor | 1.141 | 0.796 | 0.152 | 3.129 | 0.903 | 0.875 | 0.302 | 2.468 |
| Bachelor/honours | 1.245 | 0.847 | 0.142 | 3.475 | 1.199 | 0.942 | 0.203 | 3.318 |
| *Place of birth (base=city)* | | | 0.570 | | | | 0.211 | |
| Village | −0.040 | 0.397 | 0.920 | 0.961 | −0.283 | 0.448 | 0.527 | 0.753 |
| Town | −0.328 | 0.347 | 0.343 | 0.720 | −0.682 | 0.394 | 0.084 | 0.506 |
| *Work class father (base=cultivation)* | ** | | 0.004 | | * | | 0.015 | |
| Private | 1.126 | 1.040 | 0.279 | 3.084 | 0.703 | 1.120 | 0.530 | 2.020 |
| government | 1.343* | 0.648 | 0.038 | 3.831 | 1.083 | 0.717 | 0.131 | 2.952 |
| Business | −0.093 | 0.763 | 0.903 | 0.911 | −0.440 | 0.838 | 0.599 | 0.644 |
| Church | 1.811* | 0.865 | 0.036 | 6.118 | 1.984* | 0.976 | 0.042 | 7.269 |
| Politics | −0.277 | 0.890 | 0.756 | 0.758 | −0.103 | 0.978 | 0.916 | 0.902 |
| *Work class mother (base=cultivation)* | | | 0.092 | | | | 0.082 | |
| Private | −0.977 | 1.157 | 0.398 | 0.376 | −1.003 | 1.216 | 0.409 | 0.367 |
| Government | −0.081 | 0.677 | 0.905 | 0.922 | −0.577 | 0.754 | 0.444 | 0.562 |
| Business | −1.537 | 1.097 | 0.161 | 0.215 | −2.072 | 1.222 | 0.090 | 0.126 |
| Household | −0.881 | 0.633 | 0.164 | 0.414 | −1.364 | 0.721 | 0.058 | 0.256 |
| Church | −1.118 | 0.839 | 0.183 | 0.327 | −1.730 | 0.898 | 0.054 | 0.177 |
| *Age* | | | | | −0.002 | 0.038 | 0.960 | 0.998 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Place of residence (base=city outside)* | | *** | | 0.000 | |
| Village Nagaland | | 0.989 | 0.756 | 0.191 | 2.689 |
| Town Nagaland | | 2.131*** | 0.505 | 0.000 | 8.427 |
| city nagaland | | 1.156** | 0.376 | 0.002 | 3.177 |
| *Education level (base=master and above)* | | | | 0.514 | |
| Below bachelor | | −0.686 | 0.605 | 0.257 | 0.504 |
| Bachelor/honours | | −0.164 | 0.338 | 0.628 | 0.849 |
| *Gender (base=male)* | | | | | |
| Female | | 0.613 | 0.343 | 0.074 | 1.846 |
| *Model tests* | | | | | |
| Deviance (−2LL) | 303.898*** | | 274.363*** | | |
| Nagelkerke R2 | 0.153 | | 0.289 | | |
| Cox & Snell R2 | 0.114 | | 0.216 | | |
| Classification Acc. | 63.4 | | 71.6 | | |

* Significance level $\alpha \leq 0.05$;
** Significance level $\alpha \leq 0.01$;
*** Significance level $\alpha \leq 0.001$

Looking at the effects of the "symbolic inequalities" block, only place of residence is significant. Compared to those living outside Nagaland, youth living in the towns have more than eight times higher chances to work for the government. Even in the cities, the chances are still more than three times higher, while results of those living in villages also indicate higher chances but are not significantly different. Like unemployment, government service is highly related to the state Nagaland, while the chances to work in the private sector are highest outside. We can therefore conclude that the outmigration from the state is related to a significant degree with the higher chances of finding employment in the private sector, while those looking for government jobs have the highest chances in their own state, especially in the towns and district capitals. The state structures, and here we must think especially of the reservation system, influence the kind of employment to a large degree and in return lead to migration if aspirations or possibilities relate to the private sector.

*Model III: higher income*

In the last model, I want to find out which factors determine income class in a positive way. With an ordinal logistic regression model, it is possible to assess these factors on an ordinal variable like income class, rather than treating it as a nominal category like in the models before with unemployment and government jobs.

As shown before, we find significant correlations of income class with parents' as well as individual education, and similarly with age and place of residence. The nominal variables of parents' work class and gender, but also place of birth, not surprisingly, do not. What the effect of these variables is if taken together will be seen in the ordinal logistic regression. Again, n = 243 cases are included in the analysis.

Looking at the model tests first, only the combined model achieves a significant improvement over the null model which includes only the intercept. Due to some empty cells in the model one should be cautious with the Chi Square test, however, since it requires usually at least five expected cases per cell. We see the same improvement for the pseudo $R^2$ values of the models: while social origin accounts for between 10.6% and 12.2% of the variance, the complete model can explain more than double of it, between 25.2% and 29.3%. Though compared to textbook standards these values are rather low, we can conclude again on the theoretical level that social origin alone is indeed a very bad indicator of income class. An indicator for explanatory power for ordinal logistic regression – classification correlation – shows a strong improvement for

the complete model, though the social origin model is also significant here.[19] Taking into account the influence of other inequalities, both fit and explanatory power increase significantly with both models.

Again, the most interesting values are found on the level of the single indicators. One feature of the estimates here is that it is possible to calculate individual chances by adding individual scores and then subtracting them from the threshold value of the category in question (Bühl 2014, p. 484). We arrive directly at the *z*-value that can be inserted into the logistic function above to calculate the individual chance to belong to that class. Here, I don't want to go deeper into this matter, but want to look at the influence of the variables in the two models.

In the social origin model, there are three low significant influences: if the father is a politician, the chance to be in a higher income category increases compared to a father in cultivation, while, though not significant, a mother's government job seems to decrease the odds compared to a cultivator mother. Other than that, there are no significant influences of parents' work classes. If fathers have other jobs than cultivation, the chances for higher income generally improve (except for private employment), while they decrease if mothers leave it (except if they work for the church). Overall, we can say that the chances for a higher income are best if the father is a politician, businessman or government servant, and when the mother works in cultivation or for the church. On the other hand, mother's education is more important than father's education to improve the chances of higher income, especially if they have a master's degree or higher.

If we introduce the variables of the "symbolic inequalities" block into the model, all indicators of social origin turn insignificant. In the final model, only age, gender and most importantly place of residence influence income significantly. With growing age, the chances of being in a higher income class improve significantly. At the same time, gender surprisingly plays a big role in the model, as women's chances to higher income are significantly lower than those of men. This influence is hidden by other factors in the correlations but has significant influence independent of other factors. Regarding place of residence, living outside Nagaland relates most positively to higher income, while it is worst for those staying in the towns and cities of Nagaland. Education however plays no role for the chances to higher income, against the expectation one gets from its significant correlation with income shown before. At present, moving outside Nagaland seems to be the most effective strategy to higher income that working young Nagas can actively pursue.

## Summary

This chapter started with the theoretical construction of classes among the Naga youth in the first section. First, I looked at statistically significant associations and correlations that can shed light on the processes of the production and reproduction of class. Theoretically, I argued for a combination of two dimensions of class: the first, specifying the cultural background of the division of work, which led me to distinguish different "work classes" as instances of a historically developed horizontal differentiation of work. Second, the value work is given in the capitalist market economy and is expressed in income, which I analysed as vertically differentiated "income classes". However, as I argued, a class model of the youth must incorporate two large sections as well who stand outside paid labour but are nevertheless incorporated structurally into the work milieus: the unemployed through their exclusion, higher education students through their efforts to gain a higher entry position through the accumulation of cultural capital.

Building on these two dimensions, I developed a class model of the Naga youth in the second section which includes eleven theoretical classes. This model depicts the contemporary configuration of both dimensions and has therefore only a time-specific analytical value. Nevertheless, it is crucial for understanding the relative weight of the theoretically defined classes and allows the further analysis of the process of class formation and change.

In the third section, I aimed to trace the processes of class production and reproduction. The theoretical focus was on two different strands of class formation: class reproduction through social origin and class formation through symbolic and place-based inequalities. For social origin, I first included both parent's education level and work class, leading to differentiated class models for both fathers and mothers. Surprisingly, only mother's education level appeared significantly connected to class position, but only with respect to the vertical dimension of income. As an outcome, the preliminary analysis could not confirm the thesis of class reproduction.

The *first model* looked at the unemployed. I showed that social origin cannot explain the likelihood of unemployment. Age as well as the place of residence are significant explanations for the chance to be unemployment and the combined model can account for up to 23% of the variance. Even though the interaction of inequalities shows a significantly improved explanation of unemployment, the improvement is rather weak and requires more research.

*Table 4.12* Ordinal logistic regression models for income class

| | *Model I SO* | | | *Model II SO + SI* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *Estimate* | *SE* | *Sig* | *Estimate* | *SE* | *Sig* |
| *Threshold (Base= >50.000)* | | | | | | |
| Income <20.000 | −2.978 | 1.014 | 0.003 | 0.539 | 1.560 | 0.730 |
| Income 20.000–50.000 | −0.563 | 0.992 | 0.570 | 3.413 | 1.576 | 0.030 |
| *Education father (base=master and above)* | | | | | | |
| Below bachelor | −0.621 | 0.567 | 0.273 | −1.006 | 0.605 | 0.096 |
| Bachelor/honours | −0.691 | 0.562 | 0.219 | −1.064 | 0.592 | 0.072 |
| *Education mother (base=master and above)* | | | | | | |
| Below bachelor | −1.780* | 0.780 | 0.022 | −1.053 | 0.826 | 0.203 |
| Bachelor/honours | −1.683* | 0.833 | 0.043 | −1.013 | 0.900 | 0.260 |
| *Place of birth (base=city)* | | | | | | |
| Village | −0.506 | 0.375 | 0.177 | −0.728 | 0.419 | 0.082 |
| Town | −0.362 | 0.328 | 0.271 | −0.338 | 0.372 | 0.363 |
| *Work class father (base=cultivation)* | | | | | | |
| Private | −0.270 | 1.028 | 0.793 | −0.298 | 1.077 | 0.782 |
| Government | 0.933 | 0.593 | 0.115 | 0.968 | 0.652 | 0.138 |
| Business | 1.149 | 0.723 | 0.112 | 0.952 | 0.793 | 0.230 |
| Church | 0.503 | 0.765 | 0.511 | 0.227 | 0.826 | 0.783 |
| Politics | 1.683* | 0.810 | 0.038 | 1.414 | 0.862 | 0.101 |
| *Work class mother (base=cultivation)* | | | | | | |
| Private | −0.186 | 1.071 | 0.862 | 0.450 | 1.122 | 0.689 |
| Government | −1.143 | 0.607 | 0.059 | −0.568 | 0.652 | 0.384 |

(*Continued*)

*Table 4.12* (Continued)

| | *Model I SO* | | | *Model II SO + SI* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Variable* | *Estimate* | *SE* | *Sig* | *Estimate* | *SE* | *Sig* |
| Business | −0.396 | 0.888 | 0.656 | −0.906 | 1.072 | 0.398 |
| Household | −0.874 | 0.565 | 0.122 | −0.363 | 0.608 | 0.551 |
| Church | 0.349 | 0.788 | 0.658 | 1.154 | 0.832 | 0.165 |
| *Age* | | | | 0.136*** | 0.037 | 0.000 |
| *Place of residence (base=city outside)* | | | | | | |
| Village Nagaland | | | | −0.908 | 0.710 | 0.201 |
| Town Nagaland | | | | −0.957* | 0.446 | 0.032 |
| City Nagaland | | | | −1.359*** | 0.364 | 0.000 |
| *Education level (base=master and above)* | | | | | | |
| Below bachelor | | | | −0.554 | 0.591 | 0.349 |
| Bachelor/honours | | | | −0.453 | 0.316 | 0.152 |
| *Gender (base=Male)* | | | | | | |
| Female | | | | −0.689* | 0.333 | 0.038 |
| *Model tests* | | | | | | |
| Model improvement ($Chi^2$) | | *24.739* | | | *62.742*** | |
| Nagelkerke R2 | | 0.122 | | | 0.293 | |
| Cox & Snell R2 | | 0.106 | | | 0.252 | |
| Classification correlation (Kendal's tau-b) | | 0.236** | | | 0.353** | |

* Significance level $\alpha \leq 0.05$;
** Significance level $\alpha \leq 0.01$;
*** Significance level $\alpha \leq 0.001$

The *second model* tested the influence of both theoretical explanations on the chance to work in a government job rather than in the two categories of the private sector. Both social origin and symbolic inequalities improve the explanatory power of the model significantly: the work class of the father remains significant in both the reduced and the complete model, showing a positive influence of father's government and church employments in the reduced, and only a positive influence of his church employment in the complete model as significant explanations for a government job. Of the second theoretical strand, only the place of residence has a highly significant impact: living in a town or, to a lesser degree in a city, enhances the chance to work in a government job considerably. Both explained variance (up to 29%) and classification results (improved by 15.6%-points) show a comparatively good explanatory value of the model.

Finally, the *third model* looked at the question which factors contribute to belonging to a higher income class. For the model, I adopted an ordinal logistic regression approach in accordance with the nature of the income hierarchy. Regarding social origin, the model improvement was insignificant. Of the variables, mother's education was the only significant explanation, as expected from the previous analyses. If we take the variables of symbolic and place-based inequalities into account, however, this influence ceases to be significant: age, place of residence and surprisingly gender now appear as significant influences on the height of income, and the power of fathers' education has turned out to be on the same par as the mothers, though not significant on the decided level. Being older, male and living outside Nagaland contributes to higher income, while especially living in the cities and town of Nagaland correlates with lower income in return. Again surprisingly, education level has no influence on the income level. The previously established correlations have proved to be insignificant if we control for other influences. Under the surface, the traditional inequalities as well as the position of the place of residence in the larger economic structure of India are statistically connected to a large degree of income differences.

## Notes

1 Both full and part-time work was considered, those engaging only in household work and those who did not answer the question on work status (total n = 17) were filtered out, as well as a single cultivator (n = 1). Despite the focus on the urban youth and the small number of village residents, I decided to keep this category as an indicative contrast to the largely urban sample.

2 Cramer's V can vary between 0 (no association) and 1 (perfect association). Due to cell numbers below 5, Monte Carlo Simulation was used to determine significance numerically rather than using usual asymptotic *p*-values that are problematic in these cases. Calculation based on Monte Carlo Simulation, using 1,000,000 samples and starting seed 1487459085, n = 455, $p < 0.0005$.
3 According to (Acton and Miller 2009, p. 150), adjusted standardised residuals below –2 or above 2 deserve our attention, as the reveal significant contributions to chi-square statistics.
4 Kendal's tau-c is a symmetric non-parametric test for rank correlations, which can take values between –1 (perfect negative correlation) through 0 (no correlation) to 1 (perfect positive correlation). Kendal's tau has the advantage that it is statistically robust and can be directly interpreted as the probability of observing concordant or discordant pairs. Compared to e.g. Gamma, Kendal's tau is more conservative by accounting for ties in the data, while Gamma values are usually higher and are based solely on concordant and discordant pairs without taking ties into account (Conover 1980).
5 Calculations based on Monte Carlo Simulation with 1,000,000 samples and starting seed 1149983241. * indicates significance level $\alpha \leq 0.1$, ** significance level $\alpha \leq 0.05$ and *** significance level $\alpha \leq 0.01$.
6 The relevant coefficient Kendal's tau-b is merely 0.094. Here, Kendal's tau-b is used for square-shaped cross-tables instead of tau-c, which is better for quadrangular tables.
7 p-values are 0.129 for both indicators.
8 Valid n = 456, p = 0.008 using Monte Carlo Simulation based on 1,000,000 sampled tables, starting seed 303130861.
9 Calculation based on Monte Carlo Simulation with 1,000,000 samples, starting seed 2000000 for fathers, and 1502173562 for mothers. Both Cramer's V are not significant on significance level $\alpha \leq 0.01$.
10 Calculation based on Monte Carlo Simulation with 1,000,000 samples, starting seed 307647058 for both fathers and mothers for income class, 251863758 for work class. Only Cramer's V for mothers' education and income class is significant on level $\alpha \leq 0.01$.
11 Calculation based on Monte Carlo Simulation with 1,000,000 samples, starting seed 92208573 for fathers, and 562334227 for mothers for youth class, 307647058 for both parents and youth income class and 1487459085 for both parents for youth work class. All six Cramer's V are not significant on significance level $\alpha \leq 0.01$.
12 $F = 8.846$, $p < 0.0005$.
13 Calculation based on Monte Carlo Simulation, using 1,000,000 samples and starting seed 1122541128, n = 423 and $\alpha \leq 0.001$.
14 Calculation based on Monte Carlo Simulation with 1,000,000 samples and starting seed 1122541128.
15 Calculation based on Monte Carlo Simulation, using 1,000,000 samples and starting seed 1122541128, n = 415 and $\alpha \leq 0.001$.
16 Kendall's tau-c with –0.025 and $p = 0.540$.
17 Minimum value for both indicators is 0, but Cox & Snell R Square cannot reach 1, while Nagelkerke R Square can. The range between both values

can be interpreted as the range of explained variance of the dependent variable (Acton and Miller 2009, p. 262).

18 Backhaus sees values above 0.2 as acceptable, above 0.4 as good as a rule of thumb, though it is difficult to generalise them.

19 Classification correlation was computed by Kendall's tau-b rank correlation between observed and predicted categories.

# 5 Career patterns

Having discerned relevant historical, cultural and socio-structural macro-structures that form the context of social life in Nagaland, this chapter zooms in on the micro-perspective of individual life-courses. Compared to the relatively stable macro-structures that change rather slowly and often gradually, individual lives of young Nagas exhibit a great complexity with many breaks and turning points. This chapter shows that this defining experience of insecurity towards the future differentiates this generation from their parents' generation, where the choices were largely between a life as a cultivator or, if higher education was available, to become a government servant; it also distinguishes them from e.g. German youth of the same age, where strongly institutionalised life-courses and a resulting greater match between expectations and possibilities are still the rule.

Analysing life-courses sociologically implies to abstract from concrete individual experiences and to distil common patterns and common aspirations from subjective reflections on past, present and future life. The aim is not to disregard the individuality of lives, but to show how social contexts shape and influence life-courses in specific and often systematic ways. Just as primary education or growing up within a family engaged in cultivation are indeed experienced individually, these experiences share many commonalities that allow people to engage in vivid conversations about them – even though they happened in geographically or temporarily distant places.

I first introduce the descriptive, formal approach to the analysis of life-course patterns that focusses on the level of a "sequence". This approach is then applied to the transition into and within the work sphere, using the life-course interviews of nineteen Naga youths as data source. The second section introduces the interpretative, typological "documentary method" that looks at the events and orientations giving shape to these sequences and sequence patterns and exemplifies

the analysis. The third section establishes four major types of orientation patterns. In the last section, I explore the connections between the sequence pattern and orientations on the one side, and the macro-structures of work milieu and social origin on the other. The aim is to see whether there are specific correlations between these levels and to gain insight into the dynamics and causes of class formation.

## Sequence pattern and orientation frames

The questions guiding the first section of this chapter are twofold. First, which different types of post-educational trajectories can be found in the sample? Second, what do these types show about the organisational structures and inter-linkages of the work milieus? What are the units of analysis when investigating a life-course?

Glenn Elder's distinction between institutionally regulated phases, transitions between phases and turning points is the starting point (Glen Holl Elder 1985). Unlike regulated and institutionalist features of the life-course, turning points mark a change in the objective direction of the trajectory. These transitions include normativities concerning the form of the life-course itself. In order to investigate this question empirically, life trajectories can first be described objectively in the form of typical pathways or phase structures. In a second step, they can be evaluated concerning their importance for class formation and social inequality, as well as their relation to socially shared orientation and interpretation pattern that make it possible to account for the normativities that underlie these objective pathways. For all theoretically defined perspectives, the transition into the work sphere is of special importance for understanding inequality in capitalism.

### *Sequence pattern*

One can only agree with Karl Ulrich Mayer's and Richard A. Settersen's sobering conclusion that "the measurement of age, age structuring, and the life course have become more problematic as the study of human lives has moved toward more detailed analyses and explanations" (Settersten and Mayer 1997, p. 255). Reinhold Sackmann and Matthias Wingens have therefore proposed to use a formal typology for robust descriptions of transition patterns rather than aiming for complete life-courses. They propose to focus on the intermediate realm between events and life-courses – the "sequence". A sequence is "any life-course movement that includes at least two transitions between states (in a given state space). Thus, a sequence is more than a single

transition, but less than a whole trajectory" (Sackmann and Wingens 2003, p. 96). Six basic sequence types can be differentiated using this definition from Table 5.1 (ibid., p. 98). Sackmann and Wingens point out that this model should be used as a heuristic methodological tool that "can and must be adapted to specific research questions" (ibid., p. 108). Similarly, it must be remembered that a sequence is itself part of a larger trajectory, carrying the history as well as the future expectations of an actor within it (ibid., p. 109).

While "rupture" does not really represent a true sequence but rather a "borderline case" (ibid., p. 97) that represents the *archetypical industrialised career*, interruption and change differ in whether a change returns to the initial state completely, or not. The other three states, "bridge", "return" and "fusion" are special in that they exhibit "combined states" that are ambivalent with respect to the end state. Combined states relate both to ambiguity on the subjective as well as on the institutional level: Sackmann and Winges refer specifically to part-time work, maternal leave and the German apprenticeship system (a combination of education and on-the-job training) as typical examples in the economic realm (ibid., p. 102f). The difficulty to copy e.g. the German apprenticeship system to the United States of America and Great Britain show at the same time the localised nature of institutional orders Dirk Konietzka pointed out. Institutionalised sequence patterns depend both on the practical milieu in its historical situation as well as its structural relationships with other milieus.

Methodologically, the analysis of transitions and sequences requires first a definition of the possible states, the *state space*, referring to the position or attribute an actor can exhibit (e.g. single, divorced, married, etc.), and between which transitions (marriage, divorce) can therefore exist (ibid., p. 95). These states are defined by the research

*Table 5.1* Sequence typology considering two transitions

| | *Sequence type* | *Formal notation* |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Rupture | A → B |
| 2 | Interruption | A → B → A |
| 3 | Change | A → B → C |
| 4 | Bridge | A → AB → B |
| 5 | Return | A → AB → A |
| 6 | Fusion | A → B → AB |
| 7 | Freeze | A → AB → AB# |
| 8 | Mishap | A → AB → C |

*Table 5.2* Work milieu states

| *Higher education/training* | *Government* | *Private* | *Unemployed* | *Business* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | C | D | E | F |

question but are similarly restricted by the legal and social institutions of a society (ibid., p. 95). In order to arrive at a more substantial typology of post-educational sequences, this purely formal system must be combined with a characterisation of states according to the context in question (Fournier and Bujold 2005, p. 418). Table 5.2 shows the coding of states that was used to denote membership in a specific work class. Taking work class as the first dimension, a second – temporal – dimension traces the pathways that lead the subjects through these states. The work class can be represented in this formal system by the letters indicating the states, *A* representing the initial stage of education. As my research focusses on those who already finished their studies, only the states after graduation are of interest here.

### *Post-educational sequence pattern*

The variation of post-educational sequence patterns within the qualitative sample of nineteen subjects is surprisingly high. In the cases which involved strings of several sequences, priority was given to the last sequence. Four out of the eight patterns considered could be found empirically: "return" and "mishap" sequences did not exist at all, in two cases "interruption" sequences were only intermediate steps in a larger "change" sequence pattern. I joined "freeze" and "bridge" patterns together as they represent in fact only two versions of a bridging pattern between two states. In all cases, the interruption was caused by a temporary return to education or training phases. Concerning the quantitative aspect, the empirical range was between one and six transitions, though almost all sequence patterns consisted of three or less transitions. All work classes were represented in the sample with a minimum of three cases, which allowed me to display a certain variance of pathways that can be connected to the work classes.

Table 5.3 shows the distribution of the cases in the "objective space" of post-educational sequence patterns. Cases cluster on certain positions, while some cells remain empty. In case of the combined states "fusion" and "freeze", each state was counted as an empirical case rather than forcing a subject into one category. As the sequence pattern is of major interest here, I use it as the primary dimension for the

*Table 5.3* Post-educational sequence pattern and states

| *Sequence type* | *Present state* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *C* | *D* | *E* | *F* |
| Rupture | DF3, DF2, DM1 | CF5 | BF1, CF4 | | CM3 |
| Change | | BM3, BM2, BM1 | | CM8, CM7 | |
| Fusion | | CF8, BM4 | CM4, CF1, CM10 | | CM4, CF1, CF8, BM4, CM10 |
| Freeze/ bridge | CF3, CM1 | | CF3 | CM1, BM2 | |

description of the empirical types, while the present states are used to discern the subtypes, if applicable. After describing the empirically founded types, I will discuss briefly the occurrence of turning points and their importance for understanding the transitions between the states and the milieus in general.

### *Turning points and milieu linkages*

This formal typification of sequence patterns aimed to reduce the complexity of life-courses within the realm of work through the formalisation of sequences described by Sackmann and Wingens. The distinction between transition patterns and states is crucial for this analysis, though in the process the importance of turning points also became apparent. In many cases, the stability in the formal pattern appears in hindsight as the result of decisions under high insecurity that could have disrupted the course of events; in others, a smooth transition involved rather fortunate turning points. Altogether, there are not many sequence patterns that follow objectively and subjectively direct transitions into the aspired state. Without these additional dimensions, it became clear that a purely formal description of sequence pattern remains unsatisfactory if implicit orientations and explicit motives of the life-course are not taken into consideration. Indeed, the same sequence pattern may be caused by rather different circumstances and intentions. The typification into rupture, change, fusion and bridge nevertheless provides us with hints towards the importance of turning points as well as the relative stability of milieus and the transitions between them.

Turning points can be distinguished between enabling or disrupting, depending on their impact on transitions. Enabling turning points, like a job appointment through connections, passing relevant exams for jobs or scholarships are enabling a transition into a stable phase that is in line with subjective orientations and aspirations. However, turning points are often experienced negatively. Most of the disruptive turning points are caused by personal circumstances like health problems, unwanted pregnancy, sickness and death of family members, especially parents. In most cases, these events lead people to give up jobs and, if situated outside the state, a long-time return to the home state without a "plan" for how to go on. While the private realm of the family gains superiority over the work sphere for a considerable amount of time, it was surprising that the decision to give up the private work life appeared beyond question for all the interviewees in my sample. Though the economic sphere is given major importance, it is the family and the duties related to it that is accorded priority over other social spheres and forms of commitment.

Concerning the inter-linkage of milieus, there is a clear distinction between government and private realms. Whether government or higher education, transitions are highly formalised through a system of clearly defined exams that regulate the entry into the separate institutions that operate rather autonomously in these milieus, especially in education. "Examination" is a central "cultural process" (Michelle Lamont) in this sphere, and it is surprising that the myriad of exams, their acronyms as well as those of the titles and positions they allow access to are household names in every village. This dispersed cultural process is complemented trough the highly centralised process of "reservation", which is standardised within the whole government and education milieu. This process involves defined symbolic infrastructures. "Quotas" reserve 15% of seats for "Scheduled Castes", 7.5% to "Scheduled Tribes" and 27% for "Other backward Classes", besides giving between 5–10% "relaxation" of aggregate marks and 3–5 years of "age relaxation" in the age limit for writing exams for government posts. On the other hand, the field of studies or even the degree level were hardly mentioned as important requirements for entering an occupation, except for employment as university teachers.[1]

Another finding is that specific work milieus like health and law are more strongly regulated than other work milieus and have established their own entry criteria, such as the practice period required for being registered as an advocate. Unlike these closely related milieus, the private sector is hardly regulated at all. While private employment is gained through processes ranging from interviews to personal

connections, starting a business – at least in the non-organised sector – has hardly any restrictions. As the examples showed, people easily switch between a vast variety of business fields in a short time. This shows that the level of professionalism and internal division of labour, but also the legal restrictions of taking up enterprises are very low. Having a business is seen by some as the final state of their work career. Private jobs, especially in the area of education, are almost always seen only as an intermediate step on the way to a life-long government employment. Unemployment, on the other side, is hardly regulated by the state and was experienced as a private matter. Unemployment is basically delegated to the families, though the government has started to introduce intermediate "bridge states" in form of trainings that aim to prepare for jobs in the private sector. This scheme however contradicts the direction of the general sequence pattern from private to government employment. Though private employment is in most cases an objectively stable state, this does not apply to the subjective evaluations and practical orientations, which will be analysed in the next section.

## Major types of career patterns

### *The "documentary method" of interpretation*

In the previous section, we saw that there is a profound distinction between the state and the market when it comes to the transition between them as work milieu. On the other side of the continuum, we find self-employment or entrepreneurship, which is characterised by a large frequency of changes not only in entering and leaving the milieu, but similarly about the business taken up within. Similarly, unemployment is hardly regulated by the state, though some training programmes are provided by the state to encourage private employability. However, it appears that for most of the youth private employment is only an intermediate step of the occupational career.

Though the identification of post-educational transition sequences has shed some light on the dynamics and interrelations of life-courses and occupational milieus, we do not know yet what *drives* these career sequences. What are the subjective reasons and practical orientations that lead to these trajectories? And how are they connected to the sequence types, the work milieu and, finally, to social origin?

Quantitative analysis of cultural milieus in chapter 3 showed already that the aspirations to work for the church or in politics are closely connected to high activity in and discursive attachment to these

specialised work milieus, whereas government and private job aspirations are very common and characterise the popular milieu. They reveal the average correspondence between aspirations and milieus and by their very nature cannot account for the temporal or spatial complexities in the relation between work class and aspirations, and especially the practical orientations that become visible during milieu transitions. The aim of this exploratory chapter is therefore to develop hypotheses about drivers of social inequality on the individual level and link them to classes, cultural and work milieus. For the reconstruction of action-guiding orientations, I follow the general methodological principles of the "documentary method":

1 Focus on practical orientations
2 Typification by constant comparison
3 Interpretative explanation through "grounding" orientation patterns in "experiential realms"

### *Practical orientations*

Theoretically, the concept of "practical orientations" builds on the constitutive difference between communicative knowledge (*knowing what*) and conjunctive knowledge (*knowing how*). Explicit descriptive or explanatory statements have no deeper theoretical meaning in this perspective. Ralf Bohnsack refers the typifications of motives, or "orientation *schemes*", to common sense on the one hand, and institutionalised, objectified and normative social action on the other (Bohnsack 2013, p. 245). Instead, he regards "habitualised" action or "orientation *frames*" as more fundamental: "this existential reality of action-guiding, implicit stocks of knowledge are rooted deeper than the reality of the institutions, roles and norms" (ibid., p. 247). While the concept of "orientation *pattern*" includes both "schemes" and "frames", Bohnsack's analytical priority is clearly on the side of the "practical frames".

### *Typification*

The typification process of the "Documentary Method" is best described by contrasting it with the classic Weberian approach. Udo Kelle and Susann Kluge have outlined a general methodology for qualitative social scientific typologies building on Weber's differentiation between objective and subjective meaning (2010). It starts by defining a multidimensional space of selected attributes, which restricts

the theoretically conceivable combinations of attributes (see also: Kluge 2000, paragraph 3). In a second step, empirical coincidences and regularities between these dimensions are defined according to the principle of maximum internal homogeneity and maximum external heterogeneity; these regularities provide the empirical foundation for types according to Weber's "objective meaning" (ibid., paragraph 8). In a last step, meaningful relationships between these attributes that are explicated by interviewees need to be examined; their subjective meaning forms the "basis of the empirically founded groups and/or combinations of attributes" (ibid., p. 9). Though this sequence can iteratively lead to the discovery of new attribute dimensions, theoretical pre-knowledge and sample design have a large influence on the derived types and restrict the theoretically defined "space of possibilities".

Documentary interpretation starts from the opposite side, the subjective meaning or "communicative knowledge" of interviewees. In sharp contrast to the Weberian method, this level of meaning has no direct importance for the typification process. After starting with the "formulating interpretation" of subjective meaning, which is thought to operate on the level of "common sense", the method proceeds to the *reflecting*, or "documentary interpretation". This second step intends to reconstruct the action-guiding orientation frames that are central for explaining social action. The "documentary meaning" is accessible by a constant comparison of *how* different actors approach a similar situation (Schäffer 2012; Nohl 2010). By contrasting empirical cases, the researcher tries to reconstruct the "rules" behind their practices, following the logical figure of "abductive reasoning".

Abductive reasoning was established by Charles S. Pierce as a third way of drawing inferences, besides the well-known forms of deductive and inductive reasoning (cf. Bohnsack 2003, p. 564). Differing from Peirce, who saw abductive conclusions as products of chance, the "Documentary Method" regards methodically controlled comparisons as a social scientific way to arrive at empirically grounded typological inferences. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that abduction does not produce "valid" results, but is a "rather risky" operation, since it concludes from a known quantity (result) to two unknowns (rule and case) by a "mental leap" (Reichertz 2009, paragraph 16).

### *Discourses and relational typologies*

For the analysis of practice-guiding orientation patterns among the Naga youth, the "documentary method" provides a novel approach

that has however been largely restricted to German sociology. For this study, I like to make two amendments to the method. First, as exemplified with the concepts of practice, aspiration and discourse, there should not be any strict boundary between what can be articulated and what not, as both symbolic and practical "spheres" are deeply interwoven. From the point of discourse analysis, the neglect of communicative knowledge in the documentary method is based on a simplified perception of the inter-discursive sphere (Diaz-Bone 2006). Empirically, this assumption presumes symbolic homogeneity that cannot be sustained in the face of more than twenty indigenous languages as well as strong influences of English, Hindi and the creole market language Nagamese. Furthermore, these languages are related to specific socio-cultures and milieus rather than being an independent realm, an interpretation supported by the observation that most people are multilingual. The assumption of an overarching "common sense" that is fundamentally different from and in opposition to implicit knowledge is hence replaced by an appreciation of the diversity of symbolic discourses and their relevance for practical milieus.

The second amendment concerns Bohnsack's idea that an existential realm has a genetic relation to a specific "orientation frame". This argument mirrors the logic of simple regression analysis by assuming that variables have the same influence on the whole sample – only in a qualitative manner. This disregards the temporal and causal complexity (Rihoux and Ragin 2008, cf.) of the emergence of orientation pattern, though qualitative analysis is specifically suited for this kind of complex analysis. Empirical work by Nohl and his colleagues recently confirmed that orientation frames cannot always be referred to an established social context (Nohl and Ofner 2010, p. 248) and a common historical event can be experienced in different ways and lead to different reactions to it (Nohl 2013, p. 49).

For the purpose of this study, "experiential realm" refers to the theoretical concepts of (historical) socio-cultures. "Relational types" are more flexible and refer to typified relations between (present) milieus, classes, career sequence patterns and orientations. This distinction makes it possible to account for the observation that some current practices (eating habits, church service, gender divisions) are firmly rooted in a specific socio-culture, while others are "imported" and historically thin (e.g. watching films, listening to rock music), include hybridised forms of old and new practices (e.g. students' union activity, Christian rock bands, "Nagawood" films etc.) and form stable relations with specific class positions or orientations.

### *Orientations in the work sphere*

In the following, I present a relational typology of work orientations as the central outcome of qualitative analysis. It is based on the orientations my interviewees exhibited towards their work-related biography, their current situation and the ways they orient themselves towards future work life. The overall aim was to find the underlying orientation that allows the researcher to understand why the individual pathways were taken rather than those observed by others. In the course of analysis, it became clear that work orientations cannot simply be deduced from the past, the current position nor from career sequence pattern. Rather, sequence patterns are the result of different combinations of career orientations and life events like dramatic turning points and stable phases. On the other hand, similar orientations might lead to rather different positions and pathways if they started from different social positions. Therefore, all four theoretical perspectives (milieu, class, orientation pattern and sequence) add a different aspect to the overall understanding and explanation of the production of social inequality among the Naga youth.

My interest in the interviews was specifically how my interviewees deal with the structural biographical openness through specific future orientations. How do these orientations shape the specific life-courses and contribute towards arriving in the present situation? What is their role in dealing with the present, in interpreting it and in structuring the outlook into the future? How are orientations in other social milieus and spheres related to work orientations?

The direct comparison of cases has shown that there exist differences not only regarding the orientation pattern, but similarly with regard to the interpretation pattern, resources and turning points that are encountered within the single life-courses. Orientation frames consist of two closely related dimensions. First, the dimension of orientation pattern, which refers to the "way" or "style" the work life is approached. This dimension resembles most closely Bourdieu's habitus concept, especially the dimension of the "way of being". Second, the dimension of the orientation towards the future. Future orientation refers to the temporal dimension of the work life, including both temporal reach and "clarity of vision". Orientation frames assume a procedural form rather than embodying a specific content that is stable over time; therefore, I do not make strong claims about their duration in time but turn their stability into an empirical question.

Empirically, these two dimensions were closely connected and made it possible to distinguish between the orientation frames of

"meritocratic planning", "pragmatic proactive/reactive", "interest-led exploring" and "resigned redirecting". Along with these two major dimensions, additional analytical dimensions were considered for the relational typification process. They include central formative cultural processes, dominant milieu-based ethos, dominant interpretation pattern as well as specific spatial arrangements and migration ranges. However, not all these additional dimensions were important for every type.

Table 5.4 shows how the different orientation types relate to the life-course sequence and the present work class(es). This cross-tabulation was used both as a methodical device and a way to present the outcome in a constant hermeneutic circle of multi-dimensional comparison.[2]

In the following, I deal with the four major orientation types towards the work sphere. Due to spatial constraints, I present only one sequence of case comparison with maximal and minimal difference. Beyond the methodological elaboration, this example might nevertheless provide the reader with a clear idea of how the method is practically applied. A detailed step-by-step description of this process has been recently published in English by Arndt-Michael Nohl as a first introduction of the method to the English-speaking academic audience (Nohl 2010).

Starting with a question on childhood experiences, the interviews progressively targeted the theme of my research from different angles,

*Table 5.4* Career types

| *Sequence type* | *Orientation pattern* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Meritocratic planning* | *Pragmatic reactive/ proactive* | *Interest-led exploring* | *Resigned redirecting* |
| Rupture | CF5 (C), DF2 (B), DF3 (B) | BF1 (C) | DM1 (B) | |
| Change | BM3 (C), BF2 (C) | BM1 (C), CM1 (EB), CM8 (E) | CM3 (F) | CM7 (E), CF4 (D) |
| Fusion | | CM4 (DF), CF1 (DDF), CF8 (DC), BM4 (CF), CM10 (DF) | | |
| Freeze/ bridge | CF3 (DB) | | | BM2 (E) |

Work States are: Higher Studies/ Training (B), Government Service (C), Private Employment (D), Unemployed (E), Business (F).

before turning finally towards specific questions concerning present discourses, opinions and argumentations. By taking the whole biography into account, I also aimed to gain knowledge of turning points and special occasions that had a lasting influence on their life. Though it is not the thematic focus here, this biographical approach was very useful for getting knowledge about both "objective" biographical events and the orientation patterns that guided their perception and response to these events.

*Naro's transition sequence*

In one of the first interviews, Naro,[3] a PhD student living in New Delhi, narrated how it happened that she is going for higher studies at a reputed university. During the interview in the room of a friend of mine, she narrates her transition in the following passage:

> *I:* and how did it happen that you that you came to [university]?
> *R:* aeh [university] coming to [university] is a blessing, from my god ((laughing)), I (.) see (.) after my, when i passed out, when i was taking my BA finals, ah=aehm the family (.) situation, financial condition was such that you know?, i had to either get into [university] or go home, na? [I:mhm] it was really tight. [I:mhm] so i struggled, and i worked a lot for (.) in- my b a also, so i still remember (.) friends (.) taking notes from me and even my juniors, and two three aft-, [I:mhm] when i was in m a i saw my notes with some (.) other guys in BA, [I:mhm] you know then? so even after two three years they were still using my notes (.) so, maybe, i (.) god help those who help themselves no? so ya (.) i could, i stuck here i got into [university].
>
> (DF2 [6796:7611], PhD student, female, 26 years, New Delhi)

The interpretation process in the documentary method starts with the *formulating* interpretation. Reformulating the semantic content of the sequence in one's own words is a way to gain distance from the empirical material and to avoid the imposition of one's presuppositions. Especially in crucial sequences this is a helpful technique to differentiate *what* is being said from the *reflective* interpretation and its focus on *how* it is being said.

This sequence deals with the theme of coming to the university in New Delhi, where she is pursuing her PhD at that moment. Naro

describes her coming to the university as a fortunate event, for which she gives credit to "her god". By the time she was finishing her graduation, the family had financial difficulties that put her into a situation that narrowed down her choices and left only two options, getting into the university where she is studying now or returning "home". In the face of this situation, she invested a lot of her energy. She recalls that friends and younger students borrowed her write-ups, which were still circulating after some years when she was already studying MA. In the end, her efforts materialised, which she attributes in a popular saying to the assistance of god to individual effort with the result that she could enter her current university.

For the reflective analysis, it is helpful to differentiate first between different text genres, as they refer to different layers of meaning for the re-constructive interpretation. The documentary method uses here Fritz Schütze's argument that narrations are more closely connected to practical experiences than evaluations and argumentations. "The experience of a direct practice of action to be reconstructed in narratives and descriptions is embedded so deeply in this practice and in the respondents' relevant knowledge and foregone conclusions that they are unable to explicate it by way of communication but can only narrate or describe it" (Nohl and Ofner 2010, p. 206). This is because narrations compel the narrator to provide details, to give a shape (e.g. a beginning and an end) to the story and to stick to the most important events of the experience only (Schütze 2003). In return, evaluations and argumentations reflect rather present theorisations about past experiences; it is "essentially abstract and therefore detached from the practice of action" (Nohl and Ofner 2010, p. 207) and hence not of direct interest to the method. However, evaluations and argumentations can tell us a lot about the level of discourse, unless we assume that there is only one universally shared symbolic world – a rather unrealistic assumption especially in post-colonial India.

This sequence starts with an evaluation ("blessing"), which is followed by a narration introduced by a break in the initial sentence ("I (.) see"). Within the narration, another narration is nested ("for (.) in-") and followed by an evaluation ("so, maybe, i (.) god"). The performative structure of the sequence is very intense, with many tonal and loudness changes as well as frequent questions that aim to reassure attention and understanding of the narration ("you know?", "na?"). This indicates already that the theme is of high subjective importance for the interviewee, though it is difficult to interpret without empirical contrasts – it could hypothetically also be a culturally rooted way of speaking. However, the emotional parts coincide with the narrative

sequences and reveal an orientation of struggle and meritocratic orientation. While it appears first that this orientation is induced by the "tight" situation, the nested narration that is introduced by "(.) in- my b a also" serves to confirm that the orientation persisted already before the situation. By detailing the circulation of her notes – ("even after two three years they were still using my notes") she provides evidence for her exceptionally hard work manifested in the notes she took during her BA studies, that were not replaced in the sharing circles even years after she left there. Two evaluations frame the two narrations and refer to the interpretation frame and through it to the discursive context of the present. Here, Christian discursive elements are used that themselves reveal an implicit individualist orientation pattern towards religion ("my god", "god helps those who help themselves").

### *Comparison with maximum contrasting case: Naro and Athrong*

A central insight of the documentary method is here that only the comparison with contrasting sequences from other interviews – rather than using our own, inconsiderate experiences – provides a valid background from which we can assess the meaning of a sequence. For that reason, it is best to start the comparative process with a maximum contrasting case. A strong difference can be seen in the following interview with Athrong, 34, a male unemployed from Kiphire town. Visiting him along with some of his friends, I conducted the interview in the house, while his friends were staying outside. As he told me, he went for high-school to Kohima and even went to Shillong in the North-Eastern State Meghalaya for his graduation, the most reputed city for higher education in North-East India. Asked about his return to Nagaland after finishing graduation outside the state, he narrated his coming back to Nagaland and finally to his home town, which is presented in a slightly shortened way below.

*I:* how did you decide to go to Dimapur after your BA in Guwahati?

*R:* actually i thought of (.) aeh trying aeh MA (I:mhm) but i changed my plan then and aeh i thought of taking (.) the MSC (I:mhm) (.) so i tried at [private programming school] and then (.) since im from arts background (I:mhm) all the formulas and (.) the methods are aeh basing on the science stream (I:mhm) as you know well (I:mhm) so i couldn't able to complete very well

(I:mhm) but i did software engineering course for two years (I:mhm) thats all
(1)
[after an exmanent question on the kind of degree he clarifies that it was a diploma course, not MA] I: and after that?

*R:* after that (.) i serve (.) in the society (I:mhm) (2)

*I:* so did you look for a job also in the computer area?

*R:* aeh no (.) i tried but (1) there was not that much (I:mhm) favourable (I:mhm) just a part time job (I:mhm) so (.) i thought that (.) if i do part time job (.) then i don't think i can serve my people (I:mhm) so i just left and joined this aeh social (I:mhm) ya students (1)
[on the exmanent question on his activities there, he explains that he worked in a function of the students union and making field trips. He received no income, but his activity was voluntary and he was financed by his parents during that time]

*I:* an aeh (.) can you tell me now about your current situation after resigning there (.) what are you doing now?

*R:* ya aeh doing nothing (I:mhm) these days (I:mhm) since i have already told that aeh i have contributed and rendered three years (.) so (.) now aehm (.) regretting all also (I:mhm) so aeh i thought that its time for me to (.) do for myself (I:mhm) then it doesn't mean that i have completely left my service or that i have to contribute to the society (I:mhm) but (1) fifty percent i have to think for myself (I:mhm) thats what i thought (I:mhm) (1)

(BM2 [3699:5343], unemployed, male, 34 years, Kiphire Town)

In this sequence, Athrong narrates that after finishing his BA in Guwahati, he deliberated several options, changed plans and finally decided to go for a programming course, though at the diploma level, as he later states, not the MSC he also thought about.[4] Due to his specialisation in arts, he was ill prepared for learning programming; instead, it requires pre-knowledge from the science stream, a statement for which he asks consent of the interviewee. Because of this mismatch, his performance was bad, but he was able to finish the two-year course. He then started to work for the "society". Asked about his computer diploma, he first denies that he even looked for a job. However, he then states that the job market was "unfavourable" and only offered part-time employment, remaining unclear whether he started with a

job or only looked for one. Athrong then changes to the genre of justification and explains that his decision to give up the job (now we know he was working there) was based on his wish to "serve [his] people". He subsequently joined the students' union, where he narrates that he occupied several leading positions on the tribal level and travelled a lot to different villages in that function. During this time, he was supported by his parents, as it is a voluntary position, which he resigned the year before. Asked about his situation after resignation, he answers that after three years of voluntary service, which he regrets now, he is doing "nothing". He justifies this situation by his decision to care for himself now, though he directly qualifies that it does not mean that he "completely" quit while being compelled to serve there, but only to accord half of his time for individual purposes.

The first contrast in this sequence is situated on the performative level. While Naro's interview involved concise narrations on the input questions, Athrong's answers were very short and were dominated by justifications. Though he, like Naro, thought for some time before answering a question, his voice was very low and at times he looked at the roof while talking and gesticulated showed strong mimics, giving the impression of anger and disappointment when themes related to education and work are touched. Given the contrasting case of Naro, we can see a clear difference in their orientations after graduation, though both face a difficult situation in their transition sequence – economic problems for Naro, and a difficult job market situation for Athrong. While Naro is however strictly oriented towards a given goal (entering the reputed university, and the prospects to get a scholarship attached to it she does not mention explicitly), Athrong is utterly disoriented, changes his goals at random and starts a course that is unrelated to his initial qualification. Naro's implicit orientation can be characterised here as clearly oriented towards a specific future, involving a high amount of "planning" and emotional attachment to that goal. In return, Athrong's implicit work orientation can be regarded as "disoriented", it is even difficult to say that he is oriented towards the work sphere during the sequence at all, since his life after graduation evolves mainly around his activity in the students' union. Even after retiring there (after internal disputes and "jealousies", as he later indicated), he sees himself still "fifty percent" involved there. During the interview, he lived at the parents' house, which indicates that they support him until now. After education, Athrong has slowly turned his overall orientation away from the labour market. He turns towards voluntary work first, from which he ultimately resigns as well and

remains doing "nothing". That was the situation in which he found himself during the time of the interview, one that he unmistakably disliked.

### *Comparison with minimum contrasting case: Naro and Tsilise*

After the first comparison we have arrived already at two typifications, "meritocratic planning" orientation on the side of Naro, and a "disoriented resigned" orientation on Athrong's side. After looking for maximum contrast, the strategy changes towards *minimal contrasts* in order to find similar cases to those contrasted before. The aim is to show that these orientations are not only individual but belong to a certain type that encompasses multiple individuals and hence refers to a more general pattern. In this respect, the interview with Tsilise from Kiphire reveals a similar orientation like that found in Naro. Tsilise, 29, a male government teacher in Kiphire district, is currently awaiting the start of his new job in a government village school. Before, he was working for two years in a private school, a work he "loved" and is a "missing part" of his life but was nevertheless experienced as "very busy" and even "beyond our capacity (.) human capacity".

*I:* so can you tell me how did you get your job?

*R:* aeh i applied my personal application (I:mhm) along enclosed with my bio data (I:mhm) and they called me for (.) an interview only within some days (.) an interview (.) in such a manner i got appointed (I:mhm)

*I:* and then you decided to change your job? How did you become government-

*R:* hm actually i didn't decide (I:mhm) aeh it was my aim that one or the other day i have to become a (.) public servant (I:mhm) especially getting the job in government (I:mhm) institution (I:mhm) so that was my aim (.) i didn't decide it (.) but since my childhood days (.) that was my aim (I:mhm) so while (.) teaching in private institution i keep on preparing for this competitive examination (I:mhm) and (.) i missed so many times (I:mhm) but aeh this current present my current job (.) my graduate teachers job (I:mhm) is through competitive examination (I:mhm) and (.) my friends they got an appointment (.) at the first declaration of the result (I:mhm) myself in the waiting list (I:mhm) after some twenty to thirty

> days (I:mhm) the government themselves they are appoint forty seven of us in general (I:mhm)
>
> (BM3 [9342:10497], government teacher, male, 29 years, Kiphire Town)

The initial answer to the question on the transition sequence into the current job is answered by Tsilise with an unequivocal description of the formalities involved in the application process for the previous private job. Following the immanent, closed question on the decision that led to the government job, he denies that a decision was involved. Rather, getting an unspecified government job has been his aim since he was young, and he repeats that no decision has been involved. He explains that during his employment as a private teacher he was constantly preparing for the exam and failed many times, but now he got his current job as a government graduate teacher through this exam. While his friends were given the job directly, he was in the waiting list and was appointed later, being one among forty-seven altogether.

Clearly, the intention of the interviewer to get to know about the present job is misunderstood at first, given that he describes explicitly what normally belongs to the generalised and institutionalised "implicit knowledge" on application practices: the sequence of a written application, involving objects like a motivation letter and an abstract summary of one's work life, followed by a personal interview. This answer is so obvious even to Europeans familiar with application practices, indicating that these transition practices are indeed standardised on a global level.

Following the next question, which uses a closed question as a trigger to the theme of interest, he is compelled to first explicate his opposition to the suggestive question ("hm actually i didn't decide"), followed by a narration that explicates the difference between having the aim and making a decision ("so that was my aim (.) i didn't decide it"). The main feature of his aim to become a ("public servant") is here that it was clear to him since his childhood. It is therefore a long-term orientation that is independent from a conscious decision that might just as well be revoked again. This sequence represents a justification and argumentation rather than a narration and is according to the documentary method therefore an interpretation frame rooted in present discourse (a "discourse of pre-ordination", probably rooted historically in a specific Christian discourse as analysed by Max Weber [1970]) and not an experiential orientation frame. After his argumentation, however, he directly provides a narration that exemplifies and details his future orientation. He invokes a persistent and meritocratic orientation towards the challenge of achieving his aim.

While for Naro the meritocratic orientation was exemplified by the quality of the "notes", it takes here the form of continuously writing the exam despite frequent failures and – as he emphasised before – the hard work load during his job as a private teacher. Both Naro and Tsilise share an orientation towards a clearly imagined future or even conscious "planning", invoking the hard work and "meritocratic orientation" that leads them to this goal. Indeed, Tsilise mentioned that he even "loved" the hard work in the private job even though it was very intense and almost unbearable.

With regard to the long-term orientation, the difference between Tsilise and Naro on the one, and Athrong on the other side, is very prominent. Athrong emphasised his changing, almost arbitrary decisions in the transition process that lead him to finally "resign" from the labour sphere altogether, replacing it by an orientation towards his work in the students' union. However, in the present state, Athrong also resigned from this work, revealing that "resignation" is for him a more general orientation, leaving him literally with "nothing" to do and disintegrated from established work practices. Besides the commonalities in work orientation that Tsilise and Naro have in common when compared to Athrong, there is a slightly different orientation between both, where another dimension – that of social relations – can be differentiated. While for Naro her transition sequence is experienced as an individual achievement that rather distinguishes her from the other students, for Tsilise his achievement is also a collective one, involving his friends as well as forty-seven other successful candidates, making him join the selected group of those who passed the exam. The very fact that he knows the exact number of those who passed, beyond his friends whom he has personal relations with, indicates that there is a strong social focus on this exam. Remembering seemingly trivial details like the total number of appointments indicates the high importance of this transition that turns the attention towards co-competitors as well as an awareness of the relatively small number of appointments. On the background knowledge that usually hundreds apply for a single post, mentioning the number shows both the meritocratic ideal and the transition into an elite group membership within the state that comes along with it.

## Typology of orientation pattern towards the labour market

In the above analysis the types of "meritocratic planning" and "resigned redirecting" could already be clearly differentiated. This differentiation and confirmation process gets refined by enlarging the

scope of comparison step by step. With every interview, possible new orientation types can emerge from the interviews, or a refinement of existing types can take place, as common properties in relevant dimensions are added or irrelevant dimensions given up in the process.

### *Type I: "meritocratic planning"*

The first type I distinguished is the "meritocratic planning" orientation frame. Meritocracy refers to the orientation pattern and is closely related to a strong work orientation, competitive cultural processes and an orientation at objectified evaluation criteria as measurements of merit. It is no surprise that the education system plays a major role in the life stories of this type, as it provides the basic experiences they build on in their later professional life. The orientation towards the future is characterised by making explicit long-term plans, driven by an orientation towards stability, security and status in the future work life. Since this type depends mainly on educational or administrative institutions, the geographical reach is on the state, and to a lesser degree on the national level: the first due to the reservation system and due to close family relations, the latter for the central state services and the education system, where the highest educated and successful can make use of the reservation quotas in these milieus – though not everyone on this level depends necessarily on the reservation policies. The main characteristics of this type are therefore a specific combination of:

1 Individualist work orientation
2 Affinity for competitive cultural processes and institutions
3 Future orientation on status and security through objectified evaluation criteria
4 High spatial autonomy and orientation on the centralist levels of state and national realm

#### *Individualist work orientation*

Interviewees with this orientation usually reported that they invested most of their time already during their childhood, into their studies. In the case of Naro, the individualist work ethic was already presented above referring to the transition sequence to university, but its roots are found even earlier, as she states:

> *R:* life (.) in [town] ya it was all about school (.) and studies (.) and the only social activity was church [I:mhm] so (.) no

that was the only thing which life evolved around (.) nothing much ya (2)

(DF2 [1545:1736], PhD student, female, 26 years, New Delhi)

To excel in studies, activities with friends often had to step back, as Tsilise, a government teacher from Kiphire district, narrates in a lengthy passage:

*R:* when we were doing our high school most of the time we used to group together we used to make a kind of a gang (I:mhm) to make our presence felt by other (.) by our other members of the school (I:mhm) most of the time we tried to do that (.) and we want to be the centre of attraction in whatever we do (I:mhm) but most of the time that tended to be a failure only (.) because we tried to be very extrovert in showing my friends how we are doing our aeh (.) i mean schooling (I:mhm) and how we are trying to get our education (.) because we tried to be very extrovert in for my personal opinion (I:mhm) we are in a group and we want to show it to other members in the school (.) that we are doing something (I:mhm) but that doesn't prove to be very much effective when it comes to the question of aeh our academic session (I:mhm) especially aeh (.) how do i explain that one (.) especially with aeh this aeh hmm (.) achieving our goal in the in the sense that aeh how to say to be excelled in our academic (.) aeh academic career (I:mhm) that was most of the time that proved to be a failure (I:mhm)

but after changing for in my personal opinion that was my personal experience (.) since that proved less effective so i tried to stay back most of the time in my room (.) to focus on my studies (I:mhm) and that proved little bit effective (I:mhm) staying keeping away from many of the friends (I:mhm) that makes me feel different from many of my friends that aeh (.) i tended to aeh (.) feel that i excelled in my studies

(BM3 [4880:7529], government teacher, 29 years, Kiphire town)

This narration shows how the end of educational merit is shared by the whole group of friends: in order to be the "centre of attraction", the "gang" tries to portrait themselves as "trying to get our education" and "doing something", which he regards as "very extrovert" and contrary to the actual experience of academic "failure". One could interpret this

first experience in such a way that though the end of the education milieu is enthusiastically taken over, the means (extrovert, expressive attitude to "make our presence felt by others") within the unit of the friends' group do not match up with the requirements of the milieu. It was only by turning himself away from the group and staying within his room that he excelled in his studies. Merit within the education milieu, one could summarise, is only possible as an individual rather than as a collective effort and requires an introvert attitude inside the room rather than an extrovert search for attention. The kind of socialisation that the school provides in order to make the students "productive" is not so much oriented towards collectivity but towards competition.

*Competitive cultural processes*

In the school, which closely echoes Michel Foucaults' (1991) analysis of typically modern "normalisation", the principle of competition, as Koheto shows, is pervasive and extends to all cocurricular activities. The basic function of the school is here first the individualisation of the students from collectivities, in order to re-organise them into "human resources productive" through competitive social relations on all dimensions. Those who were able to adapt to this competitive context often saw themselves at the top of their class, even though competition is not presented as unanimously good:

> so inside the classroom (.) aehm (.) to be honest (.) aeh(.) i was a fairly good student [I:mhm] so ah (.) but (.) our school was not very big (.) as in aehm the classroom strength was (.) say (.) like fourteen to fifteen maximum (.) you know? [I:mhm] so: aeh (.) it was (.) the competition was hm (.) competition was there (.) but it wasn't very healthy no? hm ya so the aeh teachers (.) ya (.) maybe i wasn't their favourite but then (.) they liked me (.) [I:mhm] i had always good aeh rapport with the teachers [I:mhm]
>
> (DF2 [5347:5824], PhD student, female, 26 years, New Delhi)

The principle of competition is not encountered in the whole school system. According to Imsongba's experiences, there is a strong distinction between government and private schools:

*I:* ok aehm, coming to your education aehm (.) can you tell me something about aeh your school or (.) your general education back home, when you were growing up?

*R:* aehm (.) up to my class five i went to a catholic school, [name] school in [city], and i went to government high school [city] from six to ten, and i think that was the most experiencing part of my life, because the teachers were really really good though the school was not very good, it was a government school and government schools are not considered you know (.) cool (1) but (.) the way the teachers taught us or i=if the classes were serious it was immense the learning was so big (.) and then, on i went to class- ah i went to [name] high, that was a very s- very=very strict private school (2) and were they taught me (.) one thing i never learnt in my life (.) competition ((laughing))

(DM1 [5013:6286], PhD student, 28 years, New Delhi)

Imsongba makes here the distinction on the one hand between how the schools are considered and how they are experienced by him personally. In the discourse he refers to, there is a clear hierarchy between private and government schools. Government schools are considered not "cool", and despite his rather good experiences with "immense" learning it is presented as the result of the teachers – not the school. On the second level, there is an opposition between the "very=very strict private school" that taught him "competition" (fruitlessly though, as his laughing indicates) and which contrasts sharply with the qualification of the government school, where the learning was immense only "if the classes were serious" – which was experienced by him as a possibility rather than a principle. If one were to look for the root of the competitive and meritocratic orientation among the Naga youth, the strongest candidate is certainly the private, often Christian schools.

### *Outside-orientation and objectified evaluation criteria*

The meritocratic and competitive orientation does not only require institutions that organise the social relations in a certain way, but they similarly require rules and objectified criteria that allow the classification of merit in a standardised way. Cultural processes of standardisation and evaluation (both forms of rationalisation according to Michèle Lamont (Lamont, Beljean, and Clair 2014, pp. 19–23) have gained specific importance with the rise of bureaucratic structures, as Max Weber already argued. This objectification of merit is certainly very developed in Nagaland: not only are schools openly ranked according to the merits of its students and the number of

alumni that could enter into the esteemed higher government services; similarly, students are ranked within the state according to their merit within their graduation subjects, rankings that are published state-wide involving the names and marks of all students who took part in the respective exams. In that way, students compete not only within the schools, but similarly on the state level, making statements like "being the best sociology graduate from Nagaland of the year 2015" or "my college was the second-best in Nagaland" possible at all.

Besides the schooling system, a similar objectivation and standardisation of merit is also present in the entry examinations for the higher government services, both on the state (NPSC) and the national level (UPSC). The fact that the neutrality and sincerity of these processes is frequently questioned and subject to emotional debates (Longkumer 2014; Ritse 2014; Zhoku et al. 2014) shows the importance the norms of these processes (e.g. meritocracy, equality of opportunity, transparency) hold within the Nagas. It is no surprise then that this type usually aims, certainly like many other Naga or generally Indian youths, at securing a position within the higher state services. Especially those who successfully managed to manoeuvre the educational system often prefer to stay in a related milieu with clear hierarchies and the option of a secure and projectable life-course for the future. Asen, who completed her MA in economics from a New Delhi and was about to finish her PhD at the time of the interview, expressed this orientation towards the future ostensibly when asked about how she sees her future after her studies:

*I:* how do you see your future after your studies?

*R:* don't question that ((laughing)) (.) well aehm i hope i can (.) get to work in the government service because i (.) am a little old fashioned and (.) kind of (.) not very secure about working in the corporate (I:mhm) because after all its so prone to (.) you know (.) fluctuate and because (.) you know (.) its not very secure i mean (.) no job is secure in that sense but (.) aehm (.) with this things aehm (.) with the government jobs you get that fixed pensions and everything (I:mhm) the support system is i think more secure (I:mhm) so (.) i would like to go for the government service and (.) i must be trying to make an entry into the bureaucracy but it's (.) you know (.) very tough to do that and (.) maybe out of (.) a few lakhs (.) one percent makes it so (.) i am definitely not sure about

making it so (.) if not that i could teach (I:mhm) because i have a degree from my phd so i should finish it well (I:mhm) and there is the option of teaching and all so (.) let me see (.) and in india actually entry into the government service is always based on exams (I:mhm) so basically we have to write a lot of exams (.) so i am trying to write exams and see what comes out of it (.) if not i register as a lecturer somewhere (.)

(DF3 [12354:13640], PhD student, female, 27 years, New Delhi)

Security is a major concern for this type, like many others who want to escape the deep financial insecurity in Nagaland; security is however not only the aim, but as can be seen here, is deeply entrenched into the life-course. After all, there is a backup plan to work in another work milieu in which competition is not that strong so rather than sitting for exams one just has to "register as a lecture somewhere". On the other side of the scale, there is the private economy which is presented to be "prone to [..] fluctuate" and to not be "very secure" – even though she is very well aware that with a MA degree in economy from a reputed central university the chances in the corporate world are also good, especially in the capital. However, this does not match with the ends of the "meritocratic planning" orientation.

*R:* hm (.) oh well there will be you know (.) i learned a lot more here than i would have there so (.) my friends who have done their masters from there (.) they keep on complaining (.) you know we don't have much blabla (.) and also (.) definitely i have access to a lot of things here (I:mhm) but even if i don't get things here i could even go outside in the city (.) and educationally i got good academy plus of course (.) aehm there will be more jobs definitely (.) back home its generally the government jobs and there are few in quantity (.) but here i mean in the corporate (.) you do get chance because (.) as an economist graduate (.) or masters i mean (.) there used to be placements (.) there still are i guess so (.) i did not sit for it because i was not interested but otherwise you know (.) a lot of my classmates went for corporate jobs (I:mhm) who even jobwise (.) there is more opportunity (I:mhm)

(DF3 [6654:7894], PhD student, female, 27 years, New Delhi)

The "meritocratic planning" orientation frame is not only geared by objectified criteria of merit, but is often instilled and enforced from the outside as well, as Naro narrates:

*I:* aehm (.) ok (.) back then (.) what=what were the expectations of your parents (.) towards you?

*R:* aehm (.) i (.) my maternal side i'm the young- or eldest grandchild in the family (.) so (.) and aeh (.) s- (.) that those days (.) and even now (.) the mindset is such that (.) upsc sc (.) union public service commission (.) being in the indian administrative service (.) [I:mhm mhm] is the best (.) of all (.) [I:mhm] you know? so (.) they kind of expected me to=to=to join the services (.) [I:mhm] but here i'm stuck in academics ((laughing)) and (.) ya (.) so (.) and they still expect (.) [I:mhm] but i don't know (3)

(DF2 [2284:2864], PhD student, female, 26 years, New Delhi)

It becomes very clear here that at least for the meritocratic planning orientation, the decision about the right job is not simply an individual one, nor is it the only option they are able to imagine for themselves. In the course of the interview, Naro narrates how this question has led to tensions between her, being interested in the academic stream and "being stuck" in the university and its endless possibilities for learning, and her parents, for whom government services are the only option and already wanted her to quit studies after graduation, the minimal requirement for appearing in the exams. Her future plans therefore aim to compromise between these two ends, as she reveals later when asked about her life after PhD.

*I:* ok (.) aehm (.) (4) what would you=what would you say how do you see your (.) your future (.) after (.) after phd?

*R:* hm (.) ((smiling)) what would- ok what do i see? (2) I: what are plans? plans or expectations?

*R:* ya i plan to finish my phd in three years (.) [I:mhm] and (.) i intend to have a job before i get off [university] (.) [I:mhm] you know? that's (.) ya (.) kind of trying for that (.) so i am intending to (.) i might take up the state services (.) [I:mhm] exams (.) [I:mhm] ((laughing)) i try (.) as well (.) backup sort (.) so lets see (.) but i don't mind academic stream in academics (.) [I:mhm] so (.) ya. (2)

(DF2 [14238:14819], PhD student, female, 26 years, New Delhi)

Indeed, both Asen and Naro are acutely aware of the change in values that is happening, as they locate their own orientations more within the past than in the present. This is apparent when Asen presents herself as "old-fashioned" or Naro narrates that the mindset that presents government service as the best "end" is in fact from "those days" but exists "even now", as a sort of remainder of the past. As this change is described on the level of symbolic classification but without much impact on the practice of this orientation type, it might indicate that there are changes in the hegemony of occupational discourses towards other criteria that are recognised but – confronted with the action-guiding orientation frame directed at security – is not taken over as a guiding ideology by them.

*Spatial arrangements*

To a large degree, *spatial autonomy* is of utmost importance for this group. This starts already with the educational system, where the good schools and colleges are often situated in the towns but especially in Kohima and Dimapur. Family relations in these cities can be important especially for families that do not have the resources to pay for hostels or PGs, as the private accommodations are called, which often host many students at the same time, provide for food and social control, which is very important for most of the parents in Nagaland. Due to the differentiated *quality of spaces* – following the hierarchy of the bureaucracy – this type is pulled by the centralist organisation of the Indian state. As the analysis of migration purposes already showed, it is especially education (by amount) and coaching for state exams (by amount and significance) that leads to migration on the Indian level – most of it to Delhi, where the most reputed coaching institutes and many central universities are located, especially humanities; humanities are indeed a favoured subject, both because (English) language and literature have a positive valuation in Nagaland due to Christianity, and because they are thought to be easy enough to allow parallel preparations for state exams. Except for a few, most people of this type aim to return to Nagaland ultimately. Having degrees from outside Nagaland, reservation in government jobs and ultimately the family orientation of this type favours them to be returnees after their education is over.

***Type II: "pragmatic proactive/reactive"***

The second relational type is characterised by a pragmatic orientation frame. The difference to the "meritocratic planning" orientation is the

absence of a stable pathway and a rather secure future orientation. Instead, it is focussed on the possible and options that are within direct reach, where both *ways* and *goals* are subject to reconsideration. As the name already indicates, the orientation towards the future can take either a proactive, forward-looking or a reactive, "take-it-as-it-comes" form. In both cases, there is no definite long-term goal (or one that cannot be approached directly), but rather an indefinite openness towards the future. The difference between proactive and reactive concerns the amount of energy that is put into looking for opportunities. The orientation towards the future is therefore nonetheless strong, as the ultimate end is basically to leave the present state. What distinguishes this type from the "meritocratic planning" type is its openness for multiple options – leading to a participation in several work milieus simultaneously or sequential changes between work milieus. It is no surprise then that among this type all five "fusion" sequence types are found, a sequence type where people turn to several work milieus simultaneously. The basic characteristics of this type are:

1 High work orientation and work demand from outside
2 Pragmatic flexibility and occasion-orientation with use of social networks
3 Orientation towards middle-range aims
4 Simultaneous multi-milieu work engagements
5 Highest spatial autonomy within the range determined by specific milieu

*High work orientation and work demand from outside*

Phizo's (CM10, marketing manager and entrepreneur, male, 32, Dimapur) way of life exemplifies to a strong degree the pragmatic proactive orientation type. We met on a late evening in Dimapur in the house where he stays during the week, before going back to Kohima for the weekend. The house is an old farmhouse in the outskirts, wooden and without power back-up, and Phizo just arrived from having food at his relatives' after a long day of work – rather unusual for Nagas and the importance they usually accord to regular meals. Sometimes, when the work gets too much, he narrated, he used to skip meals, and his parents already complain that he is too involved in his job: after almost ten years as a sales and communications executive – "rather low profile" – he wanted to experience something new. Through a distant friend of his father, a "weak tie", he started in a construction company that grew quickly. Today, he is one of four managers and in

charge of marketing. Already from the early morning he starts making phone calls on the way to work. Not enough, he recently took a loan and invested in a franchise for leadership training in schools within Nagaland, where he employs already four people and plans to expand in the near future. During the week-ends, he returns to his parents in Kohima, where he builds a house, supports his church and until recently had a band together with some old friends.

The motive of a high work ethic and a high work demand in this type is, unlike the type *meritocratic planning*, not related to the sphere of studies and exams but to work experiences in the private sector. Tsilise, whose narration of competition during school was a good example for the "meritocratic" orientation, later compared the work ethos typical to the private jobs with that of the government. Since he has experiences in both work milieus, he is very aware of the difference between them and the demands they put on those working in them.

*I:* you said you were working in a private institution (.) can you tell me something about that?

*R:* working in private institution makes us feel (2) very busy (I:mhm) and comparing to government institution i haven't experienced even once after my appointment (I:mhm) i haven't joined my school in my posting place because there was null enrolment for this year (I:mhm) next year it will start but (.) i have a little experience about the government (I:mhm) job also (I:mhm) but comparing this government job and the private job (I:mhm) especially in the teaching profession (.) to be a teacher in a private institution makes an (.) individual very busy throughout the day (I:mhm) the workload is (.) too much sometimes we feel that it is beyond our capacity human capacity to do that (I:mhm) [. . .] being in a teaching profession makes one (.) i would say twenty-four seven busy (1)

(BM3 [7949:9341], government teacher, male, 29 years, Kiphire Town)

Tsilise describes the work ethos of "private institutions" as "making us feel (2) very busy", a condition that lasts "throughout the day" and "makes one (.) i would say twenty-four seven busy". This is described as a general condition ("us", "one") of private institutions in the "teaching professions", certainly one of the largest in Nagaland. These high work demands are experienced by him as "beyond our capacity

(.) human capacity to do that" – one reason being a new regulation by the government, which is not described in detail. It is interesting here that the strong distinction between private and government education institutions is maintained throughout the passage, where the increased workload for teachers by the introduction of the "CCE" policy by the Indian government appears to only affect private institutions. The *demand* for a high work orientation appears to arise mainly from the private economic milieu, a hypothesis that is also confirmed by Asang's narration about his previous job at an accessory company in New Delhi, which he later had to quit due to health problems.

*I:* what exactly were the things you were doing there?
*R:* i think i really i did everything [I: laughing] i was like intern plus (.) everything (.) assistant (.) i did the photographing of the (I:mhm) clothes (.) i made the invoices (I:mhm) i sent emails (.) and made calls (.) i went to meetings with my boss (I:mhm) just everything (.) he let me do that (I:mhm) i had no idea about it (.) i was just (.) following him blindly (I:mhm) (2) it was (.) it was actually very hectic (I:mhm) i have to get up seven in the morning (.) go there (.) and change like two metros (.) and take a bus (I:mhm) and then another rickshaw (I:mhm) and then i reach the office (I:mhm) by the time i reached (.) i feel like drained [all laughing] (1)
*I:* and how did you like the job (.) like generally?
*R:* it was a nice job actually (I:mhm) but the stress was too much (I:mhm) going at meeting everything (I:mhm) so (.) i think my health got like- (I:mhm) so i quit the job (1)
*I:* you had to quit because of the-
*R:* ya (.) very hectic (.) i don't know like that aeh caps accessories and all (I:mhm) ya that will be like the (.) best job ever i think (I:mhm) because it had so much promise (I:mhm) i wish i could (.) i was doing that right now (.) rather than sitting around at home (I:mhm) (2)

(CM7 [2104:3382], unemployed, male, 28 years, Kohima)

Though Asang was rather disoriented and resigned at the moment of the interview, his narration reveals the working condition in the low-paid private economic milieu. This milieu is characterised by a hard workload and a rather low payment – especially when combined with the need to commute every day in the large metropolises of India. As he mentions, it is difficult for this class to avail affordable housing

that is even moderately close to the workplace. Besides the demanding work conditions, it is the undefined nature of his work, "intern plus (.) everything (.) assistant", which does not actually build on his skills as a graduate. Rather, he "had no idea about it" and "was just (.) following him [his boss] blindly" – a rather unspecific work culture defined by "learning by doing" and characterised by a close and hierarchical relationship with the boss, which bears signs of a patrimonial work ethos and a low formalisation and specialisation of professional practices.

In contrast, the different experience of Rosemary, a 34-year-old social worker living in Dimapur, shows that this work ethos might be specific for the class of Low Private Employed. Her narration about her previous work experience at a social service organisation draws the picture of a rather formalised sub-milieu within the private economic work milieu, one that depends to a high degree on professional degrees and experiences.

> and then i actually went to bangalore (.) for that that course (.) (I:mhm) in counselling (.) and after that after i came back in 2009 aeh ya end of 2009 i aeh applied to work in mumbai (I:mhm) i=it's called [organisation] mumbai (.) and they accepted (.) actually i applied in two places (.) [organisation] and [organisation] but [organisation] accepted me (I:mhm) so 2010 beginning of the year in january they asked me to come to work with them (I:mhm) so i went to work with them and aehm [organisation] happened to be an organisation where they were working with people living with hiv aids (I:mhm) and aeh with human trafficking and human trafficking (I:mhm) and also they were rescuing them from sex trade (I:mhm) so (.) i was mostly involved in the rehabilitative centre (.) you know the process (.) you know the women that were rescued from sex trade (I:mhm) and i was also living with those people living with the people living with HIV AIDS (I:mhm) so i was staying with them i was sleeping with them we were giving them work and we were giving them psychiatrical support and aeh (.) you know the counselling and the rehabilitative processes ya that's how i came to work in mumbai (I:mhm)
>
> (CF1 [17619:18818], social worker, female, 34, Dimapur)

The importance of professional trainings, strategic practices in a competitive job market like applying in multiple organisations and the existence of a specific professional language ("people living with hiv aids") distinguish Rosemary's account from Asang's. One can clearly

see here the heterogeneity of the milieu of private employment in India, exhibiting multiple cultures side by side. Whether these cultures depend on the income class (middle vs. low) or on the specific sub-milieu (globalised NGOs vs. domestic retail) cannot be decided here, however.

### *Flexibility, pragmatism and occasion-orientation*

As outlined above, a strong work orientation is necessary to engage successfully in the private economic milieu characterised by a strong work ethos. This work orientation is combined with an inner attitude directed towards towards middle-term ends and comprises flexibility and pragmatism. This leads to a perceptive orientation towards occasions and possibilities that open themselves only for limited durations and trough making use of social networks.

In the interview with Rosemary, the central themes were the instability of her life-course and the "pragmatic" orientation in dealing with multiple and indeed severe turning points she encountered. Being born to parents from different Naga tribes, she grew up in Dimapur before studying psychology in a big Indian city, a theological degree in South-East Asia and working there in different child care projects. Rosemary was engaged to a foreign citizen and returned with him to Nagaland, where the relationship broke up. Then, she went on first to take another course in counselling in a big Indian city and finally got a position related to HIV and prostitution rehabilitation in another big Indian city. Her life took another turn when her brother passed away in Nagaland due to his past drug abuse and she left everything behind and returned to Nagaland, where the personal trauma put her into a state of depression. The following quote now narrates how she arrived in her current situation:

> but aehm (.) i should say (.) you know aeh i don't know if you believe in god but i do believe in god and you know i should say god has been so good at i mean (.) maybe he had a plan you know? (I: mhm) somehow someday one day somebody called up and said (.) we need somebody for this work (.) you know and this is aeh (.) work under [university] (I: mhm) its a social project and they need somebody to work with us who has experience working with some people with HIV (I:mhm) and who has been working in this field for you know a couple of years (I: mhm) so i said (.) i do have the experience you know doing visits (??) and then they said its fine to be a part time (I:mhm) so at least once in three months

> we want you to visit (.) aeh mon (I:mhm) you know its one district in nagaland i'm sure you know about it (I:mhm) konyak tribe it's the district of the konyak tribe so aehm (.) for me it was far but (.) something was better than nothing (.) and i've always wanted also what is very fascinating with mon is i hear lot of stories (.) especially angh stories so (I:mhm) i said ok let me take this opportunity to get out from depression (.) go (.) see places and you know aeh help myself (I:mhm) so that's how i aeh got into a sub project at [university] and in the course of my work (.) i was really looking for a regular job because this was not regular (I:mhm) it was just part time (.) and in aeh (.) the following year 2011 august i just came across one advertisement in the newspaper (I:mhm) and it said project (??) or project officer (I:mhm) and then i said what is this all about and let me try it out because (I:mhm) and it was that ngo and i have been working with ngos for quite some time (I:mhm) so then i went for the (.) interview and then they started asking about if i know any experience=if i have any experience with aeh drugu=drugusers (I:mhm) and i said not as like a who=in a holistic way (I:mhm) but i had my brother who was a drug user (I:mhm) and i have experience working with them and so and then one question and aeh l=later after i joined my colleague said one question but that made us accept you was they asked me simple what=what=what happened to your marriage=what will happen to your marriage if you work with us you will have to travel a lot you know (I:mhm) so (.) i told him i will find a guy who (smiling) loves to travel a lot and that will make my work easier you know (laughing) (I: mhm) and we all had a big laugh you know (I:mhm) that aehm (.) later then you know because of that we selected you and we liked your sense of humour you know and (.) the interview went really well (I:mhm) so basically ya that's aeh how i got to like that so now i'm working with project [name] as project officer (I:mhm) and we aeh come under the aeh [name] fund of india which is part of the [large global foundation]
>
> (CF1 [19979:22852], social worker, female, 34, Dimapur)

For Rosemary, the previous sequence pattern after education had been a straight *rupture* entry into her professional field in the church-based social work milieu. This milieu is clearly transnational – the crossing of geographical and state boundaries is not given any importance as such but is presented as a matter of course. As she mentioned in the sequence preceding the quote above, she narrates that she simply "stayed on" there after finishing her Master of Divinity degree and

worked in two different youth rehabilitation organisations until her contract was over.

It is not clear here whether she had any specific work plans in her work milieu that would point to a "meritocratic planning" orientation, but her return to Nagaland is described in a very neutral way and only with reference to her failed marriage plans, after which she goes for further training and starts working in Mumbai. Indeed, her work sequence pattern until here is basically an interruption of her professional "career" by a professional training course after which she returns to the same professional field.

It is her second return to Nagaland caused by her brother's demise that marks a turning point in her life-course, a moment that is experienced as highly traumatic. The turning point is articulated as a multidimensional crisis in all spheres of work, family and relationship. On the level of performance and prosody, the rather neutral description using the formal register and professional counselling jargon ("people living with HIV AIDS", "women that were rescued from sex trade") completely changes: the informal register is initiated through the short laughing and explicit subjectivations ("as a person personally", "to be ho-to be very honest") with both explicit ("ups and downs") and performative (high variety of tonal change, loudness, rhythm of speech) hints to the loss of equilibrium that she experienced and contrasts with the previous sequence. Unlike her relationship crisis, the family crisis involves a complete break in her work life as well, which clearly shows how these spheres are interrelated and family is accorded priority over the work life as a matter of course – unlike Asang's case, no decision process is mentioned here explicitly.

Given her re-entry into the labour market through the part-time job, Rosemary now regains agency through her *active pragmatic* work orientation ("i just came across one advertisement in the newspaper [I:mhm] and it said project [??] or project officer [I:mhm] and then i said what is this all about and let me try it out"). Again, her professional experience in the NGO sector provides a further rationale to motivate her to actually apply (and her personal experience with her brother's addiction). The last part now deals with the decisive moment of the acceptance for the new full-time job at the NGO. After an attempt to provide an argumentative answer ("and then one question and aeh I=later"), the nature of practical experience compels her to follow the constraints of a narration, especially to provide details and to stick to a narrative order. Rosemary therefore proceeds with an arc of suspense ("and then one question and aeh l=later after i joined my colleague said one question but that made us accept you") that is

resolved by the "simple" question about her compatibility with the work requirements, especially geographical mobility. Indeed, as the sequence shows, the question is not that simple.

Besides the formal criteria, there is a need for a compatibility concerning the milieu ethos with the orientation and interpretation pattern of those who partake in it. In the case of the global care milieu, this includes the willingness and capability to work on fixed-term contracts, but also *spatial autonomy*. These motivational elements are part of the "pragmatic orientation" delineated here. In a strong form, which I would typify as a "struggling orientation", it is experienced by those who grew up from very limited social backgrounds in the villages and who invested basically their whole life and energy into social mobility – often as responsible representatives of their family. The cases of Lipise and Koheto, who grew up in similar circumstances in Eastern Nagaland, are typical examples of this "struggling orientation".

Koheto achieved a high government position in Kiphire town after having worked as a private teacher for some years. In the interview, he recalled the turns of his life, being born to cultivating parents without educational degrees who moved to Kiphire town when he was two years old – and Kiphire town still resembled a village. Since his case exemplifies this "struggling orientation" in an almost ideal-typical way, I provide a longer quotation here that allows us to follow the sequences of his life-course.

*I:* and then aeh here the catholic school until which class did you go there?

*R:* aeh here during my days do we had only up to class ten standard (I:mhm) so i joined (.) i was studying in a second (.) in a school aeh up to class seven and one year i left for (.) to join the seminary to actually (.) to become a priest (I:mhm) one year i stayed there and (.) because of family compulsion i came back (I:mhm) again continuing my studies from the same school (I:mhm) up to class ten standard (I:mhm) ya and after that my eleven to my degree i studied from this private college (.) this (name) college (.) in kiphire itself (.) that is already taken by the government now (I:mhm) ya so (.) that was my education. [. . .] I: that was up to ba right?

*R:* ya right and after that i joined aeh i qualified to go to for master degree (I:mhm) so i went and joined in the nagaland university (.) [campus] (I:mhm) that is in [name] district (.) so (.) and two years i took my ma from there (I:mhm) then

after that i came back (I:mhm) and my parish priest told me to (.) join in the school as a teacher (I:mhm) so i (.) started to teach in the same school where i was brought up (I:mhm) for two years (I:mhm) the secondary level up to twelve standard (I:mhm) so and after that i got a job (.) [. . .] I: and where there any activities outside school where you took part?

*R:* actually (.) nagas (.) as a whole we are music lovers (I:mhm) i take part in the (1) singing and so on with my groups (I:mhm) the church (I:mhm) besides that we also do aeh we play extra (.) like in football game (.) cricket as well (I:mhm) we were so interested besides that (1) i (.) used to work and earn (1) for my personal expenditures (I:mhm) i used to help my mother (I:mhm) ya i used to do the job otherwise in other social activities like (.) ngos for me do (I:mhm) i cannot involve (I:mhm) ya

*I:* and what kind of work did you help your mum (.) can you explain?

*R:* aeh (.) definitely (1) next to me were my three sisters (I:mhm) including the nun who has become nun (I:mhm) so we were helping my mums (I:mhm) we get up early in the morning (I:mhm) go to field (.) bring the firewood (I:mhm) some people we go (.) fetch water (I:mhm) after that class also (.) we go to the field (I:mhm) bring firewood (.) and we on saturdays (.) holidays (.) we go to field to work (I:mhm) to clear the maize (.) corns (I:mhm) we call it as the maize (I:mhm) corn field (.) paddy (I:mhm) so that was work that we (.) was doing (I:mhm) ya (.) and for earning money do (.) we go as in which (.) they which earners (I:mhm) so we all the way we go to collect (.) aeh we go and help other people to collect aeh firewood (I:mhm) collecting the firewood (I:mhm) packing of firewood (.) taking mud (I:mhm) and maybe for (.) collecting stones (I:mhm) and this in that we like they used to pay us (I:mhm) pay wages (I:mhm) and then we used to earn (I:mhm) ya (2)

(BM4 [5952:10201], high government servant, male, 31 years, Kiphire Town)

In this lengthy passage we get firstly a clear idea of the compulsion to pragmatism that marks the life of cultivators in Nagaland. Though both parents are firstly cultivators, the father, as he describes before this passage, was able to secure small construction contracts through political connections, while the mother had a nominal income from the local catholic church and, along with her children, engaged

additionally as an agricultural labourer for "they which earners" – the village and town elites with government jobs. His educational journey was also marked by making pragmatic adjustment to his interests ("family compulsion"; "it's all god's plan"), which in both cases of a priestly and scientific career he had to give up in order to fulfil his role as the head of the family ("i got the responsibility to [.] emphasise in my studies"). As he narrated before and only mentions at the side in this sequence ("family problem"), his father disappeared during his childhood for an extramarital affair for many years, making him as the eldest son responsible for his siblings and adjusting his personal aims.

A pragmatic orientation towards the work sphere could also be observed in the case of Lipise, a government teacher from Kiphire. We met in my room in the town after a friend arranged the contact. Lipise stood out from other people one encounters on the streets by wearing formal trousers, shoes and shirt with a pen in the pocket of the shirt – the insignias of an educated person or bureaucrat. Indeed, formal clothing in daily life was more visible in Kiphire, while in the cities and Western towns and villages it has been largely replaced by informal Western style "streetwear" outside the working place, an influence hardly visible in Kiphire up to date. His expressions were very strong and supported his self-description as a determined and confident person, and from his way of speaking it appeared obvious that he was used to speaking on formal public occasions, supporting his central points by tone and intensity as one knows from politician's speeches on TV. Compared to educated youth in the cities of Western Nagaland, however, his accent and grammar differed strongly from their often sophisticated English that is trained there already from preschool age in private institutions. Though coming from a rather different background than Rosemary, his work orientation is very similar, though orientations towards other social realms are rather different, political and students' union activities being central against family and leisure orientation in the case of Rosemary. These secondary differences however help us to see the commonality between them regarding the work sphere. In contrast to Rosemary, Lipise's pragmatic orientation is not an outcome of an important turning point but permeates his life since childhood, which is revealed in the following sequence.

*I:* ok (.) if you look back to your childhood (.) which were the most important experiences in your life?

*R:* (4) to be (.) to be honest (I:mhm) since aeh my (1) parents background is not (.) that much (.) good (I:mhm) and that is the reason why i had faced lots of (.) difficulties (I:mhm) and

> problem during my (.) high-school days (.) (I:mhm) and that is what (.) so many things (.) about aeh (.) struggles (.) struggling (.) problems in my life i had (I:mhm) experiencing so many ways (I:mhm) still then (.) out of that (.) i took (.) i have a strong determination (.) and i (.) i have a self confidence (I:mhm) and that is the reason why (.) today (.) i am in this (.) position (I:mhm) ya so (.) i had faced lots (.) especially financial problems (I:mhm) i faced so many things (I:mhm) since (.) my parents they could (.) they did their best (I:mhm) still then since they don't have any income (I:mhm) sources (I:mhm) and that is the reason why (.) within aeh the cir- among our circle of friends since aeh (1) during our (.) my high-school days and even college days i have faced lo- lots of troubles and that is the reason why (.) and before i got this aeh government job (I:mhm) after (.) com- completion of my graduation (.) i served in some private institutions (I:mhm) as a teacher (.) then even aeh one central ngo (.) since 2000 (.) ten (I:mhm) it was (.) it came very (??) kiphire district that we used to call it [scheme] (I:mhm) that is under [scheme] government of india (I:mhm) so they used to give some aeh honorium like (.) 2500 monthly (I:mhm) ya so since (.) even from there i i could able to attend three interview from kohima (.) then (.) from that few amount i (.) managed by myself (.) ya (1)
>
> (BM1 [2628:4350], government teacher, 29, male, Kiphire Town)

Lipise's childhood narration starts with his claim to honesty, which is then specified with an evaluation of his parents' background as "not that much good". This background is then taken as an explanation ("and that is the reason why") for undefined problems and difficulties during high school, problems that according to him were multi-dimensional ("so many things", "so many ways"). These difficulties, as his explanation goes on, provided him with "a strong determination", not only back then but, as he corrects himself, are a part of his present identity, in which he has "self confidence", which again provides the explanation for his current position, which he does not specify yet. Lacking details and a narrative order, this sequence most likely does not reflect experience but is based on the discoursive script of the "self-made man" who overcomes bad initial conditions through self-transformation and struggle and thereby eventually gains the upper hand.

In the second part of this sequence, he repeats the explanatory script but provides further details to it: his family background is specified as

lacking a source of income, which is distinguished from missing will or other failure on his parents' side ("they did their best"). Rather, his family background is explained from the background of a structural condition of deprivation in the village.

As he continues, his financial troubles made him stand out among the circle of friends during high school and college. Unlike his primary school, where the struggle was experienced collectively, he is now individualised when he compares himself with his friends and experiences his situation as a relative deprivation compared to them. Since the missing income from his parents serves as the explanation of these troubles in this sequence, we can assume that his friends' parents were different in this regard and had at least one source of income. His explanatory chain continues further, and he states that it was due to his financial troubles that he took up different jobs as a private teacher and one for an NGO funded by the central government, before arriving at his current government job. According to his explanation, it appears that under different circumstances he would not have taken up these jobs, as they were only a means to his aim of a government job: even his meagre income of 2,500 INR was used to attend job interviews in Kohima, hence obviously for government jobs, though travelling costs alone already amount to several hundred INR for a one-way trip with the cheapest public bus.

In this sequence, we mainly get to know about his subjective theory of his life-course, for which he uses the familiar script of the "self-made man" and self-consciously explicates his deprived background and "struggling" and "active pragmatic" orientation that led him to take up various paid private and NGO assignments before his current government job. After following up with an immanent question on his experiences of village life, I changed the topic towards his actual transition process into his current job.

*I:* can you tell me what you are currently doing?
*R:* ya i'm serving as a teacher here in (name) high-school (.) in kiphire (I:mhm) ya
*I:* can you tell me how you got into that position?
*R:* hm (.) through (.) through (.) politically (I:mhm) since aeh (.) i used to make a very good relation (I:mhm) even to the political leaders (I:mhm) and even the (state official) (.) our (state official) (I:mhm) ya aeh i have a good relation with him (.) and i=i shared all my problems (I:mhm) to them (.) then they know about my (.) family problems (I:mhm) as well as my co- life condition (I:mhm) that is the reason why (.) he helped

me (I:mhm) and he gave me (.) aeh a- (.) appointed (I:mhm) ya since (year and date) (I:mhm)

(BM1 [7827:8554], government teacher, 29, male, Kiphire Town)

His pragmatic orientation towards the work sphere, which was only indirectly inferred in the previous sequence, is now highlighted in this passage. Besides several attempts to secure a government job through interviews in Kohima, finally it was his personal connections to politicians and state officials that provided him with the desired government job. Lipise makes no secret of his use of "very good relation[s]" with politicians, and clearly sees his appointment as legitimate help in the face of his "family problems" and "life condition". This help has to be seen not only against his social background, however, which he certainly shares with many others in the district. What differentiates him from many others is his commitment in the students' union and his work for the central NGO, during which he established close connections in the villages of the district.

*Multiple engagements*

For Koheto, being a member of the Catholic community is very important, and it is this connection to the church that provides him with with the cultural and economic resources to leave the work milieu of his parents. While his previous adjustments and struggle are part of his pragmatic orientation, it is also apparent in the way he combined studying and working in a parallel way during his transition into his present position as a government servant, and which he keeps despite having reached his major aim.

*I:* you said already that you went through that exam (.) can you tell me how you came here?

*R:* when i was in my degree level (.) i started writing this (.) you went to delhi i think you know this (.) so there are so many people who are trying to (.) qualify for the indian administrative services (I:mhm) so during that time we had (.) we could there was no book-store here (I:mhm) we could not be ab(.) so i got lucky like my (??) got me one magazine (I:mhm) that is [title] (.) so i started reading that (.) since we don't have book-store i have to order from (.) post office (I:mhm) per post i used to get monthly (I:mhm) so in that way like i used to order so many books (I:mhm) i even sold to my friends like

> that (I:mhm) because (.) in that way i also earn (I:mhm) i also read (I:mhm) and after my graduation as soon as i joined my postgraduate degree (I:mhm) i started preparing for my exam (I:mhm) and by gods grace i (.) from the first year i could qualify for this preliminary exam (I:mhm) preliminary (.) and the second year i qualified for mains exam (I:mhm) and in that way for oral exam (.) and after my (.) fourth attempt (I:mhm) so after i joined my higher secondary as a teacher (.) postgraduate teacher (I:mhm) in that way like i (.) i was teaching (.) as well as i was studying (.) very hard (I:mhm) (I:mhm) it was of compulsion of my family problems (I:mhm) i studied a lot (.) i prepared thoroughly (I:mhm) and it was very difficult to compete with those advanced people (I:mhm) those who are from kohima dimapur (I:mhm) because (.) the system of education that they get is quite different from what we (I:mhm) what we get from here (I:mhm) and like if they studied for one hour we have to study for two hours (I:mhm) like that we (.) i tried to compete (.) and of course i am very lucky to qualify for this aeh nagaland public service exam (I:mhm) in that way i'm still trying (I:mhm) but because of the the work factor here in that [name] department (.) i could not appear this time for mains exam otherwise i'm trying for this aeh administrative department (.) that is what i feel is like i feel more appropriate to be in this (I:mhm) administration (I:mhm) so and that was my dream also (I:mhm) ya (1)
>
> (BM4 [11392:13392], high government servant, male, 31 years, Kiphire Town)

The way Koheto approaches the public service exams already during his MA studies parallels in many ways the competitive and meritocratic orientation typified above. What distinguishes him is the way he handles the problem of availing the magazines with previous exam questions. Both taking the initiative to order the magazines and reselling them to his friends shows the flexible and pragmatic orientation needed – and to a degree imposed – by the lacking infrastructure in Eastern Nagaland. This typification is confirmed by his occasionalist orientation – like Lipise's use of political connections – to take up the teaching job through his church relations and hence supporting himself (and probably other members of his family) directly after graduation, despite his continuing preparation for the exams ("i was teaching [.] as well as I was studying [.] very hard"). Now, though he has secured a life-long position, he continues with his double-involvement

into work and writing exams to achieve a better position within the bureaucracy – a sign of the establishment of a planning orientation. However, as he tells later, he simultaneously got involved with some friends into the business of timber extraction and trade, earning additional income that he wants to use to buy additional land for his village, where he will take over the position of a head gaon-bura (village chief) one time – though he was very clear that he will never move back to live there. In that way he is not only aware of the class difference of Kiphire district and "those advanced people (I:mhm) those who are from kohima dimapur", but similarly of the low *quality of space* that is attached to the village, even if he might be of a high class personally.

As Koheto's example shows, it is a strong characteristic of the pragmatic type to get involved into several work milieus simultaneously – even if there is no direct need for additional security any more. It is very typical for this orientation that jobs are attained by many different means, often through personal relations outside the free job market: church connections in the case of Koheto, Lipise's political connections.

For those who lack these connections, there might be the need for other options to escape from difficult conditions. In the case of Ketovi, he graduated around one year before the interview in commerce and was taking part in a government-provided training for computer skills. Ketovi, 23 years old, regards himself as too young to be a father, but after the unplanned pregnancy of his girlfriend and the following wedding he used to stay at her parents, since his father died during his youth and the mother must survive on her petty business in selling second-hand clothes and collecting firewood. Though he goes to the training every day, his aim is to get a government job that can provide for him and his young family. For this aim, he keeps on applying for jobs that are offered in the newspapers, but the conditions are difficult:

*I:* can you=can you tell me more about it? (R: mumbling, asking) about that job? you applied, you said?

*R:* the job is about like aeh (I:mhm) accounting and junior assistant accountant (I:mhm) at aeh government of nagaland (.) government job (I: mhm) so altogether its 26 aeh 32 jobs are available seats (I:mhm) and the applicants are like 7000 (.) 5000 (.) around (laughing) i don't know (laughing) maybe more (I:mhm) so i will go to kohima for this examination (.) and after examination we will be like again (.) interview form

> and then after that they give us the possibility for something (I:mhm) (3)
>
> (CM1 [4395:5003], government training for unemployed, male, 23 years, Dimapur)

Ketovi's laughing expresses a common perception of the job market in Nagaland, which is structured by an oversupply of eligible graduates and a comparably weak job market, in which acceptable jobs are seen by many only in a government position. The lack of jobs is, like Lipise, explained by the popular discourse of elite corruption:

> (.) and we have here the government (.) system is very corrupted (I:mhm) so (.) even if we are like (.) qualified for the jobs they won't like give us (I:mhm) because like its corrupted from inside like from high officials they have a lot of like (.) na (I:mhm) among them they used to get so like its very difficult for us so we have a lot of unemployment here (I:mhm)
>
> (CM1 [30416:30784], government training for unemployed, male, 23 years, Dimapur)

Due to the difficulty in securing a secure position, and due to his lack of family connections after the demise of his father, he and his new family have made plans to approach the problem in a different way and not leave it up to chance.

> *I:* so which possibilities do you see for yourself in the future?
>
> *R:* (3) possibilities (2) hm i want to like (.) before my marriage (I:mhm) i was thinking like (.) i need a loan (.) i'll go out somewhere else (I:mhm) out of state (.) or like (.) if its my (.) fate i'll go to foreign countries (I:mhm) have- i used to dream big for that (I:mhm) after my studies (.) but (1) lot of like hm (1) obstacles in my way (I:mhm) so (.) like keeps me (2) pulling down down down and so (1) but (mumbling) in 2011 (I:mhm) eleven i had like very very (.) tough time (I:mhm) financially (I:mhm) so (1) my wife she was aeh my girlfriend she could be there and she helped me (I:mhm) and (.) so like she (.) she made the decision with her mum that (.) we would like buy some jobs if that is possible for you na? (I:mhm) after your graduation so (.) its happening and i just go for these interviews (1) and- (.) or whatever jobs its been (.) in the advertisement (I:mhm) so (1) but currently (.) i wanna work

> for like (.) i wanna stay here in dimapur (I:mhm) and work here in dimapur in a government jobs (I:mhm) (4)
>
> (CM1[31572:32669], government training for unemployed, male, 23 years, Dimapur)

In the case of Ketovi we see again that the effort to use multiple means in the widest sense arises out of a situation where regular ways seem blocked or unavailable. His situation resembles that of other pragmatic "struggling" cases of this type who are responsible for their families and additionally have to support themselves – or are expected according to the patriarchal family norms among the Nagas. In these cases, the situation does not permit years of waiting – as many young Nagas of the "meritocratic planning" type do. "Meritocratic planners" often spend many years only trying to crack the NPSC or UPSC until the official cut-off age of 35 years. That age marks the decisive time when personal and family expectations to a secure and high-status life are either being fulfilled – or one's dreams and plans are shattered.

It is indeed the advantage of the pragmatic type that it does and cannot make plans too long into the future. This flexibility dramatically decreases the chances of a big failure while increasing those of small and middle-term successes. That the discourse of corruption, which blames the economic situation solely on the perceived corruption of the elites, is raised also by those who make pragmatic use of their chances is a good example of the relative detachment of discourse from practice. Indeed, this discourse is a common resource of this generation that marks their distance to the neo-patrimonial ethos they encounter especially when confronted with the old, established elite of their parents' generation. Although this critical discourse has certainly helped to curb neo-patrimonial practices to a certain degree in the last years – as every reader of the "Naga Blog" will know, its framing of the class structure as a basically "moral" problem seems to underestimate the cultural and economic structures of the economic milieus behind it. This explains why even those who speak out against corruption see themselves compelled to play according to neo-patrimonial and classic patrimonial rules.

### *Spatial arrangements and spatial autonomy*

Among all the orientation types the "pragmatic proactive/reactive" exhibits the widest variety of migration patterns and spatial mobility. The main reason is the multiplicity of its milieu involvements, each carrying its own objective structure of arrangements and places. An

orientation towards spatial autonomy differs from mere observable spatial mobility, however. Spatial flexibility is also important in the higher ranks of the government sector in Nagaland, as higher appointments usually require temporary residence for training courses in different locations within India (or Nagaland for state jobs). For government servants, spatial mobility is a part of a lifelong career trajectory and is imposed in a top-down manner. Indeed, the imposed need for spatial flexibility might be a restricting factor for women's careers, as Rosemary's case showed. My observations showed for example that among all the non-local government servants I met in Kiphire town, there was not a single woman. On the contrary, a government teacher from Kohima told me that she used all possibilities to get her post as a government teacher transferred to her birth place: leaving the city was considered by her as unbearable. Spatial flexibility, according to the passage interpreted above as well as my observations, has clearly a gendered meaning among the Nagas. This can also be seen in the suspicion that many girls and women are facing in case they are studying outside the state beyond the control of village members or relatives. In several informal conversations it was pointed out to me by men that it was important to check the "background" of women before a potential marriage proposal – especially in case they were studying outside the state, where "no-one knows what they are doing there".

### *Type III: "interest-led exploring"*

The third type resembles what has been described by Ronald Inglehart as following "post-materialistic" (Ronald Inglehart 1977, 1990) values and trading the orientation for security and material wealth for a concern about self-expression, autonomy and authenticity. The relational type "interested exploring" certainly shares the positive values of post-materialism, but, as the example of Akum shows, these values or orientations, as I would call them, can be perfectly applied to the work sphere as well. Rather than emphasising the distinction between materialism and post-materialism, I would hence point to the difference between outside-orientation and interest orientation, a dimension that certainly distinguishes this type from both "meritocratic planning" as well as from "pragmatic proactive/reactive" orientations. On the other hand, they share with the "meritocratic planners" the focus on a single end in their work life, and with the "pragmatic proactive/reactive" the future orientation on the short and middle range.

Here, only transition sequences from Imsong and Aküm were typified as cases with an "interested exploring" orientation, and it is very

likely that this type is numerically rather small. Indeed, both have grown up in stable middle-class families, so it appears that a certain sense of security is needed to develop this orientation – a position that already Ronald Inglehart held when he based his theory on Abraham Maslow's famous pyramid of needs. This can be formulated here only as a hypothesis based on these two cases and awaits empirical confirmation based on a broader empirical base. The basic characteristics of this type are:

1 Orientation towards unstable short and middle-range aims
2 Changes are induced by own decisions
3 Individualist work orientation, if it fits interest
4 "Moral-liberal" interpretation pattern opposing "moral-conformist" and "neo-patrimonial" ethos
5 Openness as a dominant (and gendered) orientation outside the work sphere

### *Short- and middle-term orientation, self-induced changes and individualist work orientation*

The first case of this type is Imsongba, male and 33 years old. He was a PhD student who lived in Delhi at the time of the interview. I interviewed him in his room at the university hostel, where he answered very openly and expressively to my questions and even asked questions himself, thereby taking active part in the rather uncommon interview situation rather than accepting a passive role as an interviewee. After describing his educational career that led him from different government and private schools to a reputed college in Bengal for his BA and MA, I asked him about his transition to his present university in Delhi.

*I:* ok (1) then aehm then you came to aeh here to to delhi [R:mhm] can=can you tell me some something aeh how you made your choices to come here or how did it (.) how did it work out?

*R:* aeh (2) before i came to delhi, i was in (.) ok i was doing my m a in [university] then i was so so interested in journalism, i was very interested in journalism (.) and i even sat for the exam, i got through, and (.) but at the same time, when i was doing my (1) third semester, my american studies teacher, she implanted this interest of american studies in me, she was a very very good teacher then (.) i got the interest to study about (1) aeh african american communities in the

> united states, then it prompted me to come over here, i sat for the exam and i got through, so (.) you know that journalism thing took a back (.) backbench and then, i (.) im here, ya. (6)
> (DM1 [10433:11288], PhD student, male, 28, New Delhi)

Imsongba tells here the story of his educational journey starting from his master's studies outside Delhi (in another Indian megacity, as he said before) to his current state as a PhD student in New Delhi. This educational and geographical shift is not subject of much detailed narration; instead, it is first his repeated interest in journalism, leading him to write and passing an exam related to it, and then the second strand of interest induced by his teacher that is the driving force of his transition sequence according to Imsongba's experience. Again, he wrote a successful exam that allowed him to make a choice for his new interest in American studies and disregard his other option regarding journalism.

Compared to Naro and Tsilise, there is no orientation to an *outward aim* (and therefore no meaningful experience of competition, though the school tried to instil a competitive environment, as he mentioned earlier), but a guidance along inner criteria. This importance of *inner* experience and impulse is emphasised by the frequent use of "interest", one that was finally "implanted" in him and led him to abandon his previous path in which he could have settled as well. Compared to Asang and Athrong, his orientation is characterised not so much by a loss of ends and purpose, but by the existence of multiple and competing interests or ends at the same time.

The second case of this type is Aküm, who was introduced to me by my host where I used to stay during my visits to Dimapur. After an appointment was made, I interviewed him in the back-office of his music instruments shop in down-town Dimapur. The interview lasted altogether three hours, during which, as usual in Nagaland, tea and cookies were served. Aküm was narrating very fluently largely by his own initiative, and even though he was sometimes disturbed by phone calls (one of them by a national group asking for taxes), he was very present and always picked up the story after the disturbances without any problem to get back to point he had stopped before.

Before the following sequence, I asked Aküm about his studies. He answered with a detailed account of his educational journey: after starting pre-university courses (PU or10+2) at a college in Mokokchung, he left the usual path after the first year and returned home to Dimapur. His father then wanted to send him to a college in Shillong,

Meghalaya, but Aküm argued that he would only go if his father bought him an acoustic guitar – with the result that he finally joined college in Dimapur. During that time, he changed his major subject from arts to science, with which he – "as a musician" – had his problems. Ultimately, he stopped his studies because he got more interested in "call it making money". After five years of being into various businesses, he went back to college in order to finish his PU level. Much to the surprise of the principal, who initially rejected him for his age and previous drop-out – and furthermore accused him of wasting his father's money – he told him that he was paying with his own money rather than his father's. He finally got admitted and finally passed PU level, after which he continued with his old way of life.

*R:* so it was a nightmare for me not passing pre-university [laughing] then (.) ya after that i=i started to get into other kind of business i did a lot of work (.) a lot of business for aeh i mean small time business before really opening this (.) you name anything i was (.) i'll say my brother had a taxi (I:mhm) ya i=i=i drove that taxi for my brother because he already had a family (I:mhm) so whenever i'm free i used to take the taxi and go to kohima (I:mhm) i think six seven times (I:mhm) and i said ok this is not my job (.) (I:mhm) ya i'm really not for this (I:mhm) that was not for my earning or like that that was just for helping out my brother (I:mhm) he had an auto [another name for a rickshaw] (.) first year he had an auto (.) i used to (.) earn for him at night (I:mhm) because that time i didn't want to be seen driving an auto like that (I:mhm) you know people will start the ya discrimination thing (I:mhm) so at night i used to aeh go on hire for my brother whatever i got i gave it to my brother that's how i started auto then taxi (.) he also sold auto and then bought a taxi (I:mhm) so (.) that's part of his success story also (I:mhm) and aeh (.) i was into so many other businesses (.) even (.) i got into this (.) used bike and two-wheeler (I:mhm) sales (.) i didn't like to drive (.) it was not very (.) i mean (.) i was not really interested in that (I:mhm) i was just (.) didn't have any other option you know with 10–20000 rupees what can you do (.) (I:mhm) and that was the savings i have (I:mhm) ya after that side by side i started getting into furnitures (.) (I:mhm) because raw materials was easy available here (I:mhm) you know (.) and i started aeh the furnitures and it was quite (.) doing quite well

and after (.) giving aeh (.) to some parties on credits (.) which i never got back (I:mhm) i started loosing interest (I:mhm)

(3)

and then the music it happened [answering the phone] (.) so (.) after everything (.) i (.) we (.) you know got some money and we brought some money (.) it was not even a lakh of rupees (I:mhm) that we had in hand (I:mhm) and that's how we started aeh a shop (.) and aeh (.) along the way (.) i had i really had my shop and i applied for so many government schemes (I:mhm) like the prime minister [scheme] which is for employment (.) like self employment of (.) educated unemployed (I:mhm) we were actually we were qualified to get it (.) but we never got- i never got (I:mhm) i as one (.) because i never (.) aeh agreed to giving bribe to (.) aeh the officials (I:mhm) whoever was responsible (I:mhm) aeh i remember myself appearing for aeh interview (.) my project was good (.) that's what the bank people told me (.) in the interview there are officials and (.) you know (.) right after the interview one of the bank people came out and told me [phone ringing and answering, short break] i applied for aeh aeh acquiring loan from the the [government department] (I:mhm) where they were giving loans to educated unemployed people (.) and (.) i applied and right after the interview one of the bank people he came out and told me (.) your proposal is very good (.) you do the necessary (.) that's what he told me because (.) they know (.) my project is good but they were helpless because of the (.) already reserved seats for the ministers and administrative officers and whatever (.) but i=i just told him i'm not gonna give anything to anyone (.) if i'm aeh qualified or if they find my project good they will chalan me (.) i just told him (I:mhm) i never went backdoors (I:mhm) and that's why i never got (.)

(CM3 [14422:17946], music instruments business, male, 39, Dimapur)

While the interpretation of the first part allows us to reconstruct the orientation pattern of Aküm's transition – and its outstanding similarity to Imsong's transition – the second part is specifically interesting regarding the interpretation pattern that manifests itself in the opposition to the practical ethos of neo-patrimonialism. In the first part, Aküm describes his engagement in various economic activities ("you name anything"), which is contrasted with "really opening" his current

undertaking. Though he initially stated that he left school to earn money, he presents his initial activities as "helping out" his brother, because he already had a family. He also describes how he creatively deals with public norms concerning appropriate labour by driving at night to avoid negative sanctions from the society ("people will start the ya discrimination thing"). Even though it remains unclear as what kind of labour is generally regarded well by these norms, driving an auto seems not to be part of it. Public norms according to Aküm's narration appear not to follow an economic ethic but rather stand in opposition to it: his experience of driving the two-hour trip six or seven times even at night shows, the business was indeed a requested and economically profitable service – seen in the upgrading of capital investment from a rickshaw to a taxi as part of the brother's "success story". As he lost interest in driving, he went to dealing with used motorbikes, while he makes a strong distinction between his interest in the business and his dislike of actually driving with them. His interest was basically induced by the low capital investment needed ("with 10–20000 rupees what can you do"), similar to his later furniture enterprise, where the "raw materials" were easily available. As some of his customers defaulted on the credit given to them, he again lost interest and started his current enterprise – described as both his own and an undertaking together with others ("we").

After leaving school, there is a rather erratic engagement with various business activities according to the growth and loss of interest in them. However, there is a clear shift in the discourses guiding his "interest orientation", as it is interpreted initially as a form of "family solidarity" ("that was not for my earning or like that that was just for helping out my brother"). This statement is at odds with his earlier statement of wanting to make money instead of going to school. In his later undertakings, the interest is guided by more definite economic criteria like availability and lack of capital and raw materials, revealing a change in the interpretation pattern towards specific economic discourses. Unlike Imsong, Aküm is here quite aware of the restrictions and boundaries of his "interest orientation". Besides economic criteria, social norms similarly restrict, though do not stop, his economic engagement, as he tries to avoid the social stigma ("the discrimination thing") attached to driving a rickshaw. As is often pointed out by young Nagas, most occupations other than government jobs are disregarded especially by the parent generation, a reason why manual jobs are usually delegated to ethnically different immigrants. Crossing the line of acceptable occupations has therefore not only a socio-structural, but also an ethnic dimension to it, as dependent and

manual labour threatens the collective self-perception of Nagas as a free and independent people without class divisions. His late return to the college, which has indeed no practical purpose for an entrepreneur, also exemplifies that while the "interest orientation" underlying his work trajectory brings him into conflict with public norms, he is nevertheless guided by the practical milieus and their implicit ends. Only by considering the intrinsic value that is accorded to formal education among the Nagas is it possible to explain why Aküm would want to return to college after having established a running business: it was a "nightmare" for him not to pass the PU level and therefore count as "uneducated". Aküm's narration also reveals the openness and low degree of formalisation of the local economy, which permitted him initially to freely cross occupational boundaries. The downside of this informality is that there are no established mechanisms beyond interpersonal trust and interest, resulting in the loss of both money and his interest in the initially successful furniture business.

### *"Moral-liberal" vs. "neo-patrimonial" ethos*

The second part of the narration deals with the establishment of the enterprise, especially the interrelation with the government in finding access to credit. In the beginning they started the music shop with a minimal amount ("not even a lakh of rupees that we had in hand") they got from an unknown source and invested into the physical structure ("i really had my shop"). This last insistence becomes clearer when he opposes his shop, and hence his entitlement to receive the benefits of the scheme, with others who had no actual "unit" but "agreed" to pay bribes to those in charge of providing the schemes. His nested narration of the application interview details this conflict of the implicit norms of credit applications ("you do the necessary") with the official purpose of supporting self-employment of educated unemployed – an official category he thinks he qualifies for. This understanding is supported by the "bank people", who are presented as the witnesses not only of his formal qualification but furthermore the economic rationality of his undertaking ("your proposal is very good"). However, they are presented as "helpless" in the face of the government officials and their neo-patrimonial ethos ("already reserved seats"), which runs against both official criteria of formal qualification and economic rationality of a "good project", which he pits against the possibility of going "backdoors" and therefore fails to get the credit.

Aküm introduces here three social figures that played a role for the establishment of his current shop. These figures are the bureaucrat,

the banker and himself, the young entrepreneur wanting to gain access to a credit scheme directed at people like him. In this narration, the banker is his natural counterpart: they share a common understanding of economic rationality that focusses on the existence of a "real" business, its profitability and the likelihood to repay the credit and interest. This common understanding, which is only articulated outside the office, also shows the different orientations of Aküm and the banker in dealing with the neo-patrimonialism of the bureaucrats: "pragmatic", doing the unavoidable that is "necessary" to achieve the outcome, and "moralistic", demanding accordance of ethos and official discourse without looking at the outcome. The essence of this second part of the narration is the refutation to play according to the practical ethos of neo-patrimonialism that underpins, in his view, the bureaucracy and "officials". This concept has been used in the larger discussion of developmental sociology to denote the "conjunction of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination" (Erdmann and Engel 2006, p. 31).

Neo-patrimonialism is understood here as a modernised form of patrimonialism that uses, as Aküm narrates, modern bureaucratic tools like business plans and a neo-liberal discourse of "entrepreneurship" as a way to induce "development". In this social structure, the exchange of loyalty and service for protection between patron and client reminiscent of patrimonialism is replaced by the control of access to governmental and bureaucratic resources for private purposes, prototypically in the form of asking money for service or using public funds for private purposes. The sort of neo-patrimonialism that can be seen in the bureaucratic milieu differs from the patrimonialism of the political milieu in two regards: first, bureaucrats do not depend on the loyalty of the clients, therefore it is not necessary for them to engage in redistribution in the way politicians have to. Second, neo-patrimonialism is optional for them, it constitutes an additional source of income and influence besides their official income, while politicians are more directly dependent on the patrimonial relationship, especially if they have no strong position within one of the two major parties. From Aküm's subjective point of view, neo-patrimonialism permeates the bureaucracy ("ministers and administrative officers and whatever"). Though it might be wrong to take this judgement as an objective description of the bureaucracy, his narration is certainly not unique but expresses a common sentiment, one that exists especially among small and medium entrepreneurs who are not able to get access to credits without personal relations. In return, as a neighbour in New Delhi told me, it is exactly the possibility to earn extra income that

made him try exams for government service. Neo-patrimonialism is hence not a phenomenon that can be reduced to Nagaland or North-East India but is an important ethos of the bureaucratic milieu that collides with the "entrepreneurial ethos" of small and medium business owners that often lack the connections of larger establishments.

For both Imsong and Aküm, an orientation along "intrinsic" criteria is central to their practice and is employed in various social situations. This "interest-guided" orientation makes their life-courses rather unpredictable, as the orientation is rather independent of the surrounding social milieus and their respective ethos. Even though Imsong's life-course appears rather straight in hindsight compared to Aküm, their general orientation is rather similar. Asked about how he imagines his future, Imsong confirms both the "interest-guided" openness of his future as well as the "liberal" interpretation pattern already present in Aküm's narration:

> *I:* ok about aehm if you look into your future (.) what are your own expectations towards your future or can you tell me something about it?
>
> *R:* i'll be so discouraged if i don't go around the world (.) that's the only thing (.) and if you would ask me about the future as in a well established future (.) where i'm settled (.) then i would i look forward to become a professor? maybe? not maybe ya a professor that's just generally what academicians end up becoming (.) so a professor aeh=aehm trying to motivate young minds, giving them different points of life, specially back home in our society (.) about how much they can contribute to the society as well as for themselves, because right now what generally people think is they all depend on the other, the government, or their parents, but (.) i would like to impart the idea of how to depend on yourself, and how much you want to, you know, the society to depend on you as well, because there are so many things that we can do, those kind of ideas i would like to impart on my (.) youngsters (2)
>
> (DM1 [18991:20044], PhD student, male, 28 years, New Delhi)

This sequence starts with a direct and spontaneous answer, which is followed by answering his own imaginary question. The performative order and emotional emphasis of the first two sentences is certainly more rooted in the practical anticipation of the future, once again

revealing an "interest-guided" orientation that is oriented towards the outward ("around the world") rather than being determined by it. This interpretation is also supported by the performative structure of this sequence: the interviewee does not follow the typical structure of an interview with a clear differentiation of question and answer but takes control of the situation by asking and answering his own questions.

The second part then involves taking a reflexive point of view on the own future and deliberates especially the question of normative ends that relate to his current position as a PhD student ("ya a professor that's just generally what academicians end up becoming") as well as age norms ("in a well established future (.) where i'm settled"). Becoming a professor here refers to the normative order of the academic milieu, while settling down with its geographical connotation refers to the phase of the life-cycle that marks the end of spatial mobility and ultimately refers to the foundation of a family – though this connotation is not articulated here, it belongs to the same semantic field in many interviews and conversations. Clearly, there is a tension between his interest-guided orientation and established life-cycle norms. Imsong is well aware of this tension and suspects that this norm is the actual interest of the interviewer. Within his imagined future as a professor, he then takes a clear position against "what people generally think", which he understands as an overarching discourse of dependence "on the other, the government, or their parents". We can call the ethos underneath this discourse "moral-conformist", since it is based on moral obligations to confirm to rules within hierarchical social relations. Though arising from paternalistic family and patrimonial social relations, this ethos gets partly transferred to the realm of the state.

His counter-position instead emphasises self-dependence and a stronger role for an active participation of individuals as individuals ("the society to depend on you as well"). Rather than arguing for a complete liberation of the individual from society, a discourse we could call "individualism", this discourse is a form of "socio-liberalism" that argues for a re-balancing of the individual-society relation. Indeed, the paternalistic relationship between professor and "my youngsters", in which the former "imparts" knowledge on the other is neither questioned by Imsong nor by Aküm. Both implicitly affirm the interpretation pattern of "education" and "seniority" within their "moral-liberal" discourse, revealing the ubiquity of pre-colonial and developmental discourses. This emphasis on an "interest ethic" and a "moral-liberal" discourse is also apparent in one of Aküm's

statements towards the end of the interview, in which he refers to his self-organised charity engagement, which he opposes to the involuntary nature of "tax collection" he is subject to.

It is important here to emphasise the difference between neo-patrimonialism and "traditional" patrimonialism, which was exemplified above in Lipise's use of personal relations to a politician to secure a government job. His case exemplifies a relation between patron and client that involves an exchange of security against loyalty and service; in his case, the exchange of a government job for political engagement under consideration of his deprived background. This relation is, unlike the bureaucratic or neo-patrimonial ethos, not based on formal rules or monetary exchange but on hierarchical *personal* relations in a family-like structure. Similar to Rosemary, personal relations and the according cultural fit are of major importance for arriving in the current position; however, the fit involves here a different work milieu and is based on a different ethos than in the global care milieu. Only by considering the difference between patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism is it possible to explain that for Lipise there is no contradiction between his pragmatic orientation towards using personal connections and his political activity against "corruption". Besides his current secure government job, Lipise continues with his involvement in the students' union and the central NGO. He agitates for the proper implementation of the midday meal scheme, against the alleged transfer of teacher posts from Eastern to Western Nagaland and back-door appointments of police posts:

*I:* so if you think about your situation right now (.) what would you like to change in your current situation?

*R:* (2) since everyone who's in (.) our naga society (I:mhm) we have (.) so many (.) corruption (I:mhm) ya then (.) this all because of aeh unemployment problem (I:mhm) ya since there are so many of naga educated youths (I:mhm) they are unemployed (I:mhm) then they used to since in our naga (.) society we have so many what undergrounds (I:mhm) and so many (.) what to say (1) corruption is taking place (I:mhm) in every nook and corner (I:mhm) so (1) in the first place we have to (.) educate (I:mhm) to those youngsters (I:mhm) then only our society we can change (I:mhm) hm (.) but until and unless (.) if aeh (.) individual if they if we don't change ourself then is not possible to change our society (I:mhm) so the change must begin within ourselves (I:mhm) ya so far (.) since we are (.) even myself i'm working in students organisations

> (.) so many ngos (.) for the welfare of the society and students (.) community in general (.) so (2) corruption (.) should be (1) changed (I:mhm) ya (2)
>
> (BM1 [8693:9804], government teacher, 29, male, Kiphire Town)

Corruption, according to Lipise, permeates the current Naga society, and for him unemployment of educated youth is the main root of both "undergrounds" and corruption "taking place in every nook and corner", a situation that he thinks can only be changed by education of the young as well as self-transformation. Even though his understanding of corruption remains very vague here, his political targets are more manifest in his actual activities. Along with the Eastern Naga Students' Unions, he agitates against the high-level scams and the alleged diversion of posts and job appointments to the economically and politically stronger Western districts and tribes. Unlike the popular interpretation pattern that makes the historical journey of Christianity from West to East responsible for the comparative underdevelopment of the Eastern districts, they regard their "backwardness" as the outcome of corrupt politics and favouritism by the dominant Western tribes. This discourse has given rise to the demand of a new state of "Eastern Nagaland" in the recent years. Despite the different explanatory discourses (underdevelopment vs. social closure) on inter-tribal inequality, the proposed solution follows the same ethos of tribal separatism that is alleged to be the root of the problem, at the heart of which lies the prevailing patrimonial and neo-patrimonial ethos in which allegiance is furthermost owed to the own tribal or sub-tribal group – whichever can provide access to the state economy. Indeed, one could state that a certain degree of patrimonialism is considered normal by almost everybody and can be seen in the general practice of providing gifts to teachers on teachers' day and even bureaucrats for the satisfactory processing of one's cases. On the other hand, neo-patrimonialism, which replaces personal ties with monetary transactions, clearly violates the general understanding of group solidarity that exists among the Nagas, as it replaces the end of group welfare with individual enrichment for its own sake. Cases of bureaucrats who *ask* payment for public services have been widely discussed in the recent years, and social networks have significantly contributed to the fast distribution of such cases – and even some direct repercussions on the concerned officials that are not high enough in the hierarchy to be basically untouchable. Corruption in the above sequence is mainly seen as a *moral* problem, for which the "ethos of education" as a moral self-transformation is

presented as a universal solution and becomes legitimated through the "discourse of service" to the common good of the society.

### *"Openness" and "hedonism" as orientations outside the work sphere*

One interesting facet especially with young Naga men is that while different orientations exist regarding the work sphere, the ethos and ends of other social spheres, especially when it comes to social norms based on Christianity and the value of modern education, are hardly questioned. Indeed, the "interest-led explorative" distinguishes itself from the other types also through this non-work orientation that I have characterised as "openness". The following sequence, in which Imsong describes his experience of New Delhi compared to his state:

> *I:* aehm about living in delhi aehm (.) what would you say is aehm what is different in living here rather than in nagaland?
> *R:* it is so (.) so (.) different (.) like aeh starting from you know(.) the basic social structure to economy (.) to opportunities (.) and even to know about so many things about (.) de- modernity and development its so (.) the difference is so vast (1) things which i never knew existed in life (.) or i never heard in life (.) you know i came over here and then i started to know about it (1) it's not just not delhi (.) it's even in calcutta you know (.) it is every day (.) every day was a learning process for me (.) i started exploring life about the different facets of life (.) so ya it's very different that way (.) technology (.) you know? or even going to a going to a shopping mall (.) to (.) the fast food chain stores(.) going for movies (.) we never had any entertainment pubs (.) you know? its so a=all so different (1) and meeting (.) interacting with different people(.) i always in-i always end up interacting with my own people back home but over here i interact with from all over the world (.) and then (1) its so different ya (3)
>
> (DM1 [17874:18989], PhD student, male, 28 years, New Delhi)

Imsong's "explorative" orientation is very clearly expressed in this section. For him, moving out of the state is experienced as an opening of a world of new opportunities – of practices related to new arrangements (shopping in a mall, eating in a fast-food chain, going for movies in a cinema, having entertainment in a pub) but also of meeting people

from "all over the world", which for him appears to be a positive end in itself.

*Gendered experiences of places and spatial autonomy*

An "explorative" orientation towards the new, including positive evaluations of the Indian metropolises, is however to a certain degree a gendered experience. Asen recalls that despite staying in the protected realm of the campus there were misinterpretations of her behaviour. Her narration is rather specific for the experience especially of female students from North-East:

> *I:* what were the biggest changes for you living in delhi?
> *R:* socially you mean? ya aehm (.) actually i had to change a lot about myself after coming to delhi because (.) aehm (.) you have seen (.) that our society is very open and (.) you know you expect people to be nice (.) and people are nice (.) generally (I:mhm) and when they talk to you (.) they smile (.) they talk to you like you are friends (.) but over here when i came and (.) i've seen since i didn't pay advice (.) even in the campus (.) if i would talk to people like that (.) people would misinterpret (.) the first few weeks i was here (.) ya for a month and a few days (.) aehm i didn't know but later on people told me that (.) oh people think you are a little fast because you talk on very friendly (I:mhm) so that was the first thing i realised that you know you have to be really (.) quiet and curt (.) not talk much (.) and not smile (I:mhm) much so my smiling (.) decreased (.) definitely (.) (laughing) so that was a big change and (.) since i am very expressive it was tough but i had to adapt so maybe (.) i have become more like a snob now (I:mhm) and aehm (.) ya of course you have to (.) adjust to the people here because they come from everywhere and (.) they don't accept you (.) sometimes (I:mhm) so you have to (.) (???) (I:mhm) its not very tough but then you know (.) outside (.) in the campus it has been pretty good (.) but outside it's not very easy (I:mhm) so (.) and what else aehm ya (2)
>
> (DF3 [3867:5336], PhD student, female, 27 years, New Delhi)

Though Asen narrates that she arrived in New Delhi with a similar orientation like Imsong, she felt compelled to change her open and expressive attitude towards becoming a "snob", since "even" in the

campus, a place she regards as otherwise distinct from "outside", her way of being is interpreted as "fast". On the other hand, the perception that women can "be themselves" in Nagaland or among other Nagas is not shared unanimously among women, as Rosemary's evaluation clearly shows. Since her life and perception is embedded within global rather than more localised milieus, she feels that it is not possible to find an eligible partner in Nagaland:

*I:* aehm what do you think how or where do you find such a such a person?

*R:* (laughing) definitely not in nagaland (.) definitely not in nagaland (laughing)

*I:* can you explain that?

*R:* [..] (laughing) i (.) definitely not in nagaland i=i'm very sorry to say but (.) aehm there's a vast difference between men and women here in nagaland (I:mhm) and the men have aehm because of culture their minds have been made up in such a way that they have (.) also the expectations but (.) see basically i have not been growing up here in nagaland (I:mhm) so i have not really been in touch with my roots or my culture (I:mhm) so (.) aeh and because i have not grown up in the rural aeh settings (I:mhm) i've been in the urban (.) town (I:mhm) and then i have lived outside a lot i told you so it's a aeh mindset that becomes so aeh not like a naga but more not even like indian (I:mhm) but so (.) kind of like exposed you know in the international level that aeh (I:mhm) at the end of the day (.) it doesn't really matter whether i'm a naga or a [tribe] or maybe i'm an indian or what (I:mhm) it's all that matters is i'm a human being right? (I:mhm) but that's not what people have here (.) in their mentalities (.) especially the men (I:mhm) they are very caught up i'm a naga (I:mhm) and i'm a [tribe] (.) and a [tribe] girl is supposed to be this (I:mhm) so they started putting all this aeh expectations on women or what a woman should be (I:mhm) but (.) i cannot help it (.) i mean i cannot come in that box (I:mhm) so therefore my ideal guy and their ideal person will never come into the same category (I:mhm) because i believe in aehm you know the choice that i make (I:mhm) and i believe the choice i make the aeh partner should respect that and the choice my partner makes i should respect that (I:mhm) but here the guys don't think that way (.) they think culture has done something to humans admitting their culture but not their choice (I:mhm) but i feel

> that if i'm not- if i'm not alive then there would be no culture (I:mhm) culture is there because i'm alive (I:mhm) so how can they put culture above me? (I:mhm) but that's the other way they think (I:mhm) and for me i go party i smoke i drink (I:mhm) you know and that's something (low voice) which my mother should never scent so (end low voice) ya i'm the (laughing) i'm the worry child (.) i'm the guy here (laughing) (I:ok)
>
> (CF1 [35811:38236], social worker, female, 34 years, Dimapur)

After her initial surprise about the question, we learn about Rosemary's classification system. First, she makes a clear distinction between men and women, where she argues that men in Nagaland are culturally determined to have a certain expectation. This explanation is not carried to its conclusion but instead the argumentation changes ("see basically") by switching from gender categories to a geographic argument that focusses not on the other (Naga men) but on herself and aims to explain her difference through her socialisation outside Nagaland, switching again to the difference between the rural and the urban. Though we do not know yet about the content of the difference, she is clear that the principal "other" to herself is at the same time male, from Nagaland and from a rural area, while she identifies with the outside and the urban, the "exposed" versus the "remote". Her classification through homologous opposites, as can be clearly seen, bears a close relationship with the dual oppositions of "developmental discourse" and its universalism ("it doesn't really matter whether i'm a naga or a [tribe] or maybe i'm an indian or what [I:mhm] it's all that matters is i'm a human being right?"). From this climax the argumentation goes back again and now takes on content: people here (in Nagaland), men, are particularistic about ethnic and tribal affinity, and impose normative constraints on women, using a patriarchal interpretation pattern of pre-colonial Naga culture. This "neo-traditional discourse" according to Rosemary restricts the spatial autonomy of women ("i cannot come in that box") in order to preserve their particularistic ethnic or tribal esteem. The conclusion – irreconcilable orientations and interpretation pattern between her and (rural) Naga men ("so therefore my ideal guy and their ideal person will never come into the same category") – is then justified with an individualist or rather "socio-liberal" discourse, which stresses "mutuality" as a partnership ideal. This discourse is again opposed to the "societist" social ontology of Naga men ("they think culture

has done something to humans admitting their culture but not their choice") which she rejects based on her "feeling" of the importance of the individual. The rejection of "neo-traditional discourse" is also practical ("for me i go party i smoke i drink"), and by affirming these practices that emphasise hedonism as a legitimate end for her.

As usual in patriarchal societies, the burden of morality among the Nagas is carried mainly by the women, while the norms are more loosely interpreted for men. The "ban" on marriages between Naga women and non-Naga men (but not between Naga men and non-Naga women) that was issued by the Naga Student's Union some years back is a case in point. It is important to see that these paternalistic-patriarchal norms are not "traditional", as dancing, smoking and drinking were – according to all ethnographic sources – important practices that belonged to communal feasts of pre-colonial Naga societies. Rather, these norms are "imported" from 19th-century European Pietism or Victorianism, as I would argue, which were introduced to the Nagas via American Baptist missionaries. Though church-related organisations allowed new ways of women's participation in the public sphere (especially in the form of the powerful Mothers' associations), the Christian milieu has simultaneously restricted (unmarried) women's participation in others. Young women suffer here from the intersection of patriarchy and gerontocracy, as one can argue from an inter-sectional perspective (Crenshaw 2001, cf. Winker and Degele 2009), being denied their own choices either because they are women or because they are yet unmarried.

Since neither the village milieu nor the Christian milieu defines contemporary Naga society completely, as I argue in this study, other milieus connected to pop culture, consumerism or global work milieus open new ways of participating in practices and offering positive identities for its – often female – members. Modern consumerism and hedonism, usually interpreted as cultural alienation by conservative Nagas, are however arguably closer to pre-colonial Naga culture than early modern Victorianism. The difference however is that its structural connection to the communalism of Naga village culture has been replaced by the de-territorialised individualism of global pop culture.

As has been shown in the previous chapter, going out for drinks is by no means an individual practice but is rather widespread among the age-group of my sample. Nevertheless, it is a practice that has not yet found a public discourse to justify its ends in the public inter-discourse of Nagaland. It is however likely that the group of geographically mobile professionals will take a more active role in shaping public inter-discourse among the Nagas, as they want to defend their

life-style against the orthodoxy – though mainly against the own parents. With the spread of industrial capitalism, it is likely that the distinction between the working week and the free week-end, especially for the private employed, will also become more prominent. This temporal structure is however still much less pronounced in the cultivating and bureaucratic work classes that are likely to remain dominant in Nagaland for some time.

Though Rosemary's work orientation frame is rather more "pragmatic" than "interest-led", there is a close similarity with the "socio-liberal discourse" of Imsongba and Toshi, revealing a certain affinity and overlap in this dimension between both types. At the same time her example shows how *spatial autonomy* as a central resource of social mobility in modern work milieus is strongly gendered in India. Restricting spatial as well as temporal mobility (like being outside the house during the night) is indeed one major feature of male domination in India. And even though young Naga women generally experience this restriction as less strict within their state and society, gendered norms are still experienced very strongly.

### *Type IV: "resigned redirecting"*

The fourth type is quite different from the other three types, as it is characterised mainly by the absence of orientations rather than a specific type thereof. In the sociological discussion, it has been treated within the concept of "anomie", a concept that became famous with Émile Durkheims analysis of suicide (Durkheim 1951) and was later elaborated by Robert K. Merton (Merton 1938, 1968). Merton distinguished between "culturally defined goals, purposes and interests" comprising "a frame of aspirational reference" (Merton 1938, p. 672) as a first dimension and "moral or institutional regulation of permissible and required procedures for attaining these ends" (ibid., p. 673). Anomie arises when a dissociation arises between these two dimensions, as when institutional considerations for attaining a goal become replaced by mere technical considerations, or in the opposite case, when the ends of activities become transmuted and are replaced by an obsessive and "ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct" (ibid., p. 673). With regard to a specific end, such as the ends engendered by a practice milieu, he distinguishes five modes of adjustment that can be made by individuals towards both ends and means: conformity (accepting ends and means), innovation (accepting ends, not means), ritualism (rejecting ends, accepting means), retreatism (rejecting both ends and means) and rebellion (rejecting both and

replacing by new goals and standards) (ibid., p. 676). Since Merton regards these forms of adjustment always as related to the integration into specific "spheres of conduct" rather than to "personality *in toto*" (emphasis in original; ibid., p. 676), it is highly compatible with the practice-theoretical framework adopted here.

Adopting Merton's schematic typification for the type of "resigned redirecting", they clearly refer to the modes of "retreatism" as well as "rebellion", though the existence of multiple milieus leads rather to an orientation I would call "redirecting" by shifting the focus of activity and aspiration towards a different milieu. In the case when other ends are not embraced as a substitute, severe experiences of anomie can be the result, including retreat from several milieus and involvement in alcohol or drug abuse. Due to the nature of this type it was difficult to find interviewees who were willing to talk about their life, and for those who have been disadvantaged generally the difficulty to converse in English has been an additional barrier. My interviewees of this type were hence young Nagas that had graduated even outside Nagaland but for various reasons returned to stay at home without employment. In the language I prefer to use here, the "resigned redirecting" type is characterised by the following characteristics:

1 Previous career aims or paths have been given up or have become unreachable
2 Future orientation is restricted to living in the moment or having aims that are disconnected from means
3 Alternatively, leaving the milieu and re-orientation at new goals
4 Relocation to family place and restricted spatial autonomy

*Previous aims have been given up or have become unreachable*

One typical case of this type is Asang's current orientation after having given up his job in New Delhi some years before. He was 28 years old at the time of the interview, unemployed and lived in a small one-room flat in Kohima, where I met him together with a common friend who had arranged the meeting. He was immediately ready to help me out and made a sad, but at the same time humorous and ironic impression during the interview. Even in sad parts of his life story, he provoked common laughter. His answers were very short and almost lead to an interrogation pattern, and it clearly was not too pleasant for him to return to some facets of his life. It was only when he described his former job in Delhi that he became more detailed in his answers. After

talking about his family, marked by the divorce of his parents and the later demise of his father during his stay in Delhi (which he did not interrupt for the burial), the interview focussed on his transition sequence after school.

*I:* if you look back, which were the most important experiences in your life?
*R:* (3) i don't really remember any experiences like that (I:mhm) (2) most important will be changing schools (I:mhm) i went to (???) school (I:mhm) with his brother (I:mhm) (2) it was a military school (I:mhm) (2) very nice atmosphere (.) very good facilities (I:mhm) (2) teachers were of very high standard (.) so i had a very good education i should say (I:mhm) after (.) i went to delhi after my twelfth (I:mhm) and i was in [university] (I:mhm) in [college] (I:mhm) did my graduation (.) come back (.) and now im (.) unemployed (I:mhm) i changed (.) i went for (???) when i was employed [all laughing] (I:mhm)
*I:* alright (.) aehm (.) in delhi (.) your graduation (.) was it in any specific subject?
*R:* actually i was in science (.) botany (I:mhm) then i changed to general (I:mhm) that's about it (I:mhm)
*I:* and when was that? when did you come back from delhi?
*R:* i came back about (.) three years ago (.) i was working there (I:mhm) for aeh for a year and a half i guess (2) then i got very sick (I:mhm) and i had to come back (1)
*I:* where was that? where did you work?
*R:* i was working in a fashion house (I:mhm) it was from [company] (I:mhm) their main (?big sale?) was (.) clothes (.) accessories and then (.) export type (I:mhm) (2)
*I:* ok (.) and what did you do there?
*R:* i was in merchandising (I:mhm) i was in [quarter in Delhi] (I:mhm)

(CM7 [664:2102], unemployed, male, 28 years, Kohima)

After describing the details of his daily work there, which were analysed above as an example of the "pragmatic" type, he continues with the situation that lead him to quit the job in New Delhi. Besides his health and the "stress" at the job, his mother also had an influence on his decision to go back to Nagaland. Interestingly, this meant leaving

behind his job without having an alternative back home where he could continue working.

*I:* and how did you like the job (.) like generally?
*R:* it was a nice job actually (I:mhm) but the stress was too much (I:mhm) going at meeting everything (I:mhm) so (.) i think my health got like- (I:mhm) so i quit the job (1)
*I:* you had to quit because of the-
*R:* ya (.) very hectic (.) i don't know like that aeh caps accessories and all (I:mhm) ya that will be like the (.) best job ever i think (I:mhm) because it had so much promise (I:mhm) i wish i could (.) i was doing that right now (.) rather than sitting around at home (I:mhm) (2)
*I:* ok back then, if you think what you had to do in that job (.) right? (.) and if you compare it to the money which you earned (.) do you think it was-
*R:* nononono the money was not good (.) [I: was not good?] no was not good (.) it did not match up to the work level (I:mhm) I: how much did they pay you?
*R:* ten thousand [I: ten thousand?] no incentives (.) nothing (1) [..] I: so how did it come that you finally decided to come back?
*R:* i got very sick (I:mhm) like i said (.) dengue you call it dengue (I:mhm) i was in the i c unit for two three days and hospitalised for two weeks maybe (I:mhm) (I:mhm) my mum (.) she was like begging me to come (I:mhm) i relented [all lauging] (I:mhm)
*I:* so then you said you came back three years back-
*R:* yes actually (.) hmm april of last year (I:mhm) on the eighteen something like that (I:mhm)
*I:* so like after coming back here like what did you do then?
*R:* i was applying for exams (I:mhm) but (2) i didn't do it with much conviction i guess (I:mhm) i was not working hard enough (2) but im (.) i'll try (I:mhm)
*I:* so (.) even right now you are still like preparing for exams and everything or do you have (.) do you have other plans right now?
*R:* right now there is nothing to do anyways (2) i'm not doing anything (2)

(CM7 [2838:4954], unemployed, male, 28 years, Kohima)

In this longer part Asang describes the transition from his "very good education" to his actual state of unemployment. The similarity, but also the difference, to Athrong are clearly visible here. Unlike Athrong, Asang directly started working in a private company after his graduation, a job that he describes as very tough, stressful and badly paid, but which he nevertheless considers as the "best job ever" and clearly prefers it to his current situation of doing "nothing". Though he describes here his sickness caused by the dengue virus as the turning point, other factors are also given that contributed to his resignation and return. First, a general state of bad health caused by an unhealthy work condition, high rental prices and bad payment, making him "drained" already before starting the work in the morning. Second, the role of the mother who "begged" him to return after the sickness. His statements about the time he returned to Delhi are interesting here, as he first claims to have returned three years ago, but then provides even an exact date of return only about more than than one year before. Whichever is the actual time he returned, one can sense a certain alienation from a clearly structured and timed biographical narrative, in which not only dates but years have become rather insignificant markers of time. His efforts to apply for exams after returning were unsuccessful until now, which he accords due to his missing "conviction" and "hard work", which he emphasis again in the end by his statement that "there is nothing to do".

Both Asang and Athrong experience their current situation in an orientation frame of "resignation", which is marked especially by the absence of any meaningful practices: both have "nothing" to do and suffer from an anomic situation that clearly puts them in a difficult emotional and psychological state of despair, without any clear idea of how to get out of it. Though it cannot be "proven" here, Asang's confusion about the time period he stayed in Kohima after returning from Delhi might be a sign of losing the attachment to a linear idea of time, as every day repeats itself – he remembers the exact date only in the end of the sequence, triggered by a conscious effort to answer the question.

The breakdown of a career path despite a continuing acceptance of its aim has also been an important turning point for Rosemary. After her brother passed away suddenly, she returned to her parents' home and had to give up her new job in Mumbai. In hindsight, she narrates her experience after having returned home, a situation marked by traumatic turning points in several social spheres: work, family and partnership:

*I:* like where you are based and=and what you are doing right now?
*R:* ok so everything is like so (laughing) interrelated (.) ever since i came back from mumbai 2010 (I:mhm) that year was a very

> challenging year for me aeh ups and downs and (.) ver- unexpected and (.) how many plans i had with my brother but aeh he not being here was a trauma and shock (I:mhm) we did not expected that so (.) as a person (.) personally i did (.) go through some depression (I:mhm) i was battling with depression and aeh to be ho-to be very honest it went to a border where i you know even wanted to end my life (I:mhm) and plus i have aeh lost aeh relationship and marriage and now family (I:mhm) and so it was too much for me to handle (I:mhm) and then aehm and in plus again i had to give up my job my career (I:mhm) so now to start from the scratch was so you know aeh stressful (.)
>
> (CF1 [19171:19978], social worker, female, 34 years, Dimapur)

As outlined above, this anomic situation changed after getting an opportunity to work part-time in Nagaland in a field related to her previous job. In her case, the "resigned" orientation was then successively replaced by a "pragmatic re-active" towards a "pragmatic proactive" orientation. In the case of Athrong analysed above, it was not a turning point but rather a "downward spiral", which started by a re-orientation from the administrative towards the private milieu and finally to the non-work milieu of the students' union that lead to his current "resigned" orientation. For Asang, the sequence into his resigned state was induced by the turning point of hospitalisation in New Delhi in combination with what I call "dwelling discourse" and his family orientation, making him follow the call of his mother to return to Nagaland.

Often, giving up a certain career path is caused by both personal orientations and changes arising in the specific social environment within a work milieu. This is exemplified by Vihoto, who expresses a certain indecisive orientation after having finished his MA in New Delhi:

> and aeh after that i came to delhi for my masters (I:mhm) and (.) after masters i was aeh in a dilemma (I:mhm) whether i should join a law college (I:mhm) because i had a (1) like aeh for this (.) law na (I:mhm) but aeh some people were applying for [university] so (.) i just applied with them and fortunately i got through and (I:mhm) they took me there otherwise aeh i had no intention to go for aeh academics (.) or for further studies as such (I:mhm) (1) and aeh (.) there is another angle like (.) i was also interested in these exams of (.) law na (I:mhm) so (.) it was a kind of (.) indecision (I:mhm) maybe those (.) maybe na guidance (.) or (.) maybe i

was not ready to take up the challenge but (I:mhm) in a way i was glad that it became these further studies (.) taking exams (I:mhm) and like (1) life became a bit (.) easy (I:mhm) but there i think i (???) (2)

(CM8 [4540:5413], unemployed, male, 30 years, Kohima)

In this passage, Vihoto narrates how the post-educational transition phase presented a sort of crisis for him, as he had no pre-defined orientation towards any specific work milieu after that. Since he was doing his MA in New Delhi, his problem is therefore not that the means to reach a defined goal have become unavailable, but that the ends are undefined despite the availability of the means (a good education) – leading to "ritualist" orientation where he followed his friends even though he "had no intention to go for aeh academics (.) or for further studies as such". For an alternative end (sitting for law exams) he did not have the emotional means ("maybe i was not ready to take up the challenge"). Since the means for higher studies were there, entry was not a problem ("taking exams"), though there was only a low emotional integration into the milieu ("life became a bit (.) easy").

*I:* an then (.) what happened aeh after your MA?

*R:* after ma i got through [university] (I:mhm) and it was initially (.) very productive experience (I:mhm) for once i realised like (.) these professors were serious (I:mhm) and even the students were serious (I:mhm) and because aeh the classroom population was small (I:mhm) there was ample opportunity to have a good professional relationship with the (.) professors as well as with the classmates (I:mhm) and there was a good competition and (.) i was actually doing very well during my mphil days there (I:mhm) phd was kind of a problem for me (.) (I:mhm) because i wanted to do something related with the north-east (I:mhm) and my prof- aeh my guide actually my first guide was (.) he got the vice chancellor of [university] (I:mhm) so i got assigned to another guide who was a specialist on bangladesh (I:mhm) an all the proposals i brought- i brought to him were (.) systematically rejected (I:mhm) mhm so he wanted to somehow bring me to bangladesh and i really got (.) on bangladesh (I:mhm) and (.) the thing is (1) apart from my own personal failings like the (.) thesis for a phd (.) even for mphil (.) requires so much of work (I:mhm) requires so much discipline (I:mhm) and that is why i couldn't like (.) and the most important thing for it is (.) you have to love for

> what you are doing (I:mhm) you see (.) a potential (.) you have a direction where you are going (.) and (.) somehow that was also missing (I:mhm) so (.) it became like (.) aeh (.) i was forcing myself to do that thing and (.) not actually loving it as much as i should (I:mhm) and i think that is also a major problem (.) apart from that ya i became (.) like that (.) and i didn't see any potential for me to draw through that title break from the phd something further up again (I:mhm) mhm (.) ah i became increasingly (.) aeh disheartened (I:mhm) by what i was doing (.) ah i lost interest actually (I:mhm) and plus there was also the pressure of aeh sitting for the civil service exams (I:mhm) both from within and from back home (I:mhm) because aeh (.) all my siblings they are all in different lines (I:mhm) although they have done reasonably well (I:mhm) none of- none of them are really this (.) still (I:mhm) so everyone wanted me to do this (.) plus even i had this long term (.) plan to sit for civils exams during that time (I:mhm) even my parents (.) even my dad called me up and said ah (.) phd you can do it later (.) aeh sit sit for exams also (.) aeh i also agreed with him (I:mhm) and end my studies and i said ok (I:mhm) mhm (2)
>
> (CM8 [6491:9058], unemployed, male, 30 years, Kohima)

In this follow-up narration, the first theme deals with the integration into the higher education milieu, which was experienced as very successful by Vihoto as long as the conditions were sufficiently structured ("serious", "professional relationship", "good competition") during his MPhil, which is based on regular course-work along with a final thesis in India. Problems arose with the transition to the PhD level, where the mismatch between orientation and milieu ends became apparent. As practice theory argues, involvement into a practical milieu requires not only an orientation towards its ends but includes emotional states as well as practical norms that define, not necessary formally, how these ends must be achieved and whether they are achieved at all. Due to the hierarchical structure of defining normativity in academics, Vihoto is faced with a situation that requires him to give up this emotional attachment to his topic ("i wanted to do something related with the north-east") and replace it with that of his new guide. In this situation, his already rather volatile attachment to the larger milieu – which is needed to bring up the discipline for the rather unstructured phases of writing the theses – lost its apparentness

("i became increasingly [.] disheartened [I:mhm] by what i was doing [.] ah i lost interest actually") along with the more strategic and conscious imagination of a possible future within the milieu as a *work* milieu ("and i didn't see any potential for me to draw through that title break from the phd something further up again").

As it becomes clear in the following lines, Vihoto also involves his family in the decision about his career path. His explanation reveals the normative expectation that at least one of the siblings should be "this". Since all other siblings have achieved only what is "reasonably well", the family expects him to achieve the more-than reasonable – getting a higher government job through competitive exams ("sit sit for exams also"), which unlike academic degrees is an aim within the work sphere that is almost universally shared ("so everyone wanted me to do this"). It is not difficult to understand that the security and status attached to a high government position are not only important from the individual point of view, but in fact determine the security and the status of the whole family. Vihoto's decision to quit PhD and return to Nagaland without any immediate job opportunity confirms the "family orientation" that can be seen among almost all Nagas. Besides the obvious emotional dimensions of family orientation, it involves on the structural level the exchange of providing food and shelter with the alignment of one's aims with the expectations of the larger family. In the case of Vihoto, his increasingly resigned orientation during higher education is thereby re-directed towards a new goal – securing a government position. Government jobs are most of the time understood as a position and a way of being ("none of them are really this") rather than a specific practice, which is rooted in the allocation system of the competitive exams, where the actual work sub-milieu (administration, police, transport, etc.) is determined solely on the score achieved by the exams. Hence, government jobs express less a specific form of work but rather a level within the hierarchy (administration on the top, police or transport comparatively lower), or sub-hierarchy (Superintendent, Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner etc.), ranks that even children can bring into the right order.

### *Milieu re-orientation and spatial relocation*

Both Rosemary and Vihoto have overcome their relative anomie through relocating with the family and investing into alternative ends. For Ketovi, it is the support and prospect of securing a job through his wife's family that offers him a new aim, despite his rather ritualistic

adherence to the training scheme provided by the government – a scheme that does not seem to fit the work orientation of Ketovi. For Athrong and Asang, the "resigned" orientation has stabilised, but there are also clear differences between them that refer to orientations towards other dimensions outside the work milieu.

Athrong's transition sequence is mainly dealt with by an orientation frame emphasising his role in the students' union, one that guides his practice even in the present situation of unemployment ("fifty percent"). I would speak here of an "organisational orientation", as position and function within an institutionalised organisation provide the ends for his practical engagement, articulated in an interpretation pattern that emphasises his aim to "serve my people" and "contribute to the society". I call this interpretation pattern the "discourse of service", a discourse that subordinates the own practice symbolically to an "imagined" community (Andersen) of the tribe or society.

For Asang on the other hand, organisational involvement does not play any role at all. Although he only mentions it in a short comment, it is the relation to the mother – to whose "begging" he "relented" – that provides the orientation frame of his return. The conflict between his emotional attachment to the job, which he repeatedly states, and the wish of his mother to return to the state, is resolved by taking over her interpretation frame. Interestingly, he does not explicitly question his mother's intervention at all, though the relation of "begging" and "relenting" during the decision reveals a clear opposition of interests. Since he finally takes over the perspective of his mother, we can speak of a "family orientation" that is ultimately stronger than his "career orientation". His justification and explanation for the return can be regarded as one rooted in a "discourse of dwelling", an emotional attachment to a specific place that gains salience especially during existentially important phases and events – like the critical dengue infection and intensive care hospitalisation that befell Asang in Delhi. According to this "discourse of dwelling", existential crises call for a return to "home" and afford the company of socially close members of family and group.

Athrong, on the other hand, makes no mention of his family members regarding his current situation. For Asang, the "family orientation" is crucial for understanding the transition into unemployment, which is communicated through a "discourse of dwelling". Triggered by his severe illness, the "family orientation" replaced his "meritocratic" and forward-looking orientation towards his hard, but "promising", job, though he makes no secret of his wish to return to the job in Delhi in the absence of meaningful alternative practices in Kohima.

*Vague future orientation*

Mary, female and 27 years old, worked in a small xerox shop in Dimapur. She graduated outside Nagaland and returned to Dimapur, where she stayed together with her brother. She was first reluctant to give an interview[5] but then agreed for a timing some days later, where she told me about the time after her graduation, where she was first unemployed and then took up the small job at the xerox shop, which always used to be empty and which reminded me of the comparatively high costs for rather simple services in Nagaland (where I paid 10 Rs./copy compared to 1–2 Rs./copy in New Delhi):

*I:* after you finished your graduation, as you said, what happened then?

*R:* then (.) actually (.) i am not searching for government job i'm very (??) and religious (I:mhm) i mean aehm (.) missionary work like that i wanted to do (I:mhm) that's why i don't search for (.) government job (I:mhm) i was planning for this IAS na? (I:mhm) after graduation i wanted to go to delhi (.) JNU delhi na? (I:mhm) and then i didn't go (.) i had second thoughts and then just wanted to do missionary work (I:mhm) so (.) I: and what about missionary work?

*R:* actually i work in this prayer group na? (I:mhm) ya(.) (laughing) mostly in my mothers (.) i'm the only one it's not more yet (.) i used to plan only (laughing) (I:mhm) and then (.) we used to pray we used to go to church (.) it really works (.) it really works through our prayers na (I:mhm) that way

(CF4 [600:1362], xerox shop assistant, female, 27 years, Dimapur)

Mary directly explains what she is not looking for and describes herself as being "religious" and her aspiration to do missionary work. Going for a government job appears to her as the standard against which she has to defend herself, even though she initially aspired for an IAS post (the highest public service post in India) as well as studying at a reputed university in New Delhi ("JNU Delhi na?"). However, the plan to go to New Delhi was given up for unknown reasons ("i had second thoughts") and replaced by the plan to become a missionary – although it turns out that her work in a prayer group only consists of her mother and her. It is important for her to point out that there is a certain success ("it really works") in her prayers, even though she does not elaborate further what that success consist of. At the end of the

interview, she provides an example of the success of her prayers and after she "found god":

> *I:* how does a typical day look for you?
> *R:* ya before finding god i used to be bored (.) i used to feel (??) (.) i used to have (??) about god (I:mhm) but since i found god it's all gone ya (.) i don't feel bored (.) just do my work and go home (.) just like that (2)
>
> CF4 [3031:3280], xerox shop assistant, female, 27 years, Dimapur)

Even though the traffic on the road made it difficult to understand parts of the recorded interview, it is clear that her involvement in praying practices plays an important role in her life. The disjunct between her rather high initial aspirations – becoming an IAS and studying at JNU – and her current activity is certainly high and might explain why she feels compelled to explain why she is not aiming for a government job any more. Despite the very sparse conversation, her religious aspirations are presented as a legitimate alternative to her initial aims to engage in higher education and apply for NPSC or UPSC exams. Although we do not get to know of any concrete future plans regarding the work sphere (which were asked for later), her religious involvement achieves to give relative meaning to her daily life ("since i found god it's all gone ya (.) i don't feel bored") that was missing before ("before finding god i used to be bored"). Her initial "resigned" orientation ("bored") was replaced or rather amended by orienting herself towards the religious milieu.

As the first sequence documents, the Christian milieu is very important in Nagaland, as it appears to be on a par with higher education or government jobs regarding social recognition. Her initial self-justification indeed expresses a discomfort with her current situation, which she mentions with no word. As church-related practices were shown to be the only milieu where women are more active than men, Mary's re-orientation towards the Christian milieu could also be a gendered response to a "resigned" orientation. Nevertheless, this orientation persists despite her current job, which is framed by her as a mechanic and trivial activity ("just do my work and go home").

Asked about his future, Athrong reveals his concrete future plans in the personal realm, in which he plans to "settle down". Settling down usually means to get married and live in one's own house, if possible:

> *I:* and what is your plan now (.) what do you want to do for yourself?

*R:* ya (.) everyone got plan but (.) (I:mhm) it has to be differ from others (laughing) my plan (.) is to settle down (I:mhm) to settle down and (.) ya 1 ill think after it after settling down (I:mhm) i have to plan up

(BM2 [5345:5642], unemployed, male, 34 years, Kiphire Town)

Asking concretely about specific plans regarding the work sphere, Athrong explains his dislike for private jobs and his vague plan to involve in some private business in construction works.

*I:* so you have any plan to apply for a job or to go for exams or anything?

*R:* i have tried exams but aeh i couldn't make it (I:mhm) but and (.) for job to aeh (.) they told me even my friends they told me to (.) sit for a job but aeh (.) i din't go for it (I:mhm) because (.) aeh some may think that job is very secure (I:mhm) but aeh in my opinion (.) i don't think so (I:mhm) if its a big job (.) working in a company something like that (I:mhm) then it can (.) they can survive (I:mhm) but thinking about the salary and so on (.) i think it won't survive (I:mhm) my needs (.) so i was thinking i won't go for a job but aeh (.) i better do myself (.) just go here and there and seek some assistant to organise some event (I:mhm) or (.) if there is some guys to help me out and i have to go for (.) this construction (.) if that is possible (I:mhm)

(BM2 [5643:6516], unemployed, male, 34 years, Kiphire Town)

In this passage, Athrong describes how his initial aim to secure a government job has failed, though he still feels attached to the security and financial income that a government job provides.

Since private jobs do not fulfil any of these aims in his perception, he opts for taking up business, though he requires other people to help him with that ("seek some assistant", "if there is some guys"). It is important here to understand the typical practice of taking up businesses in construction within Nagaland. Most of the time, it depends fully on applying for projects at the government, not on the private market, as the state government outsources most of the infrastructural works to private companies. These companies exist in various sizes and are classified accordingly to qualify for smaller or larger construction projects. Often, Naga entrepreneurs employ migrants from outside Nagaland,

especially supposedly illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, who have the knowledge to construct concrete buildings and can be made to work even on Sundays, since they are not Christians. As their labour is in high demand for construction, there was a heated debate in the letters to the editor of the newspaper about the usuries of construction workers, who demanded threefold the minimum wage of around 200 Rs. As Athrong tells towards the end of the interview, it is difficult to get a project for him, since he is asked to pay one lakh (100,000) Rs. as a bribe – money he does not have. However, he also has some "friends there", so he hopes they can help him securing a project. The difference between his orientation and the "pragmatic" orientation is that Athrong, due to his higher aspirations, does not take up the chances that are directly available but rather wants to wait to achieve his aim directly – even though it appears that this is completely dependent on other people opening up the chances for him, while he ascribes himself rather passive roles.

### *The social basis of career patterns*

As shown above, the transition of young Nagas into and within the labour market is characterised by a high complexity and insecurity. This experience is not confined to certain classes; unemployment and insecurity about the future are the defining experiences of this generation. For their parents' generation, the socially differentiated but stable alternatives of a life as cultivator, housewife or bureaucrat presented accepted states within the work sphere. A life as a cultivator or housewife has lost its appeal for the present generation and government jobs have become scarce due to educational inflation. The analysis of different economic milieus in Nagaland showed that there are structural economic, political and cultural reasons for these insecurities: state-dependence, a strategic focus on "socially thin" extractive industries and investment of capital in land rather than into agriculture and productive sectors. Given the accumulated insights from the qualitative interviews, we can now connect work orientations with sequence patterns and systematically analyse their relation to work milieus, job aspirations and social origin in order to find empirical patterns and pathways of class production and reproduction.

As can be seen in Table 5.5, there are specific connections between work orientations and the other dimensions. Using work orientations as the base category, it is possible to look at their function for the reproduction and production of class (specifically work class, as it differentiates better between the existential conditions of social origin

*Table 5.5* Work orientations and their social correlates

| *Work orientation* | *Sequence types* | *Work milieus* | *Aspirations* | *Social origin mother* | *Social origin father* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meritocratic planning | **Rupture (3)**<br>**Change (2)**<br>Freeze/bridge (1) | **Government (3)**<br>**Higher education (2)**<br>Profession/internship (1) | **Government (5)**<br>Profession (1) | **Household (3)**<br>**Government (2)**<br>Cultivation/business (1) | **Government (4)**<br>**Politics (2)** |
| Pragmatic reactive/ proactive | **Fusion (5)**<br>**Change (3)**<br>Rupture (1) | **Private (5)**<br>**Business (4)**<br>Government (3)<br>Unemployed/training (2) | **Government (6)**<br>**Business (2)**<br>Private (1) | **Cultivation (3)**<br>**Household (3)**<br>Government (2)<br>Cultivation/business (1) | **Cultivation (4)**<br>**Government (3)**<br>Army (1)<br>Church (1) |
| Interest-led Exploring | **Rupture (1)**<br>**Change (1)** | **Business (1)**<br>**Higher Education (1)** | **Business (1)**<br>**Higher Education (1)** | **Household (2)** | **Government (2)** |
| Resigned redirecting | **Change (2)**<br>**Bridge (1)** | **Unemployed (2)**<br>**Private (1)** | Government (1)<br>Business (1)<br>Church (1) | Government (1)<br>Household (1)<br>Church (1) | **Government (2)**<br>Unknown (absent) (1) |

The most important characteristics are marked bold. The term "profession" is used for strongly regulated work milieus like e.g. lawyers and medical doctors.

and allows the comparison between the generations). A short glimpse at Table 5.5 already reveals that there is no direct connection between social origin and work orientation or social origin and present work milieu – except for *meritocratic planners*. The qualitative results overall confirm the findings from the statistical test of Bourdieu's reproduction thesis in chapter 4, but also reveal that specific groups are nevertheless able to reproduce their class position.

*Meritocratic planners* exhibit the most direct transition sequence of all types and are mainly working in government positions or pursuing higher education degrees. The overall aspiration of this type is to work as a government servant, or alternatively one of the strongly related professions with high social esteem. There is hence a close fit between meritocratic work orientation, being in and/or aspiring for strongly regulated work milieus, and a rather straight and upward sequence type. Looking at their social background, there is a clear pattern, as all of them have at least one of their parents in government service. Two types of parents can be distinguished: a "bourgeois" family pattern with the father occupying a government job and the mother being a housewife, or a "politician" family pattern, where the father is into (risky) politics and the mother works for the (stable) government. Certainly, this orientation is typical for those who may have realistic hopes towards attaining the desired government position, and one could even speak of a discernible social milieu and a pattern of class reproduction. Following mainly the career path of the respective parent with the highest (in social esteem and stability) work class, we can speak of the meritocratic planning orientation and its rather direct transition into reputed higher education institutions as the reproduction pattern of the "established" sections of Naga society. These sections do not strictly follow patriarchal rules, since it does not matter whether it is the father or the mother who has a government job.

It is intriguing to mention the findings of Kedilezo Kikhi's study on the educated youth in Nagaland from 2009. While almost 50% of his sample favoured the post of an administrative official, only 15% actually expected to achieve it. With regard to business and sales jobs, the relation was inverse (6% vs. 18%) (Kikhi 2009, p. 139). There is hence no "amor fati" or "love of fate", as Bourdieu assumed (Bourdieu 2012, p. 173; 241), but rather a cultural process of attraction that leads to straight and satisfying careers for some, and a continuing production of shattered dreams and frustration for most. Though the archetypical "industrialised" or "bureaucratic" career or "railway model" has become the *norm* among young Nagas, it is *normal* only for the small "established" part of them.

With a clear aspiration towards government jobs, security, status and a focussed career path, one would certainly locate this type on the "conservative" side of the cultural dimensions within the "popular" milieu: several interviewees characterised their work aspiration and orientation as being "old-fashioned". This also fits with the high percentage of parents in government service, pointing towards a pattern of work class reproduction among a section of government servants, whereas involvement in social practices does not show any strong tendencies on either side.

The *pragmatic reactive/proactive* type is characterised by a fusion of multiple states as well as complex transition patterns into their present work class. Individuals with a pragmatic orientation are mainly working in private or government jobs, often combined with each other or with an additional involvement into business. Additionally, two interviewees who were unemployed at the time had re-oriented themselves from *resigned* to *pragmatic* orientations. Despite their involvement in private jobs, the main aspiration of this type is nevertheless a government job. For those who achieved it already, it was through more complex trajectories than for meritocratic planners and usually involved previous jobs in the private sector. This type is characterised by a highly diverse social origin. Unlike the other types, there is a high number originating from a "cultivator" family structure that is rooted completely or at least partly in cultivation. Many of them now occupy government positions and have fought their way to the desired work class with great effort, discipline and social relations. Those can be characterised as the "newcomers" among the respected section of the youth. Other typical social origins are "bourgeois" families (father government servant, mother housewife) as well as rather atypical parental work milieus (army, church, business).

Pragmatic orientations in the work sphere are typical for the greatest part of the urban Naga youth. The unstable nature of this social milieu is based on the contradiction between low entry barriers, low institutionalisation and low social esteem of the private sector and the (own or parents') aspiration for a stable and well-paying (government) jobs. Nevertheless, many young Nagas work in the private sphere and some even prefer it to the safe and regulated government jobs, since it allows for higher degrees of personal involvement and satisfaction. The observable pattern that a personal business is only opened after a government or private job has been secured shows that entrepreneurship not only requires a certain affinity and risk-taking attitude, as neo-liberalism proclaims, but similarly a background of "existential security". With growing institutionalisation, those with respective

skills increasingly exhibit "professional careers" and follow the "car model" that involves not attachment to a specific organisation or bureaucratic entity, but a flexible movement within the occupationally defined work milieu. "Entrepreneurial" careers are however rather rare, since business is usually not considered a viable option by itself. "Multiple careers" are taking its place and reflect the comparatively low degree of institutionalisation of the private economy in Nagaland, a pattern that is rather rare in Western countries like Germany with high legal and economic barriers to sustainable self-employment. This section can be characterised as the "pioneers" of the Naga youth, and their market-based position will likely form a counterweight to the state-based "established" sections.

The chance to belong to this pioneering section is however dependent on high skill levels and a high degree of spatial autonomy, which can be a possible barrier for women. This type could be further differentiated into those working in low positions within their field and those working in petty jobs as clerks, helpers or general office staff at relatives' companies with non-fitting qualifications. They can be regarded as the "disappointed" section of the Naga youth because they are not reaching the desired government job that provides security. Rather than a temporary arrangement, they are most likely to stay in their present positions in low private jobs with low chances to ascend the ladder but can nevertheless sustain themselves and lead a respected life.

Looking at the map of cultural differentiation, the highest similarity appears to be with the "materialistic progressive" quadrant and the "ambitious" cultural milieu – especially due to the involvement in several work and practice milieus, the proximity and usage of political networks in some cases as well as a tendency to favour material gains (e.g. multiple jobs rather than enjoying free time). Though aspiration for government jobs is also high in this type, there is also a tendency to aspire to work in the private sphere, where most members of this type are actually engaged in.

The *interest-led exploring* type, which was only reconstructed among two cases, shows also rather direct transitions into their work classes. It is certainly not surprising that in both cases the work milieu (business and higher education) allows for a greater freedom compared to more hierarchical work milieus. Both interviewees see their future in their present field, as future plans and present work usually fall together for this type of orientation. Both have grown up in a "bourgeois" family structure (father government servant, mother housewife) and are furthermore male. Hypothetically, these could be

important determinants for this type, but it would require elaboration by including more cases into future analyses. "Professional" or "entrepreneurial" careers are two likely options for this type, while a "bureaucratic" career is deliberately rejected by this type. This group is the most "individualised" section of the Naga youth, a characteristic that often applies to other spheres of social life, as well.

Locating this type on the map of cultural differentiation is more difficult than for the previous two types, also due to the small number of cases that can be grouped in this type (though these orientations were also observed with other respondents, as subjects do not exclusively exhibit only one orientation in their transition sequences). The "moral-liberal" ethics, especially the opposition to the "neo-patrimonial" ethos, as well as their general "openness" places them in opposition to those aspiring government jobs and exhibiting "conservative", "security"-valuing cultural orientations, though they cannot be clearly assigned to any of the asceticist or materialist poles of the first dimension.

The fourth type of *resigned redirecting* orientations has arrived at the present state, characterised by unemployment and a private petty job, through at least one additional transition or a downward bridging state of part-time employment. Their goals do not show any pattern, but in all three cases they are rather distant from their present state, especially if taking the means to arrive at the desired states are taken into account. It is somewhat surprising that these cases do not come from specifically deprived backgrounds. While failed attempts to arrive at the desired work classes are one reason behind this orientation, another one was due to rather sudden transition points like severe illness etc., which combined with the "discourse of dwelling" led to a break in the previous work state. As has been shown in the analysis, however, some of the cases had experiences of this orientation in their life-course but managed to adopt a "pragmatic" orientation after some time. For most of the cases from cultivating backgrounds this orientation might not be an option at all, as they are compelled to take up a "pragmatic" orientation and cannot fall back on parents with a stable income. This echoes Kikhi's observation that the richer the family background, the less educated young Nagas worry about their future – because they can rely on the family for a long time "during which time he might be able to work out or grab jobs that are more satisfying" (Kikhi 2009, p. 148). This option is not available to those from a poorer background who cannot afford to lose time (ibid., p. 148). While taking care of family and household is still an acceptable option for women, it is more difficult for young men to leave the labour market altogether. It would be certainly wrong to equate this

type with discussions of "social exclusion" or "underclass" in Western sociology, as this type is only excluded regarding the work sphere in an otherwise close-knit society. Nevertheless, this type will gain importance in Nagaland and requires further sociological enquiry. The term "lost generation" that has gained a foothold in news reports to describe educated unemployed youth from Southern European countries with around 50% youth unemployment (e.g. Fiona Govan 2013) probably fits the best. Despite being unemployed or having petty jobs, existent family networks prevent this type from having to beg or to take up badly paid menial and cleaning work.

A look at the overview Table 5.5 shows that this orientation is associated with unemployment or petty employment but not with any job aspiration or involvement in practice milieus outside the work sphere, though there is a tendency to retreat from previous engagements in time-consuming practice milieus like the students' union. But in general, all sorts of cultural orientations appear to be represented in this type showing that it is a state that is not institutionalised yet but remains temporal for many. If unemployment remains for an extended time, one might expect a location within the cultural realm on the "conservative" pole of the second dimension, characterised by social retreat, regarding unemployment as major problem, aspiring "secure" work milieus and probably affinity to traditionalist discourses – a hypothesis that requires further investigation.

## Notes

1 Since India is vastly expanding its higher education system to cater to a growing population, college and university teaching jobs are numerically much more important than in the satiated European system.
2 I owe special thanks to Ronggui Huang, who programmed the free software package RQDA (Huang 2014).
3 All names here are fictional and names of places and institutions were anonymised except in towns and cities. However, I tried to be accurate with respect to gender and tribe of the interviewees in order to retain the information.
4 Unlike MSC or MA, diploma courses are not academic degrees but rather comparable to German further education degrees like those offered by the chamber of commerce (IHK) or vocational training.
5 While young Naga men were almost always ready to be interviewed and talking openly, there were great differences between women. I have not made out where these differences come from, as they cut across education levels and are distinct from mere language problems. The styles of upbringing by their parents or the possibility to articulate themselves in public settings seem to be quite differentiated for girls depending on family and social environment, making it impossible to speak of a single "gendered" orientation or even a narrow type of "Naga femininity".

# 6 Differentiation of culture and class in Nagaland

This book started with the question of how the modern transformation of Nagaland impacts social and cultural differentiation in Nagaland. It looked at the historically evolved contexts of social practice, different cultural attachments, inter-generational class pattern and provided an in-depth analysis of typical careers and life-courses of young Nagas. Especially the transition into the sphere of labour forms an important phase of individuals' life-courses in which structures of inequality – but also idiosyncratic events – play out their influence on the class position that is likely to stabilise after this period.

This chapter now condenses these findings from the previous chapters. The first section looks at the relation between cultural differentiation and class, looking at whether we can find "class milieus" akin to Bourdieu's "Distinction". Results are rather clear in that we should not generalise his claim of a "class habitus" beyond his case study in France. Even though class differentiation exists to differing degrees almost everywhere, it does not necessarily go along with an according cultural differentiation. Not all societies with classes are necessarily "class societies". The cultural articulation of class structures obviously depends on the depth of integration into capitalism. But it also varies according to the specific historical background and competing practical and symbolic milieus that offer alternative identities not based on market criteria. But what other factors contribute to class formation, if it cannot be regarded as a self-propagating mechanism? The latter part of the chapter returns to this question of class production and reproduction and explores further factors that might explain the major class distinctions among the Naga youth. Specifically, it includes possible influences that were not considered by the previously tested theories and are not at the centre of European theories of inequality.

## Cultural differentiation beyond "social milieus"

Beyond class reproduction, a second theoretical argument of Bourdieu's class theory and sections of milieu theory is that cultural differentiation is closely related to the differentiation of class. The question is hence whether the established cultural milieus outside the work sphere are related to specific classes – and might hence constitute implicit cultural capital by expressing the life-style of certain classes. Youth classes were hence projected as supplementary variable within the previously established dimensions of opposing cultural orientations. Figure 6.1 shows the location of the classes within the cultural plane 1–2 from chapter 3. No relations were found with the principal axis 3, which is left out of this analysis.

A first glimpse at Figure 6.1 confirms that there is no obvious relation between class membership and cultural differentiation: the cloud of class memberships is overall very close to the barycentre, indicating that there is no strong differentiation between the classes along the cultural axes. Only two minor, but significant, associations between




*Figure 6.1* Youth class and cultural differentiation (plane 1–2)

class and the two axes can be found. First, the "Low Government" class is related to the asceticist side of principal axis 1, this class hence tends towards the "pious milieu". Second, membership in the "Higher Education" class is associated with higher values on principal axis 2, showing an association to the "progressive" pole, but without a clear tendency towards either the "pious" or the "ambitious" milieus. But altogether, most classes are not very different regarding their cultural position being close to the "average" cultural pattern that is epitomised by the "Unemployed" and "Middle Government" classes.

Beyond statistical significances, it is also visible that higher earning groups are rather on the "materialistic" side with well-earning government servants as well as "Middle Business" owners being associated with the "ambitious milieu". At face value, this inclination is not surprising as these groups might have the time and resources to engage in social and political activities, be expressive about their views and aim to increase their overall influence on society, differing from the "Higher Education" students by their relatively clear materialistic orientation. But not all these class members need to follow the same cultural and practical inclination. The analysis of career sequence pattern showed that there are at least two groups within that class – "meritocratic planning" as well as "pragmatic active" oriented – and especially the "fusion" pattern and the overall orientation of the latter group exhibits a very close similarity to the "ambitious milieu".

On the other side, "Low" and "Middle Employed" classes are relatively closer to the section within the popular milieu that engages below average in the mentioned practice milieus, being in line with the relatively lower status accorded to private employment in public discourse. Overall, this analysis does not support the thesis of a close relation between class and culture. It rather suggests that the process of cultural differentiation is relatively independent from class formation. Nevertheless, the mentioned weak associations require further investigation and research that focusses on the public influence of specific classes and the class background of opinion leaders.

Besides class, I also looked whether cultural patterns relate to factors of symbolic and spatial differentiation, namely gender, mobility scope and place of residence. As above in the case of class, I projected these variables into the cultural plane 1–2 from chapter 3. The results are shown in Figure 6.2 and 6.3.

The strongest distinction can be found between men and women with regard to axis 2 – showing that men are significantly associated with the "progressive" pole, whereas women are situated on the "conservative" side. Not surprisingly, this pattern replicates the division of




*Figure 6.2* Gender, mobility, residence and cultural differentiation (plane 1–2)




*Figure 6.3* Gender, mobility, residence and cultural differentiation (plane 1–3)

work found in the village culture where speaking publicly and occupying important posts were the prerogative of men. And despite the influence of Christianity and modern education, this general cultural pattern persists, although it is now a relative rather than an absolute exclusion from dominant cultural milieus, especially those related to politics. Indeed, a look at the integration profiles shows that church group activity is the only practice milieu where women are on average more engaged than men, showing the contribution of Christianity towards opening important cultural practices to women.

Experienced mobility and place of residence are both significantly associated with all three dimensions, though to a relatively low degree. Interestingly, those without mobility experiences outside the state do not show any clear cultural inclination – e.g. tending towards the "traditionalist" pole of axis 3, as one might suspect. Instead, it is the respondents who stay in the village or those who have already stayed in a different state within North-East India for at least half a year that tend towards the "traditionalist" cultural milieu. As a hypothesis, it might be only on the background of comparison with other North-East Indian states that a "traditionalist" orientation develops upon returning to the village; since living in the village is also significantly associated with the "asceticist" pole of axis 1, this might point towards a cultural opposition within villages between a rather "pious" and a rather "traditionalist" cultural milieu among the youth. Both groups share however a relative opposition to aspiring a political career, liberal views on expressive freedom as well as a consumption-oriented life-style focussed on media, sports and alcohol.

Another interesting opposition can be seen between those staying within the cities in Nagaland and those staying in cities outside the state. Residents of Kohima and Dimapur show rather "conservative" orientations compared to those living in villages and towns, but especially compared to those living in other Indian cities or who were internationally mobile. The cities of Nagaland, as a closer look at the activity pattern shows, appear as a space of relative "cultural vacuum". Participation in the established socio-cultures of church and party politics is weaker than in the villages and towns, while more recent social practices like sports are not as popular as in the cities outside Nagaland (yet). Cities within Nagaland are hence more related to the consumption-oriented and passive practice groups within the "popular" cultural milieu. Positively speaking, they might also allow for a greater degree of privacy and individualism, traits of social life that are hardly known in the villages and towns.

Overall, cultural differentiation proceeds along familiar lines largely determined by the socio-cultures of politics, Christianity as well as symbolic patterns of the village culture. The historically derived symbolic distinctions between men and women, between Baptist asceticism and political-economic materialism persist in the current space of cultural differentiation. Relatively new social practices like going to clubs or engaging in sports are actively pursued mainly outside the state – and all these places distinguish themselves from the "popular culture" that is at the centre of the urban Naga youth: being consumption and privacy-oriented, looking for a stable job preferably in the government sector and worrying mainly about the every-day reality of corruption and unemployment rather than "higher", more abstract societal problems and distinguished aspirations. Only a small section, which can only vaguely be characterised here as living in the villages or with regional mobility experience, regards the past village society as an ideal. Hypothetically, this section might represent those that have become disenchanted with the modernised practice milieus altogether.

## Configurations of class formation

This section re-examines the question regarding class formation in Nagaland. As before, I look at the processes of class formation from three different angles but apply an exploratory rather than a hypothesis-testing perspective. First, the aim is to find the factors that relate to unemployment. The unemployed class largely emerged within the generation under investigation but is of high importance all over India. Unemployment can be understood largely as a product of economic integration and (economic and cultural) rural decline, which have led to massive urbanisation without providing enough job opportunities for those fleeing the life of a cultivator or small-scale farmer. Second, I look at the division between the government and private sector. This distinction is symbolically very pronounced in Nagaland – as I argued, mainly due to the post-colonial heritage of an administrative milieu that was super-imposed on an agricultural society where government jobs provide security and status way beyond the difference in income. Analysis showed that this structural and aspirational division is strongly tied to the spatial realm of Nagaland due to the reservation system, but it was not entirely clear whether we can also see processes of work class reproduction among the government work class. The third angle is to look at the central axis of differentiation in capitalism, the differentiation of income.

Besides the structural parameters tested in chapter 4, I include here "mobility", which was shown to strongly influence career patterns in chapter 5, as well as the "cultural milieus" that were established in chapter 3. Since the aim of this section is purely exploratory, it wants to develop new hypotheses regarding possible factors of class formation, like the qualitative analysis in chapter 5. Further research with different data sources will be needed to further substantiate and test the hypotheses developed here.

Looking at "configurations" of class formation rather than at "general factors" is not only a play of words but involves a different theoretical perspective and new methodological tools compared to standard parametric models. Therefore, I employ tools from a group of models called "decision trees" that have become prominent in machine learning and data mining in recent years, although their applicability is not restricted to large-scale data. Like clustering methods, decision trees aim to find segments of similar people, but like regression models, they distinguish between independent and dependent variables. The aim is to find segments of people that are homogeneous regarding the dependent variable, while each segment is being defined by a hierarchical, tree-like structure according to parameters of independent variables. Unlike parametric models, decision trees are very flexible regarding variable distributions, missing value treatment and measurement scales, which makes them a tool of choice for exploratory data analysis. Their nested structure also accounts for effects, as shown qualitatively with the "meritocratic planners" and the "pragmatics" in chapter 5, that effects like social origin might only exist for a subgroup within government servants, rather than being applicable to all classes. Among the manifold versions of decision tree algorithms, I used the "ctree" function as implemented in the R package "partykit" (Hothorn, Seibold, and Zeileis 2018). Based on the description provided by Hothorn et. al, the algorithm can be described as follows:

1 Test the global null hypothesis of independence between any of the independent variables and the dependent variable(s). Stop if this hypothesis cannot be rejected, else select the independent variable with the strongest statistical univariate association with the dependent variable
2 Implement a binary split of the selected independent variable
3 Recursively repeat steps 1) and 2) until one of the defined stopping criteria is reached

The "ctree" algorithm has the advantage to be based on a conditional inference framework that uses statistical criteria to decide whether a node within the tree should be further split or the process be stopped (cf. T. Hothorn, Hornik, and A. Zeileis 2006). Important variables are hence selected automatically by the algorithm and there is no bias towards certain types of variables as in some other decision tree algorithms. Missing answers in independent variables are as default simply grouped with the majority in any induced split, allowing to include more respondents as in typical parametric models. As shown below, a further advantage of decision trees in general is that they provide understandable graphical output that enables the reader to intuitively grasp the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Especially for structure-discovering analysis this feature is a great benefit over logistic regression etc.

### *Unemployment*

Chapter 4 showed that the theory of class reproduction can be regarded as falsified for the urban Naga youth as a *general* pattern. Respective variables like parent's work class, education and the place of birth did not show a significant influence on unemployment. In the second block which included symbolic inequalities like age, gender, education and place of residence, only (younger) age and residing in a village or city in Nagaland related positively with unemployment. But with an explained variance of between 14.6% and 22.9%, and an improved classification accuracy of about 2% (within-sample), structural explanation of unemployment is rather unsatisfactory. Indeed, the unemployed were also found to be very heterogeneous with respect to their social origin in the qualitative sample. Often, career sequences or stable phases were broken by turning points rather than due to lasting structural patterns, at least on the level of individual analysis. Additionally, the previous section showed that culturally, the unemployed represent the "average" cultural orientation, they are hence similarly heterogeneous within the sphere of cultural differentiation. Can exploratory analysis reveal any further hints at structural determinants for individuals to be unemployed vs. not being unemployed? Figure 6.4 shows the results of decision tree analysis with ctree.[1]

Starting from the top, we can see that the major determining variable for unemployment is age – like the result from logistic regression. People on the right side of the first split, with age above 26 years, show overall lower risk to be unemployed than those on the left side (below/




*Figure 6.4* Decision tree analysis of unemployment

equal to 26 years). Node no. 7 on the right side is further split into two groups (below/equal 33 years and above 33 years), and the percentages of unemployment in the two terminal nodes no. 8 (17.5%) and node no. 9 (3.4%) suggest that the risk to be unemployed decreases again, indeed sharply, after the age of 33. The effect of age on unemployment appears to be rather linear, which is understandable as the chances to find as well as the pressure to take up jobs, even if they are not according to the aspiration, rise over time. Without longitudinal data, it is however impossible to infer the temporal patterns of unemployment. Looking at the left side of the chart, gender appears to have a major effect for the section of the Naga youth below or equal to 26 years. While younger women have a lower risk of unemployment (22.5%) than men of that age, the men are again divided by their place of residence: men of that age-group living in the cities of Kohima or Dimapur have almost double the risk of being unemployed than those living elsewhere. With almost 63% unemployment, men below or equal to 26 years living in the two cities in Nagaland are at the greatest risk of being unemployed, while all those above 33 years – irrespective of other criteria – have by far the lowest risk. The newly introduced variables of mobility and cultural milieu however did not improve our understanding and explanation of unemployment.

Overall, about 19% of the sample (n = 483) are classified as unemployed. If we simply regarded all respondents as not unemployed, we would already have a classification accuracy of about 79%. Though this decision tree model improved the accuracy only by 2% to 81% (slightly less than the logistic regression model [82%] with more parameters on the slightly smaller sample [n = 412]), we have learned something new about possible structural determinants of unemployment among the Naga youth that can be tested in future research studies.

### *Government vs. private sector*

With regard to the intergenerational reproduction of work classes, analysis in chapter 4 provided vague hints towards the reproduction of the government class from fathers to their children. The highest improvement of the chance to work for the government was found if the father works for the church (but the mother does not). Since those among the Naga youth that are working for the church were grouped with the government servants in this analysis due to small total numbers, this relationship is not surprising and might instead point towards a reproduction of the church work class, as well. Here, new fieldwork focussing on the numerically small group of church

employees is necessary. The weak hint at a reproduction of the government work class was partly supported by the analysis of the career sequences. Rather than a general reproduction pattern of government employees, it revealed that there may indeed be a reproduction among certain subgroups. A sizeable proportion of the qualitative sample consisted of "social climbers" with "pragmatic" work orientations and complex career patterns compared to the linear pathways of the "meritocratic planners", who represent the group that mainly accounts for the reproduction of government jobs within the family. Including alternative explanations through symbolic factors like gender, age and place of residence improved the explanatory power of the statistical model again (between 11.4% and 15.3% for social origin alone, 21.6% to 28.9% for the combined model). Of these factors, especially living in a town or, to a lower degree, in a city in Nagaland improved the chance to work for the government significantly. Again, decision tree analysis was conducted to explore further determinants for government vs. private employment or business ownership.[2]

As Figure 6.5 shows, four groups can be distinguished regarding their relative chances to work for the government. A relatively higher chance (63% and 61.5%), compared to the proportion of government employees vis-à-vis the private sector of 54% in the sample, can be found for those living either in Nagaland (numerically the largest group in final node no. 2), or outside Nagaland with an educational level above graduation with honours and with the father working either in the government sector, in cultivation or for the church (node no. 6). Those living outside Nagaland with a degree equal or below honours (node no. 4), or with honours but the father having a business or being a politician (node no. 7), have instead a greater chance of working in the private sphere. This result shows first the influence of the low economic integration and the domination of the government sector in Nagaland described in chapter 2. Without further qualification, the "quality of space" in Nagaland necessitates an inclination towards government jobs. Outside Nagaland, other factors come into play: first, relatively lower education leads rather to private jobs, while higher education rather leads to government jobs – except for those whose father is in business or politics. Based on this sample, reproduction of the government class appears to be mainly restricted to a relatively small group staying outside Nagaland and based on investment into higher education, while else staying outside Nagaland is rather related to the private sector. The relatively large group in node no. 2 with a relatively mixed proportion of government vs. private sector employment suggests that there are further factors at work within




*Figure 6.5* Decision tree analysis of government vs. private sector

Nagaland that were not captured by the chosen variables. Further research and operationalisation of "neo-patrimonial" factors might be able to improve the explanation of differing chances within Nagaland further.

### *Income*

Finally, I aimed to test and answer the question regarding income level, probably the most important factor for class analysis in capitalism. Ordinal logistic regression saw in the class reproduction model significant positive influences for a higher income group if the father is a politician, and if the mother has an educational degree of master level or above. With the addition of symbolic inequality variables, these significances disappeared and instead higher age, male gender and living outside Nagaland (compared to town and city in Nagaland) showed significantly higher chances for better income. Though only the complete model showed significantly improved fit statistics, both models' predicted classification correlated significantly with the actual income levels with a Kendall's tau-b of 0.236 and 0.353, respectively. The exploratory ctree analysis[3] is shown in Figure 6.6.

At first sight, the newly introduced variable "mobility" is most important in determining income level, followed by occupation. Age and gender play a role only on lower, more specific levels. Two of the seven terminal nodes stand out with a large proportion of the lower income category: node no. 3, representing people with relatively low mobility who work for the church or in the private sector belong overwhelmingly to the lowest income category, as well as those with higher mobility but who also work for the church (node no. 13). Low income seems therefore tied to working for the church or working in the private sector in combination with low mobility – which does not mean necessary staying within Nagaland. Second, there are two groups with roughly equal shares of low and medium income. Node no. 5 represents people with low mobility who work for the government or have a business and are below or equal the age of 30 (and whose average income increases after crossing 30 years (cf. node no. 6)), and node no. 10, women who were mobile within India and work in the private, government or business fields. For women, the increased mobility doesn't appear to have a similar pay-off compared to men of the same category, who receive a comparatively higher share of medium and especially high income (node no. 11). The highest average income group, with an exceptionally high chance to be in the highest income category, are those who experienced international mobility and work




*Figure 6.6* Decision tree analysis of income class

in any field but the church. Interestingly, it is not just the place of residence but the scope of mobility that determines the height of income for the Naga youth, followed by the work milieu – where working for the church is independently related to lower income. The analysis suggests that unlike the result of ordinal logistic regression, age and gender do not play a general role for income but only within the mobility groups. Compared to the ordinal logistic regression, this ctree-model shows a large improvement in the classification correlation with a highly significant Kendall's tau of 0.462. This might be a sign that the newly introduced variables as well as the nested structure provided a significantly improved understanding of income-determinants compared to the parametric model, despite much lower variables involved.

Overall, three main hypotheses regarding these questions of class formation can be put forward. Unemployment is (still) a highly unstructured phenomenon but is related to urbanisation within Nagaland with a high risk especially for young men. The reproduction of the government work class is similarly related to living within the state of Nagaland, though the internal mechanisms are still vague; outside Nagaland, higher education is a pathway of class reproduction of the government class, but also opens chances for children whose fathers are in stable (government, cultivation, church) jobs. Income level lastly depends on complex factors, most importantly the scope of mobility, the work milieu and to a lesser degree age and gender: women cannot reap the benefits of mobility to the degree men do. Qualitative analysis suggested that experienced insecurity for women outside Nagaland might hamper their freedom to pursue job opportunities, necessitating a return to Nagaland without similar prospects. Though this is based on the analysis of single cases and cannot be generalised from the data, it might explain the specific impact of symbolic inequalities on income distribution.

## Socio-cultures and modernisation in Nagaland

During the course of research, both the (eroding) official depiction of tribal societies as fundamentally "equal" or "egalitarian" – a relic of colonial ethnography – as well as the depiction of classes as self-replicating structures – dominant in Western sociology – had to be given up. Instead, my findings show that the class structure among the urban Naga youth is the result of complex interactions between spatial criteria and mobility, work milieus, symbolic inequalities like gender and age besides the temporal contingencies of individually evolving career sequences, work orientations and turning points.

Practice theory, which presents a social ontology rather than a concise social theory concerned with class formation, proved to be a useful underpinning to account for the continuing importance of historical socio-cultures within and through the processes of cultural and social differentiation. By and large, Naga village culture still regulates a great part of social interactions. People address each other mainly through relationship terms that indicate not only degrees of closeness and clan affiliation but similarly age. Changing forms of address that are introduced by the government ("Sir") and market milieus ("driver") are still rather rare and especially found in the urban areas and are used mainly within work contexts or when addressing people from other ethnic communities and go along with relatively higher or lower social status of the addressee. The persistence of the different local dialects even within single villages is another case in point, although the factor of urbanisation with the creation of multi-tribal families and quarters is rather detrimental to the spread and continuity of tribal languages outside the villages and towns. In higher classes English language, which is promoted in the government and sections of the education milieu, takes their place. Lower classes or informal contexts are relegated to the linguistically rather poor creole language Nagamese that emerged from the market milieu.

The Christian milieu is one of the most integrating forces of the Nagas and controls public discourse to a large degree, even into the legal processes of the government. But the analysis of cultural milieus and practice groups also revealed that beyond passive integration there is only a rather small section of the Naga youth that forms the core of the milieu. Most of the youth, while not necessarily opposing the church, contradict the strict prohibitionist or abstentionist position in practice. Every-day life outside the work sphere is for most young Nagas not so different from other parts of the world, concentrating on the private realm or consuming popular media and sports as well as indulging in occasional social drinking. But unlike the village culture and the government, Christianity is a global milieu that is not limited by spatial criteria, like pop culture or, to a degree, the capitalist economy. Increasing economic integration will therefore not necessarily weaken the Christian and the government milieu.

The government and political milieus instead develop a "neo-patrimonial" culture of nepotism, especially in the case of large-scale economic projects focussing on resource extraction that require the cooperation of local elites. Increasing economic integration might therefore lead indirectly to a further weakening of central characteristics of the village culture like community ownership of land etc.,

especially if substantial natural resources are involved. Privatisation of land for urban settlements will continue irrespective of further integration, since it depends mainly on urbanisation processes and the lack of other means of investment and social security. As argued, this process does not necessarily lead to increasing inequality as it provides the sellers with capital for other investments, and the buyers the possibility to move closer to actual or potential work places outside the own village.

There are also chances that economic integration might proceed in an "inclusive" fashion by developing the "hinterlands" of agriculture and enable small-scale businesses and production to modernise along with the other work milieus and decrease the dependence of the state from central transfers. The examples of other states in North-East India show that the latter option is rather unlikely under the given political priorities in the centre for the last decades that favour large-scale projects often financed from abroad. Finally, the overall political situation within India and the degree of racial, sexual or religious discrimination will determine whether large sections of the highly educated Naga youth will continue to leave Nagaland for better opportunities in the large Indian mega-cities.

If a large section of young Nagas living outside the state chooses to return and seek a role within the state, it will likely lead to changes in the current cultural and social set-up within the state. Especially the claim of the churches to control the symbolic sphere, but also the relatively unchallenged power of neo-patrimonial elites is likely to be challenged in the future if the aspirations and cultural orientations of voiceful sections of the youth will not be accommodated.

Meanwhile, the class of so-called "educated unemployed" is growing in the cities, leading to a large section of the Naga youth being left to resignation after years of unsuccessful attempts to land a government job. If they emerge as a powerful pressure group within Nagaland is doubtful, however, as they are mainly focussed on individual access to the government work class. But this is structurally possible only for a tiny section of this group, either by competitive means or by using patrimonial or neo-patrimonial resources. The general orientation of this group therefore rather strengthens the existing power structure rather than challenging it.

## Outlook

This book presented findings relating the overall cultural and economic context to the class structure, cultural milieus as well as typical career patterns. Its main arguments challenge both classical European

class theories as well as the predominant picture of "tribal equality" that continues to be spread in media as well as publications. The arguments presented here were developed by integrating insights collected by ethnographic fieldwork, qualitative life-course interviews, reviews of existent statistical data and official documents as well as an online survey.

I hope that despite its limitations this book was successful in highlighting the benefits of combining the whole array of available research methodologies rather than restricting oneself to either ethnography or quantitative analysis. In my view, the sociology of Nagaland would greatly benefit from approaches that look at the larger picture and develop and test hypotheses about emerging trends and persistent structures in the state, rather than focussing on single communities. This includes the collection of survey data that is independent e.g. from the census, which is not always reliable and does not include the categories and information necessary to develop own theoretically based hypotheses, especially regarding the conduct of every-day life and cultural orientations. A representative online panel – e.g. hosted by Nagaland University – would not only tremendously decrease the barriers for scholars and students to conduct their own quantitative research. It would also enable researchers to conduct longitudinal studies more suited to understand the interaction between class, career patterns and cultural orientations.

## Notes

1 Using unadjusted Monte Carlo p-values, starting seed 1111, alpha = 0.05, n = 483.
2 Using unadjusted Monte Carlo p-values, starting seed 1111, alpha = 0.05, n = 284.
3 Using Bonferroni adjusted Monte Carlo p-values, starting seed 1111, alpha = 0.05, n = 246.

# Bibliography


ACCESS Development Services and M2i Consulting (2010). *Microfinance Vision 2015: Northeast Region, India*. New Delhi.

Acton, Ciaran, and Robert Miller (2009). *SPSS for Social Scientists*. 2. ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Aier, I. Lanu (1987). "Emerging Urban Land Pattern in Nagaland: A Case of Mokokchung". In: *Land Relations in North-East India*. Ed. by B.B. Dutta and M.N. Karna. New Delhi: People's Publishing House, pp. 208–212.

Allison, Paul D. (2014). "Measures of Fit for Logistic Regression". Unpublished conference paper. SAS Global Forum 1485. URL: www.statisticalhorizons.com/wp-content/uploads/GOFForLogisticRegression-Paper.pdf (visited on 11/20/2018).

Ao, A. Lanunungsang (2001). *From Phizo to Muivah: The Naga National Question in North East India*. 1. ed. New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Appadurai, Arjun, ed. (1996). *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bacher, Johann, Andreas Pöge, and Knut Wenzig (2010). *Clusteranalyse: Anwendungsorientierte Einführung in Klassifikationsverfahren: Anwendungsorientierte Einführung in Klassifikationsverfahren*. 3. ed. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag.

Backhaus, Klaus et al. (2005). *Multivariate Analysemethoden: Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung*. 11. ed. Berlin: Springer.

——— (2006). *Multivariate Analysemethoden: Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung: Eine Anwendungsorientierte Einfuhrung*. 11. revised ed. Berlin: Springer.

Backhaus, Klaus, Bernd Erichson, and Rolf Weiber (2013). *Fortgeschrittene Multivariate Analysemethoden: Eine Anwendungsorientierte Einführung*. 2. ed. Berlin: Springer.

Barbe, Benjamin R. (1995). *Jihad vs. McWorld*. 1. ed. New York: Times Books.

Baruah, Sanjib (2004). "Between South and Southeast Asia: Northeast India and the Look East Policy". In: *CENISEAS Papers,* Vol. 4. Guwahati: Centre for Northeast India, South and Southeast Asia Studies.

——— (2008). "Territoriality, Indigeneity and Rights in the North-East India". In: *Economic and Political Weekly* 43.12, pp. 15–19.

——— (2012). "Whose River Is It Anyway? Political Economy of Hydropower in the Eastern Himalayas". In: *Economic and Political Weekly* 47.29, pp. 41–52.

Beck, Ulrich, ed. (1994). *Riskante Freiheiten: Individualisierung in modernen Gesellschaften*. Erstausg, 2. ed. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Beckert, Jens, and Mark Lutter (2013). "Why the Poor Play the Lottery: Sociological Approaches to Explaining Class-based Lottery Play". In: *Sociology* 47.6, pp. 1152–1170.

Bendangangshi, I. (2008). *Glimpses of Naga History: Origin & Migration of the Nagas. The Ao Naga Polity*. Vol. II. Kohima: I. Bendangangshi.

Bendangangshi, I., and I.T. Apok Aier (1997). *The Religion of the Ao Nagas*. 2. revised ed. Guwahati: Saraighat Offset Press.

Benzécri, J-P. (1969). "Statistical Analysis as a Tool to Make Patterns Emerge from Data". In: *Methodologies of Pattern Recognition*. Ed. by S. Watanabe. New York: Academic Press, pp. 35–74.

——— (1992). *Correspondence Analysis Handbook*. New York: Marcel Dekker.

Berger, Peter A., ed. (1995). *Sozialstruktur und Lebenslauf*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Béteille, André (1996). *Caste, Class and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village*. 2. ed. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bhaumik, Subir (2009). *Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India's North East*. New Delhi: Sage.

Blasius, Jörg, and Joachim Winkler (1989). "Gibt es die "feinen Unterschiede"? Eine empirische Überprüfung der Bourdieuschen Theorie". In: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie: KZfSS* 41.1, pp. 72–94.

Bohnsack, Ralf (2003). "Dokumentarische Methode und sozialwissenschaftliche Hermeneutik". In: *Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft* 6.4, pp. 550–570.

——— (2013). "Typenbildung, Generalisierung und komparative Analyse: Grundprinzipien der dokumentarischen Methode". In: *Die Dokumentarische Methode und ihre Forschungspraxis: Grundlagen qualitativer Sozialforschung*. Ed. by Ralf Bohnsack, Iris Nentwig-Gesemann, and Arnd Michael Nohl. 3. Auflage. Wiesbaden: Springer, pp. 241–270.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——— (1985). "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups". In: *Theory and Society* 14.6, pp. 723–744.

——— (1986). "The Forms of Capital". In: *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. Ed. by John G. Richardson. New York: Greenwood, pp. 241–58.

——— (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

——— (2012). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. First Indian Reprinted. London and New York: Routledge.

Bühl, Achim (2014). *SPSS 22: Einführung in die moderne Datenanalyse*. 14. ed. Hallbergmoos: Pearson Longman.

Burzan, Nicole et al. (2008). *Das Publikum der Gesellschaft: Inklusionsverhältnisse und Inklusionsprofile in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

CBCNEI (2018). "Historical Background of the CBCNEI". URL: www.cbcnei.in/index.php/about/history (visited on 11/14/2018).

Chishi Swu, Isak (2015). "Speech of the Chairman, Isak Chishi Swu on the 36th Raising Day of the NSCN". *Nagalimvoice*. URL: www.nagalimvoice.com/speeches/speech-of-the-chairman-isak-chishi-swu-on-the-36th-raising-day-of-the-nscn/ (visited on 11/17/2018).

Collins, Randall (1979). *The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification*. New York: Academic Press.

Conover, W.J. (1980). *Practical Non-Parametric Statistics*. 2. ed. New York: Wiley.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé W. (2001). "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics". In: *Sisters of the Academy: Emergent Black Women Scholars in Higher Education*. Ed. by Retumetse Obakeng Mabokela and Anna L. Green. Sterling, VA: Stylus Publications, pp. 57–80.

Diaz-Bone, Rainer (2004). "Milieumodelle und Milieuinstrumente in der Marktforschung". In: *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung* 5.2, Art. 28.

——— (2006). "Developing Foucault's Discourse Analytic Methodology". In: *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 7.1.

Diewald, Martin, and Karl Ulrich Mayer (2009). "The Sociology of the Life Course and Life Span Psychology: Integrated Paradigm or Complementing Pathways?" In: *Advances in Life Course Research* 14.1, pp. 5–14.

Directorate of Economics & Statistics (2007). *Statistical Handbook of Nagaland*. Kohima: Government of Nagaland.

Downs, Frederick S. (1992). *History of Christianity in India: Northeast India in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. History of Christianity in India 5. Bangalore: The Church History Association of India.

Dumont, Louis (1970). *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications*. London: Weidenfield & Nicolson.

Durkheim, Émile (1951). *Suicide, a Study in Sociology*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah (2003). *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Leiden: Brill.

Ekström, Mats (1992). "Causal Explanation of Social Action: The Contribution of Max Weber and of Critical Realism to a Generative View of Causal Explanation in Social Science". In: *Acta Sociologica* 35.2, pp. 107–122.

Elwin, Verrier (1969). *The Nagas in the Nineteenth Century*. Bombay and London: Oxford University Press.

Engels, Friedrich, and Karl Marx (2004). *The Communist Manifesto*. Original 1848. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Erdmann, Gero, and Ulf Engel (2006). "Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch-All Concept". In: *GIGA Working Papers 16*.

Erik Olin Wright (1997). *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis*. 1. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ezung, T. Zarenthung (2001). "Corruption and Its Impact on Development: A Case Study of Nagaland". In: *International Journal of Rural Studies (IJRS)* 19.1, pp. 1–7.

Fernandes, Sujatha (2009). "Ethnicity, Civil Society, and the Church: The Politics of Evangelical Christianity in Northeast India". In: *Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Asia*. Ed. by David H. Lumsdaine. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 131–153.

Fernandes, Walter, and Sanjay Barbora, eds. (2009). *Land, People and Politics: Contest over Tribal Land in Northeastern India*. Guwahati: North Eastern Social Research Centre.

Fernandes, Walter, and Gita Bharali (2008). "Customary Law-Formal Law Interface: Impact on Tribal Culture". In: *Christianity and Change in Northeast India*. Ed. by T.N. Subba, Joseph Puthenpurackal, and Shaji Joseph Puykunnel. NewDelhi: Concept Publishing Company, pp. 93–108.

Finance Minister, Nagaland (2006). *Budget 2006 Nagaland State*.

Fiona Govan (2013). "Spaniard Becomes Voice of Country's 'Lost Generation' ". *The Telegraph*. URL: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/10347776/Spaniard-becomes-voice-of-countrys-lost-generation.html (visited on 11/21/2018).

Foucault, Michel (1991). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Reprinted. London: Penguin Books.

Fournier, Geneviève, and Charles Bujold (2005). "Nonstandard Career Trajectories and Their Various Forms". In: *Journal of Career Assessment* 13.4, pp. 415–438.

Frank, Robert H., and Philip J. Cook (1995). *The Winner-Take-All Society*. New York: Free Press.

Franke, Marcus (2009). *War and Nationalism in South Asia: The Indian State and the Nagas*. 1. ed. London: Routledge. Chapman & Hall.

Frazer, Nancy (2000). "Rethinking Recognition". In: *New Left Review* 3, pp. 107–120.

Fürer-Haimendorf, Christoph von (1939). *The Naked Nagas*. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.

Geiger, Theodor (1932). *Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes: Soziographischer Versuch auf statistischer Grundlage*. Stuttgart: Enke.

Gerhard Schulze (1992). *Die Erlebnisgesellschaft: Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag.

Glen Holl Elder (1985). *Life Course Dynamics: Trajectories and Transitions, 1968–1980*. 1. ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Goldthorpe, John H. (1980). *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

——— (1983). "Women and Class Analysis: In Defence of the Conventional View". In: *Sociology* 17.4, pp. 465–488.

Government of India (2011). "Census 2011: Primary Data Highlights". URL: www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/PCA/PCA_Highlights/pca_highlights_file/India/Chapter-4.pdf (visited on 11/17/2018).

——— (2012). "Census 2011: Economic Profile". URL: https://nagaland.gov.in/portal/portal/StatePortal/UsefulLinks/Census (visited on 11/17/2018).

——— (2018). "Constitution of India". URL: www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/constitution-india-full-text (visited on 11/17/2018).

Greenacre, Michael J. (1984). *Theory and Applications of Correspondence Analysis*. 1. ed. London: Academic Press.

Gupta, Dipankar (2012). "Whither the Indian Village". In: *Village Society*. Ed. by Surrinder S. Jodhka. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, pp. 197–209.

Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson (2010). "Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States". In: *Politics & Society* 38.2, pp. 152–204.

Hindustan Paper Corporation Limited (A Govt. of India Enterprise) (2018). "Nagaland Pulp & Paper Company Ltd. (A Subsidiary of Hindustan Corporation Ltd.)". URL: www.hindpaper.in/mills/nppc.htm (visited on 11/14/2018).

Honneth, Axel (1986). "The Fragmented World of Symbolic Forms: Reflections on Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology of Culture". In: *Theory, Culture & Society* 3.3, pp. 55–66.

Horvath, Stefan, and Michael Bernhard (2009). "Klasse und Kapital bei Marx und Bourdieu". RSO. revolutionär sozialistische organisation. URL: www.sozialismus.net/kategorien/linke-theorie/1137-klasse-und-kapital-bei-marx-und-bourdieu (visited on 11/14/2018).

Hothorn, Torsten, K. Hornik, and Achim Zeileis (2006). "Unbiased Recursive Partitioning: A Conditional Inference Framework". In: *Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics* 15.3, pp. 651–674.

Hothorn, Torsten, Heidi Seibold, and Achim Zeileis (2018). *Partykit: A Toolkit for Recursive Partytioning*. Version R package 1.2–1.

Hradil, Stefan (1987). *Sozialstrukturanalyse in einer fortgeschrittenen Gesellschaft: von Klassen und Schichten zu Lagen und Milieus*. Opladen: Leseke+Budrich.

Huang, Ronggui (2014). *RQDA: R-Based Qualitative Data Analysis*. Version R package 0.2–7.

Indian Army (2010). "Brief History of the Kumaon Regiment". URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20090410115110/http://indianarmy.nic.in/arms/kumaon/history.html (visited on 11/17/2018).

Inoue, Kyoko (2005). "Integration of the North-East". In: *Sub-Regional Relations in the Eastern South Asia: With Special Focus on India's North-Eastern Region*. Ed. by Mayumi Murayama, Kyoko Inoue, and Sanjoy Hazarika. Joint Research Program Series 133. IDE-JETRO: Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organisation, pp. 241–274.

James Ferguson (2006). *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Jamir, N. Talitemjen, and A. Lanunungsang (2005). *Naga Society and Culture: A Case Study of the Ao Naga Society and Culture*. 1. ed. Mokokchung: Tribal Research Centre, Nagaland University.

Jamir, Toshimenla (2009). "Engendering Public Space in Naga Society: Tradition and Modernity". In: *Indian Folklife* 33, pp. 18–21.

Jodhka, Surinder S. (2005). "Beyond 'Crises': Rethinking Contemporary Punjab Agriculture". In: *GAPS Series* 4 (May). URL: http://www.cess.ac.in/cesshome/wp/gaps_wp-4.pdf (visited on 11/17/2018).

Kaplinsky, Raphael (2007). *Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*. NJ: Wiley.

Karlsson, Bengt G. (2003). "Anthropology and the 'Indigenous Slot' Claims to and Debates about Indigenous Peoples' Status in India". In: *Critique of Anthropology* 23.4, pp. 403–423.

——— (2011). *Unruly Hills: Nature and Nation in India's North-East*. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

Kelle, Udo, and Susann Kluge (2010). *Vom Einzelfall zum Typus – Fallvergleich und Fallkontrastierung in der Qualitativen Sozialforschung*. 2. ed. Wiesbaden: Springer.

Kikhi, Kedilezo (2009). "Educated Youth in Nagaland: Aspirations vis-à-vis Employment Opportunities". In: *Village Development in North-East India: New Approaches*. New Delhi: Mittal, pp. 133–153.

Kikon, Dolly (2009). "Ethnography of the Nagaland-Assam Foothills in North-East India". In: *Land, People and Politics: Contest over Tribal Land in Northeastern India*. Ed. by Walter Fernandes and Sanjay Barbora. Guwahati: North Eastern Social Research Centre, pp. 58–87.

Kilpinen, Erkki (2012). "Human Beings as Creatures of Habit". In: *Collegium* 12, pp. 45–69.

Kluge, Susann (2000). "Empirically Grounded Construction of Types and Typologies in Qualitative Social Research". In: *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 1.1.

Kohli, Martin (2003). "Der institutionalisierte Lebenslauf: Ein Blick zurück und nach vorn". In: *Entstaatlichung und soziale Sicherheit. Verhandlungen des 31. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Leipzig 2002*. Ed. by Jutta Allmendinger. Opladen: Leske+Buderich, pp. 525–545.

Küchle, Andreas (2015). "Cultural and Social Change in Nagaland". In: *Changing India: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*. Ed. by Gernot Saalmann. New Delhi: Winshield Press, pp. 137–192.

——— (2016). "Inequality in Rural Nagaland. Changing Structures and Mechanisms". In: *Economic and Political Weekly* 51.26, pp. 52–60.

Kumar, Anand, and Frank Welz (2003). "Approaching Cultural Change in the Era of Globalisation: An Interview with T.K. Oommen". In: *Social Identities* 9.1, pp. 93–115.

Lacina, Bethany (2009). "The Problem of Political Stability in Northeast India: Local Ethnic Autocracy and the Rule of Law". In: *Asian Survey* 49.6, pp. 998–1020.

Lahire, Bernard (2011). *The Plural Actor*. English ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Laishram, Bidhan S. (2005). "Naga Nationalism: The Inward Turn of a Conflict". *Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies*. URL: www.ipcs.org/focus themsel.php?articleNo=1577 (visited on 11/17/2018).

Lamont, M., S. Beljean, and M. Clair (2014). "What Is Missing? Cultural Processes and Causal Pathways to Inequality". In: *Socio-Economic Review* 12.3, pp. 573–608.

Le, Sebastien, Julie Josse, and Francois Husson (2008). "FactoMineR: A Package for Multivariate Analysis". In: *Journal of Statistical Software* 25.1, pp. 1–18.

Leach, Edmund R. (1954). *Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Lizardo, Omar (2004). "The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu's Habitus". In: *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 34, pp. 375–401.

Longkumer, Toshi (2014). "Nagaland Public Service Commission (NPSC) and Its Fantastic Contribution Against Nagas". *The Morung Express Online*. URL: www.morungexpress. com/public_discourse_public_space/121486. html (visited on 11/12/2014).

Lotha, Abraham (2007). *History of Naga Anthropology (1832–1947)*. Dimapur: Chumpo Museum.

——— (2012). "Quo Vadis Naga Nationalism?" *Nagalimvoice*. URL: www. nagalimvoice.com/articles/quo-vadis-naga-nationalism/ (visited on 11/17/2018).

Luhmann, Niklas (1985). "Zum Begriff der sozialen Klasse". In: *Soziale Differenzierung: Zur Geschichte einer Idee*. Ed. by Niklas Luhmann. Opladen: Westdt. Verlag, pp. 119–162.

——— (1997). "Globalization or World Society: How to Conceive of Modern Society?" In: *International Review of Sociology* 7, pp. 67–79.

——— (1998). *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*. 8. ed. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Lutter, Mark (2013). "Strukturen ungleichen Erfolgs. Winner-take-all-Konzentrationen und ihre sozialen Entstehungskontexte auf flexiblen Arbeitsmärkten". In: *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 65.4, pp. 597–622.

Maaker, Erik de (2013). "Performing the Garo Nation? Garo Wangala Dancing between Faith and Folklore". In: *Asian Ethnology* 72.2, pp. 221–239.

Majumdar, Ushinor (2014a). "Oil Stains on the Naga Regime". In: *Tehelka* 11.43.

——— (2014b). "Silencing Dissent in Changpang". In: *Tehelka* 11.47.

Marx, Karl (1909). *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Ed. by Friedrich Engels. Trans. by Samuel Moore, Edward Aveling, and Ernest Untermann. Translated from the 3. German edition, revised and amplified according to the 4. German edition. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels (1981). *Werke*. 9. ed. Vol. 23–25. MEW. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Mayer, Karl Ulrich (2000). "Promises fulfilled? A Review of 20 Years of Life Course Research". In: *European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 41.2, pp. 259–282.

——— (2009). "New Directions in Life Course Research". In: *Annual Review of Sociology* 35, pp. 413–433.

McDuie-Ra, Duncan (2013). *Northeast Migrants in Delhi: Race, Refuge and Retail*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Merton, Robert K. (1938). "Social Structure and Anomie". In: *American Sociological Review* 3.5, pp. 672–682.

——— (1968). *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Enlarged ed. New York: Free Press.

Mills, J.P. (1926). *The Ao Nagas*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

——— (1935). "The Effect of Ritual upon Industries and Arts in the Naga Hills". In: *Man* 35, pp. 132–135.

Ministry of Development on North Eastern Region (2008). *Peace, Progress and Prosperity in the North-Eastern Region, Vision 2020*. Volume I. Government of India.

Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (2010). "National Account Statistics – 2010". URL: www.mospi.gov.in/publication/national-accounts-statistics-2010 (visited on 11/17/2018).

Mishra, Bhubaneswar (2002). "Population Dynamics, Environment and Quality of Life in North-East India". IUSSP. URL: www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Population-Dynamics-%2C-Environment-and-Quality-of-in-Mishra/43aef47185ec8a3afbea18a435debc0c627cf20a (visited on 11/18/2018).

Misra, Udayon (2000). *The Periphery Strikes Back*. Shimla: Indian Institute for Advanced Studies.

Mollica, C., and L. Tardella (2017). "Bayesian Plackett-Luce Mixture Models for Partially Ranked Data". In: *Psychometrika* 82.2, pp. 442–458.

The Morung Express (2010). "An Open Appeal by some Concern Senior Church Leaders". *The Morung Express Online*. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20100721133651/www.morungexpress.com:80/public_discourse/51599.html (visited on 11/17/2018).

——— (2018). "Nagaland: Fund Diversion Stopped Revival of Tuli Paper Mill". *The Morung Express*. URL: http://morungexpress.com/nagaland-fund-diversionstopped-revival-of-tuli-paper-mill/ (visited on 11/10/2018).

Nagaland State Information Commission (2014). *Disclosures Under Sec 4 of Right to Information Act 2005*. Government. Kohima: Government of Nagaland, Economics and Statistics Department.

National Informatics Centre (2013). "Economic Survey 2012–13". Economic Survey. URL: http://indiabudget.nic.in/budget2013-2014/es2012-13/estat1.pdf (visited on 11/18/2018).

Nayak, Purusottam (2014). "Some Facts and Figures on Development Attainments in Nagaland". In: *Munich Personal RePEc Archive 51851*. URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51851/8/MPRA_paper_51851.pdf (visited on 11/18/2018).

Ngullie, Al (2013). "Nagaland Apathetic to Coal Mining, Environment". *Eastern Mirror Nagaland*. Online. URL: www.easternmirrornagaland.com/nagaland-apathetic-to-coal-mining-environment/ (visited on 11/18/2018).

Nohl, Arnd-Michael (2010). "Narrative Interview and Documentary Interpretation". In: *Qualitative Analysis and Documentary Method in International Educational Research*, pp. 195–217.

——— (2013). *Relationale Typenbildung und Mehrebenenvergleich: Neue Wege der dokumentarischen Methode*. Wiesbaden: Springer.

Nohl, Arnd-Michael et al. (2006). "Cultural Capital during Migration – A Multi-level Approach for the Empirical Analysis of the Labor Market

Integration of Highly Skilled Migrants". In: *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 7.3.

Nohl, Arnd-Michael, and Ulrike Selma Ofner (2010). "Migration and Ethnicity in Documentary Interpretation: Perspectives from a Project on Highly Qualified Migrants". In: *Qualitative Analysis and Documentary Method in International Educational Research*. Ed. by Ralf Bohnsack, Nicolle Pfaff, and Wivian Wellner. Opladen: Barbara Budrich, pp. 237–266.

NPL (2015). "Nagaland Premier League". URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20120621085129/www.nagalandpremierleague.com:80/ (visited on 11/18/2018).

Oesch, Daniel (2006a). "Coming to Grips with a Changing Class Structure: An Analysis of Employment Stratification in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland". In: *International Sociology* 21.2, pp. 263–288.

——— (2006b). *Redrawing the Class Map: Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Oomen, T.K. (2007). *Knowledge and Society: Situating Sociology and Social Anthropology*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Oppitz, Michael (2008). *Naga Identities*. 1. ed. Gent: Snoeck.

Otte, Gunnar (2005). "Hat die Lebensstilforschung eine Zukunft?" In: *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 57.1, pp. 1–31.

——— (2008). *Sozialstrukturanalysen mit Lebensstilen: Eine Studie zur theoretischen und methodischen Neuorientierung der Lebensstilforschung*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

R Core Team (2017). *R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing*. Wien.

Rappaport, Roy A. (1968). *Pigs for the Ancestors*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rawat, J.S., Bomchak Riba, and Teniya Rina (2010). "Jhumming, a Traditional Lifestyle Than Merely a Cultivation Method". In: *Current Science* 98.8, pp. 998–999.

Reed, Isaac Ariail (2010). "Epistemology Contextualized: Social-Scientific Knowledge in a Postpositivist Era". In: *Sociological Theory* 28.1, pp. 20–39.

Rehbein, Boike (2007). *Globalization, Culture and Society in Laos*. London: Routledge.

——— (2010). "Critical Theory after the Rise of the Global South". In: *Transcience* 1.2.

——— (2011). "Differentiation of Sociocultures, Classification, and the Good Life in Laos". In: *SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 26.2, pp. 277–303.

——— (2015). *Critical Theory After the Rise of the Global South: Kaleidoscopic Dialectic*. London: Routledge.

Reichertz, Jo (2009). "Abduction: The Logic of Discovery of Grounded Theory". In: *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 11.1.

Rihoux, Benoit, and Charles C. Ragin, eds. (2008). *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Ritse, Sarah R. (2014). "NPSC Responds to Article". *The Morung Express Online*. URL: www.morungexpress.com/public_discourse_public_space/121893.html (visited on 11/12/2014).

Ronald Inglehart (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

——— (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rosenberg, Joshua M., Jennifer A. Schmidt, and Patrick N. Beymer (2017). *prcr: Person-Centered Analysis*. Version R package version 0.1.5.

Rössel, Jörg (2005). *Plurale Sozialstrukturanalyse: Eine handlungstheoretische Rekonstruktion der Grundbegriffe der Sozialstrukturanalyse*. 1. ed. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Roux, Brigitte Le, and Henry Rouanet (2010). *Multiple Correspondence Analysis*. Thouand Oaks: Sage.

Saalmann, Gernot (2012). "Wie kreativ kann der 'Homo Habitualis' bei Bourdieu sein?" In: *Kreativität und Improvisation*. Ed. by U. Göttlich and R. Kurt. Wiesbaden: Springer, pp. 99–108.

——— (2015). "The Concept of Modernity and its Uses". In: *Globalization, Culture and Society: Challenges, Policies and Interventions*. Ed. by S. Shirwadkar. Pune: in press.

Sackmann, Reinhold (2007). *Lebenslaufanalyse und Biographieforschung: Eine Einführung*. 1. ed. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Sackmann, Reinhold, and Matthias Wingens (2003). "From Transitions to Trajectories: Sequence Types". In: *Social Dynamics of the Life Course: Transitions, Institutions and Interrelations*. Ed. by Walter R. Heinz and Victor W. Marshall. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, pp. 93–116.

Schäffer, Burkhard (2012). "Dokumentarische Methode. Einordnung, Prinzipien und Arbeitsschritte einer praxeologischen Methodologie". In: *Handbuch Qualitative Erwanchsenen- und Weiterbildungsforschung*. Ed. by Burkhard Schäffer and Olaf Dörner. Berlin: Barbara Budrich, pp. 196–211.

Schatzki, Theodore R. (1991). "Spatial Ontology and Explanation". In: *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81.4, pp. 650–670.

Schindler, Seth (2015). "Governing the Twenty-First Century Metropolis and Transforming Territory". In: *Territory, Politics, Governance* 3.1, pp. 7–26.

Schütze, Fritz (2003). "Hülya's migration to Germany as Self-sacrifice undergone and suffered in Love for her Parents, and her later biographical Individualisation: Biographical Problems and biographical Work of Marginalisation and Individualisation of a young Turkish Woman in Germany. Part I". In: *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 4.3.

Schwinn, Thomas (2008). "Zur Analyse multidimensionaler Ungleichheitsverhältnisse". In: *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 33.1, pp. 20–42.

Scott, James C. (2009). *The Art of not Being Governed. An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Settersten, Richard A., and Karl Ulrich Mayer (1997). "The Measurement of Age, Age Structuring, and the Life Course". In: *Annual Review of Sociology* 23.1, pp. 233–261.

Shahin, Sultan (2003). "India's 'Look East' Policy Pays off". In: *Asia Times*. 10/11/2003. URL: www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/162/27908.html (visited on 11/18/2018).

Shimrai, U.A. (2002). "Equality as Tradition: Women's Role in Naga Society". In: *Economic and Political Weekly* 37.5, pp. 375–377.

Shishak, Donray A. (2014). "Tarif Order Financial Year 2014/2015". Nagaland Electricity Regulatory Commission 01/2014–15. Kohima, Nagaland.

Singh, M. Amarjeet (2010). *A Study on Illegal Immigration into North-East India: The Case of Nagaland*. In collab. with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. IDSA occasional paper no. 8/November 2009. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Singh, Yogendra (2009). *Modernization of Indian Tradition*. Reprinted. New Delhi: Rawat.

Sinus Markt- und Sozialforschung (2014). "Sinus-Milieus®". URL: www.sinus-institut.de/en/sinus-solutions/sinus-milieus/ (visited on 11/14/2018).

Smith, W.C. (2009). *The Ao Naga Tribe of Assam*. 2. Reprinted. New Delhi: Mittal.

South Asian Terrorism Portal (2010). "National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak-Muivah". *South Asia Terrorism Portal*. URL: www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india-insurgencynortheast-nagaland/national-socialist-council-of-nagaland-isak-muivah-nscn-im (visited on 11/18/2018).

Spielmann, Katherine A. (2002). "Feasting, Craft Specialization, and the Ritual Mode of Production in Small-Scale Societies". In: *American Anthropologist. New Series* 104.1, pp. 195–207.

Srinivas, Mysore Narasimhachar (1995). *Social Change in Modern India*. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1996). "Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle". In: *The World Bank Research Observer* 11.2, pp. 151–177.

Stockhausen, Alban von (2008). "Creating Naga. Identity Between Colonial Construction, Political Calculation, and Religious Instrumentalization". In: *Naga Identities*. Ed. by Michael Oppitz. 1. ed. Gent: Snoeck, pp. 57–79.

Stoll, Florian (2012). *Leben im Moment? Soziale Mileus in Brasilien und ihr Umgang mit Zeit*. Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus.

——— (2017). "Perspectives of the Future among 'middle-class' milieus in Nairobi". In: *Transcience* 8.2, pp. 40–57.

Sumi, Huska (2002). "Fiscal Mismanagement in Nagaland". In: *Dialogue* 4.1.

Swedberg, Richard, and Ola Agevall (2005). *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

The Telegraph (2012). "Nagaland 'wet' After 23 Yrs of Prohibition". URL: www.telegraphindia.com/1120217/jsp/northeast/story_15143550.jsp#.VSW_gpPhmUk (visited on 11/18/2018).

Thong, Tezenlo (2014). *Progress and Its Impact on the Nagas: A Clash of Worldviews*. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

Urry, John (2000). *Sociology Beyond Societies*. London: Routledge.

Vandenberghe, Frédéric (1999). "'The Real is Relational': An Epistemological Analysis of Pierre Bourdieu's Generative Structuralism". In: *Sociological Theory* 17.1, pp. 32–67.

Vester, Michael (1993). *Soziale Milieus im gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel*. Köln: Bund-Verlag.

——— (2006). *Soziale Milieus im gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis". In: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, pp. 387–415.

——— (1980). *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Reprinted. Paris: Cambridge University Press.

Ward, J.H. Jr. (1963). "Hierarchical Grouping to Optimize an Objective Function". In: *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 58.301, pp. 236–244.

Weber, Max (1922). *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. 2 vols. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.

——— (1970). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Trans. by Talcott Parsons. London: Unwin University Books.

Weber-Menges, Sonja, and Michael Vester (2011). "Probleme einer integrierten Analyse der Entwicklungsdynamiken der Berufsgliederungen". In: *WSI Mitteilungen* 12.

Weiß, Anja (2004). "Unterschiede, die einen Unterschied machen: Klassenlagen in den Theorien von Pierre Bourdieu und Niklas Luhmann". In: *Bourdieu und Luhmann: Ein Theorienvergleich*. Ed. by Armin Nassehi and Gerd Nollmann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 208–232.

——— (2005). "The Transnationalization of Social Inequality: Conceptualizing Social Positions on a World Scale". In: *Current Sociology* 53.4, pp. 707–728.

——— (2006). "Comparative Research on Highly Skilled Migrants. Can Qualitative Interviews Be Used in Order to Reconstruct a Class Position?" In: *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 7.3.

Weiß, Anja et al., eds. (2001). *Klasse und Klassifikation: Die symbolische Dimension sozialer Ungleichheit*. 1. ed. Wiesbaden: Westdt. Verlag.

Weller, Wivian, and Nicolle Pfaff (2013). "Milieus als kollektive Erfahrungsräume und Kontexte der Habitualisierung: Systematische Bestimmungen und exemplarische Rekonstruktionen". In: *Dokumentarische Methode: Grundlagen, Entwicklungen, Anwendungen*. Ed. by Peter Loos et al. Opladen: Barbara Budrich, pp. 56–74.

Welz, Frank (2009). "100 Years of Indian Sociology from Social Anthropology to Decentring Global Sociology". In: *International Sociology* 24.5, pp. 635–655.

Wickham, Hadley (2017). *Tidyverse: Easily Install and Load 'Tidyverse' Packages*. Version R package version 1.1.1.

Winker, Gabriele, and Nina Degele (2009). *Intersektionalität*. Bielefeld: transcript.

The World Bank (2015). "World Development Indicators". URL: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx (visited on 11/18/2018).

Wouters, Jelle J.P. (2011). "Keeping the Hill Tribes at Bay: A Critique from India's Northeast of James C. Scott's Paradigm of State Evasion". In: *European Bulletin of Himalayan Research* 39, pp. 41–65.

Xaxa, Virginius (1997). *Economic Dualism and Structure of Class*. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications.

——— (2008). *State, Society and Tribes: Issues in Post-Colonial India*. New Delhi: Pearson Longman.

Zhoku et al. (2014). "Open Letter to Secretary, NPSC". *The Morung Express Online*. URL: www.morungexpress.com/public_discourse_public_space/121559.html (visited on 11/12/2014).

Zou, David Vumlallian, and M. Satish Kumar (2011). "Mapping a Colonial Borderland: Objectifying the Geo-Body of India's Northeast". In: *The Journal of Asian Studies* 70.1, pp. 141–170.

## List of interviewees

BM1 (government job, male, 29 years, town)
BM2 (unemployed, male, 34 years, town)
BM3 (government job, male, 29 years, town)
BM4 (government job, male, 31 years, town)
BF1 (private job, female, 25 years, town)
CM1 (training/unemployed, male, 23 years, city Nagaland)
CM3 (business, male, 39 years, city Nagaland)
CM4 (private job, male, 37 years, city Nagaland)
CM7 (unemployed, male, 28 years, city Nagaland)
CM8 (unemployed, male, 30 years, city Nagaland)
CM10 (private job, male, 32 years, city Nagaland)
CF1 (private job, female, 34 years, city Nagaland)
CF3 (internship, female, 27 years, city Nagaland)
CF4 (private job, female, 27 years, city Nagaland)
CF5 (government job, female, 28 years, city Nagaland)
CF8 (government job, female, 24 years, city Nagaland)
DM1 (PhD-student, male, 28 years, city outside Nagaland)
DF2 (PhD-student, female, 26 years, city outside Nagaland)
DF3 (PhD-student, female, 27 years, city outside Nagaland)