Metaphor and Continental Philosophy

From Kant to Derrida

Clive Cazeaux

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Over the last few decades there has been a phenomenal growth of interest in metaphor as a device which extends or revises our perception of the world. Clive Cazeaux examines the relationship between metaphor, art, and science, against the backdrop of modern European philosophy and, in particular, the work of Kant, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. He contextualizes recent theories of the cognitive potential of metaphor within modern European philosophy and explores the impact which the notion of cognitive metaphor has on key positions and concepts within aesthetics, epistemology and the philosophy of science.

Clive Cazeaux is Reader in Aesthetics at the University of Wales Institute, Cardiff. He is the editor of *The Continental Aesthetics Reader* (Routledge, 2000), and the author of articles on metaphor, phenomenological aesthetics, and the relation between art and knowledge.

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For my father, Victor Roy Cazeaux

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Introduction

There has been a phenomenal growth of interest in metaphor as a subject of study in recent decades. While literature and the arts, as far back as Plato, have always recognized metaphor as a source of poetic meaning, this new interest in metaphor is part of a shift in thinking which asserts that the metaphorical creation of meaning holds significance for the way we understand the construction of knowledge and the world. The following works give a good indication of the scope of metaphor research, and contain extensive bibliographies: Barcelona 2000; Gibbs 1994; Knop et al. 2005; Kövecses 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Ortony 1993; Ricoeur 1978a; Sacks 1978. However, despite the large volume of material published on the cognitive potential of metaphor, little has been done to assess how claims made within the field draw upon continental philosophy, or how continental philosophy might contribute to our understanding of the cognitive reach of the figure. These omissions are addressed in this book. The continental tradition from Kant to Derrida, I maintain, provides arguments which not only inform and support existing claims for the cognitive value of metaphor, but also extend the significance of the figure to the point where it becomes an ontological tension, operating in between the fundamental distinctions of philosophy.

How is it that metaphor, the description of one thing as something else, has become so important for questions of knowledge and cognition? There are, I suggest, a number of reasons. Firstly, the linguistic turn in the humanities – following the work of Saussure (1983), Frege (1952), Wittgenstein (1922; 1953), and Whorf (1956) – has foregrounded awareness of the role our linguistic categories play in the organization of the world into identifiable chunks. This position can be regarded, to some extent, as an elaboration of Kant's thesis that concepts within the mind of the subject are responsible for determining the nature of reality. A key question for this view is how objectivity can be confirmed given that the task of organizing the world has been assigned to subjective consciousness. As several commentators have observed, metaphor itself raises this question (Black 1979; Hausman 1989; Ricoeur 1978a). An original, freshly minted trope (the argument runs) is an instance of creative, subjective language yet,

far from producing nonsense, a new metaphor offers insight on its subject and, as such, could be said to be objective or to contain an objective component. If the world is in some sense determined by the order and distribution of human concepts, then metaphor, as the creation of new combinations of concepts, would appear to be a mode of thinking in which human creativity constructs an objective world. Therefore, to confront metaphor is to confront one of the central themes of Kant's epistemology and the linguistically inclined humanities.

It is not just in the humanities that these questions have arisen. Science too has begun to explore the notion that human concepts construct the world rather than merely correspond to a pre-determined reality. Two related developments are significant here: the 'science wars' and recognition of the role metaphor plays in science. The 'science wars' refers to a series of debates involving scientists, cultural theorists, sociologists, and philosophers in dispute over the status of scientific knowledge (Collins and Pinch 1993; Franklin 1996; Levins 1996; Martin 1996; Rose 1996; Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Snow 1964; Sokal 1996). Is science a disinterested reflection of the world as it really is or a discourse whose findings are heavily influenced by the interests and prejudices of those who work within it? The orthodox view of science merely 'reading off' knowledge from a mind-independent reality is challenged on the grounds that it is primarily political, ideological or economic interest which determines the course of science and, therefore, which determines what counts as new knowledge about the world. Metaphor bears on this because of the role it plays in the formulation of scientific theories and models. Do the scientific concepts derived from metaphors actually refer to entities in the world or are they merely heuristic terms, coined to facilitate investigation? The debate occurs as part of the mid- to late twentieth-century challenge to positivist philosophy of science, and its preoccupation with determining the conditions for the identification of entities and the verification of claims. What emerges in the wake of positivism is a renewed commitment to broader questions of epistemology and ontology, including the Kantian 'linguistic' thesis that concepts do not just refer to reality but also shape it. The science wars are fought against this backdrop, and theses on metaphor as the generator of scientific concepts are advanced by realists and anti-realists alike (for example, Boyd 1979; Kuhn 1979). I return to this contest below.

It is another area of science, however, which has seen the largest growth of interest in metaphor. Since the 1970s, cognitive science has become increasingly aware of the dependence of concepts and reason upon the body, and the extent to which conceptualization relies upon metaphor and imagery. This is in contrast to the view of thought, held by 'first generation' cognitive science, as a process which can be formalized in purely functional or symbolic terms, away from any bodily or cognitive context. As a part of this new awareness, cognitive linguistics emerged, using the discoveries of 'second generation cognitive science to explain as much of language as

possible' (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 496). For cognitive linguistics, metaphor denotes one of the mechanisms (if not the principal mechanism) whereby thought and perception are generated from our condition as physically embodied beings (Gibbs 1994; Johnson 1987; Knop et al. 2005; Kövecses 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). This embodiment is manifest, according to Lakoff and Johnson, in the derivation of the concepts we use for thinking and perceiving from concepts 'that optimally fit our bodily experiences of entities and certain extremely important differences in the natural environment' (1999: 27). Hence, concepts we use to describe relations and values have a spatial origin, such as 'happy is up', 'intimacy is closeness', and the concepts we assign to objects and events in general ('starting', 'stopping', 'running', 'grasping') derive from bodily movement and action (1999: 38–39). Thus, the importance of metaphor for cognitive linguistics lies in the fact that it represents the territory to be explored in order to achieve a fuller understanding of the transpositions which draw the structure of thought and experience from our physical being.

Finally, the popularity of metaphor is also evident in the questioning of boundaries – between subject areas and between the wider concepts of the moral, the political, the epistemological, and the aesthetic – that has arisen from the tension between modern and postmodern thought. Principal concerns in these debates are the status of knowledge and the way in which concepts of truth and objectivity are understood. Philosophy has been under attack on this score with its history of 'universal truths', e.g. Descartes's *cogito*, Kant's table of categories, and Hegel's Absolute Consciousness. The main arguments against this universalism invoke metaphor on two related accounts: (1) the fact that key epistemological concepts have metaphors at their root, for example 'mirroring', 'correspondence', 'sense datum', is taken as evidence of the contingent, communal, subjective basis of knowledge, and (2) because metaphor (as a form of dislocated or dislocating predication) works by testing the appropriate with the inappropriate, it is seen as a means of challenging the boundaries whereby one subject defines itself in relation to another.

This book locates the recent interest in metaphor, including all the debates outlined above, within the tradition of continental philosophy from Kant to Derrida. As I have already indicated, Kant's critical philosophy lends itself to being a framework for the theorization of metaphor on account of it representing experience as the subjective determination of an objective world. The idea here is that metaphor is something creative and subjective which nevertheless produces meaning that has the characteristics of being objective and a discovery. Ricoeur (1978a, 1978b) and Hausman (1989), in constructing their theories of objective metaphor, both suggest that Kant's epistemology may, in some way, be able to explain the subjective creation of objectivity. Philosophers in the continental tradition after Kant, I would argue, work within the ontological space opened up by him, to devise (alongside Kant) structures and relations which challenge the dualisms of

orthodox, Cartesian metaphysics, and to demonstrate (beyond Kant) how these new structures and relations work upon, challenge or transform experience and our conception of what is possible within it. In describing philosophers after Kant as working within the space 'opened up by him', it is not my intention to make them footnotes to Kant. The space which he opens up, I maintain, is the region of possibility which emerges once one departs from dualistic thought, i.e. thinking which remains within the boundaries created by oppositions, such as mind–body and subjective–objective. Without the comfort of these neat oppositions, the work of building new theoretical structures which can articulate the textures and complexities of experience is a daunting prospect, and a philosophical endeavour which cannot be reduced to a footnote, as my 'beyond Kant' indicates. The relevance of philosophers in this tradition – I concentrate upon Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Bachelard, Ricoeur, and Derrida – lies in that they either identify metaphor as one of these ontological structures working within experience or introduce arrangements whose operations parallel the transpositions and cross-conceptual mappings of metaphor.

This is also the reason why I am examining metaphor in relation to continental, as opposed to analytic, philosophy: continental thought has more to say on the ontological implications of metaphor, whereas analytic accounts invariably examine the figure within the confines of the philosophy of language (for example, Cooper 1989; Davidson 1978; Guttenplan 2005; Kittay 1987). There are exceptions within the analytic tradition, however, and, interestingly enough, all the clues they give to ontological metaphor point towards theses developed at length within continental philosophy. Black asserts that metaphors can create new yet objective meaning and, to explain his thinking, he adopts images of a Kantian nature (Black 1979). Metaphors, he declares, are like 'cognitive instruments' in that they create new perspectives on objects, allowing us to see things in a new way, as in the case of the first cinematograph 'creat[ing] the aspect' of a horse appearing to gallop in slow-motion (1979: 39); the Kantianism here, I suggest, lies in the notion that a different appearance is determined for reality by our new cognitive, conceptual perspective on it. Another exception within analytic philosophy is Kittay (1989). Although she explores the cognitive potential of metaphor in purely linguistic terms – her debatable reason for doing so is that 'our present understanding of language exceeds our understanding of any other expressive medium' (1989: 15) – she nevertheless acknowledges Nietzsche in her final chapter as a philosopher who might afford some insight into the fundamental nature of metaphorical truth, but the link is not pursued (1989: 327).

Chapters 1 and 2 consider the importance of Kant for an understanding of metaphor. Chapter 1 examines the metaphorical creation of objectivity in relation to Kant's epistemology and, in particular, Heidegger's retrieval of the schematism. As indicated above, both Ricoeur (1978a, 1978b) and Hausman (1989) suggest that Kant's philosophy may, in some way, be able

to explain the subjective creation of objectivity. Unfortunately, gaps or uncertainties are left in the ontological claims they make as part of their explanation of objectivity. The key element in Kant's epistemology for Ricoeur is the schematism – the process which ensures that the structure of experience meets *objectively* with the content of experience – but the contribution which he sees this making to his theory of metaphor is not spelt out. To make matters worse, the schematism is that part of Kant's critical epistemology which he notoriously dismisses as 'an art concealed in the depths of the human soul' (1929: A 141, B 180–1). However, Heidegger's retrieval of the schematism in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, I argue, can assist both Ricoeur's and Hausman's theories. This is because the ontology that Heidegger constructs in order to retrieve the schematism articulates a mode of encountering the world which does not repeat the conventional opposition between subjective structure and objective content. For Heidegger, we encounter the world as a series of possibilities, and it is his claim that any one concept anticipates a range of possible appearances which enables the resolution of the uncertainties left by Kant, Hausman, and Ricoeur, and the completion of Hausman's and Ricoeur's theories of objective metaphor.

In Chapter 2, metaphor is shown to have significance for Kant independently of Heidegger's interpretation when I assess the structure of his argument in the *Critique of Judgment*. Kant returns to the area of the schematism, except he faces it here in moral as well as cognitive terms. The first *Critique* asks how (supersensible) pure, transcendental concepts can accommodate (sensible) empirical intuitions cognitively, and the second *Critique* asks how a (supersensible) universal moral imperative can serve as a principle for showing us how we ought to act in (sensible) particular situations. These lead to the central question of the third *Critique*: how is it possible to reconcile the supersensible basis of nature with the supersensible basis of our freedom to act independently of nature? The answer: through metaphor. As I show, it is through a series of nested analogies and ultimately the 'density' of metaphor itself that Kant is able to hold nature and freedom united (to demonstrate the possibility of their interaction) yet distinct (to maintain the object-directedness of experience) at the same time. This means that Kant relies on metaphor to the extent that (a) his philosophy cannot be rendered systematic without it, and (b) metaphor is situated as a condition of possibility of judgment. Tracing the analogies within the third *Critique* also affords a perspective on a number of recent studies of the structure of Kant's theory of judgment. I assess the impact which my reading has on accounts from Derrida, de Man, and Lyotard.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 consider metaphor as an ontological principle in Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Nietzsche respectively. Metaphor can be seen to occur for the three thinkers as a relation or process whose operation is responsible for determining the structure of experience, where this structure is prior to and constitutive of the human subject, the world, and the

interaction between the two. In addition, this position on metaphor unfolds for all three from a reappraisal of the nature of the senses and human embodiment. Quite why there should be this tie between metaphor and the senses becomes apparent once it is recognized that the concept of metaphor has, in this context, been broadened to represent a process of interaction or transposition out of which ordered, intelligible experience arises. It is therefore being considered as a process which works within the same cognitive space, so to speak, as the senses, as the sensory transmission of material from the world to the mind. Except, of course, that this describes the senses in empiricist terms, when, within the theories of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Nietzsche, they are theorized in a quite different way. Common to all three is the view that the senses operate not as receivers of impressions but as transformative creators of experience and the world. The place which this metaphorical structure of transposition occupies in the ontologies of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Nietzsche is examined in these three chapters.

Metaphor is often associated with the senses on occasions when we try to describe a sensory experience, and find ourselves drawing upon other senses in order to determine the character of the experience, for example, 'a bitter, lemon yellow', 'tinselly, stream-like percussion', and 'the sound of a trumpet is scarlet'. These descriptions might loosely be called 'synaesthetic' in that they combine different sensory modalities. They are, strictly speaking, distinct from neurological cases of synaesthesia on account of their involving active metaphorical association, in contrast to involuntary neurological combination. I do not address synaesthesia as a subject in its own right, but I do show, in Chapter 3, that the history of classification, including the classification of the senses, is bound up with the distinction between literal and metaphorical language. The customary division of the senses into five channels, I argue, is indicative of those theories of knowledge in the history of philosophy which understand truth as a one-to-one correspondence between categories and things in themselves. I focus on Locke's epistemology as an example, since it lets us see the relationship between arguments for the individuality of the senses and those for the existence of individual essences, epistemic access to which is gained through 'correct', literal language. In contrast, post-Kantian philosophy theorizes sensation as the 'generation' or 'brining into being' of certain forms of appearance, for example, colour, sound, texture. Of particular relevance to this area is Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, since it presents metaphors of the type 'bitter, lemon yellow', 'tinselly, stream-like percussion', and 'the sound of a trumpet is scarlet' as paradigm forms of the conceptual and sensory transitions through which we organize the world. I draw out the differences between Locke's and Merleau-Ponty's understandings of the metaphor–sensation relation, and show how Locke's concept of the relation prompts him to condemn metaphor as an unreliable form of description, whereas Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the relation positions metaphor as a fundamental condition of our embodied being.

Chapter 3 also gives me the opportunity to compare my notion of onto-logical metaphor with the theory of embodied metaphor given by Lakoff and Johnson. The comparison is made because Lakoff and Johnson cite Merleau-Ponty as the forerunner of their 'embodied mind' thesis in *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999: xi). Leading metaphor theorists in the field of cognitive linguistics, Lakoff and Johnson situate basic bodily acuities as the foundation of a theory of knowledge, and present metaphor as an extension of the process whereby the human body deals with the world through adaptation and articulation. Most metaphors, they argue, involve con-ceptualizing a subjective experience in terms of bodily, sensorimotor experience, e.g. understanding an idea (subjective experience) in terms of grasping an object (sensorimotor experience) (1999: 45). However, despite Merleau-Ponty's influence, their concept of embodied metaphor is the inverse of his: whereas 'metaphor *is embodied*' for Lakoff and Johnson, I argue that 'embodiment *is metaphor*' for Merleau-Ponty, on account of his redefining the body as the ontological schema which structures human being in the world through transposition.

Although Heidegger does not provide an explicit, systematic account of the senses, the redefinition which they undergo as part of his rethinking of metaphysics nevertheless provides a revealing insight into the direction of his thought. Indications as to how the senses are transformed by Heidegger can be gleaned from the occasional references he makes to them. The rele-vance of these for us is that his transformation of the senses implicates metaphor. In Chapter 4, I consider the relation he constructs between human being and truth as *aletheia*: Da-sein (human being) and *aletheia*, he asserts, are related 'in terms of the temporality of existence', and fathoming this arrangement is the *'central problematic'* of *Being and Time* (1996: 357; original emphasis). His concept of temporality is in fact introduced in my first chapter. It is the process which opens up a world for human being as a realm of possibility. This is time conceived not in the ordinary sense of a sequence of moments but as an ontological structure which creates the 'space', so to speak, in which reality can appear before the human subject. This action, for Heidegger, is also a form of truth as *aletheia*. Instead of referring to the correspondence between statement and world, as truth is conventionally understood, *aletheia* denotes the process of disclosure which allows a world to come into being in the first place. The senses are located within this temporal articulation of disclosure, and metaphor's role is to be the process which allows this articulation to take place.

Heidegger does not actually use the word 'metaphor' in this context, but he does refer in *Being and Time* to 'something as something' as the relation which coordinates the disclosure of any object (1996: 359), and he arguably reinforces its metaphor-like nature in *The Essence of Truth* when he refers to it as making 'something out to be what it is not' (2002: 184). What this ontological as-structure does, I argue, is institute a latticework of possible similarities and differences, and this provides the coordination necessary for

the continuous, coherent disclosure of an object. The generation of sensibility as world-disclosure has metaphor play a constructive role in the formulation of a new ontology, an ontology distinct from Cartesian metaphysics. Its latticework of similarities and differences promotes a realm of possibility which does not conform to the oppositions of conventional metaphysics. This idea of metaphor as metaphysically transcendent though is at odds with Heidegger's confinement of metaphor within Cartesian metaphysics in *The Principle of Reason* (Heidegger 1991). Conventional metaphysics, he argues, has cut certain divisions into reality, for example, the Cartesian split between mental thinking and physical hearing. Thus, metaphor 'only exists within metaphysics' because the conjunctions it makes always start from or are in terms of concepts shaped by metaphysics (1991: 48). I consider this discrepancy in Chapter 4 and again in Chapter 8.

Nietzsche is the philosopher who most explicitly formulates perception as a metaphorical process. In the fragment 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense', he describes cognitive judgment as a series of metaphorical leaps from nerve stimulus to retinal image (first metaphor) to sound as signifier (second metaphor) (Nietzsche 2000: 55). Our perception, he argues, can never correspond to things in themselves because it is formed through a series of transformations which ensures that 'there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression' connecting the first stage (the stimulus) with the last (the concept) (2000: 58). This metaphoricity though, for Nietzsche, is not merely perceptual. Arguably, in his view, it defines human being entirely. I say 'arguably' since this is an extrapolation from his epistemology to his will-to-power ontology. In contrast to the orthodox ontological scheme of subjects confronting a world, Nietzsche presents being in general (of nature and the human subject – no distinction is made at this point) as a set of competing perspectives or wills to power, out of which emerges human experience of an external world. The metaphorical dimension of this lies in the necessarily transpositional nature of the contest between perspectives. No one will to power exerts itself in isolation; rather, power in Nietzsche's ontology is always asserted against a rival or an opposite, where the 'assertion against' is realized not as annihilation of the other viewpoint but as the capacity to see from it. On this understanding, metaphor is not a structure of world-disclosure, as I have claimed with Heidegger, but a network of transpositions, where any individual item, any individual identity, be it a person, an experience or a meaning, occurs as a tensional interaction between competing forces.

Chapter 5 explores the idea that the will to power is metaphorical in nature. I challenge Kofman's opposition to the idea, and argue that the metaphorical nature of the will-to-power ontology makes certain conceptual resources available which can remove the paradoxes generated by this ontology. To give one example: all things are wills to power or perspectives, Nietzsche affirms, including the perspective which grants me the knowledge that this is what the world is like. The paradox here is that Nietzsche's assertion of

perspectivism appears to cancel or deflate itself as just another perspective: if it is the case, as Nietzsche tells us, that all things are perspectives, then his view is *purely his perspective*, with the same cognitive force as the next person's. However, the paradox only stands because certain assumptions are made about what belongs to or is available from a perspective. What the notion of a metaphorical will brings to the debate, I argue, is the recognition that something belonging to or being intrinsic to a category, including the category of perspective, cannot be taken for granted, with the consequence that the individuation of perspectives as items with equal cognitive force – the key claim within the paradox – cannot proceed.

Chapters 6 and 7 consider metaphor in relation to epistemology and the science wars. As announced above, the 'science wars' refers to a series of debates in which the status of scientific knowledge is contested by scientists, cultural theorists, sociologists, and philosophers. The epistemological debate within the wars is akin to the contest between realism and anti-realism: the former is committed to the existence of a mind-independent reality underlying appearances which is either *directly or indirectly* knowable through appearances, whereas the latter asserts the Kantian view that it is our concepts which shape and determine the nature of reality. However, the realism–anti-realism contest is in danger, as McDowell puts it, 'of falling into interminable oscillation' between the concepts of a mind-independent reality and a mind-determined reality, due to the undecidability over whether order and the possibility of knowledge have a mental, subjective or an external, objective origin (McDowell 1994: 9). Chapter 6 argues that the oscillation between realism and anti-realism is attributable to the metaphors that are at work in the competing theories of knowledge. Two cases I cover in detail are 'cutting nature at the joints' and the concept of 'world' used as a metonym. In both cases, it is ambiguous whether what is being described is the (noumenal) world as it is in itself or the (phenomenal) world as it is accessed and made available to us through perception.

My intention though is not to accuse metaphor of disrupting the passage of rational thought but, rather, to suggest that we look to metaphor to find an alternative theme whose imagery can avoid the oscillation. In Chapter 7, I argue that Heidegger and Bachelard do just that. In different ways, they configure the encounter between subject and world as an opening, which is to say that subject and world meet each other not as two pre-formed components but as entities who acquire their being through their mutual participation in or as an opening. What this achieves, I argue, is a new application of the concept of belonging within epistemology. I say 'new application' because the concept is already active in epistemology, encouraging us to think in terms of what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the object. However, the new application presents 'belonging' as a question. Rather than being something that *can be taken for granted*, with the subject possessing some qualities and the object possessing others, belonging is left as a question, on account of knowledge being theorized as a process in

which mind and world are mutually sustaining. The state of having something left permanently as a question might seem inadequate or vague but this, I argue, is an epistemological adjustment which Heidegger and Bachelard invite us to make in order to express the openness of the tensile relation between subject and object. As such, it is also an epistemological arrangement which avoids the oscillation between realism and anti-realism. There are differences between Heidegger's and Bachelard's positions, and Bachelard even constructs his poetic ontology as a response to Heidegger's 'language of agglutination', the network of prefixes and suffixes in his vocabulary which, on Bachelard's interpretation, only serves to reinforce the very ontology which Heidegger claims to overturn (Bachelard: 1969: 213). I draw out the differences in their accounts, but find that their shared interest in metaphor as the generator of the openings within their ontologies means that the differences cannot be too sharply drawn.

The final chapter examines the various ways in which metaphor and metaphysics are interwoven in the work of Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida. The 'interwoven' metaphor is deliberate, since in Ricoeur's and Derrida's responses to Heidegger's metaphysics, and in Ricoeur's and Derrida's responses to each other, there is a dense network of agreement and disagreement over what the relations between metaphor and metaphysics might be. Discussion follows Heidegger's declaration, noted above in the context of Chapter 4, that 'the metaphorical only exists within metaphysics' (Heidegger 1991: 48). According to Ricoeur, there is a 'theoretical core common to Heidegger and Derrida, namely, the supposed collusion between the metaphorical pair of the proper and the figurative and the metaphysical pair of the visible and the invisible' (1978a: 294). But Derrida is surprised by the way his analysis in 'White Mythology' is read by Ricoeur. He finds that the criticisms of his position made by Ricoeur are statements which he (Derrida) in actual fact supports and, more surprisingly for Derrida, are views which (he thinks) are already evident in 'White Mythology'.

I explore the ways in which 'intersection' and 'entanglement' operate as concepts in the relations of metaphor and metaphysics drawn *individually* by Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida, and argue that these concepts determine how the three thinkers stand in relation to one another. While Ricoeur presents his theory of the intersection of discourses in contradistinction to Heidegger's 'metaphorical within the metaphysical', Derrida traces the ways in which the metaphorical themes in Heidegger's text cross over, entwine, and generally exceed any 'X within Y' containment relation. What comes to light here is that one of the contradictions Derrida finds in Heidegger is the very same contradiction which Heidegger uses to create the as-structured opening of truth as *aletheia* in *The Essence of Truth.* That is to say, what Derrida finds as a textual contradiction in one context is put to work by Heidegger as a coherent ontological condition in another. The possibility that Heidegger and Derrida might intersect at the point of relying upon ontological or transcendental structures is considered by Gasché (1986).

However, whereas Gasché ultimately dismisses the possibility of their intersection on account of the discourse–experience distinction, I assert that the two philosophers do in fact meet as a result of the opposition between discourse and experience being removed by Heidegger's ontology. Their meeting on these terms, I argue, also brings them closer to Ricoeur's interactionism, but their proximity to one another should not be mistaken for unity.

My study of metaphor in continental philosophy takes the figure from being a creative and objective poetic device, through being a mode of cognition, to being the structure of belonging and transposition which constitutes the possibility of experience *and the* world. I emphasize 'and the' because epistemology conventionally distinguishes experience from the world, creating two distinct regions: the world, and our experience of it. In contrast, I present the two as conjoined within metaphor. This is not to say that they are seamlessly fused together or that experience is all there is. Rather, it is to assert the claim (from Chapters 5 and 7) that metaphor can serve epistemology *as a structure* whose internal transpositions articulate the distinction between experience and the world that is normally, and problematically, expressed in terms of regions, domains, and other spatial metaphors. In different ways, Nietzsche (Chapter 5), Heidegger (Chapters 4 and 7), Merleau-Ponty (Chapter 3), and Bachelard (Chapter 7) show that what is conventionally regarded as the content of subjective experience, for example a datum, a quale, a manifold, occurs because it is constructed by ontological relations which take it beyond itself, which allow it already to include a reference to the condition responsible for objectivity.

The passage described above, from poetry, to cognition, to ontology, does not run in a straight line through the book. Rather, the categories cross over and intersect throughout, each drawing upon the other. For example, ontology is brought to poetry in Chapter 1 in order to explain the capacity of poetic metaphor to be creative yet objective. And in Chapters 4 and 7, poetry is applied to ontology as part of Heidegger's formulation of truth as disclosure. Here, poetic metaphor, the creative conjunction of something as something else, generates an arc of possibility between the two somethings, opening a space in which an object can appear. This intermingling of subjects could give the impression of circularity: metaphor is explained by ontology which then, in turn, is explained by metaphor. I comment on this at several points, since the impression of circularity relies upon an image which needs redressing. Circularity represents the idea of leaving and then returning to a certain point or, in our case, a certain concept. Yet to think that we leave a point and then return to it is to reason in spatial terms, to assume the existence of an item with a boundary, which is departed from, and an external region in which we make our circular journey back to the starting point. However, metaphor's ontological bearing, I maintain, derives from its upsetting conventional notions of belonging, notions of what belongs on the inside and what belongs on the outside. Impressions of circularity are checked by the claim that, in moving from poetry to ontology

and from ontology to poetry, we are not leaving spaces to return to them but (to adopt an image from Merleau-Ponty) moving between facets on a diamond, where each facet is visible in the face of the other (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 207). For judgment, experience, meaning, or anything which we regard as having identity or content, is shown at various points within continental thought to be constructed by transformations between terms, where the terms function not in isolation as units in themselves but as interactive components in a complex of cross-referral and implication.

The main ontological shift which results from my continental articulation of metaphor is that judgment becomes a question, a questioning of what belongs to the judgment. I use 'judgment' here in the Kantian sense of 'judgment of experience', i.e. to include the conceptualization or determination of experience. This is, in effect, to claim that my articulation of metaphor leads to *experience* becoming a question, a questioning of what belongs to experience. The emphasis on belonging derives from metaphor: its juxtaposition of remote or unrelated subjects, and the reassessment we are invited to make of the properties which belong to its two subject terms. Turning judgments and experiences into questions might seem an unsatisfactory outcome, given that questions are generally regarded as incomplete, in need of answers. But on the ontology presented here, incompleteness is not a gap left through an oversight but a property that is integral to the process of drawing in judgments from other perspectives, of leading our current standpoint towards others in the world. Assigning metaphor this ontological value means I take the view that *everything arises out of metaphor*, but this is not the same as saying 'everything is metaphor'. The latter locates everything within metaphor, has everything belong to metaphor, whereas the former, with its action of 'giving rise' to entities, grants us the room to question what belongs to metaphor.

1 Kant and Heidegger on the creation of objectivity

Both Ricoeur in *The Rule of Metaphor* (1978a) and Hausman in *Metaphor and Art* (1989) draw on Kantian ontology to explain how a metaphor can create new yet appropriate meaning. Hausman, on the one hand, explains new metaphorical meaning by the direct proposal of an ontology. This is made up of unique, extraconceptual particulars akin to Kant's things in themselves which, Hausman maintains, stand as the referents of inventive metaphors and, therefore, as the items which guarantee their appropriateness. Ricoeur, on the other hand, turns indirectly to ontology via an allusion to Kant and the transcendental functioning of the mind which determines, prior to experience, the ontological order of the world. Ricoeur suggests that new metaphorical meaning is achieved as a result of the tension between creative and claim-making discourses where the operation of the latter proceeds 'from the very structures of the mind, which it is the task of transcendental philosophy to articulate' (1978a: 300).

The appeals to ontology are made by Hausman and Ricoeur in order to overcome a paradox. The paradox is that, on their interactionist understanding of the trope, a strong metaphor creates a meaning which is in some way objective or truthful, yet this meaning is new, which is to say that, prior to the metaphor, the *independent* subject terms could neither suggest the new meaning nor signify the concepts which would support it. If the meaning is new, *what is it* that supplies the feeling of appropriateness?

The relation between metaphor and Kant is not merely the product of a coincidence of reference in the two scholars' work. The phenomenon of inventive metaphor is a concentration of the problem faced by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1929). One of the premises adopted by Kant is that experience, to be experience, must be experience which belongs to a subject. From this premise, he attempts to determine the principles of organization which the subject must apply a priori in order for intelligible experience to be possible. The problem to which this arrangement gives rise, however, is how to secure objectivity given the investment of the possibility of experience within the subject. Kant does not want to assert that the mind creates its own, subjective reality, but that it merely supplies the conditions which enable experience of an objective reality to be

possible. He has somehow to project himself out of his self-made subjective prison.

Heidegger is relevant here. His contribution is to suggest ways in which structures already present in the *Critique* allow Kant to confirm the objectivity of experience (1962b). Kant asks how it is possible for *empirical* intuitions to be subsumed under pure, *ontological* concepts, and introduces the notion of a schema as the mediating condition (1929: A 137–38, B 176–77). Unfortunately, the manner in which a schema reconciles the two natures is not clearly defined and, ultimately, Kant dismisses the possibility of their subsumption as 'an art concealed in the depths of the human soul' (1929: A 141, B 180–81). I explicate Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and, with supporting material from the *Critique*, show that what Kant perceived as an incongruity is in fact the tension in virtue of which the categories receive objective application. It is this tension between the ontological and the empirical, I argue, which consolidates both Ricoeur's appeal to transcendental philosophy and Hausman's notion of a *unique* metaphorical referent.

A third author, Kirk Pillow, has also recently turned to Kant to develop a theory of objective metaphor (2000). Pillow takes his lead from Ricoeur and, in particular, the position assigned to Kant's doctrine of aesthetic ideas within Ricoeur's theory. Although Pillow addresses questions in Kant's epistemology and aesthetics, he does not approach metaphor through the creation–discovery paradox, as Ricoeur and Hausman do, and so I shall not dwell on his account here. However, I shall refer to it at the end of this chapter to indicate how I think it compares with the ontology I extract from Heidegger's Kant.

Interactionism in Hausman and Ricoeur

Both Hausman and Ricoeur work from the perspective of the interactionist theory of metaphor developed by Black (1962, 1979). In contrast to the comparison theory, which asserts that a metaphor simply makes explicit what was already implicit, interactionism promotes the creativity of metaphor by stressing the trilogistic nature of the trope. A metaphorical expression is made up of two subjects: (in Black's idiom) the primary subject, the word used literally, and the secondary subject, the word used non-literally. The third element which completes the metaphor is the interaction which occurs between the two subjects. (The rival, comparison theory does not acknowledge this third element. Rather, it presents metaphor as a condensed simile and claims that the significance of a trope can be explicated by listing the ways in which its subject terms are alike.)

Central to the interactionist account is the idea that interaction provides the condition for a meaning which neither of the subject terms possesses independently of the metaphorical context. The primary subject is coloured by a set of 'associated implications' normally predicated of the secondary

subject (Black 1979: 28). From the number of possible meanings which could result, the primary subject sieves the qualities predicable of the secondary subject, letting through only those that fit. The interaction, as a process, brings into being what Black terms an 'implication complex' (1979: 29), a system of associated implications shared by the linguistic community *as well as* (or so Hausman thinks) an impulse of free meaning, free in that it is meaning which was unavailable prior to the metaphor's introduction (Hausman 1989: 82–83). Somehow, interaction admits a meaning that is not already deducible from or present in the lexicon of a community.

Interactionism proposes to explain how metaphors *create* new significance rather than merely discover significance latent within a system of predetermined meanings. The question which Hausman wants to answer is how the meaning created by metaphor can be significant. If metaphors create meaning which is significant, what is it that makes it so? What allows metaphor to be more than the attempt to strain intelligibility from a seemingly nonsensical combination of subject terms? Hausman calls this predicament the paradox of creativity, and in order to reconcile the concepts of new yet significant meaning, he introduces the notion of a metaphorically created referent:

> A metaphorical expression functions so that it creates its significance, thus providing new insight, through designating a unique, extralinguistic and extraconceptual referent that had no place in the intelligible world before the metaphor was articulated.
>
> (1989: 94)

Uniqueness and extraconceptuality or extralinguisticality (the last two terms are synonymous for Hausman) are the two conditions which the referent of every creative metaphor must satisfy, and it is their conjunction in a single expression which gives metaphor its cognitive value:

> Uniqueness is necessary to the idea that the referent of a creative metaphor is new and individual. Extralinguisticality is necessary to justify saying that a creative metaphor is *appropriate* or *faithful* or *fits the world* … [And] it is the joining of these two conditions that is special to metaphors. There is something to which the expression is appropriate, some resistant or constraining condition: yet this condition is new.
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> (1989: 94)

Whereas Black presents the meaning of metaphor as a complex of associations, i.e. the exchange or interaction between them, Hausman wants to theorize this process as an object, a unique, objective referent. The metaphor 'Juliet is the sun' can serve as an example (Hausman 1989: 103). Both the referents of the primary and secondary subjects are familiar; 'Juliet' and

'the sun' each have a straightforward meaning which is understood prior to the metaphor. The effect of the metaphor though is not, as Black would have it, to colour 'Juliet' with some of the relevant associations from 'the sun'; neither is it simply to admit that Juliet shares certain qualities with the sun, such as radiance, brilliance, the fact that she makes the day or that she gets up every morning. Rather, Hausman extends Black's account so that the senses of both subjects interact not only to create a new meaning but also to create a new referent. In short, a brand new signification is injected into the reader's cognitive awareness. The expression's meaning does not remain as a complex of associated implications but comes to fruition as a particular, intentional object. The referent carries the feeling of there being something more which gives the expression its cognitive value.

There is some ambiguity though in Hausman's account concerning the precise nature of the extraconceptual object. It wavers from being something there, actual but unknowable, to being a conceptual provision posited to exceed the limitations of a linguistic community. To label these extremes, we can say that the status of the extraconceptual condition is either material or verbal respectively. The discord is contained by the question of whether or not the 'extra' refers (materially) to another realm or (verbally) to something more than is conceptually available at the time. At some points, Hausman says of the condition that it 'adds an ontological dimension to the uniqueness' condition (1989: 107). Similarly, extraconceptual objects are said to 'constitute a dynamic, evolving world' (1989: 117). 'Extraconceptuality is necessary to justify saying that a creative metaphor is *appropriate* or *faithful* or *fits the world*' (1989: 94). However, these admissions of material status are all countermanded by Hausman assigning verbal status to the condition. 'What the extraconceptual condition adds to uniqueness', he claims, 'is *not substantiality* but, rather, a controlling factor, a locus for the senses … Its function is to constrain certain senses and resist others' (1989: 108, my emphasis). Extraconceptual objects, he continues, 'are intelligible complexes of meaning which *gain* extraconceptuality' by offering resistance or constraint (1989: 193, my emphasis).

Hausman inadvertently brings Kant's thing in itself to mind by explicitly denying that it has anything to do with his extraconceptual object. He disassociates his theory from transcendental idealism on the grounds that the thing in itself is an unknowable existent which cannot possibly 'bear a direct, dynamic relation' to the world (1989: 186). The difference between the two concepts, as Hausman sees it, is that extraconceptuality, unlike the thing in itself, plays an active role in determining its knowable counterpart; it represents the way in which new, extralinguistic experiences are created by existent meanings drawn from the conceptual repertoire of the linguistic community. If language did not open onto these events then the collective awareness of the community would be limited to the arbitrary associations of the idealist. Hausman takes the irremovable presence of a mind-independent world, there each time we open our eyes, as evidence of this condition

(1989: 216). Other examples which he suggests amplify the required sense are the counterpressure we experience upon lifting an object and our surprise at a sudden clap of thunder. The inescapable or unpredictable nature of the metaphorical referent cannot be consumed, but this, Hausman maintains, does not entitle us to dismiss it as a thing in itself, unknowable and unintelligble.

My claim is that extraconceptuality and all the ontological difficulties which come with it (as distinct from an ontological perspective *per se*) are unnecessary for a definition of his metaphorical referent. Hausman's intention is to give an account which resolves the paradox of metaphor. For him, the thing in itself is definitely a material consideration: something which is there in a realm of some description but which is unknowable because it is never directly encountered in experience. However, I submit that if he had been aware of the noumenon's more defensible role as a limiting concept in Kant's critical system, he could have fulfilled his intention and successfully defined the metaphorical referent solely in terms of the uniqueness condition.[1] Just how Kant's epistemology assists Hausman's project I shall discuss later.

Ricoeur in actual fact anticipates Hausman's creativity paradox. In *The Rule of Metaphor*, Ricoeur asks:

> Does not the fittingness [of metaphor] ... indicate that language not only has organized reality in a different way, but also made manifest a way of being of things, which is brought to language thanks to semantic innovation? It would seem that the enigma of metaphorical discourse is that it 'invents' in both senses of the word: what it creates, it discovers; and what it finds, it invents.
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> (1978a: 239)

Ricoeur introduces the notion of intersecting discourses to explain the 'enigmatic' production of new yet appropriate metaphorical meaning. He avers that metaphor is the result of the interaction between metaphorical and speculative discourse. Metaphorical discourse is the domain in which new expressions are created but not conceptualized or translated; it is where inventive metaphors receive their first outing.[2] The combinations of subjects which take place in metaphorical discourse are *diaphoric* (to use Aristotle's term) in the sense that they are unprecedented and unresolved (Aristotle 1996: 34–38).[3] Instances of the discourse might be a poem, a narrative or an essay. Speculative discourse is the domain of the concept and, furthermore, the domain in which the concept can be predicated of an object. It is this discourse which focuses the play of meanings thrown up by metaphor into a proposition which revivifies our perception of the world. To adopt Aristotle's contrast term, speculative discourse is *epiphoric* in that it combines subjects on the basis of rational, explicable similarity. As intersecting discourses, the metaphorical creates the utterance '*A* is *B*' together with all the

'nonsensical' possibilities that it implies, and through its encounter with the speculative, the play of possibilities is resolved and *A's B*-like nature is conceptualized.

The importance of the productive tension between metaphorical and speculative discourse for Ricoeur cannot be overstated. Metaphor 'is living', he proclaims, 'by virtue of the fact that it [metaphorically] introduces the spark of imagination into a "thinking more" at the conceptual [speculative] level' (1978a: 303). 'My inclination', he writes, 'is to see the universe of discourse as a universe kept in motion by an interplay of attractions and repulsions that ceaselessly promote the interaction and intersection of domains whose organizing nuclei are off-centred in relation to one another' (1978a: 302). However, despite this stress on interplay, speculative discourse is shown to be the principal element in Ricoeur's theory, since it is the mode of discourse which resolves the 'nonsensical' possibilities of the metaphorical '*A* is *B*' into appropriate, worldly meaning; that is to say, it is the speculative which assigns metaphor its 'ontological vehemence' (1978a: 300). The interpretation of metaphor, he adds, 'is the work of concepts' and 'consequently a struggle for univocity' (1978a: 302). Possibly because of its elementary status though, speculative discourse is the component whose origin is explained the least satisfactorily. We are told that it proceeds 'from the very structures of the mind, which it is the task of transcendental philosophy to articulate' (1978a: 300), and Ricoeur seeks to explain it through comparison with Kant's doctrine of aesthetic ideas. Kant defines an aesthetic idea as 'a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e. no [determinate] *concept*, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it' (Kant 1987: 314). The production of aesthetic ideas forms part of Kant's account of the genius of the artist in giving expression to *rational ideas*, concepts to which no sensory object or experience can correspond, such as the concepts of God and justice (I provide a detailed analysis of this aspect of Kant's aesthetics in the next chapter). As such, one could be led into thinking that Ricoeur's reference to aesthetic ideas is intended to demonstrate how the speculative within metaphor is capable of exceeding conventional thought. However, while he holds that metaphor in general does this, it is not the reason why he appeals to Kant's transcendental philosophy.

What Ricoeur wants from aesthetic ideas is not the artistic capacity to exceed thought – this, in Ricoeur's analysis, falls within metaphorical discourse; it is speculative discourse that we are dealing with here – but the capacity to exceed thought *objectively*. Aesthetic ideas strive to grant objectivity to rational concepts; in Kant's words, they 'try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts ... [and thereby give them] a semblance of objective reality' (1987: 314). Exhibition provides intuitions for concepts, demonstrates that concepts are not empty but adequate for cognition (Kant 1987: 314). All exhibition, Kant announces, 'consists in making [a concept]

sensible, and is either *schematic* or *symbolic*' (1987: 351). It is schematic exhibition that is important for Ricoeur. (Symbolic exhibition is not relevant here because, in Kant's words, it 'is an expedient we use for concepts of the supersensible, which as such cannot actually be ... given in any possible experience' (1987: 351, n. 31).[4]) A concept is schematically exhibited when an intuition corresponds to it, that is, when an object is brought under a concept and judged to be of a certain kind. Explicating this process, Ricoeur thinks, will help to explain the objective 'thinking more' which speculative discourse carries out when it intersects with metaphorical discourse. He reaffirms the importance of the schematism in his essay 'The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling' (Ricoeur 1978b):

> I want to underscore a trait of predicative assimilation which may support my contention that the rapprochement [between heterogeneous ideas] characteristic of the metaphorical process offers a typical kinship to Kant's *schematism*. I mean the *paradoxical* character of the predicative assimilation which has been compared by some authors to Ryle's concept of 'category mistake', which consists in presenting the facts pertaining to one category in the terms appropriate to another.
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> (1978b: 146)

However, Kant's schematism is by no means unproblematic, and so the manner in which it informs the assimilation of heterogeneous ideas in a metaphor cannot be taken as self-evident. Unfortunately, the nature of this 'kinship' is not made explicit by Ricoeur. Nevertheless, the full relevance of the schematism, I suggest, can be brought out by examining Heidegger's retrieval of Kant's 'Transcendental Analytic'. As I shall show, both the emphasis on possibility and the importance of the schematism which emerge from Heidegger's study support Ricoeur's treatment of metaphor.

The creation of objectivity in Heidegger's Kant

Kant asks in the first *Critique* how it is possible for empirical intuitions to be subsumed under pure, ontological concepts.[5] This difference in kind between the ontological and the empirical is, in Heidegger's opinion, the Copernican Revolution condensed into one moment. Heidegger contests the traditional interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as being an enquiry into the conditions of the possibility of knowledge; the work, he claims, 'has nothing to do with a "theory of knowledge"' (Heidegger 1962b: 21). If the *Critique* does contain any positive, theoretical import, then, he thinks, it is towards evincing the conditions of the possibility of *knowledge of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge.* Given that experience is always already occupied with empirical objects, its principles of organization must be logically prior to experience; it is the conditions of the possibility of

knowledge of these a priori principles which, according to Heidegger, Kant seeks.

To develop the notion that it is the subject which organizes experience, Kant introduces the binary model of concepts interpreting intuitions (1929: A19, B33). The concept–intuition relation, I suggest, is primarily an acknowledgment of the finitude of human cognition: it serves as a model to demonstrate that experience must always be in receipt of an object. Ontic or empirical knowledge, in Kant's presentation of it, arises through the unproblematic subsumption of empirical intuitions under empirical concepts. However, 'what makes the relation to the essent (ontic knowledge) possible', Heidegger observes, 'is the precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being of the essent, namely, ontological knowledge' (1962b: 15).[6] Churchill follows Manheim in translating Heidegger's *Seiend* as 'essent'. It refers to any item in the world which can be discussed without a commitment to any particular epistemological and ontological framework, whereas 'object' refers specifically to an item the knowledge and ontological nature of which is being considered in relation to the finitude of human cognition. Reason must somehow 'look ahead' of experience and determine in advance the ontological nature of the essent, its quiddity (*Wasgehalt*) or what-ness (*Wassein*), so that conceptualization has something to aim for. The essent can only be represented in intuition *as an object* with the determination necessary to promote conceptualization if the ontological nature of the essent is projected in advance by pure reason.

For Heidegger, then, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is an enquiry into the possibility of ontology. Ontological knowledge is the ontological nature of the essent which determines its offering-character (*Angebotscharakter*), its capacity to be represented in intuition as an object. It is not knowledge in the traditional sense: it tells us nothing about the object in itself but, rather, simply represents how the essent must be determined by pure reason for it to be represented by intuition within human finitude. The problem with this arrangement is the central concern of this chapter in Kantian form: precisely *how* is the essent able to manifest itself as an object within finite experience prior to its being represented in intuition; that is, how is ontological knowledge possible? How is it possible for an operation (experience for Kant and metaphor for Hausman and Ricoeur) to acquire objectivity given its basis in subjectivity? For Kant, the objectivity of experience is supposedly guaranteed by the finitude of experience, but his main problem is the justification of the possibility of finitude. Ultimately, the *material source* of objectivity, for Kant, will be empirical intuition, but this is only after it has been determined by the pure concepts of the understanding. Empirical intuition will only be the *objective* representation of an object if there is ontological knowledge in advance of it which can 'produce' an object, i.e. establish the conditions which allow an object to appear before consciousness.

The principles supplied by the subject which structure experience are the categories or the pure concepts of the understanding. The pure concepts are

contentless: they merely represent how the mind is active in ontologically determining the object of experience so that it can be represented in empirical intuition. But, Kant wonders, how can something without content (a pure concept) correspond with something which has content (an empirical intuition)?

> In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representation of the object must be *homogeneous* with the concept; in other words, the concept must contain something which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it . . .
>
> But pure concepts of understanding being quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions . . . can never be met with in any intuition. For no one will say that a category, such as that of causality, can be intuited through sense and is itself contained in appearance. How, then, is the *subsumption* of intuitions under pure concepts, the *application* of a category to appearances, possible?
>
> (1929: A 137–38, B 176–77)

'Obviously', Kant reasons, 'there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance [empirical intuition], and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible' (1929: A 138, B 177). The third thing which Kant introduces is a 'schema': a transcendental determination of time which brings a category into line with intuition by presenting an 'image' for the category. Kant provides three illustrations of how his notion of 'image' is to be conceived, as well as individual accounts of each category's relation to time (1929: A 140–41, B 179–80). I shall quote just the first illustration.[7] While the concept of a small number such as 'five' can be represented by the image '.....', the concept of a large number, Kant asserts, cannot be pictured so easily. The thought of a large number in general is

> the representation of a method whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept, [rather] than the image itself. For with such a number as a thousand the image can hardly be surveyed and compared with the concept. This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept.
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> (1929: A140, B179–80)

Taking this and Kant's additional illustrations into account, the salient point would seem to be that, in trying to understand the notion of a schema, we should think more in terms of a *method* of representation rather than a single representation, since no individual image can realize the universality of a concept. Yet this recommendation does not go very far towards clarifying how mediation between ontological concepts and

empirical intuition occurs. The unaccompanied notion of an image, Heidegger avers, leaves unaddressed the difficulty that 'a concept as a represented universal may not be represented by a *repraesentatio singularis,* which is what an intuition always is. That is why a concept by its very essence cannot be put into an image' (1962b: 99).[8] Kant too is aware that his account is not entirely satisfactory, for directly after his last illustration of an image comes the infamous admission that 'this schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze' (1929: A 141, B 180–81). All that he can assert is that a schema is 'a product and, as it were, a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible' (1929: A 142, B 181).

The basic move which Heidegger makes to salvage Kant's notion of a schema, and thereby to retrieve the critical project, is to emphasize the significance of time in the *Critique*. In retrieving the schematism, Heidegger essentially demonstrates how Kant's notion of the transcendental object, used by Kant to establish the unity of consciousness, may also be represented as part of a 'temporal action' which is itself constitutive of objectivity. Components of this demonstration are a revision of the understanding of time – from empirical to primordial time – as the pure form of intuition, and an emphasis of the significance of the relation between the transcendental object and primordial time.

Kant employs the concept 'intuition' to acknowledge that consciousness is always in receipt of an object; empirical intuition is receptive or, one could say, receptivity itself. Time is the form of intuition or pure intuition, the field or opening in which inner representations may occur, and as such, Heidegger avers, is not receptive but productive; time, he claims, is constitutive of the possibility of receptivity. This is time understood not empirically, as a succession of 'nows', but primordially, 'as that which lets time as the *now*-sequence spring forth' (1962b: 181). The paradigm of an act of perception, receiving something which is present in a single *now,* overlooks the consideration that a single *now* could never be intuited: each *now,* Heidegger argues, has 'an essentially continuous extension in a *just passing* and *just coming* [*Soeben und Sogleich*] ... Pure intuition must in itself give the aspect of the *now* in such a way that it looks ahead to the *just coming* and back to the *just passing*' (1962b: 179).

For Kant, it is the transcendental object which confers the unity of consciousness upon a 'series' of representations that would otherwise be unconnected 'nows'. However, while this confirms the *necessity* of the application of the categories to experience, it does not confirm their *objective validity.* The validity Kant seeks is a matter of *justifying* the necessity of their application to experience. The model of knowledge whereby a form is imposed upon matter is not being proposed here: an object, Kant insists, is

not produced for a concept 'in so far as *existence* is concerned'; this is not objectification 'by means of the will' (1929: A 92, B 125). Neither can recourse be made to the deducibility of the categories *from* experience, as exercised by Locke and Hume, because 'on any such exposition they would be merely accidental' (1929: B 126). We postulate the empirical rule of association whenever we cite a relation between objects or events as rule-governed, universal, objective, or more than accidental, but how is this association possible?

The objectivity of the categories, Heidegger declares, is 'formed' by schemata, as transcendental determinations of time, primordially creating a transcendental object for them. Primordial time itself is nothing more than the movement whereby an object is proposed for consciousness; it is the original bifurcation of the distinction between subject and object. Heidegger justifies his 'radical interpretation' by offering an explication of primordial time which parallels Kant's account of synthesis (1962b: 181). Primordial time is not unidirectional but prospective *and* retrospective. Pure intuition, he writes, 'can form the pure succession of the *now*-sequence only if, in itself, it is imagination, as that which forms, reproduces, and anticipates' (1962b: 180). Corresponding to the stages of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, primordial time is the 'looking ahead', the 'holding on' and the 'looking back' to an object which creates the unity necessary for any sense of the empirical succession of nows. Time, Heidegger writes, 'is that in general which forms something on the order of a line of orientation which going from the self is directed toward ... in such a way that the objective thus constituted springs forth and surges back along this line' (1962b: 194, original ellipsis). This line is perhaps best pictured as a circle: the original burgeoning forth of the proposition of an object, the pulling round as the object is held in the present, and then the pulling back towards the self as the object's passing away completes the process of succession.

The relation between time and the transcendental object is important. The transcendental object or 'object in general', Heidegger asserts, is not a thing, an essent, something which can be reported in intuition, but a horizon of objectivity, the proposition of an opposition which opens up the possibility of intuition and, therefore, which represents the ontological distinction between mind and reality. What lies before the horizon, so to speak, is the space in which the content of experience may appear, and this space is primordially temporal: the transcendental object *is* the act of *looking forward to* and *holding on to*; *looking forward to* and *holding on to* are the anticipation and retention of a something in general. Experience, Heidegger affirms, 'is an act of receptive intuition which must let the essent be given' (1962b: 122), but in order for an object to be capable of being given in intuition, there must in advance be ontological knowledge: the '*orientation toward* that which is capable of being "called up"' (1962b: 122, my emphasis).

Objectivity and possibility in Kant, Hausman, and Ricoeur

At this stage, we can begin to draw together Heidegger's Kant and the two theories of metaphor I outlined above. The role played by the transcendental object in the schematism is the best analogue to display the correspondence between Kant, Hausman, and Ricoeur. The action common to all three philosophemes – the transcendental object, the metaphorical referent, and speculative discourse – is the creation of the notion of a 'something' about which judgment can be made; they are all nominalizations of the point where predication meets ontology. An empirical concept is a concept of a particular object, e.g. a tree, a house, a mountain, whereas the Kantian category, as a *pure* concept, is a concept of an object in general, which amounts to saying it is a concept of the predicative relation. The identification of 'object in general' and predication is justified, Kant writes, by the recognition that 'the function of categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate' (1929: B 128). The categories, Kant writes, are 'concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment' (1929: B 128) and whose division is 'developed systematically from ... the faculty of judgment' (1929: A 80–81, B 106). The imagination produces an object for a category not in the sense that it manufactures a tree or a mountain but in that it creates the original divide between subject and object, and thereby allows intuition to appear opposite consciousness.

The same concern to create an object for judgment occupies Hausman and Ricoeur. Hausman seeks to explain the objectivity of metaphor by introducing the notion of a metaphorical referent. One of the defining conditions of a referent is uniqueness. The condition is modelled on Peirce's notion of an 'immediate object': the interpretive process through which a speaker is able to formulate a declarative sentence from a list of abstract qualities, for example, to transform the qualities redness, largeness, and what it is to be a rose, into the judgment 'This red rose is large' (Hausman 1989: 209–23). The condition, for Hausman, serves to ensure that the meaning of a metaphor derives not from a complex of associated implications but from the fact that it identifies a new, unique individual. For example, the novelty and significance of the metaphor 'the chanting of the cars' is explained not simply by the interaction of the associations connected with chanting and cars, but by the notion that the metaphor refers to a state, a thing, an object in the world.

Ricoeur conceives metaphor as the intersection of two discourses: the metaphorical and the speculative. The latter is the epiphoric, predicative element which endeavours to assimilate the heterogeneous subjects combined in the former. The speculative provides the recognition that a proposition is always about something and draws out a claim from an otherwise diaphoric combination of terms. Although a seemingly nonsensical pairing

of words, it is the fact that a metaphor is a proposition, that it has an object, that it has 'ontological vehemence', which grants the trope its cognitive value (Ricoeur 1978a: 299–300). Thus, Ricoeur's claim that the necessity of speculative discourse proceeds 'from the very structures of the mind, which it is the task of transcendental philosophy to articulate' could be taken as a reference to the production of a transcendental object, a 'something' upon which the heterogeneous subjects in metaphorical discourse are focused (1978a: 300).

The emphasis on 'producing an object' though does little to justify how Kant, Hausman or Ricoeur can talk in terms of objectivity. The arrangement whereby intuitions are subsumed under categories in virtue of the creation of a temporal horizon has, I feel, to a large extent, the same formulaic quality as that provided by Kant to elucidate the subjective unity of consciousness. Like the notion of the unity afforded by the concept of an object, the notion of a space in which an essent may manifest itself is a wholly general one; that is, it would seem not to discriminate between what can and cannot be an object, what is and is not appropriate, what is objective and what is random. Furthermore, Hausman's notion of a metaphorical referent and Ricoeur's predicative dialectic of epiphor and diaphor would seem to be just as formulaic: neither confronts the fact that the impact of a metaphor is tied to the experience and understanding of the particular subjects which feature in it.

However, the notion of a temporal horizon only appears to exhibit an unsatisfactory generality in the face of empirical intuition because the ontological is confused with the empirical. The transcendental object is not the idealized notion of an essent existing in a specious present but the proposition of an opposition which opens up the *possibility* of receptivity. 'Possibility' here does not signify the question of whether or not an essent will appear but, rather, affirms the contingency with which all essents appear to consciousness. It is, Kant affirms, the *possibility* of experience which 'gives objective reality to all our a priori modes of knowledge' (1929: A 156, B 195). The expression 'possibility of experience', Heidegger reminds us, refers 'to that which makes finite experience possible, i.e. experience which is not necessarily but contingently real' (1962b: 121). The objectivity of the empirical is that things may appear otherwise than they do. The essent is not a particularity apprehended in a single now but something which may be this or may be that, something whose nature can never be exhausted by conceptualization. Heidegger provides an illustration. 'In what way', he asks,

> does the aspect of [a particular] house reveal the *how* of the appearance of a house in general? The house itself, indeed, presents a definite aspect. But we do not have to lose ourselves in this particular house in order to know exactly how it appears. On the contrary, this particular house is revealed as such that, in order to be a house, it need not

necessarily appear as, in fact, it does appear. It reveals to us 'only' the 'how' of the possible appearance of a house.

<div align="right">(1962b: 99)</div>

It is the notion of something existing *in the particular* which is under revision here. A particular house is only a particular house because it could have appeared otherwise, that is, as another particular house. This is not the point that a particular house is only this house and not another because it is just one member of the class of houses; this point only sustains the universal–particular divide. Rather, the point is that the appearance of a particular house is not the 'what' but the 'how' of the possible appearance of a house. A particular house is not a particular house at all but (only) a possible one.

The element which needs to be examined is what it is that delimits the scope of possible modes of appearance or, as Heidegger puts it, 'what regulates and determines how … something must appear in order be able … to present an aspect corresponding to its nature' (1962b: 100). 'Aspect' here is synonymous with 'image' (the identification is made by Heidegger at 1962b: 102). The recommendation is that a representation predetermines the essent such that it (the representation) presents an aspect which is a possible aspect for the essent's nature (1962b: 100). Predetermination will occur precisely with a view to the essent presenting a *possible empirical aspect*:

> This predetermination of the rule [concept] is not a description which simply enumerates the 'characteristics' which one finds in a house but is a 'distinguishing characteristic' [*Auszeichnen*] of the whole of that which is intended by 'house'.
>
> But what is thus intended can, in general, be so intended only if it is represented as something which regulates the possible insertion of this complex [the house] into an empirical aspect.
>
> <div align="right">(1962b: 100)</div>

Cropping this quotation makes its claim explicit: the *predetermination* of the concept is a 'distinguishing characteristic' of the whole of that which is intended by the concept and which can be so intended only if it is represented as something which *regulates the possible insertion of the essent into an empirical aspect*. Predetermination is thus a 'distinguishing characteristsic' of the concept. Heidegger refers to this predetermination within the concept as 'conceptual representation'. If, he continues,

> a concept is that which serves as a rule, then conceptual representation is the supplying, in advance, of the rule insofar as it [conceptual representation] provides an aspect corresponding to the specific way in which it [determines]. Such a representation is referred *by a structural necessity* to a possible aspect and hence is in itself a particular mode of sensibilization.
>
> <div align="right">(1962b: 100, my emphasis)</div>

The unifying action of a concept, that is, its application to many is only evident, in Heidegger's words, as '*the representation of the way* in which the [concept-as-] rule prescribes the insertion of [the] pattern [of the essent] into a possible aspect' (1962b: 100, my emphasis).

It is this representation of how the concept prescribes which is the schema of the concept. Kant maintains that a pure concept can be sensibilized by a schema producing an image for it. A concept, by structural, schematic necessity, always refers to a possible image. 'Schema' and 'image' emerge from this example as the affirmation, by Kant, that a concept is the presentation of a possible aspect: the schema is the necessarily 'offering' side of the concept and the image is the possible aspect offered. The image though is not a singular representation, a particular aspect, but the tension between the ontological and the empirical nominalized as a mediating notion: it is the possibility of the aspect, that is to say (in Heidegger's words), it is the 'possibility itself, [and] not [for example] the isolated aspect of a multiplicity of points' (1962b: 105). A concept can never be considered distinct from the offering of a possible image. It is this understanding which prompts Heidegger's comment that 'what in logic is termed a concept *is based upon the schema*' (1962b: 103, my emphasis). The concept is in fact part of, the middle term within, the relation between schema and image.[9]

With this recognition of the structural relation between schema and image, the sense of the three illustrations given by Kant becomes apparent (1929: A 140–41, B 179–80). In the first illustration, quoted above, he likens the 'universal procedure of the imagination in providing an image for a concept' to 'the thought of a large number in general', for with such a number 'the image can hardly be surveyed and compared with the concept' (1929: A140, B179–80). The thought of a large number in general, he claims, rather than being the image of a particular number, is '*the representation of a method* whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept' (1929: A 140, B 179, my emphasis). In the third illustration, he affirms that neither an object of experience nor its image is

> ever adequate to the empirical concept; for this latter always stands in immediate relation to the schema of imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with some specific universal concept. The concept 'dog' signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent *in concretio*, actually presents.
>
> (1929: A 141, B 180)

The inadequacy of the image to the concept, Heidegger declares, is to be considered a virtue of the relation. It is only by being inadequate to an

empirical concept that the image or aspect of the object can be a *possible* aspect. The one–many distinction is a virtue because the *one* admits of *many* possible applications. The original general–particular relation between concept and object which regarded the incongruity between terms to be a difficulty for their conjunction is here replaced by a relation in which incongruity is the enabling condition. The particular object in any conceptual representation, Heidegger explains,

> has renounced the possibility of being just anything and, by this means, has become a possible example for the one which regulates the indifferent many. In this act of regulation, however, the general acquires its own specifically articulated determination and is in no way to be contrasted with the particular as being an indeterminate and confused 'everything and anything'.
>
> (1962b: 103)

The object's status as a possible object in relation to its concept also forestalls any charge of formularity which may be made against Hausman or Ricoeur. The objectivity of a metaphor, for Ricoeur, derives from its primary subject being a component in a play of meaning which entertains the actualities and potentialities introduced by novel predication. Speculative discourse, present in both literal and metaphorical predication, is the production of an object for judgment. The creation of an object admits objectivity not through simply accepting any empirical content as an object, but through being the horizon before which and in virtue of which possible contents may appear. The meaning of a metaphor can be significant, and not just flat or nonsensical, precisely because no single, autonomous image or representation is described by the metaphor. Its diaphoric pairing of terms impels the reader to find new ways of relating subject and predicate and, thus, to bring the 'odyssey' of actuality and potentiality into play (Ricoeur 1978a: 298).[10]

It is the unification of category and intuition through an ontology of possibility which Ricoeur adopts and identifies with the metaphorical process of comparison between incompatible realms. The claim which is useful to him is that the so-called generality of the concept exists not 'in itself' but in the exercise of its 'regulative function'. The concept's circumscription of an object is not the bringing-into-relation of two autonomous contents but the schematic predetermination of a possible image. The idea that the concept delimits a general kind to which there corresponds an autonomous representation is engendered by habitual patterns of seeing and is the assumption, with its commitment to belonging and literal appropriateness, which makes metaphorical objectivity seem such a conundrum.

The significance of the schematism for Hausman's explanation of metaphor is not so straightforward. As we have seen, the definitions he gives of a metaphor's extraconceptual referent are equivocal, shifting from being something materially present in the world, actual but unknowable, to being

a conceptual provision posited to exceed the limitations of a linguistic community. However, some progress can be made if we concentrate upon what Hausman sets out to achieve with his extraconceptual condition. Extraconceptuality is included as a defining condition of the metaphorical referent in order to make it a more worldly entity. It confirms that there is particularity or quiddity 'in the world' beyond language to which metaphor can be appropriate. 'Constraints against embodying qualities that would [for example] constitute [the flower] as a tulip rather than as a rose', he explains, 'are more relevant to certain kinds of classification than are the constraints that affect [considerations of colour and size]' (1989: 217). The objectivity he wishes to convey, I suggest, is that expressed by Ricoeur in his account of the dialectic between sense and reference (1978a: 297–98). There is a reciprocity between acquiring new words and individuating new features of reality, Ricoeur argues, which enables us to relate new predicates to familiar referents and relate familiar predicates to an unknown referential field. It is the fact that a state of enablement exists between the two, that both domains are articulate and allow distinctions to be made within themselves, which corresponds to Hausman's notion of appropriate description. The difficulty Hausman encounters with extraconceptuality is caused by the category mistake he makes with the condition. He cites it to be a property of the referent when it is actually a function of the exchange between description and the object (1989: 94).

However, his uniqueness condition, I maintain, exhibits the same predicative structure as the transcendental object and, through this comparison, can be shown to explain the possibility of objective description independent of any reference to extraconceptuality. The possibility of objective description, I propose, is reflected in Kant's transforming the notion of a particular object into that of a possible object. Hausman's uniqueness condition is the interpretive process which allows a speaker to focus abstract qualities as the description of a particular. Yet, as we have seen, the particular object only exhibits its particularity against the possibility of the other appearances it could have presented. The state of enablement whereby concepts can be applied to the world follows not from the comparability of singular representations but from the possibility that an object may be apprehended in different ways, for it is only against the backdrop of the differences in salient features that Hausman's criterion of appropriate description can obtain. His uniqueness condition, therefore, already includes extraconceptuality as a necessary component, for it, like the transcendental object, is the projection of an object in general which entertains the particular wholly in virtue of the other, alternative appearances that empirical experience supplies.

Pillow's Kantian theory of metaphor

As I announced at the start of the chapter, Kant is also made the basis of a theory of objective metaphor by Pillow (2000). Pillow develops Ricoeur's

reference to Kant's doctrine of aesthetic ideas (1978a: 303). Kant's aesthetic ideas lend themselves to a theory of objective metaphor, Ricoeur suggests, because they are presentations 'by the imagination that [force] conceptual thought to *think more*', where the 'thinking more' corresponds to the claim that metaphor goes beyond pre-existent similarities to create new ones (1978a: 303). To quote Kant's definition again: an aesthetic idea is 'a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e. no [determinate] *concept,* can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it' (Kant 1987: 314). What Pillow does from here is to locate this excess within judgments of the sublime, on the basis that the 'language of the ineffable [from aesthetic ideas] . . . is redolent of the Kantian sublime' (2000: 79), with the advantage, as he sees it, that 'it avoids the temptation to force aesthetic ideas into taste's limited compass', as if 'the judgment of taste [were] the only game in town' (2000: 88–89). This move, I think, is questionable, and I shall return to it shortly.

For now, it is worth briefly examining Pillow's trajectory, as an interesting parallel emerges between his account and mine. Having this 'prompt to thought', including metaphor, originate from sublime judgment as opposed to aesthetic judgment, Pillow argues, allows the prompt to do two things: (1) to serve cognition through generating the conceptual free-play necessary for determinate judgment to occur (also achievable through aesthetic judgment), but – and this is Pillow's main claim – (2) to do so in such a way that, instead of only resulting in a concept being brought to intuition, an inexhaustible, open-ended and judgment-resistant network of connotations is produced. Sublime judgment or reflection, for Pillow, is 'a special construal of Kantian reflective judgment' which can be triggered by any encounter, not just a sublime one (2000: 5, 69). Its 'judgment-resistance' is described by Pillow as 'the unpresentable, uncanny Other of the conventionally understood', but, he insists, it is not wholly external or opposed to conventional, determinate judgment (2000: 303). Although a sublime experience has 'a disrupting and a *dehabituating* effect on current categories, current ways of slicing up and threading together worlds', the reflective judgment we exercise in response is nevertheless 'an "ingenious" inventive power' which 'forges into the unpresentable Other of our conceptual store, in search of how else we might make sense of our shared worlds' (2000: 5). He relates talk of 'our shared worlds' to the Kantian thesis of a mind-constructed world, but acknowledges the epistemological difficulty that arises for it, namely, the oscillation between the concepts of a mind-determined reality and a mind-independent reality (2000: 307). However, a way of jumping off the see-saw of mind-dependence and mind-independence is advanced by John McDowell, and Pillow adopts McDowell's proposal as a means of determining the ontological status of his concept of sublime reflection.

It is here that Pillow's account parallels mine, for although neither Pillow nor McDowell make systematic reference to Heidegger, McDowell's philosophy

nevertheless shares a key principle with Heidegger's ontology.[11] McDowell's position is based upon a 'naturalized' reading of Kant's epistemology, where 'naturalized' embodies the claim that human cognitive faculties belong to the nature they access; we have just seen this in terms of the ontic subject and world emerging from shared ontological conditions of possibility. The idea that human cognition and nature overlap ontologically in some way is termed 'second nature' by McDowell (McDowell 1994: 84). This is a concept of nature, McDowell writes, that 'does not exclude the intelligibility that belongs to meaning', which is to say that it is a 'realm of law' whose lawfulness belongs to the same 'space of reasons' or space of concepts in which human thought operates (McDowell 1994: 72–74, 84–86). In eschewing the orthodox, Cartesian view which places thought on one side of a divide, and reality on the other, second nature provides an ontological space in which languages and traditions can be seen 'as constitutive of our unproblematic openness to the world' (McDowell 1994: 155, quoted in Pillow 2000: 308). This is the space, Pillow argues, in which sublime reflection, including metaphor, operates. Through its judgment-resistant network of connotations,

> [sublime reflection] revises fields of shared meaning and so recasts the worlds they pattern, [with] the validity of its product [resting] on how astutely it manipulates the current practices of sense-making, and how well it communicates a compelling disclosure to those who sufficiently share the webs of connectivity it reworks.
>
> (2000: 309)

For Pillow, the worlds are not alternative realities in a relativistic sense but 'networks of meaning-giving connection' which work against the cognitive impulse 'to reduce complex and contextually shifting phenomena to fixed structures' (2000: 305). Sublime reflection, he continues, 'always awaits the revision of its tentative claims [or worlds], claims that in their very partiality spur on the search for other construals of purposive design' (2000: 305). Pillow has in mind, I suggest, a thick, textured zone of never fully realized world-construction which, in the context of Kant's epistemology, generates the flux of possible worlds necessary for determinate judgment to intersect with reality, but in a fashion which has a sense of possibility or otherness endure to prevent determinate judgment from reducing reality to a fixed structure. My description of Pillow's sublime reflection in terms of the generation of possibility signals where I think his study lines up with mine (although 'possibility' is not a key term in his epistemology). Metaphor creates objective, insightful judgment from a Kantian perspective because, with Pillow, it embodies the sublime multiplication of worlds which brings a provisionality to cognition and, with my reading of Heidegger's Kant, the subject of a metaphor manifests itself as a possible subject, as something that could appear otherwise than it does.

I have some reservations regarding Pillow's theory though. While it cannot be denied that the sublime plays an important role in Kant's theory of judgment, the work which Pillow tries to make it do is already being done by other elements within Kant's system. As I outline above, Pillow asserts that the sublime contributes to Kant's theory of judgment and, within this, that it creates an inexhaustible, open-ended and judgment-resistant network of connotations or worlds. But this is already accounted for by aesthetic ideas. An aesthetic idea, in Kant's words, 'prompts the imagination *to spread* over a *multitude of kindred presentations* that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words' (Kant 1987: 315, emphases added). As I demonstrate in the next chapter, this 'spreading over a multitude' forms a resistance within reflective judgment which plays a positive, if not to say vital, role in the completion of Kant's critical system.

Pillow overlooks this and introduces the sublime, I suggest, because he has a narrow view of the significance which judgments of taste (as opposed to judgments of the sublime) have for Kant. 'My solution', he declares, 'has the advantage that it retains Kant's formal judgment of taste as it stands. It avoids the temptation to force aesthetic ideas into taste's *limited compass,* by locating interpretation of them in a separate sublime reflection' (2000: 89, emphasis added). Further evidence of Pillow's narrow view of aesthetics comes in his criticism of Kantian scholarship's concentration on the relation between cognition and judgments of taste. The standard approach to the question of how concepts stand with regard to aesthetic judgment, he maintains, is 'to *loosen up*, to the point of all-inclusiveness, the array of elements that contribute to the harmony of cognitive powers in the judgment of taste' (2000: 88, emphasis added). However, it is only from Pillow's narrow perspective on the judgment of taste that it appears 'loosened up'. The reason why he perceives taste as having such a 'limited compass', I think, is evident in his asking (albeit rhetorically) the following question: 'how indeed can a pure aesthetic judgment that appears to have no truck with concepts or representations of affairs contribute to our reflection on the thematic material imparted by a work of art?' (2000: 88). Aesthetic judgment differs from cognitive or determinate judgment in that it does not immediately bring an intuition under a concept. So Pillow is right to say that judgments of taste 'have no truck with concepts'. However, it is the concept-less nature of aesthetic judgment that makes it the focus of Kant's systematic account of our capacity to judge. As I explain in the next chapter, because judgment, by Kant's own lights, always requires a concept, aesthetic judgment does not categorize its object but, instead, *produces a concept* which reflects *its own capacity to form a judgment*, to get a conceptual purchase on the phenomenon before it which is posing a challenge to categorization. The concept that is produced is nature's subjective purposiveness, the concept that nature appears as if it were designed for our awareness. This concept is more than sufficient to answer Pillow's question –

about how a concept-less judgment can inform reflection on the content of an artwork – because it refers to a process whereby a range of possible concepts is considered within the act of aesthetic judgment, with aesthetic ideas playing an active role in the stimulation of concepts. Pillow turns to the sublime, I suggest, because he thinks it is the only way of involving a judgment-resistant network of connotations that might constitute (not so much a resistant but) a playful reflection on the thematic material imparted by a work of art. However, aesthetic judgment already does this.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of inventive metaphor is a concentration of the problem faced by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: how is it possible for an operation (experience for Kant and metaphor for Hausman and Ricoeur) to acquire objectivity given its basis in subjectivity? Heidegger's retrieval of Kant, I have argued, explains how subjectivity can create objectivity. The objective validity of the categories is shown to be a consequence of the possibility created by the relation in which empirical intuition stands to time, the pure form of intuition. Heidegger argues that the essent is able to manifest itself as an object within finite experience prior to its being represented in intuition because the transcendental imagination antecedently creates a horizon of objectivity before which determinate intuition is able to appear. What is produced by the transcendental imagination is the schema of an object in general that not only 'holds open' a space in which intuitions can be temporally run together and connected, but also represents the structure of primordial time whereby the subject is originally able to propose and apprehend something distinct from itself. Objectivity is presented ultimately as the difference between how an essent appears and how it might have appeared within the possibility of receptivity created by the schema producing a transcendental object for a category.

Hausman endeavours to resolve the paradox that a metaphor *creates* new insight yet, in doing so, nevertheless *discovers* something significant that constrains it as something already in the world would do. He devises the notion of a metaphorical referent: an 'object' which is both the product and the objectifying condition of a metaphor. The latter aspect confirms that the relation between description and reality is such that degrees of appropriateness and, therefore, appropriateness *per se* are possible. Despite the epistemological and ontological difficulties which Hausman creates with the extraconceptual condition, I have shown that the transcendentalism implicit in his notion of a *unique* referent can nevertheless supply the objectivity he requires. His uniqueness condition, like the transcendental object, is the projection of an object in general which entertains the particular wholly in virtue of the other, alternative appearances that empirical experience supplies, and it is against this backdrop of the differences in salient features that Hausman's criterion of appropriate description can apply.

For Ricoeur, the objectivity of a figure derives from the play of actuality and potentiality which occurs at the intersection of metaphorical and speculative discourse. His claim that the necessity of predicative, claim-making discourse issues from the transcendental structures of the mind, I have argued, can be taken as a reference to the schematic production of a transcendental object. The transcendental object represents both the definite something about which categorical judgment can be made, and the scope of possibility which allows the essent to appear in a multiplicity of ways to consciousness. Furthermore, the essent can only manifest itself before the mind on the basis that it could always appear otherwise than it does, and it is this retort to routine cognition which corroborates Ricoeur's avowal that the metaphorical suspension of everyday perception is comparable to the Kantian schema.

While, on my account, cognition is generated *schematically* as a network of possibilities, Pillow offers sublime reflection as a way of 'thickening' or 'possibilizing' judgment. Some common ground exists between our theories on account of the kinship between McDowell's concept of second nature, upon which Pillow relies, and Heidegger's ontology. However, Pillow's concept of metaphor as *sublime* reflection is questionable on Kantian grounds due to the constructive resistance to judgment which it performs already being included in Kant's aesthetic ideas. It is the role played by aesthetic ideas in Kant's third *Critique*, and their contribution to the metaphorical structure of Kant's theory of judgment, that I turn to now.

2 The power of judgment

Metaphor in the structure of Kant's third *Critique*

Although Kant does not address metaphor directly, he does consider analogy, the kind of metaphor (following Aristotle's definition) which, instead of comparing one thing with another, compares one relationship with another in the form A is to B as C is to D (Aristotle 1996: 34–35). Analogy is vital to Kant's architectonic because, as a creator of relationships, it allows him to explain how the key terms in his system interact with one another. The main gulf which has to be bridged is between the sensible and the supersensible. The supersensible in this context refers to human reason and, in particular, its capacity for *going beyond* what is given in immediate (sensible) experience. While Kant maintains the philosophical tradition (following Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes) of defining reason as the ability to think creatively and act according to principles which are independent of nature, he nevertheless departs from tradition with his claim that the objectivity or validity of these supersensible principles lies not in themselves, in their own terms, but *in their application to sensible reality*. This is the relationship which has to be explained.

As a result, Kant faces the question of the interaction between the sensible and the supersensible on two accounts, since reason goes beyond the given in both *theoretical* (or cognitive) and *practical* ways, as argued in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1929) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1996b) respectively. The questions which arise are: theoretically, how do (supersensible) pure, transcendental concepts projected in advance of experience accommodate (sensible) empirical intuitions; and practically, how can a (supersensible) universal moral imperative supplied by reason in advance of experience serve as a principle for showing us how we ought to act in (sensible) particular situations? We have just considered Heidegger's answer to the first question in the previous chapter. Now I shall show that a response to both questions can be found by focusing on the role metaphor plays within the structure of the *Critique of Judgment*. This is not to undermine or detract from Heidegger's retrieval of Kant. The relation between the pure and the empirical was explored in Chapter 1 following references made by Hausman and Ricoeur to the first *Critique*. Here, though, I show that Kant addresses the incongruity between the pure and the empirical in the third

Critique through a series of metaphors and analogies, to the extent that (a) his philosophy cannot be rendered systematic without it, and (b) metaphor is situated as a condition of the possibility of judgment. This analysis occupies the first part of the chapter. In the second part, I consider the implications of my 'metaphorical' theory of judgment for recent continental studies of analogy in the third *Critique*. I assess how the transcendental positioning of metaphor impacts upon my Heideggerian theory of metaphorical objectivity in the conclusion.

Metaphor in the structure of Kant's third *Critique*

The project of uniting the sensible and the supersensible ultimately leads Kant, in the *Critique of Judgment* (1987), to the problem of reconciling two concepts of the supersensible: the supersensible substrate of all appearances in accordance with the laws of nature, and the supersensible substrate of our freedom to act in accordance with the moral law; or in other words, the supersensible as the substrate of nature *and* as the substrate of our freedom to act in ways which are not determined by nature. The one debate (the reconciliation of sensible and supersensible) leads to the other (the reconciliation of two supersensibles) for two reasons. Firstly, the supersensible in Kant's epistemology is the source of the conditions of possibility which allow sensibility to come into being, that is to say, it is the origin of the conditions of possibility of nature appearing to the experiencing subject through sensibility. Secondly, accounts of sensibility lead to discussions of supersensibility because of the terms in which these debates are set in the history of philosophy and, in particular, the spatial or 'realm' metaphors which are used to mark philosophy's central distinctions, for example, the material and the ideal, the sensible and the intelligible, the immediate and the transcendent. Philosophical argument traditionally locates metaphysical absolutes, such as identity, truth, and reality in itself, behind or above our physical dimensions; this applies to both rationalism and empiricism. Kant's project throughout his critical writing is to show how these binary domains can intersect but, in the *Critique of Judgment*, it culminates in the question of how such intersection is possible when the two source domains – the supersensible of moral autonomy and the supersensible of nature in itself – would seem (adopting the spatial metaphor again) to entertain no overlap whatsoever. Kant uses a similar image: 'The concept of freedom determines nothing with regard to our theoretical cognition of nature, just as the concept of nature determines nothing with regard to the practical laws of freedom; and to this extent it is not possible to throw a bridge from one domain to the other' (1987: 195).

How then does analogy serve Kant in his attempt to reconcile the supersensibles of nature and freedom? Firstly, it is by means of analogy that Kant identifies our power of judgment as the principle to which we should turn in order to achieve the desired resolution. He does this in his second

introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*. Reviewing his work from the first two *Critiques,* Kant observes that the concepts of nature 'which contain a priori the basis for all theoretical cognition, were found to rest on the legislation of the understanding', and similarly that the concept of freedom 'was found to contain a priori the basis for all practical precepts that are unconditioned by the sensible, and to rest on the legislation of reason' (1987: 176). On this basis, he argues,

> we have cause to suppose, by analogy, that [judgment] too may contain a priori, if not a legislation of its own, then at least a principle of its own, perhaps merely a subjective one, by which to search for laws. Even though such a principle would lack a realm of objects as its own domain, it might still have some territory; and this territory might be of such a character that none but this very principle might hold it.
>
> (1987: 177)

An important metaphorical theme is introduced here: namely, the absence of a domain. Once again we have thought perceived in spatial terms, although in this instance it is the *applicability* of a concept which is represented spatially.[1] Kant distinguishes between realm, territory, and domain in his account of whether or not there are objects corresponding to concepts. 'Realm' (*Feld*) represents the region of objects covered by a concept *as an abstract possibility.* Within this, the part of the realm 'in which cognition is possible for us', Kant avows, 'is a territory [*Boden*] . . . and that part of the territory over which these concepts legislate is the domain [*Gebiet*] of these concepts' (1987: 174). But the point here isn't that metaphors are being employed. Rather, it is that, according to Kant, the principle he seeks does not have its own domain. Metaphor (of which analogy is a form) is introduced precisely because it is *the disrespecter* of domains, the cognitive principle which, lacking a domain of its own, operates by rupturing the conceptual landscape and placing two formerly incongruent semantic fields side by side.

While this first instance of analogy merely suggests that judgment itself might be the 'territory' to turn to for answers, subsequent analogies are introduced to form the key concepts in Kant's theory of judgment. In order to appreciate the role they play, it will be helpful to provide some exposition of his theory. Kant's examination of our power of judgment consists of a critique of aesthetic judgment and a critique of teleological judgment. This can give the impression that the *Critique of Judgment* is a book of two halves, and it is certainly true to say that the greater part of Kantian scholarship has concentrated on the account of aesthetic judgment given in the first half. However, there is a very good reason why the third *Critique* is a combined study of aesthetics and teleology: both forms of judgment, Kant avows, go beyond intuition by invoking concepts which cannot be explained *in terms of their application to intuition.*

Aesthetic judgments or judgments of taste are those utterances where we describe something as beautiful or as having special significance, for example, 'This is a beautiful landscape', 'This is a powerful work of art'. These judgments go beyond the given in that, while they are a description of a personal feeling in response to an object, they nevertheless extend beyond this subjectivity to make a claim about the object's beauty or aesthetic merit which *arguably should hold for everyone*. In other words, they claim a level of universality normally attributed to conceptual determination, yet it cannot be the case that determination is taking place since it is a personal feeling which is being expressed. How is this universality to be accounted for?

Teleology also goes beyond what is given in intuition, albeit in a different context. Teleology asserts that complex or living systems, such as plants, animals, people, can best be explained in terms of ends or aims or purposes. Whereas a causal account explains behaviour as an aggregate of mechanical events, one leading 'blindly' to another, a teleological explanation projects an end in advance of experience which allows various elements to be seen to be working together as an organic whole in pursuit of the end. Thus, in a teleological judgment, there is the assumption of a concept which allows us to perceive unity in a situation for which there is no basis in the mere causal structure of events as observed through intuition.

Kant formalizes the problem posed by this 'beyondness' in aesthetics and teleology as the antinomy of aesthetic judgment and the antinomy of teleological judgment respectively. The antinomy in both cases is the conflict between, on the one hand, a judgment (whether aesthetic or teleological) seeming to be about what is personal (aesthetic) or what is determined in intuition (material things produced in accordance with 'blindly' mechanical laws) and, on the other, the same judgment also seeming to employ a concept (universal agreement in aesthetics, and organic unity in teleology) for which there is no empirical warrant.

In order to solve these antinomies, Kant draws a distinction between determinative and reflective judgment. 'Judgment in general', he writes, 'is the ability to think the particular under the universal' (1987: 179). Determinative judgments, on the one hand, subsume a particular under a universal or, in a more Kantian idiom, an intuition under a concept, and determine an object to be a certain kind of thing, for example, 'This is a tomato'. Reflective judgments, on the other, do not assign properties to an object. They are attached to experiences where no determining concept is available or where an available concept is inadequate to the experience; in describing a landscape as 'beautiful' or a piece of music as 'sad', or in claiming that a series of events is the product of a purpose, I am not ascribing an empirically determinate quality to an object. However, since judgment, by Kant's own lights, always requires a concept, what reflective judgment does in these circumstances, he argues, is not categorize its object but *produce a concept which reflects its own capacity to form a judgment*, to get a purchase on the phenomenon before it which is posing this

challenge to categorization. The concept that is produced is 'nature's sub-jective purposiveness', the concept that nature appears as if it were designed for our awareness. As Kant defines the term, purposiveness is the a priori principle

> that what to human insight is contingent in the particular (empirical) natural laws does nevertheless contain a law-governed unity, unfa-thomable but still conceivable by us, in the combination of what is diverse in them to [form] an experience that is intrinsically [*an sich*] possible.
>
> (1987: 183–84)

Purposiveness is the appearance of design or purpose in nature that is necessary for our faculties to obtain a unified, coherent purchase on the world; it is the 'harmony of an object ... with the mutual relation of the cognitive powers ... that are required for every empirical cognition' (1987: 191). Thus purposiveness represents not the presence of a *particular order* in nature (this would mean that the concept of purposiveness was being exer-cised *determinatively*) but the *possibility of order* in nature, not the *determi-nation* but the *determinability* of nature (1987: 196). Purposiveness is also therefore the subjective principle belonging to judgment hinted at above, the principle 'by which to search for laws', the principle which defines the *ter-ritory* 'in which cognition is possible for us' (in Kant's technical sense of 'territory').

Claiming aesthetic and teleological judgments as reflective therefore removes their respective antinomies, since their universal character is shown to follow not from the determinative application of a concept (which would conflict with the subjectivity of aesthetic judgment and the mechanical determination already exercised in teleological judgment) but instead from reflection on the purposiveness of nature for our judgment. But how does this excursion into aesthetics and teleology help Kant unite the super-sensibles of nature and freedom? The answer to this lies in the analogy at the heart of the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness. The possibility that the mind can intersect with a *determinable* nature, Kant argues, is one we cannot fathom directly but only conceive of indirectly by analogy to an understanding other than our own. As he admits, in order to think of nature being determinable by us, we need to view the particular empirical laws of nature 'in terms of such a unity [as they would have] if they too had been given by an understanding (even though not ours) so as to assist our cognitive powers by making possible a system of experience in terms of particular natural laws' (1987: 180). Kant's most forthright statement along these lines is the following:

> The purposiveness that we must presuppose even for cognizing the inner possibility of many natural things is quite unthinkable to us and is

beyond our grasp unless we think of it, and of the world as such, as a product of an intelligent cause (a God).

<div style="text-align: right">(1987: 400)</div>

To be the product of an intelligent cause here means to have one's being or actuality determined by a concept held by an *intellectus archetypus* or *intuitive understanding* or supreme being (1987: 406–08). This is an understanding which is *archetypal* in the sense that it is the origin of its own reality. It can be called *intuitive* (in Kant's sense) on the grounds that the intuition of reality is self-present to it; all objects cognized by it simply exist (1987: 403). Or as Kant puts it in the first *Critique,* an intuitive understanding is 'an understanding through whose [spontaneous] presentation the objects of this presentation would at the same time exist' (1929: B 139). In other words, it is an understanding which can theoretically legislate not merely the universal but the particular as well.

However, the problem with our reliance on the concept of an intuitive understanding is that it is a form of understanding for which there is no contingency, that is, no distinction between the possible and the actual (1987: 402). Our form of understanding, in contrast to the intuitive form, Kant describes as *discursive* or as an *intellectus ectypus*, which signifies that it relies on perceptions gained through sensibility (1987: 408). This means that, for a discursive understanding, there is always a contrast between how things *might appear* and how things *actually appear* in intuition. Against this, an intuitive understanding neither has nor requires this contingency since, as stated above, all objects cognized by it simply exist.

This becomes a problem for Kant when it comes to the question of what each of the two types of understanding takes to be the basis for the perception of organisation in nature, the perception of how various parts fit together to make a whole. As far as an intuitive understanding is concerned, the relationship of the parts to the whole in an organized natural product necessarily follows from or is already contained in the concept which the understanding has of it. However, Kant observes, we, as discursive individuals, cannot present the possibility of the parts as dependent on the whole because of the 'peculiarity of our understanding' which requires that our concepts have to work on the particulars given in intuition, that is to say, our concepts have to work up from the parts to the whole. 'We, given the character of our understanding', he declares, 'can regard a real whole of nature only as the joint effect of the motive forces of the parts' (1987: 407). To suggest that our discursive understanding through its theoretical legislation could determine organization on a 'top down', 'whole to part' basis, Kant insists, 'would be a contradiction' (1987: 407). Yet discursive understanding requires this teleological projection of unity for judgment to take place. How, then, is it possible to have a concept of the purposive determinability of nature which does not involve a contradiction between, on the one hand, the *contingency* with which discursive understanding works up

from the parts to possible wholes and, on the other, the *necessity* with which the parts follow from the wholes characteristic of intuitive understanding?

Kant's solution is to argue that the theoretical legislation exercised by intuitive understanding can be thought by us in terms of the practical legislation of reason, and that this can be achieved by analogy to the concept of a purpose. An intuitive understanding, Kant observes, working as it does from the whole to the parts, 'has no *contingency* in the combination of the parts in order to make [an empirically] determinate form of the whole possible' (1987: 407). However, if we think of the connection of the parts (required to make the form possible) as an effect which is determined 'merely on the basis of the presentation of that effect', that is to say, if the connectivity and the whole which supplies it are seen as products, then we are regarding the whole *as a purpose,* that is to say, as a product *of practical reason*. A purpose, for Kant, refers to a thing whose form

> could not have arisen according to mere natural laws, laws we can cognize by understanding alone as applied to objects of sense, but requires that even empirical cognition of this form in terms of its cause and effect presupposes concepts of reason. [Therefore] the form of such a thing is, as far as reason is concerned, contingent in terms of all empirical laws ... [T]hat very contingency of the thing's form is a basis for regarding the product *as if* it had come about through a causality that only reason can have.
>
> (1987: 370)

The causality that only reason can have is the causality of freedom or, in other words, the kind of causality 'that confines nature to a particular form for which nature itself contains no basis whatsoever' (1987: 422). By introducing the concept of purpose through the analogical 'as if', Kant is able to show how discursive understanding can borrow a notion of determinability from the concept of an intuitive understanding, where that notion allows us to think of determination *over and above* the order of mechanistic cause and effect which generates empirically contingent outcomes. The concept of practical reason can supply this sense of contingency because of the distinction it admits between moral necessity and causal necessity. The objective necessity of a moral, duty-bound action is of a quite different kind from the necessity that the act would have if it were an event with its basis in nature. An action 'that morally is absolutely necessary', Kant writes, 'is regarded as quite contingent physically (i.e. [we see] that what *ought* necessarily to happen still fails to happen on occasion)' (1987: 403).

By overcoming the seemingly contradictory aspects of teleological judgment (relating to discursive and intuitive understandings), this mode of analogical reasoning also completes Kant's account of the reconciliation of the two supersensibles. The mediating condition produced by judgment, we recall, is the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness. The concept

allows us to think of the two supersensibles 'occupying the same space', so to speak, because it represents the idea of the supersensible substrate of nature in terms of, that is, by analogy with, the supersensible substrate of freedom and its contingent effects in the physical world. The analogy is confirmed by Kant when he considers the *forms* of causality which are attached to the two supersensibles: 'the causality of nature in its universal lawfulness [and the causality of] an idea that confines nature to a particular form for which nature itself contains no basis whatsoever' (1987: 422) or, to give another characterisation of the causality of freedom, a causality that is 'the ability to act according to purposes (i.e. a will)' (1987: 370). From this perspective, Kant suggests, we might think of the causal mechanism of nature 'as the instrument, as it were, of a cause that acts intentionally' (1987: 422). Thus, mediation between the two supersensibles is conveyed by thinking of the causality of nature being used as a tool by the causality of freedom.

What this account has shown so far is that Kant's theory of judgment is structured by a nested series of analogies. The first analogy, with the legislative capacities of reason and the understanding, prompts Kant to work on the basis that judgment too has its own principle by which to search for laws. The principle Kant arrives at is the concept of purposiveness, and this is devised by a second analogy to the idea of an understanding other than our own, an intuitive understanding. A third analogy, to the concept of practical reason, allows us to think of the effects of the intuitive understanding having the contingency that is appropriate for our discursive power of judgment.

Beyond these, however, there is a further respect in which analogy figures in Kant's argumentation, one which brings his account of teleology back to his aesthetic theory. If we return to the 'instrument' metaphor given above, it would seem that this particular metaphor makes the supersensible of nature subservient to the supersensible of freedom. Kant himself admits that 'in view of the character of our cognitive power... we must regard mechanism as originally subordinated to a cause that acts intentionally' (1987: 422). However, there are good grounds for exercising caution when it comes to interpreting the metaphor and therefore assuming we can assign a definite predicate to the interaction between the two supersensibles. And Kant makes this quite plain, for there are several declarations at this point in the *Critique* to the effect that 'it is beyond our reason's grasp how this reconciliation of the two kinds of causality is possible' (1987: 422; cf. 1987: 411, 412). Even though the concept of purposiveness unites the two supersensibles, our possession of that concept does not mean we are able to cognize the supersensible theoretically; we cannot perceive the relationship between nature and freedom with the determinative exactitude which follows when a concept has an intuition corresponding to it. The reason for this is that the concept of purposiveness is what Kant terms a 'rational idea': an idea which 'can never become cognition because it contains a

concept (of the supersensible) for which no adequate intuition can ever be given' (1987: 342).

Nevertheless, while rational ideas cannot be evidenced or realized in intuition, a 'content' can nevertheless be provided for them, Kant suggests, by analogy. Our interest here is in the adequacy of the concept of purposiveness for cognition and, in particular, the question of the thinkability of purposiveness raised by the 'instrument' analogy between the causalities of nature and freedom. The demonstration that a concept is not empty but adequate for cognition Kant refers to as the 'exhibition' (*vorstellen*) or 'hypotyposis' of a concept. All hypotyposis, he announces, 'consists in making [a concept] sensible, and is either *schematic* or *symbolic*':

> If we provide the concept with objective reality straightforwardly [*geradezu*] (*directe*) by means of the intuition that corresponds to it, rather than [indirectly or] mediately, this act is called schematism. But if the concept can be exhibited only [indirectly or] mediately, in its implications [*Folgen*] (*indirecte*), this act may be called the symbolization of the concept. The first we do for concepts of the sensible, the second is an expedient we use for concepts of the supersensible, which as such cannot actually be exhibited, and given in any possible experience... The symbol of an idea (or rational concept) is a presentation of the object by analogy: i.e. we present the object of the idea [e.g. God] in terms of the relation [which some other object, e.g. man, has] to its [effects or] consequences [*Folgen*] and which is the same relation that we consider the object itself as having to its consequences, and we do this even though the [two] objects are quite different in kind.
>
> (1987: 351, n. 31)[2]

Thus rational ideas are not exhibited *directly* by the schematization of an object but are exhibited *indirectly* through the symbolization of a relation between objects. What is important here, as regards the concept of purposiveness and the metaphor of nature as an instrument, is that the symbolization of the relation by analogy necessarily displays a degree of unresolvability, an unresolvability which comes from there being a lack of correspondence between concept and intuition. Not only does this unresolvability act as a 'buffer' preventing any determinate predicate from being drawn out of the analogy (in this case, the 'instrument' metaphor), but it also represents a region of creative, critical thought, a region in which the various possible mappings between relations are generated, the 'thickness' or density of these possibilities constituting the buffer effect.

This line of interpretation is supported by the fact that rational ideas, for Kant, are the counterpart of aesthetic ideas. Discussion of aesthetic ideas forms part of Kant's account of the genius of the artist; Kant in fact defines 'genius' as 'the ability to exhibit *aesthetic* ideas' (1987: 313). Whereas a rational idea is 'a concept to which no *intuition* (presentation of the imagination)

can be adequate', an aesthetic idea, Kant writes, is 'a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e. no [determinate] *concept,* can be adequate, so that no language can express it' (1987: 314). As such, aesthetic ideas 'strive towards something that lies beyond the bounds of experience, and hence try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts (intellectual ideas) ... [so that these concepts] are given a semblance of objective reality' (1987: 314). Just how aesthetic ideas might assist the exhibition of the concept of purposiveness is hinted at by Kant when he considers the aesthetic '*attributes* of an object ... whose concept is a rational idea and hence cannot be exhibited adequately' (1987: 315). The examples he gives are 'Jupiter's eagle with the lightning in its claws [as] an attribute of the mighty king of heaven, and the peacock [as] an attribute of heaven's stately queen' (1987: 315). These aesthetic attributes (the eagle, the peacock and, in our case, the instrument) do not represent the determinative content of their respective rational ideas (sublimity, the majesty of creation and, in our case, purposiveness) but instead present something different,

> something that prompts the imagination *to spread* over a *multitude of kindred presentations* that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words. These aesthetic attributes yield an aesthetic idea, which serves the mentioned rational idea as a substitute for a logical exhibition, but its proper function is to quicken [*beleben*] the mind by opening up for it a view into an *immense realm* [*unabsehliches Feld*] of kindred presentations.
>
> (1987: 315, emphases added)

It is not certain whether Kant intends 'realm' in his technical sense, but letting it carry its technical meaning does reinforce my interpretation. 'Realm' is one of the spatial metaphors, alongside 'territory' and 'domain', used by Kant to indicate whether or not there are objects corresponding to concepts. Taking 'realm' in its technical sense supports my reading because it represents the region of objects covered by a concept *as an abstract possibility*, that is to say, of Kant's three terms, it is the furthest away from signifying that there are objects to correspond with concepts, although it nevertheless retains correspondence as a possibility. What I think is important in this, and in the above quotation, is that 'realm', 'spread', and 'multitude' all hint at the density or 'thickness' of analogy. In other words, they indicate that analogy functions not by applying concepts directly or determinatively but instead by *opening up a space* in which a wealth of cognitive possibilities (left 'undeveloped' by the understanding in its singular, determinative application of concepts) is available for consideration (1987: 317). This means there is a very good reason why it is impossible for us to be clear on how the two kinds of causality might be reconciled: the impossibility is an aspect of the necessarily analogical nature of judgment. In order

for there to be determinability between our faculties and the world, there must be, in between them, an analogical middle-ground of possible presentations which is not itself a domain where theoretical or practical legislation takes place. This is what purposiveness, exhibited as the meeting of two causalities, represents.

Thus, analogy, as well as being the means by which Kant arrives at the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness, is also *the procedure by which the concept of purposiveness operates in Kant's system*. Otherwise put, the concept of purposiveness is not only constructed by analogy but represents or embodies the performance of analogical thought itself. This is in effect to assert that reflective judgment – the form of judgment which brings the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness to the fore – is fundamentally analogical. What is reflected upon is the capacity of our cognitive powers to apply concepts to intuitions and to entertain the possibility that alternative concept–intuition mappings are available; the idea of transferring a concept from one object to another is, of course, one of the defining characteristics of metaphor. In terms of the supersensible, analogy becomes not only the 'opening of possibilities' which allows the two supersensibles to be combined in a coherent concept, but also the form of thinking which lets us see freedom intersecting with nature, which lets us explore how objects *ought* to be conceptualized. This is in accordance with Kant's definition of beauty as the symbol of morality. The metaphors we utter in response to a work of art are motivated by the question of how we *ought* to describe the work; examples given by Kant here include buildings characterized as 'majestic and magnificent' and colours as 'humble or tender' (1987: 354). This is essentially another way of saying that aesthetic judgment makes a claim to everyone's assent. Aesthetic judgment, as reflective judgment, Kant explains, 'legislates to itself' and, he continues:

> because the subject has this possibility [of judgment] within him, while outside [him] there is also the possibility that nature will [purposively] harmonize with [the judgment], judgment finds itself referred to something that is both in the subject himself and outside him, something that is neither nature nor freedom and yet is linked with the basis of freedom, the supersensible, in which the theoretical and practical power are in an unknown manner combined and joined into a unity.
>
> (1987: 353)

The manner of the theoretical–practical combination is only 'unknown' if this paragraph is taken in isolation as an account of beauty's symbolism of nature. For our purposes, the quotation reaffirms the manner in which reflective judgment holds the supersensibles of nature and freedom within 'the same space'. A brief consideration of how analogy or metaphor applies to the passage should help to make it and the analogical nature of reflective judgment a little clearer. It is, I suggest, the density of analogy which *on the*

one hand allows Kant to claim unity for his system by apparently collapsing the distinction between the inside and the outside of the subject ('something that is both in the subject himself and outside him, something that is neither nature nor freedom'), yet which *on the other hand* allows Kant to keep the subject–object distinction in place by maintaining the notion of an 'external' object for judgment ('judgment finds itself referred to something … [supersensible] in which the theoretical and practical are in an unknown manner combined and joined into a unity'). To adopt an analogy ourselves at this point: if we follow Kant in picturing the scope of application of a concept as a domain, then, holding onto this notion of concept as domain, the double-handed, collapsed-yet-distinct account of judgment given here can be symbolized or illustrated by the action of metaphor itself. In this analogy, the unification of subject and object, or freedom and nature, is represented by metaphor as the cognitive principle which brings two domains together. The contrasting state of affairs, whereby it is conceivable that judgment can find 'itself referred to something that is both in the subject and outside him' without entirely collapsing the distinction between subject and object or between nature and freedom, is represented by metaphor (as I characterized it above) lacking a domain of its own or, in other words, '[arousing] more thought than can be expressed in a concept' (1987: 315). That is to say, the domains in a metaphor are never wholly combined to produce a new domain but always remain in a complex or tensile state.

Derrida, de Man, and Lyotard on analogy in Kant's aesthetics

What I propose to do is spell out some of the ways in which my reading of analogy in the third *Critique* relates to recent concerns within Kantian aesthetics. The idea that key stages in Kant's argumentation belong to a nested series of analogies promotes the view that the *Critique of Judgment* is a coherent and unified text when, as recent studies make it clear, this is not something which can be taken for granted. Commentators in both the analytic and the continental traditions of philosophy have questioned the structure of Kant's aesthetics, its compatibility with his critical system as a whole, and the role played by analogy in determining issues of structure and compatibility.[3] In the continental tradition, Derrida, de Man, and Lyotard have arguably done the most prominent work in these areas.

   In two essays, 'Parergon' and 'Economimesis', Derrida traces various metaphors and analogies used by Kant to evince that, far from being just convenient turns of phrase or helpful illustrations, they in fact constitute a network of themes which is central to the concerns of the third *Critique*, and which also has a bearing upon the structure of Kant's philosophy as a whole (Derrida 1981b, 1987). For example, questions regarding what is intrinsic and what is extrinsic to a concept or body are paramount for Kant, Derrida claims, since he is attempting to show how one order of being, the conceptual, can open onto another, the sensible or the aesthetic. Thus, Kant

needs to be clear on these terms in order to establish their interaction. Yet, as Derrida demonstrates in 'Parergon', how Kant determines what can or cannot be embraced by a concept is affected by the metaphors of ornament and framing he uses in the *Critique of Judgment*. Ornaments, for Kant, are *parerga*: 'what does not belong to the whole presentation of the object as an intrinsic constituent, but [is] only an extrinsic addition' (Kant 1987: 226). Depending upon the form in which it appears on or in a work, ornament can, according to Kant, either *contribute* to beautiful form, as in drapery on statues, or it can amount to nothing more than 'finery' and 'impair genuine beauty', as with a gold frame which is 'merely attached' to a painting. This means there is uncertainty with the notion of a *parergon* over whether ornament contributes to or detracts from beauty. 'Aesthetic judgment', Derrida writes, '*must* properly bear upon intrinsic beauty, not on finery and surrounds. Hence one must know ... how to determine the intrinsic – what is framed – and know what one is excluding as frame *and* outside-the-frame' (Derrida 1987: 63).

What Derrida finds is that this aesthetic uncertainty impinges upon the structure of Kant's philosophy at the point where Kant imports the table of categories from the first *Critique* to the third; a move made in the interests of establishing (in Derrida's words) 'the list of the forms of judgment under [the] four headings and twelve moments' of the categories (Derrida 1987: 68). By importing 'this table, this tableau (*Tafel*), this *board,* this *border* into the analytic of aesthetic judgment', Derrida argues, it is as if 'the content of the analytic of [aesthetic] judgment were a work of art, a picture whose frame, imported from the other *Critique,* would by virtue of its formal beauty play the role of the *parergon*' (Derrida: 1987: 69, 71, 73). This creates a tension between art and philosophy, where philosophical thought is seen to rest upon aesthetic sensibility. As Derrida makes the point:

> It so happens that it is this analytic of [aesthetic] judgment itself which, in its frame, allows us to define the requirement of formality, the opposition of the formal and the material, of the pure and the impure, of the proper and the improper, of the inside and the outside. It is the analytic which determines the frame as *parergon* ... A frame is essentially constructed and therefore fragile: such would be the essence or truth of the frame. If it had any. But this 'truth' can no longer be a 'truth', it no more defines transcendentality than it does the accidentality of the frame, merely its *parergonality.*
>
> (Derrida 1987: 73)

In other words, although Kant seeks to regulate aesthetics by means of an ordering or framing principle borrowed from his epistemology, this priority is inverted through epistemology becoming a mere frame for the true work to be undertaken here, aesthetic judgment. The central position accorded to aesthetic judgment through the act of framing, Derrida argues,

entails that it, as opposed to epistemological thought, becomes the means by which we distinguish between what is intrinsic and extrinsic, what is inside and outside the frame, and any epistemological or transcendental principle of organization is rendered accidental or *parergonal*. Thus, the possibility of the boundaries and oppositions within Kant's system being internally coherent – a clear working out of what is intrinsic or extrinsic to his terms – rests upon an aesthetic sense of what contributes to or detracts from genuine beauty. Kant's theory of aesthetic experience is therefore organized according to a structure which is explained by analogy to aesthetic experience.

Derrida's reading of Kant is taken by Guyer to amount to the claim that 'because Kant cannot succeed in mechanically distinguishing between the essential and the inessential in art, even including the picture frame, in the case of painting . . ., he can make no meaningful distinction between art and what is outside of art at all' (Guyer 1996: 395). This kind of argument, Guyer thinks, is 'wretched': it is 'the crudest form of positivism, assuming that if there is no mechanical way [by attending to art's physical constitution or appearance] to make the distinction between essential and inessential for all cases, then there is no way to make it in any particular case' (1996: 395). It is certainly the case that *this kind of* claim – i.e. uncertainties introduced by the figures and analogies in a philosophical text have an impact on the argument contained within the text – can be found in Derrida's essay, but his assertions to this effect should not be taken as attacks on the logical structure of Kant's theory. Guyer writes from the perspective of analytic philosophy, but dialogue between the analytic and continental traditions in philosophy is not as frequent as it could be. His reaction, I suggest, is a result of his treating Derrida's essay as a text in isolation, when a broader or more continental-friendly view, one which takes into account the store set by deconstructionists on metaphor and imagery in philosophy, would allow Derrida's argument to be seen as part of an ongoing project to challenge the boundaries of rationality and art. On this account, Derrida's analysis of Kant becomes a demonstration of the extent to which aesthetics informs cognitive judgment. Derrida's text, rather than attempting to knock down Kant's theory of art, in fact evidences or 'performs' the role which Kant assigns to aesthetics within his system by multiplying and interweaving metaphorical associations so that they acquire a conceptual efficacy which matches and parries with Kant's argumentation.

The exposition of the third *Critique* I give above helps to show how the textual details highlighted by Derrida's critique can be regarded as consistent with the analogical structure of Kant's theory of judgment. The analogy Derrida works with, between the framing of art works and notions of conceptual and architectonic division, is distinct from the analogies I identify above on account of its reference to aspects of framing. Nevertheless, Derrida's suggestion that concepts of boundary and opposition in Kant's argument rest upon aesthetic notions is in perfect agreement with

Kant's claim that aesthetic judgment, in virtue of the concept of purposiveness, involves the state of freeplay in which our cognitive powers assess the applicability and the appropriateness of concepts. In Derrida's idiom, this freeplay manifests itself in the form of uncertainty over what is intrinsic, what fits, and what is extrinsic, what doesn't. Furthermore, notions of 'containment' or 'what belongs to a region', as noted above, are paradigm metaphors in the history of philosophy for concepts and their application. Given Kant's intention to 'escape this containment' (my phrase) and to show how one region, freedom, can intersect with another, nature, it could be argued that the tension Derrida finds between the project of structuring critical philosophy and the *parergonal* metaphors used in the project of structuring are illustrations of the difficulties faced by Kant in uniting two 'contained' and isolated regions.

One of the aims of deconstruction is to demonstrate the extent to which philosophical argument is organized and sometimes swayed or redirected by the aesthetic dimensions of the language in which it is set, for example, Kant's reliance on metaphors of ornament and framing. There has been much debate over whether deconstruction's emphasis on these subversions and slippages makes it a negatively critical strategy, antithetical to philosophical argument, or whether it confirms deconstruction as a form of close textual analysis in the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics, a method for drawing attention to the cultural and discursive bases of knowledge.[4] Kant can be read as supporting the latter view, I propose, on the grounds that his theory of judgment anticipates a deconstructive approach to the relationship between the formation of judgments and the multitude of possibilities which is implicit in their formation. Because rational ideas, including purposiveness, are exhibited, i.e. made objective, by aesthetic ideas, judgment necessarily includes as a component (in Kant's words) 'a multitude of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept' (1987: 315). Otherwise put, judgment, as a cognitive power in Kant's system, requires excess for its own articulation and, as such, shows how Kant's theory of judgment is equipped to assist the deconstructionist strategy of locating the rational in terms of the aesthetic. On this basis, Derrida's claim that Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment is structured by analogy to particular aesthetic judgments need not amount to the identification of a regress, since (in a fashion which parallels my response in the previous paragraph) aesthetic experience or aesthetic language is understood by deconstructionists to be constitutive of discourse in general, and therefore is understood by them to play a role in theorization, including the theorization of aesthetic experience.

De Man (1978), like Derrida, also maintains that analogy dominates Kant's argumentation in the *Critique of Judgment*, but whereas Derrida's claim to this effect is 'performed' through his deconstruction, de Man adheres more to conventional claim-making discourse. As a result, he is more forthright than Derrida in stating why such an overrun works against

Kant's intentions, as de Man understands them, but this forthrightness, I maintain, draws attention to the weaknesses in his interpretation. De Man approaches Kant with the assumption that Kant wants or needs to be precise on the distinction between schematic and symbolic representation, and accuses Kant of imprecision due to 'uncontrolled metaphors' or symbols taking over his argument at the point when 'controlled' philosophical, schematic language should be 'eliminating' them (1978: 25). But his emphasis on precision is misplaced, and the loss of control which results, as he sees it, does not in fact emerge. As I explain above, schema and symbol are the terms used by Kant to describe hypotyposis, that is, how a concept is made 'sensible', how a concept receives an intuition. A concept is schematized when we provide it 'with objective reality straightforwardly [*geradezu*] (*directe*) by means of the intuition that corresponds to it', but is symbolized if it 'can be exhibited only [indirectly or] mediately, in its implications' by analogy (1987: 351, n. 31). The breach in Kant's argument which allows the schematic or philosophical to be overrun by the symbolic or analogical occurs, de Man asserts, when Kant admits that we cannot categorically distinguish between schema and symbol. All symbols, Kant writes

> express concepts not by means of a direct intuition but only according to an analogy with one, i.e. a transfer of our reflection on an object of intuition to an entirely different concept, to which *perhaps* no representation can ever correspond [*dem* vielleicht *nie eine Anschauung direkt korrespondieren kann*].
>
> (Kant 1987: 352–53, quoted in de Man 1978: 25, emphasis in original)[5]

But, de Man insists,

> it has been the point of the entire argument that we know for certain whether a representation directly corresponds to a given concept or not ... [T]he 'perhaps' raises the question of how such a discussion can be made, whether it is in the nature of things or whether it is merely assumed.
>
> (1978: 25)

It is certainly the case that the 'perhaps' refers to 'an entirely different concept' and not to the analogy or the 'transfer of our reflection', since 'concept' (*Begriff*) is masculine in German (hence 'dem *viellecht*' in the dative case) whereas 'analogy' (*Analogie*) and 'transfer' (*Übertragung*) are feminine (which would be written as 'der *vielleicht*' in the dative). De Man is right to find the 'perhaps' problematic. If the alternative possibility signalled by the 'perhaps' were ever realized, if an intuition were found to correspond *directly* to the 'entirely different concept', then the need for an analogical transfer would be cancelled, and a schematic representation would result.

Because it is now only *possibly* the case that we can distinguish between the schematic and the symbolic, de Man argues, 'the theory of a schematic hypotyposis loses much of its power of conviction', and certainty over what is schematic or philosophical and what is symbolic or metaphorical in Kant's text is lost (1978: 25). Furthermore, the examples Kant gives to illustrate just how widespread symbolic analogy is in language – '*foundation*' when used to mean 'support', '*flow*' to mean 'follow', and '*substance*' to mean 'the support of accidents' (1987: 352) – only serve to demonstrate that 'the language in which [the schematic–symbolic distinction] is stated reintroduces the elements of indetermination it sets out to eliminate' (1978: 25).

However, de Man's analysis has two major weaknesses. Firstly, he assumes that it is Kant's aim to eliminate the indeterminacy between schematic and symbolic language. He insists that it is 'the point of the entire argument' to determine 'for certain whether a representation directly corresponds to a given concept or not' (1978: 25). But it isn't. Kant's intention in §59 of the *Critique* (to which I take de Man's 'entire argument' phrase to apply) is to establish beauty as a symbol of morality. It is true that this endeavour relies upon analogy – for example, Kemal (1992) asserts that beauty in art symbolizes morality first by analogy to God's design, and then by analogy to the freedom in human productivity – but this is still available to Kant. The admission that we may be uncertain *in some cases* of whether a concept can be made sensible schematically or symbolically does not mean we are uncertain *in all cases*. If it is only *possibly the case* that 'no intuition can ever directly correspond' to these concepts, then it would seem that Kant is admitting that we may be uncertain as to whether *some concepts* have schematic or symbolic application, but not uncertain with regard to *all concepts*. That this might be the nature of Kant's admission is supported when, in his next two sentences, he considers an example of a particular concept where there is disagreement over its schematic or symbolic status: the concept of God. In Kant's view, 'our cognition of God is merely symbolic', but there are some who regard it as schematic; these people, he thinks, have 'fall[en] into anthropomorphism' on account of their mistakenly direct attribution of the qualities of man to God (1987: 353).

Secondly, de Man claims to find evidence of the 'epistemological unreliability' of metaphor in the *Critique of Judgment*, but this is nothing more than sleight of hand on de Man's part. Because terms such as 'foundation', 'flow', and 'substance' are symbolic or metaphorical when used in an abstract or philosophical context, de Man reasons, they are 'not reliable from an epistemological point of view' (1978: 25). Immediately after this observation comes the sentence, quoted from Kant, that all symbolic hypotyposes 'are a mere translation [*Übertragung*] from a reflection upon a represented object into an entirely different concept, to which *perhaps* no representation could ever correspond' (1978: 25, emphasis in original). But why are metaphors not reliable epistemologically? To argue that they are not reliable *purely because* they cannot be distinguished ultimately from

schematic concepts is to beg the question, since it is assumed that what one cannot ultimately distinguish between is a question of epistemological reliability: epistemologically reliable concepts, on the one hand, and epistemologically unreliable concepts, on the other.

Yet ultimate indistinguishableness does not entail epistemological unreliability for one side or the other. It is taken as a matter of definition that schematized concepts are reliable, and symbolized, metaphorical ones are unreliable, and the author of the definition is de Man himself, not Kant. A further sign of de Man's inclination is the fact that, when he quotes Kant to say that all symbolic hypotyposes 'are a *mere* translation [*Übertragung*] from a reflection upon a represented object into an entirely different concept', the adjective 'mere' does not appear in Kant's original text (Kant 1987: 352–53; de Man 1978: 25, my emphasis). Kant, it would appear, does not hold analogy to be as marginal or undermining a force as de Man would have us believe. As I argue above, Kant makes analogy integral to our capacity to judge. In addition, while not bearing directly on Kant, there is extensive research within cognitive linguistics on the metaphorical nature of thought (discussed in Chapter 3), thereby challenging the division of metaphor from thought *by definition*. De Man's charge of 'uncontrolled metaphor' overrunning Kant's analysis, reintroducing 'the indetermination it sets out to eliminate', is more a display of de Man's identification of metaphor with unreliability and lack of control, and schematic language with reliability and control, than an argument for confusion in Kant. Admittedly, prior to the examination of Kant, de Man (1978: 11–23) has sections in his essay on instances of 'corrupt' metaphor in Locke and Condillac, but he is wrong to carry this view over into Kant.

Lyotard's study of analogy in the third *Critique* also deserves to be acknowledged, but it contains a serious flaw (1994). For Lyotard, it is the sublime, as opposed to taste or beauty, which displays the analogical structure used by Kant to mediate between morality and cognition. Both beauty and the sublime, he admits, demand to be communicated, but the nature of the demand in each case is different. Whereas judgments of taste are demands for universal assent which are made 'apart from a concept' (this is Lyotard quoting Kant), the demand made by the sublime (in Lyotard's own words) 'passes through the concept of practical reason' (1994: 231). 'The demand comes to sublime feeling', Lyotard explains, 'from the demand to be communicated inscribed in the form of the moral law, and this latter demand is authorized by the simple fact that the law rests on the Idea of freedom' (1994: 231). A moral law, to be a law, he declares, must carry 'the demand for a universal communication' and this universality must be 'borrowed from the form of a conceptual, cognitive rule' (1994: 230). So the analogical dimension of the sublime, for Lyotard, obtains on the grounds that the universal communicability of the moral law is analogically imported from cognitive, theoretical reason. But this is not right. Lyotard needs the claim that moral universality is 'borrowed from the form of a conceptual,

cognitive rule' in order to argue that the sublime represents the metapho-
rical transposition from universality to practicality. But the notion that
universality can only be supplied epistemologically ignores the super-
sensible, and therefore universal, basis of freedom; the moral law has its
own universality, and so does not need to borrow the universality of theo-
retical reason. This omission wholly undermines Lyotard's avowal of an
analogical Kantian sublime. Pillow, whose theory of metaphor I considered
in Chapter 1, observes this, but because of his sympathies with the account,
is somewhat kinder in his description, suggesting that Lyotard
'*overemphasizes* ... imagination's relation to *reason as moral legislator*'
(Pillow 2000: 107, the first emphasis is mine).

Conclusion

The applicability of our categories in the epistemological, moral, aesthetic,
and teleological realms, I have argued, is theorized by Kant in terms of a
series of analogies. The concept which reconciles the supersensibles of
nature and freedom, and which therefore underpins the conjunction of sen-
sibility and supersensibility – the concept of purposiveness – is defined as
the process of analogy itself: the opening of a space in which a multitude of
cognitive possibilities is available for inspection. Derrida traces the analo-
gies at work in the third *Critique* to demonstrate that Kant's theory of aes-
thetic experience relies upon a structure which is explained by analogy to
aesthetic experience. However, far from constituting an attack on Kant's
philosophy, Derrida's reading is part of the deconstructionist strategy of
evidencing the material, aesthetic properties of philosophical thought. The
Critique of Judgment is consistent with or accommodates this strategy, I
have argued, in that Kant presents judgment as being fundamentally ana-
logical, that is to say, judgment is shown to involve the generation of a
multitude of aesthetic possibilities, thereby anticipating deconstruction's
interest in locating the cognitive in terms of the aesthetic. Derrida's essay
'Parergon' is a particular example of this: a cognitive or philosophical
thesis – in the case of the third *Critique*, the claim that a multitude of aes-
thetic presentations is a necessary stage in the process of concepts deter-
mining or 'framing' intuitions – is expressed by Derrida in terms of 'border'
and 'frame' metaphors, and questions of what fits and what doesn't. De
Man similarly finds analogy overrunning Kant's text, but his account is
undermined because of his misinterpretation of Kant's intentions, and his
identification of metaphor with unreliability and lack of control.

On a broader scale, the work to which metaphor is put in Kant's aes-
thetics, and the cognitive dimension which it acquires as a result, means the
Critique of Judgment deserves to be recognized as an important text for the
theorization of metaphor within contemporary aesthetics and metaphor
theory. Metaphor is positioned as an ontological condition, operating both
'inside' and 'outside' the human subject, enabling the unity of nature and

freedom while, at the same time, maintaining the distinction between them through a buffer effect created by an array of possibilities. This unified-yet-distinct relation might be likened to the contrast Aristotle draws between diaphor and epiphor in his characterization of the trope (Aristotle 1996: 34–38).[6] Diaphor seeks impact and plurivocality whereas epiphor aims for meaning and univocality. The former refers to the unprecedented or even disruptive nature of the juxtaposition of terms in a metaphor (and here corresponds to the array of possibilities), whereas the latter is the more measured or focused transference of a name from its referent to another object carried out in order to express a noted similarity (representing the unity of freedom and nature).

To claim that metaphor is an ontological principle is to assert that experience of the world has a fundamentally metaphorical structure. The claim requires us to take what is ordinarily regarded as a single, isolatable object or content, for example, the perception we are having at any one moment or the sense we bring to a word, as something which is constructed by a movement *between terms*, the result of which is never finalized or fully determined. Quite what these terms are, what ontological status they have, how they construct experience, and how they impinge upon experience, are questions that need to be answered. I address them in subsequent chapters, when I show how metaphor as an ontological principle is explored in the theories of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bachelard, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida.

What needs to be answered here though is how the Kantian account of ontological metaphor just given accords with the Heideggerian theory of objective metaphor from Chapter 1. Both deal with Kant's problem of the mediation between the pure and the empirical, except that metaphor is the explanandum in Chapter 1 and the explanans in this chapter; that is to say, *metaphor is explained by* the possibility of pure–empirical interaction, as retrieved by Heidegger, whereas here the possibility of pure–empirical (or supersensible–supersensible) interaction is *explained by metaphor*. Two matters require clarification: (1) the different approaches to the pure–empirical distinction, and (2) the relation between the distinction and metaphor. Firstly, Hausman, Ricoeur and Heidegger concentrate upon the ontological aspect of the distinction as it occurs in the first *Critique*. However, by the third *Critique,* the pure–empirical distinction has become the problem of reconciling two supersensibles due, as I indicate above, to the conditions of the possibility of the pure and the empirical being identified with the supersensibles of freedom and nature respectively. To some extent, I think it has to be admitted that different solutions to the question of the interaction between the pure and the empirical emerge from the two contexts: the temporal opening of possibilities within Heidegger's fundamental ontology, and the metaphorical bridging and buffering achieved within Kant's architectonic network of analogies. But the extent of this difference is limited, for both approaches employ the image of a 'spread' or a 'space' of possibilities, where the play of possibilities creates the tension necessary for us to

conceive of subject and world as united yet distinct. Finding the interaction between nature and freedom to be a metaphorical condition for Kant in actual fact anticipates steps taken by Heidegger in the articulation of his fundamental ontology. As I show in Chapter 4, further study of Heidegger's ontology reveals that it is determined by a metaphorical as-structure, with the anticipation of one thing *as something else* at work within the action which has so far been described as temporal. Thus, while it is possible to distinguish between Kant's and Heidegger's responses to the pure–empirical incompatibility, the deeper analysis of Heidegger to come will confirm that the latter, like the former, has metaphor as its fundamental structure.

The second matter in need of clarification is the relation between metaphor and the pure–empirical opposition. Isn't there the danger of circularity in metaphor being explained in terms of the opposition in Chapter 1, only for metaphor to emerge as the process which resolves the opposition in this chapter? An appeal to the different contexts – Kantian architectonic and Heideggerian ontology – will not do because, as I have just announced, the direction in which Heidegger takes us ontologically only makes it more apparent that metaphor is at work in the construction of experience. This predicament is addressed in Chapter 4, but to hint at the position I adopt: the danger of circularity only emerges because it is assumed that there is one phenomenon, metaphor, which, having been explained at one level, is then incoherently drawn upon, and drawn down into, the development of the explanation. We are pictured as moving from metaphor (with Hausman and Ricoeur) to explanation (with Kant and Heidegger), then back to metaphor (with Kant and, ultimately, Heidegger). But we have never left metaphor. To think that we left metaphor in analysing the pure–empirical relation is to separate metaphor from the cognitive structures responsible for the organization of experience. But it is precisely at the level of these cognitive structures that Hausman, Ricoeur and I see metaphor operating. What we customarily regard as *our* capacity of metaphor *is an aspect of* the ontological process which creates a world for us. This is the movement which is implicit in Hausman and Ricoeur, and is the direction in which Kant, Heidegger, and phenomenology take us. We are not returning to metaphor in a circular fashion but showing how metaphor, as we first understood it with Hausman and Ricoeur, is a facet of the ontological (judgment-enabling) transpositions we have found in Kant, and which we shall go on to find in the phenomenological tradition.

3   Sensation, categorization, and embodiment
Locke, Merleau-Ponty, and Lakoff and Johnson

The attempt to describe a particular sensation often, if not inevitably, requires us to draw metaphorical comparisons with another sense, for example, 'a bitter, lemon yellow', 'tinselly, stream-like percussion', and 'the sound of a trumpet is scarlet', with the end result that metaphors of the order 'colour is taste', 'sound is texture', and 'sound is colour' are produced. While these descriptions might loosely be called 'synaesthetic', they are, strictly speaking, distinct from neurological cases of synaesthesia. In neurological terms, synaesthesia occurs when stimulation of one sensory modality involuntarily triggers a perception in another, for example, consuming a certain type of food creates volumes of colour in the patient's visual field as evident to her as the furniture which surrounds her (Baron-Cohen and Harrison 1997: 3). In contrast to this, however, my examples above involve active metaphorical association.

It is the relationship between metaphor and the senses that I am interested in. What I show in the first part of the chapter is that the distinction between literal and metaphorical language is bound up with the history of classification and, in particular, the classification of the senses. The customary division of our sensory experience into five discrete forms, I suggest, is indicative of those theories of knowledge in the history of philosophy which understand truth as a one-to-one correspondence between categories and things in themselves. The empiricism of John Locke is a good example (1997), since his work lets us see the relationship between arguments for the individuality of the senses and those for the existence of individual essences. I consider Locke's epistemology in more detail below. Problems arise in essentialist theories of this kind, however, because they cannot adequately deal with the relationships that exist between objects, as Locke is himself aware, and it is arguably the most important relationship of all – that between reality and the human mind – which is made centre-stage one century after Locke by Kant in order to overcome certain problems in empiricism.

With Kant's theory of knowledge (1929) and its development by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), we find an entirely different perspective on categorization and sensation. Kant emphasizes the creative and transformative nature of experience. Instead of experience being theorized as the passive

and partial reception of essences, it becomes the 'generation' or 'bringing into being' of certain forms of appearance, e.g. colour, sound, and texture. Merleau-Ponty extends Kant's thesis by arguing that the kinds of transformation necessary to generate ordered, intelligible experience are rooted in our condition as physically immersed beings. And as I show, it is against the background of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body that metaphors of the type 'bitter, lemon yellow', 'tinselly, stream-like percussion', and 'the sound of a trumpet is scarlet' become paradigm forms of the conceptual and sensory transitions through which we organize the world.

Merleau-Ponty holds a position of special significance in metaphor theory since he is the figure cited by Lakoff and Johnson as the forerunner of their 'embodied mind' thesis in *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999: xi). In the second part of the chapter, I consider the similarities and differences between Merleau-Ponty's and Lakoff and Johnson's theories of embodiment. Both accounts translate basic bodily acuities into a theory of knowledge, and represent metaphor as an extension of the basic fact that our bodies deal with the world through adaptation and articulation. While there is a lot in common between them, subtle differences emerge between Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological perspective and Lakoff and Johnson's neurological approach. These differences are instructive for my purposes because they help to clarify the significance I am attaching to sensory metaphors. A major theme within recent phenomenology is the redefinition of the aesthetic as a region of experience which holds immense significance for the way we apply concepts in general. Interestingly enough, this aspect of phenomenology directly supports the aims Lakoff and Johnson have for their embodied philosophy. However, despite their interest in Merleau-Ponty, Lakoff and Johnson do not acknowledge this dimension of phenomenological research. I outline phenomenology's reappraisal of the relationship between conceptuality and sensibility in order (a) to elucidate further my claims for sensory metaphor, and (b) to show that, while Merleau-Ponty and Lakoff and Johnson ultimately differ over the relation between metaphor and embodiment, they nevertheless have comparable aims.

Categorizing the senses

It would seem to be a statement of the obvious to say that the five senses are discrete. Sight comes to us through the eyes; we hear through the ears; smell through the nose, etc. However, we need to be reminded of the fact that the senses are things which are themselves theorized. By this, I mean that we understand them from a particular point of view. To say that they are discrete on the grounds that they have separate inlets is to speak from the point of view that the senses are receptors, receivers of stimuli. This is the basis of the empiricist theory of knowledge developed in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries respectively by Francis Bacon, John Locke, and David Hume, with its roots in Aristotle's theories of observation

and induction. However, while this is an extremely accurate, insightful, and seemingly self-evident view, it is nevertheless still a viewpoint. There is another, not wholly opposed to empiricism but sufficiently distinct from it to affect the way we think about the senses.

This other viewpoint stems from Kant's transcendental idealism and the phenomenological tradition to which it gives rise. Kant, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1929), affirms that we receive the world through sensibility in the form of *Anschauung* or 'intuition' *but* (and here lies the difference) asserts that the nature and condition of our receptivity is something which is actively created by transcendental principles located within the subject. The argument which drives Kant's entire critical enterprise is the transcendental deduction: the conditions of the possibility of experience are, at one and the same time, the conditions of the possibility of *the objects of* experience (1929: A108).[1] In other words, things appear to us the way they do because that is the way in which our cognitive faculties translate the world for us and, most importantly, for Kant, it is only in terms of this creative translation between subject and object that we can ever conceive of the notions of 'subject' and 'object'.

The contrast between empiricism and transcendental idealism can be illustrated by thinking through what we understand by the term 'stimulus'. The idea that perception is the result of our senses being stimulated by something outside of us is common to both theories of knowledge. However, on the one hand, with empiricism, the stimulus is a quality external to the mind which is passively received by the mind as an idea, impression, or datum, e.g. a redness, a hardness, a bitterness, whereas, on the other, with Kant, for a stimulus to be a stimulus, there has to be the necessary and appropriate conditions of receptivity within the subject in order to translate the wealth of possible experiential material around her into the kind of material that can become stimuli in the first place. In Kantian terms, the process which gives us sight is not simply the absorption of ready-made visual sense data but a sequence of transformations which converts part of the otherness of the world into that which can become phenomenal and visible for us. We only have to consider that there are creatures with differently attuned senses to appreciate that the constitution of our cognitive faculties determines which sections of a potential reality stimulate our awareness, for example, bats are sensitive to the spectrum of ultra-sound and rely on sonar-like echo-location to create a landscape of reflected sonic pulses.

Thus, with Kant, sensory receptivity is the 'bringing into being' of stimuli. What is significant about this view is that it goes some way towards challenging the notion that our five senses are five discrete channels. They are not all claimed to be the same but, instead, while their differences are preserved, a unifying arc is nevertheless placed around them in virtue of the fact that they are all facets of the way in which the conditions of the possibility of experience make the world accessible to us. There is going to be

some connection between them in as much as the conditions which determine the nature of our receptivity all issue from the transcendental operations which constitute the original opening-up of experience. Phenomenology has done the most to pursue this idea and, as I indicate below, it is in the work of the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty that the transcendentally interrelated and world-constituting properties of sensation receive their fullest articulation.

Metaphor is relevant here in two respects. Firstly, in the history of philosophy, metaphor has always been associated with the task of classification, albeit in a negative way. Since Plato's criticism of the arts, the metaphorical juxtaposition of unrelated subjects has been marginalized as an activity which disrupts and undermines philosophers' attempts to establish the true and proper application of concepts. The theory of the Forms, as it appears in Plato's *Republic*, asserts that, for every kind of thing, there is a true, original, essential Form, and just as a certain kind of object is 'true' to a certain kind of conduct, for example, using a pruning knife rather than a chisel to cut a vine, so individuals should live in accordance with their essence in order to lead a just life (Plato: 1987: 353a). However, artists and poets do not conform to this life of propriety, Plato argues, as their crafts require them to represent a diversity of phenomena and, therefore, to create visual and verbal juxtapositions which ultimately work against the promotion of essential uniformity.

Secondly, and in reaction to the first point, the twentieth century has seen the reclamation of metaphor as a figure that can make a positive contribution to perception and the creation of meaning. This has come largely from the formalist and structuralist dimensions of modernist literature where the ambition is to give language a palpability which defamiliarizes our perception of the world and foregrounds the role of language as that which is constitutive of any perception at all. Metaphor, it is argued by theorists such as Viktor Shklovsky and Roman Jakobson, shakes up our habitual chains of association, makes us aware of the 'thick', constructed nature of language and, in so doing, gives us a new perspective on the world (Hawkes 1977). The propensity of metaphor to create new ways of seeing has been taken further by Max Black (1979). The cross-fertilization of associations that takes place between the subject terms in a metaphor, Black suggests, changes our perception of both terms, and he likens this bringing-to-light of a new perspective to the way in which Muybridge's photography allowed us for the first time to study creatures in motion.

The different ways in which metaphor, categorization, and the senses intertwine themselves can be made clear if we compare two competing epistemologies: the empiricism of Locke, and the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. Running through Locke's epistemology, in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1997), is a 'literal essentialism' which has as its ideal the image of knowledge as a direct and immediate channel from the world to the mind. This is manifest in Locke's notion of the 'simple idea'. Simple

ideas, he avers, are the basic constituents of our sensory contact with the world. At birth, the mind is a sheet of 'white paper void of all characters' and we accumulate knowledge through experience by objects impressing themselves on our senses and creating in us simple ideas such as 'whiteness', 'hardness', and 'sweetness' (1997: 2.1.1).[2] The notion of singularity is decisive here. Simple ideas are 'unique' in the sense that each one contains 'one uniform appearance' and comes to us 'by the proper inlets appointed to each sort' (1997: 2.2.1, 3.4.11): 'the coldness and hardness, which a man feels in a piece of ice, being as distinct ideas in the mind, as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar, and smell of a rose' (1997: 2.2.1). Furthermore, simple ideas are unique in that their content cannot be conveyed conceptually:

> all the words in the world, *made use of to explain, or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea [which the name] stands for* ... He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pineapple, and make him have the true idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit.
>
> (1997: 3.4.11, original emphasis)

The arguments for the uniqueness of experience form part of Locke's reaction to the rationalism of Descartes and Leibniz. Locke wants to show that it is direct experience of the world and not relationships between a set of universals innate in the mind which is the foundation of knowledge and morality. But his elevation of the epistemological status of raw sense impressions comes at a price. The senses give us only a partial view of the nature of reality; as Locke admits, this 'microscopes plainly discover for us':

> for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour, is by thus augmenting the acuteness of our senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering [(*sic*)], as it were, the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our usual sight, produces different ideas from what it did before.
>
> (1997: 2.23.11)

Thus, the five senses may be pure and direct channels between us and the world, but the perceptions they furnish are 'remote from [the] real internal constitution [of things] ... and are made up of nothing but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities our senses can discover' (1997: 4.6.10). The only way we can proceed, given these limitations, is to be vigilant when ascribing the qualities we *find* in objects *to the objects themselves*. This means being careful with words, to ensure that the ideas we group together under a species or 'nominal essence' are related in such a way that they offer some purchase on the hidden boundaries in nature. In this, we follow nature in the best way our faculties permit, only putting those ideas together which

are 'supposed to have a union in nature': 'nobody joins the voice of a sheep, with the shape of a horse; nor the colour of lead, with the weight and fixedness of gold' (1997: 3.6.28). Metaphor, as the bringing-together of two incompatible terms, is to be avoided:

> All the artificial and figurative applications of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment … For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things themselves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the pipes, whereby it is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind.
>
> (1997: 3.10.34, 3.11.5)

Locke's epistemology, therefore, lets us see how a theory of the senses is tied to a theory of language: the senses are conceptualized as distinct and unique 'inlets' in order to argue for the irreducibility of experience as the foundation for knowledge but, given that experience only grants limited access to things in themselves, our use of concepts or 'nominal essences' must be 'proper' or 'literal' in order to make the fit between the arrangements of our ideas and the boundaries in nature as close as possible.

However, metaphor, categorization, and the senses exist in a different relationship within the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962). Phenomenology develops the Kantian thesis that reality and the subject's perception of it are interconnected. Another way of saying this is that *experience is intentional*: experience is necessarily experience *of something*. For there to be experience, there has to be *both* the sense of subjective awareness that experience is being had *and* the 'counter-pressure' sense of a 'something other' that is being encountered. What is important to note is that these kinds of awareness are two sides of the same coin; they both unfold as part of the same world-creating process. The location of this process, Merleau-Ponty argues, is the body: 'my body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my "comprehension"' (1962: 235). However, in making the body central to his theory of knowledge, Merleau-Ponty is radically redefining what we take the body to be. The body, he asserts, is not an empirical object, one thing among others in the world, but an ontological condition, a 'body schema': a framework of intentionality whereby consciousness and the world are opened-up for each other (1962: 206). Not only is it the medium which organizes a coherent sensory picture of the world for us, but also something active and prospective which is able to play this constructive, objective role because it moves around the world and maps it out for us.

This can be made clearer by examining Merleau-Ponty's theory of the senses, as it is through a reappraisal of the cognitive status of sensation that

he articulates his concept of the 'body schema'. Sensation, he argues, is not something we have or take in but a relationship of mutual 'beckoning' between consciousness and world. The red of the carpet is not a datum I receive but, rather, a product of the way in which my senses approach the carpet and allow it to be manifest to me. As he writes in his seminal text, the *Phenomenology of Perception*:

> The sensor and the sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two mutually external terms, and sensation is not an invasion of the sensor by the sensible. It is my gaze which subtends colour, and the movement of my hand which subtends the object's form. . . . As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not *set over against* it as an acosmic subject; I do not possess it in thought, or spread out towards it some idea of blue such as might reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, it 'thinks itself within me', I am the sky itself as it is drawn together and unified, and as it begins to exist for itself; my consciousness is saturated with this limitless blue.
>
> (1962: 214)

This is in fact redolent of the idealism put forward by George Berkeley (1988) as part of his criticism of Locke's theory of knowledge. For Berkeley, to be is *to be perceived*. Objects only exist as perception-dependent encounters: 'the table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that *if I was in my study I might perceive it*' (1988: §3, original emphasis). Common to Berkeley and Merleau-Ponty is the thesis that every objective detail we take to be 'in the world' is perception-dependent, is a reflection of our capacities as sensory beings. Reality is still 'hard' but this hardness is now explained in terms of a network of perceptual relationships – even the hardness of a stone is an impression felt by the hand – instead of the problematic notion of a substance or reality in itself which lies beyond human perception. It is the concept of 'substance' in Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* to which Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge* is, in part, a response. However, whereas Berkeley ultimately explains the coherence of our sensations by locating them in the mind of God, Merleau-Ponty shows how bodily sensation is a world-disclosing activity in terms of its own textures and possibilities.

The body schema is an *ontological* object, rather than one *empirical* object among others, Merleau-Ponty avows, because it is both *sensor and sensed, seer and seen, toucher and touched*. It can bring sensory experience into being and organize it into a coherent whole because the sensory experience it makes available to us and the way it physically organizes and orientates itself in the world are mutually defining conditions. In order to make a particular range of sense experience available to us, the body must belong to a world in which it can contextualize the information received.

For example, when I perceive a cube, I never see it all at once, but I am able to conceptualize it as a regular six-sided solid because, by rotating the cube in my fingers, *the rotation in my fingers* is an action in space which allows me to orient the successive stages of the experience as a whole cube. The exploration of my hand and what it will teach me can only open onto a tactile world, Merleau-Ponty argues, if my hand

> takes its place among the things it touches, is in a sense one of them, opens finally upon a tangible being of which it is also a part. Through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, its own movements incorporate themselves into the universe they interrogate, are recorded on the same map as it; the two systems are applied upon one another, as the two halves of an orange.
>
> (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 133)

The status of the body schema as a unified agent of sensory disclosure and coordination means that the senses operate as a unity. What the 'natural unity of the perceiving subject' offers, Merleau-Ponty declares, is 'a "primary layer" of sense experience which precedes its division among the separate senses' (1962: 227). The senses, rather than being conceptualized as five individual source channels filling the subject with information from the world, are here presented as modes of subject–world interaction that are able to open onto the world because they are internally coordinated within the body schema: things and the world 'are given to me along with the parts of my body ... in a living connection comparable, or rather identical, with that existing between the parts of my body itself' (1962: 205).

This could be construed merely as the point that the senses intersect, something which Locke readily accepts; for example, the edge of my mug indicates the point where I can no longer see its surface as it curves away from me but it also indicates the zone of contact my hand will have with the mug when I pick it up. However, it is the use to which Merleau-Ponty puts this point that is significant. It is precisely the interactions between the senses, he observes, which enable the body schema to open onto and to navigate its way around the world. Just as any coordinate or triangulation system defines one location in terms of another, so colours, for example, can exist as comprehensible parts of our world 'only if they cease to be closed states or indescribable qualities presented to an observing and thinking subject, and if they [instead] impinge within me upon a certain general setting through which I come to terms with the world' (1962: 210). Synaesthetic perception is, therefore, 'the rule':

> Sight, it is said, can bring us only colours or lights, and with them forms which are the outlines of colours, and movements which are the patches of colour changing position. But how shall we place transparency or 'muddy' colours in the scale? In reality, each colour, in its

inmost depths, is nothing but the inner structure of the thing overtly revealed. The brilliance of gold palpably holds out to us its homogeneous composition, and the dull colour of wood its heterogeneous make-up. The senses intercommunicate by opening on to the structure of the thing. One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this sound is conveyed by the visible glass. One sees the springiness of steel, the ductility of red-hot steel, the hardness of a plane table, the softness of shavings. The form of objects is not their geometrical shape: it stands in a certain relation to their specific nature, and appeals to all other senses as well as sight. The form of a fold in linen or cotton shows us the resilience or dryness of the fibre, the coldness or warmth of the material ... One sees the weight of a block of cast-iron which sinks in the sand, the fluidity of water and the viscosity of syrup. In the same way, I hear the hardness and unevenness of cobbles in the rattle of a carriage, and we speak appropriately of a 'soft', 'dull', or 'sharp' sound.

(1962: 229–30)

Locke would argue that these instances of joined sensation are learned through association, simple ideas that are put together over time because experience teaches us that they come together. In other words, the senses are essentially separate but can be related *empirically*. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty is claiming the fused nature of the senses as a basic *ontological* condition, a condition of the body schema's being able to organize any meaningful experience at all. Thus we have two theories about how the senses connect us to the world. The difference between them arises from the fact that Locke is a *pre*-Kantian philosopher, whereas Merleau-Ponty is *post*-Kantian. Locke is arguing, against rationalism, for the importance of experience to the construction of knowledge. There is no necessary connection, he writes, 'between *malleableness* and the *colour* or *weight* of *gold*' (1997: 4.6.10). If such a connection existed, then the truth of the proposition 'all gold is malleable' would be knowable a priori, independently of experience, as certain as 'the three angles of all right-angled triangles are equal to two right ones' (1997: 4.6.10). This is a possibility that Locke's empiricism cannot entertain.

Merleau-Ponty is able to assign sensory fusion an ontological role primarily as a result of the changes Kant makes to our conception of the a priori and the a posteriori. As Kant finds them at the end of the eighteenth century, the a priori and the a posteriori, as forms of knowledge, exist as polar opposites. On the one hand, according to rationalism, it is a priori reasoning that represents the only path to clear and distinct knowledge whereas, on the other, for the empiricist, the foundations of knowledge rest with the material collected by the senses. Hume, like Locke before him, observes that sensory experience cannot provide the evidence necessary to prove the universality of key structural concepts such as time, substance,

causality, and the self. Kant's response is to suggest that the reason why these concepts can't be evidenced in experience is because they are concepts which have to apply a priori for experience to be possible in the first place. The revolutionary move Kant makes is to affirm that the a priori and the a posteriori are forms of knowledge that necessarily intersect. A priori knowledge represents the necessary conditions for the possibility of there being any empirical knowledge at all. As Kant argues in the transcendental deduction:

> There can be in us no modes of knowledge … without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible … [E]ven the purest objective unity, namely that of the a priori concepts is only possible through relation of [empirical] intuitions to such unity of consciousness … [T]he mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations … if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules.
>
> (1929: A107–08)

Otherwise put, coherent, unified experience is only possible because of the mutually defining nature of the a priori and the a posteriori: the former prepares the ground for unity, the latter provides that which can be unified. It is worth noting that this unity is conferred in a way that lends itself particularly well to forming a Kantian theory of metaphor, as considered in Chapters 1 and 2. Experience, for Kant, is defined in terms of concepts unifying empirical data (or 'intuitions'). For this model to work, concepts have to be understood as necessarily manoeuvrable or transferable. This is because allowing a concept to apply to something that is otherwise foreign to it is the only way Kant can explain how the subject's cognitive faculties are equipped to deal with, and therefore bring unity to, the diversity of empirical phenomena.

If a priori conditions must apply for there to be any experience at all, then these conditions will have an impact on the shape the world can take for us. In recognition of this, Heidegger adopts the term 'ontological' to refer to the world-determining processes exercised by a priori concepts in their organization of experience (Heidegger 1962a, 1962b, 1996). By suggesting that sensory fusion is an ontological condition, Merleau-Ponty is following Heidegger's usage of the term. The ways in which sensory qualities appear and intersect before us, Merleau-Ponty claims, are a priori determined processes, and the interactions between sensory domains are the ontological transitions through which the body schema is able to open onto and organize the world for us. Sensory fusion, in this respect, is very much like a crease in a piece of paper lifting the paper from out of being a two-dimensional

surface into being a three-dimensional form, with one facet (mind) that can now look upon another (reality). So when Merleau-Ponty announces that 'the brilliance of gold palpably holds out to us its homogeneous composition', i.e. when colour speaks to texture, it is not meant in the rationalist sense that knowledge of colour gives us a priori knowledge of texture but in the ontological sense that sensory qualities are interconnected phenomena whose manner of interconnection lets us witness the cognitive transitions through which our body schema is able to open onto and organize the world for us.

In this regard, Merleau-Ponty's redefinition of sensory and bodily experience is a forerunner of Gibson's theory of affordances (1979). On Gibson's account, sensations are not received 'bare', waiting to be 'clothed with meaning' (1979: 140), but instead occur as value-laden 'affordances' or 'valences' which are always impelled towards a meaning or another aspect of experience. For example, a surface will not be perceived as a mute datum but rather as 'climb-on-able' or 'fall-off-able' or 'bump-into-able' relative to the perceiver (1979: 128). The concept of affordance is central to Gibson's 'ecological' theory of perception; it is the theoretical unit at the heart of his claim that all perception takes place as a series of 'beckonings' between what the environment makes available to the perceiver and how the perceiver can interact with or adapt to her environment. In Merleau-Ponty's account, these 'beckonings' – for example, between toucher and touched, and between the different senses – appear as the world-determining processes exercised by the ontological body schema.

The effect which phenomenology has on our understanding of the senses then – as a result of an epistemological line from Kant through Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty – is to show that they do not belong entirely within the realm of the a posteriori. The senses are openings onto the world which result from the intersection of the a priori and the a posteriori. What we experience as qualia have the qualities they do precisely because built within them are the a priori determinations necessary (a) for the original appearing of the world to consciousness and (b) for the interqualia relationships which enable consciousness to locate itself in the world. This explains why phenomenology pays such close attention to the minutiae of aesthetic experience – for example, Sartre's meditations on a cardboard box (Sartre 1963: 9) or Heidegger's ruminations on the paintings of peasant shoes by Van Gogh (Heidegger 1971a: 32–37) – for it is in the detail that we can find the cognitive relationships which underlie the possibility of our categorizing the world at large.

We can amplify this point by briefly considering observations from Searle and Liu on the metaphorical nature of aesthetic sensibility. In his article 'Metaphor', Searle (1993) argues against the (comparison theory) thesis that a metaphor's meaning can be accounted for by listing all the literal similarities which exist between its two subject terms. This is on the grounds that, in some cases, there simply are no literal similarities between the terms. As

Searle observes with the metaphor 'Sally is a block of ice', 'there do not seem to be any literal similarities between objects which are cold and people who are unemotional' (1993: 97). When it comes to matters of 'perception, sensibilities, and linguistic practices', he declares, some properties *just are* linked or associated in people's minds; 'the notion of being cold *just is* associated with being unemotional' (1993: 98, emphasis added). Merleau-Ponty's theory can offer some assistance here in as much as he tells us (above) that attributes and properties are not to be thought of as 'closed states' but as 'modes of impingement' (my phrase) which come to me as part of 'a certain general setting through which I come to terms with the world' (1962: 210). No literal similarities exist between the properties but they can nevertheless entertain a metaphorical relationship because, on Merleau-Ponty's terms, their conjunction is an expression of the fundamental interfusability he is positioning as an ontological condition of experience. Thus, coldness and lack of emotion will always entertain the possibility of connection because they are 'modes of impingement' in our interaction with the world before they are circumscribable, quantifiable properties. To see them as isolatable and independently definable is to have the separationist tendencies of Locke's empiricism among your working assumptions. And it is the shortcomings of empiricist epistemology to which the phenomenological tradition is a response.

Similarly, Liu (1997) notes that we readily think of circles as soft and squares as hard, or circles as happy and squares as sad, or circles as bright and squares as dark. These observations are part of Liu's study of 'form symbolism': the use of forms 'to represent things that are not inherently matters of shape', where the relationship between form and referent is judged to be apt 'in the absence of familiarity with a convention' (1997: 135, 137). He finds that we make the same judgments for sphere and cube, but very different judgments for curved and straight. The fact that these different judgments arise, Liu argues, supports the claim that form symbolism is not a matter of clichés or learned conventions but rather a nonarbitrary matching of forms with perceptual, emotional, intellectual, and expressive qualities. For Merleau-Ponty, this nonarbitrary aptness we can perceive between forms on the one hand and qualities that are not 'inherently' matters of shape on the other comes about because form and quality, although apparently not of the same order, nonetheless exist first and foremost as the 'beckonings' or fusable regions which make up the body schema.

It is widely recognized within metaphor theory that there is a lexicon of primary metaphors – such as 'categories are containers' and 'purposes are destinations' – which are fundamental to the way we conceptualize basic objects and events (although this view is disputed; see, for example, Vervaeke and Kennedy 1996). Now it might be objected that there is a big leap from these primary, framework-generating metaphors to particular instances of sensory or aesthetic metaphors, yet, the objection runs, I am nevertheless claiming that these sensory metaphors are basic to any organized experience

whatsoever. How can this be? In order to answer this objection, it needs to be borne in mind how phenomenology affects our conception of what is significant and what is insignificant, what is central and what is peripheral. As indicated above, the sensory, the aesthetic, and the poetic – while they might customarily be regarded as peripheral to a theory of knowledge – are, from a phenomenological point of view, those regions of experience where the conceptualization operative throughout experience at large is most visibly at play. This aspect of phenomenology is evident in Merleau-Ponty in as much as he shows how sensation, far from being the mere reception of a ready-made world, is the condition of intersensory coordination through which the body schema orients us in the world. To move from the visual to the acoustic, or from the acoustic to the textural, is therefore to put consciousness in a position where it confronts in the most fundamental way possible the motion of conceptual cross-referral, the task of apprehending one thing in terms of something else. Ultimately, the long-term goal of phenomenology (held also by critical and poststructuralist theory) is to show how questions of aesthetic sensibility, far from being merely subjective, are in fact implicated in the conceptual negotiations which define moral, political, and epistemological judgment. Reconfiguring aesthetic experience in such a way that it ceases to be the mere having of a world and instead becomes a state of responsible, perceptual immersion in a world, the argument goes, will help to counter the divisions exercised by dualist thought and the capitalization of culture.

Metaphor and embodiment in Merleau-Ponty and Lakoff and Johnson

While the arguments I have given undoubtedly support an anti-dualist project, my immediate concerns in this chapter are (i) to show how metaphor and the categorization of the senses are epistemologically intertwined, and (ii) to indicate how the nature of their relationship has a bearing on the epistemological significance that is ascribed to metaphor. So far we have seen that metaphor is made to appear epistemologically suspect against the backdrop of Locke's empiricism. This is because truth is couched by Locke in terms of essences whose purity is maintained by adhering to the appropriate inlets and channels, with the consequence that metaphor is theorized by him as an 'artificial' application of words which 'breaks' or 'stops' the 'great conduit' of language.

However, metaphor is assigned a more positive role in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy and in the phenomenological tradition as a whole. A family of 'sociability' metaphors is employed within the texts of phenomenology to emphasize the involved, interactive dynamism of their epistemologies – for example, Heidegger's 'offering' and 'giving' (1962b) and Gadamer's 'conversation' (1993) – in contrast to the detached, static absolutism of orthodox metaphysics. The fact that phenomenologists happen to employ metaphors

is not the point here. Rather, the metaphors they do use are ones which are 'about metaphor'; they are figures which ask us to move from one realm to another. Experience and understanding are theorized as processes of engagement in which each episode is not a thing in itself, a complete and pre-formed content, but an invitation to consider another perspective or move to a new horizon.

The act of moving from one realm to another, on Merleau-Ponty's account, is not the corruption or dilution of an original source, but the forging of a relationship that makes new experiences possible. The idea that metaphor can generate perceptual insight is not a new one. As I indicate above, Max Black likens metaphors to new cognitive instruments: the cross-fertilization that takes place between the two terms, he declares, prompts us to see both terms in a new light. Merleau-Ponty lends considerable support to this view. The interaction between realms that he makes central to the body schema's coordination of the world is, I suggest, what takes place in metaphor. Just as ontological comparisons drawn between sight and touch or sight and sound represent the foot-holds or fissures that grant us purchase on the world, so metaphorical cross-referral between concepts etches out new lines of association for us to pursue.

It should be pointed out that Merleau-Ponty does not actually discuss or refer to metaphor by name in any of his writings. But this, I maintain, is not a problem for anyone trying to derive a theory of metaphor from his work: (a) because he does consider at length the creative use of language and artistic media – what he calls 'originating speech' or 'primary expression' – and (b) because his retheorization of language as an embodied activity allows many of his thoughts on the body's creative role in perception to be translated into a theory of metaphor. Language, concepts, and ideas, Merleau-Ponty argues, are not abstract entities divorced from the particularities of experience but aspects of our bodily immersion in the world:

> the phonetic 'gesture' brings about, both for the speaking subject and for his hearers, a certain structural coordination of experience, a certain modulation of existence, exactly as a pattern of my bodily behaviour endows the objects around me with a certain significance both for me and for others.
>
> (1962: 193)

This is not the point that we make sounds and marks with our bodies; neither is it an attempt to reduce the significance of the word to a collection of bodily sensations. Instead, language is claimed to be one of the 'behaviour patterns' 'through which we can "be at home in" [the] world' (1962: 237). Our capacities for understanding language and uttering language exist in a parallel relationship to seeing and being seen, and any word, sentence, or gesture we offer belongs to the fundamental 'beckoning' relationship that exists between subject and world. Just as my 'familiar' hand can encounter

'new' textures, so the creative use of language – originating speech – is 'that paradoxical operation through which, by using words of a given sense, and already available meanings, we try to follow an intention which necessarily outstrips, modifies, and itself, in the last analysis, stabilizes the meanings of the words which translate it' (1962: 389). Metaphor, on this account, 'is like the boiling point of a liquid': a realignment of reality's joints, comparable to the sensory integrations performed by the body schema, through which 'man transcends himself towards a new form of behaviour' (1962: 196).

Another dimension can be given to this account if we draw an analogy between language and the body. Our sensory openness to the world, Merleau-Ponty argues, is reflected in the physical articulations of our bodies: we can see and be seen, touch and be touched, etc. It is because we are rooted in the world that we can exercise the sensibilities and calibrations necessary to organize experience. The more our physical behaviour and dexterity allow us to contextualize the experiences we have, then the finer and more incisive our perceptions become. With the analogy between language and the body, literal language can be likened to the joints and bodily capacities we are used to employing, the areas where we are most flexible; literal language gives us the world as we are used to finding it. To create a metaphor, on the other hand, is to bring two words together that are normally kept apart and, by this analogy, is comparable to flexing a joint that has never been exercised before. It is, therefore, to extend the reach of one's body, to make a new realm of experience available.

The suggestion that bodily acuity and conceptual pliability are interconnected at a fundamental level represents, to my mind, the main point of contact between Merleau-Ponty's work and Lakoff and Johnson's thesis in *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999). Their book, as the subtitle indicates, lays down a 'challenge to Western thought'. They propose to combat philosophy's predilection for single perspective, universalizing metaphysics by showing how concepts and thought processes are extensions of our condition as physically embodied beings. The reason why our concepts fit the world so well, Lakoff and Johnson argue, is because 'they have evolved from our sensorimotor systems, which in turn evolved to allow us to function well in our physical environment' (1999: 43–44). Thought and perception are embodied, they suggest, in the sense that the concepts we use for thinking and perceiving are derived from the concepts 'that optimally fit our bodily experiences of entities and certain extremely important differences in the natural environment' (1999: 27). Hence, on this view, it is claimed that the concepts we use to describe relations and values have a spatial origin, such as 'happy is up', 'intimacy is closeness', 'important is big', and the concepts we attribute to objects and events in general ('starting', 'stopping', 'running', 'grasping') derive from bodily movement and action (1999: 38–39). Metaphor is central to their thesis in this regard because it is the principal way in which we apply and adapt sensorimotor concepts to our experience.

Although Merleau-Ponty only receives one mention in *Philosophy in the Flesh* (in the 'Acknowledgments' section; 1999: xi), the extent to which his phenomenological account parallels Lakoff and Johnson's neurological perspective cannot be overestimated. Both accounts translate basic bodily acuities into a theory of knowledge, and represent the metaphorical action of applying one conceptual domain to another as a prolongation of the basic fact that our bodies deal with the world through adaptation and articulation.

However, there is the question of the epistemological differences that lie between a phenomenological and a neurological perspective. This is important because it affects how the two theories understand the embodiment of metaphor. For Lakoff and Johnson, metaphor takes place in the body, that is, the empirical body. Most metaphors, they argue, involve conceptualizing a subjective experience in terms of bodily, sensorimotor experience, e.g. understanding an idea (subjective experience) in terms of grasping an object (sensorimotor experience) (1999: 45). This happens, Lakoff and Johnson affirm, when neural connections between parts of the brain dedicated to sensorimotor experience and parts dedicated to subjective experience are coactivated. From the point of view of the concepts involved, the inferences flow in one direction only, from the sensorimotor source domain (e.g. grasping an object) to the subjective target domain (understanding an idea) on the grounds that sensorimotor experience possesses a 'greater inferential complexity' (1999: 57). This complexity, they explain, comes from the fact that, as beings immersed in the sensory world, the relationships we perceive between everyday objects are the principal, if not the only, source of connections and orientations which can be applied to subjective, abstract, less phenomenal or tangible relationships. 'What makes concepts concepts', they assert, 'is their inferential capacity, their ability to be bound together in ways that yield inferences. *An embodied concept is a neural structure that is actually part of, or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of our brains'* (1999: 20, original emphasis). Thus, for Lakoff and Johnson, metaphor is embodied in the sense that metaphor is the 'openness' or 'inferential potential' (my phrases) of the neural structure that is part of the sensorimotor system of our brains; that is to say, the conceptual cross-domain mappings performed by metaphor are extensions of the neural processes employed by the body in coping with its environment.

However, for Merleau-Ponty, our embodiment is an ontological issue. As indicated above, when Merleau-Ponty talks about the body, he is describing not so much the body as we are used to thinking about it, i.e. in Cartesian terms as a flesh and bone container for the self, but more the body as a schema of cognitive transformations and articulations through which consciousness and our experience of the world are brought into being and organized. The 'ontological' in this context, if we recall, refers to the forms that the world and our experience of it take as a result of the a priori determination of experience and, for Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is the

zone of interaction where the a priori opens onto and coordinates the a posteriori. 'I do not look at chaos, but at things', he writes, because there is an a priori crisscrossing between the seeing and the visible, the touching and the tangible (1968: 133). The movements of the eye and hand, he goes on, 'incorporate themselves into the universe they interrogate, and are recorded on the same map as it', where 'interrogate' and 'record' denote the a priori determinations exercised by the body schema in its generation and organization of experience (1968: 133).

What I am claiming for Merleau-Ponty is that the ontological crisscrossing action which allows one thing to be oriented in terms of another is the same action we find in metaphor. The way in which his theory of the body is formulated in terms of articulated, interlocking domains – including the senses – means his phenomenology is perfectly placed to exhibit the cognitive significance of metaphor. Since it is the transitions between domains which enables the body schema to open onto and organize the world, the full epistemological force of this claim as regards metaphor might be expressed by saying that, for Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is metaphor. That is to say, in transforming the body from being merely one object among others in the world to being the schema responsible for the disclosure of a world, the body has to be ontologically redefined as the location of a series of fundamental transpositions. Although the conventional concept of the human body already includes its articulated, transpositional nature, this is purely at the physical, empirical level, referring to the human being's ability to move in and cope with an already existing world. In order to move articulation away from being just a physical, coping capacity, for example, grasping an object, to being the ontological, schematic generation of a meaningful and determinable world, a concept has to be assigned to the body which can effect this transition. This is what 'metaphor' does: on Merleau-Ponty's terms, the body schema is metaphor because the effect of metaphor, as the predicate, is to position the interlocking relations of the body as modes of world-disclosure. The concept of metaphor can do this because, in its interactionist sense and in Merleau-Ponty's understanding of originating speech, it supplies 'the boiling point of [the] liquid' (1962: 196), the mechanism whereby two familiar regions intersect to create a new, meaningful possibility. Thus, whereas *metaphor is embodied* for Lakoff and Johnson in as much as metaphor draws neurally-structured inferences from sensorimotor domains, *embodiment is metaphor* on Merleau-Ponty's terms due to the a priori articulations of the body schema (which open onto and coordinate the world) amounting to the meaning- and possibility-generation of metaphor.

Referring to the body schema as 'metaphorical' in its operation is clearly a departure from the conventional use of the word: metaphor is generally understood to create similarity between subjects, whereas here I am asserting that it is the structure of experience. However, the departure is not so great when one bears in mind the steps we have already taken in making

metaphor ontological: locating the figure's capacity for objectivity within Kant's critical philosophy in Chapter 1, and identifying metaphor as the mechanism within Kant's architectonic which prevents the subjective perception of order from collapsing into the idealist notion of a designed world, in Chapter 2. With Merleau-Ponty, we find that his theory of embodiment provides another context in which orienting one thing in terms of another can be seen to have ontological significance. What is more, this aspect does not have to be a departure from metaphor as the creation of similarity. In defining Merleau-Ponty's position as 'embodiment is metaphor', likeness becomes an aspect of world-organization as it is created through bodily coordination. Saying X is like Y amounts to placing X next to Y, with 'likeness' in its ontological aspect becoming the process whereby one thing is located and identified in the world by the body in terms of another thing, and all the possible courses of action in the world which follow from the conjunction.

The danger with this arrangement is that it would appear to be tantamount to saying everything is linked to everything else on the grounds that all things are items within our experience of the world. Lakoff and Johnson arguably avoid this criticism by introducing a notion of restraint in terms of the inferential capacity of sensorimotor concepts; everything is not necessarily linked to everything else, they could argue, on account of sensorimotor concepts deriving from the 'constraining domains' (my phrase) of space and physicality.[3] This option is not open to Merleau-Ponty because, on my interpretation, metaphor is a condition of the possibility of experience, including space and physicality. However, I think he can avoid this predicament too, in two ways. The first is to observe that, in making metaphor ontological, the scope of its significance changes, with the consequence that 'likeness' acquires a new ontological meaning. Everything is linked to everything else in virtue of being items within our bodily experience of the world, but far from being a devaluation of the notion of similarity, this state of affairs is an expression of the body schema's capacity to construct an intelligible, graspable reality. Likeness is in fact already within the bodily action of coordination, of assigning the same order to an object, where the order in question is a matter of being located within the world.

The second way is to recognize that Merleau-Ponty's theory also includes a restraint against all-out connectedness. Ontological transposition occurs throughout experience as an enabling structure, a condition of the possibility of experience. However, there are moments when we are aware of the creation of similarity, moments when the ontological structuring of experience is manifest in experience. Such occasions, for Merleau-Ponty, are definitive of art and of primary expression: occasions when 'a system of definite powers is suddenly decentralized, broken up and reorganized under a fresh law unknown to the subject or to the external witness, and one which reveals itself to them at the very moment at which the process occurs' (1962: 193–94). Being revealed or becoming manifest is, of course, a highly significant

event from the perspective of a phenomenology: it is the moment when instead of merely being embodied in the world, we become aware of the transpositions which embody us in the world. But this awareness, this condition of being manifest, does not happen all the time because, normally, experience is fully occupied with the world as it is revealed to us. Here lies the element of restraint. Ontological transpositions generally do not strike us as creative metaphors because they are not events happening before us as observers. Rather, they are processes sustaining us and the world; they are conditions of the possibility of experience, including our possibility as experiencers. We are not aware of them because we are within them, being given the world. As regards determining or predicting which transpositions will make the ontological manifest in experience, Merleau-Ponty does not say. Neither, arguably, should we want him to or desire him to comment. On his view, an ontologically revealing transposition involves the 'decentralization, breaking up and reorganization' of the conditions in which the subject finds themselves in the world. The process outstrips or exceeds what we would ordinarily associate with conscious deliberation or prediction on account of its being the reorganization of the subject-in-the-world, that is to say, it is a function of a person's locatedness in the world at any one moment, and not a process made up of components whose arrangement can be determined in advance.

At first glance, this would seem to suggest a major difference between the source of restraint in Lakoff and Johnson (as I interpret them) and in Merleau-Ponty: the inferential capacity of sensorimotor concepts in the human brain with the former, and the subject's immersion in the world with the latter. It would appear that Lakoff and Johnson locate restraint within the subject, whereas Merleau-Ponty regards it as an aspect of the subject's embodied engagement with reality. However, to equate 'in the brain' with 'in the subject' is to fall back on the Cartesian belief that the human subject is a capacity for consciousness which can be located wholly on the inside of the body or the head. It is, therefore, to forget the emphasis which Lakoff and Johnson place on sensorimotor concepts being the structures through which the human subject deals with the world. Both Merleau-Ponty and Lakoff and Johnson then can be read to present restraint in the formation of metaphors as a function of human engagement with reality, except that the former does it in phenomenological and the latter does it in neurological terms.

The distinction between the phenomenological and the neurological though is still a crucial one. Much has been done recently to explore their interaction (for example, Petitot et al. 1999) but further discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter and this book. However, some thought can be given as to how the two perspectives alter our understanding of the relationship between metaphor and the world. Both Merleau-Ponty and Lakoff and Johnson want us to recognize that the thoughts we have about subjective experience, objective reality, and how one comes into contact with

the other, even down to the sensations which constitute phenomenal experience, will have a structure and a content that are imbued with metaphor. Interestingly enough, Lakoff and Johnson do actually distinguish between 'phenomenological embodiment' and 'neural embodiment' (1999: 36). The former, they suggest, refers to 'the way we schematize our own bodies and things we interact with daily', for example, the image schema of a container used to conceptualize rooms, beds, buildings, etc., whereas the latter 'characterizes the neural mechanisms that give rise to concepts – for example, the neural circuitry connected to the colour cones [in the eye] that brings colour into existence and characterizes the structure of colour categories' (1999: 36).

This is a very interesting distinction for our enquiry, for while Lakoff and Johnson are right to identify phenomenology with the everyday (as already observed, the everyday holds immense significance for phenomenology), what they classify as 'neural' in fact comes very close to the kind of cognitive transformations that most phenomenologists would take to fall within their oeuvre. 'We see a particular colour', Lakoff and Johnson comment, 'when the surrounding lighting conditions are right, when radiation in a certain range impinges on our retina, and when our colour cones absorb the radiation, producing an electrical signal that is appropriately processed by the neural circuitry of our brains' (1999: 24). However, Merleau-Ponty, like Kant before him, is making the same point: colour is not 'in the world' but instead is a phenomenon that comes about as a result of our faculties reaching out into the world and converting part of its otherness into that which can become phenomenal for us. Both theories, then, are demonstrations of the embodied nature of perception, except that whereas Lakoff and Johnson's neurological account is based on developments in cognitive science, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology arrives at its conclusions by redefining bodily experience in the light of Kant's critical philosophy.

In fact, Kant might be the reason why Merleau-Ponty and Lakoff and Johnson don't quite see eye-to-eye on the scope of phenomenology or, come to that, the scope of philosophy. This is because there is an aspect of Kant's philosophy which could be of immense significance to Lakoff and Johnson's project but which they do not consider. Their main criticism of philosophy is that it relies too heavily on a priori thought reasoning in abstract, universal terms as a way of arriving at truths which exceed the contingent and the immediate. To curtail these excesses, Lakoff and Johnson recommend that there should be a 'co-evolving and mutually enriching' relationship between philosophy and science: to have philosophy informed by an ongoing critical engagement with the best empirical science available, and to have science 'maintain a self-critical stance ... [through] a serious familiarity with philosophy and alternative philosophies' (1999: 52). But this, in essence, is precisely what Kant argues for in his transcendental deduction: a necessary relationship between the a priori and the a posteriori. Admittedly this is not in the form of an explicit request for philosophy and science to be

mutually more responsive, but what is important and decisive is that Kant redefines the a priori as a conceptual structure that has no role other than its engagement with sensibility. Kant's a priori, in Lakoff and Johnson's terms, is an 'empirically responsible' a priori in that it provides the unity necessary for all meaningful experience and, more importantly, in that its emphasis on experience occurring as a unified manifold of representation encourages us to recognize that new conceptual mappings will always be available to unify the unfamiliar through the familiar.

It could be claimed that, in talking about the body ontologically, Merleau-Ponty is nevertheless having to draw on our everyday, empirical familiarity with the body and its capacities and therefore repeating the very action that Lakoff and Johnson spend the greater part of their book describing, i.e. using physical concepts to articulate abstract, philosophical concepts. Such a claim might even carry with it the implication that, in repeating this action, Merleau-Ponty's insights are not as profound as his supporters make out. Now it cannot be denied that Merleau-Ponty is using physical concepts to articulate abstract, philosophical concepts but he is doing it with a very particular aim in mind, and it is an aim which Lakoff and Johnson share. That is, to redefine our concept of sensory and bodily experience in such a way that, rather than accepting it as a given which we passively receive, we see it as a network of relationships within which we are cognitively active, transforming the concepts through which we come to terms with the world. For Lakoff and Johnson, the long-term aim of embodied philosophy is to combat the alienation characteristic of modern experience by cultivating an 'ecological spirituality': 'an aesthetic attitude to the world that is central to self-nurturance, to the nurturance of others, and to the nurturance of the world itself' (1999: 566). The mechanism which can make this possibility tangible or 'passionate', they suggest, is metaphor: metaphor as that which translates the aloofness or blandness of abstract possibilities into the immediate bodily realities of 'pleasure, pain, delight, and remorse' (1999: 567).

Phenomenology would seem to be a clear example of philosophy already doing what Lakoff and Johnson ask of it, since phenomenology shows how the textures of the empirical contain within them the conceptual structures which are responsible for the determination of experience as a whole. One of the consequences of Kant's work on the a priori and the a posteriori is that aesthetic experience becomes the region of experience we can turn to for a more thorough understanding of the relationship between concepts and sensibility. This manifests itself in Kant's *Critique of Judgment* as the question of how a subjective, aesthetic judgment can nevertheless claim universal assent (1987). Traditionally, in the history of philosophy, sensory or aesthetic experience is dismissed as a means to truth either because it can be confused or indistinct or because it is not amenable to conceptual analysis. What Kant does is take this supposed resistance to categorization and transform it into a process of conceptual reappraisal or realignment that is central to the whole idea of a conscious subject conceptually organizing the

world. As a result, from the point of view of phenomenology, the demands made by an aesthetic experience on us to find the right words to describe its effect or significance are paradigms for the conceptual or interpretive decisions which have to be made in all forms of judgment. This is why I have been examining the categorization of the senses against the backdrop of empiricism and phenomenology: to demonstrate that what we take for 'immediate' sensory experience is in fact a site of world-involvement the understanding of which has implications for our understanding of categorization at large.

Conclusion

Metaphor and the categorization of the senses, I have argued, are tied together in the history of epistemology. Their intertwinement raises a number of questions. We are asked: (a) to consider what it means for something to be separate and pure; (b) to compare the terms on which metaphor is judged to be either a muddier of truth or a generator of cognitive insight; and, ultimately, (c) to reflect upon how we understand the contact that the senses give us with the world. Contrasting approaches to these questions are offered by Locke and Merleau-Ponty. Locke's arguments for the separateness of the senses and the importance of literal language rest upon a theory of knowledge which assumes that knowledge comes to us directly from the world in the form of unique 'simple ideas', 'by the proper inlets appointed to each sort'.

While Locke seeks to promote the importance of experience in the construction of knowledge, post-Kantian epistemology shifts attention to the conditions of possibility which allow consciousness to open onto a world and receive experience in the first place. Against this backdrop, an altogether different relationship between metaphor and the categorization of the senses emerges. Sensation is no longer theorized as being 'on tap', a given that can be taken for granted, but instead is understood as the form of disclosure or zone of interaction whereby the subject's cognitive faculties bring a world into being. From this point of view, the idea that there are overlaps or fusions between the senses becomes a very important consideration for Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body. The relationships between the senses, he argues, exist as 'joints' in our body schema, the necessarily interlocking aspects of the ontological framework which enables the world to be coherent and determinate. On this account, occasions when we are moved to describe one sensory modality in terms of another are times when the body schema's ontological transformations are made tangible to us. The concept of 'making tangible' is significant because it belongs to the phenomenological tradition of showing how the textures of the empirical and the immediate are pregnant with the determinations of the a priori. A helpful illustration in this respect is the fact that touch, as a sense, uses pressure, temperature, vibration and our own movement to produce a

unified percept. For example, to gain an impression of a hard, polished dining tabletop, I have to sweep my hand across its surface. Thus, the unity of the percept is due to the a priori as well as the empirical input to the senses.

However, it is not just the case that Merleau-Ponty revises our concept of sensory fusion. His phenomenological redefinition of sensation is also part of a theory of knowledge which lends considerable support to the epistemological significance of metaphor. Whereas the transitions between realms promoted by metaphor are regarded by Locke as distortions of a ready-made world, for Merleau-Ponty they become extensions of the ontological cross-referrals through which we create the world and extend our perception of it. His writing on language bears this out. Language, he argues, is not of an order that is distinct from the particularities of experience but, rather, occurs as a 'modulation' of our embodied immersion in the world. Just as the hand that I know and have always known can reach out to grasp a new object, so thought is at its most creative, he avers, when 'already available meanings' serve an intention which 'outstrips' and 'modifies' them.

The concept of the body as a 'body schema' – a network of interlocking transformations – is, I suggest, an aspect of Merleau-Ponty's theory that Lakoff and Johnson do not acknowledge. Their principal interest in Merleau-Ponty is the extent to which his phenomenology of the body supports their thesis that all our concepts are extensions of the sensorimotor concepts used by the body in coping with its environment. Admittedly it could be argued that a notion of the body as that which necessarily promotes the cross-fertilization of concepts does appear in Lakoff and Johnson. On their terms, it is the inferential complexity of sensorimotor concepts – 'their ability to be bound together in ways that yield inferences' (1999: 20) – that represents the embodied nature of our cross-domain mappings. However, because Merleau-Ponty redefines the body in such a way that it ceases to be a thing and instead becomes a world-creating network of conceptual cross-referral, his final position as regards metaphor and embodiment, I have proposed, is slightly different from Lakoff and Johnson's: not 'metaphor is embodied' but 'embodiment is metaphor'.

Despite this divergence between Lakoff and Johnson's and my assessments of metaphor, our aims are nevertheless very similar: we both see metaphor as the mechanism which can make large scale philosophical theses – in Lakoff and Johnson's case, a form of 'ecological spirituality' (1999: 566) and, in mine, Kantian assertions of the interrelationship between subject and object – palpable or passionate at the immediate, sensory level. The difference between us exists because we perceive philosophy differently: Lakoff and Johnson call for a greater dialogue between the a priori and the a posteriori in philosophy, whereas I am claiming that this is already happening with thinkers in the phenomenological tradition from Kant onwards. Merleau-Ponty's contribution in this regard is to provide a

phenomenology of the body which allows us to transform metaphor, normally regarded as an empirical phenomenon, into an a priori, ontological condition of experience. This is one example of how post-Kantian philosophy helps us to reappraise our condition in the world and, in so doing, to foster the vivification of thought propounded by Lakoff and Johnson.

4 Heidegger and the senses

Metaphor and the senses are strangely linked in the history of epistemology. As I demonstrate in Chapter 1, sensibility is brought to metaphor in order to explain the objectivity of metaphor. Prompted by Ricoeur and Hausman, my study of Heidegger's Kant formulates objectivity as the subjective generation of a network of possibilities, where the notion of possibility qualifies the way in which sensory intuition appears before consciousness. In Chapter 3, I argue that Locke's arguments for the simplicity and separateness of the senses belong to the same architectonic which stresses the importance of literal language. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty constructs an ontological framework which operates on the basis of transposition: synaesthetic coordination between the senses is presented as an aspect of the metaphorical, jointed articulation through which the body schema creates and sustains meaningful experience for a subject. And in my study of Kant's aesthetics in Chapter 2, while the senses are not explicitly considered, the relation between subjective cognitive judgment and a world that is amenable to the ordering exercised by judgment is shown, for Kant, to be metaphorical; the multiple associations generated by metaphor act as a buffer preventing the subjective perception of order from being equated with the idealist notion of an ordered or designed world. One philosopher not considered so far is Nietzsche. This would seem to be a serious omission, given that he is the first figure in Western philosophy to assert explicitly that the senses are metaphorical (Nietzsche 2000). But this omission is only a temporary one, as I examine his views on metaphor and the senses in the following chapter.

Heidegger does not provide a sustained or systematic account of the senses. An explicit but brief indication occurs in *The Principle of Reason* as part of an account of the nature of thought and, in particular, of how thought might be regarded as a form of hearing or seeing:

> If we take thinking to be a sort of hearing and seeing, then sensible hearing and seeing is taken up and over into the realm of nonsensible perception, that is, of thinking ... The language of scholars names such a carrying-over 'metaphor'. So thinking may be called a hearing and listening, a viewing and a bringing into view only in a metaphorical,

figurative sense. Who says 'may' here? Those who assert that hearing
with the ears and seeing with the eyes is genuine hearing and seeing.

(Heidegger 1991: 47)

This analysis supports Heidegger's claim that 'the metaphorical exists
only within metaphysics', which I discuss at greater length in Chapter 8
(1991: 48). What is apparent for our present interest is Heidegger's opposi-
tion to the Cartesian division between thought and sensibility which, as he
sees it, means that the two can be conjoined only by metaphor. Also evident
within this is his reluctance to equate 'genuine' hearing and seeing, or sen-
sing in general, with the empiricist model of reception of stimuli from the
external world. 'Of course we hear a Bach fugue with our ears', he adds,
'but if we leave what is heard only at this, with what strikes the tympanum
as sound waves, then we can never hear a Bach fugue. *We* hear, not the ear'
(1991: 47). The suggestion, then, gleaned from this brief reference, is that
Heidegger regards the senses to have a more intimate relationship with
thought, and thinks that they represent a relation between subject and
world which is more intimate than empiricism allows.

When Heidegger does mention the senses in passing or examines subjects
which implicate them, some signs begin to emerge as to what a Heidegger-
ian theory of sensibility might be. The areas of his work I shall consider in
this chapter are: (a) the thesis, given in *Being and Time* (1996) and *Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics* (1962b)*,* that primordial time represents the
opening whereby a human being is able to stand before and receive the
world (to adopt the Kantian idiom of the later book) in the form of sensible
intuition; (b) the passages in *Being and Time* which cite the senses as exem-
plars of truth as *aletheia;* and (c) his analysis in *The Essence of Truth* of the
relation between sensation and knowledge (2002).[1] The three principal
concepts in this list are sensibility, primordial time, and *aletheia*. An attempt
to work out a Heideggerian theory of sensibility will consist, in the main, of
examining the relations which exist between them in Heidegger's thought.
The latter two – primordial time and *aletheia* – are definitely linked for
Heidegger: Da-sein (human being) and *aletheia*, he asserts, are related 'in
terms of the temporality of existence', and fathoming this arrangement is
the '*central problematic*' of *Being and Time* (1996: 357, original emphasis).

The questions which I shall address in this chapter are: (1) how does
primordial time structure sensibility?, and (2) what does it mean for this
structuring of the senses to be conceived as aletheic? The answers I give will
help (a) to extend the Heideggerian account of metaphor and finitude given
in Chapter 1, and (b) to ascertain how ontological structures in Heidegger
compare with the ontological role assigned to bodily articulation by Merleau-
Ponty, explored in Chapter 3. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty locate the
possibility of experience in the notion of an as-structure, the relation
whereby one thing is regarded as something else.[2] For Heidegger, it is the
mechanism which allows the ontological predetermination behind an encounter

to meet with and draw out the character of that encounter and, for Merleau-Ponty, it is the origin of meaning in experience, the significance that is created 'when one or more terms exist *as* . . . [*sic*] representative or expressive of something other than themselves' (1962: 428). The metaphorical dimension of seeing one thing in terms of something else should not pass unnoticed and, as my analysis in this chapter shows, the work which the concept of as-structure undertakes in Heidegger's ontology helps to further our understanding of the transformational nature of cognition within phenomenology.

How does primordial time structure sensibility?

As we saw in Chapter 1, temporality, for Heidegger, structures the way in which our cognitive faculties determine sensory intuition. Heidegger presents this view as part of his retrieval of Kant's schematism in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,* the text which was to have been part two of *Being and Time.* Continuity between the works is signalled by Heidegger in *Being and Time*: 'What it is that Kant shrinks back from [in the schematism], as it were, must be brought to light thematically and in principle if the expression "being" is to have a demonstrable meaning' (1996: 23). The question faced by Heidegger in the second book is the one left unanswered by Kant: how can ontological concepts (the categories) meet with and organize empirical intuition? Kant's epistemology cannot amount to concepts being determined by sensory impressions (this would be a form of empiricism) nor to concepts imposing their shape onto a malleable sensory material (this would lead to all-out idealism). Instead of the immediate, 'point-to-point' relations of impression or imposition, an altogether different, 'mediated' epistemological arrangement is sought. As we know, Kant leaves the nature of this mediation, the schematism, unresolved; it is, to quote his now notorious description, 'an art concealed in the depths of the human soul' (1929: A 141, B 180–1). However, retrieving the concept of time in Kant's epistemology, Heidegger declares, makes the nature of the mediation explicit.

While we ordinarily regard time as linear, as a continuous sequence of nows moving from the future into the past, primordial time is the original opening of a 'space' wherein ordinary, empirical time can take place. It is, Heidegger declares, '*ekstatikon par excellence, . . . the primordial "outside of itself" in and for itself*' (1996: 329, original emphasis). It is the unified act of looking-forward-to, holding-present, and holding-onto which creates the continuity necessary for empirical time to flow, and this is the same ecstatic continuity which generates subjective experience of an external reality. As I suggest in Chapter 1, this action is perhaps best pictured as a circle: the original burgeoning forth of the proposition of an object, the pulling round as the object is held in the present, and then the pulling back towards the self as the object's passing away completes the process of succession.

At this point, we need to be wary of language and the assumption that referring expressions such as 'intuition' and 'consciousness' denote pre-existing,

individuatable items in the world. This is not the case here. The appearing of intuition before consciousness is not the meeting of two pre-formed entities but an opening wherein the two sides of the opening – intuition and consciousness – are mutually constituted by the generative, opening force of temporality. The resulting experience occurs *as a possibility*, in the sense that it could occur otherwise than it does. 'Higher than actuality', writes Heidegger in the 'Introduction' to *Being and Time,* 'stands *possibility*. We can understand phenomenology solely by seizing upon it as a possibility' (1996: 38). Da-sein or human being, we are told, 'is not something objectively present which then has as an addition the ability to do something, but is rather primarily being-possible. Da-sein is always what it can be and how it is its possibility' (1996: 143). As Heidegger's retrieval of the schematism shows, the particularity of any appearance, such as a house, 'is only 'the "how" of the possible appearance of a house' (1962b: 99). The latter point accords with Kant's affirmation that it is the possibility of experience which 'gives objective reality to all our a priori modes of knowledge', where 'the possibility of experience' refers not to the question of whether or how experience may occur but to the nature of experience as possibility (1929: A156, B195).

In the contexts of an intuition appearing to consciousness and a situation appearing to Da-sein, both modes of appearing arise due to the *as-structure of temporality*. Da-sein, as a being-possible, has an 'overview' of 'the totality of useful things in the actual world' which can lend themselves to application or adaptation by Da-sein as it 'takes care', that is, as it acts in and deals with the world (1996: 359). As such, Da-sein acts according to an 'if-then' schema: 'if this or that is to be produced, put into use, or prevented, for example, then we need these or those means, ways, circumstances, or opportunities' (1996: 359). However,

> if deliberation is to be able to move in the scheme of 'if-then', taking care must already understand a context of relevance in an 'overview'. What is addressed with the 'if' must already be understood *as this and that*. For this, it is not necessary that the understanding of useful things be expressed predicatively. The scheme 'something as something' is already prefigured in the structure of pre-predicative understanding. The as-structure is ontologically grounded in the temporality of understanding.
>
> (1996: 359)

The 'temporality of understanding' is not a temporality which belongs uniquely to the understanding as an independent faculty, but is instead an understanding which operates within temporality, that is to say, it is the anticipatory circumspection through which world-immersed and world-confronting care *temporally comes into being*. '*Like understanding and interpretation in general*', Heidegger writes, '*the "as" is grounded in the ecstatic*

and horizontal unity of temporality' (1996: 360, emphasis in original). In order to analyse the 'something as something' structure further, he insists, we must 'make the as-phenomenon thematic and define the concept of the "schema" existentially' (1996: 360). To make the as-phenomenon thematic is to examine it for its ontological significance, and this is to be done by defining 'schema' existentially, that is to say, by bringing to light what 'Kant shrinks back from' in positioning the schema as a transcendental determination of time (1996: 23).

In turning to the as-structure of temporality, we are working towards an understanding of how temporality unfolds to create the basis of possibility upon which intuition is received. As-ness or as-structuredness is intrinsic to the temporal action whereby the world is disclosed and encountered as a series of possibilities. This is revealed in Heidegger's study of Kant's schematism. Heidegger's unified temporal act of looking-forward-to, holding-present, and holding-onto which creates the continuity necessary for empirical time to flow is based upon Kant's assertion that pure intuition 'can form the pure succession of the now-sequence only if, in itself, it is imagination, as that which forms, reproduces, and anticipates' (1929: A113). The three actions of forming, reproducing, and anticipating correspond in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition respectively. However, for Heidegger, the three are not of equal importance: of the three, 'the third is precisely the first, i.e. the one which governs the other two' (1962b: 191). This is because, to quote Heidegger quoting Kant: 'if we were not conscious that we think is *the same as what we thought a moment before*, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless' (Heidegger 1962b: 189–90; Kant 1929: A103, emphasis added). The synthesis of recognition in a concept, Heidegger continues,

> pro-spects [*erkundet*] and [quoting Kant] 'investigates' that which must be pro-posed in advance as identical, in order that the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction can find a closed field of essents within which they can fix and receive *as essent* that which they bring back or encounter.
>
> (1962b: 191, emphasis added)

Thus, as-ness is intrinsic to temporality because it is the projection of a line of reference or co-ordination, so to speak, which creates continuity between what we encounter now and what we encountered a moment before.

We need to tread carefully here in order to understand how 'as' is being used. Most importantly, we should not let Kant's description of how one thing might be judged 'the same as what we thought a moment before' lead us to the conclusion that Heidegger regards the as-structure of temporality as the mere comparison of one thing with another or one moment with another. Heidegger's concept of temporality is a systematic development of

the ideas in the first *Critique* which point towards the ontological significance of time. Thus, Heidegger is not working with Kant's undeveloped notion of an object which can be judged to be the same across time. The process under discussion is the ontological articulation of primordial time which represents the ground of empirical time. As such, the things which are to be compared cannot be two individual moments, since these can only be abstractions from already flowing empirical time. Neither can they be two 'frozen' essents or objects, since these can only be encountered as stable, continuous entities within empirical time. Rather, where Kant talks of sameness and identity, Heidegger focuses on the *investigation* and *pro-position* of 'a closed field of essents' which enables the 'fixing' and 'receiving' of an essent:

> If the function of this pure synthesis is recognition, this does not mean that its prospecting is concerned with an essent which it can pro-pose to itself as identical but that it prospects the horizon of the pro-position in general. As pure, its projecting is the pure formation of that which makes all projection [*Vorhaften*] possible, i.e. the future. Thus, the third mode of synthesis also proves to be essentially time-forming.
>
> (1962b: 191)

The process under description is not the projection of an essent in the particular but the projection of 'a horizon of proposition in general'. We encountered this in Chapter 1: the 'horizon' was discussed in terms of Kant's notion of a transcendental object. Its status as an object in general, I argued, overcame the traditional philosophical divide between the general and the particular by being the 'opening' within which empirical particularity could manifest itself to mind as a (or in the mode of) possibility. This present analysis goes one step further by identifying the as-structure of temporality as the primordial hinge, so to speak, which grants time the capacity to be an opening-for-possibility. The arrangement 'something as something' does not assign a predicate to a subject, that is to say, it does not identify an essent; we already have Heidegger's assertion that the arrangement 'is pre-predicative' (1996: 359) and, as if we had to be reminded, the structures we are assessing represent the ontological conditions of experience, and not empirical judgments conceived by an experiencing subject.

In order to explicate what 'something as something' does do primordially, I suggest we reflect upon Heidegger's assertion that, in prospecting the horizon of the pro-position in general, the synthesis of recognition 'investigates' and 'pro-poses' 'a closed field of essents' from which an essent can ultimately be 'fixed' and 'received'. How is 'field' to be understood here? It is not meant as a region occupied by pre-existing, individual essents which can be recognized. Instead, I propose, it might be taken in the sense of a field of provenance, a field from which something originates or to which something belongs. This would turn the phrase 'a closed field of essents' away from suggesting the already discounted notion of a domain of particulars

and towards expressing, in a more metaphorical mode, the notion of a region of origin or propriety which enables the recognition of appropriateness. The context of this operation, to remind ourselves, is the as-structure of primordial time which represents Da-sein's original opening to the world, and which parallels Kant's account of the pure synthesis of recognition in a concept.

In trying to fathom just how the something-as-something structure functions primordially, it is important to remember that there is no clearly demarcated 'something' which consciousness then likens to something else. Rather, something-as-something is the structure of comparison per se whose bifocal outlook allows similarity and difference to be recognized. Also, the something-as-something structure is only a component, albeit, for Heidegger, the most important component, in the projection of the temporal opening through which intuition is received. As such, something-as-something does not itself have to meet an object as a possibility, but simply institute the latticework of possible similarities and differences which ensures that the projection is a continuous arc of receptivity. On my account, then, 'something-as-something' becomes the minimal ontological process of co-ordination necessary for appropriateness to arise, where appropriateness provides the element of recognition necessary to sustain continuity in the primordial opening of temporality.

The idea that something-as-something is the minimal ontological process of coordination necessary for appropriateness to arise finds some consolidation in Heidegger's later thinking on the notion of possibility. In the 'Letter on Humanism' from 1947, Heidegger makes possibilization central to the notion of 'the essence of enabling', understood to mean not the essential qualities of the process we call 'enabling' but the idea that essence resides in the process of enablement. Possibility-as-enablement (or possibilization-as-enablement) can help us here because it confirms that possibility as a modality of being, for Heidegger, is understood not 'in contrast to "actuality"', is not 'a merely represented *possibilitas*' (1993a: 220), but instead is the ontological condition which creates the provenance and propriety necessary for something to be:

> To embrace a 'thing' or a 'person' in its essence means to love it, to favour it. Thought in a more original way such favouring [*Mögen*] means to bestow essence as a gift. Such favouring is the proper essence of enabling, which not only can achieve this or that but also can let something essentially unfold in its provenance, that is, let it be. It is on the 'strength' of such enabling by favouring that something is properly able to be. This enabling is what is properly 'possible' [*das 'Mögliche'*], whose essence resides in favouring. From this favouring Being enables thinking. The former makes the latter possible. Being is the enabling-favouring, the may-be [*das 'Mög-liche'*]. As the element, Being is the 'quiet power' of the favouring-enabling, that is, of the possible.
>
> (1993a: 220)

The first thing to note here is the repetition of the portentous phrase from *Being and Time*: 'the quiet power of the possible' (1996: 394), the one difference here being that 'favouring-enabling' (*Mögen*) is made synonymous with the possible (*Mögliche*). Secondly, the suggestion of a connection between the 'Letter on Humanism' and *Being in Time* is strengthened further by Heidegger's description of the process of possibilization in transactional terms, the act of giving from one realm to another. In the terms of the quotation: the 'essence' of a thing (or a person) which is 'bestowed as a gift' lets the thing come into being not on the traditional, metaphysical understanding, where a thing is grounded and sustained by an internally self-sufficient actuality or substance (as Heidegger himself confirms in the 'Letter' (1993a: 229, 233)). Instead the thing is enabled into being through possibilization, that is to say, it 'unfolds' as one of the possibilities which follow the 'giving' or the transition from one realm to another. To reiterate this in terms of giving: an entity is made possible or can 'unfold in its provenance' in the same way that the gesture of giving makes ownership possible from within a framework of possible transactions – the gift could be going to you, to me or to another.

If we were to pursue the link between *Being and Time* and the 'Letter', then the metaphors of 'giving', 'provenance', and 'unfolding' could be construed as a 'poetics of the concept', where by 'concept' I mean any concept or 'concept in general'. A notion of concept is needed because, from Heidegger's Kantian perspective, it provides the synthesis of recognition which unifies primordial time. And by a 'poetics' of the concept, I mean the images and metaphors used by Heidegger for the processes of transaction and interrelation which enable recognition in a concept or, in terms of the 'closed field' identified above, which create a field wherein recognition or appropriateness can occur. This, we should remember, will be appropriateness not in an ontic or empirical sense of something corresponding to a concept but in an ontological sense, denoting the degree of fit that is necessary for an opening to organize and receive in a sustained, continuous fashion that onto which it opens.

But are the reappearances of the 'quiet power of the possible' phrase and the concept of possibility through transaction sufficient as evidence of continuity between Heidegger's earlier and later works, especially when the 'Letter' comes after the alleged 'turning' in his thought? As Kearney observes, '"the possible" is not an unequivocal notion in Heidegger's philosophy' and 'is much neglected by [his] commentators' (Kearney 1992: 299). Kearney identifies three meanings of 'the possible' in Heidegger: (1) *Möglichkeit* (possibility) as the being-possible which defines care; (2) *Sein-können* as, in Kearney's words, Da-sein's 'ability to project itself [ecstatically] in the first place' (1992: 303); the term is translated by Stambaugh as 'potentiality-of-being' and by Macquarrie and Robinson as 'potentiality-for-being'; and (3) the verb *ermöglichen,* meaning 'to make or render possible', the activity (Kearney again) 'by which [Da-sein] deploys itself as a potentiality-for-being which projects its own possibilities of existence' (1992: 305).

The third meaning is fundamental, Kearney thinks, for two reasons: (1) it is the process by which Da-sein as a potentiality-of-being (*Seinkönnen*) *can be* a being-possible (*Möglichkeit*), and (2) it indicates that Heidegger's work after the 'turning' of the 1940s does not constitute a 'turning' at all but in fact represents a 'deepening' of his earlier philosophy. This is the apparent shift from his early use of *ermöglichen* when the verb's subject is human Da-sein to his later use of it when the subject of the verb is Being itself, giving rise to formulations wherein Being becomes a 'making possible', a possibilization or a 'loving potency' (*Das Vermögen des Mögens*) whose operation makes human being possible, as in: 'It is on the strength of this loving potency or possibilization of love that something is possibilized in its authentic being' (Kearney 1992: 310).[3] This is Kearney's own translation. Capuzzi and Glenn Gray, in their translation (Heidegger 1993a), do not use 'possibilization' but nevertheless indirectly confirm the sense of 'making possible' through their translation of *Das Vermögen des Mögens* as '*enabling by favouring*' (my emphasis): 'It is on the strength of such enabling by favouring that something is properly able to be' (Heidegger 1993a: 220). The turning 'is not a change of standpoint from *Being and Time*', as Heidegger himself insists in the 'Letter', but a reorientation through which 'the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which *Being and Time* is experienced' (1993a: 231–32), where the dimension in question (out of which human Da-sein is experienced) is Being itself. It is, I suggest, Kearney's third sense of possibility that we are dealing with: we are examining the ontological processes which are responsible for determining experience of a world, where determination is exercised in such a way that subjective awareness and objective reality emerge as epiphenomena from the processes involved.

Aletheia and the as-structure of the senses

The importance of as-structure to Heidegger's concept of Da-sein has been discussed at length by Mulhall (1990). His analysis concentrates on the as-structure of what Heidegger terms the equipmentality of the world, the mode in which we encounter the world as ready-to-hand. In this mode, we do not regard objects as items clearly set out from their backgrounds, as though awaiting description, but instead as extensions of our ability to manipulate and move about the world. So we see entities not as entities in their own right but, to quote Mulhall's examples, '*as* a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge', that is, as interactions which facilitate our passage through the world (1990: 117). While Mulhall is right to conclude that the seeing-as structure is 'the essence of all our encounters with the world' (1990: 117), where the world in question is the ontic or empirical manifestation of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, he does not consider the significance which the structure has when it is employed by Heidegger as a mechanism for articulating the relationships which determine the

ontology itself, that is to say, for articulating the ontological relationships through which the subject opens onto the world. This is the context in which we are examining the as-structure of sensibility, where sensibility is understood not as the empiricist's receipt of pre-formed sensory impressions but rather as a highly organized receptivity, where its organization provides the structure and articulation necessary for a world to reveal itself before a subject.

There are, I suggest, two directions we can take in explicating what an as-structured sensibility might amount to: consider the relation Heidegger draws between the senses and truth as *aletheia* in *Being and Time* and *The Essence of Truth*, which I shall do now, and draw a parallel with Merleau-Ponty, to which I shall return later. In *Being and Time*, as part of his examination of the conditions of human being in the world, Heidegger questions the traditional view of truth which holds that the relation between reality and a true judgment about that reality is one of agreement or correspondence. The problem with this view, he declares, is it assumes that all judgments and all portions of reality exist in a comparison-ready state, two orders of being whose mutual correspondence is already contained and primed within themselves. But this, he asserts, is not the case. Our primary condition in the world is one of immersion and engagement; people and things are relationships and interactions before they are individuated, isolated objects of judgment. To make a judgment or statement, and thereby to make something an object of that judgment, is therefore to wrench or 'tear' beings from their immersed, concealed state (1996: 222). Disclosing or revealing beings, for Heidegger, is an ontological action, and a truthful one, in the sense of the Greek concept of truth as *aletheia*. As a concept of truth, *aletheia* is distinct from and logically prior to the conventional Roman concept of truth as *veritas* or 'correspondence with the facts'. Prior to there being states of affairs to which our statements can correspond, there must first be the 'truth' which discovers or brings these states of affairs into being. 'To say that a statement is *true*', Heidegger avows, 'means that it discovers the beings in themselves ... [I]t lets beings "be seen" [*apophansis*] in their discoveredness' (1996: 218).[4]

One of the aims of Heidegger's ontology is to show how things (in the broadest sense) can be encountered, how they can be brought to light in order to manifest themselves. Now while we might accept that judgment, as described above, can enact this process, we misunderstand the concept of truth as *aletheia* if we only see it as pertaining to judgment. Rather, for Heidegger, *aletheia* or truth as disclosure plays a much more fundamental, ontological role: 'Disclosedness is the basic character of Da-sein in accordance with which it *is* its there [*das Da,* what stands before or lies around the vicinity of Da-sein]. Disclosedness is constituted by attunement, understanding, and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to the world, being-in, and the self' (1996: 220–21). One aspect of this attunement, for Heidegger, is sense perception:

> In the Greek sense what is 'true' – indeed more originally true than the *logos* [speech or judgment] we have been discussing – is *aisthēsis,* the simple sense perception of something. To the extent that *aisthēsis* aims at its *idia* [what is its own] – the beings genuinely accessible only *through* it and *for* it, for example, looking at colours – perception is always true. This means that looking always discovers colours, hearing always discovers sounds.

> (1996: 33)

The senses are aletheic in that they discover the world or bring it to light in a way that is appropriate to them. How is this sense of appropriateness to be understood? One possibility is the following: the manner in which our faculties encounter what is beyond them is such that they translate part of that beyondness into phenomena (for us), but the translation is only able to occur because each set of anticipatory sensitivities with which we approach the world meets with and converts a region of otherness which it accommodates or with which it can fit. As far as my study of metaphor and the senses is concerned, this presents (at best) a difficult or (at worst) an antithetical situation, for the senses, on this reading of Heidegger, are configured entirely in terms of *appropriateness*, when I am endeavouring to broach an account of sensibility which involves metaphorical transformations, that is, transitions between realms that are, to all intents and purposes, mutually *inappropriate*.

Heidegger does not expand upon the aletheic nature of the senses in *Being and Time*. However, a discussion of truth and sensibility figures prominently in *The Essence of Truth* (2002) and, importantly for us, it addresses the topics of appropriateness and as-structure. In *The Essence of Truth*, the suggestion that the senses have an as-structure is reached through an appraisal of the relation between *aletheia* and the senses in Plato's *Theaetetus* (1987b). The *Theaetetus*, a dialogue principally between Theaetetus and Socrates, deals more with *episteme* (knowledge) than *aletheia* but, as Heidegger indicates, the two concepts are connected in that knowldege is the possession of truth (2002: 115–17). *Episteme* refers to knowledge of what is present which, in terms of *aletheia*, means what is revealed and available for knowing. The section of the *Theaetetus* examined by Heidegger addresses the question of whether *episteme* is *aisthēsis*, that is, whether knowledge is perception. In fact, two questions are here, due to an ambiguity shared by the Greek term *aisthēsis* and its English translation 'perception': both terms can mean either the (sensory) process by which something is perceived or the act whereby some*thing* is perceived. As Heidegger shows, asking the question first of whether knowledge is sensory perception leads Theaetetus and Socrates to the second question of whether knowledge is some form of perceptual contact with objects.

Theaetetus denies outright the first possibility: that knowledge is sensory perception. As far as he is concerned, the truth of the senses is not the

sensory material which they deliver, such as colours, sounds, and tastes, but the relations which exist between them, for example, their dissimilarities, their combination in a single object, and the similarity they have in virtue of their all being existent, that is, possessing being. Socrates asks Theaetetus if there is a special, sixth sense-organ which is responsible for perceiving the relations between the other five. Theaetetus denies this, arguing instead that the relations are investigated in the mind 'by means of itself' (1987b: 185 d–e). From here, Socrates concludes (following Theaetetus's line of argumentation) that 'knowledge is not located in immediate experience, but in reasoning about it, since the latter [reasoning], apparently, but not the former [immediate experience], makes it possible to grasp being and truth' (1987b: 186d).

However, the possibility of a connection between *aletheia* and the senses does not end there. Even though the second question considers 'perception' in its 'contact with being' sense, the responses given to this form of the question of knowledge by Theaetetus and Socrates, Heidegger argues, nevertheless reintroduce the senses, and the manner of their return, as Heidegger presents it, is decidedly Kantian. The second form of the question is in fact a continuation of the first, since, in asking whether knowledge is contact with being, it probes further into 'that function of the mind when it is involved with things by itself', the operation which Theaetetus terms 'thinking' (1987b: 187a). Crucial in following the dialogue at this point, Heidegger insists, is the way in which we understand the Greek term *doxa*, translated as 'thinking' in the quotation above by Waterfield. As Heidegger notes, it is also often translated as 'opinion' but this, he thinks, 'only goes half-way to capturing the Greek meaning of the word', a 'half-measure which ... is more dangerous than complete error' (2002: 180). Present in the corresponding Greek verb (for us, 'to think' or 'to opine'), he maintains, is the notion of 'I show myself, either to myself or to others' in the sense of representing to oneself an image or picture one makes of the subject in hand (2002: 181–82). This is not wholly removed from our notion of opining or thinking, since we often talk of adopting a view on something or holding an opinion on something, where the opinion, in this context, would correspond to the view or picture one has of the matter.

In order to have a view on something, one must be able to *represent it to oneself*, which means, as Heidegger comments, being able 'to hold a being before us when we ourselves are *no longer present* with it', that is to say, when the being is absent (2002: 210). This 'making-present', as Heidegger terms it, is vital to *doxa* since it is 'that faculty and comportment in which we *think of*, keep thinking *of*, something, e.g. a person, the situation of a nation' (2002: 210). But this imagining of something not present, Heidegger insists, is not purely a form of recollection or fantasy but 'a mode of comportment to the beings themselves' (2002: 212), that is to say, it is a mode of projection which prepares us for encountering beings. As he illustrates the point, the comportment of making-present

can be seen in a modified form when we talk about holding to a person, not giving a person up. In this way, with various modifications, we constantly hold ourselves to all beings, also and precisely because not all beings are and *can* be bodily present.

(2002: 213)

Thus, perception understood as contact with being, as the 'function of the mind when it is involved with things by itself' (from Plato 1987b: 187a), is shown here to have two components: a having-present when something is immediately before us, given as vividly present, and a making-present whereby we can imagine something or bring it expressly to mind (2002: 217). Or, in other words, to adopt Heidegger's metaphor, perception is 'forked', the comportment of *doxa* 'is in itself two-pronged' (2002: 221).

It is this arrangement, Heidegger thinks, which reintroduces *aisthēsis* as sensation into the analysis, and does so along Kantian lines. Redolent of the thesis that 'thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind', Heidegger declares enigmatically that it is 'the nature of a fork to spike with both prongs' (2002: 222). The object of *doxa,* the being with which it is in contact, can only be an object for it, Heidegger argues, if the prong of making-present reaches out beyond and before the prong of having-present in order to provide the mind with a view or perspective from which to apprehend the object which it has-present. In Heidegger's words: 'the essence of *doxa* is neither the one prong nor the other, but rather: to see someone approaching in the distance *as* . . .; or, e.g. to make-present this approaching person in advance *as Theaetetus*, who could very well be coming' (2002: 222, emphasis added). Perception through the senses is thereby reintroduced on account of its being the corporeal delivery of the having-present, *of which one has a view*, which is to say, it supplies the presence-that-is-had upon which the mind can have a view.

This fork, Heidegger declares, 'is the image of the fundamental constitution of human Da-sein, of its essential construction' (2002: 222) for it introduces the possibility of error, of things being other than they seem, of one thing occurring as something else. A view or a look, Heidegger writes, 'can present the being itself, the given thing, but it can also make something out to be what it is not' (2002: 184) or, as Socrates puts it, false belief occurs 'when the mind exchanges something that is for something else that is, and one is claimed to be the other' (1987b: 189 b–c). It is not the incidence of error or mis-taking itself which is significant but the way in which it is promoted *as a possibility*: *doxa* must always assume error as a possibility 'in so far as the forking involves a *doubling,* i.e. a *sphere of free-play* [*Spielraum*] for seeing something as something' (2002: 225). In order for *doxa* to function, the mind must have the capacity to make-present those aspects which might not fit the situation, those aspects whereby error can arise:

Anything which can *be* existent to us can [*was uns ein Seiendes sein kann*], in so far as it shows itself as unhidden [i.e. disclosed], also *seem* (appear). So much being, so much seeming. Untruth (or error) belongs to the most primordial essense of truth as the hiddenness of being, i.e. to the inner possibility of truth. The question of being is thus thoroughly *ambiguous* – it is a question of the deepest truth and at the same time it is on the edge of, and in the zone of, the deepest untruth.

(2002: 228)

The Kantianism in Heidegger's analysis has already been noted, but it is again very much in evidence here. On the one hand, being is a question of 'the deepest truth' in the Kantian, ontological, world-structuring sense, where *doxa*'s projecting prong of making-present corresponds to the horizon of possibility extended by Kant's transcendental object; this, in turn, is translated by Heidegger (in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*) into the horizon-creating action of primordial time. On the other hand, being is on the edge of 'the deepest untruth' in a Kantian, empirically received sense. However, untruth, as indicated above, refers to error not in the sense of an undesirable mishap which is to be avoided. As Heidegger makes the point, while 'mis-taken' perception distorts 'the *genuine* look of the thing' and, as such, is a '*hiding* of the thing', it is nevertheless 'a mode of being-manifest', an '*unhiddenness,* which in itself is simultaneously, and indeed essentially, *hiddenness*' (2002: 227). From a Kantian perspective, in the terms of the analysis of *doxa* just given, untruth belongs to the essence of truth in that it is the necessary incongruity between the preparatory view projected in making-present and the object with which one has-present through sensory or intuitive contact. In turn, incongruity is intrinsic to the 'zone' of the empirical in as much as it represents the otherness of experience, the multitude of possibilities within finitude wherein things may be other than they seem.

How does the as-structured sensibility of *The Essence of Truth* compare with that given in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*? The two would appear to be different. In *Essence*, the as-ness of sensibility refers to the anticipatory, made-present view which one has of the having-present, in other words, the tension between the prongs of making-present and having-present. However, in the Kant book, as-ness *is intrinsic to the synthesis of recognition in a concept* which unifies the temporal opening onto intuition. In the terms of *The Essence of Truth*, the arrangement given in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* would seem to amount to as-ness being the preparation of recognition wholly within the projected, anticipatory prong of making-present, rather than being stretched between the prongs. What are we to make of this difference? It would be unfair to accuse Heidegger of inconsistency because he has made no claim to identify as-ness with any one particular aspect of the ontological generation of experience. Furthermore, the difference is only identified after two lines of textual extrapolation, one from the Kant book, the other from *The Essence of Truth*.

But we are wrong to think that as-ness is intrinsic to the synthesis of recognition in the Kant book, but stretched between making- and having-present in *Essence*. The synthesis of recognition in a concept is tensional too. To return to Heidegger's house example:

> We do not have to lose ourselves in this particular house in order to know exactly how it appears. On the contrary, this particular house is revealed as such that, in order to be a house, it need not necessarily appear as, in fact, it does appear. It reveals to us 'only' the 'how' of the possible appearance of a house.
>
> (1962b: 99)

Synthesis of recognition in a concept projects a line of continuity which, as I describe above, can be pictured as a circle: the original burgeoning forth of the proposition of an object, the pulling round as the object is held in the present, and then the pulling back towards the self as the object's passing away completes the process of succession. Appearance within this ontological space is tensional: we are not 'lost' in a distinct, particular house but, instead, are shown 'only' a 'possible' house. 'Only' here does not indicate a lesser or impoverished experience but, rather, indicates that we don't get the 'whole house'. Again, this might sound as if experience is being denied its full object, but it is precisely the concept of experience as the receipt of objects in themselves, as encounters with objects which can be quantified against the objects in themselves, which is rejected here. On Heidegger's view, the intimation of deficiency in '"only" the "how" of the possible appearance of a house' is in fact 'more' because it grants experience the openness to include other possible appearances. Thus, the as-ness of recognition in a concept, rather than being located entirely within the ontological machinery which prepares the ground for receptivity, is in fact an opening onto and therefore an interweaving with that which offers itself to receptivity, namely, intuition.

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty on the as-structure of the senses

A second source of insight with regard to the prospect of an as-structured sensibility is Merleau-Ponty. From the Introduction to this chapter, we know that significance in experience is created on his account 'when one or more terms exist *as* ... [*sic*] representative or expressive of something other than themselves' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 428). While this, it could be argued, would seem to describe the meaning we find in empricial experience, akin to Mulhall's observations with respect to Heidegger concerning tables and doors, I maintain nevertheless that Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body schema has as-structure operate within the senses at an ontological level. As I argued in the previous chapter, it is the interactions between the senses for Merleau-Ponty, where one sense acts *as another*, which enable the body

schema to open onto and to navigate its way around the world. 'One *sees*', he writes, 'the *hardness* and *brittleness* of glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this *sound* is conveyed by the *visible glass*' (1962: 229, emphases added). Just as any coordinate or triangulation system defines one location in terms of another, so colours, for example, can exist as comprehensible parts of our world 'only if they cease to be closed states or indescribable qualities presented to an observing and thinking subject, and if they [instead] impinge within me upon a certain general setting through which I come to terms with the world' (1962: 210). 'Comprehension' and 'impingement' are, I suggest, the key concepts in the last sentence. The comprehensibility of colour, and its capacity to exist not just as colour, as a datum, but as a region of world-disclosure which contributes to a coherent reality, are achieved because vision and the other modalities are each the result of their own mutual impingement upon a 'general setting': the 'bipedal' action whereby one sense can be seen as (impinged upon by) another, and whereby it can also be the other for another sense (the one which does the impinging) constitutes the network of relations out of which subjective experience of an objective world emerges. Or, as I illustrated the process in the previous chapter, the world-disclosing nature of sensory interaction is like a crease in a piece of paper lifting the paper from out of being a two-dimensional surface into being a three-dimensional form, with one facet (mind) that can now look upon another (reality).

How does this perspective on the as-structure of sensibility square with Heidegger's? On the one hand, we find a similar bipedal action in the two accounts: limbed or pronged 'hinges' are used to formulate the processes which, through their own internal movement, create the transitivity necessary for a subject–world relation. On the other hand, the two processes in question are subtly different. With Merleau-Ponty, we know that bipedal as-ness is part of the jointed nature of the body schema whereby one thing is located in terms of another, and this process of ontological articulation includes the transpositions whereby each sense can be seen as another. That the senses are a part of the ontological structure which, for Merleau-Ponty, creates awareness of a determined world is confirmed by Protevi. In his comparison of Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's concepts of vision, Protevi observes that Merleau-Ponty employs a *Fundierung*-relation or a 'junction of *sensibilité* and *signification*' (Protevi 1998: 218–19): the world-disclosure performed by the senses is the ground or condition for a consciousness that always returns to and locates itself in the world through the senses.

With Heidegger, however, although he adopts comparable notions of bodily articulation and as-ness in his concept of care (*Sorge*),[5] the as-structure responsible for opening and exercising the subject-world relation, including the senses, is not one of mutual transposition or co-ordination but instead a 'broader' possibility-generating field of provenance or appropriateness. In the terms of my 'bipedal' metaphor, whereas the joints of Merleau-Ponty's body schema disclose and organize reality through their

mutual co-ordination, Heidegger's prongs perform distinct but necessarily conjoined roles: the prong of making-present reaches out beyond and before the prong of having-present in order to provide the mind with a view or perspective from which to apprehend the object which it has-present. On this basis, the event of something being seen as something else is not a case of synaesthetic transference but a condition or 'sphere' of free-play, the generation of possibilities which constitute the otherness of a disclosed world. In other words, with Merleau-Ponty, each sense is a contender for being seen *as something else,* that is, another sense, whereas with Heidegger, our multisensory experience exists as a network of possibilities and appropriatenesses which is created by a broader or more generalized apprehension of one thing as something else.

Up to this point, my claims regarding the senses have been located in terms of Heidegger's architectonic, with some reference to Merleau-Ponty and secondary literature. But in such terms, my claims remain highly abstract and raise many questions. How are we to understand the appearing of the world before us as metaphorical? How does anticipating one thing as something else allow the world to be manifest before us? We are accustomed to regarding metaphor as a linguistic or (empirically) conceptual process in which regarding one thing as something else generates similarity and insight. How, then, in the present context, can I refer to one thing appearing as another when the process being described is ontological and, therefore, prior to the emergence of things which can be perceived, talked about, and made the subjects of metaphors? Furthermore, it is not apparent how we reconcile the metaphoricity of the senses given here with the Kantian metaphysics set out in Chapter 1, whereby world-receptivity through intuition is constructed as a field of possibilities.

I call sensibility 'metaphorical' because it is the structure of one thing as another which creates the space in which possibilities can appear. The things at this stage are neither identified nor individuated. Rather, it is the action of anticipating one-thing-as-another that creates a spectrum of possibility – a movement between 'it could be this' or 'it could be that' – which is constitutive of receptivity. The metaphoricity lies not in the insight achieved between two terms (since these are not defined) but in the openness to error – again, 'it could be this' or 'it could be that'– within the spectrum of possibility. The movement between positions which we recognize from linguistic or conceptual metaphor here becomes an ontological condition because the element of inappropriateness or 'category mistake' (to borrow Ryle's concept) affords the leeway or freedom necessary for a preparatory structure both to determine (ontologically) and receive (ontically or empirically) the world. A useful comparison at this point is Leibniz. In his monadology, each being, from the level of human being to that of particles of matter, is constituted by a soul or (what Leibniz terms) a monad, with each monad being a reflection or an expression of every other monad on account of a God-given pre-established harmony between them

(Leibniz 1973: 179–94; 1996: 440). Thus, with Leibniz, correspondence between entities, or one entity as another, exists because interrelationship has been determined by a divine order. However, the metaphoricity I am claiming for Heidegger is an enabling condition for finitude, that is, the receipt of intuitions from a mind-independent reality. Both forms of connectedness are a priori, but Leibniz's looks for agreement within the structure, whereas Heidegger's anticipates otherness beyond the structure; the former is the expression of 'a universal cause ... which brings it about that [each] being perfectly agrees with and corresponds to the others' (1996: 440), whereas the latter is the 'mis-taking' of one thing as another through which the external object 'shows itself, offers a look, [gives us] a view of it' (2002: 227).

Objectivity and belonging

Unfortunately, the suggestion that the generation of possibilities has an as-structure creates two predicaments for my account: one in relation to my assessment of the objectivity of metaphor in Chapter 1, and the other with regard to Heidegger's own stipulation that every sense discloses entities that are accessible to it 'within that domain of discovery which is *genuinely its own*' (1996: 147, emphasis added). With regard to the first predicament, the close examination of Heidegger's account of sensibility and subject–world interaction given in this chapter was prompted by the thesis, argued for in Chapter 1, that the objectivity of metaphor, as formulated by Ricoeur and Hausman, can be explained in terms of the temporal, ontological structuring of the empirical, as proposed by Heidegger in his retrieval of Kant. The main problem which had to be overcome in addressing both metaphor and Kant's schematism was how the 'subjective' conditions of possibility could structure objective meaning or an objective world. Metaphor is objective on Hausman's and Ricoeur's terms because it creates new aspects of reality and, as such, embodies the position of the Kantian subject, which subjectively organizes objective reality. Heidegger's fundamental ontology explains the subjective construction of objectivity by presenting objectivity as a mode of possibility: the schematic predetermination of a possible image with Ricoeur, and the projection of an object in general which entertains possible, alternative appearances with Hausman.

But the further analysis of subject–world interaction conducted in this chapter finds that the mechanism within this interaction which is responsible for the network of possibilities coming into being is itself metaphorical in nature, is itself the regarding of one thing in terms of another. This would appear to give rise to the situation where the objectivity of metaphor rests upon another layer of metaphor. In other words, the source of the objectivity we thought we had identified at the end of Chapter 1 – the receipt of intuition and the generation of meaning in the mode of possibility – would seem to be nothing more than the very phenomenon whose objectivity we

first sought, i.e. metaphor. One way out would be to say I am creating problems for myself by referring to this new as-structure as metaphor when, strictly speaking, it is a mode of transposition. Thus, I could claim, without circularity, that a Heideggerian account of the objectivity of metaphor rests upon a fundamental concept of transposition. But this, it strikes me, is merely to hide behind the metaphor–transposition distinction, a distinction which is difficult to maintain given the emphasis placed on transposition within metaphor by, for example, Nietzsche (2000), Derrida (1998), and Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999).

Instead, circularity can more credibly be avoided by questioning the concept of 'resting upon' which makes our situation appear as if 'metaphor is resting upon metaphor'. It is not the case that events at one level, the empirical objectivity of metaphor, are being explained in terms of events at another level, the ontological preparation of sensibility. The ontic (or empirical) and the ontological (in Heidegger's sense of the words) are not ontologically separate realms for Heidegger; they are not realms which can be left and then returned to in a circular manner. It only appears that metaphor is being multiplied if it is assumed that Ricoeur's and Hausman's objective, possibility-generating metaphor is a phenomenon that is repeated or returned to within Heidegger's ontology. But metaphor as an objective, possibility-generating principle has never been left, has never been left behind to be repeated or returned to. It only strikes one as a notion that has been left if Ricoeur's and Hausman's objective, possibility-generating metaphor, which essentially denotes the human being's capacity for metaphor, is taken to operate at an empirical or experiential level that is removed from Heidegger's ontology. But this would be to draw a line between experience and the conditions of possibility of experience under discussion here, and to suggest that our capacity for metaphor is distinct from the ontological significance which I am claiming for metaphor within Heidegger's account of the senses. It is human experience which Heidegger is theorizing, and accounts of the centrality of metaphor to experience which I am bringing to Heidegger. Experience, far from being distinct from ontology, on Heidegger's view, in actual fact embodies or reveals ontology on account of his formulation of ontology as the opening of experience. Objective metaphor and Heidegger's as-structure are neither two names for the same point on a circle, nor are they operations which can be described as 'isomorphic', since this would imply a relation *between two forms*. Rather, they are two names for the same ontological arrangement which generates the possibilities constitutive of subjective opening onto an objective world. What we customarily regard as *our* capacity for objective metaphor is a facet of the ontological process which creates an objective other, as theorized by Ricoeur and Hausman, and pursued by me to Heidegger's fundamental ontology.

My second predicament involves the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, Heidegger's stipulation in *Being and Time* that each sense reveals that part of reality which is 'genuinely its own' and, on the other, the

arguments given in this chapter to the effect that sensibility is constructed through the recognition of one thing as something else, through the transposition of what is proper to one region into an altogether alien region. The latter analysis would seem to cancel outright the former suggestion that each sense discloses entities within a domain which belongs to it, a domain which can provide the sense with phenomena without having to refer to or cross over to another realm. Two responses can be given to this. First, in asserting that perception is structured by a something-as-something relation, Heidegger is not arguing, as Merleau-Ponty does, that this involves regarding one modality as another. Thus, Heidegger can still refer to each modality having its own province. Unfortunately, while this reply recognizes that Heidegger does not entertain synaesthetic transference between the senses, it does nothing to address the fact that, in enabling sensory intuition to be received, actions take place which undeniably involve the materiality of intuition, that is, possibility, being prepared and nourished by *that which is other than it*, that is, the anticipatory second prong of synthesis-by-recognition and, therefore, something which is not 'genuinely its own'.

In actual fact, there is no problem here at all, on account of the supposed conflict between 'genuineness' and 'transposition' being a false one. That the two notions appear to oppose one another is a result of our adopting a particular understanding of what genuineness consists in. With the notion of a form of reality that genuinely belongs to a sensory modality, the image which customarily governs our concept of belonging is a number of objects residing within a particular realm, the implication being that these objects are either exemplary forms of a particular category or the property of a particular individual.[6] Originary motifs are Plato's analogy of knowledge as an aviary in the *Theaetetus*, where knowing is presented in terms of acquiring and keeping birds within an enclosure (1987b: 197b–199e), and Aristotle's metaphor of predicates as containers in *Prior Analytics*, where asserting that all cats have four legs is likened to thinking 'that one term ['cats'] should be included *in another* ['have four legs'], *as in a whole*' (Aristotle 1987a: 24b, emphasis added). If we were to adhere to this concept of belonging or genuineness, then what belongs to each sense could only be conceived in terms of items lying 'within' the realm of phenomena for that modality, its province, so to speak, for example visual episodes within the realm of the visual, aural events within the realm of hearing, textures within the realm of touch, and so on.

But this is not what the concept of a 'genuine realm of discovery' amounts to for Heidegger, for the simple reason that propriety, especially as it applies to Da-sein, is one of the central terms whose meaning and ontological bearing undergo revision within his existential hermeneutics. 'Any genuine method', according to Heidegger, 'is grounded in the appropriate preview of the fundamental constitution of the "object" or area of objects to be disclosed' (1996: 303). However, as he points out, 'Da-sein is in principle different from everything objectively present and real. Its "content" is

not founded in the substantiality of a substance, but in the *"self-constancy"* [*Selbständigkeit*] of the existing self whose being was conceived as care' (1996: 303). Thus, the 'genuine', when considered in relation to Da-sein and its realms of sensory discovery, is to be worked out not in terms of 'appropriate objects' but instead in terms of the continuity of care which unfolds from the recognition- or appropriateness-generating structure of temporality.

Two things require clarification here: *Selbständigkeit* and the suggestion that genuineness is founded upon the continuity of care. As is no doubt already apparent, Da-sein or the self is not a thing for Heidegger. In terms of accounting for its constancy, Heidegger extends Kant's claim that the self is necessarily a world-opening self or, in Heidegger's idiom, an 'I-am-in-the-world' (1996: 320), thereby attributing its constancy to the ontological necessity whereby subject and object unfold as epiphenomena from the structure of temporality. In terms of providing an account of genuineness, these details culminate in the conclusion, already demonstrated in this chapter, that appropriateness as regards what belongs to a category is itself generated by the something-as-something structure of comparison within primordial time. In trying to fathom just how the something-as-something structure functions primordially, the first point to be clear on is that there is no clearly demarcated 'something' which consciousness then likens to something else. Rather, something-as-something is the structure of comparison per se which, as a result of its bifocal outlook, provides the means whereby similarity and difference can arise.

The suggestion that genuineness is founded upon the continuity of care can be clarified by recognizing that, in order for something to occur or emerge as genuine, it has to emerge as some thing *or other*. The emphasis on 'or other' is not the restatement of the claim that objects can always appear otherwise than they do but the assertion that notions of genuineness and belonging unfold from the world-structuring process whereby objects are determined and located in the world, that is to say, a 'caring' or 'concerned' sense of 'this object can be placed here *but not there*' is involved. 'Care' (*Sorge*), as I explain in note 5, is Heidegger's term for the series of possibilities through which we encounter the world, as made available to us by the human body. It is the condition of 'being concerned about' that defines the necessarily transitive relation in which the human subject stands before the world (1996: 192, 324) and, as a kind of being, is articulated or jointed in the sense that it is a 'hankering,' a 'being-in-the-world-already-among' objects (1996: 195). Acknowledging that objects are always cognitively or categorically *placed* in this way highlights the fact that *something's being genuine or proper* does not come about simply through its falling within a conceptual 'region' or 'container' but rather is an event whose occurrence rests upon the condition of the world as a network of possibilities, 'a world that has to be dealt with' (1996: 195), a world that is landscaped, articulated, and pitted with nooks and crannies by the ontological transactions of temporality.

Conclusion

A theory of the senses can be found in Heidegger in virtue of the fact that sensory perception is an aspect of Da-sein. In this chapter, I have pursued the relation between sensibility, primordial time, and *aletheia* to show that the senses, as forms of world-encounter for Heidegger, have a metaphorical as-structure: metaphorical in that the possibility of opening onto the otherness of the world is made to hinge upon an ontological transposition from like to unlike. Theorizing the senses in this way understandably affects what we understand them to be. Instead of regarding them as receptor channels from the world, they are positioned as regions of disclosure rooted within temporality (or primordial time), where this opening is achieved through the possibilities generated by anticipating something as something else. These are terms which we would not ordinarily associate with the senses, especially when orthodox empiricism divides them into discrete channels, obviating any question of belonging or appropriateness: a datum of blue belongs to colour, the click from my fingers belongs to sound, etc. In making the structure of the senses transpositional, Heidegger does not remove or cancel the possibility of sensory order or distinguishability. A transpositional origin does not preclude the senses acquiring their own particularity or individuality. It is just that this particularity will not be a channel in its own right, but a region located within and participating in the ontological structuring of experience.

   This conclusion has several implications. As just described, the ontology of the senses is redefined. The redefinition, I maintain, is consistent with Heidegger's observation in *The Principle of Reason* that 'the metaphorical exists only within metaphysics', quoted at the start of this chapter (1991: 48). The assertion that 'thought is a form of hearing' can only be understood as a metaphor, he thinks, because Cartesian metaphysics divides thought from sensibility. Against this, Heidegger seeks an ontology in which thought and sensibility can enjoy a more-than-metaphorical combination. In this context, it would appear that Heidegger sees metaphorical predication as working within and, therefore, acceding to the conceptual divisions imposed by Cartesian metaphysics. His standpoint in this regard, and responses to it from Ricoeur and Derrida, are discussed in Chapter 8. As I argue there, it is possible to distinguish between mere metaphor and ontological metaphor in Heidegger's writing, where ontological metaphor is understood as embodying structures of transposition which upset established metaphysical divisions. The account of the senses given in this chapter contributes to this revised ontology of being by repositioning the senses as openings determined by the anticipative as-structure that is 'the fundamental constitution of human Da-sein' (Heidegger 2002: 222). As such, their bearing on human thought and being is no longer by *mere metaphor* – receptor channels whose content has to be made relevant to broader questions of human being by association – but instead is now articulated as a part of human thought and being through *ontological metaphor*.

If the significance of this repositioning of the senses is in question, then maybe it can be clarified if we reflect on its contribution to another context: namely, phenomenology's aestheticization of thought. Aesthetics is understood here not in the sense which is removed from questions of knowledge and morality but in the sense, after Kant, which enables and motivates knowledge and morality. As indicated in the previous chapter, one of the aims of phenomenology is to show how the textures of the empirical contain within them the conceptual structures which are responsible for the determination of experience as a whole. This point was made in response to Lakoff and Johnson's call for an aesthetic attitude to the world – an 'ecological spirituality' (1999: 566) – whereby the aloofness or blandness of abstract possibilities are translated through metaphor into the immediate bodily realities of 'pleasure, pain, delight, and remorse' (1999: 567). Repositioning the senses as openings determined by the as-structure that is 'the fundamental constitution of human Da-sein' transforms our understanding of experience (2002: 222): the colours I perceive, the sounds that I hear, are no longer isolated, personal events, but phenomena which reveal or 'speak of' my situation in the world. This might seem an overblown claim to make for the blue of the book cover in front of me and for the cries of the seagulls outside, to give two examples. But to regard these phenomena in this way is to take it for granted that this is *just* the colour of a book and that is *just* the noise made by a bird. The views of the book cover designer and the ornithologist would be quite different: for these individuals, the respective phenomena would be more significant, more divulging of the possibilities they represent for the world of the book owner and the seagull. The suggestion is not that Heidegger's phenomenology leads to a world in which we are required to become experts in the sensory aspects of all areas of life, but his philosophy does ask us to reflect on the nature of our engagement with and commitment to situations, where notions of 'engagement' and 'commitment' are not too far removed from the degree of immersion one associates with expertise.

Finally, Heidegger's repositioning of the senses gives further emphasis to the ontological status of metaphor. As I have already argued in Chapter 2, metaphor is the generator of associations which prevents subjective perception of order from being equated idealistically with an ordered or designed world in Kant's critical system. With regard to Merleau-Ponty in Chapter 3, metaphor is identified as the process of jointed articulation through which the body schema creates and sustains meaningful experience for a subject, with synaesthetic coordination between the senses being an aspect of the process. As well as finding parallels between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, this chapter has also shown that metaphor as as-structure is crucial for Heidegger ontologically, since something-as-something constitutes the possibility of error which allows objects to manifest themselves before a subject. Admittedly, this changes what we recognize metaphor to be – from a creator of similarity to a generator of experience – but such a change should

be welcomed, given that I have set out to explore the figure's philosophical reach. As a result, we might have to modify our concept of similarity. It is not the case that we lose the concept of similarity to ontology. Novel, metaphorical similarities will still be created and will still delight and surprise us; these are empirical expressions of the ontological transpositions through which we organize the world. But, as regards ontological metaphor, similarity becomes the anticipation of one-thing-as-another – the movement between 'it could be this' or 'it could be that' – which is constitutive of receptivity. It is active in allowing the blue of the book on my desk to manifest itself to me, as well as in the capacity of the blue to point towards other things.

5 Conflicting perspectives
Epistemology and ontology in Nietzsche's will to power

Nietzsche is the first Western philosopher to define the human as a metaphorical being. I could rephrase the point by saying that, for Nietzsche, we are *in metaphor* or *we are metaphor*: our being is not derived from a Platonic, eternal essence or from a Cartesian thinking substance but (in as much as there is a way of being we can call ours) is emergent from tensional interactions between competing drives or perspectives. This claim may be a familiar one as far as truth and human perception are concerned, since Nietzsche argues the point explicitly in 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense' (2000), but may be less familiar with regard to defining human being. Taking truth first, we customarily hold it to be a relation of correspondence between knowledge and reality but, Nietzsche declares, *it is in fact* 'a movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms' due to the *fundamentally* metaphorical nature of concept-formation, a series of creative leaps from nerve stimulus to retinal image (first metaphor) to sound as signifier (second metaphor) (2000: 55). Our categories, and the judgments we form with them, can never correspond to things in themselves because they are formed through a series of transformations which ensures that 'there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression' connecting the first stage (the stimulus) with the last (the concept) (2000: 58).

Beyond perception, the metaphoricity of the human can be found within Nietzsche's will-to-power ontology. In contrast to the orthodox ontological scheme of subjects confronting a world, Nietzsche presents being in general (of nature and the human subject – no distinction is made at this point) as a set of competing perspectives or wills to power, out of which emerges human experience of an external world: 'When one speaks of *humanity*, the idea is fundamental that this is something that *separates* and distinguishes man from nature. In reality, however, there is no such separation: "natural" qualities and those called properly "human" are indivisibly grown together' (from 'Homer's Contest' in Nietzsche 1968b: 369). The metaphorical dimension of this lies in the necessarily transpositional nature of the contest between perspectives. No one will to power exerts itself in isolation; rather, power in Nietzsche's ontology is always asserted against a rival or an opposite,

where the 'assertion against' is realized not as annihilation of the other viewpoint but as the capacity to see from it: '[The philosopher] tries to let all the notes [*Töne*] of the world resound [*nachklingen*] in himself, and to set forth out of himself this total sound [*Gesammtklang*], in concepts' (Nietzsche 1979: 22).

Stretching metaphor beyond being a literary or poetic device to being a mode of perception is a well-supported move in recent philosophy and psychology, for example, the neural transformations involved in perceiving colour form part of Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor as an embodied neurological structure (1999: 24). However, broadening metaphor so that it becomes the essential nature of the human being might seem a less familiar or a not-so-well-supported claim. It is in fact made by Kofman (1993) as part of her deconstructionist study of Nietzsche, although it could be objected that ascribing the claim to her runs counter to her explicit intentions. Nietzsche moves from talk of metaphor to talk of the will to power, Kofman argues, precisely to avoid metaphor becoming an all-consuming, metaphysical principle. But my mention of essential nature is not intended to suggest that there is a fundamental stratum of being (metaphor) which can be known independently of the cognitive and linguistic capacities (metaphor) which make such knowledge possible. Instead, my enquiry in this chapter is precisely into the epistemological and ontological complexities that arise when one is thinking with and through a medium which is also recognized to be a part of the world.

This state of affairs, as well as being a feature of Nietzsche's will to power, is also a problem for it in as much as it generates a paradox. All things are wills to power or perspectives, he affirms, including the perspective which grants me the knowledge that this is what the world is like. The paradox here is that Nietzsche's assertion of perspectivism appears to cancel or deflate itself as just another perspective. However, drawing on a recent account of the will to power from Richardson (1996), I argue that Nietzsche avoids the paradox due to his ontology having a 'metaphorical' structure. Consistent with but not recognized by Kofman, Nietzsche's ontology represents what is the case through the interplay between conflicting perspectives, in contrast to orthodox models which define identity either by assigning a property to an object or by assigning an object to a category. In setting out this debate, metaphor drops away as a noun or a subject *in its own right,* but this is not a departure from the theme of this book. Rather, the notion of something belonging to or being intrinsic to a category, which metaphor questions, becomes prominent, since Nietzsche's ontology requires us to conceptualize identity as a relation between one term and another, where *what does not belong* – as that which can transform, enliven or challenge the subject of our attention – is positioned by Nietzsche as a motivating force. With regard to the question of what arises when one is thinking with and through a medium which is also recognized to be a part of the world, we find that the motif of belonging or not belonging assumes

new importance as the mechanism which articulates the encounter between mind and world.

The will to power as an ontology

Kofman finds Nietzsche substituting the will to power for metaphor as a result of his deconstruction of the 'proper' in Western philosophy. On Kofman's reading, Nietzsche becomes a proto-deconstructionist, taking metaphors which, at first glance, appear to serve philosophy as concepts of propriety and structure, for example, beehive, tower, pyramid, and turning them around to reveal values that are antithetical to the original ambition, for example, equating the structure of scientific knowledge with the instinct-driven productivity of bees (1993: 59–80). As Nietzsche argues in 'On Truth and Lie', there is no 'proper' language in the sense of concepts corresponding directly to objects in the world; instead, there are only metaphorical leaps between realms, for example, from stimulus to retinal image to aural signifier. This challenge to the 'proper', Kofman suggests, has the effect of positioning metaphor as the 'improper', the combination of one concept with another which is wholly inappropriate to it. But this, it would seem, limits the power of metaphor: 'as Nietzsche has taught us', she avers, 'two opposites belong to the same system, and if one cannot deconstruct the one without generalizing the other, the deconstruction remains trapped within the territory it seeks to go beyond' (1993: 16). In other words, metaphor's power is limited because it becomes *philosophy's concept of metaphor*. If one were to continue with the concept of metaphor defined as the 'improper', then one would not only trap it within the proper–improper opposition, but would also assign the concept 'metaphysical implications' (1993: 17). 'To continue using this notion [of metaphor as "improper"] as a key concept', she writes, 'might have been dangerous because of its metaphysical implications, and it is understandable that Nietzsche should have abandoned it after making strategic use of it' (1993: 17). Metaphor is made metaphysical because it is generalized and made proper as the proper–improper distinction; that is to say, in response to the question 'What is proper to metaphor?', the philosopher can answer: 'The proper–improper distinction'. In substituting will to power for metaphor, Kofman argues, Nietzsche sacrifices the signifier 'metaphor' in order to prevent metaphor's capacity for transposition and re-evaluation from being reduced by philosophy to a single opposition.

To appreciate fully the insight of Kofman's reading, one needs to recognize that this substitution 'away from' metaphor is itself a metaphorical transposition, and one that exhibits the competing wills to power in and around metaphor. The substitution takes place, she writes, because 'metaphorical activity coincides with that of the will to power' (1993: 82):

> The hypothesis of the will to power, an evaluative artistic force which posits forms but seeks also to master by means of them, accounts for

the generalization of metaphor, or of text, as well as for the illusion which passes them off as 'proper': every desire tends to impose its evaluations as absolute, tends to master, is 'philosophical'.

(1993: 82)

The generalization of metaphor is 'accounted for' by the limited form of the trope – the proper–improper opposition – posited by philosophy's will to power. Renaming metaphor, as 'perspective' or as 'will to power', is an act of defiance carried out by metaphor's will to power against its own reduction by philosophy; it moves the concept on through language, sustaining its capacity for transposition not as a unique signifier but as a process of interpretation which regards meaning as a contest between opposing wills. On this understanding, metaphor becomes a text:

> If Nietzsche substitutes 'perspective' for 'metaphor', then it is because the meaning which is posited and transposed in things is no longer referred to an essence of the world, a proper. The 'world', the 'essence' are themselves texts written by a specific type of will. The idea of an originary music of the world – a sort of original text making human texts into mere metaphors – disappears: every text becomes the correlate of an interpretation which constitutes a specific, provisional meaning symptomatic of a certain type of life's mastery over the world and over other types of life.

(1993: 82)

Metaphor is moved away from the notion of the proper (and its opposite), and away from being a single concept, to a notion of textuality which, rather than being conceived in purely or narrowly linguistic terms, equates to the form- and meaning-generating action of a will to power. Kofman's characterization of this interpretive process as 'mastery *over* the world and *over* other types of life' is questionable, however. While the concepts of 'overcoming' and *das Übermensch* are central to Nietzsche's later thought, the notion of 'mastery over' is problematic in an ontology which configures the world as competing wills. What happens to the wills that are mastered? Is there any form of resistance or intermingling between victor and vanquished, or is the weaker will silenced forever? I return to this discussion when I focus on the cogency of competing wills as epistemology below.

One question left unanswered by Kofman is why she should think Nietzsche's continued use of the term 'metaphor' gives it metaphysical status. To continue using metaphor as a 'key concept' – the concept of the proper–improper opposition – Kofman declares, 'might have been dangerous because of its metaphysical implications, and it is understandable that Nietzsche should have abandoned it after making strategic use of it' (1993: 17). Perhaps she has in mind the process whereby freshly minted metaphors gradually have their particular impact worn away through usage, making

them general concepts, but in this instance we are already discussing metaphor as concept and not as a new, token metaphor. The value of Kofman's emphasis on Nietzsche's substitution of terms – from metaphor to perspective to will to power – is that she can present the substitution itself as an effect of metaphor as will to power, thereby showing how Nietzsche's writing is implicated within the ontology he writes about or writes with. However, she fails to consider that substitution, as a device for resisting the pull of metaphysics, only delays the process, and merely has the effect of putting a new term in line for becoming a metaphysical principle.

That this does in fact happen is evidenced by Kofman's own exchange with Jean Granier over the status of interpretation in Nietzsche, with Kofman arguing for 'interpretation all the way down' in contrast to Granier's commitment to a metaphysical text in itself, of which an objective, authoritative reading is possible. To some extent, with Kofman, one can recognize how the persistence of a signifier might result in its signified concept accruing greater association and importance. However, I think Kofman's argument fails to take into consideration that the signifier 'metaphor' (which she regards as philosophy's concept of metaphor) denotes a concept which, through its opposition to conventional notions of what belongs to a category, resists the process of accrual, and therefore actively undermines any tendency for it to become a governing principle. Furthermore, such a possibility is even entertained by the power-based interpretive scheme which Kofman finds in Nietzsche: philosophy, in forming a concept of metaphor, would not automatically dominate the concept but would have to compete with other perspectives on the figure, for example from literature or from metaphor itself. Such an approach precludes the need for a substitution of signifiers because the possible elevation of metaphor to a metaphysical principle (which substitution was intended to avoid) is here counteracted by the different directions in which metaphor is conceptualized, for example in terms of perspective, transposition, carriage, interaction, and not just propriety.

If the will to power were to be regarded as an ontology, it would be described as follows: a theory of the universe as made up of competing perspectives and drives, each working against other, opposing forces in an attempt to achieve its end, with consciousness and human being presented as phenomena arising out of the conflict between drives. For some commentators, presenting the will to power as an ontology is a mistake: it contradicts the assertion running throughout Nietzsche's philosophy that we should view the world not from one perspective – which is arguably what the imputation of an ontology amounts to – but from a variety of perspectives. For example, in Nehamas's view, the will to power cannot be construed as 'a general metaphysical or cosmological theory' because of Nietzsche's hostility to the concept of the thing in itself; any general metaphysical or cosmological theory, Nehamas argues, is simply going to introduce a new set of things in themselves (1985: 80). It is because a thing 'cannot be distinguished … from its various interrelations' that the will to power

stands as 'a reason why no general theory of the character of the world and the things that constitute it can ever be given' (1985: 80).

On Kofman's view, the will to power is 'the text of nature' but this does not mean that 'Nietzsche claims to have arrived at the essence of being … for Nietzsche relates this "text of nature" to the art of interpretation which enabled it to be read, an art of interpretation motivated by a specific intention' (1993: 142). The 'specific intention' here is not a reference to a particular intention which Kofman has singled out as paramount for Nietzsche, but is rather the reinforcing of the point that the text of nature, as will to power, is always already subject to interpretation from a perspective. Kofman articulates her text as 'interpretation all the way down' position in contrast to Granier's 'ontological' reading. Granier has the 'text of nature' imply the existence of a text in itself, 'the final referent for any reading and any commentary' (in Kofman's words), and, by analogy, an ontological order, to which interpretation must do justice (1993: 138). But on this view, Kofman argues, one is tempted to think of the text as 'an object in itself, independent of the originary interpretation which constituted it, and one arrives at an ontological position by cutting the text off from its interpretations' (1993: 138). Thus, as Kofman sees it, reading the will to power ontologically amounts to asserting that an aperspectival determinacy is available to interpretation.

Whether one finds an ontology in Nietzsche or considers ontology to be antithetical to his philosophy largely depends upon how one understands the term and, more importantly, its relation to what can be known. Both Nehamas and Kofman are right to disassociate ontology from Nietzsche on their understanding of the term as referring to a fundamental realm of entities which, in principle, can ultimately be known; in Nehamas's case, it is a realm of things in themselves standing behind appearances, and for Kofman, it is the notion of a final, interpretation-independent text. In this respect, they are acknowledging the crucial difference between the concepts of will in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: with the former, the will is a principle underlying appearances *which can be known* (Schopenhauer 1967: 184) whereas, with the latter, it underlies appearances but *not as an eventual object of knowledge*. However, as Richardson points out, in criticizing Western metaphysics, Nietzsche nevertheless produces alternative ways of thinking about knowledge and the world and, therefore, can be seen to be contributing to debates within the traditions of metaphysics and ontology (1996: 3–5). In this context, talk of ontology is not necessarily tied to questions of the *knowability* of ultimate forms or noumena. When a philosopher is proposing a model of being, including the being of knowing subjects, 'ontology' can still be used to refer to that model of being, its elements and their interactions. The key difference is that these are not elements which Nietzsche claims we can ever know in the sense that they are grasped as objects in themselves independent of any perspectival contribution, because we, as knowing subjects, are constituted by them and always know from the

perspectives which they give to us. I think Kofman works towards this view in the final footnote of *Nietzsche and Metaphor* (1993: 189–90, note 15). She quotes Nietzsche: 'I take appearance to be the reality which resists being transformed into an imaginary "true world". A specific name for this reality would be "the will to power" – in other words a designation from within, not based on its elusive, fluid, protean nature' (1993: 189; Nietzsche 1901–13: XIII, 121). On this basis, Kofman argues, the will to power is 'a *name* which designates the foundation of things yet without providing us with reality', where the absence of provision, I suggest, means the name 'will to power' is not intended to have a knowable, ontological ground, the substratum of nature, as its referent.

The paradoxes of perspectivism

There is one problem with this, however. While it is possible to talk about an ontology that is not offered as an ultimate ground of appearances, the distinction between ontology and knowability is not as straightforward as I have suggested. There remains the question of the status of the claims made by Nietzsche and his commentators regarding the will to power. As Kaufmann has noted, Nietzsche creates for himself with the will to power a predicament akin to that faced by Epimenides the Cretan (1950: 176). If the statement 'All Cretans are liars' uttered by Epimenides is true, then his utterance contradicts the statement, rendering it false. With regard to Nietzsche, Kaufmann writes, he 'asserts that any attempt to understand the universe is prompted by man's will to power. If so, it would seem that his own conception of the will to power must be admitted by him to be a creation of his will to power' (1950: 176). If all statements about the world are made from the perspective of a will to power, then this state of affairs (being made from a wilful perspective) must logically apply to the statement *which asserts that all statements about the world are made from the perspective of a will to power*. Which is to say that the statement (regarding all statements about the world) cannot get beyond its own perspectival nature to reach how things are between perspectives and the universe. Just as the truth of Epimenides's utterance contradicts the content of what is asserted, so the (seemingly extraperspectival) truth or objectivity of Nietzsche's epistemological assertion appears to contradict itself through having to acknowledge its own wilful origin.

A different but related version of the paradox is given by Danto. Instead of perspectives seeming to offer extraperspectival knowledge, Danto concentrates upon nihilism cancelling itself out. Nihilism is the ontological correlate of perspectivism in that its denial of metaphysical or mind-independent order equates to the claim that the world can only be known as it appears to someone from a point of view. But this gives rise to the following problem:

> Nietzsche's is a philosophy of nihilism, insisting that there is no order and a fortiori no moral order in the world. Yet he sometimes wants to

be saying what the world is like. The world is made up of points of origin for perspectives, ... occupied by active powers, wills, each seeking to organize the world from its perspective, each locked in combat with the rest ... In the end then, [Nietzsche] too has his metaphysics and his theory as to what its structure and composition ultimately must be. If nihilism depends in any logical way upon this view, then nihilism is false or, if it is true, it entails the falsity of its own presuppositions and cannot be seriously asserted.

(1965: 80)

Thus, a statement about the way the world is has as its content the claim 'there is no way the world is', which is to say that the statement is the assertion of its own falsity. Danto's ontological formulation of the paradox – a denial of the determinacy of reality which is nonetheless determinate – is the obverse of Kaufmann's epistemological formulation – an epistemology undermining itself through relying on an antithetical concept – precisely because Nietzsche's ontology impacts upon his theory of knowledge and, by implication, the knowledge claims he makes about his ontology. Underlying both forms of the paradox is the fact that Nietzsche's ontology of wills describes both the way human beings know and the way the world is – competing wills underlying subject and world – but the sense of 'this is how things are' – both epistemologically as a way of grounding perspectivism (Kaufmann's question), and ontologically in a judgment about the nature of reality (Danto's question) – is a notion which both commentators think Nietzsche cannot draw upon without contradicting himself.

As well as being a problem for Nietzschean scholarship in its own right, the paradox also takes us back to Nehamas's and Kofman's dismissals of ontology in Nietzsche. For, in denying that Nietzsche's philosophy refers to a world in itself, Nehamas and Kofman seek to jettison the sense of 'this is how things are in the world' which is responsible for the paradox. Finding a resolution to it will be useful not only in its own terms but also because it will demonstrate how Nietzsche's statements regarding the nature of the world can be rendered consistent with his perspectivism and, therefore, will help me to extract a metaphorical, perspectival ontology from him.

Several responses have been given to Nietzsche's paradox (Anderson 1998, Clark 1990, Freeman 1988, Mittelman 1984, Newman 1983, Richardson 1996). Mittelman argues that the statement 'there is no order in the world' is consistent with a claim to the effect that 'this is what the world is like' if it is accepted that the former amounts to a denial of 'the existence of a true world, i.e. a world of being', a world of stable, continuous particulars (1984: 5). Thus, 'there is no order in the world' is not intended *epistemologically* 'to reject as false *every* statement we can make about the world' but *ontologically* to assert that the world is in flux – the continual process of becoming generated by transitions between wills to power – and, as a result, 'there are no enduring particular things for us to make true statements

about' (1984: 6). Because Nietzsche's denial of truth is aimed at our conception of the world and not the status of our knowledge claims about the world, Mittelman reasons, this leaves room for Nietzsche to make statements which are true and which do not have to be thought of as being made from a perspective. Ontologically, the universe is made up of competing perspectives but the epistemological space still remains for us to describe this without our judgment being accused of being one perspective among many.

Mittelman's approach is a version of what Richardson terms the 'two-level response': Nietzsche's perspectivist epistemology is created by his ontology but does not refer back to it to call its own status into question (1996: 10–11). Initially, it would appear that the distinction between epistemology and ontology succeeds in meeting Danto's formulation of Nietzsche's paradox. The first part of Danto's objection is that 'if nihilism [as the denial or order] depends in any logical way upon [the view of the will to power], then nihilism is false' (1965: 80). But on Mittelman's terms, Nietzsche can deny order ontologically, that is, the existence of things in themselves, while still presenting a thesis about how we know the world through wills to power. Similarly, in response to the second half of Danto's objection (that nihilism is false), nihilism does not entail the falsity of its own presuppositions because the denial of the existence of things in themselves does not entail the denial of principles of order per se which can be used to form epistemological judgments, or even alternative ontological judgments for that matter. As Richardson observes, Danto himself appears to favour this response when he writes that '*apart from the bare* [epistemological] *assertion* of power striving, there appears to be little one can say about the world [ontologically] which is not interpretation' (1996: 11, n. 21; 1965: 222, my emphasis).

However, while this response to Danto could be upheld in general terms, that is, with notions of epistemology and ontology as they are generally understood, it cannot be sustained in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy. The perspectival will to power is a combined epistemological-ontological thesis. It is wholly out of keeping with Nietzsche's philosophy to think that epistemology can be separated out from ontology, since our capacity to know is a product of will to power. When Mittelman affirms that the claim 'there is no truth' does not '*rule out as false or perspectival* the claim that the world is in a state of becoming' (thereby letting it seem that the 'state of becoming' claim is perspective-free), he is relying upon conventions of entailment (determining what can be ruled out as ontology and what can be ruled in as epistemology) whose principles of inclusion and exclusion are among the foremost targets of Nietzsche's critique of Western philosophy (1984: 9–10; my emphasis). I am thinking here of his repudiation of concept-formation as the stripping away of the inessential, a process, he asserts, which is customarily oblivious to the interest governing what is judged to be essential. Nietzsche's truth paradox is caused by the intertwining of epistemology

and ontology – a claim to knowledge is made about an ontology which comments directly on the status of our claims to knowledge – but Mittelman's account does not heed this sufficiently. Ironically, this problem in Mittelman is identical to the problem he himself finds in Magnus's treatment of the paradox. 'Nietzsche's claim that there are only interpretations is not itself an interpretation of the world', Magnus argues (in Mittelman's words), 'but is rather a *meta*-theoretical claim' (1984: 17, original emphasis). What is overlooked here, Mittelman replies, is that Nietzsche's perspectivism, far from being a meta-theory, is in fact a 'first-order' theory making claims about the world, including those 'things' or perspectives involved in making claims about the world. But it turns out that Magnus and Mittelman are equally misguided, for the distance from things (or perspectives) which the former seeks in meta-theorizing and the latter seeks in epistemology is not forthcoming.

Extraperspectival perspectives: Clark, Anderson and Richardson

The more successful responses to the paradox, to my mind, face head-on the complexities of 'a claim to knowledge regarding an ontology which includes our capacity for knowledge' and set out to show how Nietzsche can be consistent on his own terms. Because our question, otherwise put, is 'what does it mean to offer a perspective on perspectivism?', these responses focus on the 'mechanics', so to speak, of Nietzsche's perspectivism and, ultimately, on how it is possible to understand a perspective on perspectivism in such a way that it is not taken as being wholly self-referential or self-undermining. Common to these approaches is the idea that a viewpoint never simply looks at the world from its own perspective but also engages with other perspectives and, as a result, *is in a position to assess the relative merits of all the perspectives involved*. This point is crucial because the epistemological space in which the assessment of merit occurs will be the same space in which a perspective can be recognized as consistently asserting an extraperspectival claim. I shall consider three accounts: from Anderson (1998), Clark (1990), and Richardson (1996). The three authors agree on the following: transcendence over and above any one viewpoint is achieved not through a mere summative adding of a number of viewpoints (which merely compiles perspectives indiscriminately, without selection), but through a process of evaluation which defines stages towards truer or better perspectives, and which opens the epistemological distance necessary for Nietzsche to assert consistently, as a perspectivalist, that the world is made up of perspectives. However, disagreement occurs over what the process of evaluation within the space of the overlap consists in.

For Clark and Anderson, evaluation is a cumulative process, with perspectives overlapping to generate comparisons that work towards greater insight. On Clark's view, perspectives can talk to one another and can recognize when one is better than another because 'cognitive interests or

standards of rational acceptability' work across or between perspectives: 'we think of one perspective as superior to another if it gives the occupants of both perspectives more of what they want from a theory – would better satisfy their standards of rational acceptability – than does the other perspective' (1990: 141). To say that truth is decided by rational acceptability means that truth is 'what would be rationally acceptable under "epistemological ideal conditions" for beings like ourselves (ones with our current capacities for observation, conceptualization, calculation and reasoning)' (1990: 43). Comparison between perspectives on the grounds of rational acceptability implies that there are standards of acceptability which exist across perspectives or endure throughout perspectives over time but, as Clark rightly observes, this does not commit her to the notion of standards of rational acceptability (and their concomitant perspective) which can legislate across *all perspectives*. All that is entailed, she argues, is that, for any two conflicting perspectives, there may be standards of rational acceptability that are 'local' (my word) to the perspectives in conflict in that they are 'neutral in regard to what is at issue between the two' (1990: 141). It may also be the case that different perspectives have different standards of rational acceptability, for example Nietzsche's genealogical and the Christian-moral perspectives on history, but even this does not preclude the possibility that a 'neutral corner' made up of criteria that do not beg any relevant questions can be found. Thus, for Clark, evaluation across perspectives is made possible by locally applicable, perspective-transcendent standards of rational acceptability, and the process is cumulative in the sense that the shared concept of rational acceptability enables the superiority of perspectives through the satisfaction of standards to be assessed.

Anderson offers a comparable and slightly more detailed account. Objectivity is achieved, he argues, 'by playing perspectives off against one another, using each to produce arguments and insights which expose the limitations and presuppositions of the others' (1998: 20). This is organized in terms of an epistemological tension, originally advanced by Leibniz, between unity and variety in viewpoints, evidence of which Anderson finds in the following passage from *On the Genealogy of Morals*: 'the *more* affects we allow to speak about *one thing* [my emphasis, made to bring out Anderson's point], the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of the thing, our "objectivity", be' (1998: 18; Nietzsche 1967: III, 12). In practice, Anderson writes, an individual, 'unified' viewpoint, say, knowledge about the psychology of depression (to borrow his example), can advance through the 'back and forth' co-operation between the incompatible perspectives of talk therapy and drug therapy, with progress in one course of therapy being made at stages where progress is not made in the other, and vice versa.

Unity is important for Anderson's interpretation because it provides the identity of focus between viewpoints necessary for their orientation and interrelation. However, just as Clark rejects the implication of an all-embracing

perspective, so Anderson dismisses the idea that the accumulation of insight through unity commits Nietzsche to a Hegelian, teleological account of truth. Whereas a Hegelian 'might insist that these various perspectives are all ultimately compatible, that in the end they will all be reconciled in a single broadest perspective', as far as Nietzsche is concerned, it is always possible that 'other perspectives might throw what we have already accomplished into a new and more problematic light' (1998: 20–21); 'we cannot reject the possibility', Nietzsche writes (quoted by Anderson), 'that [the world] may include infinite interpretations' (1998: 21; Nietzsche 1974: 374). Unfortunately, Anderson's point on its own is not sufficient to dismiss the similarity with Hegel, since the event of our perspective being thrown off-course and cast in a new light could be nothing more than our tributary of enquiry joining a wider stream towards absolute truth. However, Nietzsche's reference to an infinity of interpretations might forestall this criticism, if one is prepared to accept that a teleological path cannot have an infinite number of steps. But this is not my main concern. All I want to establish is that Anderson provides another model for the possibility of evaluation between perspectives: each perspective is played off against another as part of a tension between unity and variety, with the unity of focus providing the identity necessary to accumulate the advances achieved through the 'back and forth' between incompatible perspectives.

Richardson's analysis differs from Clark's and Anderson's in the way it presents one perspective's accommodation of incompatible views. Instead of the cumulative approach adopted by Clark and Anderson, Richardson explicates the evaluation of perspectives in terms of Nietzsche's metaphor of 'health'. 'Health' is understood epistemologically by Nietzsche not as a pure state, one which has eradicated all oppositional or detrimental viewpoints, but as a 'higher' state, in that it embraces tension between viewpoints: 'today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a "*higher nature*", a more spiritual nature, than being divided in this sense and still really a battle ground for these opposites' (quoted by Richardson 1996: 277, n. 143; Nietzsche 1967: I, 16). The healthy perspective will 'know better' not just by referring to or including other viewpoints but, more significantly, by embracing the contradiction between them. Whereas contradiction between judgments is conventionally taken as a sign that one is true and the other is false, Nietzsche in contrast, Richardson avers, 'wants to preserve the opposing positions and to build his own viewpoint with, or out of, their contradictions' (1996: 279). It is the perspectivism in Nietzsche's epistemology which makes this coherent, (again) not as a mere addition of opposing views (which would result in their mutual cancellation), but as a framework that provides the space for two or more opposing views to be held. 'This embrace of contradiction', Richardson declares,

> doesn't take a form that paralyzes thought: A and not-A can both be
> true when we allocate the claims to different wilful views ... [M]y A

and your not-A collide less intolerably to the extent that we see how these opposites are mine and yours.

(1996: 279)

However, the embrace of contradiction is not intended to flatten this perspectivism into a form of 'anything goes' relativism. Richardson adds:

Either my A or your not-A can have *more* of truth: the point is to see better which part of truth each has, by advancing their conflict by [embracing contradiction] ... [In this way] viewpoints settle into a rank order that reflects how well they know. The knower accomplishes in himself the real epistemic levels of these viewpoints: their power in him reflects how well they see.

(1996: 279)

The references to one view having 'more truth' in contrast to another, our seeing parts of truth 'better', and the accomplishment of 'the real epistemic levels' of viewpoints need explanation. They imply the existence of a measure of truth that is external to the framework of competing wills, and suggest, contrary to my introduction to Richardson, that he subscribes to a cumulative concept of truth alongside Clark and Anderson. But Richardson doesn't take this route. In the final analysis, he argues, the ranking of perspectives is not a matter of placing x above y because the former is true and the latter is false, as judged by correspondence with an extraperspectival court of appeal. Rather, the understanding generated by the opposing views 'finds truth not in either alone but precisely in the continuing, unequal dialogue between them, in which each progressively qualifies the other', and it ranks itself 'above both of them, because they see just parts of its whole' (1996: 279–80). According to Richardson then, we can have a view with 'more truth' or which 'knows better' where truth is a function of *the interplay between views that allows inequality between them to arise*, the measure that makes the difference being *the degree to which one view qualifies another* within the interplay of views.

What does Richardson mean by one viewpoint qualifying another? His brief response to Clark's assessment of the same problem offers a clue. Clark suggests that Nietzsche's perspectivism allows one viewpoint to be 'cognitively superior' to another on the grounds that it 'satisfies more fully ... the cognitive interests of the perspective constituted by all of the relevant beliefs that the two perspectives agree on' (Clark 1990: 141). But superiority or health, Richardson replies, is not a function of the number of 'relevant beliefs' that are agreed upon. Leaving aside the question (for Clark) of how the relevance of a belief may be determined in any given context (which Richardson could answer in terms of strength of opposing wills), it is not agreement that qualification of one viewpoint by another consists in, Richardson affirms, but the preservation of ambiguity between

wills (Richardson 1996: 279). Ambiguity here signifies not a cancelling or disabling form of confusion but a state of putting oneself in the place of another which allows the difference between viewpoints to be fully felt or understood. ('Felt' can be equated with 'understood' here because, from the point of view of Nietzsche's power epistemology, understanding – together with any moment of experience – is theorized as one will or viewpoint acting upon another.) Thus, when Clark asks (on the assumption that superior cognition comes through agreement between viewpoints) why a cognitively superior perspective should 'need supplementation by the interpretation of things from an inferior perspective' (1990: 148), Richardson replies:

> Nietzsche's knower comprehends each attitude [in his society] by inhabiting or experiencing it himself, 'from inside', and by directing competing attitudes on it, thereby viewing it 'from outside', from (the point of view of) its most relevant or neighbouring opponents. By holding in synthetic [dialectical] view both stances (of it as 'subject', of it as 'object'), he knows it better than it knows itself and better than it can be known by any external view, including (to the extent even possible) the purely objective 'view from nowhere'.
>
> (1996: 280)

Thus the dialectic in Nietzsche's perspectivism is intrinsic to what it means to be a perspective and, in Richardson's view, is what enables Nietzsche's account to transcend the limits of a perspective. A Nietzschean, wilful perspective, Richardson argues, amounts not merely to viewing reality from one particular angle but to having a view which is necessarily taken beyond itself or (one might even go so far as to say) is constituted by its tensile, simultaneous accommodation of other, opposing views. The notion of a tensile relation between opposing viewpoints may seem redolent of Anderson's unity-in-variety model, but there is a key difference. The tension in Anderson operates in the service of 'playing perspectives off against one another, using each to produce arguments and insights which expose the limitations and presuppositions of the others', so that the limitations can be supplemented or fulfilled in the interests of a broader, more objective view (1998: 18, 20). In contrast, tension between viewpoints is maintained in Richardson's model not as a step towards broadening a perspective but as a means of retaining the counterpressure which, as he sees it, is intrinsic to the forcefulness of a perspective in its willing against other views.

But what if one perspective has 'won' against another: is Richardson asserting that the 'defeated' view nevertheless remains in play as a force to remind the victor of its own forcefulness? Yes, I think he is. We need to be careful over how we take the notion of 'winning' here because, applied to the concept of truth, it is all too easy to reason that the victorious perspective is the true one, and those that have been defeated or left behind are partial and have less truth content. The question takes us back to Clark's enquiring

into why a superior perspective should need supplementation by an inferior one. The same response can be given here. The question only arises for Clark and (implicitly) Anderson because they retain the conventional ontological picture of knowledge as a series of judgments, albeit perspectival judgments, which, through their epistemic success, can be singled out and detached from the overall flux of the world as perspectives which *correspond to the world*. In contrast, Richardson is working with a new ontology based on Nietzsche's will to power in which all perspectives *already belong to the world*. The vocabulary of 'winning' or 'successful' perspectives does not apply because truth, on this model, is a function of the contradiction or tension between perspectives which are held in play as mutually constitutive forces. The idea that truth consists of a certain set of perspectives grouped together as successful, away from false, limited or less successful ones, is dismissed since perspectival wills are part of the world; they exist as wills-with-a-view-on-the-world and so cannot be divided into components of 'world' and 'judgment of world', with those possessing unsuccessful judgment components rejected as false.

Resolving the paradoxes

The comparison between Clark, Anderson, and Richardson was made in order to ascertain whether Nietzsche's epistemology can avoid or overcome the paradox of being a perspectival assertion of perspectivism. All three commentators give grounds for thinking that this is possible. This is on account of a perspective being something which is not simply confined to judgments made within its own scope but, rather, something which can engage with judgments made from another perspective, thereby suggesting that the perspectival can open onto the extraperspectival. On Kaufmann's reading, Nietzsche's claim that 'any attempt to understand the universe is prompted by man's will to power' undermines itself through merely being a 'creation of his will to power', merely being a theory of perspectives given by a perspective (1950: 176). Based on the analogy to the Cretan liar paradox, Kaufmann takes Nietzsche's assertion of his epistemology to be *self-cancelling*: just as the truth of 'All Cretans are liars', *when applied to its utterance by Epimenides*, renders it false, so any truth which the will to power thesis might possess is rendered false because it is judged by Kaufmann *to be the product of Nietzsche's own, subjective will to power* as manifest in the assertion of the thesis.

What my study of Clark, Anderson, and Richardson shows is that Nietzsche's predicament is not the same as Epimenides's. The strict bivalence of truth and falsity which operates in the liar paradox does not apply to the will to power thesis because Nietzsche is concerned with perspectives, whereas the liar paradox deals with statements. Kaufmann makes it appear that Nietzsche's situation is bivalent because he (Kaufmann) creates an opposition between the perspectival origin of the thesis (it is a creation of

Nietzsche's will to power), on the one hand, and the seemingly extra-perspectival truth or objectivity that (he thinks) Nietzsche needs in order to assert that knowledge is necessarily perspectival, on the other; these terms correspond respectively to the utterance of 'All Cretans are liars' by Epimenides, and to the truth relation between the statement and the world. Kaufmann is right to suppose that Nietzsche relies on extra-wilful warrant, but he assumes that Nietzsche can only obtain it by stepping outside his epistemology of perspectives to confirm a statement-world mapping for his theory, thereby contradicting himself. However, what Kaufmann doesn't acknowledge is that sufficient extra-wilful warrant (although not of the statement-world mapping kind) is consistently available to Nietzsche on account of the extra-wilfulness that is internal to his ontology of wills, as demonstrated by Clark, Anderson, and Richardson. Will to power as perspective is not something which can be packaged as an idiosyncratic utterance and subsequently directed (as an individual utterance) against the content of what was uttered, as is the case with Epimenides's assertion. Wilful perspectives, including Nietzsche's, are distinct from assertions (ordinarily conceived) in that they are already of the world, whereas assertions (ordinarily conceived) are taken to stand alongside or above the world in a bivalent relation. Thus, to be the creation of a will to power is not to amount merely to being a subjectivizing idiosyncrasy, but is already to be interacting with other wills and to have acquired an objectivity that is consistent with the epistemology of wills under consideration.

The version of the paradox which Danto finds in Nietzsche is not so easily resolved. Clark and Anderson successfully demonstrate the possibility of extraperspectivism in Nietzsche but do so with reference to the notion of cumulative truth: for Clark, locally neutral standards of rational acceptability enable the recognition of cognitively superior perspectives and, for Anderson, there is a guiding thread of unity which allows contributions to be amassed from incommensurable perspectives. But Danto's paradox is that an assertion of 'how the world is' is being made, when the content of the assertion is that there is no order or there is no one way in which the world is. The positions of Clark and Anderson are not equipped to respond to Danto's 'absence of order' because their accumulation and coordination of truth presuppose an order in the world sufficient for such accumulation and coordination to take place, and this is precisely what nihilism denies; a reading which assumes an order in the world cannot intervene in a paradox generated by the assertion and denial of order. However, Richardson's analysis is able to respond to Danto's paradox because it does not rely on the abidance of a particular world-view or perspective. For Danto, the paradox is caused by nihilism, as the denial of order, asserting a world order of wills to power. This would appear to be exactly what Richardson does with his own theory of Nietzsche's power ontology (implying that his account is as unsuccessful as Clark's and Anderson's in meeting Danto) except for the fact that, on his view, no one perspective exists as a will that can be separated

from the others *and identified as the predominant world-view* which, for Danto, is the element that contradicts the absence of order. In other words, on Richardson's interpretation, nihilism as the denial of order can be consistent with the will to power thesis *if it is accepted* that, on the will to power thesis, the 'health' of a perspective occurs not through its being the singularly dominant view of the world but through its maintaining the contradictions created by its accommodation of other perspectives. As such, it does not possess the singular order which can be construed as the abidance of a particular world-view or perspective.

While it might be agreed that Nietzsche's ontology consists of wills which cannot be separated from one another, on account of their inherently oppositional nature, it could be argued that I am missing the point. Danto, the objection might run, is finding paradox not just in the constituents of Nietzsche's ontology but also in *his saying of the ontology*, in the linguistic structure he has to assume *in order to assert* that the world has no ontological structure. There is some evidence for this. Although Danto criticizes Nietzsche for having 'his theory as to what its structure and composition ultimately must be', while at the same time denying the existence of order, he also draws attention to the fact that Nietzsche 'sometimes wants to be saying what the world is like' (1965: 80). This creates a problem for the position I have adopted from Richardson. Despite replacing the paradoxical notion of a predominant world-view with a multiplicity of competing world orders, Richardson cannot avoid the singular linguistic order necessary – but logically unavailable – for making the declarative statement that the world is made up of competing orders.

But what is overlooked here is the fact that different conceptions of the epistemology–ontology relation are at work. I have already indicated that epistemology and ontology cannot be separated in Nietzsche's writing because his ontological thesis bears upon the entities in terms of which we theorize knowledge. In such a setting, I think it needs to be recognized that Danto's formulation of the paradox also includes within itself an understanding of the relation between epistemology and ontology, one that is at odds with Nietzsche. On Danto's view, *saying* is *about the world*; judgment stands like a surface or screen before and in some correspondence with reality. Nietzsche's paradox is caused, Danto reasons, because his description of the world as having no order is contradicted by the order in his saying that the world is without order; an ontological thesis and its verbal articulation (as an epistemological or theoretical claim) are in conflict. However, with Nietzsche, the two are not separate items capable of contradicting one another in the antithetical or cancelling sense given by Danto. Judgment or truth-claiming does not have a purely transitive relation with the world, with the former existing like a screen before the latter, because the two both make up the world. This is one of the shifts in conception brought about by Nietzsche's power ontology: judgment and reality are both theorized as interactions between opposing wills.

What the difference in epistemology–ontology relations means for Danto is that his own formulation of the paradox is constructed in terms which fail to address the implications of Nietzsche's thought. Danto enquires how Nietzsche can sometimes want to say what the world is like within a philosophy which abandons any sense of what the world is like, all the time assuming that Nietzsche's statements are at a remove from the reality he is theorizing when, in fact, they are among the competing perspectives in terms of which he is theorizing reality. Thus, when Nietzsche asserts 'this is what the world is like' – for example, 'this world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself' (1968a: 1067) – he is offering it not as a bystander's impression of reality which is true for all time because it corresponds to the way that reality is, but as an expression about the world which is already of the world, and has 'aboutness' precisely because it is part of the world and open to support or criticism from other wills. The above quotation hints at this with the declaration that the world 'does not expend itself but only transforms itself'. What is important to grasp is that being part of the world *and* being open to support or criticism from other wills are not contingent properties of Nietzsche's statement; the second isn't merely added to the first. Rather, they are necessarily conjoined as aspects of the power ontology which presents a mind's perception of the world and its engagement with another mental viewpoint as homologous interactions between wills to power.

Further confirmation that Nietzsche's ontological statements should not be taken as at-a-distance, theory-external judgments is given by the style of his writing. First and foremost, he writes in epigrams, issuing thoughts in fits and bursts rather than in the form of linear, continuous enquiry. Arguments are not ready-made, 'on the page' but dispersed across contrasting voices and are only brought into being as discrete arguments once they are interpreted as such by a wilful reader. In this respect, the form of his writing is an analogue for his view that 'whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it' (Nietzsche 1967: II, 12). Secondly, as we have already seen with Kofman, the substitution of terms in Nietzsche's writing, for example, will to power for perspective and, in turn, for metaphor, is itself an expression of will to power, part of a textual strategy to prevent a stable word-world mapping that would amount to a correspondence relation with the world. This means that the world as will is manifest in his writing not *referentially* as the content of a proposition existing in the world beyond the text (as Kofman puts it, 'an originary music of the world – a sort of original text making human texts into mere metaphors' (1993: 82)) but *performatively* as a mode of 'all the way down' textuality which recognizes that its own claims will be taken up and transformed by commentators as part of the very interplay of wills that is being

described. In case the use of 'description' here is taken as question-begging reliance on a correspondence theory of reference, I should point out that the notion of 'description' is available to Nietzsche in terms of the 'about-ness' considered above: any description will be made from a perspective that is already part of the world conceived as interacting wills.

Ironically, Richardson thinks that Nietzsche cannot avoid falling back upon a correspondence theory of truth in the sense that he believes his theory of wills accords with the way the world is. This would seem to contradict the interpretation I have given of Richardson above. 'The Nietzschean knower', Richardson writes, 'tries to bring it about that his synthetic viewpoint [made up of competing wills] matches or mirrors the larger structure of reality', which means that 'Nietzsche follows the classical correspondence model of a microcosm mirroring a (the) macrocosm' (1996: 280). These elements of correspondence, he argues, are especially evident in the doctrine of the eternal return – a 'genuine truth' to which we correspond through 'willing that everything return[s]' (Richardson's words) – and in *The Genealogy of Morals* which 'carr[ies] out its diagnoses chiefly from [a] broad external perspective' in the sense of being external to 'our' perspectives (1996: 282–83). In contrast, I have made Richardson's account of the will to power support a position where the subject or knower is represented in terms of their acting-upon-and-being-acted-upon immersion in the play of wills. This is distinct from the microcosm–macrocosm picture given by Richardson here because it does not individuate the subject as an item which then stands in a correspondence relation with the-world-minus-the-subject. I do not think I have distorted Richardson's view of Nietzsche in developing this account of the subject; I have simply elaborated a consequence of an ontology which replaces the conventional foundation of the subject–object relation with that of the will to power.

If anything, Richardson works against his own exposition of Nietzsche by presenting him as a correspondence theorist. He can only charge him as such if it is accepted that the subject is an already constituted ground for the interplay of wills and, therefore, an entity which can be identified as distinct from the world as will in order for it to stand in a correspondence relation. Yet, by Richardson's own lights, subjectivity for Nietzsche arises out of the ontologically more fundamental interplay of wills. To present Nietzsche as a correspondence theorist is, at best, to compromise or, at worst, to dismiss the will to power as a systematic ontology. One sign that Richardson does work against his own notion of ontological wills is his characterization of *The Genealogy of Morals* as offering a view that is external to 'our' perspective. Given the scope of our current debate, the notion of what is ours cannot be taken at face value, since it assumes a distinction between what belongs to us as knowing subjects and what does not belong to us, that is, what belongs to the world-as-distinct-from-us. Precisely the question at issue is whether the subject, and all that belongs to it, is an ontological distinction-marker or a phenomenon generated by the

overlapping of more fundamental ontological distinctions (namely, wills). It is not the case that Nietzsche discards the subject–object distinction; it is just that his will-to-power ontology transforms how we understand the distinction, with one consequence being that we should be wary of employing its terms uncritically as epistemological or ontological building blocks.

A much more defensible approach would be to characterize Nietzsche as a coherence theorist, with some qualifications. Whereas the coherence theory of truth customarily defines truth as agreement between beliefs, with the accompanying image of a web of beliefs pulling together through agreement, Nietzsche's coherence theory of truth or perspectival health would be one which coheres through the accommodation of contradictory views, with an image of strands or muscles being made stronger or healthier through the pushing and pulling of agreement and opposition. This model would have the additional advantage of meeting one of the main objections against the coherence theory, as it is traditionally conceived: that is, it leaves propositions out of touch with reality, because propositions are held only to cohere with each other and not to correspond to the world in itself (Walker 1989: 176–77). Nietzsche's model would not have this worry because proposition and reality are already in contact as epiphenomena generated by cohering and flexing wills to power.

Animism in Nietzsche

There are two major problems though with this ontology of wills and the epistemology it supports: (1) its configuration of the world as a series of perspectives is tantamount to a form of animism, and (2) it is by no means clear that a model of interacting wills, as that which underlies and structures the subject–object distinction, can account for knowledge and experience of an objective world, as we ordinarily think of them occurring. (1) With regard to animism, Nietzsche is aware of his tendency to ascribe mental properties to all phenomena, as the following quotation from his notebooks demonstrates:

> Neither of the two explanations of organic life has been hitherto successful, neither the one from the perspective of mechanics, *nor the one from the perspective of the mind*. I emphasize the *latter* ... The governance of the organism occurs in a such way that both the mechanical *as well as* the mental world can be invoked only *symbolically* as a means of explanation.
>
> (Nietzsche, quoted in Moore 2002: 42, original emphases, from the notebooks in Nietzsche 1967–: VII 2, 26 [68])

And in *Beyond Good and Evil*, also noted by Moore, Nietzsche asserts that the inorganic world should be regarded as a 'more rudimentary form of the world of emotions, holding everything in a powerful unity, all the

potential of the organic process to develop and differentiate' (Moore 2002: 43; Nietzsche 1998: 36). Animism, Moore suggests, is part of Nietzsche's challenge to contemporary science and its reduction of life to matter, the forces of Newtonian physics, and Darwinian mechanisms of mere survival. But despite Nietzsche emphasizing that 'his conception of nature is merely an interpretation with no more epistemic justification than any other', Moore argues, 'it seems to me that it is virtually indistinguishable from the widespread crypto-Idealism of contemporary German biology' (2002: 43). He is wholly oblivious to the fact, Moore continues, that 'his anthropomorphic vision of the world permeated by spirit and will is ... strikingly reminiscent of the pan-animism of Leibniz... and its derivatives in German *Naturphilosophie*' (2002: 43).

But I don't think Nietzsche's position should be characterized, let alone dismissed, as such. Animism is the ascription of soul, mind or agency to inanimate matter. Nietzsche appears to make such an ascription but *the nature of this apparent ascription* needs further examination since the process of applying a concept to something to which it does not belong is a highly significant gesture, given our focus on metaphor. There is a difference between speaking of matter as if it literally possesses mind, as if we were being asked to think of matter as having a mental life in exactly the same way as human beings, on the one hand, and speaking of matter as if it possesses mind metaphorically or symbolically, on the other. As Nietzsche writes above: 'The governance of the organism occurs in a such way that both the mechanical *as well as* the mental world can be invoked only *symbolically* as a means of explanation' (quoted in Moore 2002: 42). Much could be written on what a metaphorical or symbolic ascription amounts to but, in relation to the theory of metaphor as will that is being developed here, I suggest the ascription needs to be considered as part of the network of opposing perspectives. A perspective can be construed as symbolic (following Nietzsche's use of the term) in the sense that it explains one thing (the organism) in terms of something else (in this case, mind). Furthermore, as a perspective, it acknowledges and includes other, opposing judgments which, in the present case, would be the mechanistic conception of nature. Moore, when he sums up Nietzsche's position as 'merely an interpretation', fails to take into account the ontological significance which interpretation has for Nietzsche: as far as Moore is concerned, interpretation is simply one view among others whereas, on the view I am setting out, we need to recognize that interpretation is conducted by Nietzsche in such a way that judgments are not outright assertions but statements that embrace opposites within a dynamic, for example, his inclusion of the competing perspectives of mind and machine. On this basis, Nietzsche does not resort to wholesale animism, understood as the literal ascription of mind to matter, since his ascription belongs to a tensional dialectic of wills where the tension prevents mind from becoming a property of matter.

It should also be pointed out that Nietzsche's ontology of wills can meet the charge of animism from the other direction: namely, by contesting the certainty with which we believe mind to be a human property. This is not the point that mind remains a philosophically contentious term and so any charge of animism is weakened due to the uncertainty of its central concept. Rather, the point is that Nietzsche's ontology, as a wilful, metaphorical ontology, upsets conventional notions of conceptual propriety or belonging, that is, our customary sense of which predicates belong to which subjects. On this model, the denotation of terms such as mind, consciousness or subjectivity cannot be taken for granted because the concept of the human (subject as) receiver or constructor of experience which the terms customarily serve is now represented by a tension between wills. Thus, to say that Nietzsche, in describing nature as a series of competing perspectives, is assigning human properties to nature is to assume that we are clear on the denotation of 'human'. Connotations of human mind and nature are undeniably present and are intended to be present, otherwise why speak of 'perspective' and 'world', but, within the framework of competing perspectives, suspended from their conventional denotations, they work to generate different perspectives by promoting alternative combinations of concepts. Nietzsche's philosophy, it should be remembered, aims to challenge established concepts of knowledge and being. His intention is not to humanize nature through simply grafting the (supposedly agreed) properties of the human onto nature but to create an ontology which can reinvigorate our sense of the human and the world by turning conventional oppositions, for example, mind and world, into tensional perspectives (or wills acting) on one another. This is an important point for the second objection to Nietzsche's ontology – to what extent we can recognize it as a theory of knowledge – and I shall return to it shortly.

Locating the apparent ascription of mind to nature within the ontology of perspectives also helps to distance Nietzsche from Leibniz. Moore accuses Nietzsche of being 'oblivious' to the similarities between his anthropomorphism and the pan-animism of Leibniz. However, the two are quite distinct. Animism is a modern, secular concept, formulated from the modern perspective in which matter is distinct from and devoid of soul or mind. Technically speaking, Leibniz only appears to us to present a form of animism because we view him from a modern perspective. In pre-Cartesian terms (that is, before Cartesian dualism becomes orthodox metaphysics), he does not ascribe mind to matter because he doesn't have to: he is working with a theistic metaphysics which accepts matter as animate; in other words, the concept of soul already belongs or is close to the concept of matter. In Leibniz's ontology, each being, from the level of human being to that of particles of matter, is constituted by a soul or (what Leibniz terms) a monad (Leibniz 1973: 179–94). A being's interaction with other beings, including its knowability by other beings, is derived from each monad being a reflection or an expression of every other monad within the God-given universe

(Leibniz 1996: 440). In contrast, although Nietzsche appears to ascribe mind to matter in the modern sense, no ascription is taking place because the exchange of terms is in fact an expression of the interaction between competing perspectives.

The will to power as a theory of knowledge

The second objection to Nietzsche's ontology I am anticipating is the question of whether a model of interacting wills can account for experience and knowledge of an objective world, as we ordinarily think of them occurring. At first glance, the question might appear to miss the point because Nietzsche does not set out to preserve reality, knowledge and experience as we ordinarily regard them. However, it is not so much ordinariness that I think Nietzsche has to accommodate; rather, the question asks – in a fashion that is true to his ontology – what it is about a seemingly diffuse interplay of wills that meshes with our traditional subject–object awareness sufficiently for us to be able to see ourselves or the possibility of ourselves in the interplay of wills. My phrasing would appear to verge on the conversational – our 'being able to see ourselves' – but it is in fact philosophically precise in that we are asking how our current perspective on self and world can be seen in and transformed by Nietzsche's perspective. If the subject–object distinction is no longer the basis upon which experience is theorized, then we need to know how a model of interacting wills can explain the subject–object character of experience, for example, the sense of experiences being mine, especially given that his account undermines conventional notions of propriety.

   The concept in Nietzsche's writings which would seem to respond explicitly to these questions is *der Übermensch*, the 'overman', the person who is able to synthesize competing wills into a dynamic unity: 'active, successful natures act, not according to the dictum "know thyself", but as if there hovered before them the commandment: *will* a self and thou shalt *become* a self' (Nietzsche 1977: 232). For Nietzsche, it is one of the tasks – if not the most pressing task – of philosophy to make people aware of the capacity or the liberty they have to become overmen. The first words spoken by Zarathustra to the townspeople he meets assembled in the square are: '*I teach you the superman*. Man is something that should be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?' (1977: 237). But this takes us back to the Nietzschean project of exceeding the values and definitions ordinarily ascribed to human being, and does not assist us with the epistemological questions which have arisen for the systematic version of Nietzsche given here.

   The question of how a model of interacting wills can account for experience and knowledge of an objective world, I think, only arises because we are not used to subject and object being made up of the same kind of thing, i.e. wills. Such an account goes against our Cartesian belief that mind and world are wholly distinct and separate entities. However, the notion that subject and object emerge from a common ground is a central principle of

Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, for example Kant's claim that conditions of the possibility of experience are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of objects of experience (1929: A111). Kant, it could be argued, is not a helpful comparison because the world which his subject opens onto is only (so the majority of commentators have it) the subjective realm of appearance whereas, with Nietzsche, we are asked to consider subject and object occurring between competing wills where the appearance–reality distinction does not apply. But the comparison stands, I think, because the central issue is one of proprietorship: what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the world. We are asking the question of Nietzsche's ontology of wills because he seems to be saying that subject and world, rather than possessing distinct kinds of will, are constantly exchanging their wills or drawing them from the shared realm of interaction. Kant's predicament is also one of proprietorship because, in articulating a world which belongs to the subject, 'belonging' is taken by Hegel and successive critics to be a relation of confinement – confined to the realm of appearances – when the relation can also be taken (against the majority of Kant's commentators) as one which, through interrelating mind and world, modifies the denotation of both terms so that they no longer conform to the appearance–reality opposition.

There are recent developments in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind which bear comparison with Nietzsche's ontology in that they rethink what belongs to subject and object. They are contentious, as one might expect, but my reason for introducing them is not to engage in their debates but merely to illustrate how challenges to proprietorship in relation to the subject–object distinction are active in recent philosophy. I shall focus on two examples. The first is John McDowell's response to the stalemate between realism and anti-realism (1994). McDowell would probably regard himself as more Kantian than Nietzschean, given that his theory builds upon Kant's dictum that 'thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (Kant 1929: A51, B75), but what is significant for us is that he overtly challenges the spatial metaphors with which we demarcate subject and object. His position is based upon a 'naturalized' reading of Kant's epistemology, 'naturalized' in that human cognitive faculties are acknowledged as belonging to the nature they access. Because of the inextricable tie between mind and world, McDowell argues, we are in error if we frame epistemological debate in terms which assume that there are isolated and individually identifiable entities such as mind and world, scheme and content, and concept and intuition. In the stalemate between realism and anti-realism, participants are limited to arguing either, with the realist, that nature impresses itself upon mind or, with the anti-realist, that mind constructs nature. However, with McDowell's approach, the impasse is avoided

> because of how we place the reality that makes its impression on a
> subject in experience. Although reality is independent of our thinking, it
> is not to be pictured as outside an outer boundary that encloses the

conceptual sphere. *That things are thus and so* is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject is not misled, that very same thing, *that things are thus and so,* is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world.

(McDowell 1994: 26)

The stalemate is averted, McDowell reasons, because subject and object are freed from their conventional either–or opposition. Rather than what belongs to subjectivity and what belongs to objectivity being pictured as mutually exclusive realms, the two terms – in the above quotation, the concepts extended by the subject on the one hand, and the world on the other – are arranged so that they belong to the same ontological space, without subject and world collapsing into one another.

McDowell reaches this position by examining what belongs to the subject in Kant's transcendental deduction. Kant writes: 'There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions' (1929: A107; 136). To forestall critics who view this as evidence of the anti-realist, 'mind imposing on world' Kant, McDowell points out that the unity of consciousness is not to be read as a Cartesian ego standing before the world. When Kant speaks of an 'I think' that must be able 'to accompany all my representations', McDowell asserts, he is not referring to 'the substantial identity of a subject who persists as a real presence in the world she perceives' (1994: 99). Rather, it is merely the unity provided by temporal continuity – a sense of things being held together from the future, through the present and into the past – which stands as the minimum condition necessary for *experience* of a *world* to occur. In support of McDowell's reading, I would argue that Kant in fact *borrows* the notion of 'I think' (unhelpfully in this context, it has to be admitted) as a way of articulating the unity he requires, since *inner* experience is the most familiar space in which we can conceive of such minimal unity taking place. The key point to grasp is that the unity *does not belong to* the human subject; it is not a structure imposed on experience by an already defined mental agent. The process of constructing experience is too complex to be reduced to a one-way opposition with one term acting upon the other; the stalemate in the realism–antirealism debate is arguably attributable to its limited epistemological apparatus. The act of casting a dividing line between mind and reality, normally carried out within epistemology by presenting 'subject' and 'object' as mutually exclusive domains, now has to be realized some other way: a means of creating or articulating a sense of subject–object transitivity within the ontological space which embraces them both. McDowell does it in terms of the concept of 'second nature': a concept of nature that 'does not exclude the intelligibility that belongs to meaning', which is to say that it is a 'realm of law' whose lawfulness belongs to the same 'space of reasons' or space of concepts in which human thought operates (1994: 72–74, 84–86).

A second debate in recent philosophy which exhibits a Nietzschean challenge to proprietorship is Dennett's critique of qualia (2002). 'Qualia' refers to the way things seem to us or are experienced by us, for example, the blue of the book cover I am looking at as it occurs privately and subjectively to me is the quale of my visual experience at the moment. Qualia are generally held to be ineffable, private, immediately apprehensible in consciousness, and intrinsic to experience. Of particular interest to us is the notion that qualia are 'intrinsic to experience', that is to say, a particular quale is datum-like in possessing a particular determinacy or content of its own, as famously summed up by Nagel's claim that there is '*something* that it is like to be a bat' (Nagel 2002: 219). As Dennett observes, 'propriety' is a metaphor that is highly active in determining our thoughts about intrinsicality. People who disapprove of his attacks on intrinsicality, he writes, still insist that 'I know *how it is with me right now*', but this, he thinks, is essentially people wanting 'to reaffirm their sense of proprietorship over their own conscious states' (2002: 233). Further, the 'seductive step' taken by the same people upon learning that colour is not an intrinsic but a relational property – constituted by a relation between our faculties and the world – is 'to cling to intrinsicality . . . and move it *into the subject's head*' (2002: 241, emphasis added).

Dennett argues against intrinsicality on grounds which are sympathetic to Nietzsche's perspectivism, although the connection is not noted by him. Private, immediate experience, Dennett asserts, is a relational phenomenon: 'properties that "seem intrinsic" at first', he declares, 'often turn out on more careful analysis to be relational', for example, the quale which the taste of beer has for an experienced beer drinker lies not in the sip alone but also in the reactivity or acuity of their sense of taste cultivated over many years of drinking beer; the quale which the taste of beer has for someone trying the drink for the first time will be different, as they have not cultivated an appropriate sense of taste (2002: 237). The Nietzschean element here is that an event which is customarily regarded as being intrinsic to the subject's experience is shown to be the product of interacting components. In Nietzschean terms, the experience of drinking beer, including what occurs to the drinker as a particular quale, could be conceptualized as being made up of the competing wills of the beer and the subject's taste receptors. This sounds wrong, if not ludicrous, on two counts. First, it seems nonsensical to be referring to the will of the beer, and seems once again to lead us towards animism. But, as I argue above, the ascription of a will to inanimate matter is not to be taken as the literal assignment of mind to matter. Rather, it is to be taken as an ascription made within the context of an ontology which holds that truth emerges not from the unambiguous assignment of predicates to subjects but from the tension created when two or more perspectives are combined.

The second respect in which talk of the will of a drinker's taste meeting the will of beer seems wrong is that wills have been described as *competing* perspectives, when – the animism issue already having been dealt with – it

appears to make no sense to refer to the drinker's taste and the beer having competing views of the world. Surely, in talking of wills as perspectives, and competing perspectives at that, I am referring to cognitive viewpoints on the world, and viewpoints which compete in as much as they offer rival but nonetheless commensurate versions of the world? In what sense can the perspective of beer be considered a rival cognitive viewpoint on the world? The reason why such a bizarre question is being asked, I suggest, is largely because study of wilful perspectives in Nietzsche tends to concentrate upon perspectives as the cognitive viewpoints of disinterested observers, and this, in turn, is simply because such viewpoints are the conventional topics of epistemology. The exchange between Clark, Anderson and Richardson above is a case in point. But while discussion tends to focus on Nietzschean perspectives in a cognitive sense, we should not lose sight of the fact that, in his ontology, all elements within the universe exist as wilful perspectives and (perhaps more importantly) the capacity for cognition which we customarily take to be intrinsic to a cognitive perspective is now, on Richardson's view (supported above), a function of the interplay between perspectives, as Nietzsche defines them. Thus, to take from my example the notion that beer has a perspective in the conventional epistemological sense is to fail to recognize that Nietzsche's perspectives are essentially dynamic, relational components, and that conventional cognitive judgment – which Nietzsche is still interested in – is not the province of a single perspective, say, that of beer, but the product of two perspectives bearing upon one another.

Conclusion

In Nietzsche's will to power, we find a combined perspectival epistemology and ontology. Such a combination is possible, and not paradoxical, it is argued, because perspectives necessarily open onto other perspectives. This meets Kaufmann's objection that a perspective cannot judge on matters beyond itself because it is confined to its own horizon. The necessarily open or relational nature of perspectives also meets Danto's concern that Nietzsche has to assert a world order in denying world order because it reconfigures how we understand the assertion of a world order, on two accounts. Firstly, the world order asserted by Nietzsche is not a single, dominant world-view, which would contradict his denial of order, but a series of competing world-views. Secondly, Nietzsche's assertion of a world order is not given as an all-embracing thesis about the nature of the world, as Danto interprets Nietzsche's ontology, but given as a thesis which, in part, is responding to a rival thesis and which, in another part, will itself be responded to by another thesis, due to the necessarily relational nature of perspectives. Another way of making the point is to draw attention to the 'all-embracing' metaphor used above to characterize Nietzsche's ontological thesis, for it is precisely the image of a perspective as a container completely circumscribing a situation which is being rejected in favour of one where the

perspective is interlaced with or brought to bear upon another. This solution also allays the concerns of Kofman and Nehamas. Extracting an ontological thesis from Nietzsche, they warn us, commits him to the existence of a realm of things in themselves, which countermands the emphasis they place on perspectival interpretation in Nietzsche. However, my ontological reading of Nietzsche makes no such commitment, since it shows him presenting an (extraperspectival) ontology not through the antithetical positing of things in themselves but through redefining perspectives as necessarily interlaced components. One apparent problem with this though is that the ontology could be construed as a form of animism because it defines all things in the world as wilful perspectives. But this is not the case, since the ascription of will to matter occurs within the context of Nietzsche's interplay of perspectives wherein each predication is always tensional, is always seen in relation to other, alternative predications, as opposed to being the direct, one-way assignment of mind to matter.

The accounts of McDowell and Dennett demonstrate contexts in which an ontology of intersecting perspectives can be applied. The way in which we conceptualize the subject–object division in epistemology needs reappraisal, McDowell avers, since reality, while independent of our thinking, 'is not to be pictured as outside an outer boundary that encloses the [subjective] conceptual sphere' (1994: 26). Instead, mind and world share the same ontological space, and a new means of articulating subject–object transitivity is required. McDowell does this in terms of his concept of second nature, but Nietzsche's ontology, I assert, is also working in the same territory. Dennett provides a model which allows us to see how the intrinsic qualia of experience can be theorized as an interaction between terms. The intrinsicality of qualia, which would have us regard them as the *content* of a subject's experience, Dennett argues, is only apparent. The supposed 'content' is in fact a relational phenomenon, distributed along the 'arc' from the material presented to the senses, at one end, to the faculties which open onto and interpret the material, at the other end. In Nietzsche's terms, the relation would be defined by intersecting wills.

Despite these illustrations, however, the sense might still remain that Nietzsche's epistemology merely leaves us with a series of viewpoints in perpetual conflict without resolution, that is, without ever arriving at a state where we can say we know the world. This worry arises, I propose, because we are used to a state of knowledge being one where we assign properties to an object, for example, 'I know this cup is red' is understood to mean 'I know the property of being red belongs to this cup'. This view of epistemology is arguably reinforced by the correspondence theory of truth, since the attribution of a predicate to a subject grammatically will be judged to count as knowledge if the corresponding property belongs to the designated object in the world. In Nietzsche's ontology, the interaction of wills is not intended to leave us in a state in which nothing can be known. Rather, in a self-consistent fashion, it transforms our concept of knowledge; it brings a

perspective to bear upon what we customarily regard as knowledge. On Nietzsche's view, knowledge is a function of the interaction between perspectives. What does this mean? For Richardson, as we saw above, it signifies a state of putting oneself in the place of another which allows the difference between viewpoints to be fully felt and understood. But this seems to lead to the 'viewpoints in perpetual conflict' scenario anticipated above.

The key difference, noted by Richardson but not Clark or Anderson, is that 'perspective' or 'viewpoint' does not refer exclusively to the cognition of a human subject but rather refers to the will of every existing thing. Thus, the scenario of a series of conflicting viewpoints is not the conventional epistemological problem of deciding which view of the world is the correct one. Instead, the image is of *the world as* a realm of forces or wills acting upon one another. The question of correspondence or being right with the world does not arise because *correspondence* or *being of the world* is already built in. To ask what makes up these forces is, as Nietzsche sees it, simply to enact the forceful process whereby one thing is referred to another. On this basis, to put oneself in the place of another, and thereby to allow the difference between perspectives to be understood (as Richardson recommends), is to act in a way which promotes interaction between wills, to recognize that if one understands *S is P* now, then in the next moment it could be that *S is Q*, where the shift from *P* to *Q* is not a confusing, undermining state of affairs but a transition which asks us to consider the relation between the two predicates. Assessing the relation between the predicates will not be a *purely* linguistic exercise, in the sense of studying how terms are applied within a (pure) self-contained, subjective system, since the ontology does not accommodate strict subject–object or language–world divisions. Instead, it will be an examination of the interactions or tensions between the predicates and the others they may extend to, where these connections or articulations are the forceful flexing of the joints in the ontology.

6   Cutting nature at the joints
Metaphor and epistemology in the science wars

Postmodernism's disavowal of meta-narratives and universal truth claims has recently manifested itself in a series of debates that has become known as the 'science wars': scientists, cultural theorists, sociologists, and philosophers in dispute over the status of scientific knowledge (Collins and Pinch 1993; Franklin 1996; Levins 1996; Martin 1996; Rose 1996; Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Snow 1964; Sokal 1996). Is science a disinterested reflection of the world as it really is or a discourse whose findings are heavily influenced by the interests and prejudices of those who work within it? Strong objections are raised by the realists in the debate to the sociologists' metaphor of scientific knowledge as a 'construction'. What the sociologist understands by this is that scientific theories are constituted by the perspectives and research opportunities which are made available within a particular community. However, the realist reacts to the more subjective, 'fabricated' associations of 'construction' and interprets the relativism of the sociologist to mean that it is the *scientific community* and not *nature* which determines where ontological divisions lie. Do we *create* or do we *discover* truths about the world? Surely, the realist demands, it cannot be the former? It is in this context that Richard Dawkins's often quoted remark – 'show me a relativist at 30,000 feet and I will show you a hypocrite!' – is made (quoted in Franklin 1996: 143).

This chapter argues that much of the epistemological conflict which makes up the science wars is attributable to the metaphors that are at work in the competing theories of knowledge. Two cases I cover in detail are 'cutting nature at the joints' and the concept of 'world' used as a metonym. In both cases, it is ambiguous whether what is being described is the (noumenal) world as it is in itself or the (phenomenal) world as it is accessed and made available to us through perception. My argument though is not against metaphor; I am not accusing metaphor of disrupting the passage of rational thought. Rather, I am claiming that more attention needs to be paid to the way in which figurative language functions at the epistemological level and, in particular, to the way in which the same metaphor can lend itself to conflicting epistemologies.

Explanations of how knowledge 'fits' the world are invariably metaphorical, for example, talk of knowledge *mirroring* the world, knowledge as a

construction, *correspondence* and *coherence* theories of truth, *receiving* sensory *impressions* or sense-*data*. The reason for this, I argue in the second part of the chapter, is that there is a fundamental two-way relationship between metaphor and epistemology. On the one hand, epistemology is metaphorical in the sense that the task of describing how our faculties mesh with the world requires us to make claims which exceed what is given in experience and which therefore can only be articulated by drawing on external areas of discourse. But, on the other, metaphor itself has been 'epistemologized' by recent research in philosophy and psychology, that is to say, metaphor has been shown to be central to the mapping and organizational procedures we employ in perception at large. What this two-way relationship means, I suggest, is that metaphor acquires an epistemological significance which (a) goes some way towards explaining why it is that the same metaphor can adapt itself to opposing theories of knowledge, and (b) can guide epistemological thought through the science wars in a fashion which avoids the binarism of phenomenal appearance and noumenal reality. As I show in the following chapter, such guidance already exists in the philosophy of science, and has been plotted by Heidegger and Bachelard along the lines of a single family of metaphors.

Metaphor and the science wars

In the science wars, the deepest epistemological lines are drawn between 'glass mirror epistemology' (GME)[1] and the strong sociology of knowledge (SSK). The former is essentially a version of direct realism and rests upon a belief in the transparency of perception. Reality, it is assumed, exists in itself with its own inherent structure independently of any perceiver, but is directly (or indirectly, via apparatus) open to view and knowledge can be derived by naming the various, distinct natural kinds which the scientist discovers through increasingly refined observation. This position is tied to the emergence of science as a distinct discipline in the seventeenth century. In this time, the senses are affirmed as true and reliable channels of information on the world and, as a result, the new empiricist mind is promised the possibility of accessing or 'reading' the secrets of nature. We find this sentiment in Bacon's 'alphabet of nature' and Galileo's concept of the universe as a 'great book ... written in the language of mathematics' (Arbib and Hesse 1986: 149).

SSK theorists contest GME. The interests of SSK are, as the title suggests, primarily social and political: to disclose and emphasize the moral and political concerns which, it is claimed, have been active in determining what we accept as knowledge and, more especially, what we accept as scientific knowledge. According to SSK, two unwarranted assumptions are made by GME: (1) the world is immediately and unproblematically open to view, and (2) (as Franklin makes the point) 'things can be known in and of themselves through a method of observation and description that does not

leave a mark upon its objects' (1996: 142). In these respects, science views the world from a God's-eye point of view; it maintains a perspective which is not a perspective. This is where the danger lies for, according to Franklin, it is the denial of the perspectival and partial basis of science 'that attempts to render invisible and inaccessible to scrutiny or questioning exactly how that perspective works, what it includes and excludes, and how that inclusion or exclusion is a cultural effect' (1996: 151). Examples of the value-ladenness of science cited by SSK theorists include the ubiquity of chemical therapy in medicine and farming as expressions of the interests of the chemical industry (Levins: 107), the assertion that the female body is of merely secondary or marginal importance in anatomy, and the privileging of 'scientific discovery' over the human or animal suffering generated by research (Martin 1996: 46).

A key SSK text is Shapin and Schaffer's *Leviathan and the Air-Pump* (1985). This argues that it was political sensitivity rather than epistemic success which led to Boyle's theory of a vacuum winning over Hobbes's theory of a plenum in the seventeenth century. Boyle argued that it would be physically possible to create a vacuum (an absence of all matter) given the right conditions and apparatus, whereas Hobbes maintained that every portion of nature must contain some form of material substance, which he referred to as a 'plenum'. For a period of time, the vacuist and plenist theories both 'saved appearances', that is, both Boyle's and Hobbes's ontologies fitted the observed phenomena. However, according to Shapin and Schaffer, Boyle's theory was ultimately accepted *not* because it provided a better fit with the world but because it was felt to be in keeping with 'the settlement and protection of a certain kind of social order' (1985: 342). The openness and consensus of opinion which were characteristic of Boyle's empiricist scientific method were perceived to be congruent with 'civil stability and peace' and 'the polity that emerged in the Restoration' (1985: 342).

Epistemologically, the contrast between GME and SSK is akin to the opposition between realism and anti-realism. Although the variety of realisms within analytic philosophy and the philosophy of science arguably make the realism–anti-realism distinction an oversimplification, for example, metaphysical, semantic and epistemic, as Psillos describes them (1999: xix), the various realisms nevertheless share a commitment to a mind-independent reality underlying appearances which is either *directly or indirectly* knowable through appearances, and it is the contrast between this commitment and the lack of it within anti-realism that I am interested in. Realism, in its strongest, metaphysical form, as Putnam characterizes it (although it is not his position), adopts the perspective of the God's-eye point of view alongside GME. It understands truth to be 'some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things' (1981: 49). It maintains what Putnam calls a 'similitude theory of reference': 'the relation between the representations in our minds and the external objects that they refer to is literally a *similarity*' (1981: 57). Ideally, no differences between *the properties we perceive* and *the properties the*

object has in itself should emerge in the process of coming to know the object. The empiricist notion of a sense *impression* – originally described by Aristotle in *De Anima* as the impress of a signet ring in wax – is one version of this ideal (Aristotle 1987b: 424a).

Against this, anti-realism is a form of subjective Kantianism: instead of the content of our thoughts being determined by external objects impinging upon them, it is the nature of our concepts which determine the shape of reality. Kuhn's commentary on Lavoisier is a good illustration of the position:

> In learning to see oxygen ... Lavoisier also had to change his view of many other more familiar substances. He had, for example, to see a compound ore where Priestley and his contemporaries had seen an elementary earth, and there were other such changes besides. At the very least, as a result of discovering oxygen, Lavoisier saw nature differently. And in the absence of some recourse to that hypothetical fixed nature that he 'saw differently', *the principle of economy* will urge us to say that after discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked in a different world.
>
> (Kuhn 1962: 118)

As a result of discovering oxygen, the methods and vocabularies which constitute Lavoisier's practice as a scientist are completely redefined. The processes and objects with which he is dealing are therefore different, and so 'the principle of economy' urges us to say he is working 'in a different world'. In support of this is Goodman's claim that the concept 'world' should be understood as shorthand for 'descriptions and depictions of the world', since a world *undescribed*, *undepicted* or *unperceived* is something which (according to Goodman) cannot enter our conceptual reckoning (Goodman 1978: 4).

It is easy to see how friction between the two positions is generated. SSK argues that it is not 'the world' or not just 'the world' which determines theory-choice but social, cultural, extra-scientific affairs. This conclusion is reached on the understanding that *necessarily* there cannot be a direct, transparent 'looking at the world', Franklin's 'looking through a toilet paper tube' (1996: 143). This utterly contradicts GME, cancels altogether the notion that our knowledge is, *first and foremost*, a reflection of the way the world is. In this way, SSK approaches anti-realism. Nature's joints are either non-existent or sufficiently malleable to the degree that the categories of entity we accept as existent are determined by contingent, independent factors. The claims that science always works with a particular interest and from a particular cognitive perspective are taken to imply the denial of the existence of self-similar objects or, in Putnam's idiom, self-identifying objects: 'objects that intrinsically correspond to one word or thought-sign rather than another' (Putnam 1981: 51). In other words, objects which, because of their self-similar, self-evident nature, cannot help but direct the scientist towards defining her concepts so that they are in point-to-point correspondence with them.

Metaphor is by no means an innocent bystander in all of this. Not only are key epistemological concepts metaphorical (as I illustrate in my introduction), but also the appearance of metaphors in scientific theories has been taken by some as a test case of whether (with GME) new scientific entities are *discoveries* from a range of pre-existent, self-similar objects or (with SSK) *constructions* made as a result of the scientific mind's increasingly refined fashioning of nature. The exchange between Richard Boyd and Thomas Kuhn is a good example (Boyd 1979; Kuhn 1979). Boyd's intention is to show how metaphor can help us discover or grant us 'epistemic access' to new natural kinds. Epistemic access, for Boyd, qualifies the success with which our categories acquire, assess, refine, and communicate knowledge about the entities or purported entities to which they refer. In this respect, Boyd claims, metaphors can function as 'a sort of *catachresis*' in science, that is to say, 'they [can be] used to introduce theoretical terminology where none previously existed' (1979: 357). If a metaphor enables sustained information gathering about a presumed or partially understood natural kind, Boyd reasons, then 'the only epistemologically plausible explanation' is that the metaphor in question refers (1979: 401). On this account, metaphor is granted a referential value and, as a result, made consistent with the causal realist project of accommodating language 'to the causal structure of the world' or, as Boyd puts it, 'the task of arranging our language so that our linguistic categories "cut the world at the joints"' (1979: 357). He gives as examples tropes from cognitive psychology drawn from the terminology of computer science and information theory, e.g. 'the claim that thought is a kind of "information processing" and that the brain is a sort of "computer"' and 'the suggestion that certain motoric or cognitive processes are "preprogrammed"' (1979: 360).

However, the epistemological value of metaphor for Kuhn is not one of discovery but of creation. The problem with Boyd's idea that metaphors can help to identify natural kinds, Kuhn asserts, is that it assumes that 'nature has one and only one set of joints to which the evolving terminology of science comes closer and closer with time' (1979: 417). This, Kuhn thinks, fails to acknowledge that the world and nature are themselves, to some extent, constituted by theory and language. Kuhn favours an ontology 'without "things in themselves" and with categories of the mind which could change with time as the accommodation of language and experience proceeded' (1979: 418–19). Such a view, he adds, need not make the world 'less real' (1979: 419). Metaphor contributes to this ontological diversity, Kuhn argues, because it is forever redefining conceptual boundaries. The effect of combining two semantic fields in a metaphor, he suggests, is that both regions are never seen in quite the same way again, their outlines are completely reconfigured. Our linguistic divisions, Kuhn maintains, far from being governed by divisions in nature, are constantly open to renewal thanks to the highlighting of new aspects and features that comes with metaphorical juxtaposition.

The way in which the terms of the science wars are set would seem to preclude the possibility of any resolution. Any attempt to offer a response will inevitably have to adopt some of the assumptions of one side and so will be dismissed by the other as partisan. For example, to argue for the necessarily perspectival nature of perception (as SSK does) will be taken by the realist as simply another assertion of anti-realism. Alternatively, it could be argued against SSK (as Norris makes the point), that the historical contexts of discovery must not be confused with the scientific context of justification (Norris 1997: 33). That is to say, the procedures for either supporting or falsifying a hypothesis ensure that the way reality appears to the scientist is not wholly a product of her historically and culturally rooted conceptual scheme. But the SSK theorist can reply to this by observing that whatever is brought forward as evidence will have been selected from a range of possible phenomena and, by virtue of this selection process, will already be affected by certain ideological determinants. On this account, even appeals to experimentation and the evidence of the senses – pivotal to scientific method – cannot avoid the conceptual organization present in experiment design and the determination of what is and is not significant. Some might see the debate as concerned merely with whether our theories talk about 'the world' or about 'our perspective on the world'. Rorty (1980, 1982), in his typically dismissive manner, would argue that, either way, it doesn't really matter: whether we think we are dealing with reality as it is or reality as it appears to us does not alter the fact that it is the reality we have to deal with in constructing a better existence. But there is more at stake here. Not only is this one of the oldest disputes in the history of epistemology (although Rorty would take the lack of resolution as an indication of its vacuity), but it is also fundamental to the idea that there is a reality which transcends and resists our judgment in some way; things can be otherwise than they seem to be. Even if one does not value epistemology, it ought to be recognized that epistemological notions of concept- or culture-transcendent realities are central to debates regarding what is morally and politically right.

The realism and anti-realism of 'cutting nature at the joints'

One reason for the polarized nature of the debate, I suggest, is the metaphorical basis of the terms at work in it. As Dummett observes, the realism–anti-realism contest requires us 'to choose between two metaphors, two pictures' (Dummett 1978: 229). His comments are made in relation to the philosophy of mathematics but apply equally to epistemology and the philosophy of science:

> The platonist metaphor assimilates mathematical enquiry to the investigations of the astronomer: mathematical structures, like galaxies, exist, independently of us, in a realm of reality which we do not inhabit but

which those of us who have the skill are capable of observing and reporting on. The constructivist [or anti-realist] metaphor assimilates mathematical activity to that of the artificer fashioning objects in accordance with the creative power of his imagination. Neither metaphor seems, at first sight, especially apt, nor one more apt than the other: the activities of the mathematician seem strikingly unlike those either of the astronomer or of the artist. What basis can exist for deciding which metaphor is to be preferred?

(1978: 229)

Dummett, as an anti-realist, opts for the artificer metaphor, although he doesn't state this explicitly. However, while choosing a metaphor will place us neatly on one side of the divide or the other, it will also overlook a more fundamental respect in which metaphor is active epistemologically. Although the metaphors behind the realism–anti-realism opposition are acknowledged, what is not recognized is that they are also responsible for the polarized nature of the contest, the fact that it takes place as an oscillation between poles, with little or no sign of resolution. Certain metaphors within the science wars sustain the oscillation because they lend themselves to the epistemologies of both realism and anti-realism. This, I suggest, is due to the range of images and associations permitted by a metaphor giving both sides the room to find an interpretation which takes the metaphor in their particular direction. Two examples of such stretchable metaphors are the notions of 'world' and 'cutting nature at the joints'. Both accommodate, on the one hand, the realist's reference to reality as it is in itself and, on the other, the anti-realist's notion that reality is shaped and organized by our conceptual framework. Let us examine how these conflicting interpretations arise.

The suggestion that 'world' might be used as a piece of figurative language in the context of epistemology needs some explanation. Both sides in the debate try to explain the truth or objectivity of knowledge *by reference to the world or a world*. The realist is committed to the notion that knowledge consists of the *discovery* of truths *about the world,* whereas the anti-realist talks of the *creation* of *worlds*. How are we to understand the notion of 'a world' here? Is the anti-realist's concept of 'world' the same as the realist's? Difficulty emerges because the concept can be taken either as an *ontological* reference to reality as it is in itself or as an *epistemological* reference to the world as we experience it to be. This has the effect of making the concept of 'world' a metonym: a term which refers to its object not directly, by individuating it as a whole, but instead by denoting either a particular part of its object, e.g. 'crown' as a reference to the monarchy, or by referring to a *greater* whole, of which the object is a part, e.g. 'France' as a reference to the country's football team. 'World' is metonymical in as much as talk of 'the world as it appears' is still a reference to the world (part for whole), and talk of 'the world as it is in itself' is undeniably linked to our perception of it (whole for part), if only to acknowledge that it is our

cognitive efforts which have enabled us to achieve this level of impartiality. Both forms of talk are descriptions of the same thing – our knowledge of the world. To adopt Frege's idiom: they have the same referent, but their senses and, therefore, their value and (philosophical) associations are different.[2]

Much of the ontological vehemence of Kuhn's writing trades on the metonymical properties of 'world'. Kuhn is considered an ontological relativist (and, therefore, an anti-realist) because of his claim that, after a change in its theoretical paradigm, a scientific community is 'working in a different world'. One example of this can be found in his commentary on Lavoisier (quoted above) when he suggests that 'in the absence of some recourse to that hypothetical fixed nature that he "saw differently", *the principle of economy* will urge us to say that after discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked in a different world' (1962: 118). The metonymical alternatives are brought into sharp relief here: 'world' as a 'hypothetical fixed reality' or 'world' as 'nature that is seen differently', a world in itself versus the world as it appears to be. In this case, as I indicate above, 'world' is used by Kuhn above to mean 'our experience of the world' because, according to him, 'the principle of economy' urges us to do so. However, elsewhere, Kuhn switches to the other pole of the metonym. Discussing the incommensurability of Newtonian and relativistic dynamics, Kuhn argues that it is impossible to show Newton's laws to be a limiting case of Einstein's because the passage to the limit involves altering 'the fundamental structural elements *of which the universe to which they apply* is composed' (1962: 102). Here Kuhn is referring to the world in itself: Netwon's and Einstein's paradigms are incommensurable because the ways in which their fundamental structural elements apply to the *one* universe are different. This is confirmed in the next paragraph when Kuhn suggests that a paradigm shift creates the need only 'to change the meaning of established and familiar concepts' and therefore 'the conceptual network through which scientists view *the world*' (1962: 102–03).

On a more general note, it could be argued that the 'world in itself' component of the metonym is itself figurative in origin. The empiricist accounts of Locke (1997) and Berkeley (1988) draw attention to this. Both observe that the notion of an underlying substance or reality is primarily a metaphor of support, based on the many relations of support which are perceived in daily life, such as pillars supporting a building (Locke 1997: 2.13.16; Berkeley 1988: §16). Anti-realism's rejection of a reality behind appearances is taken to an extreme by Berkeley. To conceive of a thing in itself which exists independently of any observer, Berkeley argues, is impossible:

> what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?
>
> (1988: §23)

The thing in itself, it is claimed, is first and foremost an image that tries to conceal its status as an image: a landscape or a room devoid of any perceiving consciousness but which nevertheless retains all the attributes which allow it to be perceived as the thing it is. But this can only be done if we overlook the presence of the consciousness that is holding the image. Thus, even when the realist thinks he is seeing the world as it is, according to this radical anti-realism, the 'as it is in itself' is itself a notion that cannot be divorced from figurative thought.

'Cutting nature at the joints', as we have seen in the Boyd–Kuhn exchange, is also popular as a metaphor for the objectivity of our knowledge claims. The implication is that the distinctions we make in our vocabulary correspond to the differences in kind that exist in nature. The metaphor is originally Plato's and occurs in the *Phaedrus*, interestingly enough, in a section which discusses the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic (Plato 1973: 271). The rhetorician, Socrates argues, directs his attention to the soul, and a good speaker will know the different types of soul and the different types of speech which correspond to them. However, in order to practice rhetoric successfully, Socrates advises Phaedrus, a knowledge of dialectics is also required, since *it is only through dialectical method* – 'the ability to divide a genus into species, ... observing the natural articulation, not mangling any of the parts, like an unskilful butcher' – that the rhetorician can come to know the different parts of the soul (1973: 265).

Like the 'world' metonym, the 'joints' metaphor can also be interpreted either ontologically or epistemologically. Reading it ontologically, as the realist would, the body represents the world as it is in itself: a domain immediately open to view and occupied by self-similar entities that interact with each other in set, specific ways, just as a body consists of limbs and organs interacting in certain ways. Knowledge of its constitution, it is assumed, can be read off from it in the form of representations that collectively depict every conceivable arrangement and interaction of parts, both in terms of posture and the operation of the internal organs. The mind, according to this view, is not free to devise its own distinctions; nature's joints are set in the same way that a leg will prefer to flex at the knee and ankle and not half-way along the fibula.

'Cutting nature at the joints' though can also be applied epistemologically by the anti-realist in as much as the incisions we make will, in part, be a reflection of our capacity to make cuts. This, I propose, turns the body into a metaphor for Kant's theory of knowledge: the body is used not as a reference to the world but as a reference to the way in which our cognitive faculties and instruments *interact* with the world. The nature and organization of reality is independent of us in the sense that the constituents of the world are restricted in the way they appear or respond to us; the way objects appear to us is *created but not wholly determined* by our perspective or intervention. The resistance or counter-pressure which the world gives to perception is comparable to resistances and restrictions in a body's movement.

Here 'joints' refers not to divisions in an inert body but, instead, to the way a body can or might want to move in response to a stimulus, for example, in a dance. The idea that a leg will prefer to flex at the knee and ankle and not half-way along the fibula corresponds on this account *not* to a division in a mind-independent nature but to the fact that a certain meshing of concept and intuition has to take place for perception to be possible at all.

To give a particular example of a 'jointed', Kantian epistemology, we can do no better than turn to Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1968). His phenomenological theory of knowledge asserts that it is the jointed nature of the human body which grants us the possibility of being able to perform any cognitive act. However, what Merleau-Ponty understands by the 'body' is not what we ordinarily associate with the term. The body, he argues, is not an *empirical object*, one thing among others in the world, but an *ontological condition*: a framework of intentionality whereby consciousness and the world are opened up for each other.

This requires some exposition. In setting out this background, it might seem that I am veering away from the topic of epistemology in the science wars, but the detail is necessary in order to appreciate how the concept of a joint or jointedness can express the active nature of subjectivity in perception. Phenomenology develops the Kantian thesis that reality and the subject's perception of it are interconnected. Another way of saying this is that *experience is intentional*: experience is necessarily experience *of something*. For there to be experience, there has to be *both* the sense of subjective awareness that experience is being had *and* the 'counter-pressure' sense of a 'something other' that is being encountered. What is important to note is that these kinds of awareness are two sides of the same coin; they both emerge as part of the same world-creating process. The location of this process, Merleau-Ponty argues, is the body: 'my body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my "comprehension"' (1962: 235). It is in this sense that the body is an ontological body schema: a framework through which the world and conscious experience of the world are brought into being for each other. All sensory experience comes to us through the body but it is only because the body is an object which moves about in the world in a particular way that our sensory experiences, as bodily events, can be located within a unified framework. In order to make a particular range of sense experience available to us, the body must belong to a world in which it can contextualize the information received. The exploration of my hand and what it will teach me, Merleau-Ponty writes, can only open onto a tactile world if 'my hand takes its place among the things it touches, is in a sense one of them, opens finally upon a tangible being of which it is also a part' (1968: 133). For example, when I perceive a cube, I never see it all at once, but I am able to conceptualize it as a regular six-sided solid because, by rotating the cube in my fingers, *the rotation in my fingers* is an action in space which allows me to orient the successive stages of the experience as a whole cube.

This represents a 'jointed' epistemology in as much as what we perceive as divisions between kinds in nature are shown in actual fact to be bound up with our status as fundamentally jointed beings, from the flexing of limbs to the visual acuity which enables us to distinguish between different colours. Whereas a joint, from a realist perspective, refers to a division between self-similar kinds in a mind-independent world, from the point of view of Merleau-Ponty's 'embodied' anti-realism, it is conceptualized as the basic ontological articulation or interlocking out of which experience and the world-which-is-experienced arise. This is the distinctly Kantian aspect of the joints metaphor. As I explain above, experience, for Kant, is necessarily experience *of a world*; the orderliness of subjective awareness has the same root as the compartmentalizability of the world into graspable, understandable objects. What Merleau-Ponty's theory of embodiment demonstrates is that this divisibility or intelligibility of experience and the world is precisely the body schema's jointedness: the network of relationships and cross-referrals necessary for subjectivity to open onto a world and to locate or contextualize what it finds there.

Kant and the metaphorical nature of epistemology

What, then, follows from the fact that the 'world' and 'joints' metaphors can be taken as expressions of both realism and anti-realism? The epistemological and ontological leeway which they permit would seem to support the claim, often made in the history of philosophy (e.g. by Plato and Locke),[3] that figurative language obstructs clear, rational thought. However, I don't think it is merely a case of metaphor waywardly exacerbating the opposition between realism and anti-realism. Rather, we face these difficulties, I propose, because the task of epistemology is itself fundamentally metaphorical.

Epistemology necessitates a looking down on oneself from above, an attempt to view how one views, a double perspective which, it seems to me, can only be achieved through metaphor. We are never in a position to describe fully the nature of our cognitive acquaintance with the world, it could be claimed, because we can never extricate ourselves fully from our form of perception in order to view the meshing process from above, so to speak. This is one of the problems Kant addresses in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1929): how to explain the possibility of perception given that we can never exceed a particular form of perception. As he argues in the transcendental deduction, the conditions of possibility of subjectivity are at one and the same time the conditions of possibility of objectivity, which is to say that perception is only possible because our cognitive faculties necessarily apply to the world, organizing and shaping it for us (1929: A95–130, B129–69; in particular A108). Because the conditions under which perception is possible are already ones of active engagement, it is impossible for the epistemologist to step outside the process in order to examine the

components of perception when they are in a restful state; Kant situates the noumenon as a limiting concept precisely to indicate the impossibility of knowledge beyond the limits of experience (1929: A139–40, B178–79). It is this predicament which gives epistemology its metaphorical dimension. Without a field of its own that is open to direct inspection and, therefore, without a vocabulary that would correspond to this God's-eye view, epistemology can only proceed by drawing its terms metaphorically from other areas of discourse. This would seem to go some way towards explaining the prominence of metaphorical concepts within epistemologies, such as mirroring, impression, sense-datum, correspondence, coherence, etc.

Furthermore, the lowest common denominator of epistemology is the concept of independence: as Devitt puts it, the 'starting place' for epistemology is the question of 'the independence of what exists from theories and theorists' or, in other words, the question of where one thing (reality) ends and another thing (the representation of reality) begins (1997: 233). But, as far as Kant is concerned, reality and our perception of it, at a fundamental level, cannot be separated, since the conditions of possibility of one are also the conditions of possibility of the other. This grants Kant's epistemology a second metaphorical aspect, in as much as metaphor is the conjunction of those categories or domains which we normally regard as separate or independent (i.e. in Kant's case, concept and intuition or subject and object). If we plug this Kantian, metaphorical intertwining back into the science wars, then the aporetic switching backwards and forwards between the realist's noumenon and the anti-realist's phenomenon – 'Is this the world as it is in itself or the world as it is carved up by us?' – becomes a particular instance of the metaphorical action whereby two concepts exist in an irrevocably integrated state rather than standing as mutually exclusive and isolatable categories.

This is a proposal though that I can imagine some will find hard to accept, especially the realist, since it seems to reduce our capacity for rational, cognitive insight to the mere formation of images and metaphors. However, what such a response fails to consider is the extent to which metaphor has been 'epistemologized' or made perceptually significant in philosophy and psychology over the past few decades (Kittay 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Ortony 1979). While it cannot be claimed that all the research in these areas is pointing in the same direction or making consistent and confirmatory claims, there is nevertheless the shared recognition that our capacity for creating metaphors is central to the mapping and organizational processes we employ in perception at large. On this account, far from being a muddier of truth, metaphor is theorized as an operation which is constitutive of truth or at least constitutive of the possibility of the conceptual relationships which allow truth to be determined. Thus, in suggesting that epistemology itself is fundamentally metaphorical, I am in no way making the theory of knowledge simply a kind of poetry or a kind of writing. Rather, my point is that epistemology is enabled by the cognitive possibilities that such metaphorical thinking brings, for example, with Plato, assessing how

a particular object can be thought of as 'sharing' the form of its universal template (1987a: 452c) or, with Locke, exploring how knowledge of the world can be constructed from sensory 'impressions' or 'simple ideas' (1997: 2.1.6; 2.2.1).

By showing that the epistemological conflict between realism and anti-realism is attributable to the metaphors at work in their theories of knowledge, and by offering a Kantian explanation for why their epistemologies operate in this way, it could be objected that I am locating myself wholly within the anti-realist camp and that therefore my analysis amounts to nothing more than a partisan contribution to the wars, an argument in favour of anti-realism and SSK. Such an assessment, I admit, is inevitable, primarily because one of the principles of realism is that it is possible to talk about the world possessing a structure independent of any form of perception and this is, in effect, to exclude from consideration *by definition* the cognitive predeterminants responsible for granting the observer perceptual access to the world in the first place. Furthermore, by presenting the concept of 'world' as a metonym above, I am committed to the view, with Berkeley, that the notion of the 'in itself' cannot be divorced from metaphor and our capacity for producing images. Thus, as I have already intimated, it would seem that any attempt to adopt a perspective on the science wars which could lessen the conflict between the two sides or offer some hope of reconciliation cannot avoid being interpreted as the restatement of one or the other side's epistemological preferences.

However, there is a way in which this account of metaphor and Kant can avoid the dichotomy of realism and anti-realism. This stems from the fact that, in one very important respect, it is wrong to classify Kant as an anti-realist. He is traditionally identified as such on the grounds that he has categories in the mind determine the ontological structure of reality. The thesis that categories located in our understanding organize the world for us is taken by anti-realists to mean that 'we cut up the world into objects' when we introduce one or another conceptual scheme or, as Devitt recounts it (as part of his critique of anti-realism), 'the cook imposes cookie cutters (concepts) on the dough in order to create cookies (appearances)' (1997: 73). But we have the wrong image in mind if we see concepts determining intuition as stencils pressing shapes into an utterly submissive and pliable dough. This image does not do justice to the conclusion of the transcendental deduction, which states that the conditions of possibility of subjectivity are, at one and the same time, the conditions of possibility of objectivity. In other words (as we have already seen in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological development of Kant), the categories I need to make my experience intelligible are also those which I find apply to the bits and pieces of the world. One consequence of this argument is that 'subjectivity' no longer denotes the subject and the subject alone, and 'objectivity' no longer denotes the world and the world on its own, for the former term now extends to embrace the conditions of possibility of objectivity, and the latter term extends to embrace the conditions of possibility of subjectivity.

A similar claim is made for Kant by McDowell (1994). In *Mind and World*, McDowell warns us that the realism–anti-realism debate is in 'danger of falling into interminable oscillation' between the concepts of a mind-determined reality and a mind-independent reality (1994: 9). He aims to jump off the see-saw and delineate an intermediate standpoint which accommodates the mind-dependence of the anti-realist and the mind-independence of the realist. His position is based upon a 'naturalized' reading of Kant's epistemology, 'naturalized' in that human cognitive faculties are acknowledged as belonging to the nature they access. This gives the utmost epistemological and ontological weight to the mutual dependence between mind and world expressed in Kant's dictum, 'thoughts without content are empty, [and] intuitions without concepts are blind' (Kant 1929: A51, B75). Because of the inextricable tie between mind and world, McDowell argues, we are in error if we frame epistemological debate in terms which start from the assumption that one is isolated from and exclusive of the other. Once epistemology is moved away from questions of how two components, conceived as distinct, can intersect, the oscillations between realism and anti-realism cease. Kant's epistemology can help us in this, McDowell thinks, because it is able to meet the dual requirement of receiving a world through intuition (to satisfy the realist), yet this intuition is located within a rational framework structured by the understanding (to accommodate the anti-realist). Thus, Kant's transcendental interweaving of subjectivity and objectivity is distinct from the 'cookie-cutter' anti-realism with which he is often associated.[4] What is more, on this reading of Kant, he would in actual fact stand alongside the realist in criticizing the 'imposing' or 'cutting' metaphors of anti-realism for making reality too much a 'product' of mind. As Kant makes it clear, objectivity in his transcendental idealism is not conferred 'by means of the will' (1929: A92, B125).

Thus, attributing the realism–anti-realism aporia to the metaphors at work within epistemology, and giving a Kantian explanation for why epistemology operates in this way, do not amount to reassertions of anti-realism. Rather, what these steps show is that picturing or envisioning is intrinsic to the configuration of the subject–object relation in epistemology, where the associations introduced by the image are decisive in shaping our understanding of how subject and object interact. As I have argued, existing epistemological metaphors within the science wars require us to assign priority either to the 'world' and 'the joints' of the object (with GME and the realist), or the 'world' and 'the joints' of the subject (with SSK and the anti-realist). The themes of both metaphors are ultimately spatial in origin: reality is conceived as a realm containing objects, and the human subject, while not exactly represented as a place, is nevertheless conceived as a domain to which claims, concepts, and possibly objects can belong. The oscillation between realism and anti-realism is created because the 'domain' metaphor only entertains the binary alternatives of inside or outside.

Problems with visualizing the subject–object distinction

These concerns over the subject–object distinction are not new. They are often encountered in terms of the contest between the correspondence and the coherence theories of truth, a contest that is not altogether removed from my interest here in Kant, especially given Walker's presentation of Kant as a coherence theorist (1989: 61–82, 102–21). Truth, for the correspondence theorist, is understood as a form of correspondence relation between proposition and reality: *p* is true if it is the case that *p*. On this account, the truth content of statement *p,* uttered by a subject, is established by the way objects are in the world. This arrangement, however, creates the problem of having to explain how entities of one type, concepts or propositions, can be seen to 'correspond' with entities of an altogether different type, namely, material objects in the world. The main objection to the notion of correspondence, raised by defenders of the opposing, coherence theory of truth, is that no account can be given of what this relation of correspondence consists in (Walker 1989: 21). Any attempt to spell out further the conditions which might determine how a particular arrangement of words can correspond to a set of objects will have one of two unsatisfactory outcomes: either it will be working within the categories of word and object and so will be leaving the gap between them unaddressed, or it will try to explain 'correspondence' in terms of a comparable metaphor, one which is in equal need of explanation.[5]

The coherence theory of truth seeks to avoid the problems attached to correspondence, but the way it does so is rendered highly problematic by the subject–object opposition. Whereas correspondence theory emphasizes correspondence *with the world*, coherence theory gives priority to the notion that knowledge necessarily occurs *within the subject*. Testing a knowledge-claim involves not a check between proposition and a mind-independent reality but between one proposition and another or one perception and another. This still involves contact with the world, except it is the world as it is perceived and reported by other individuals. Thus, the problem of correspondence is avoided because coherentism is working with only one kind of being – cognitions or propositions and the relations which hold between them – rather than two. But this is also the basis for the main objection to coherentism, levelled by correspondence theorists: namely, that it loses contact with mind-independent reality or (echoing the charges made against anti-realism above) that it reduces reality to a series of subjective reports. As Pollock writes in his critique of coherentism:

> The basic difficulty with [the coherence theory] is that it *cuts justification off from the world*. A person could be justified in believing anything. All that would be required would be a sufficiently outlandish but coherent set of beliefs ... [While these beliefs may cohere with one another, they] are nowhere *tied down* in any way to the evidence of [the] senses.
> (Pollock quoted in Walker 1989: 176–77; emphases added)

Furthermore, to quote one of the most popular metaphors used against coherentism, critics (in this case, Blackburn) assert that propositions, on the coherentist view, are left 'free-floating', i.e. out of touch with reality, because propositions are held only to cohere with each other and not to correspond to the world in itself. 'It is no good', Blackburn writes, 'trying *to anchor one free-floating term* by attaching it to another equally *free-floating* term' (quoted in Alcoff 1996: 185).

The difficulties involved in trying to rethink the subject–object distinction should not be underestimated, as Putnam is all too aware. He argues that the subject–object distinction needs reconceptualizing (1981: ix–xii), and offers internal realism as his contribution to the process (1981: 49–74). Internal realism denies that 'there are any [experiential] inputs *which are not themselves to some extent shaped by our concepts*, by the vocabulary we use to report and describe them', and denies also that there are 'any inputs *which admit of only one description*' (1981: 54). Truth, for the internal realist, resides in 'some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences *as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief system* and not [in] correspondence with mind-independent or dis-course-independent "states of affairs"' (1981: 50). However, Putnam's position is dismissed by many as a mere restatement of epistemological subjectivism. For example, internal realism is judged by Devitt to be synonymous with anti-realism. Devitt finds anti-realist sentiment in the following expressions of internal realism by Putnam:

> *everything* we say about an object is of the form: it is such as to affect *us* in such-and-such a way. *Nothing at all* we say about any object describes the object as it is 'in itself', independently of its effect on *us*.
>
> (Devitt 1997: 252, quoted from Putnam 1981: 61)

> I ... advance a view in which the mind does not simply 'copy' a world which admits of description by One True Theory. But my view is not a view in which the mind *makes up* the world, either (or makes it up subject to constraints imposed by 'methodological canons' and mind-independent 'sense-data'). If one must use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this: the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world. (Or, to make the metaphor even more Hegelian, the Universe makes up the Universe – with minds – collectively – playing a special role in the making up.)
>
> (Devitt 1997: 220, quoted from Putnam 1981: xi)

For Devitt, Putnam's incorporation of the subject in the construction of the world and knowledge about the world can mean only one thing: knowledge and the world are taken to fall wholly within the realm of the subject (where subjectivity is understood to stand in opposition to objectivity), and therefore to suffer from the subjective attributes of whimsy,

unreliability, caprice, in fact all the qualities that a stable, continuous, determinate, mind-independent world does not exhibit. Similarly, Alston, while not applying the term 'anti-realism' to Putnam, nevertheless accuses him of making reality *subjectively internal* (1996). As Alston makes the point:

> if the aim of thought is to satisfy its own internal standards, rather than conform itself to the character of something other than thought it is about, then we can't suppose that what determines whether our beliefs are true or false is the character of what they are about.
>
> (Alston 1996: 186)

Thought either satisfies its own internal standards or is about something other than thought; knowledge is either 'in contact with' the world or 'floats above it', merely cohering with itself. It is one or the other.

But if it is the case that metaphor is intrinsic to the configuration of the subject–object relation in epistemology, then it certainly does not follow that we have to be confined to metaphors which commit us to the oscillation between realism and anti-realism. What is needed, I suggest, is another epistemological metaphor or family of metaphors which can articulate the relation between subject and object in a way which does not repeat the internal–external dichotomy. This would be a metaphor whose subject matter is organized in such a way that both sides' commitments – the subjective predetermination of experience with anti-realism, and the realist's idea that knowledge is a representation of how things are in the world beyond subjectivity – can be accommodated in a non-polar fashion. Looking for a new metaphor to meet this end is not simply casting around for a novel or alternative image for the sake of it, but an act which acknowledges the metaphorical nature of epistemology and the possibility of there being a metaphor which can provide a much-needed re*vision* of epistemology. Such a metaphor, I think, exists, and I shall set out its philosophical origin and epistemological efficacy in the next chapter.

7 Opening and belonging

Between subject and object in Heidegger and Bachelard

In the previous chapter, we saw how a number of metaphorical themes give the contest between realism (or GME) and anti-realism (or SSK) its dichotomous character: we are required to assign priority either to the 'world' and 'the joints' of the object (with GME and the realist), or the 'world' and 'the joints' of the subject (with SSK and the anti-realist). I concluded that another epistemological metaphor or family of metaphors is needed, one which can articulate the relation between subject and object in a way which does not repeat the internal–external dichotomy. In this chapter, I argue that such a metaphor is introduced by Bachelard and Heidegger. In different ways, they configure the encounter between subject and world as an opening, which is to say that subject and world meet each other not as two pre-formed components but as entities who acquire their being through their mutual participation in or as an opening. This achieves a different kind of belonging within epistemology. Conventionally, the foundations of knowledge are *ascribed* either to the subject or to the object, hence the oscillation between realism and anti-realism. In contrast, the image of the opening works epistemologically as a metaphor for knowledge but the opposition conventionally expressed in terms of subjectivity and objectivity is ascribed differently. Quite what this means, I explain below. I also draw out the differences in Heidegger's and Bachelard's formulation of the metaphor, and suggest what impact these differences have on their theories of knowledge.

Heidegger on truth as disclosure

As we saw in the previous chapter, the opposition between epistemological subjectivism and objectivism is sustained by images which promote binary distinction, for example the distinction between what is internal to or belongs to something, and what is external to or does not belong to something. The parallel contest between correspondence and coherence brings a related binary image, one which allows either a state of belonging to or being in contact with reality, on the one hand, or a state of belonging to the subject but being detached or removed from reality, on the other. In contrast, Heidegger and Bachelard present theories of knowledge based on the

image of an opening which does not perpetuate the binary, oppositional notion of belonging.

The metaphor of opening occurs in Heidegger as part of his exposition of the Greek concept of truth as *aletheia*. As I explain in Chapter 4, *aletheia* means the 'disclosure' or the 'unconcealedness of beings'. As a concept of truth, it is distinct from and logically prior to the conventional Roman concept of truth as *veritas* or 'correspondence with the facts'. For there to be any objects that can make up the states of affairs to which our statements can correspond, there must first be the 'truth' which 'nourishes' the objects into being. This concept of truth is central to Heidegger's critique of the history of philosophy which, he asserts, has conceived of reality as a collection of already existing, self-contained objects, including humans. Against this view, Heidegger argues that the primary condition of human beings is to be immersed in and engaged with the world. The form and structure of experience, rather than coming from or corresponding to reality, as they are conventionally argued to do, arise from ontological structures whereby a realm of experience is disclosed by our perceptual faculties, for example, our openness to the visual world.

I use the word 'nourishes' above because Heidegger, in his exposition of *aletheia*, adopts Plato's metaphor of photosynthesis: just as the sun draws out a plant from the soil, so our cognitive receptivity is conceptually focused to make certain features of our environment *stand out* as prominent and tangible for us. Although *aletheia* receives its first systematic description in *Being and Time* (1996), its articulation in terms of the 'photosynthesis' metaphor appears in three later texts. Firstly, in Heidegger's 1931–32 lecture series 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth' (1998), the sunlight theme is shown to derive from Plato's idea of the good, the idea of all ideas, in the *Republic*. The good, Plato argues, like the sun, 'not only makes the things we see visible, but causes the processes of generation, growth and nourishment *without itself being such a process*' (1987a: 508). What is significant in this for our purposes is that one thing, the sun, is shown to generate a transitive, cognitive relation between two things, the generation of entities on the one hand, and their visibility or knowability on the other. As Heidegger notes, when we think of the good, we ordinarily do so in moral terms, but this is not what the term means in ancient Greek thought. Rather, the good for Plato, Heidegger declares,

> means that which is capable of something and enables another to be capable of something. Every [idea], the visible form of something, provides a look at what a being is in each case. Thus in Greek thinking the 'ideas' enable something to appear in its whatness and thus be present in its constancy. The ideas are what is in everything that is. Therefore, what makes every idea be capable as an idea – in Plato's expression: the idea of all ideas – consists in making possible the appearing, in all its visibility, of everything present.
>
> (1998: 174–75)

The idea of the good, then, is that which enables another to occur, is that which creates a transitive relation; in other words, it is that 'which is most able to shine in its shining' (1998: 175), where shining, of course, is understood as bringing something to vision. Truth as disclosure (*aletheia*) and the good are conjoined, roughly speaking, in terms of the best illumination or shining possible. Disclosure and disclosedness, Heidegger writes, 'designate at each point what is present and manifest in the region where human beings happen to dwell' (1998: 168). Plato's understanding of where human beings dwell, where they are able to move around freely, Heidegger asserts, is coordinated in terms of what can be manifest, as determined by the good. Thus, in terms of the idea of the good, disclosure means 'the unhidden always as what is accessible thanks to the idea's ability to shine' (1998: 173). But, as Rouse observes, although Heidegger employs the 'photosynthesis' (or 'light') metaphor from Plato, Heidegger rejects both Plato's 'identification of this "lighting" with an entity (a Form)' and the notion that it can be known through reason, since, on Heidegger's terms, this would amount to turning the condition of the possibility of objects into an object (2005: 132).

The second use of the 'photosynthesis' metaphor is in Heidegger's 1936 lecture series entitled 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (1971a). Art is aletheically true, he writes, in that it lets us see 'the conflict of world and earth', where 'world' refers to the opening of a realm, in the sense that a series of cares, concerns, and possibilities is placed before us, and 'earth' is the concealed domain from which the world emerges (1971a: 39–57). The metaphor is more explicit in Heidegger's discussion of *aletheia* in the context of scientific knowledge in 'The Question Concerning Technology' from 1950 (1993b: 327–28, 332). Modern physics, he claims, is dependent upon technical apparatus for the disclosure or 'bringing-forth' of a realm of representation beyond human visualizability – 'the bursting of a blossom into bloom', as he describes it (1993b: 317) – but, he warns us, unless we are aware of the fundamentally disclosive nature of technology, we stand to lose sight of the fact that for each realm which is revealed to us, other potential realms remain undisclosed.

Aletheia, pictured as a form of photosynthesis, is epistemologically significant for the impasse between realism and anti-realism in that it can accommodate both the anti-realist's commitment to the constructedness of perception and the realist's requirement that discoveries can be made about the world. With Heidegger's reading of Kant, the mind is *transcendentally* creative in that concepts make certain features of reality stand out as prominent for us, but the mind is nevertheless *empirically* acted upon or impinged upon by the objects which are made manifest as a result. Thus the mind structures perception to the extent that it provides *focused* or *focalizable receptivity* (to quote Kant's dictum: 'thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (1929: A51, B75)). In Heidegger, the transcendental–empirical distinction is

preserved as the distinction between the ontological and the ontic respectively. In *Being and Time,* the contrast is expressed in terms of (ontological) disclosure *(Erschliessen)* and (ontic) discovery *(Entdeckung)*. Objects are discovered within 'a context of things at hand', that is to say, they are relatable to a set of needs, interests or desires, and because we approach the world through our needs, desires, and interests, what is discovered will be one of a number of possibilities (1996: 145). Discovery only occurs as 'one of its *possibilities*' because it takes place within the prior disclosure of its condition of possibility, that is to say, disclosure is the ontological opening of the realm of possibilities in which ontic discovery can take place (1996: 145). In terms of the photosynthesis metaphor, the contents of the discovered world are as independent of mind as a taxonomy of plants is independent of the principles of photosynthesis; a knowledge of the principles of photosynthesis does not give me knowledge of all the *possible* plants that might flourish on the planet. It could be objected, however, that this model doesn't assign reality the inherent, mind-independent structure which the realist requires. In response, a supporter of aletheic truth would claim that the structure exists as a potentiality in the yet-to-be discovered possibilities of reality, just as the potential for plant life lies in the nutrients of the soil.

It is important to emphasize, on behalf of the realist, that this interpretation of Kant and Heidegger retains the essentially empiricist notion of the mind being acted upon directly by nature. What their transcendental (with Kant) or ontological (with Heidegger) conditions makes us realize is that the capacity to be acted upon requires predetermination. To revise Aristotle's seminal metaphor for empiricism: a signet ring can make an impression in wax *but only because the wax has been heated beforehand* (1987b: 424a). Similarly, for a sensory stimulus to be a stimulus, there has to be the appropriate sensitivity in advance, where 'sensitivity' means the capacity to transform surrounding conditions into the kind of material that can be meaningful in the first place. As Heidegger indicates, the senses, if understood in a certain way, are good illustrations of perception as *aletheia*: 'in the Greek sense what is "true" … is *aisthēsis,* the simple sense perception of something', since *aisthēsis* 'aims at its *idia* [what is its own] – the beings genuinely accessible only *through* it and *for* it, for example, … looking always discovers colours, hearing always discovers tones' (1996: 33). Furthermore, the senses make certain features of the world prominent for us, i.e. all the objects that are perceivable through vision, sound, taste, smell, texture, and bodily counter-pressure, but, *unaided*, they leave the existence of, for example, micro-organisms, atoms, and non-visual electromagnetic radiation 'buried' within the 'earth' of potential perception.

Citing Heidegger's philosophy as a way out of the realism–anti-realism debate is misguided, some might argue, since he does not have these epistemological concerns. But this is not the case. Although anti-realism as a name is coined after his time, Heidegger is nevertheless explicit in disassociating

himself from an earlier version of the binary epistemological divide. 'Realism and idealism alike', he writes, 'thoroughly miss the meaning of the Greek concept of truth from which alone the possibility of something like a "theory of Ideas" can be understood as philosophical *knowledge*' (1996: 34). A theory of Ideas is meant here in the sense of *idia* quoted above: 'what belongs to or is appropriate to something' or 'what is its own'. However, even if *Being and Time* is primarily a consideration of the fundamental ontology at work within everydayness, as opposed to a text which can be applied to epistemology, it cannot be denied that the book stems from a preoccupation with ontology, temporality, and a redefined concept of truth which has implications for contemporary epistemology. According to Harré and Grene, it is precisely the Heideggerian turn that the philosophy of science needs to take in order to avoid the aporias of orthodox epistemology (Harré 1986: 50; Grene 1983: 93–94).

If proof were needed of the applicability of Heidegger to the realism–anti-realism debate, we only have to turn to his first sustained account of *aletheia* in section 44 of *Being and Time* to find him asking a pertinent question. He asks whether Newton's laws were 'true' before they were discovered? His answer is 'no': 'before Newton's laws were discovered, they were not "true"' (1996: 226). In support of this, he adds:

> '*There is*' ['*gibt es*'] *truth only insofar as Da-sein is and as long as it is*. Beings are discovered only *when* Da-sein *is*, and only *as long* as Da-sein *is* are they disclosed. Newton's laws, the law of contradiction, and any truth whatsoever, are true only as long as Da-sein *is*. Before there was any Da-sein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Da-sein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, discovering, and discoveredness *cannot* be. Before Newton's laws were discovered, they were not 'true'. From this it does not follow that they were false or even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were possible any longer. Just as little does this 'restriction' imply a diminution of the being true of 'truths'.
>
> The fact that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false cannot mean that the beings which they point out in a discovering way did not previously exist. The laws became true through Newton, through them beings in themselves became accessible for Da-sein. With the discoveredness of beings, they show themselves precisely as the beings that previously were. To discover in this way is the kind of being of 'truth'.
>
> The fact that there are 'eternal truths' will not be adequately proven until it is successfully demonstrated that Da-sein has been and will be for all eternity. As long as this proof is lacking, the statement remains a fantastical assertion which does not gain in legitimacy by being generally 'believed' by the philosophers.
>
> (1996: 226–27, emphases in original)

Given that Heidegger largely explores truth as an ontological notion, it is somewhat confusing to find him equating truth with *ontological* disclosure and *ontic* discovery.[1] Nevertheless, it is not inconsistent to say – as Heidegger does here – that there is truth (ontological and ontic) only as long as Da-sein is. He anticipates the realist's objection that this is 'tantamount to saying that all truth is "subjective"' by pointing out that 'subjective' does not mean 'left to the arbitrariness of the subject' (1996: 227). Instead, truth, as discovering, 'exempts [subjective] statements from the province of "subjective" arbitrariness and brings discovering Da-sein before things themselves' (1996: 227). Because subjectivity is theorized as an aspect of disclosure, it is no longer to be dismissed as 'mere' or 'arbitrary' subjectivity but, rather, is to be regarded as *belonging to* the ontological process which generates a world. Da-sein cannot be identified with the subjective side of the subject–object distinction; it is not a disembodied Cartesian consciousness but a state of being-in-the-world, that is to say, a condition in which the possibility of subjectivity and the possibility of objectivity are mutually enfolded.

But isn't this rebuttal of subjectivism only achieved by Heidegger appearing to commit himself to realism in its metaphysical form, i.e. a commitment to the possibility of encountering 'beings themselves' and to discovered beings showing themselves 'precisely as the beings that previously were', where 'previously were' (one assumes) confirms that the beings existed prior to their discovery? It cannot be denied that these phrases would appear to show Heidegger falling back upon the existence of noumena. But another interpretation is possible. We can take his describing 'the fact that there are "eternal truths"' as 'fantastical' as a good indication that he does not entertain the notion of a permanently abiding noumenal realm. While the possibility of encountering 'beings themselves' sounds like a face-to-face engagement with things in themselves, we need to recall the way in which the 'in itself' is being applied. Customarily, knowledge of things in themselves is theorized as the highest or perfect form of knowledge because what is known is pictured as coming *directly and purely* from the things *themselves,* that is to say, no distortion or contamination is introduced through perception. However, this ideal assumes a two-term theory of knowledge, with knowledge presented as a series of judgments which, in its highest condition, constitutes a pure representation of the world. But as I argue in Chapter 4, the question of what is proper for Heidegger is not asked of the object in itself but asked of the *mode of disclosure of the object*. In both cases, the 'in itself' is conceptualized as falling within *the ontological boundaries of the object*; it is just that different concepts of 'the ontological boundaries of the object' are at work. With metaphysical realism, the boundaries seal the object within 'its own space' and isolate it from any subjective determination, whereas, with Heidegger, the boundaries include the process of disclosure because, on the interpretation I am giving, objects cannot exist apart from the ontological operations which bring them and the human subject into being.

It is the ontological scope of the metaphor of 'own' or 'what belongs to the object' that is at issue: we are having to decide whether use of the 'in itself' phrase entails reliance on what, for Heidegger, would be the antithetical concept of a noumenon or whether it can be found to be consistent with his philosophy of disclosure. I think the latter is possible because his fundamental ontology seeks to redraw the ontological relation in which subject and object stand to one another. Within conventional metaphysics, the noumenal realm is defined in such a way that all things subjective are exiled from it, on the understanding that subjectivity is opposed to objective, non-arbitrary determination. But as we have seen, on Heidegger's view, subjectivity *belongs to* the ontological process which generates a world. The shift in the scope of belonging is vital: from belonging to the object to belonging to the process which generates subject and object. 'The "universal validity" of truth', Heidegger writes, 'is rooted solely in the fact that Da-sein can discover and free beings in themselves', where the 'in themselves' already includes the being of Da-sein (1996: 227). Da-sein can discover and free beings in themselves because Da-sein has 'already referred itself to an encounter with a "world"' (1996: 87).

It might be objected that I am stretching the point too far in trying to preserve consistency in Heidegger. To argue that 'beings in themselves' applies not to the beings but to the process which brings them into being, the objection might run, is to contradict the recognized meaning of something in itself. But this, I maintain, cannot be taken for granted in a context where ontological boundaries and, therefore, the scope of an 'in itself' are at issue. The objector could reply by asking why Heidegger retains such loaded language if the scope of a realm is at issue. In defence of Heidegger, there is a significant sense in which it is important to retain the concept of a being in itself, but in a non-noumenal sense. This is because of the fact that *aletheia* occurs 'within its genuine realm of discovery', which is to say that what is disclosed in some sense 'belongs to' or is 'appropriate to' the ontological determination which creates the disclosure. However, this is not belonging or appropriateness theorized as the mind imposing a concept around a portion of reality, which would achieve belonging by means of the will. Instead, belonging is repositioned by Heidegger as a product of the something-as-something structure which determines how we encounter the otherness of the world. As I argue in Chapter 4, in order for consciousness to be able to open onto the world, there has to be a structure of anticipation which, on the one hand (or prong, to borrow Heidegger's image (Heidegger 2002: 221)), confers unity upon the experience while, on the other, allows that experience to occur within a range of possibilities. This is what the something-as-something structure achieves: it is the *continuous questioning* of whether what we next encounter will be *a 'this' or a 'that'* which sustains unified experience of a mind-independent reality. On this view, belonging is manifest as the permanently unresolved play of possibilities within the pliability of something being brought under concept X or concept Y, as opposed to the outright imposition of any single concept. Thus, there are

grounds for retaining the 'in itself' within Heidegger's vocabulary: not as a reference to a noumenal reality but to the permanent questioning-character of experience, occurring as an encounter with a 'this' or a 'that'.

The question of whether Heidegger's theory of truth as *aletheia* lends itself to an idealist (with anti-realist sympathies), a realist or a midway interpretation has been discussed within recent Heideggerian scholarship. Despite the fact that he supplies conceptual apparatus for the avoidance of subjectivist–objectivist conflict within epistemology, it is still the case that some commentators claim him for one side or the other. As they demonstrate, it is possible to identify passages in *Being and Time* and later texts which suggest a realist perspective and others which promote an idealist standpoint. For example, Dreyfus takes Heidegger to be an empirical (or what Dreyfus terms a 'robust') realist on the grounds that 'in situations of extreme instrumental breakdown, we encounter things as occurrent, as independent of the instrumental world – that is, as having no essential relation to our everyday coping practices' (Dreyfus 2002: 222). In contrast, Blattner claims Heidegger as an idealist, on the grounds that he situates temporality as the ontological framework for being as a whole, and that he, with Kant, maintains that time depends on us (Blattner: 2002). Both Dreyfus and Blattner, I suggest, confine Heidegger within subjectivist–objectivist epistemology because they unwittingly return to a pre-Heideggerian or pre-Kantian notion of subjectivity or 'what belongs to us', where 'we' and 'our' refer to domains that stand opposite to and distinct from the world. This, I would argue, in the context of Heidegger's philosophy, is to confuse the ontological with the empirical: to take the appearance of things as divided between conscious subjects and mind-independent objects, and make it the basis of an ontological distinction. Customarily, or in other contexts, this might be an obvious thing to do. But if the implications of Heidegger's ontology are to be realized within epistemology, then it needs to be recognized that ascriptions cannot be made straightforwardly to subject and object for these are given a more complex, aporia-avoiding relation by Heidegger. It is possible that epistemological recapitulations of the order displayed by Dreyfus and Blattner occur because it is not apparent what kind of distinction, other than that between subject and object, can account for knowledge of the world. After my exposition of Bachelard, I shall show how Heidegger's and Bachelard's epistemologies maintain a sense of belonging as the basis of an ontological distinction, but where 'subject' and 'object' are not the terms to which belonging applies.

Bachelard on the opening between subject and object

The subject–object distinction is also judged by Bachelard to be inadequate as the basis for a theory of scientific knowledge. The distinction's polar nature, he asserts, is incapable of accommodating 'the supple, mobile character of contemporary thought' (McAllester Jones 1991: 47). The supple thought he

has in mind is scientific thought. Whereas speculative philosophy is divided between thinking either from the perpsective of rationalism, with its location of laws in the human mind, or from the perspective of realism, with its location of laws in the world, developments in modern science require these perspectives to be synthesized with a suppleness or mobility which exceeds their philosophically polar 'purity' and 'unity' (McAllester Jones 1991: 48). As Tiles observes, Bachelard proposes a new, non-Cartesian epistemology which suspends 'the assumption that there are epistemological foundations and the assumption that subjective and objective are unproblematically separable in empirical knowledge' (Tiles 1984: 42).

Bachelard's approach bears comparison with Heidegger's on two accounts. Firstly, as McAllester Jones points out, Bachelard makes use of Heidegger's concept of project (McAllester Jones 1991: 43). In *The New Scientific Spirit*, Bachelard declares that 'modern science is founded upon the *project*, above the *subject* and beyond the immediate *object*. In scientific thought, whenever a subject thinks about an object, his reflection is in the form of a project' (Bachelard 1984: 11–12). Just how direct an influence Heidegger was on Bachelard is uncertain, since Heidegger's work was not well known in France in the early 1930s. However, the first translation of his work into French, the article 'De la Nature de la cause', appears alongside Bachelard's article 'Noumèet microphysique' in the first issue of *Recherches philosophiques* and, 'given [Bachelard's] appetite for the written word', McAllester Jones maintains, he 'can be assumed to have read this article' (McAllester Jones 1991: 43). In the article, 'project' is clearly employed as the ontological condition in which the human subject finds themselves implicated and active within the apparently 'external' world. 'Transcendence', Heidegger declares,

> defines the nature of the [human] subject, it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity... *Transcendence means project of the world, in such a way that the projecting being thus penetrated is as if traversed by the existent that he goes beyond.*
>   (Heidegger quoted in McAllester Jones 1991: 43, original emphasis)[2]

The second respect in which Bachelard's approach to epistemology can be compared to Heidegger's is the use of metaphor. Whereas Heidegger articulates his ontology through the figures of disclosure and blossoming, Bachelard adopts the congruent image of the 'open' attitude, in the sense of being open to the new. According to Tiles, if a new scientific epistemology is being proposed, it is necessary for a group of individuals 'to think outside the accepted norms ... [which, in turn, requires] scientists themselves to regard the framework within which they are working as open, as having a potential for development, rather than as fixed, final and closed' (1984: 64). To convey his understanding of 'open-minded rationalism' (*le rationalisme ouvert*), Bachelard quotes Gustave Juvet:

> The surprise created by a new idea or association of ideas is surely the most important element in the progress of the physical sciences, for it is astonishment that excites logic, which is always rather cold, and that forces scientists to make new connections. But the ultimate cause of progress, the reason for our surprise itself, has to be sought in the force fields that new associations of ideas set up in our minds, fields whose strength measures the good fortune of the scientists lucky enough to bring those ideas together.
>
> (Bachelard 1984: 173–74, quoted from Juvet 1933: 105)

This appeal to openness is not simply an expression of liberal-mindedness but an epistemological position which is a response to the inadequacies of the realism–rationalism divide in the face of technological, cognitive developments in modern science. The levels of reality disclosed by increasingly powerful microscopes, Bachelard thinks, constitute a 'realism reacting against everyday reality and contesting immediate experience, [a] realism which is the fruit of reason that has been realized, of reason tested by experiment' (Bachelard quoted in McAllester Jones 1991: 49). He invites epistemology to become 'a realization of the rational', a mode of thinking in which the conventional metaphysical poles of rationalism and realism, subject and object, mind and world are interwoven.

Just how 'open' reason compares with 'closed', Cartesian reason is evident in Bachelard's response to Descartes's wax example from the *Discourse on Method*. In order to demonstrate that truth is attained through the internal, self-sufficient operations of a priori reason, and not through external sensation, Descartes examines a piece of wax by the fire. Unsurprisingly, the wax melts. Descartes asks himself what he knows of the wax after it has melted, and replies: 'Certainly . . . nothing of all the things which I perceived by means of the senses, for everything which fell under [them] is changed' (Descartes 1968: 109). Thus, he dismisses the information about the wax conveyed by his senses because it is constantly changing, making it at odds with his rational conviction that there is a singular, unchanging substance before him corresponding to the concept 'wax'. In contrast, Bachelard asserts, the technological complexities of modern science mean much more attention has to be paid to the preparation and construction of the experiment or, in other words, to the way in which reason *sculpts and is sculpted by* its subject matter. The physicist would choose 'chemically pure wax produced by careful purification techniques', melting it in a crucible and then resolidifying it 'in a slow, methodical manner', thus obtaining 'a wax "droplet" whose shape and surface composition can be precisely controlled' (1984: 168). The scientist 'might expose [the droplet] to a monochromatic beam of X-rays . . . The surface molecules [of the droplet] will be oriented in a precise way relative to the surface of the drop [and this] orientation will determine the diffraction pattern of the X-rays' (1984: 168). The resultant images are crystal spectograms, images which 'have given new

life to the discipline of crystallography by enabling scientists to deduce the internal structure of various crystals... and may give us new knowledge of the surface structure of this form of matter' (1984: 168).

Attending to what is revealed by the physicist's organized intervention, Bachelard argues, constitutes 'a new way of "reading" matter' (1984: 168). The metaphor is a dangerous one in this context, because it puts us in mind of Bacon's 'alphabet of nature' and Galileo's concept of the universe as a 'great book ... written in the language of mathematics', that is to say, the concept of nature designed in a way that the human mind can access.[3] But this is not Bachelard's meaning. On his view, matter can be read in the sense that the disturbances created within it by technology are openings for new orientations and correlations to occur:

> The outer film of a substance determines its relations with the outside world, a whole new realm for physical chemistry to explore. It is by attending to this new realm that the metaphysician can best understand the influence of structure. We can examine the orientation of the molecule at various depths below the surface of the wax droplet ... [We can] observe an interesting set of phenomena having to do with the discontinuity of the molecular fields at the separation surface ... In this intermediate region, various interesting experiments reveal an interplay between the physical and chemical properties of the wax and enable the physicist to alter its *chemical nature*.
>
> (Bachelard 1984: 169)

Although Bachelard admits that changing chemical activity by mechanical means is 'in keeping with the Cartesian ideal' of knowledge, it is 'the artificial, constructive intent of the experiment, its impulse to greater and greater complexity' which locates it within a non-Cartesian dialectic (1984: 169–70). 'Construction' is another word which is loaded with connotations in scientific epistemology. For example, the principal claim from the standpoint of the strong sociology of knowledge is that knowledge is a construct, as opposed to being a series of judgments which correspond to the world. As Tiles admits, and as we have seen with Heidegger above, there is always the danger that an endeavour to avoid the oscillation between subjectivist and objectivist epistemologies is accused of ultimately being another form of subjectivism; any suggestion that mind and world are mutually constitutive is going to be seen by objectivists as a case of relativizing what they (objectivists) hold as mind-independent nature (1984: 63). But 'construction' is misunderstood if it is taken to mean, in assertions such as 'knowledge is a human construct' or 'the world is constructed by perceptual faculties', that reality or our knowledge of it is determined wholly by subjective will, where this will acts capriciously and with no constraint whatsoever. All that is needed is a short period spent building or trying to build something in order for us to recognize that construction is an interaction

between mind and material: the mind has some knowledge of, and possibly stipulates, the materials it needs within a given range of appropriate materials, but nevertheless has to know and understand the material, and respond to the possibilities which are available and the breakages which may occur. Goodman offers the same point. Languages and other symbol systems 'make worlds' – i.e. we make the stars by making the word 'star' – but with the caveat that 'not all making is a matter of moulding mud … we do not make stars as we make bricks' (Goodman 1996: 145). That is to say, 'making' does not necessarily mean bringing an object into being on a whim simply by manipulating matter, but can describe the process of negotiation between mind and matter which has to take place in order for objects or situations to be open and made manifest to us.

Ontological openings for Bachelard are created not just by increasingly powerful technological interventions in nature, but also by competing theoretical perspectives within science. In this regard, Tiles observes, Bachelard adopts a coherence theory of knowledge, making differences between perspectives occasions for insight rather than contradiction (1984: 65):

> Non-Euclidean geometry [Bachelard writes] was not invented in order to contradict Euclidean geometry. It is more in the nature of an adjunct, which makes possible an extension of the idea of geometry to its logical conclusion, subsuming Euclidean and non-Euclidean alike in an overarching 'pangeometry'. First constructed in the margins of Euclidean geometry, non-Euclidean geometry sheds a revealing light on the limitations of its predecessor. The same may be said of all the new varieties of scientific thought, which have time and again pointed up gaps in earlier forms of knowledge. We shall discover that the new doctrines share many of the same characteristic features, the same methods of extension, inference, induction, generalization, complementarity, synthesis, and integration – all equivalents for the idea of novelty.
>
> (Bachelard 1984: 8)

Cognitive gaps, Tiles suggests, are the appearance 'of something to be discovered' and, as such, demonstrate how a coherence theory of knowledge avoids subjectivism by disclosing what lies beyond the conventional or the axiomatic (Tiles 1984: 93). Coherence is created by the recurring methods of, for example, extension, inference, and induction, yet these are also 'equivalents for the idea of novelty' because they are the 'overarching' elements which allow one form of geometry to open onto another. Tiles develops the point in relation to arithmetic and geometry. Two systems of concepts – numerical and geometric – 'can be introduced axiomatically and hence as systems of conventions', Tiles argues, but it is when the systems are combined, for example, when 'numerical questions [are asked] about ratios between geometrical magnitudes', that cognitive gaps appear in both systems (1984: 95). Asking numerical questions of geometric relations would mean, to use

Tiles's example, 'knowing what the ratio [between the circumference and the diameter of a circle] is, by which is meant knowing what numerical ratio it coincides with' (1984: 95). But 'the procedures for such a determination are not given within either system' and so they 'have to be created' but not 'freely created' since 'there is the constraint of keeping consistency with both systems' (1984: 95).

The poetics of the opening in Heidegger and Bachelard

The parallel between Heidegger and Bachelard though runs deeper than the coincidence of the 'opening' image, for both trace the ontological force of their respective images back to poetry. In turn, they both explore the status of poetry as a basic condition of human being in terms of dwelling, with the crucial difference that Bachelard constructs his poetics in opposition to Heidegger's. As explained above, art is a form of truth as *aletheia* for Heidegger on the grounds that it lets us see 'the conflict of world and earth', where 'world' refers to the opening of a realm, in the sense that a series of cares, concerns, and possibilities is placed before us, and 'earth' is the concealed domain from which the world emerges (1971a: 39–57). But at the end of 'The Origin of the Work of Art', he declares that 'the nature of art is poetry', that is to say, art is at its truest, at its most *aletheic*, when it is poetic (1971a: 75). This is poetry conceived not as 'an aimless imagining of whimsicalities ... [nor as] a flight of mere notions and fancies into the realm of the unreal' but as a mode of speaking which bears upon the world ontologically (1971a: 72). Within Heidegger's phenomenology, uttering a description is never simply a case of applying words to things but a form of projection (in the sense given above) in which the everyday flow of experience is interrupted and something is made to stand out before the speaker as an object. While ordinary language is a form of projection, poetry projects in a more fundamental way. When the poet speaks, Heidegger argues, words are arranged in a way which allows truth as disclosure to happen: poetry is a form of 'saying which, in preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable *as such* into a world' (1971a: 74, emphasis added); an 'announcement is made [by the poet] of what it is beings come into the Open *as*' (1971a: 73).

The action of being brought into the world *as something* is developed by Heidegger fifteen years later in 'Poetically Man Dwells' (1971b, originally presented as a lecture in 1951). The essay title comes from the late Hölderlin poem 'In lovely blueness'. The lines run:

> Full of merit, yet poetically, man
> Dwells on this earth.
>
> (Hölderlin quoted in Heidegger 1971b: 216)

On Heidegger's reading of the lines, it is poetry that 'first causes dwelling to be dwelling', but 'how can human dwelling be understood as based on

the poetic?' (1971b: 214–15). The answer, Heidegger argues, lies in the neighbouring lines within Hölderlin's poem:

> May, if life is sheer toil, a man
> Lift his eyes and say: so
> I too wish to be? Yes. As long as Kindness,
> The Pure, still stays with his heart, man
> Not unhappily measures himself
> Against the godhead. Is God unknown?
> Is he manifest like the sky? I'd sooner
> Believe the latter. It's the measure of man.
> Full of merit, yet poetically, man
> Dwells on this earth. But no purer
> Is the shade of the starry night,
> If I might put it so, than
> Man, who's called an image of the godhead.
> Is there a measure on earth? There is
> None.
>
> (Hölderlin quoted in Heidegger 1971b: 219–20)

Humankind is 'full of merit' because 'only in the realm of sheer toil does [the human] toil for "merits"' but, in its toil, humankind is measuring itself 'against the godhead' as a way of orienting itself in the world, where God-as-measure is 'manifest like the sky' (1971b: 220). But the crucial point for Heidegger is that, on earth, there is no measure to be had. All that we are told by the poem is that 'poetically, man dwells', which can only mean that humankind measures itself poetically (1971b: 221). Heidegger assures us that this is no ordinary, empirical concept of measure. Rather, poetry is a measure in the sense that, within poetry, 'there takes place what all measuring is in the ground of its being', which is to say that measuring and orientation are conducted in and through poetic disclosure (1971b: 221). This happens because poetry is a 'revealing *as*':

> The measure consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown, is revealed as such by the sky. God's appearance through the sky consists in a disclosing that lets us see what conceals itself, but lets us see it not by seeking to wrest what is concealed out of its concealedness, but only by guarding the concealed in its self-concealment.
>
> (1971b: 223)

For the poet, the sky is not a thing or a mere appearance but the disclosure to us of 'the god who remains unknown', in other words, the sky is 'the unknown *as sky*'. Poetry as measure speaks to us in images: it discloses the alien to us or for us *as something* while simultaneously keeping it from us. This 'image of something' is not a mere external appearance or imitation

but the mode of appearance by 'which the invisible imparts itself in order to remain what it is – unknown', the 'visible inclusion ... of the alien in the sight of the familiar' (1971b: 225–26). Thus, poetry is a measure for humankind to orient itself in the world because its images are tensile: states of interaction whereby earthly form looks up to the unknown and the unknown 'yields' itself (but never completely) to earthly appearance. 'Man dwells', Heidegger writes, 'by spanning the "on the earth" and the "beneath the sky". This "on" and "beneath" belong together. Their interplay is the span that man traverses at every moment insofar as he *is* as an earthly being' (1971b: 223).

  Disclosure, then, is poetic, where the poetic is understood as a measure for dwelling: disclosed images and forms are tensile, in-between states which, through their mediated nature, provide the scope and coordination for human being. This action bears some comparison with the ontological *aletheia* developed in the period from *Being and Time* to *The Essence of Truth*. The 'central problematic' of *Being and Time*, we are told, is fathoming the relation between Da-sein (human being), *aletheia* and temporality (Heidegger 1996: 357), and, as I have shown in Chapter 4, the relation is a matter of encountering *one thing as something else*. Temporality, it was argued, is the projective mode of encounter which enables the world to appear by antici- pating and sustaining the occurrence of an object *as something*. Identifying this with 'poetic' disclosure amounts to interpreting measurement from 'Poeti- cally Man Dwells' as a form of the ontological coordination articulated by Heidegger from *Being and Time* onwards. If it is felt that this misdirects his writing on poetry back to his fundamental ontology, then the extent of the ontological significance which Heidegger wants to claim for poetry needs to be borne in mind. We dwell poetically in the sense that (poetic) transposi- tion is the mechanism which orients us in the world. But Heidegger's poetic measurement, it could be argued, is (from Hölderlin) always 'against the godhead', whereas his earlier fundamental ontology does not rely system- atically on the concept 'God' and is essentially the framework for human being as a network of possibilities. However, it is not the godhead against which human being measures itself but its poetic manifestation *as sky*, that is to say, measurement is achieved not through *immediate* contact with God (whatever that might be) but through the process whereby what is before us is not a thing or domain in itself but an encounter which necessarily *points somewhere else*. This is not in the form of a promise or aspiration which will always remain unfulfilled and therefore will always disappoint, but as an assertion of the ontological condition of human being: 'the unknown god appears as the unknown by way of the sky's manifestness. This appearance is the measure against which man measures himself' (1971b: 223). Further- more, the notion that human being 'looks toward God' for its essence or for the possibility of transcendence is identified by Heidegger, in *Being and Time,* with traditional anthropology, and is dismissed by him for leaving the form of humanity's contact with God – 'looking toward' or being 'drawn toward' or being 'in the image of' God – 'ontologically undetermined' (1996: 49).

Bachelard, like Heidegger, locates his epistemological concept of the opening between subject and object within poetry but, unlike Heidegger, Bachelard does not construct an architectonic which allows his writings on poetry to be referred back to his philosophy of science. The disagreement within Bachelardian scholarship over whether or not his philosophies of science and poetry are conjoined is acknowledged by McAllester Jones: 'the two aspects of his work are proved by some to be quite distinct, by others to have unity; his work on the poetic imagination is for certain critics a betrayal of his epistemology, while others regard it as paramount, the crown of that epistemology' (1991: 91). According to McAllester Jones, Bachelard does maintain in his later years, and in particular his last three books on poetry, that the two aspects of his work are different, but, she points out, and rightly to my mind, 'difference for him does not ... imply contradiction or total opposition' (1991: 91).

It is in the earliest of these three books, *The Poetics of Space* from 1957, that Bachelard's poetic exploration of the opening occurs. Here, his scientific interest in overcoming the subject–object distinction would seem to be the motivation for his poetic study. Contemporary philosophy, he declares, is suffering from a 'geometrical cancerization of [its] linguistic tissue' (Bachelard 1969: 213). The geometry in question is the spatial division between outside and inside which has been 'endowed with unsupervised powers of ontological determination' and, as a result, become the schema in terms of which philosophy conceives of human being and thought: 'philosophers, when confronted with outside and inside, think in terms of being and non-being ... Man's being is confronted with the world's being, as though primitivity could be easily arrived at' (1969: 211-12). Although Heidegger is not mentioned by name, his concept of Da-sein or being-there is identified as one 'in which the outside features blend with the inside' (1969: 213). However, instead of finding it a plausible response to the geometrification of thought, Bachelard dismisses the term, and the philosophy of which it is a part, as 'a language of agglutination' (*une langue agglutinante*) (1969: 213). Such a language permanently runs the risk of 'prefixes and suffixes – especially prefixes – [becoming] unwelded', and the problems which result, rather than helping to challenge spatial, oppositional thinking, will instead be 'sharply summarized in a geometrical fashion' (1969: 213).

Avoiding verbal conjunctions which simply preserve outside and inside 'in their simple reciprocity', Bachelard proposes to undertake what he calls 'concrete poetics': 'I shall ask a poet to provide an image that is sufficiently new in its *nuance of being* to furnish a lesson in ontological amplification' (1969: 216). The outside–inside distinction is too geometric or simplistic to serve epistemology, but in poetry the descriptions of outsides and insides are more detailed and nuanced and, as such, can provide images that suggest a richer and more complex relation between subject and object. Within the context of Bachelard's 'phenomenology of poetic imagination',

the being of man is 'considered as the being of a *surface*, of the surface that separates the region of the same from the region of the other' (1969: 222). In contrast to the paucity of geometric imagery, which divides the surface in merely binary, reciprocal terms, poetic imagery lets 'waves of newness flow over the surface of being', finding 'opening[s] and closing[s]' on the surface that 'are so numerous, so frequently inverted, and so charged with hesitation, that we could conclude on the following formula: [the hu]man is half-open being' (1969: 222). This detailed, concrete poetics comes not just from the 'opening up' of poetic expression (in contrast to the 'enclosing' action of literal language), but from the poetic expression of a particular theme: the human as 'half-open being' or 'the door':

> The door is an entire cosmos of the Half-open. In fact, it is one of its primal images, the very origin of a daydream that accumulates desires and temptations: the temptation to open up the ultimate depths of being, and the desire to conquer all reticent beings...
>   On May nights, when so many doors are closed, there is one that is just barely ajar. We have only to give it a very slight push! The hinges have been well oiled. And our fate becomes visible.
>
> (1969: 222–23)

The door is not merely one theme among others, but a subject which, through the arc of possibilities cast by its hinges, through the variety of human encounters which occur at or across doorways, embodies the density and complexity of detail necessary for the amplification of subject–world interaction. The first example selected by Bachelard is from Jean Pellerin's *La Romance du retour*:

> La porte me flaire, elle hésite.
> [The door scents me, it hesitates.]
>
> (1969: 223)

As Bachelard warns us, the attribution of sensory capacities to the door might make the reader 'who attaches importance to objectivity ... see [in the line] mere brain-play' (1969: 223). But more than mere brain- or word-play is at work here. He wants us to take the attribution seriously: 'Why not take the poet's verse as a small element of spontaneous mythology? Why not sense that, incarnated in the door, there is a little threshold god?' (1969: 223). What is notable, as far as this comparison of Heidegger and Bachelard is concerned, is that a sensory modality becomes a mode of access to that which is beyond the senses, a god. Just as the sight of the sky, for Heidegger, becomes the means by which an invisible god 'imparts itself in order to remain ... unknown', so Bachelard focuses on smell as the modality which, through its complex and diffuse interactions, lets us have some sensory intimation of the open subject–world threshold.

However, on closer inspection, the similarity breaks down. It is not the status of smell as a mediator between subject and world which holds Bachelard's interest but the act of *mis*attribution: 'Why not sense that, incarnated in the door, *there is a little threshold god?*' (1969: 223, emphasis added). We are asked to admit that there is 'a little threshold god' not in any literal sense, assuming that the literal–figurative distinction is meaningful or applicable in this context, but rather as part of a wider project of being playful with, as opposed to respectful of, the categories and ontologies which determine the attribution of predicates to subjects. Misattribution achieves ontological amplification because, in Bachelard's words, 'through the newness of the image and through its amplification, we shall be sure to reverberate above, or on the margins of reasonable certainties' (1969: 216). As McAllester Jones argues, underlying Bachelard's philosophies of science and poetry is 'the idea of deformation, ... the dynamic character of thought' (McAllester Jones 1991: 96). He reads the images of Lautréamont (in his 1939 book on the poet) 'not as a mad distortion of immediate reality but as a realizing of the possibilities of reality: a fishtail with wings, a particle behaving like a wave, why not?' (1991: 97). Thus, the sense of smell is not transformed by Bachelard into a tensile, opposition-mediating state, as the appearance of the sky is with Heidegger. Instead, smell comes with Pellerin's door as one predicate among others, assigned to the door as part of the playful mismatching of subject and predicate.

But how does Bachelard understand concrete poetics or ontological amplification to take place? The phrase 'concrete poetics' *would appear to be* a reassertion of his anti-Cartesianism, in that it combines mind-independent physicality with subjective imagination. But how is the relation between language and ontology within it to be understood? He does not provide us with, as Heidegger does, an explicit ontology in which the poetic is located as the principal mechanism of world-disclosure. Instead, we are thrown back again on the question of the relation between poetry and science in Bachelard's thought. As noted above, there is disagreement within Bachelardian scholarship over continuity between the two areas but, fortunately for us, he gives an indication in his poetics of the doorway that continuity is intended here. 'The abnormal nature of the image' under consideration – in this case, the 'reversal of dimensions ... of inside and outside' experienced by the poet – 'does not mean that [the image] is artificially produced, for the imagination is the most natural of faculties ... Every [poetic] project is a contexture of images and thoughts that supposes a grasp of reality' (1969: 226). The imagination then is a part of nature, and 'concrete poetics' is a reassertion of anti-Cartesianism, on the understanding (from Bachelard's philosophy of science) that subjectivity and objectivity are not separable in empirical knowledge. As we saw in Bachelard's account of experiment design, subjective thought *sculpts and is sculpted by* its subject matter. Ontological amplification can take place through poetry because poetic subject–predicate arrangements, far from being events within an isolated,

subjective mind, are departures from real-world possibilities *which never-theless belong to the world as possibilities that the human mind* (active and located within the world) *sees within it*.

This might be a difficult arrangement to countenance within the context of the realism–anti-realism debate. Bachelard asserts that 'the imagination is the most natural of faculties' in order to rescue the poetic image from a charge of waywardness or outright subjectivity and reclaim some objectivity or reality-directedness for it. However, to assign 'a grasp of reality' to the imagination after advocating ontological playfulness, in which poetic com-binations of subject and predicate are entertained, could be mistaken for a form of ontological relativism: the imagination is a part of nature; therefore (the argument runs), we should entertain the possibility of the existence of any subject–predicate combination that the imagination produces. Heidegger avoids this predicament because he works with the ontological–empirical distinction: the preparatory ontological structure of something appearing *as something* does not impose its determination upon empirical reality (in a relativistic fashion) but allows it to appear as a play of possibilities. However, it would seem that there is no comparable epistemological apparatus in Bachelard to prevent his philosophy of poetry from entailing a relativistic philosophy of science. Even McAllester Jones goes so far as to admit that, with regard to playful subject–predicate combinations, Bachelard 'was used to thinking in terms of second-order reality, constructed rather than found', as opposed to (what I assume to be) first-order reality, that is, reality in itself (1991: 97).

But I think we and McAllester Jones are in danger of missing the point, and missing certain clues that save Bachelard from relativism. To think we find relativism in Bachelard on account of the idea that ontologically play-ful subject–predicate combinations are generated by the imagination, as a part of reality, is to assume that the *imaginative predication* is imposed on a *mind-independent reality*. But this is not his thinking at all, for it reverts back to the two-term metaphysics which Bachelard rejects. Admittedly, Bachelard himself occasionally falls back on conventional metaphysics.[4] But he provides us with enough to plot a coherent path away from relativism. Firstly, the fact that Bachelard provides an epistemology in which imagina-tion and reality are interwoven means that a two-term interpretation, in which we take him to impose poetic ontologies on the world, cannot be given. The notion of imposition is supplied here in line with conventional thinking on how mind–world transitivity – the opening of mind onto the world – is visualized: the mind, as something detached from the world (on the conventional view), comes into contact with it by imposing its mode of perception onto malleable, indeterminate reality. However, with Bachelard, the opening of mind onto world is already built into his epistemology: cognitive possibilities are generated through the constructions, manipulations, and transformations of a mind already located in and engaged with the world.

Secondly, the charge of relativism assumes a one-to-one image-reality correspondence but, again, this does not represent Bachelard's view. It is

not the fact that he intends a certain possibility of being to follow from each and every poetic image individually. Rather, a poem, as a project (in the Heideggerian sense, one assumes) 'grasps reality' through its being 'a contexture of images and thoughts' (1969: 225). The movement from one image to the next, or from an image to a thought, highlights differences and the possibility of novelty:

> [The phenomenologist] takes the image just as it is, just as the poet created it, and tries to make it his own, to feed on this rare fruit. He brings the image to the very limit of what he is able to imagine. However far from being a poet he himself may be, he tries to repeat its creation for himself and, if possible, continue its exaggeration. Here association ceases to be fortuitous, but is sought after, willed. It is a poetic, specifically poetic, constitution. It is sublimation that is entirely rid of the organic or psychic weights from which one wanted to be free. In other words, it corresponds to pure sublimation.
>
> (1969: 227)

Sublimation is an ontological term for Bachelard, signalling the capacity of a poem to exceed the life or experiences of the poet and to achieve 'a felicity of its own', a wider truth about the locatedness of the human within the world (1969: xxx). The movement from contexture to sublimation reaffirms the significance of the doorway: the capacity of a poem to touch reality arises from the interconnection of its images, the passage from one space to another. On this basis, the objectivity of imagination derives not from any relativistic imposition of subjective will onto the world but from the insight or excess generated by associations between images and thoughts. In this regard, there would appear to be a parallel between Bachelard's philosophy of poetry and his coherentist philosophy of science. From a coherentist perspective, a claim or image is objective in virtue of its coherence with other claims or images. This is how openness is theorized within Bachelard's philosophy of science: the paradigms of geometry or the preparations involved in experimentation 'interlock' through competition or intersection – coherence does not have to be 'smooth' or 'seamless' – to realize what exceeds the limits of the constituent practices. Just as non-Euclidean geometry intersects with Euclidean geometry to create a new horizon for both, so a poetic image grasps its reality or achieves sublimation in virtue of the other images and associations that might be conjoined with it.

The epistemological status of belonging

The poetic ontology which Bachelard produces as a departure from Heidegger's 'language of agglutination' in actual fact bears strong similarities with Heidegger's philosophy as it develops after *Being and Time*. Ironically, these are developments which are contemporaneous with Bachelard's work, and

which see Heidegger drawing on architectonic to a lesser degree and on poetry to a greater degree. For both, conventional subject–object metaphysics is overturned in favour of ontologies in which subject and object are mutually constitutive, and in which the interaction between subject and object is theorized as an opening generated by poetic transposition. If there are any differences between them, they are over language and ontology. Of course, these are central concepts and it is hard to think of others which could be more urgent for an assessment of the differences between Heidegger and Bachelard. But given the territory we are in – the relation between poetics and ontology – it is difficult to be certain on how sharply the differences can be drawn. In Bachelard's view, the problem with terminology like Heidegger's, as noted above, is that 'prefixes and suffixes – especially prefixes – [can] become unwelded', and the problems which result, rather than helping to challenge spatial, oppositional thinking, will instead be 'sharply summarized in a geometrical fashion' (1969: 213). His criticism is directed against the 'dogmatization of philosophemes as soon as they are expressed': the danger that new terms, such as Da-sein or disclosure (*Erschliessen*), are reduced to expressions that refer to objects or processes within conventional metaphysics, rather than remaining as concepts which challenge established modes of objectification (1969: 213). The criticism is motivated though by the difference between the French and German language: 'in the tonal quality of the French language', Bachelard writes, 'the *là* (there) is so forceful, that to designate being (*l'être*) by *être-là* is to point an energetic forefinger that might easily relegate intimate being to an exteriorized place' (1969: 213). Instead of introducing new terminology, Bachelard aims for sublimation through concrete poetics, based on the understanding that images and thoughts are a part of reality but can exceed themselves, can generate insight, through interconnection.

Against Bachelard's criticism, one could argue that Heidegger's prefixes and suffixes are important, certainly within German, as a way of introducing alternative ontological distinctions into the world. They are part of the articulation of an ontology which, alongside Bachelard's, has the transpositional or metaphoric structure of encountering something as something else. To argue that technical terminology necessarily leads to the objectification of its terms commits Bachelard to asserting that Heidegger's ontological–ontic vocabulary can only ever reinforce the opposition between fundamental, ontological structure and empirical (ontic) reality. But this is to give referential and, ultimately, ontological weight to the mere appearance of a word or words, and to overlook the nature of the relation into which Heidegger places the ontological and the ontic. As I show in Chapters 1 and 4, the two are not to be regarded as distinct realms, with the ontological behind (or in any spatial relation with) the ontic; rather, the ontological is a structure of enablement for the ontic, its anticipatory apprehension of an entity *as something* providing the space of possibility within which the ontic can appear. Thus, technical terms are not necessarily hostages to objectification but can

be components in the articulation of a new model of objectivity. Bachelard is also mistaken in thinking that he avoids the introduction of philosophemes. Although his coinages are not as forthright as Heidegger's, he nevertheless leaves a trail of 'openings', 'ontological amplifications', 'concrete poetics' and 'sublimations' which cohere to form a standpoint opposed to conventional metaphysics. Admittedly, we have had to carry out the interpretive work in demonstrating coherence in Bachelard, but the coherence is not just for coherence's sake: if the claim that concrete poetics can generate an epistemology of sublimation is to count for anything, then a series of technical concepts needs to be in place in order to demonstrate how the technicalities of traditional epistemology are being overturned.

The main consideration as far as we are concerned is that both Heidegger and Bachelard provide theories of knowledge in which the epistemological status of 'belonging' is repositioned, on two accounts. The first involves the relation between subject and object. In contrast to orthodox epistemologies which are limited to thinking in terms of what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the object, Heidegger and Bachelard present ontologies in which it is not so easy to demarcate between what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the object. This is because the subject encounters the world as an opening, which is to say that both subject and world open before one another as part of the same action. For Heidegger, the human encounter with the world 'blossoms' within truth as *aletheia* while, for Bachelard, the mind is located in the world through a series of openings or cognitive gaps created through technological intervention or when two areas of understanding are brought together. 'Belonging' is epistemologically repositioned in the following way: rather than being something that *can be taken for granted*, with the subject possessing some qualities and the object possessing others, it is instead *left permanently as a question*, on account of knowledge being theorized as a process in which mind and world are mutually sustaining and always interactive. It might seem unsatisfactory or vague to have something left permanently as a question, but this assumes that the question is in need of an answer. However, this is not the case; the question is not an absence which needs to be filled. Belonging-as-a-question remains *open* as a question because it expresses the openness of the tensile relation between subject and object. Uncertainty of attribution (to adopt a loaded and seemingly negative word against my interpretation) has to remain because it is the zig-zagging backwards and forwards which sustains the opening, which sustains the disclosure and the coherence in Heidegger and Bachelard respectively. For example, the questioning of belonging, I suggest, is active in Heidegger's assertions that physical laws 'became true through Newton' (1996: 227) and that truth, as subjective, is not 'left to the arbitrariness of the subject' (1996: 227). The same questioning of belonging, I maintain, motivates Bachelard's depiction of scientific knowledge as 'a new way of "reading" matter' (1984: 168), and his characterization of 'the outer film of a substance' as something which 'determine[s] its relations with

the outside world' and, therefore, makes it 'a whole new realm for physical chemistry to explore' (1984: 169).

As a part of this realignment of the epistemological status of 'belonging', the term is reapplied for a second time as the poetic mechanism which generates the opening. That is to say, the ontological concept of an opening requires us to think of belonging in a new epistemological setting (the sense just outlined), but then this setting relies on the term in a second, poetic context. For Heidegger, what emerges in the space of an opening is a range of possibilities, and these can only appear in the opening because of the projection of something as something else; the play or uncertainty between categories creates the leeway which allows what is before the subject to manifest itself as an object in the world. In Bachelard's ontology, the mind is located within nature, and their interaction as an opening is generated by poetic conjunctions between images and thoughts, with the passage – through a doorway – from one space to another creating combinations which exceed what is currently recognized within the world. In its poetic application, belonging is exercised not so much *as a question* but as something which *is challenged or tested*. The disturbance made by moving attributes from one space to another, from a predicate to an unconventional subject, stimulates other possible articulations or arrangements within both philosophers' frameworks of experience: the ontological structuring of the ontic or the empirical, for Heidegger, and the creative coherence between one theory or term and another, for Bachelard. These disturbances or rearrangements in patterns of belonging – something as something else or the movement from one concept to another – can create the opening between subject and object because it is the element of challenge which amounts to asserting that what a particular thing is conceived to be is not yet complete; the conjunction with another thing introduces the new or the 'other' or what is customarily theorized as 'beyond mind'.

Mind-independence is traditionally conceptualized in spatial terms, the subject on the inside and the world on the outside, with the externality and mind-independence of the world accounting for the vivacity and otherness of experience. But, as we have seen, it is the binarism inherent in concepts of 'inside' and 'outside' that Heidegger and Bachelard are opposing. The positions they take up in response, it could be objected, involve frameworks – of ontological predetermination or coherence – which appear to be largely or wholly self-contained and, therefore, not able to account for the transitive, object-directed character of experience. Working against my position here is how 'self-contained' is understood. The implication is that both Heidegger and Bachelard introduce ontologies which, because of their reliance on ('internal' would be the conventional adjective to use here, but I shall refrain from doing so) as-determination or coherence, are somehow 'at a remove' from experience and operating wholly within their own terms. But it is precisely the notion of 'its own terms' which cannot be taken for granted. Customarily, it would be taken to mean 'within its own terms, to the

exclusion of reality beyond it', where 'exclusion' denotes either that reality has been left out or has been incorporated only to be overrun or ignored. But such an interpretation is not permissible here, for the frameworks include reality in such a way that it presents itself or makes itself manifest as an opening, through the poetic challenges to belonging just described. In giving this answer, I seem to fall the other way, and rely on the notion of a reality presenting itself, that is, presenting itself as an in-itself. But I only seem to do this, for it is not a pure in-itself that I am referring to but reality as it *presents itself* or as it *manifests itself*, where the emphasis on 'presentation' and 'manifestation' signals the emergence of reality as part of an opening in which what belongs to mind and what belongs to world remain in question. To think that this falls back the other way and subjectivizes reality is, once again, to regard the subject as an entity opposed to objectivity which impresses its waywardness on the world.

These concerns come close to those I address with Nietzsche in Chapter 5. His ontology of wills rejects conventional notions of what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the object, and presents mind and world as being constituted by the same kind of entity: intersecting forces. Although Nietzsche's position is distinct from Heidegger's and Bachelard's, the three nevertheless use transposition as a frictional or tensional relation to turn what would ordinarily be regarded as a uniform or monistic principle – will with Nietzsche, ontology with Heidegger, and realized rationality with Bachelard – into ontologies which accommodate the subject's openness to and participation in the world. What this chapter has shown is that images for epistemology are possible which do not repeat the binary conflicts of the realism–anti-realism divide, and that a complexity of imagery and association created by metaphor can be applied where previously there was only a binary opposition. Complexity here is advantageous because it 'thickens' an issue and thereby helps to prevent it from being reduced to oppositional terms. In particular, it allows reference to reality within the science wars in terms other than 'a domain that is given' (as held by realism or 'glass mirror epistemology') or 'a domain shaped by mind' (the view ascribed to anti-realism and the strong sociology of knowledge). In place of these 'domain' metaphors are the figures of 'opening' and 'belonging': reality opens before the subject through an interplay of belonging.

There is the view, identified with Rorty in the previous chapter, that epistemological questions about appearance versus reality are irrelevant to any assessment of the social or political value of knowledge (1980, 1982). On this account, whether we think we are dealing with reality as it is or reality as it appears to us does not alter the fact that it is the reality we have to deal with in constructing a better existence. However, the theories of Heidegger and Bachelard, far from conforming merely to subjective positions in epistemology (as they are interpreted by Blattner (2002) and McAllester Jones (1991: 97) respectively), in actual fact ascribe new political urgency to epistemology on account of the role which the question of

belonging plays within them. I am not thinking here of questions of 'Whose reality?' or 'To whom does reality belong?'; these are questions for the anti-realist in as much as they assume that reality is a domain which can be carved up by one subjective conceptual scheme or another. Rather, the question of belonging as it is put to work by Heidegger and Bachelard, I suggest, has (what might be termed) 'ecological' implications for epistemology, on the grounds that mind and world can only be seen as relational terms, with the scope of mind in the world, and the scope of world in the mind, always remaining open and undecided. This would be ecology as ontology: a theory of entities which does not allow the being or interests of the subject to be imposed upon the object, or vice versa, for the simple reason that the two are conjoined by the uncertainty of what belongs to one and what belongs to the other. The lack of resolution is not a weakness but simply the state of affairs which arises from mind and world occurring as an opening before one another. Admittedly, the lack of resolution leaves us in a position where we are unable to distinguish between mind and world as circum-scribable entities or regions to which a specific set of attributes can be assigned, but the desire to do so and the view that it is important to do so are commitments determined by spatial, region-centred images of objectiv-ity. From a phenomenological point of view, the human being is always open and constituted by its ongoing participation in the world, and the world is always an engaged world. This is not to subjectivize reality, but to present transformation – from perception in terms of one thing to perception in terms of another – as a mechanism for the coherent (aporia-avoiding) articulation of the subject–object relation in epistemology.

8 Metaphor and metaphysics in Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida

Metaphor and metaphysics are finely interwoven in the work of Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida. The 'woven' metaphor is intentional. The relation between metaphor and metaphysics is a complex one, requiring assessment or reassessment of how fundamental concepts, such as art, language, perception, truth, and reality, are interlaced with one another. In Ricoeur's and Derrida's responses to Heidegger's metaphysics, and in Ricoeur's and Derrida's responses to each other, there is a dense network of agreement and disagreement over what the relations between these fundamental concepts might be. For Ricoeur, the interwoven nature of metaphor and metaphysics appears as his notion of the intersection of discourses while, for Derrida, it unfolds as the many meanings of the *retrait* of metaphor. As Derrida points out in 'The *Retrait* of Metaphor', there is much that he and Ricoeur agree upon, yet there are also many respects in which they diverge (Derrida 1998: 107). In this chapter, I plot Ricoeur's and Derrida's responses to the question of metaphor and metaphysics as it is posed by Heidegger, and argue that Heidegger's fundamental ontology makes available an understanding of metaphor which requires us to rethink how Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida stand in relation to one another.

Ricoeur and Derrida

According to Ricoeur in *The Rule of Metaphor*, there is a 'theoretical core common to Heidegger and Derrida, namely, the supposed collusion between the metaphorical pair of the proper and the figurative and the metaphysical pair of the visible and the invisible' (1978a: 294). Derrida's congruence with Heidegger, as Ricoeur sees it, is present in the former's essay 'White Mythology'. There, Ricoeur declares in his summary of the essay, the theory of metaphor is shown to be 'metaphorically stated', that is to say, 'the theory of metaphor [as presented by Derrida] returns in a circular manner to the metaphor of theory', with the consequence that 'there can be no principle for delimiting metaphor, no definition in which the defining does not contain the defined; metaphoricity is absolutely uncontrollable' (1978a: 287). The reason why this tactic should align Derrida

with Heidegger, Ricoeur argues, is that it relies upon perceiving concepts as terms whose meaning is essentially a paradigmatic or 'vertical' relation with an opposite meaning or with a dead metaphor; this is in contrast to the syntagmatic or 'horizontal' relations created between concepts in a sentence. The perception of both metaphor and metaphysics as 'vertical' relations, the former between the literal and the metaphorical and the latter between the sensible and the intelligible, is the reason, Ricoeur thinks, why Heidegger announces, in *The Principle of Reason*, that 'the metaphorical exists only within metaphysics' (Heidegger 1991: 48). 'The "raising" by which worn-out metaphor is concealed in the figure of the concept', Ricoeur argues, 'is not just some fact of language. It is the pre-eminent philosophical gesture that, in a "metaphysical" orientation, sights the invisible beyond the visible, the intelligible beyond the sensible, after having first separated them' (1978a: 287). Similarly, it is the act of raising or revivifying the dead metaphorical roots in concepts which enables the deconstructionist to reduce metaphysical discourse to aporias, for example, Derrida's claim that the theory of metaphor is itself metaphorical (1978a: 287).

However, Derrida is surprised by the way his analysis in 'White Mythology' is read by Ricoeur. In his second essay on the relation between metaphor and metaphysics, 'The *Retrait* of Metaphor', Derrida finds that the charges levelled against him by Ricoeur are statements which he (Derrida) in actual fact supports and, more perplexingly for Derrida, where indications of his support are already before Ricoeur in 'White Mythology': 'it is because I sometimes subscribe to some of Ricoeur's propositions that I am tempted to protest when I see him turn them back against me as if they were not already evident in what I have written' (1998: 107). Confusion arises, Derrida thinks, because Ricoeur takes Derrida's statements to be assertions which he is defending when in fact they are statements which Derrida is 'putting into question' in what he terms ('for the sake of speed') 'a deconstructive mode' (1998: 108). That is to say, Ricoeur misses the deconstructive 'twist' which redirects statements from being outright assertions to being encounters or negotiations with 'the intractable structure in which we are implicated and deflected from the outset' (1998: 109).

As proof that he does not share Heidegger's identification of the literal–metaphorical and the sensible–intelligible oppositions, Derrida cites note 19 from 'White Mythology' where he affirms that the sensible–non-sensible opposition stressed by Heidegger is 'an important trait *but not the only, nor doubtless the first to appear, nor the most determinant for the value of metaphor*' (1998: 108, emphasis added). As Wood observes, Derrida's ambition is to show that metaphor 'is constituted not [just] by a single opposition' but by a whole series of concepts and associations making up what could be referred to as metaphorical discourse, including: 'wear and tear (abstract concepts are just worn out metaphors), life and death (living and dead metaphors), transportation, transference, transposition, use/usage/usury, home, proper place, and so on' (1990: 39). In response to Ricoeur's criticism

that deconstruction treats concepts as worn-out metaphors whose history of wear and tear is always available for manipulation, Derrida insists that Ricoeur has failed to recognize the status of the manipulation which he (Derrida) exercises. This is not manipulation carried out as an assertion to which Derrida is putting his name; it is not a 'triumphant perversity on my part' (1998: 109). Rather, it is once again a form of 'putting into question' through the deconstructive mode of working with the 'intractable structure' of concepts within which we are implicated, while at the same time trying to demonstrate or reveal the intractability with which certain concepts determine thought. Thus, when Derrida writes, in 'White Mythology', that 'the concept of wear and tear ... most certainly [belongs] to the concept of metaphor itself and to the long metaphysical sequence which it determines or which determines it', he is not stating his position but describing a condition or 'philosophical construction' in need of examination (1998: 109).

Much of Ricoeur's criticism of Derrida's 'White Mythology', then, would seem to be attributable to an interpretation or misinterpretation of deconstructive writing as claim-making. This is not necessarily a lack of interpretive insight or rigour on Ricoeur's part. The status of deconstructive writing in relation to the claims of philosophy has been much discussed, perhaps most notably in the exchange between Rorty and Norris over whether or not deconstruction amounts to treating all philosophical claim-making as storytelling or as 'a kind of writing' to use Rorty's phrase (Norris 1989, 1990; Rorty 1982, 1991). In the case of Ricoeur and Derrida, it cannot be denied that there is a difference in what might loosely be termed their styles, or what might more precisely be described as the way in which their philosophical positions on language are manifest in their writing. While Ricoeur's style is conventionally academic or theoretical in that it maintains a transitive relation with its object of study, that is, he writes *about* metaphor and metaphysics, Derrida adopts a more 'embodied' or 'performative' approach to language, allowing a structuralist thesis on the differential nature of meaning to reveal itself in his writing in the form of word play, association, and the revivification of metaphors. As a result, his engagement with a subject takes not so much the form of a passage steered by a single, guiding mind but more the form of a network of associations and oppositions intended to show how a philosophical position or standpoint is implicated within a web of meanings.

This difference aside, it would appear that there is some common ground between Ricoeur and Derrida with regard to metaphor and metaphysics in Heidegger. Both are intrigued as to why the use of metaphor and the reliance on poetry in Heidegger's writing seem to exceed or contradict the explicit statements he makes about metaphor. As Ricoeur puts it: 'what Heidegger does when he interprets poets as philosophers is infinitely more important than what he says polemically' when he casts 'metaphors as particular philosophical statements' (1978a: 282). And for Derrida, 'the metaphoric power of the Heideggerian text is richer, more determinant than his

thesis on metaphor' (1998: 115). Furthermore, Derrida admits his 'indebtedness' to Ricoeur and the fact that he 'sometimes subscribe[s] to some of Ricoeur's propositions' (1998: 107). The propositions in question, as might be gleaned from the comparison above, are to the effect that metaphor is not contained by metaphysics, and that neither metaphor nor metaphysics can be reduced to single oppositions (literal–metaphorical and sensible–intelligible, respectively). Building on this, there is a shared interest in redefining the relation between metaphor and metaphysics as 'intersecting' discourses, as opposed to discourses where the former is 'contained' by the latter. In *The Rule of Metaphor*, Ricoeur proposes that new metaphorical meaning is the result of the interaction between metaphorical and speculative discourse. Metaphorical discourse is the domain in which new expressions are created but not conceptualized or translated; it is where inventive metaphors receive their first outing. Instances of the discourse might be a poem, a narrative or an essay. Speculative discourse is the domain of the concept and, furthermore, the domain in which the concept can be predicated of an object. It is this discourse which focuses the play of meanings thrown up by metaphor into a proposition that revivifies our perception of the world. In turn, shortly after indicating that the 'watchword' for Ricoeur's analysis is 'intersection', Derrida announces his intention to adopt the theme of 'entanglement' or 'interlacing' as the 'thread' which will guide his 'readings, interpretations or re-writings' of 'Heidegger's immense corpus' in 'The *Retrait* of Metaphor' (1998: 112). However, immediately after this announcement, he decides 'to leave this theme [of entanglement] withdrawn (*en retrait*)' since 'it would not have been economical enough' as a means of organizing his way through the breadth of material in Heidegger (1998: 112). But this is no literal or straightforward declaration of withdrawal; 'interlacing' is not being dismissed as irrelevant. Rather, it is a use of 'withdrawal' that is mindful of the multiple associations which Derrida extracts from *entrait* and *retrait* in the essay. In effect, it is a conjunction of 'interlacing' with the notion of withdrawal which will enable Derrida to reintroduce 'interlacing' later in the essay as part of his deconstruction of withdrawal in Heidegger.

My intention here is to compare the ways in which 'intersection' and 'entanglement' operate in Ricoeur's and Derrida's studies of metaphor and metaphysics. While Ricoeur presents his theory of the intersection of discourses in contradistinction to Heidegger's 'metaphorical within the metaphysical', Derrida remains very much within the context of Heidegger, and offers his intervention within the fields of metaphor and metaphysics as re-readings and re-writings of Heidegger. However, it is not simply the case that a comparison between Ricoeur and Derrida on this topic only has their textual attitudes to Heidegger to go on. If the lines of interpretation outlined so far would appear to be on divergent paths, I can declare here that they nevertheless curve back and eventually cross one another. This is because Ricoeur's philosophical direction and Derrida's textual direction

converge at a point or region that, for the moment, is best described as midway between Kant and Heidegger. Let us examine these intersections more closely.

Spatial thinking: between Ricoeur and Derrida

Stellardi, in his study of Heidegger and Derrida, argues that Ricoeur and Derrida maintain radically distinct positions with regard to metaphor and metaphysics. While Stellardi recognizes the importance of the concept of 'interlacing' for Derrida, he insists that 'Ricoeur's dialectics of belonging and distantiation, in which speculative [or philosophical] thought . . . installs itself, does not correspond to Derrida's interlacing of belonging and over-coming' (2000: 103). To some extent, one has to agree with Stellardi on account of the differences in philosophical style between Ricoeur and Derrida noted above. As Stellardi makes the point, 'Ricoeur's philosophy is con-stantly "in quest", open to all manner of interactions with other modes of discourse, and it looks for different ways and forms' (2000: 103). Thus, Ricoeur is in conventional, transitive 'quest' mode, seeking to articulate a theory of metaphor, whereas Derrida is in deconstructive mode, questioning concepts or claims through his performative engagement with oppositions and associations.

However, to my mind, Stellardi overlooks the extent to which the concept of intersection operates in Ricoeur's theory. Because Ricoeur is a theorist 'in quest', Stellardi reasons that thought in his analysis 'never risks its own point of foundation, because [quoting Ricoeur] "speculative discourse has its necessity in itself, in putting the resources of conceptual articulation to work. These are resources that doubtless belong to the mind itself, that are the mind itself reflecting upon itself"' (Stellardi 2000: 103; Ricoeur 1978a: 296). In contrast, for Stellardi, it is Derrida who 'puts thought . . . in danger of losing itself, puts it in a position of relative difference, that is, of partial exteriority to the traditional, speculative line of thought' (2000: 103). This, he adds, 'is precisely the position and the difference that Ricoeur rejects outright' (2000: 103).

Two aspects of this, related to one another, fail to do justice to Ricoeur in my opinion. Firstly, Stellardi's charge against Ricoeur is that he operates a 'dialectics of belonging and distantiation', whereas Derrida produces an 'interlacing of belonging and overcoming' (2000: 102–03). By 'dialectic', Stellardi means a 'line of communication is opened up between the experi-ence of belonging (proper to poetic discourse) and the power of distantiation on which speculative thought relies' (2000: 104). However, despite this line of communication being opened up between poetry and thought, 'in the end', according to Stellardi's reading of Ricoeur, 'the metaphoric power remains external to philosophy, and is accepted only inasmuch as philosophy is able to master it and to put it to work to its own benefit' (2000: 104). Yet this ignores the fact that, by Ricoeur's lights, thought embraces that which

is 'partially exterior' to it, since it is thought's opposite, metaphorical discourse, which acts as a spur to thought, encourages thought to think beyond its confines. As I indicate in Chapter 1, speculative discourse is primary for Ricoeur in comparison to metaphorical discourse because it assimilates the heterogeneous subjects in a metaphor to create meaningful insight. We are able to 'think more', to think beyond what our categories conventionally designate, he asserts, because speculative discourse intersects with metaphorical discourse to make sense of the 'nonsensical' combination of terms in a metaphor (1978a: 303). This 'making sense of' is not a reclamation of meaning *by* the speculative *from* the metaphorical, not a reduction of the poetic to the conceptual, but a stimulation and stretching *of* thought *by* metaphor, consistent with the view, held by Ricoeur, that meaning is 'less like a determined content, to take or to leave [and more] like an inductive principle capable of guiding semantic innovation' (1978a: 298).

Secondly, I do not think we should take Ricoeur at face value when he talks of resources doubtlessly 'belonging to the mind itself'. Stellardi's response to the notion of the mind 'reflecting upon itself' is to exclaim: 'Must we, then, to escape despair and impotence, have resort to *l'esprit lui-même*? Ricoeur does not seem to hesitate in this regard' (2000: 103). In defence of Ricoeur, I think he does hesitate. What form this takes, I shall come to shortly. Before that, though, I think it is worth pointing out that there is a significant difference between appealing to the mind in itself and appealing to a general notion of the in-itself: the former identifies a *particular* subject or territory which is to be understood in its own terms or through its own operation, whereas the latter directs us to the noumenal and matters regarding what it means to be self-present or self-sustaining. The issue here is the same as the one taken up by Ricoeur against Derrida's deconstructive style: meaning changes depending upon whether one focuses on the predicative, syntagmatic, horizontal relations between words on the page or on the semiotic, paradigmatic, vertical relations between the selected word on the page and others which, although not present as signifiers, are nonetheless associated with it. In this case, Stellardi opts to read Ricoeur paradigmatically. That is to say, he separates the 'in itself' from its horizontal, syntagmatic qualification of 'mind' in Ricoeur's sentence, and focuses upon the in-itself as a content in itself, in this case, the concept of the noumenal.

However, further reading of *The Rule of Metaphor* indicates that this is not Ricoeur's intention. Four pages later, after the quotation made by Stellardi above, Ricoeur declares that the necessity of speculative discourse proceeds 'from the very structures of the mind, which it is the task of transcendental philosophy to articulate' (1978a: 300). Stellardi is convinced that 'Ricoeur does not seem to hesitate' in referring to the noumenal, but I would construe this appeal to transcendental philosophy as a hesitation of sorts, since it presents the 'mind in itself' not as a region whose functioning in noumenal terms can be taken for granted but as the topic of an ongoing, far-from-resolved debate in

Kantian epistemology. Furthermore, it is a debate where we find that a necessary condition of the possibility of mind is its opening onto that which is beyond it, i.e. intuition, and where the architectonic which defines this transitive, opening-onto mind is organized by metaphor throughout (as I argue in Chapter 2).

Stellardi's perception that Ricoeur and Derrida hold radically distinct positions with regard to metaphor and metaphysics is also sustained by a trope which is active in his description of the two philosophers. The trope in question is the family of metaphors which presents concepts as spatial fields or containers. The consequence of this is that debate is limited to a binary economy of insides and outsides. As quoted above, Stellardi says of Ricoeur's position that 'in the end, the metaphoric power remains totally *external* to philosophy, and is accepted only inasmuch as philosophy is able to master it and to put it to work to its own benefit' (2000: 104, emphasis added). By picturing the relation between metaphor and philosophy in Ricoeur's account as simply the former being outside the latter, Stellardi is able to make it appear that Ricoeur has philosophy bear down upon and master metaphor, when, as I have argued, Ricoeur in fact has the two mutually sustaining one another. Similarly, in his introduction to the Ricoeur–Derrida exchange, Stellardi describes the two philosophers' shared ambition as 'a radical self-interrogation of philosophy in the quest for its own statute, for its *own place* (to be found or maintained)' at a time when the position of philosophy is challenged 'by the pressure of literary and poetic discourse, which *invades* philosophy ... and *replaces* the traditional procedures of its discourse with its own more analogical, metaphoric, and allusive ways' (2000: 99–100, emphases added). Once again, poetry and philosophy are assigned a binary relation, with the former threatening to take over and occupy the latter. This economy of insides and outsides, of regions and occupation, it seems to me, is insufficient – too compartmentalized – to accommodate the complexity of the interrelationship between metaphor and thought offered by Ricoeur. For him, metaphor is neither the province of poetry nor the province of philosophy but the result of the interaction between the two, where the interaction is not a mere overlapping of regions but a process of conceptual reappraisal which, as we have seen, ultimately draws upon Kant's transcendental philosophy. But before this admission is taken as evidence that Ricoeur can be located wholly within the territory of philosophy after all, we should recall the argument, put forward in Chapter 2, that the appeal to Kant leads to a theory of judgment where, once again, metaphor is at work organizing the application of our cognitive faculties.

It is the image of a concept as a container which was at the start of the Ricoeur–Derrida exchange: namely, Heidegger's declaration that 'the metaphorical exists only *within* metaphysics' (1991: 48, emphasis added). As we have seen, both Ricoeur and Derrida dismiss any simplistic notion of the metaphorical being contained by metaphysics and, furthermore, Derrida

rejects the suggestion, made by Ricoeur, that he perpetuates the identification of the literal–figurative and the sensible–intelligible distinctions. It is reflection on the concept-as-space which marks the difference between how Ricoeur perceives Derrida and how Derrida perceives himself. The paradox Derrida creates in 'White Mythology', Ricoeur asserts, is that it is impossible for philosophy to theorize metaphor without employing metaphor or, as Ricoeur puts it, 'the theory of metaphor returns in a circular manner to the metaphor of theory' (1978a: 287). But the terms which enable Derrida to demonstrate this circularity are, as one might expect, spatial:

> How are we to decipher figures of speech, and singularly metaphor, in the philosophic text? ... [M]etaphor remains, in all its essential characteristics, a classical philosopheme, a metaphysical concept. It is therefore *enveloped in* the field that a general metaphorology of philosophy would seek to dominate ... If one wished to conceive and to class all the metaphorical possibilities of philosophy, one metaphor, at least, always would remain *excluded, outside* the system: the metaphor, at the very least, without which the concept of metaphor could not be constructed, or, to syncopate an entire chain of reasoning, the metaphor of metaphor. This extra metaphor, remaining *outside the field* that it allows to be *circumscribed*, extracts or abstracts itself from this field, thus subtracting itself as a metaphor less ... [Thus] the field is never saturated.
>
> (1982: 219–20, emphases added)

The theory of metaphor returns in a circular manner to the metaphor of theory (as Ricoeur describes Derrida's trajectory) because 'one metaphor always remains excluded', namely, metaphor as it is active within the philosophy which seeks to circumscribe metaphor. It is only the binary terms of inside and outside, of circumscription and exclusion, I propose, which allow the picture of metaphor *eluding* philosophy to be drawn: metaphor evades capture by philosophy because it is represented as something which can detach itself from one region (metaphor) and occupy another ('this extra metaphor, outside the field'), and because philosophy is represented as something with an outside where escapees can sit and taunt it. Whereas 'this extra metaphor', on Derrida's binary terms, becomes the 'tropic supplementarity' which represents an 'interminable *dehiscence*' for any supposedly complete theory of metaphor, for Ricoeur, I suggest, this 'extra' can be readily accommodated by metaphor understood as an intersection of discourses. Because intersection is already at work in Ricoeur's account (Derrida's theme of 'entanglement' does not appear until 'The *Retrait* of Metaphor'), it means that metaphor is defined from the outset as something which acts beyond itself or 'outside the field', to use Derrida's idiom. Wood hints at this difference when he ascribes to Ricoeur the view that 'it is a mistake to suppose the conditions of possibility circumscribe the subsequent development

of what they make possible' (1990: 33). That is to say, it is a mistake to picture meaning as a circumscribable region since the conditions of the possibility of meaning are such that they develop and project meaning beyond any delimitation. In terms of the imagery of the debate, we might say that metaphor, as Ricoeur defines it, is conceived not as a bounded region with an outside but as a relationship that is plotted by the perpendicular axes of metaphorical discourse and speculative discourse.

Binary logic is also prominent in Derrida's deconstruction of metaphor in philosophy. But whereas Stellardi uses binary logic to *state* differences between Ricoeur and Derrida, Derrida employs binary logic or 'questions it' in a deconstructive mode in order to *show* a condition of entwinement. This makes Derrida closer to Ricoeur than Stellardi admits. In both 'White Mythology' and '*Retrait* of Metaphor', binary logic is the mechanism which enables Derrida to show that whatever philosophy tries to exclude nevertheless returns to challenge or transform philosophy's ambition, for example the metaphor which 'remain[s] outside the field that it allows to be circumscribed' in 'White Mythology' (1982: 220), or the 'splayed' and 'invaginated' metaphor of '*Retrait*' 'whose rhetorical border is no longer determinable according to a simple and indivisible line' (1998: 117).

Similarly, it is the binary pairs of light and dark, and creation and destruction which Derrida uses at the end of 'White Mythology' to express his position on the relation between the conceptual (or the speculative, in Ricoeur's terms) and the metaphorical. The theme of light and dark which governs our concepts of knowledge and philosophy – 'the sun of absence and presence, blinding and luminous, dazzling' (1982: 267) – ensures that any term or concept will always include its own erasure or destruction. As regards metaphor, it 'cannot be what it is except in erasing itself, indefinitely constructing its destruction' (1982: 268). This happens in two ways: through it 'being carried off [by metaphysics] to a horizon or a proper ground' in order to discover 'the origin of its truth' (1982: 268), and by its passing through a 'supplement of syntactic resistance . . . that disrupts the opposition of the semantic and the syntactic, . . . wresting [the] borders of propriety from [the philosopheme of metaphor]' (1982: 270). In other words, the two-way destruction arises, on the one hand, as a result of metaphor being subject to the demands of truthful or verifiable discourse and, on the other, as a result of the transpositions within metaphor, belonging to metaphor itself (since this is *self*-destruction, by Derrida's lights), exceeding any sense of propriety. Thus, against Stellardi's assertion that Derrida puts thought 'in danger of losing itself' within the metaphorical, binary opposites are enfolded and cancelled to *show* what can only be loosely *stated* as a mutually constitutive tension between the metaphorical and the philosophical.

The German idealists who inform Ricoeur's and Derrida's studies – Kant with the former, Hegel with the latter – may go some way to explaining the difference between Ricoeur's discourse-intersection metaphor and Derrida's supplementary, 'outside the field' metaphor. Ricoeur turns to Kant's epis-

temology and aesthetics in order to support his claim that the diaphoric juxtaposition of terms (created by metaphorical discourse) operates in relation to world-directed epiphoric predication (created by speculative discourse). With reference to Kant's ideas of reason, to which no concept is equal (as set out in the *Critique of Judgment*), Ricoeur declares that it is the 'presentation of the Idea by the imagination that forces conceptual thought to *think more*. Creative imagination is nothing other than this demand put to conceptual thought' (1978a: 303). And this 'thinking more' is (again) 'ontologically vehement'; it applies to the world, it is schematized in a Kantian sense (1978a: 300). This Kantianism, I maintain, is evident in the imagery of intersection which informs Ricoeur's thesis. To make it more evident with some exaggerated imagery: Ricoeur's position is Kantian to the extent that the diaphoric swirl of ideas turns about a perpendicular, world-directed axis, where the turning and the world-directedness are mutually defining vectors.

In contrast, the preponderance of two-dimensional circumscription in Derrida can be seen as a consequence of the position which Hegel occupies in his deconstruction of metaphor. In 'White Mythology', Derrida says of Hegel that he 'defines our problem, or rather determines the problem with an answer indistinguishable from the proposition of his own speculative and dialectical logic' (1982: 225). The problem in question is the status of the sensible–intelligible and the living–dead oppositions in philosophy's concept of metaphor, and it is determined with an answer indistinguishable from the proposition of Hegel's own logic in the sense that Hegel's answer – the oppositions are necessary as part of the progression from sense experience to absolute consciousness – is given by the dialectical nature of his system. Circumscription and containment are active, I suggest, through the concept of *Aufhebung* in Hegel's dialectic whereby a judgment or stage of experience is 'carried up' as a content from one metaphysical level to the next. In Hegel's words, quoted by Derrida:

> The question above all is whether a word which looks entirely pictorial, deceptive, and illustrative has not already, in the life of the language, lost this its first sensuous meaning, and the memory of it, in the course of its use in a spiritual sense and been *relevé* [*aufgehoben hatte*] into a spiritual meaning.
>
> (Derrida 1982: 225; Hegel 1975: 405)

Further confirmation is given by Stellardi who attributes to Hegel philosophy's classic stance against metaphor: the attempt 'to reduce the metaphorical power, conceived as negative; to *contain*, to *overcome* metaphor, also in the sense of Hegel's *Aufhebung*' (2000: 75, emphases added). In Hegel's dialectic, uttering one judgment about an object (the thesis) makes the speaker aware that there is more to the object than her statement allows. This recognition of inadequacy (the antithesis) is 'taken up' into the speak-

er's awareness, bringing a previously unrecognized aspect of the object to light in the form of a revised judgment (the synthesis, which becomes the new thesis). With Hegel's dialectic taken as the principal representative of philosophy's treatment of metaphor, one can see how the process whereby a content is taken up as a whole and revised creates the binary, circumscriptive inclusions and exclusions which go on to become the form and content of Derrida's response to philosophy.

Lawlor argues for a similar difference between Ricoeur and Derrida and, like Stellardi, does so by underplaying the work which intersection plays in Ricoeur's theory. Although (*unlike* Stellardi) Lawlor acknowledges the proximity between the two – due to their both being philosophers of the 'between', relying upon concepts of 'simultaneity', 'trace', 'dialectic', and 'passage' (1992: 123) – he nevertheless insists that there is a fundamental difference between them on account of what they regard as the condition of possibility of meaning. For Ricoeur, he suggests, it is distanciation, the claim-making aspect of speculative discourse operative within metaphor, whereas for Derrida, it is *différance*, the structural slippage between signifiers which prevents any correspondence between signifier and signified and which therefore (as Lawlor puts it) ensures that words 'never organize themselves into a unitary direction or sense' (1988: 189). However, in order to maintain this contrast, Lawlor has to wrest speculative discourse from its entwinement with metaphorical discourse and hold it up as Ricoeur's governing principle: 'Ricoeurian distanciation', he argues, 'always points to a horizon of totalization, always in the direction of the complete identity of thought and being' (1992: 126). While it cannot be denied that speculative discourse is, in Ricoeur's words, 'ontologically vehement', working in the direction of making claims about the world in thought, 'pointing towards' or 'working in the direction' is an altogether different matter from actually arriving at such totalization. Anticipating the objection that the ontological vehemence of the speculative amounts to 'the conceptual order abolish[ing] or destroy[ing] the metaphorical order', Ricoeur responds by saying:

> My inclination is to see the universe of discourse as a universe kept in motion by an interplay of attractions and repulsions that ceaselessly promote the interaction and intersection of domains whose organizing nuclei are off-centred in relation to one another; and still this interplay never comes to rest in an absolute knowledge that would subsume the tensions.
>
> (1978a: 302)

Ricoeur's inclination is supported on two accounts. Firstly, there is an aesthetic or metaphorical component within speculative discourse which ensures that the conceptual is always working with the metaphorical, rather than trying to contain or exclude it. That such a component exists is indicated

by Ricoeur's appeal to Kant's aesthetic ideas as an explanation of the objectivity of the speculative. The relevance of aesthetic ideas is that, in Kant's words, they 'strive towards something that lies beyond the bounds of experience, and hence try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts (intellectual ideas), and thus [these concepts] are given a semblance of objective reality' (Kant 1987: 314). Secondly, the ontology developed by Ricoeur as part of his theory of metaphor does not allow the referential component of speculative discourse to be understood as a univocal relation between sentence and world or as 'the complete identity of thought and being' alleged by Lawlor (1992: 126). Ricoeur sets out an ontology of potentiality and actuality in which the determination of objects occurs as an ongoing process, with the consequence that there are no absolute definitions which are exclusive of less immediate, fringe possibilities. As I have already quoted him to say: meaning is 'less like a determined content, to take or to leave, than like an inductive principle capable of guiding semantic innovation' (Ricoeur 1978a: 298). With the *A is B* form of an inventive metaphor, there is no final state of identity within the object which supports or corresponds with the claim; all that can be said is that the claim is one moment in the odyssey of actualities and possibilities which extends the play of sense and reference for both subject and predicate. The accuracy of the metaphor is attributable to the fact that the object, as a component in the play of meaning, sustains the actualities and possibilities introduced by predication.

Thus, differences can be drawn between Ricoeur and Derrida but not on the terms which Lawlor and Stellardi give, and not with the radicality which Stellardi implies. To claim, as Stellardi does, that Ricoeur's position is distinct from Derrida's on the grounds that the former argues for a dialectical relationship between poetry and thought, whereas the latter entwines the two, misconstrues the fundamental nature of the interweaving between poetry and thought carried out by the former. One explanation for this misconstruction, I have argued, is Stellardi's binary logic which leads him to interpret the interactions at work in Ricoeur's study as inclusions, exclusions or dominations. But this misrepresents Ricoeur. Lawlor also wrongly claims that Ricoeur's speculative discourse points towards 'a horizon of totalization' (1992: 126). What these accounts fail to recognize is that Ricoeur presents metaphor and metaphysics in non-binary or non-dualistic terms. Metaphor and metaphysics are interwoven by him through the former generating the heterogeneity which speculative discourse needs to 'think more', to formulate new, objective possibilities. He achieves this explicitly by asserting the interaction between metaphorical and speculative discourse, and implicitly by drawing upon Kant's theory of judgment.

Heidegger and Derrida: between contradictions

The dialogue between Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida on metaphor is beset with contradictions. (1) Both Ricoeur and Derrida take the metaphorical

nature of Heidegger's prose to exceed or to be at odds with his confinement of metaphor within metaphysics.[1] To draw out the difficulty, one might accuse Heidegger of denying the appropriateness of metaphor while endeavouring to introduce a new mode of speaking that is nevertheless metaphorical. (2) The second contradiction, for the purposes of exposition, is the series of contradictions which represents Derrida's reaction to the first. In 'White Mythology', Derrida manipulates the propensity for contradiction within the metaphors applied by philosophy to metaphor (light and dark, life and death, etc.) in order to demonstrate the impossibility of philosophy ever achieving a supervisory position in relation to the figure (Derrida 1982). Ricoeur interprets this as Derrida's decision to stand alongside Heidegger in equating the oppositions of metaphor and metaphysics, but Derrida counters this by reiterating the various distinctions and ensuing tensions at work in Heidegger. (3) One tension found by Derrida is our final contradiction: Heidegger's concept of truth as non-truth, introduced by Derrida in the closing pages of 'The *Retrait* of Metaphor' to explore the irreducible crossing between the figures of *Ziehen* (to pull) and *Reissen* (to tear) and, ultimately, to elucidate Heidegger's metaphor-dependent disavowal of metaphor (1998: 127).

My interest here is in the different routes which might be taken between Heidegger's contradictions: between (1) his metaphorically formulated confinement of metaphor within metaphysics, and (3) his assertion of truth as un-truth. In '*Retrait*', Derrida finds the former to be motivated by a series of textual conflicts emanating from the latter. However, I maintain that an alternative route is available due to the 'truth as un-truth' contradiction which Derrida pursues in fact having a coherent ontological interpretation, based on my ontological account of metaphor. That is to say, a contradiction in a deconstructive context finds non-contradictory expression in an ontological context. I set out Derrida's route between (1) and (3) and my alternative to it, and indicate how plotting the routes – do they diverge or intersect? – has implications for Heidegger's and Derrida's evaluation of metaphor, and for the status of contradiction in ontology and deconstruction.

For Derrida, the word '*retrait*' opens onto meanings (in French) associated with metaphor and *with the attempt to talk about or theorize metaphor*. In starting to outline the topic of metaphor, Derrida finds that he cannot avoid using metaphor:

> I am obliged to speak of [metaphor] *more metaphorico*, to it in its own manner. I cannot *treat it* (*en traiter*) without *dealing with it* (*sans traiter avec elle*) … I do not succeed in producing *a treatise* (*une traité*) on metaphor which is not treated with (*traité avec*) metaphor which suddenly appears intractable (*intraitable*).
>
> (1998: 103)

'The word *retrait*, which is "French" up to a certain point', Derrida suggests, 'is not too abusive, I believe, as a translation of *Entziehung* [withdrawal], the

Sich-Entziehen of Being, insofar as, suspending, dissimulating, giving way, and veiling itself, etc., Being withdraws into its crypt' (1998: 117). As Derrida indicates, metaphysics 'corresponds to a withdrawal of Being' for Heidegger, which is to say that the conceptual divisions imposed by the history of Western metaphysics, in Heidegger's view, have divided reality in such a way as to obscure or limit the other possible or more authentic relations which human being is capable of having with the world. Metaphor, in Heidegger's view, is a part of this withdrawal of Being: 'the metaphorical exists only within metaphysics' since, on his understanding of the trope, it is always used to create relations between categories as they have already been divided within metaphysics, for example to make the invisible visible as in expressions which refer to (invisible) thought as a form of sight or insight (1991: 48).

However, Derrida finds that withdrawal as *trait* has multiple significations within Heidegger's text on account of the metaphorical nature of Heidegger's writing being 'richer, more determinant than his thesis on metaphor' (1998: 115). The space or region wherein these multiple withdrawals operate lies between, on the one hand, 'the meaning and necessity which link [the] apparently univocal, simplifying and reductive denunciation of the "metaphysical" concept of metaphor' and, on the other, 'the apparently metaphoric power of a text whose author no longer wishes that what happens in that text and what claims to get along without metaphor there be understood precisely as "metaphoric", nor even under any concept of metalinguistics or rhetoric' (1998: 115). Despite Heidegger's attempt to contain metaphor within a metaphysical concept of the figure, it nonetheless breaks out and overruns his writing, Derrida claims, because an irreducible lattice of mutually defining expressions circumscribes his account of the relation between thought and poetry. This latticework is constituted by two families of words: *ziehen* (to pull) and *reissen* (to tear, to rip). In the German language, Derrida observes, *Ziehen* (with its cognates *Zug*, *Bezug*, *Gezüge, durchziehen*, *entziehen*) and *Reissen* (including *Riss*, *Aufriss*, *Umriss*, *Grundriss,* etc.) represent two 'families' of words which 'form an alliance, engage, cross each other in this contract of the trait' (1998: 122). In Heidegger's essay 'The Nature of Language', for example, 'the trait (*Riss*) of this *Bezug* [drawing into relation] between *Denken* and *Dichten*', Derrida declares, is that 'of an "incision" (*entame*), of a tracing, *fraying* opening, of an *Aufriss*' (1998: 124). There is also Heidegger's observation, summarized here by Derrida, that 'we often know *Riss* only under the "devalued" form that it has in the expressions "to mark a wall", "to plow" and "to cultivate a field", in order to trace furrows (*Furchen ziehen*) so that the field will shelter, and keep in it the seeds and the growth' (1998: 126). The theme of growth here, for Heidegger, is revalued as 'the opening of *Sprache*' but not in any straightforward metaphorical sense. As he writes in 'The Nature of Language', 'we would remain suspended in metaphysics if we wished to take Holderlin's nomination in the turn of phrase, "words like flowers", for a metaphor' (Derrida 1998: 115). A metaphysical reading would take the materiality of flowers as a metaphor for the immateriality of thought,

represented here by 'words', when (as we have seen in Chapters 4 and 7, and as I shall reiterate below) Heidegger wants the intersection of speech and growth to occur in the context of a metaphysics where what belongs to each (and every) term occurs as a question.

The irreducible crossing between the 'families' of *Ziehen* and *Reissen*, Derrida admits, has 'never been remarked or at least thematized', with one exception: Heidegger's essay 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (1998: 122, 127). Here, Heidegger presents truth as a 'combative' or 'adversarial' relation (Heidegger's words, emphasized by Derrida) between opening-to-view and withdrawing-from-view. This is Heidegger's concept of truth as *aletheia*, which I have already considered in relation to the senses and the science wars in Chapters 4 and 7 respectively. Truth as *aletheia*, Heidegger asserts, is distinct from and ontologically prior to the Roman concept of truth as *veritas*, correspondence with the facts, in as much as it functions as the original disclosure or bringing-into-being of objects which go on to become the subjects of facts. Disclosure takes place as a conflict of 'world and earth' in the sense that a world is revealed but we are also kept mindful of the conditions, the earth, which allow the world to come into being. For Derrida, it is the combat between opening and withdrawal that is significant. This combat, he writes,

> is not a trait (*Riss*) as *Aufreissen* incising a simple abyss (*blossen Kluft*) between adversaries. Combat attracts the adversaries in the attraction of a reciprocal appurtenance. It is a trait which attracts them to the provenance of their unity by way of common ground, *aus dem einigen Grunde zusammen*. In this sense it is a *Grundriss*: fundamental plan, project, design, sketch, outline. A series of locutions is then printed [in Heidegger's essay], whose current, usual 'literal' sense, so to speak, is found re-activated as it is simultaneously, discreetly, re-inscribed, displaced, put back into play in what works in this context. The *Grundriss* is *Aufriss* ('incision' and in the current sense, an 'essential profile', a 'schema', a 'projection') which designs (*zeichnet*) the fundamental traits (*Grundzüge*), that here intersect the two systems of traits in order to say trait in the language of the opening of being.
>
> (1998: 127)

So the combat placed by Heidegger within truth as *aletheia* attracts 'adversaries in the attraction of a reciprocal appurtenance', adversaries which belong together, and this state of belonging-together is their common ground, a *Grundriss*, the 'lattice' of mutual definition (or appurtenance) referred to above. Within the *Grundriss*, the 'two systems of traits', *Reissen* and *Ziehen*, intersect in order to allow *trait* or any drawing into relation, any predication, to be said. And within Heidegger's essay, the 'current, usual, "literal" sense, so to speak' of his terms – for example, truth as originary combat (*Urstreit*), attraction towards the work of art (*Zug zum Werk*, from

ziehen), and attraction as the artwork's significant possibility (*ausgezeichnete Möglichkeit*) – is 're-activated' as it is 'put back into play in what works' in the context of his writing. The decisive trait in Derrida's argument is the transition from attraction of traits 'by way of common ground' to the concept of a *Grundriss* or 'fundamental plan, project, design, sketch, outline'. The drawing together of a common ground of attraction and a project represents the articulation or act of jointing whereby 'the two systems of traits' (*Reissen* and *Ziehen*) in Heidegger's text are put to work or 're-activated' in Heidegger's 'language of the opening of being'. To venture an answer to the question of how a disavowal of metaphor nevertheless reinvigorates and relies upon metaphor, on the Derridean terms outlined here: a ground of adversarial, reciprocal appurtenance exists which, as a condition of the possibility of saying, impels any denial of a term, in this case, metaphor, to reaffirm and re-employ that which is denied.

'The Origin of the Work of Art' is identified by Derrida as the text in which Heidegger 'seems for the first time to have called for this crossing of *Ziehen* and *Reissen*' (Derrida 1998: 127). According to Derrida, it is the combat generated by Heidegger's definition in the essay of truth '*as non-truth*' – '*Die Wahrheit ist un-Warheit*' – which 'attracts the adversaries [of *Reissen* and *Ziehen*] in the attraction of a reciprocal appurtenance' (Derrida 1998: 127; Heidegger 1971a: 55). And it is 'reciprocal appurtenance' or 'putting back into play' which causes Heidegger's dismissal of metaphor to rely upon metaphor. What is of interest here is that Derrida should identify a conflict or contradiction in Heidegger – truth as untruth – which, as I have shown in Chapter 4, admits an alternative, ontological interpretation of metaphor in Heidegger. 'Truth, in its essence, is un-truth', for Heidegger, because the mode in which beings are made manifest within truth as disclosure is such that they may appear otherwise than they do, or otherwise than conceptual predetermination predicts (Heidegger 1971a: 55). This 'appearing otherwise', though, is not a defect in truth, but intrinsic to the concept of truth conceived as a dynamic 'primal conflict in which that open centre is won within which what is, stands, and from which it sets itself back into itself' (1971a: 55). The 'open centre' is reminiscent of the image of a circle I use in Chapters 1 and 4 to illustrate the opening of a space in which beings can emerge through *metaphorically* or *as-structured* anticipation.

While Derrida finds Heidegger's metaphorical dismissal of metaphor to be motivated by a series of textual conflicts emanating from truth as untruth, I suggest that another route can be found based on my ontological account of metaphor, principally (as it bears on Heidegger) from Chapter 4. This is to claim ontological and architectonic continuity between Heidegger's 'metaphorical within the metaphysical' and the context in which he defines truth as non-truth. His assertion in *The Principle of Reason* that 'the metaphorical exists only within metaphysics' belongs to a discussion of the nature of thought and, in particular, of how thought might be regarded as a form of hearing or seeing. 'We are quick on the draw', Heidegger warns us,

in explaining that thinking can be called a hearing and seeing only in a figurative sense. No doubt. What one listens to and brings into view in thinking cannot be heard with our ears nor seen with our eyes. It is not perceivable by our sense organs. If we take thinking to be a sort of hearing and seeing, then sensible hearing and seeing is taken up and over into the realm of nonsensible perception, that is, of thinking ... The language of scholars names such a carrying-over 'metaphor'. So thinking may be called a hearing and listening, a viewing and a bringing into view only in a metaphorical, figurative sense. Who says 'may' here? Those who assert that hearing with the ears and seeing with the eyes is genuine hearing and seeing.

<div align="right">(Heidegger 1991: 47)</div>

An anti-empiricist or anti-dualist theory of sensation is proposed here. Genuine hearing and seeing, or sensing in general, is not to be identified with the receipt of stimuli from the external world; reality does not come to us as a series of sensory components which have been processed by our sense organs ready for assimilation by consciousness. 'Of course we hear a Bach fugue with our ears', Heidegger declares, 'but if we leave what is heard only at this, with what strikes the tympanum as sound waves, then we can never hear a Bach fugue. *We* hear, not the ear' (1991: 47). On his view, the senses are modes of access to a world which are intimately tied to human being, including our mental being, and which, due to this intimate involvement, become sources of meaning and possibility over and above any narrow, aesthetic or decorative appreciation. Heidegger's focus though is not upon the senses in themselves but upon how they might inform the nature of thinking once they have been freed from their opposition to the intelligible.

Heidegger's 'sensibilization' of thought, I suggest, distances his 'metaphorical within the metaphysical' statement from amounting to the former being collapsed *entirely* into the latter. This distance is achieved as a result of Heidegger's aiming for an ontology of transposition which is not read as 'mere' metaphor. Transposing a thinking into a sensing, a thinking which 'brings into view what was unheard (of) before', Heidegger asserts, can help to find new resonances in language (1991: 46): not just alternative meanings but possibilities which extend beyond intelligibility to aspects of our being in the world, for example, the move Heidegger makes from 'nothing is without reason' to '*being in itself essentially comes to be as grounding*' (1991: 49).[2] The notion of 'mere metaphor' is crucial. It indicates that there is more than one concept of metaphor at play: mere or decorative metaphor, a colourful way of speaking, versus the much more far-reaching ontological principle which Heidegger is seeking to express here. Casenave makes this point: 'Heidegger's rejection of metaphor', he argues, 'appears to be based on an inadequate understanding of metaphor, one which sees "mere metaphor" as synonymous with metaphor' (1982: 145). However, when considered more

widely, Casenave asserts, metaphor 'is a deviance in language use ... which goes on to propose a new vision of things' and, as such, is congruent with the 'way-making [nature] of language' sought by Heidegger (1982: 146).

Ricoeur too, despite his criticisms of Heidegger's account of metaphor, is aware of the distinction between mere metaphor and metaphor as a whole. The purpose of the 'metaphorical within the metaphysical', Ricoeur observes, quoting Heidegger, is 'to warn us not to jump to the conclusion that the talk of thinking as a hearing and a seeing is a mere metaphor, and thus take it too lightly' (1978a: 283). To which he adds: 'Our own entire effort too is turned against this "mere metaphor"' (1978a: 283). For Heidegger, while (mere) metaphor can only work with or within the oppositions of metaphysics, true poetry, such as Hölderlin's, awakens 'the largest view' and (to draw on a quotation from Heidegger made by Ricoeur) 'makes World appear in all things' (1978a: 284). Yet immediately after this, Ricoeur asks rhetorically: 'Is this not what *living* metaphor [the intersection of poetic and speculative discourse which creates new perspectives on reality] does?' (1978a: 284). On this reading, identifying metaphor with metaphysics is not an act of confinement but the drawing of a distinction between mere metaphor and more far-reaching ontological transpositions, transpositions which might go by the name of ontological metaphor.

Thus we have two routes linking Heidegger's confinement of metaphor inside metaphysics with his assertion of truth as un-truth. With Derrida, combat between truth and untruth draws together terms – here, *Reissen* and *Ziehen* – in such a way that any denial of a term, in this case, metaphor, leads to the reinstatement of that term, whereas, on my account, metaphor as as-structure operates within truth as part of Heidegger's redrawing of the lines of metaphysics, creating the untruth which occurs as the otherness of experience. In both cases, metaphor is the condition of possibility of the subject in hand. With Derrida, from 'White Mythology', one metaphor always remains '*excluded, outside* the system: the metaphor, at the very least, without which the concept of metaphor could not be constructed, or, to syncopate an entire chain of reasoning, the metaphor of metaphor' (1982: 219–20). Any attempt to delimit the scope of metaphor will always generate a supplement that remains beyond vision, including attempts made to examine metaphor by metaphor, as these will involve metaphor 'dying', *becoming mere*, so that it can be examined by its counterpart. In contrast, on my reading of Heidegger, metaphor is a condition of possibility in as much as it provides the as-structure which allows an object to appear within a framework of anticipated similarities and differences.

Before assessing the implications of this difference for Heidegger and Derrida, it will be worthwhile to consider briefly the impact it has on the relation between Ricoeur and Derrida. What is notable here is that Derrida should summon a concept in Heidegger which also has a bearing upon Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. Admittedly Ricoeur himself does not identify *aletheia* as a notion which might be relevant, despite the fact that he identifies the

world-directedness (or 'ontological vehemence') of metaphor with Heidegger's concept of world disclosure (1978a: 284). However, the parallel with *aletheia* is hard to deny given Ricoeur's assertion that the schematism – that part of Kant which is of principal interest to Heidegger in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* – might be the place to turn to for an explanation of the necessity of speculative discourse (1978b: 148). This is consistent with the broader Kantianism which determines Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, as evidenced, for example, by his situating Kant's ideas of reason as correlates of the generative, revitalizing capacity of metaphor. As I argue in Chapter 4, *aletheia* is represented by Heidegger in Kantian terms in as much as it is assigned a two-pronged structure of anticipation (making-present) and reception (having-present), where the prongs correspond to the temporal pre-determination of experience set out by Heidegger in his retrieval of the schematism. Thus, if we follow the direction in which Ricoeur's ontological account of metaphor leads, we end up tracking *aletheia* as a consequence of our trying to construct a Kantian schematism of metaphor. Even though the connection is not made by Ricoeur, the ambidexterity of a concept of truth which lends itself both to an epistemological account of the schematic objectivity of metaphor, and to a deconstructive display of the intractable incision at the heart of metaphor in philosophy ought to be acknowledged.

To return to Heidegger and Derrida: both have been shown to rely upon transcendental, generative concepts of metaphor. What are the implications of this for an assessment of Heidegger's and Derrida's positions on metaphor? One could argue that acknowledging the mere–ontological distinction in Heidegger annuls Derrida's suggestion in 'White Mythology' that philosophy only ever operates with a concept of metaphor, that is, a singular concept, for now we have two. Philosophy may, as Derrida declares, get '"carried away" each time that one of its products – here, the concept of metaphor – attempts in vain to include under its own law the totality of the field to which the product belongs' but, we could add, *not necessarily*, since distinctions can be drawn to ensure that we are not left in the situation where metaphor *as an entire field* is examining itself *as that field* (1982: 219). This would mean that Heidegger's use of metaphor to criticize metaphor could not strictly be regarded as self-reflexive. It is not the case, with Derrida, that 'I am obliged to speak of [metaphor] *more metaphorico*, to it in its own manner' since a finer distinction between kinds of metaphor has been drawn, with one kind speaking about another (1998: 103). But this is a minor point which does not address the main difference between Derrida's perspective and mine on Heidegger.

The main difference between our perspectives would appear to be that Derrida's is textual and thematic, whereas mine is ontological. By 'textual and thematic', I mean that Derrida concentrates upon the tensions and connections that emerge when one focuses upon the paradigmatic, associative properties of words. However, I am not convinced that we can stop at the textual–ontological distinction, for both Heidegger and Derrida regard text

and ontology as interwoven fields. The idea that the two are isolated or antithetical domains trades on the belief that a sharp distinction can be drawn between the linguistic (on the side of deconstruction) and the non-linguistic (on the side of ontology and epistemology). Some might hold that a distinction can be drawn, in that we can distinguish between words on the one hand, and the items in experience to which words refer on the other. However, while such identification might be plausible, it overlooks the fact that reference to things cannot be made without presupposing a framework of identification which will be linguistic. But this does not leave us in the position of saying 'everything is linguistic'. Derrida's oft-quoted claim (from *Of Grammatology*) that 'there is nothing outside the text' would seem to endorse the point (1976:158), but the idea is not that reality or what might ordinarily be thought to lie outside the text has been consumed by language.

Rather, text and ontology are interwoven by Heidegger and Derrida through their disruption of the conventional metaphysical division between language and experience, and cognate distinctions, such as mind and world, and inner and outer. This can be said of Heidegger now because it is apparent that he has a concept of ontological metaphor or as-structure which is essential to overturning the distinctions of metaphysics. With regard to Derrida, as I observe in the previous section, although binary, inside–outside thinking enables him to show that a concept will invite its destruction or its opposite, his analysis occurs as a form of showing, and not stating. He creates contradictions between concepts and their opposites as a critical stance against metaphysics, rather than acquiescing in the categories of metaphysics by recommending that we stand on one side of a conceptual divide or the other. Contradiction in philosophy is normally taken as a sign of collapse or failure, an indication that accepted standards of coherence and consistency have not been met. However, in the context of deconstruction, it becomes a way of demonstrating 'the intractable structure in which we are implicated and deflected from the outset', a way of demonstrating that what we think we mean by a word can be undermined by its own historical and textual associations, associations which ironically are responsible for making the word available to us in the first place (Derrida 1998: 109).

If it is accepted that both Heidegger and Derrida are working at the edges of the conceptual boundaries we have inherited from metaphysics, then Derrida's 'textual' reading of Heidegger's 'truth as un-truth' contradiction could intersect with my ontological interpretation in the following way. Derrida demonstrates 'the intractable structure in which [Heidegger is] implicated and deflected from the outset' by focusing on the combat or contradiction in Heidegger's 'truth as un-truth' and 'metaphor dismissed by metaphor'. These though are not negations or cancellations of a thesis but *contra-dictions* – 'against sayings' – where the resistance to judgment *makes tangible*, *brings to sensibility*, the way in which thought is articulated through traits and thematic associations. To suggest that a demonstration of 'the intractable structure in which we are implicated and deflected from the

outset' amounts to a 'bringing to sensibility' sounds like an unacceptable collision of the textual and the sensory, but it is the possibility of these terms being rethought as interwoven threads which Heidegger's ontology and Derrida's deconstruction entertain. When we hear 'the sensory', we have to recall, from Chapter 4, that, for Heidegger, the senses are not wholly isolated, subjective events but phenomena which 'speak of' my situation in the world. 'Speak of' is a metaphor but, again, the contradiction which this creates, I aver, rather than indicating collapse or failure, occurs positively as a questioning of what belongs to the senses and what belongs to speaking, where the questioning of belonging (explored in Chapter 7) is the principal effect of ontological metaphor and, in particular, ontological metaphor's challenge to the boundaries of conventional metaphysics.

Gasché also draws a parallel between Heidegger and Derrida following their concentration on conditions of possibility, but keeps them apart, i.e. does not have them intersect, due to the text–ontology opposition (Gasché 1986). The metaphor of metaphor which, for Derrida, remains 'outside the field that it allows to be circumscribed' is *a condition of possibility,* Gasché argues, because (quoting Derrida) it is 'the metaphor, at the very least, without which the concept of metaphor could not be constructed' (Derrida 1982: 220). However, he stops short of identifying both Heidegger and Derrida as transcendental philosophers. Derrida's metaphoricity, Gasché asserts, 'is a transcendental concept *of sorts* . . . a *quasitranscendental*' (1986: 316). What makes the difference for Gasché is that quasitranscendentals are the 'conditions of possibility and impossibility concerning the very *conceptual* difference between subject and object', whereas transcendentals are the conditions of possibility and impossibility concerning the difference between subject and object (1986: 317, emphasis added). For Gasché, it is the distinction between the possibility of conceptual, philosophical discourse and the possibility of experience which separates Derrida from Heidegger.

However, I am not convinced that the discourse–experience (or text–ontology) distinction stands up in this context, for it overlooks the very aspect of Heidegger that would challenge such a distinction. Gasché acknowledges that as-structure operates at more than one ontological level for Heidegger, for example at the 'existential-hermeneutic' level which has the human being always encounter an object as something, and at the 'apophantic' level, whereupon objects are wrenched or torn from their immersed, wordless 'furniture of the world' state and described explicitly as something (1986: 300). However, he announces that he will 'not deal here with the levelling modifications that are required to transform the existential-hermeneutical *as* into the apophantic *as* which is itself the structure of the possibility of assertion' (1986: 300). Neither does he recognize that further ontological 'levelling modifications' take place within Heidegger's corpus, whereby experience and discourse are articulated, although by no means unified or equated, in terms of as-structure. I am thinking here primarily of Heidegger's transposing a 'thinking' into a 'sensing' such that it 'brings into

view what was unheard (of) before' (1991: 46). Sensation is conjoined to thought through a process of transposition which opens the world up to us as a range of intelligible or determinate possibilities. As such, sensation occurs not as mere source material, but as a spectrum of world-engagement which interacts with and can challenge our concepts. So the distinction which Gasché uses to separate Heidegger and Derrida breaks down once the ontological levels which are brought into relation through as-structure in Heidegger are taken into account.

Conclusion

To suggest that metaphor and metaphysics are *interwoven* in the texts of Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida might seem too easy or too general a claim to make, given the readiness with which connections can be drawn between subjects. However, as I have shown, the 'weave' metaphor has particular significance in this context, on two accounts: firstly, it and the cognate figure of 'intersection' structure Ricoeur's and Derrida's treatments of metaphor; and secondly, questioning the relation between metaphor and metaphysics cannot occur without metaphor-as-metaphysics and metaphysics-as-metaphor being drawn upon, with the consequence that analysis is folded back on itself, multiplying the various positions which the two terms occupy in relation to one another for the three thinkers. For Ricoeur and Derrida, the 'interwoven' theme is a response to Heidegger's location of 'the metaphorical within the metaphysical'. Initially, their responses diverge. Ricoeur offers a theory of 'living metaphor' which defines the trope as the tensional intersection between metaphorical and speculative discourse. Also contained within Ricoeur's theory is his reply to Derrida's 'White Mythology': Ricoeur emphasizes the semantic, sentential, claim-making status of speculative discourse as the component which, he claims, is absent from Derrida's 'semiotic', word-focused study of the trope. In contrast, for Derrida, the metaphor of the 'trait' has multiple significations in his readings of Ricoeur and Heidegger. It denotes the 'singular course' and the 'withdrawal' plotted by Ricoeur in criticizing Heidegger's concept of metaphor from *The Principle of Reason* and (the same course) in criticizing Derrida's concept of metaphor from 'White Mythology'. As regards Heidegger, the significations of 'trait' are manifold – a course which is not linear but refolded or 'splayed' or 'invaginated' – on account of his disavowal of metaphor occurring in a text which is saturated with metaphor (1998: 117).

While the lines cast by Ricoeur and Derrida from Heidegger initially diverge, they subsequently turn around and cross over. This is partly to be expected, given Derrida's admission of his indebtedness to Ricoeur and that Derrida in fact agrees with many of the claims which Ricoeur levels as charges against him. Derrida does not go into detail here but if one had to identify an area where this agreement holds, it would be over the metaphorical nature of our engagement with the world or (if this sounds insufficiently

Derridean) our engagement with *what is beyond but nevertheless included within* metaphor. The full complexity of the intersection between Ricoeur and Derrida, though, becomes apparent once Heidegger's Kantian lineage is introduced. The attempt by Stellardi to distinguish Ricoeur from Derrida on account of the former's appeal to the transcendental capacities of the mind overlooks the extent to which *metaphysics functions as metaphor*: that is, the extent to which transcendental capacities are formulated by Kant not wholly in terms clearly and distinctly belonging to the rational but in terms which require the bridging operations of the aesthetic (for example, the architectonic position held by aesthetic ideas in the *Critique of Judgment*). Thus, the 'objective' or 'transitive' or 'in quest' mode of Ricoeur's writing style, while undeniably distinct from Derrida's, cannot be distinguished from it on the basis that Ricoeur has the rational dominate the metaphorical, since the rational, for Ricoeur, is already consistent with and directed by the metaphorical.

Transposing our terms, *metaphor's occurring as metaphysics* in Heidegger gives two final twists to the Ricoeur–Derrida intersection. Apparent contradictions in Heidegger's text, instead of being systematic weaknesses on his part, become occasions when the limits of one understanding of a term open onto a new, ontological understanding of the term. Within metaphor, a distinction can be drawn between mere and ontological metaphor: whereas the former simply associates a physical concept with a metaphysical one, the latter recognizes that all concepts resonate with possible transpositions and, as such, brings to the fore the world-making power of speaking. Furthermore, ontological metaphor structures experience as an openness to transposition, an openness to movement between concepts, with the consequence that what belongs to one concept and what belongs to another cannot be taken for granted.

If this brings Heidegger's thesis on language into line with Ricoeur's position on metaphor, then the second contradiction to have an ontological outcome, truth as untruth, tightens the threads between all three philosophers. In Derrida's reading of Heidegger, the contradiction within truth as *aletheia* creates a common ground, a 'reciprocal appurtenance', between adversaries, and this is reinscribed in Heidegger's description of his own metaphysics. However, this contradiction also finds coherent expression in Heidegger's formulation of ontological metaphor or as-structure. The Kantian heritage of this ontology, and the acknowledgment that metaphor plays a world-determining role, strengthens Heidegger's ties with Ricoeur. But it would also appear to free Heidegger from the 'reciprocal appurtenance' which, according to Derrida, has metaphor play an active role in confining metaphor to metaphysics. This is on the understanding that it is in fact *ontological* metaphor in Heidegger's text which enables him to observe that *mere* metaphor is within metaphysics. However, this fails to address the contrast between fundamental ontology and deconstruction. Whereas Gasché takes the discourse–experience distinction as a reason for separating Heidegger and Derrida, I maintain that their meeting at the point of 'truth as untruth' creates an understanding of contradiction in which both fundamental ontology

and deconstruction participate. This is contradiction as an against-saying which brings to sensibility an awareness of the traits and tensions at work in thought, and where sensibility and thought are conjoined not by mere metaphor but in virtue of the questioning of belonging initiated by Heidegger's ontology.

It could be objected that my weaving together of Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida is wrong-headedly ecumenical, is trying to forge unity when important differences exist. I think we have to be careful how we understand the contrast between unity and difference. The notion that philosophical positions can only be oriented with respect to one another in terms of unity, that is, seamless unity, *or* in terms of difference or opposition essentially limits any mapping of philosophical orientation to one of two alternatives, when in fact a vocabulary based on a spectrum of differentiations may be required in order to express adequately the complexity of the relationships between philosophical positions. I have opted for a textural metaphor of interweaving, and have drawn upon the ontological significance given to metaphor by Heidegger in order to work against the polarization of Ricoeur and Derrida. It is not simply the point that the positions of Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida are interwoven because they all happen to employ the metaphor in their theories of metaphor or theories of knowledge (Heidegger's ontological structuring of the empirical, Ricoeur's intersection of the metaphorical and the speculative, and Derrida's tracing of the trait). Rather, the point is that, in an examination of the relation between metaphor and metaphysics, we become very sensitive to the scope and significance of transposition, the metaphorical carriage of meaning from one domain to another which cannot help but create networks of interaction, and, more importantly, transposition between metaphor and metaphysics. It is these transpositions we have been studying, especially with regard to metaphor as metaphysics and the consequences of applying the ontological account of metaphor (developed in this book) to the Ricoeur–Derrida debate.

It might be asked by some deconstructionists how I think I can 'break through' metaphoricity to 'get to' metaphysics, to speak about metaphysics as metaphysics and not as an enterprise which needs to be made aware of its linguistically contingent origin; there is, after all, 'nothing outside of the text'. But metaphor, on Derrida's view, as I have shown, cannot be circumscribed as a region *which we are in* but *from which* metaphysics is excluded. If such a move were made, it would immediately throw into question the definition and scope of metaphor. Instead, with Derrida, while the rootedness of our concepts in metaphor is not denied, the metaphorical operation of language is such that, working with and building upon itself, metaphor necessarily opens itself to what is beyond metaphor. True, 'beyond' here is a spatial metaphor, but the act of remaining within itself while at the same time reaching outside itself is precisely the two-way movement which demonstrates the challenge posed by metaphor to metaphysical distinctions, such as discourse–experience and subject–object, and thus demonstrates the figure's metaphysical potency.

Notes

1 Kant and Heidegger on the creation of objectivity

1 In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant argues for the finitude of human cognition: he demonstrates the possibility of knowledge within experience and the impossibility of knowledge beyond the limits of experience. The thing in itself or noumenon is a limiting concept employed in the latter demonstration, the counterpart of the 'enabling' concept of a transcendental object which operates in the former. In arguing for finitude, Kant is opposing the attempts made by traditional ontology to describe *empirically* the *ontological* nature of beings. Ontological knowledge of objects, he declares, is a transcendental, enabling condition of the possibility of empirical knowledge of objects and, as such, offers nothing real, actual or definite which can be articulated *about* them. To have empirical knowledge of the ontological nature of an object is impossible, he claims, because there is no intuition to support such awareness (Kant 1929: A 139–40, B 178–79).

2 The reliance on the notion of metaphorical discourse to explain the production of new metaphorical meaning does not mean that Ricoeur's theory is circular, using the phenomenon to be explained as part of the explanation. Rather, to reword his thesis, it is necessary to posit the existence of a metaphorical discourse in order to show that the phenomenon of metaphor as we understand it *intuitively* is only the *recognizable* phenomenon that it is because it occurs at the intersection of the metaphorical and the speculative. Ricoeur is, in effect, using as an explanation the fact that metaphor is only the perplexing phenomenon it is because, despite the semiotic disruption which it commits, it nevertheless creates pertinent meaning. If the combination of terms in a metaphor never attained a degree of significance beyond random association, then metaphor would not be metaphor.

3 For a fuller account of diaphor and epiphor, see Wheelwright 1971: 71–91.

4 The quotation is from Kant's *On the Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff*, Ak. XX, 279–80, included in a footnote by Pluhar in his translation of the *Critique of Judgment*.

5 Kant uses the word 'pure' to describe the principles of organization which are produced by the mind itself in advance of and without derivation from any particular experience, and which are always active in organizing empirical intuition. Pure reason, for Kant, is that faculty which 'contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely a priori' (1929: A 11, B 24). All that is given to pure reason in the way of intuition requires the determination which pure reason itself *produces* in order for the essent to be apprehended as an object. It is these principles as they apply to empirical intuition which constitute knowledge of the conditions of the possibility of (empirical) knowledge.

There is a correspondence between Heidegger's ontological–ontic distinction and Kant's pure–empirical distinction. The reason why Heidegger introduces his own version of Kant's distinction is that, while still working within Kant's stipulation that experience is necessarily the experience which belongs to a subject, Heidegger wants to shift attention to the object and, ultimately, objectivity. Whereas the *pure* concepts of the understanding, for Kant, are the principles of organization *within the subject* which prepare the object for conceptualization, ontology, for Heidegger, is the characteristics *within the* ('purely determined') *object* which it must exhibit for it to be an object ready for conceptualization. Thus, pure knowledge is to the subject what ontological knowledge is to the object.

6 'Essent' refers to what is generally understood by the term 'object' and is introduced primarily because 'object', in the translation of Heidegger, receives a narrower, more technical application. 'Object' or 'ob-ject' is the translation of *Gegenstand* which, as Churchill comments, literally means 'that which stands opposite to' (Heidegger 1962b: 35). The 'object', for Heidegger, is always the object *for a subject* within finite knowledge. *In*finite or ontological knowledge, by comparison, has no object as such. Rather, it is itself the disclosure of the essent and 'possesses' it only to the extent that the essent comes to be through the disclosure (1962b: 36). Reason, by looking ahead of experience, produces an object within intuition, something which stands opposite to the subject, and it is through this distinction that the essent is able to manifest itself within finitude.

7 I quote Kant's third illustration of the image-like nature of the schema later in the main text. Here is his second illustration:

> it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts. No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle in general. It would never attain that universality of the concept which renders it valid for all triangles, whether right-angled, obtuse-angled, or acute-angled; it would always be limited to a part only of this sphere.
>
> (1929: A 140–41, B 180)

8 To complicate matters further, Kant uses the term 'image' in three ways, as Heidegger observes: to mean (1) the aspect of an essent which is actually present, (2) the reproduction of an aspect of an essent which is now or no longer present, and (3) the aspect which serves as a model for the production of something (1962b: 97). What Kant suggests is that the imagination produces an image for a concept which represents the possible object given in intuition; the image is a precursory representation of a possible object for the concept which enables the concept to apply at the level of the particular. The spread of the possible meanings of 'image' – from recollection, through present representation to future projection – proves to be a useful ambiguity for Kant. All three senses are alluded to in his use of the term and no attempt is made to distinguish which, if any, should have priority in a claim.

9 To expand briefly on the relation between the image and time. Primordial time, Heidegger avers, is that 'which furnishes an [image] prior to all experience' and, given this *a priority*, the aspect may be termed a 'pure image' (1962b: 108). Kant writes: 'The pure image of . . . all objects of the senses in general is time' (1929: A 142, B 182). The schema, Heidegger continues, as a transcendental determination of time, 'represents unities, and . . . represents them as rules which bear upon a possible aspect' (1962b: 108–9). Heidegger coins the term 'schema-image' to emphasize the essentially *image-producing* nature of a schema, although the merit of the neologism is uncertain as, arguably, it obscures the tension between the notions of schema and image. The image as schema-image, Heidegger declares,

does not derive its intuitive character [*Anblickscharakter*] uniquely or in the first place from … [its content]. Rather, this intuitive character results both from the fact that the schema-image comes into being [through a subjective necessity] and from the way it comes into being from a possible presentation which is represented in its regulative function [through an objective necessity].

(1962b: 104)

10 Neither does literal predication generate a single, autonomous image. One has only to recall Heidegger's 'house' example to appreciate the scope of possibility in any routine observation. The difference between what we refer to as 'literal' and what we refer to as 'metaphorical' predication is that the latter prompts the reader to find new connections between subject and predicate.

11 I consider McDowell in more detail, but with regard to Nietzsche, in Chapter 4, and in relation to the realism–anti-realism debate in Chapter 5.

2 The power of judgment: metaphor in the structure of Kant's third *Critique*

1 The first instances of the applicability of a concept being pictured in spatial terms are Plato's analogy of knowledge as an aviary in the *Theaetetus,* where knowing is presented in terms of acquiring and keeping birds within an enclosure (1987b: 197b–199e), and Aristotle's metaphor of predicates as containers in *Prior Analytics*, where asserting that all cats have four legs is likened to thinking 'that one term ['cats'] should be included *in another* ['have four legs'], *as in a whole*' (Aristotle 1987a: 24b, emphasis added).

2 The quotation is from Kant's *On the Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff*, Ak. XX, 279-80, included in a footnote by Pluhar in his translation of the *Critique of Judgment*.

3 For studies within analytic philosophy of the importance of analogy to the third *Critique*, see: Allison 2001; Elliott 1992; Genova 1992; Gotshalk 1992; Guyer 1996, 1997; Kemal 1992; Pluhar 1987; and Rogerson 1992.

4 For discussion of the relationship between deconstruction, philosophy, and art, see Rorty 1982: 89–109, and Norris 1989.

5 I have used Pluhar's translation which differs slightly from the one given by de Man but not in any way which affects the discussion at this stage. One important difference, however, is that de Man writes '*mere* translation' when no such adjective appears in the original text or in Pluhar's translation. I comment on this later in my chapter.

6 For a fuller account of diaphor and epiphor, see Wheelwright 1971: 71–91.

3 Sensation, categorization, and embodiment: Locke, Merleau-Ponty, and Lakoff and Johnson

1 This form of numbering refers to the pagination in the original *Akadamie* edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and is reproduced in the margins of the Kemp Smith translation (1929). 'A' and 'B' denote pages in the first (1781) and revised (1787) editions of the *Critique* respectively.

2 This form of numbering refers to book 2, chapter 1, para. 1 in Locke's *Essay* (1997).

3 Gibbs draws attention to the constraints which the metaphorical conceptualizations of experience place on how we think, due to their being drawn from the realms of space and physicality (Gibbs 1994: 8–9, 146–61).

4　Heidegger and the senses

1　Other relevant passages are the references to sensibility Heidegger makes in his study of Nietzsche's aesthetics (Heidegger 1981), and the assertions that art and technology are expressions of aletheic truth (Heidegger 1971a and 1993b respectively). I discuss Heidegger's concept of truth as *aletheia* at greater length in Chapter 7.

2　Mention of the word 'as' might be taken by some to suggest that it is simile rather than metaphor with which I am dealing. This is on the understanding that a metaphor states 'A is B', for example, 'Achilles is a lion', whereas a simile makes the comparison explicit by including the word 'as' and identifying one respect of similarity, for example 'Achilles is as brave as a lion', 'A is as X as B'. But as-structure is not a form of simile, since the similarity in a simile is explicit and consciously observed, whereas the structure of one thing as another is theorized as the mode or space of transposition which creates the possibilities of experience. It is because transposition is generative that I later refer to it as 'metaphorical', in line with the interactionist view (held by Black (1979), Ricoeur (1978a, 1978b) and Hausman (1989)) that metaphor creates similarity, as opposed to merely calling attention to already observed similarity. The fact that, in this ontological context, it is experience rather than similarity which is created, I address in the main text.

3　Heidegger's original, cited by Kearney, reads: '*Das Vermögen des Mögens ist es "Kraft" dessen etwas eigentlich zu sein vermag. Dieses Vermögen ist das eigentlich "Mögliche", jenes, dessem Wesen im Mögen beruht*' (Kearney 1992: 323).

4　Heidegger draws a distinction between (ontological) disclosure *(Erschliessen)* and (ontic) discovery *(Entdeckung)*. Objects are discovered within 'a context of things at hand', that is to say, they are relatable to a set of needs, interests or desires, and because we approach the world through our needs, interests and desires, what is discovered will be one of a number of possibilities (Heidegger 1996: 145). Discovery only occurs as 'one of its *possibilities*' because it takes place within the prior disclosure of its condition of possibility, that is to say, disclosure is the ontological opening of the realm of possibilities in which ontic discovery can take place (1996: 145). Disclosure and discovery 'are interlocked among themselves' on account of discovery being '*the ontic condition of the possibility of the disclosure of beings*' (1996: 87) or, in more cognitive terms, ontic discovery appears in the mode of possibility within the opening created by ontological disclosure.

5　'Care' (*Sorge*) denotes the series of possibilities through which we encounter the world, as made available to us by the human body. It is the condition of 'being concerned about' that defines the necessarily transitive relation in which the human subject stands before the world (1996: 192, 324) and, as a kind of being, is articulated or jointed in the sense that it is a 'hankering,' a 'being-in-the-world-already-among' objects, a state of being located in a world that has to be dealt with (1996: 195).

6　That the concept of belonging as it applies to the senses might be interwoven with the concept as it relates to private property is not a new idea. Marx, in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, argues that our interpretation of the senses as discrete channels through which we receive or *have* external impressions is governed by capitalism's division of our otherwise intersubjective species-being into objects (including the senses) to be had or *owned* (Marx 2000: 210–19).

6　Cutting nature at the joints: metaphor and epistemology in the science wars

1　I have adapted this from Hilary Rose's 'glass mirror ideology' (Rose 1996: 73).

2　This refers to Frege's (1952) distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*). The reference of a word is the object it denotes, whereas the sense of

a word is the identity or associations which the word has in the context of utterance. To use Frege's example, the terms 'Morning Star', 'Evening Star' and 'Venus' all refer to the same object, i.e. they have the same reference, but their senses are subtly different.

3 The theory of the Forms, as it appears in Plato's *Republic* (1987a), asserts that, for every kind of thing, there is a true, original, essential Form or template, and just as a certain kind of object is 'true' to a certain kind of conduct, for example using a pruning knife rather than a chisel to cut a vine, so individuals should live in accordance with their essence in order to lead a just life (1987a: 353a). However, artists and poets do not conform to this life of propriety, Plato argues, as their crafts require them to represent a diversity of phenomena and, therefore, to create visual and verbal juxtapositions which ultimately work against the promotion of essential uniformity. In the context of seventeenth-century empiricism, Locke's concern (1997) is that, when deciding upon which properties are intrinsic to a species or 'nominal essence', we only group ideas together whose combination offers some purchase on the hidden boundaries in nature. Metaphor, as the bringing-together of two incompatible terms, Locke argues, is therefore to be avoided. I set out Locke's position on metaphor in Chapter 3.

4 The claim that the interwoven nature of subjectivity and objectivity, as an epistemological standpoint, is distinct from anti-realism has been made by Sacks (1989), although without specific reference to Kant or the science wars. Sacks's concern is the impasse between realism and anti-realism, and his claim is that, while the two sides are normally in dispute over the perception-dependence or perception-independence of the world, the main point which needs to be grasped is that it is incoherent to talk about a world independently of the 'form of perception', that is, independently of the minimal conditions of perception which make reference to a world possible at all. This is essentially a restatement of the thesis, common to Berkeley and Kant, that any concept or thought of an object or a world 'out there' already includes as a part of itself the minimal grounds of subjective awareness necessary for that concept or thought to take place.

5 These outcomes are reached respectively by the two best-known proponents of the correspondence theory of truth: J.L. Austin, who attempts to explain correspondence in terms of the semantic conventions that relate a statement to the world it purports to describe (1979: 117–33), and Wittgenstein, who argues, in the *Tractatus*, that propositions exist in a 'picturing' relation with the world, but where the picturing relation itself is something about which we cannot speak (1922).

7 Opening and belonging: between subject and object in Heidegger and Bachelard

1 Referring to 'truth' as 'discovery' at this point might seem to contradict the definition of truth as disclosure given above, especially when the pairing of ontological-disclosure and ontic-discovery is borne in mind. This, though, should not be taken as inconsistency on Heidegger's part. Rather, disclosure and discovery 'are interlocked among themselves' on account of discovery being '*the ontic condition of the possibility of the disclosure of beings*' (Heidegger 1996: 87) or, in more cognitive terms (drawn from my description in Chapter 1), ontic discovery appears in the mode of possibility within the opening created by ontological disclosure.

2 Quoted by McAllester Jones from Heidegger's article 'De la Nature de la cause' in the first issue of *Recherches philosophiques* (1931–32).

3 Arbib and Hesse offer further discussion of the 'reading nature' metaphor (1986: 149).

4 An example of Bachelard falling back on conventional metaphysics can be found in *The Formation of the Scientific Mind*. He writes:

> We can talk with complete confidence now of the creation of phenomena by humankind. The electron existed before twentieth-century men and women. Yet before them, the electron did not sing. Now in the triode valve the electron sings. This phenomenological realization occurred at a precise point in mathematical and technical development, the point at which it came to maturity.
>
> (Bachelard 2002: 246)

This would appear to commit Bachelard to a form of Kantian noumenal realism: humankind can create phenomena, that is, appearances, but the things in themselves underlying those appearances have always existed; the phenomenal form in which noumena are made manifest to us is only realized when the time is right mathematically and technologically. While many hold this position – it can be likened, for example, to Bhaskar's critical realism (1978, 1989) – it would seem to represent for Bachelard a relinquishment of his open, rationalized reality thesis. This concession to noumenalism is unfortunate because he does not need to make it. All he has to do to make his point consistent with his opposition to subject–object philosophy is affirm that *the reality out of which the electron as phenomenon could be formed* already existed. Reality conceived in this way already includes a subjective–objective formative element, whereas reference to a previously existing electron wrongly attributes the shaping of the electron to the noumenal realm, and not to subject–object interaction.

8 Metaphor and metaphysics in Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida

1 Bruzina also notes the contradiction created by Heidegger's using metaphor after he has identified it with a particular metaphysics (Bruzina 1973). He accuses Heidegger of denying the appropriateness of the designation 'metaphorical' for his language, 'while attempting to actualize a type of meaningful articulateness that philosophy maintains surreptitiously within itself, in the very category of the metaphorical' (1973: 321).
2 If there is *more* to 'mortal-human hearing and viewing... than mere sense reception', Heidegger argues, then maybe, 'in hearing the unison of "is" and "reason" in the intonation of the principle of reason "Nothing is without reason", [this excess can] bring something obvious into view that is present in the content of the statement of the principle of reason' (1991: 48-49). By 'bringing into view... the principle of reason in the tonality introduced here', Heidegger moves through a series of meanings to arrive at the statement: '*being in itself essentially comes to be as grounding*' (1991: 49).

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